SPE 38513

The Subsea Well Decommissioning Project

B. Morrice, E. McGennis, Coflexip Stena Offshore Ltd. S.J.N. Kirby*, BP Exploration Operating
Company Ltd.

*member SPE

Copyright 1997, Society of Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1997 Offshore Europe Conference held in Aberdeen. Scotland. 9—
12 September 1997
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Abstract
An important new initiative to clean up the seabed has resulted in a major project to decommission and remove
redundant subsea wells. The subsea well decommissioning project was instigated by BP Exploration to fulfill its
commitnents and obligations under various license agreements. When exploration wells arc no longer required for
further appraisal or devclopmcnt, thc rcquircmcnt is to rcmovc all subsea wellhead equipment and clear the seabed.
This paper will dcscribe first thc organisation and execution of the project. It will then look at the experience gained
and how it challenges the current well suspension philosophy.

Introduction
The joint BP Exploration and Coflexip Stena Offshore (CSO) project was tasked to remove redundant suspended
subsea exploration and appraisal wells in the United Kingdom (UK) sector of the North Sea. 'Ihe principles of the
project were safety, recognition of the environment and efficiency, both operational and financial.
Looking at the number of wells to be removed, a single project team was charged with the safe and efficient
decommissioning of these suspended wells. The first tranche of the work covered some 24 wells and makes it the
largest single programme of its kind ever carried out in the North Sea. The purpose of this paper is to outline the key
steps taken to achieve the aims of this project.
Within the project CSO were selected as the lead contractor using the established light well intervention vessel
the CSO Seawell. With this vessel the project could offer BP a total package producing savings and efficiency with a
combined programme. As part of the project scope, an extensive amount of well engineering had to be completed to
ensure the safe and correct abandonment of all the wells. 'Ihis resulted in the project team having to complete a critical
review and analysis of the condition of a large number of different suspension designs.

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The Challenge
In the UK, there is considerable pressure on the Government from Fishing and other marine related organisations for
a clear sea bed. All subsea wells, if they are not held for a development, must therefore be removed.
There are around 400 suspended subsea Exploration and Appraisal (E&A) wells in the UK Continental Shelf
(UKCS), of which BP is responsible for 72. To meet the challenge, BP inaugurated the subsea well decommissioning
project. The decision to remove the wells sends a powerful message to Environmental and Fishing organisations and
the UK Government of BP's commitnent to both fulfill its obligations and to provide a seabed clear of such obstructions.
The wells have to be decommissioned and abandoned in accordance with legislative requirements, BP policy
and UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) guidelines (Reference l). Typically, these require the permanent
plugging of a well by, if possible, two laterally extensive, tested barriers. The wellhead must then be removed at least
10 ft below the seabed and all debris removed, for a 70 m radius around the location. All the wellheads and debris
must be returned to shore and would normally be sent for scrap steel recycling. In the case of this project each field
group had the option to refurbish wellheads if considered economic
This opened a challenge to the project team on the issue of plugging policy and the approach to temporary
well suspensions. The design of well suspension will have a direct effect on final abandonment and this needs to be
considered.
2

The current Design and Construction Regulations (DCRs) (Reference 2) require final abandonment and
decommissioning to be considered at the design stage of any well. This regulation was not in force when the majority
of wells in the programme were drilled The experience in the well decommissioning project has highlighted that this
issue is a challenge that needs to be taken up by the indusüy in general.

Developing a Solution
BP set about developing a solution that would meet all its important objectives. 'Ihese included avoiding accidents
and harm to people, protecting the environment and completing the work in the most effective and efficient manner.
Since BP has a significant number of suspended E&A wells, it was logical to set up a single project team. As
BP is organised on an asset basis, a single project team eliminated duplication of effort by the assets. This team
were also able to take a consistent approach to problems and they were also the focal point for all discussions with
Government bodies and other operators.
A conventional solution would have been to use a Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU) but BP was aware
of the success of Dynamic Positioned (DP) light well intervention vessels, such as the CSO Seawell, in this type of
operation. The large number of wells to remove presented BP with a good opportunity to ask the marketplace for
ideas. This would allow BP to review the entire range of solutions that existed in the industry.
Having defined the wells to be removed, BP issued a formal notice to the industy through the European Union
(EU) joumal and associated bade organisations. This notice was an open invitation for all interested parties to learn
about the project and evaluate the opportunity for new products and services. BP received some 70 responses to
the notice. Interested parties were issued with an information pack and invited to a presentation and pre qualification
exercise.
The object of the pre-qualification was to enable BP to focus on the best in class solution while still keeping
an eye out for that unusual idea that could represent a breakthrough in well operations. Having reviewed the various
responses it became clear that the CSO Seawell, which has an extensive background in this type of work, was the
industry leader in light intervention and well abandonment. BP completed a formal tender exercise and so the CSO
Seawell was selected for the project.

Enrolling the Contractor

Having confirmed the technical suitability of a light well intervention vessel, BP and CSO set about creating a
responsive contractual arrangement for the work.
The companies explored a number of arrangements. The agreed solution was for CSO to take on the role of
lead contractor and in turn be responsible for all subcontracts and
dealings with third parties. Included, within the CSO contract, were all the support services including cementation,
perforating, plugs and explosives. CSO also took care of all logistics and shore based operations. This eliminated a
large amount of interfacing and reduced the need for BP to have personnel to assist with routine support services.

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Risk Reward. Excessive incentive was not part of BP's contract strategy for this project. BP and CSO achieved a
contract basis where CSO would commit to perform certain work, but within a schedule that optimised use of the
vessel.
BP and CSO agreed a cost scheme based around a target operational cost per well which then rolled-up to a
target cost for each phase of the work. Through the use of this pricing system, the cost to remove each well was easily
visible. The cost savings and economics of scale, inherent with a large number of wells, were shared between all wells.
This pricing mechanism was important because the project involved work on a number of BP assets, each with different
co-venturers and participation commiments.
The companies agreed a risk and reward scheme, to improve the efficiency of operations and define liability for cost
overrun. These were a 'best possible' performance and an 'expected' performance based on the previous experience
of the CSO Seawell and industry benchmarks.
For 'best possible' performance, everything had to go right. This included no weather time, no debris from
marine activity on or around the wells, no difficulty with the corrosion caps and no mechanical failure of any type. For
the 'expected' performance, an allowance was made for possible lost time based on agreed benchmarks and
experience. A bonus or malus was based on the actual results of operations offshore and the overall performance with
relation to the 'target cost' .

Project Organisation.
The Project was set up between BP and CSO as the lead contractor. CSO provided the detailed engineering input,
operational expertise and sub-contracted the additional services. The BP Shared Petrotechnical Resource (SPR)
group provided the technical assurance for the BP Assets and the project external interface.
The perceived project organisation "risk" (see below) was resolved by detailed examination of BP and CSO
Safety Management Systems (SMS) documentation and the generation of a project specific management document,
commonly known as a bridging document.
This document specified the roles and responsibilities of each of the kcy members of the Project team. It
covered not only thc operational structure but also emergency response and safe working process.
A successful Project organisation is also a question of the degrcc of commitment of cach company. From the
onset BP and CSO agreed a joint project structure with an open

book policy. Both BP and CSO had a Project Manager, each accountable to his own organisation for the success of
the project. CSO provided accommodation for the BP Project Manager within their offices and an example of the close
cooperation was in the field of auditing as described below.

Project Plan.
Ihe project team recognised the primary objectives of no harm to personnel or the environment while efficiently
executing the operation. The mechanism to achieve the objectives was to recognise the risks inherent in the project
and to institute mechanisms and procedures to mitigate the risks.

Risk assessment. At inception, the Project team, with input from other relevant groups, carried out a risk assessment
on the proposed operation using a system of 'Peer reviews'. The project identified 125 "risks" in 23 themes. The
principle themes identified were in the areas of competency, integrity of well data, loss of containment and project
organisation.
Audit Process. Competent personnel, suppliers, procedures and equipment are a prerequisite to any project. The audit
process was a very important stage, since it was the mechanism to confirm that correct choices have been made and
that risks are controlled.
The Project was able to enhance this process by using the audit specialists of both BP and CSO. The project
team carried out full audits of all companies but the manner depended on the contract relationship. Within the project
BP carried out the audit of CSO but it was a combined BP / CSO audit team that examined the sub-contractors. The
audit specialists from both companies achieved a great deal of mutual learning from the different systems.

Competency.

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Competency systems exist within most companies involved with the project, but it was difficult to merge these into a
specific project plan. For this reason the project team decided to adopt a different approach. They took the roles and
responsibilities of key positions and decided the competencies or profile required. They discussed and agreed the
profile with the contractor company to ensure their buy-in and approval of the process. A request was sent to the
contractor to complete and endorse the appropriate profile for each person proposed for the Project. If a person was
not fully competent, the contractor had to provide a written proposal to improve the situation.
The result for the Project was a register of persons considered, by their employer, to be competent. They also
had a set of requirements against which they could challenge or request further justification for the placement of staff.
It was also possible to make direct comparisons when personnel were changed during the programme.
Above all, it was a very simple process to implement and control. It achieved the project aims without a massive
bureaucratic back-up. Several groups, including some within BP, have expressed interest in this new process and it
is intended to publish a separate paper on this topic to disseminate the scheme more widely.

Well Data & Planning.

A team of BP engineers completed the initial review of all the available well data on the suspended well stock. With
the contract in place, the CSO part of the project team, using their previous experience in this area, independently
carried a detailed review of the well engineering issues.
Each well was examined in detail and all the available records were checked and cross checked to ensure
that the condition of the wells were understood in complete detail. Once agreement was reached on the existing
condition of a well a plan was then drawn up to allow the CSO Seawell to first re-enter the well and then isolate and
seal off the formation to meet the requirements of existing legislation and BP internal standards.
The outcome of this process was the categorisation of wells into three groups. This was based on the
categorisation of the UKOOA Guidelines for Well Abandonment that is an indusfry standard document, BP policy and
legislative requirements.
The plans to decommission the wells were developed with Input from a number of sources. The principle one
was previous experience and indusfry practice. 'Ihe well engineering groups of each Asset also made their
contribution.
The outline proposals were discussed with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), at a very early stage, and
incorporated a number of their suggestions. The HSE must receive official notification of, and have the opportunity
to review all well activity on the UKCS. project team found that being proactive and maintaining an open dialogue
with them, as with other Government departments, facilitated accomplishment of all legislative requirements.

Well Category 1 In the early days of the project it became clear that some wells had better suspension designs than
others. In some cases the well suspensions had been completed and tested in such a way that no further down hole
intervention was required as all the zones had been fully isolated. For this reason these wells were ready to have the
well heads removed without the need for any remedial work.
This type of well was classified as a Category I well and required a simple operation to sever the casings
below the mudline and recover the well head and casing stump to surface. These Category 1 wells became known
within the project as 'Blow and Recover' wells.

Well Category 2 For some of the other wells the engineering and risk assessment work showed up concerns into
various

aspects of the initial well suspension. The major problems that caused concern were lack of isolation between
permeable zones and lack of a tested laterally extensive cement plug across the full diameter of the well to the open
formation. This appeared to be due to incomplete cement placement during the primary cement job on the casings
and incorrect placement of the final cement plugs so that they did not overlap with the cement behind the other
casings.
To rectify these problems the wells would have to re entered with a well control package. The programme
would then involve a series of new perforation jobs and remedial cement placement so as to isolate all the permeable
zones and provide, as far as reasonably practicable, laterally extensive cement job on all the casings strings right out
to the original open hole.

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These wells that required down hole intervention were classified as Category 2 wells. Once a Category 2 well
had been worked on and the permanent barriers had been successfully tested then it became a Category I well as
described above.

Other Wells The final group of wells were ones that could not be easily accessed or did not need to be tackled.
Examples are wellheads within the 500 metre exclusion zone of existing platforms or in very close proximity to
pipelines. As these wells do not represent a hazard they can safely be left in place and will be removed at the end of
field life along with the other equipment.
Wells that required intervention beyond the capabilities of the CSO Seawell were also excluded. Typically
these would be wells with known shallow gas or wells that required plugs to be drilled out.

Loss of Containment.
Loss of containment was obviously a major concern. Having good details on the well status it was possible to assess
the probability for unplanned flow to the environment. On all of the Category 2 wells requiring additional barriers,
pressure control equipment was deployed onto the wellhead. This made sure that any pressure or flow could be
safely contained and dealt with, using standard well control techniques.
A Lower Riser Assembly (LRA) with Re-Entry Hub (REH) was introduced as the interface between the well
head connector and the subsea lubricator. This provided an independent -well control contingency in case problems
occurred outwith the CSO Seawell capability. If this happened the well could be shut in and the problem contained
with the LRA. This would allow the removal of the lubricator allowing the standard REH on the LRA to facilitate a rig
intervention if requried.
A number of the wells contained residual Oil Based Mud (OBM) sealed in the casing annuli. This OBM was a
mixture of water, oil and a weighting material. The oil adheres to the weighting material and therefore it was known
that there would be relatively little free oil in the mixture. The project planning recognised however that if small
volumes of oil were trapped in the casing annuli that it would not be possible to prevent the escape once the wellhead
was cut.
To evaluate this problem the project team worked with environmental specialists to review the potential loss
and its likely environmental effect. The actual amounts of oil expected were quite small and in the worst case it was
estimated that a maximum of 15 bbls could be released. Discussion took place with the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) at an early stage to review the options. It was agreed that since the original well was drilled using OBM
that additional finite oil discharge at the seabed, while not desirable, would not be as damaging as if it occurred
elsewhere.
The DTI accepted this analysis so that clearance of the seabed could proceed. It was agreed to monitor all
volumes of OBM released and this was to be incorporated within BP's annual return of oil discharged to the
environment. During actual cutting operations on the well heads the project team were pleased to note that no release
of oil was observed either on surface or at the seabed. This confirmed the conservative approach taken with this
possible environmental hazard.

Blast Effect. Though the wells were in BP operated blocks in the North Sea, other Operators have pipeline and cables
running through the area. The BP SPR survey group reviewed and plotted the location of each well for possible subsea
conflict. During the current programme, three well severance operations were to take place close to existing sub-sea
infrastructure.
To ensure there was no risk to other subsea facilities, a study was commissioned by a firm of engineering
consultants to examine the blast effect of a severance charge exploding in open water.
All operational procedures arc designed to ensure that the severance charge remains within the wellhead. The
open watcr casc was recognised as a "worst-case" scenario as it represented a detonation outside the wellhead,
representing a total failure of all procedures. The study examined both pressure wave and pulse frequency, since there
was the potential hazard of causing harmonic vibration in a nearby pipeline in one particular area. The study gave a
clear definition of the possible operating envelope with explosives and confirmed that this was an acceptable process
for the project. These results were forwarded to the Operators of adjacent subsea infrastructure for their information.

Offshore Operations.

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With such a large number of wells to remove it was decided to run a optimisation exercise to develop the most efficient
way to complete the work. This exercise involved among others tracking the resources required for each well, the
distance between wells, the allowable vessel loads and the cost of mobilisations. As there was a lot of equipment to
5

recover off the seabed it was impossible to fit everything on one vessel. The object therefore was to determine the
sequence of well operations and port calls that would reduce costs and improve efficiency on site.
This also involved a consideration of deck space to ensure that the recovered well heads and equipment would
not interfere with the well control and intervention equipment required. With the different category of wells it also
became clear that savings could be made if specific equipment was mobilised and kept on the vessel for only as long
as required. The final analysis resulted in a programme with three phases. Each phase was defined as a separate
mob and demob to port. This return to port would then be used to unload recovered well equipment, unload intervention
equipment no longer required or both.

Phase One. This phase föcused on operations in the northern sector where there were a number of category 2 wells
to be removed. These wells required the use of the Camco Subsea Intervention Lubricator (SIL) but an analysis of the
deck layout showed that all the recovered wellheads and equipment could fit onto the CSO Seawell without problem.
As the northern sector is geographically remote from the remaining wells it was agreed that it made good sense to
complete this work as a single phase,

Phase Two. This phase was intended to plug off the remaining category 2 wells, where there was some doubt over
the quality and reliability of the existing suspension. Once this phase was complete then all the wells would then be
category 1. Looking at the project economics it was found that it was best to focus on well plugging only in this phase
of the operations. This was because the plugging operations require a significant amount of specialist equipment and
services that would be idle during well severance and recovery operations. For this reason phase two focused on well
plugging before returning to port to demobilise. As the northern sector was complete in phase 1 this remaining work
was central and southern north sea only.

Phase Three. By the time this final phase starts all the remaining wells will be classified as category l . This includes
the wells that were plugged and tested in phase two and the wells that were originally found to have been suspended
correctly. As the final operations to remove the well heads are relatively simple all the specialist down hole tools can
be removed to reduce the cost of the vessel spread required offshore. This allows the final recovery of equipment and
seabed clearance to be done with a lowered cost vessel with plenty of deck space to store and transport the various
debris recovered.
Operations Execution. Within the project organisatlon CSO were fully responsible for programme execution. To
facilitate the process, the offshore team was organised slightly differently from that normally associated with drilling
or well operations. A BP representative was present on the vessel at all times. His terms of reference were to ensure
safe operations and provide technical advice, rather than be directive. CSO have a highly developed process of Safe
Job Analysis (SJA), where the offshore team, including the BP representative, analysed problems and generated a
range of solutions. Within a predefined range of criteria, the best solution was then implemented by the team or
referred to the BP and CSO project managers for their approval. All SJAs were recorded.

Equipment
When considering the subsea well decommissioning operations from the CSO Seawell monohull it was important to
review the components involved and how they contribute to the successful operations offshore. The main
components involved were the CSO vessel, the Camco SIL and supporting services such as perforating, pumping
services and explosive severance.

Vessel. On the vessel the main components are the heave compensated derrick, the choke manifold, high pressure
pumps and storage tanks. Of these components the heave compensation system is the heart of the subsea
intervention capability. This allows for the safe deployment, attachment and interfacing of the Camco SIL to the
client's subsea tree or wellhead. Operations are assisted with a standard guideline system on the vessel which allows

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the SIL to be deployed and recovered in the correct orientation with respect to the wellhead. On the deck of the vessel
a skid system moves well equipment into the derrick and over the moon pool.

Hydrocarbon Handling. The 10,000 psi choke manifold is primarily intended to control the return to surface of any
hydrocarbons that accumulate in the subsea lubricator unit. The returned hydrocarbons are passed from the choke
manifold into an atrnospheric storage and separation tank that is mobilised on to the deck for well operations. As the
volume of the lubricator unit is small the amount of returned hydrocarbons is usually just a few barrels. The amount
of gas is equally small so often this is simply cold vented to atmosphere through a boom suspended over the back
of the vessel. With this equipment the CSO Seawell is fully certified as an 'Offshore Installation' in line with current
UK government guidelines.
For pumping operations, a set of 15,000 psi triplex pumps are built into the hull of the vessel. These pumps
are intended for a range of operations such cement work and if necessary well kill. For well decommissioning
operations the vessel uses a set of High Pressure (HP) Coflexip flexible lines that connect either to the SIL.
6

Camco Subsea Intervention Lubricator (SIL). Necessary for all well operations is the Camco subsea intervention
system. This has been described in detail in a number of papers such as that by R. Pollock (Reference 3) so only a
summary is included here. Essentially the unit is latched onto the subsea wellhead with the original equipment
manufacturer wellhead connector. Above this is the optional LRA and REH and then an appropriate crossover to adapt
to the lower guide frame spool of the lubricator.
Onto this frame is mounted a 5 1/8" shear gate valve (foot valve) and two variable wireline Blow-out Preventers
(BOP) to ensure complete pressure control of the well. On top of this a 40 foot lubricator section is attached and this
is intended to hold the various wireline tools before the foot valve and tree valves are opened. On top of the riser
section is a BOP with blind rams and finally the hydraulic removablc stuffing box that seals on the wireline and slickline.

Operations To-Date
To date the project team have completed phases I & 2 as described above. Phase 1 was completed in January 1997
and phase 2 in June 1997. It was not possible to fully complete the work in phase 1 due to advcrsc weather conditions,
however the outstanding work was casily incorporated into phase 2. For the project overall, this has only resulted in a
2 day delay.
So far 11 wells have been fully abandoned, leaving 13 wellheads to be removed in phase 3. The total
operational time has been 41 days, including 4 days waiting on weather and 3h days removing debris.

Experienced Gained
With the large number of wells involved in this project it was seen to be a good opportunity to review the entire process
of well decommissioning. In some areas this involved going back to first principles to challenge even the most routine
operations of the CSO Seawell operations. This exercise yielded many benefits but especially the points noted here.

Suspension Designs. As the project started off it became obvious that a lot of the down hole work required could have
been avoided had the original suspension and well design been done in a rigorous manner. Although every well had
been suspended in a completely safe manner it was not necessarily the most economic manner in each case. Having
reviewed all the well files it should have been an easy and low cost task to modify the initial suspension designs so as
to permit simple wellhead removal.
With a consistent approach to well design it should be possible to ensure that every well is suspended in such
a way that the final cement plugs are co-ordinated with the primary cement jobs to ensure complete well enclosure
with laterally extensive cement placement. With the correct placement and testing of cement plugs during initial
suspension it should be possible to complete the final well abandonment without the need for further down hole
Intervention. This will reduce the cost of decommissioning as the well head removal and seabed clearance can be
done without the need for specialist well control equipment.

Well Condition. The project team spent a considerable time reviewing the well records to confirm the likely well status.
In many cases even though there was a suspension diagram, it was difficult to confirm the details reported.

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One problem lay in attempting to verify the height of cement in the annuli, especially in the near seabed
casing strings. The volume of ccmcnt originally pumped was recorded but little or no data cxistcd on either the original
hole volume (caliper logs etc.) or cvcn the final pumping pressures.
The second conccrned the verification of the suspension plugs. Too often the final plugs were balanced plug
set "on the fly" and not verified by either pressure testing or tagging.

Well Access and Debris. The vessel has had to spend a certain amount of time establishing access to the wellheads.
This was due to fishing equipment that has previously been snagged. During project planning we estimated that this
would occur in 20% of wells but in fact it was actually seen on 60% of wells.
The site inspections have also turned up some interesting artifacts, not least a number of heavy duty tuck
tyres and four monel drill collars.
Two wells that were recorded as having seawater above the upper most suspension plug in fact contained
drilling mud. In one case, the mud was a simple bentonite polymer, which could be safely discharged to sea. 'The
other contained an OBM that was circulated back to the vessel.

Project Costs. The current work programme is due to be completed in July 1997. Current costs and projections
indicate that the final figures will be approximately 10% higher than the initial estimates. Actual numbers cannot be
revealed for reasons of commercial confidentiality, it is sufficient to say the cost savings for BP have been more than
the actual cost of the work

Combination with other Operators. During the course of the project, it proved possible for CSO to carry out well
interventions for other operators. This combination gave financial and operational benefits to all parties involved.

Conclusions
The new Design and Consfruction Regulations now make it mandatory for new well designs to consider the final
abandonment of wells. Drilling engineering personnel must
7

accept this obligation and acknowledge the potential

long term financial implications of their design
decisions. Improved suspension designs will eliminate
the need for down hole intervention during well
abandonment. This will make future decommissioning
work much safer, faster and cheaper. Being able to use
a vessel, such as the CSO Seawell, can reduce well
abandonment costs by over 60% compared to using a
MODU.
Whether or not a well is designed for simple
abandonment, the information recorded for a well must
always consider the requirements of abandonment. A
simple question for any engineer preparing a drilling
completion report is "have I included enough data so
that my report can be verified?"
Though not yet completed as a project, the
success to date has confirmed the original decision to
create a single, integrated project team. On the
operations side, the large work program made it cost
effective for the project team to spend time optimising
the principal well activities to improve safety,
performance and efficiency offshore.
Within the scope of the project, BP Exploration
has been able to signal to the UK Government,
interested parties and other operators, its clear intent
to remove redundant subsea wellheads.
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The decommissioning project has shown the

benefit of a pro-active approach to the removal of
redundant subsea equipment. By combining a large
number of wells, the project achieved considerable
economy of scale both in efficiency and cost of
operations.
This lesson applies both to well abandonment
and well intervention operations. It is especially frue
when a number of wells can be grouped together in
the same geographical area. This points to the benefit
of cross operator co-operation on the well
decommissioning issue where savings can be made
by packaging wells together rather than working on
individual solutions.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Graham Medhurst,
Steve Nairn and Hamish Stewart for their helpful
advice and guidance in the preparation of this paper.
The authors are also grateful to Coflexip Stena
Offshore Ltd. and BP Exploration Operating Company
Ltd. for permission to publish this paper. The authors
also acknowledge the rights of companies to their
trade names and services referenced to in this paper.

References

I UKOOA. "Guidelines for the Suspension and

Abandonment of Wells." June 1994 Issue l.
2. Offshore Installation and Wells (Design and
Construction, etc) Regulations 1996.
3. Pollock R. A. "Subsea Wireline: Two years of
Practical Experience" paper OTC 6461 presented
at the OTC conference, Houston, May 1990.

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