Classes Staende Parties by Max Weber Tra

Typescript from Chapter 4 from Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society, Edited and Translated
by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters. 2015.New York Palgrave Millan. Please cite book version.
C H A P T E R F O U RChapter 4
Introduction: The Distribution of Power Within the
Gemeinschaft: Classes, Stände, Parties
This essay is about the roles honor, prestige, and Stand play in the organization of society.
Weber wrote that prestige and the accompanying justification of Stand underpins how people
organize themselves using the visible markers of rank. In the modern world, though, this can be
understood only in the context of the social stratification of social class, as spread by the
anonymous actions of the capital markets. This results in an irony in the modern world, which is
that while Stand is based on economic acquisition, it is also based on the pretension that naked
economic power does not matter. Rather, honor, privilege, and subordination are based on
ideologies about merit rooted in values emerging from within the Gemeinschaft, not the naked
power of the market from which privilege actually emerges. This essay is about how this has
worked throughout history, and points out bluntly that:
tThe market may know no ‘“honor’” or ‘“prestige,’,” but the reverse is true for the Stand.
Stratification and privileges in terms of honor and of lifestyles are inherent to each Stand,
and the Stände assume these rights of honor by their virtue. As such privileged Stände are
threatened to their very roots by the market, and its emphasis on mere economic
1
acquisition and naked economic power—which still bear the stigma of origin outside of
the Stand.
Marianne Weber put this particular essay only at the end of Weber’s original collection,
Economy and Society, even though the individual subjects appear repeatedly throughout. Still,
this essay is among the most important of Max Weber’s essays because it summarizes his ideas
about social stratification that permeate his other writings. Terms including Gemeinschaft,
Gesellschaft, cClass, Stand, and pParty are all defined clearly here. What emerges is Weber’s
“three component view of stratification.”
Typically, these three components are presented as being coequal—though in our view
Stand (plural Stände) are is Weber’s most important concept for understanding society, including
both the ancient and modern worlds. Stand, we believe, is the central component of Weber’s
theory of social stratification, not only in this article, but throughout his writing too. Weber’s
description of Stände dominates the center middle portion of the essay and for a good reason. As
he wrote, classes and the raw muscle of market power dominate only in times of rapid change,
particularly in the modern world. And while class is important for understanding society,
inevitably the honorbased Stände reemerge as the most important forms of social stratification.
Indeed, it is the Standbased forms of stratification that people encounter in daytoday
interactions, whether they are rooted in ethnicity, skin color, professional status, fraternities and
2
sororities at college campuses, immigration status, or any of the myriad of the amorphous groups
individuals navigate between during their daily routines. In developing this point about Stände,
Weber is writing in direct response to Marx, who had asserted that all significant stratification in
capitalism emerges out of the relationship to capital. Weber, writing some decades later, is
arguing that this is not the case—and that despite Marx’s materialistic logic, social distinctions
rooted in honor of a premodern era coexist uneasily and awkwardly with “social class” as a
form of social stratification.
As for political parties, as Weber points out, these are coalitions of Stand and class
interests—products of the other forms of stratification. Parties form coalitions that first and
foremost seek power—in doing so, the platforms, policy goals, and ideologies they profess are
become secondary. In this sense, parties are a mixed bag, the implications of which are
introduced here, and developed more thoroughly in “Politics as Vocation.” Still, it is in “Classes,
Stände, Parties” that Weber’s most succinct definition of parties as being “at home within the
sphere of ‘power’ ” (see p. XXX) is found.
Just as critical to understanding Weber’s sociology are his definitions of Gemeinschaft,
and Gesellschaft, which are used throughout Economy and Society (see p XXX). It is in this
essay that Weber most sharply tied Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to definitions of economic
classes, social Stände, and political parties, respectively. As discussed in the iIntroductory essay
3
to this volumebook, Weber crafts his definitions in the context of Ferdinand Tönnies’s older
descriptions.
As was described, Weber is not quite as optimistic about the inevitability, inexorability,
or desirability of this shift as Tönnies. Weber is different than Tönnies on at least two major
points. First, he does not believe that the change from the traditional to the modern is inexorable
—rather he sees a fluid process in which the society dominated by Gesellschaft ties emerges out
of and seemingly dominate the underlying Gemeinschaft, but the Gemeinschaft ties, rooted as
they are in abstract values, are never completely eliminated. Rather, in a modern society, the two
coexist uneasily—like oil and water—with one never subsuming the other. To highlight this
point, as described before, Weber introduces in this essay the verbalnoun (gerund) forms of the
two words—the ungainly (to the English ear) Vergemeinchaftung and Vergesellschaftung.
Rendered into English, the words might take on an awkward English “–ing” suffix. But awkward
indeed to the Englishspeaking world are such concepts by their very nature!
Reading “Classes, Stände
, Parties”
The heart of this essay is Weber’s description of Stände. In reading the essay, it is possible to
start with the initial description of social stratification and power at the beginning of the essay.
But, it is in the section on Stände stratification that the forms of stratification become familiar to
the modern reader, including ethnicity, nationality, race, ethnicity, guild, and caste. Although
Weber did not himself make this point, we also think that the social categories of genders,a as
4
developed by feminist scholars in the late twentieth century, can be found here. Here too are
described the mechanisms of domination and subordination that are so common when comparing
types of culture.
Having said that, grasping Weber’s point is not possible without also reading the sections
on class and party. Indeed, this is where the dynamic nature of the Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft are illustrated in the interaction of all three forms of stratification. Economy and
rationalization are important; but so is the nature of social ties.
History of the Essay
“Classes, Stände, Parties” was written in 1913 or 1914 as France was mobilizing for war.
Notably, Weber never quite finished the essay himself—it is clear that the essay is a fragment,
particularly the last pages of the work dealing with political parties, and summary statements
were probably touched up by Marianne Weber and other editors for publication in 1921 or so.
The essay was among the first of Weber’s writings from Economy and Society translated into
English, and was published by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills in Dwight MacDonald’s pacifist
magazine Politics, in 1944, during World War II (Weber 1944). Gerth and Mills believed that
this essay was among the most important of Weber’s writings, despite being buried deep in the
German versions of Economy and Society (although the concepts are used throughout Economy
and Society and are fundamental to the whole book).
5
Gerth and Mills gave what they called “Class, Status, Party” prominence in their popular
edited collection From Max Weber, first published in 1946–1947. From this central point, the
essay entered the Englishspeaking world, and as a result, it is among the most cited of Weber’s
works from Economy and Society. In particular, it is especially cited in texts about social
stratification where Weber’s model is referred to as his “three component theory of
stratification.”
The version translated here was first translated in 2008 as part of a class at Zeppelin
University and published in the Journal of Classical Sociology in 2010. It was modified for this
version to make editorial corrections, add footendnotes, and, most importantly, presented in a
fashion that uses similar translation conventions with respect to the other essays presented here.
6
The Distribution of Power Within the Community: Classes, Stände, Parties
By Max Weber
Translated by
Dagmar Waters, Benjamin Elbers, and Tony Waters (2013-2014)
and
Dagmar Waters, Tony Waters, Elisabeth Hahnke, Maren Lippke, Eva Ludwig-Glück, Daniel Mai,
Nina Ritzi-Messner, and Christina Veldhoen. Dagmar Waters, Tony Waters, and Lucas Fassnacht
in 2008
I. Introduction
Article I. II. The Phenomena of the Power Distribution of Power within a
Gemeinschaft Community is ‘Classes,’ ‘Stände,’ and ‘Parties’
(a) Classes
(b) Stände1
(c) Parties
Article II. III. Conclusion: The scope of ‘Classes,’ ‘Stände,’ and ‘Parties’
I. Introduction
Every legal order (state or nonstate) directly affects the distribution of power, economic power,
and all other powers, within its respective Gemeinschaft.
1
The German ‘Stand’ (plural ‘Stände’) is perhaps best translated as the French word ‘estate,’ as it refers to feudal
divisions within society, including those that are both professional, ethnic, and relational. Unfortunately the word
‘estate’ in English has a wide range of other meanings as well and we think this translation obfuscates Weber’s
original meaning. Previous translators have compromised by translating the word ‘Stand’ variously as ‘status’ or
‘estate’ depending on the context. However, the translation of ‘Stand’ into ‘status’ is also imprecise. First, German
has the same word ‘Status,’ and Weber did not use it. We suspect he did not use it because its meaning lacks the
historical content of ‘Stand.’ Because of this ambiguity in meaning, as well as the fact that precision in this term is
so important for this essay, we have elected to use the German term throughout this translation. For other
discussions of these issues, see Weber (1978 [1968]: 305–306) and Waters and Waters (2010). ‘Stand’ reflects a style
of life, and an assumption about the rights that go with this status.
7
Broadly, we define power as a person’s or group’s chance to enforce their own will
through an action by a Gemeinschaft, even against the resistance of others involved.
But, ‘“economically determined’” power of course is not identical with power in general.
Nevertheless, the emergence of economic power can be the consequence of power that exists for
other reasons.
Also, people, do not strive for power only to enrich themselves economically, but power,
including economic power, can be valued ‘“for its own sake.’.” The striving for power in many
cases is also determined by the heightened social ‘“honor or reputation,’”1 which the possession
of power inherently embodies. Not all kinds of power, however, bring such honor: the typical
American boss,2 as well as the ‘“stereotypical’” largescale investor may deliberately abstain
from developing an honorable reputation. Generally and in particular, ‘“mere”’ economic power,
and specifically the ‘“naked”’ power of money is by no means an accepted basis for social
honor. But neither is power by itself the only basis for honor. Social honor (or prestige) can also
be the basis for power, including economic power, and often it has been so.
The legal order can guarantee power as well as honor, but usually it is not the primary
source of either. Rather the legal order is an additional factor that can enhance the chance to
create an honorable reputation, but the legal order cannot necessarily bring about an honorable
reputation.
8
How social honor is distributed between the stereotypical groups in a Gemeinschaft
distribution is what we will call ‘“social order.’.” The relation between this social order and the
legal order is certainly similar to the relation between social order and economic order.
Nevertheless, the social order is nevertheless not identical with the economic order, as the
economic order is merely the way in which economic goods and services are distributed and
used. But, of course, the social order is highly determined by the economic order, and in turn
exerts influence on it.
9
II. The Phenomena of the Distribution of Power within a
Gemeinschaft
Community is ‘ “ Classes
,’
,”
‘ Stände ,’
, and ‘ “ Parties
”
’
a) Classes
‘“Classes”’ in our definition are not Gemeinschaft communities, but represent only one possible
(and a frequent one) basis for communal Gemeinschaft action. We may speak about a ‘“class”’ in
the following circumstances:
1. When a large number of people have a specific causal component of their life chances
in common, and
2. When this causal component is represented only and exclusively by economic interests
in the possession of goods and the opportunities of income, and
3. When the causal component is represented under the conditions of the commodity or
labor markets (‘“class situations’”3).
It is the most elementary economic fact that specific life chances are created by the
manner in which material property is distributed among a plurality of people meeting
competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange.
According to the law of marginal utility,4 it then follows that using the market as the
mode of distribution excludes the “propertyless” from effectively competing with the
“propertied” for highly valued goods. In fact, the law of marginal utility produces an effective
monopoly for the acquisition of highly valued goods. This monopoly belongs to the propertied.
10
Thus, other things being equal, this mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for
profitable deals to those who already have goods, and therefore quite simply are not dependent
on trading for their livelihood. Generally then, using the market as the mode of distribution also
increases the propertied people’s power in price wars with propertyless people over highly
valued goods. Propertyless people have nothing to offer but their labor itself or the products
created through their own labor. Unlike the propertied owner, such laborers are forced to use
their products and labor in a timely fashion in order to simply eke out the most basic existence.
Using the marketplace as the mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunity to
transfer commodity from being seen and used as a ‘“fortune,’,” to being seen and used as
‘“capital.’.” This opens for the propertied a chance for to use capital for an entrepreneurial
function and therefore share chances, directly or indirectly, the returns on capital [and thereby
exclude the propertyless]. This prevails under typical property conditions.
‘“Property and assets’” and ‘“lack of property or assets’” are therefore the basic
categories of all class situations, no matter whether they effect price wars or are effectively used
in competitive struggles. Nevertheless, within these basic categories, the class situation can be
differentiated further in regards to the type of property which that can is be used for returns, on
the one hand, and in regards to the type of services which that can be offered in the market, on
the other hand.
11
All of the following property distinctions differentiate the class situations of the
propertied, as well as the ‘“meaning”’ they can (and do) give to the utilization of their property,
especially the liquid assets which that can beare easily converted to cash. These assets include
the following:
 Ownership of residential houses, factories, depots or stores, agriculturally usable land.
All theseis can be further differentiated into large or small holdings, which means there
are quantitative differences which that may possibly have qualitative consequences.
 Ownership of mines, of domestic animals, people (slaves).
 To have at one’s disposal the mobile tools of production, or means for procurement of
any kind, especially money or goods that at any time can be easily exchanged for
money.
 Ownership of products of one’s own labor, or of other peoples’ labor which that are
differentiated by the level of desirability, or by marketable monopolies of any kind.
All these distinctions in turn also determine whether the propertied belong, for example,
to the class of pensioners/rentiers [Rentner] or the class of mercantile manufacturers.
The propertyless providers of labor are also starkly differentiated from each other,
according to the kind of services they offer, and in particular whether they have a continuous
relationship to the buyer of their labor, if the labor is bought on a casebycase basis [e.g., as
piece labor].5
12
However, the concept of class is always organized around one common principle. The
principle is that chances in the market determine the common conditions and make up the
individual’s fate [e.g., class position]. Therefore, ‘“Cclass Ssituation’” is ultimately a ‘“market
situation.’.” For example, among the cattle breeders, the propertyless are put under the power of
the cattle owner as slaves or serfs as a result of the ‘“naked’” possession of assets.6 This only
happens during the preliminary stages of true class formation. Thus, in this type of
Gemeinschaft, the mere possession of [property] determines the individual’s fate. The ‘naked
cruelty of the law of debt, which emerged in those kinds of Gemeinschaft, is observed when bank
loans are given and cattle is used as collateral. This stands very much in contrast to the
traditional agricultural Gemeinschaft communities, where one’s fate was determined only by
labor, and not by possession.7
At first, the creditor–debtor relation became a basis for the ‘“class situations’” only in
cities, where—no matter how primitive—a credit market emerges. In the credit market, interest
rates increased depending on the debtor’s level of distress, and a de facto monopolization of
credit by the plutocracy emerged. This is the situation that led to ‘“class struggles.’.”
On the other hand Nevertheless, there are various groups of people whose fate is not
determined by utilizing their own property or their labor in the market—for example, slaves—
and they are technically not a class (but a ‘Stand’). So, by this definition, classes are definitely
created only by economic interests which that are bound to the existence of the market.
13
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘“class interest”’ is an ambiguous one, and not even a
precise empirical term, especially as soon as one defines class interest as being something
different from simply an ‘“average”’ objective direction of the class member’s interests, which
flow with a certain probability from the class situation.8 Indeed, even if the class situation and
other circumstances remain the same, the direction in which the individual worker pursues his
interests still may still vary greatly. This variation depends, for example, on whether the
individual is well qualified for the task at hand at a high, average, or low level. In the same way,
the direction of interest may vary according to whether or not a communal action of the
Gemeinschaft has grown out of a classderived situation. Out of a classderived situations,
communal actions form larger or smaller groups of workers, or they might even form
Gesellschaftorganizations (i.e., as a trade union from which the individual may or may not
expect promising results). However, the development of such Gesellschaft [Vergesellschaftung]
ties, rooted in a common class situation, is by no means a universal phenomenon.
The class situation may produce an effect that restricts actions to essentially similar
reactions, termed here as ‘“mass actions.’.” However, other results are possible. Often, merely an
amorphous Gemeinschaft action emerges. An example would be the ‘“grumbling”’ by workers,9
which is an expression of moral outrage directed at the workmaster’s conduct, as has been
described as occurring in ancient Oriental ethics. This grumbling was probably equivalent to an
increasingly typical phenomenon of the latest industrial development, —namely, the ‘“slow
14
down.’.” ‘“Slowdown’” means to deliberately limit the work effort by the effect of tacit
agreement among the laborers.
The degree to which the ‘“mass action’” of the class members leads to the emergence of
Gemeinschaft ties [Vergemeinschaftung], or perhaps even of Gesellschaft ties
[Vergesellschaftung], reflects general cultural and intellectual conditions. The emergence of
Gemeinschaft ties or Gesellschaft ties is specifically linked to the extent of the evolved contrasts,
i.e.that is, the transparency of connections between causes and consequences of the ‘“class
situation.’.” But, in fact, even the most extreme differentiation of life chances per se, do not at all
produce ‘“class action”’ (that isi.e., a Gemeinschaft action of class members), as experience
shows. For this to happen, the relative cause and effect of the class situation has to be distinctly
recognizable [to the worker]. Only then can the differentiation of life chances be perceived by
the class as something that is not an absolute that needs to be endured. Rather it can be seen as
resulting from either
1. the given distribution of property/assets, or
2. the structure of the concrete economic order.
Only when these two causalities are recognized by the workers, are they able to react
against the class structure not only by acts of intermittent and irrational protest, but also by
developing rational Gesellschaft ties [Vergesellschaftungen].10 Intermittent and irrational protests
emerged when the class situation was based on the first category, that is, the distribution of
15
property and assets. Examples are found in the urban centers of aAntiquity and during the
Middle Ages. This can be clearly seen where great fortunes were accumulated by effectively
monopolizing trading in industrial products or foodstuffs. However, when agriculture was
increasingly exploited in a profitmaking manner, great fortunes were also accumulated in the
rural economy during very different times. The most important historical example for the second
category [based on the structure of a concrete economic order] is the class situation of the
modern ‘“proletariat.’.”
So every class can be the carrier of some of the innumerable forms of possible ‘“class
actions,’,” but they do not have to be, and class by itself does not constitute a Gemeinschaft
community. Hence, to equate the term “class” with the term Gemeinschaft leads to a warped
reasoning.
However, as discussed above,: class members can react with a mass action, and they
regularly do so. This is particularly the case when there are shared intense feelings about similar
situations, especially economic ones. Thus mass actions are based on the most adequate (or
average) opinion of the group. This fact is both simple and important for understanding historical
events. But this should never lead to the pseudoscientific usage of the term ‘“class”’ or ‘“class
interest,’,” which nowadays is frequently done nowadays and has also found its most classic
assertion in the statement of a ‘“talented author’”11 (i.e., that the individual may be in error
concerning his interests but that the class is ‘“infallible’” about its interests).
16
Thus, even though a class is not a Gemeinschaft community per se, class situations only
emerge out of the development of Gemeinschaft ties [‘Vergemeinschaftung’]. However, the
communal action that creates these Gemeinschaft ties is not primarily based on interaction
between members of the same class, but between different classes. For example, the communal
actions of a Gemeinschaft that directly determine the class situation of the worker and the big
businessperson are organized around:
 the labor market.
 the commodity market.
 and the capital market.
The existence of a capital market, however, requires a very specific Gemeinschaft action
that protects the possession of goods, and as a matter of principle protects the individual’s power
over the means of production. This is the ‘“legal order,’,” and the one that is needed is of a very
specific kind.12 Thus, every class situation which that is based on the pure power of property
assets becomes most effective when all other causes that determine the nature of reciprocal
relationships [between Stände]13 lose their significance. Then, the power of property obtains its
almost sovereign importance in the marketplace.
The existence of Stände hinders the realization of the ideals of the blind marketplace. At
this point, the term Stand interests us from this perspective. Before we briefly talk about the term
Stand, note that there is not a lot more to be said about the particular distinctions between
17
different ‘“classes.’.” The great historical shifts in class struggles, which took place in the past
and hasve been going on until the present [e.g., about 1914], may be summarized in the
following way, albeit at the cost of some precision. The type of struggles which that arose from
class situations have progressively shifted from the issue of credit for the purposes of
consumption, to a competitive struggle in the commodity market, and then to a price war in the
labor market [i.e., over interest rates, commodity prices, and now the cost of labor].
The ‘“class struggles”’ of Roman aAntiquity, insofar as they were really class and not
Stände wars, started out as fights between the indebted peasants threatened by debt bondage, and
urban creditors. Fights also took place between artisans and urban creditors. Such debt bondage
was usually the result of variation in wealth accumulation between domestic livestock breeders,
and the leading commercial cities, especially cities with seaports. It was such debt relations that
produced classbased actions until the time of Catilina.14
Thus, the fights over foodstuffs emerged. This happened especially in the struggle over
the provision of bread and its price when towns were increasingly supplied with grains imported
from abroad. This lasted throughout Antiquity and the entire Middle Ages. It pitted the
propertyless poor, who had no assets altogether, against those who were actually or supposedly
interested in the dearth and high cost of bread. This kind of war spread until it embraced all
commodities that were essential to life as well as the raw materials of the cottage industries.
Rudimentary talk about ‘“wage wars’” then increased slowly from Antiquity to the Middle Ages
18
up until modern times. Disputes over wages took a back seat to the rebellions of slaves, and the
fights in the commodity markets.
Thus, the propertyless people during Antiquity and the Middle Ages protested against
monopolies, dumping, hoarding, pricefixing, and all acts designed to raise prices. Today,
however, the central point of labor negotiations is the determination of wages. The struggle
which that took place between merchants and skilled artisans in the ‘“putting out system’” was
about gaining access to the marketplace and the pricing of commodities. This occurred during
the transition to modern times.15
As it is a general phenomenon, we must mention the following: Class antagonisms which
are conditioned by the market situation are usually most bitter between those who directly
participate as opponents in price wars [even though they themselves do not necessarily benefit
personally from the success of the struggle]. Thus, it is not the pensioner/rentier [Rentner], the
shareholder, or the banker who suffers the animus of the worker, but almost without exception it
is the manufacturer and the business executives who are the direct opponents to workers in price
wars. But, ironically, it is the Rentner, the shareholder, and the banker’s cash boxes into which
more unearned profits flow, rather than into the pockets of the manufacturers or of the business
executives.16
19
This simple fact has frequently been crucial for the role the class situation played in the
formation of political parties. For example, it was those conditions that made the many variations
of patriarchal socialism possible. It was also why in the beginning, threatened ‘Stände’
commonly formed alliances with the proletariat against the ‘“bourgeoisie.’.”
(b) Stände
‘Stände’ are in contrast to classes, usually a Gemeinschaft, even though they are often of an
amorphous sort. In contrast to a ‘“class situation,”’ which is purely a product of economic
factors, we want to describe a ‘“Stand situation”’ as an individual’s situation, which has typical
features and is determined by a specific social assessment of ‘“honor’” which that may be
positive or negative. This assessment of honor is tied to a common characteristic that many
people in the Stand share. Such honor is also tied to class situations, and the different classes
which that form alliances with different Stände in different ways. But property as such does not
necessarily, as mentioned above,17 generate prestige in terms of increased honor in stratification
by Stand. Nevertheless, it does so with extraordinary regularity. For example, in the subsistence
economy of an organized neighborhood anywhere in the world, the richest man frequently
becomes the chief. But this equation of wealth with Stand, really just represents the honor
typically associated with wealth.
20
In the socalled ‘pure’ modern democracy, where an explicitly ordered privilege of single
individuals arranged by their Stände does not exist, it happens nevertheless that only families
who belong to the same approximate tax class dance with each other (i.e., this is said about some
small Swiss towns18). But sStill, the honor based on Stand does not necessarily need to be linked
to the class situation. Rather, such honor normally stands in stark contrast to the pretensions of
‘“naked’” property. For instance, both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same
Stand, and often they do so with very palpable consequences—no matter how precarious this
‘“social equality”’ becomes in the long run.
The ‘“equality’” within the Stand of the American ‘“gentleman”’ is illustrated by the
following example: At work, old traditions still rule, and subordination of the worker is deemed
necessary for objective reasons [i.e., the smooth operation of the business]. However, outside the
workplace (e.g., in the evening while playing billiards or cards in a club, it would be very much
frowned upon if even the richest ‘“boss”’ did not treat his ‘“clerk”’ equally in every conceivable
sense). The American boss would never treat his clerk with the condescending ‘“benevolence”’
that marks differences connected to ‘“position”’ in the workplace. Such condescension is
something that the German boss can never ban from his sentiments and attitude. This is one of
the most important reasons why the German ‘“club culture’” has never been able to attain the
attraction that the American clubs have.
21
As regards to content, the honor of the Stand is predominantly expressed by a specific
lifestyle that is imposed on anyone who wants to belong to that social circle. Linked with this
lifestyle are restrictions on the ‘“social’” intercourse with other Stände, meaning interactions that
do not serve an economic or otherwise commercial/material purpose. These restrictions include
marriages within the social circle of the Stand,19 and establish social boundaries that lead to a
strict endogamy. Once an agreedupon Gemeinschaft action of this type of exclusion is
established, and it is not simply an individual or socially irrelevant imitation of a foreign
conduct, the formation of a Stand is underwaybegins.
This kind of Ständerelated stratification, with its typical characteristics, is currently [in
about 1914] emerging in the United States. It is there also based upon the conventional conduct
of life that emerges within the context of democracy. For example, only the resident of a
particular street (‘“the street’”) is accepted as a member of the ‘society’,20 and therefore regarded
as qualified for social interaction, and eligible to be visited and invited into each others’ homes.
Strict submission to the dress code which that is in vogue in a particular parts of
American ‘“society”’ at this particular moment, even among men (and to an extent unknown to
us Germans), is another sign of the development of Stände. Such submission to the current
fashion is an indicator that a given man is claiming or pretending to possess the qualities of a
‘“gentleman.’.” Consequently, this submission = =at least prima facie21= = decides that he will
22
be treated as such. This becomes important with respect to his chances for employment in a
‘“good’” business. Above all, the importance of such submission becomes clear in matters of
social interaction and marriage with ‘“esteemed”’ families, and is comparable to the capacity to
‘“give satisfaction in the conduct of duels.’.”22
As for the rest:, ‘Stände’related honor is predominantly usurped by particular families
resident for a long time (and, of course, correspondingly wealthy), such as the ‘“F. F. V.’.”
(‘“First Families of Virginia’”);, the actual and alleged descendants of the ‘“Indian princess”’
Pocahontas;, or the Pilgrim Fathers, Knickerbockers;,23 the members of almost inaccessible
sects;, and various circles which that set themselves apart by displaying any kind of distinct
feature. In this case, we have a stratification that is essentially based on pure convention and
usurpation (but this is true for the origins of almost every Standbased honor).
However, the way from this purely conventional stratification to legal privileges (positive
or negative) is easily accepted everywhere as soon as a particular stratification of social order
becomes the ‘“settled’” way of life. And, subsequently, with the stabilization of the distribution
of economic power, the system of stratification by Stand achieves stability.
When the most extreme consequences of stratification are realized, the Stand evolves into
a closed ‘“caste.’.” Apart from the conventions and legal guarantees, this means that rituals
develop guaranteeing the distinctions between Stände. This is achieved by restricting any
23
physical contact of members of higher castes with members of castes regarded as ‘“lower.’.”
This protects the higher caste from becoming ritually impure. If ritual impurity nevertheless
occurs, religious rituals are used to atone for, or expiate, any impure contact. In fact, the
individual castes sometimes develop distinctive rituals, cults, and gods.
Generally, the stratification by Stand does only evolve into castes where the underlying
differences are attributed to ‘“ethnicity.” Typically, the caste system develops in societies where
various ethnic Gemeinschaft communities develop Gesellschaft ties between each other
[vergesellschaftet], while they still also believinge in blood relationships,, and restricting both
exogamous marriage and social intercourse within their own ethnic Gemeinschaft.
For instance, this is the case among pariah peoples around the world, as discussed
earlier.24 Pariah people are communities [Gemeinschaft] which that have acquired specific
occupational traditions of particular crafts, or other occupations, and cultivate a belief in an
ethnic identity which that underlies their sense of community [Gemeinschaft]. They live in a
‘“dDiaspora,’,” strictly segregated from all but with inevitable personal interaction with others,
which puts the pariah legally into precarious situations. However, owing to their economic
indispensability, they are tolerated and often have given privileged positions, while living
interspersed in political communities. The Jews are the most impressive historic example.
24
The structure of segregation differs, depending on whether it is based on ‘Stand’ grown
into ‘“caste’,” or based on ethnic criteria alone. The caste system transforms the horizontal
unconnected coexistence of the ethnically segregated community into a vertical system of
hierarchical stratification. This can be Eexpressed correctlythus:: the development of
comprehensive Gesellschaft ties [Vergesellschaftung] incorporates the ethnically distinct
communities [Gemeinschaft] into a specific action by a political Gemeinschaft.
Ethnic and caste segregation hence differ regarding their effects. Ethnic coexistence,
which implies mutual rejection and disdain, permits any ethnic community to value its personal
honor as the highest. However, caste stratification is accompanied by a ‘“vertical social
gradation”’ and acknowledges a socially accepted higher ‘“honor’” benefiting privileged castes
and Stände. This is because ethnic differences were transformed into distinct ‘“functions,’,”
serving the political development of Gesellschaft ties (warrior, priest, craftsmen who are
politically important for war, building trades, and so on). However, even the most despised
pariah people who somehow still cultivate what is peculiar to Stände develop ethnic
communities [Gemeinschaft] that cultivate the belief in their own unique ‘“honor’” (as do the
Jews).
However, Stände which that are both despised and negatively privileged, have a specific
deviation regarding ‘“sense of dignity’” [that emerges from their position relative to the
25
positively privileged]. Their ‘sense of dignity’ is a subjective social honor and reflects the
conventional demands, which the positively privileged Stand requires for its own members’
deportment. As a result, it is said that the positively privileged Stände’s sense of dignity naturally
relies on their immediate, earthly ‘“being’” and on their own ‘“beauty and excellence.’.”25 Their
kingdom is ‘“of this world’”26 and their kingdom lives for the present and off the glorious past.
So it is in the nature of the negatively privileged Stand to draw its sense of dignity by referring to
a future that lies beyond the present, and is transcendent. In other words, this sense of dignity is
nourished by a belief in a providential ‘“mission,’,” or a specific honor before God as the
‘“chosen people.’.” Therefore, the idea arises that ‘“the last will be the first’” in the afterlife, or
that a messiah will arrive who will unveil the hidden honor of the pariah people (Jews) or
‘Stand.’. It is tThis is a simple fact—and its significance will be discussed in another context.27
That condition is the source of the religious character of the pariah Stand. It is not the much
admired construct of ‘“resentment’”28 by Nietzsche (in the Genealogy of Morals29) which is only
marginally true, while Nietzsche’s example of Buddhism does not apply at all. 30
The ethnic origin of Stände formation is by no means a typical phenomenon. Rather, it is
the contrary. Since objective ‘“racial differences’” are not at all the basis for most subjective
‘“ethnic”’ feelings of belonging, a rationale for stratification by Stand based on race ultimately
can be made and is only a question in concrete individual cases. The Stand itself creates ‘“pure
breds”’ [or stereotypes] in the anthropological sense. This is to say, the Stand functions in a
26
highly exclusive manner and is based on the selection of individuals who are personally qualified
for membership. An example for this was the Kknighthood, where the members of the Stand
were recruited based on their martial, physical, and psychological usefulness. However, simple
personal characteristics for selection are far from being the only or predominant way of creating
Stände. Political affiliation or class situation has always been instrumental as well, and today
class situations have become the dominant reason for eligibility for selection to a Stand. Thus,
the possibility to conduct one’s life according to the Stand naturally tends to be economically
conditioned.
So, from a practical point of view, stratification by Stände goes hand in hand with a
monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities, in a typical manner which that
becomes known as typical. Besides the specific honor of Stand and their its honorary
preferences, which always bases itself upon distance and exclusiveness, there are all sorts of
material monopolies. For example, honorific benefits include the privilege to wear special
costumes or to eat special dishes which that are a taboo to others. Honorific preferences can also
consist of the privilege to carry arms, which is most obvious to others in its consequences [i.e., as
an obvious expression of authority and power], and even the right to exert certain non
professional dilettante artistic practices (i.e., to play certain musical instruments). Besides the
honor of Stand is rooted in its material monopolies which that naturally provided athe most
effective motive for exclusivity in the material monopolies ofwithin the Stand. By themselves,
27
these okmonopolies are rarely sufficient, but almost always they are the most potent motive for
keeping the Stand exclusive.
With respect to the Stand’s connubial interests, there are two monopolies of equal
importance. These are (1) the interest of the families in the monopolization of daughters, and (2)
the interest of the families in the monopolization of the potential bridegrooms who are able to
provide for their daughters.
Also, with an increased rigidification of Stand membership, the conventional, preferred
opportunities for special employment grow into legal monopolies to special offices for
specifically defined Stand groups. Certain estates also become objects for monopolization by
forby the Stand as well. Typically, it includes ‘“knightly estates’” everywhere, and often that
includes possession of serfs or bondsmen, and specific trades, that which become objects for
monopolization by the Stände. This monopolization can become a positive characteristic for a
Standmember when, for the sake of preserving a way of life, it is allowed [or even required] to
own specific properties and operate them. It becomes a negative character for a Standmember
when, for the sake of preserving a way of life, it is not allowed to own these properties and
operate them. Hence, the decisive role that the ‘“style of life’” has for the honor of the Stand
entails that the members of the Stände are the specific bearers of Stand conventions. All ‘“life
28
styles’”—in whatever way they manifests themselves—either arise from the Stand or are
preserved by the Stand.
Despite the vast differences in Stand conventions, this principle displays certain typical
features, especially among the highest privileged social strata. Generally speaking, conventions
of privileged Stände are connected to the avoidance of common physical labor. This
disqualification is even emerging in America, despite older contrary traditions. Every
rationalized economic pursuit and especially ‘“mercantile activity,’,” is very frequently
considered as being disqualifying for members of a privileged Stand and is considered to be
dishonorable work. Furthermore, this also applies to artistic activities which that are regarded as
degrading as soon as they are exploited for income. In particular, artistic activities are regarded
as degrading as soon as they are connected to hard physical exertion/effort. An example is the
sculptor working like a mason in his dusty smock. The contrary examples are the painter in his
salonlike ‘“studio,’,” and those forms of musical practice that are accepted by the privileged
Stand.
The frequent disqualification of ‘“gainful employment”’ for the privileged Stand, is a
direct result of the principle of a social order stratified by Stand. Furthermore, it is also a result of
its opposition to the principle that power is regulated exclusively through the economic market.
There are other individual reasons alongside these two main ones. Those will be given further
29
along [in another part of Economy and Society]. We have seen above that the market and its
economic processes are anonymous and therefore do not recognize ‘“personal reputation,’,” only
“‘objective interests.”
The market does not know ‘“honor’” or ‘“prestige’” [it only knows cash], but the reverse
is true for the Stand. Stratification and privileges in terms of honor and lifestyles are inherent to
each Stand. Therefore, the privileged Stände are threatened at their very roots by the market and
its emphasis on mere economic acquisition and naked economic power—which still bears a
stigma as emerging from outside the Stand. Stratification by Stand is even more threatened by
mere economic acquisition as is the virtue of property that personifies the superhonor (which is,
though, still not yet acknowledged yet). Therefore, it is even possible that mere acquisition of
economic power bestows higher honor to its possessor than the members of the Stand can impute
to themselves by virtue of the very lifestyle of the Stand itself. In this context, all groups
interested in stratification by Stand react with a special and pungent sharpness against the claims
and implications that pure economic power demands. The more they feel threatened, the more
violently they react.
For instance, Calderon’s31 respectful treatment of the peasant, as opposed to
Shakespeare’s ostensible disdain for the ‘“riffraff’,”32 occurred in literature at about the same
time. This illustrates the different ways in which a secure and established Stände system reacts,
30
relative to a Stände system that has become unstable economically. Everywhere there are such
recurring issues.
The privileged Stände groups never accept the upstart ‘parvenu’ completely and
unconditionally, even if he has fully adapted his lifestyle to theirs. The privileged Stand only
accepts the parvenu’s descendants of the parvenu, who were raised [from birth] in the
conventions of the Stand, and who never ‘“soiled”’33 their honor by participating in economic
labor.
At this point, we can establish that the most important effect of Stände stratification is
that it restrains the free development of the market. Initially, the development of the market is
hindered because the Stände withdraw goods from free exchange by establishing monopolies.
This was done by either law or a more conventional means. Examples are the inherited estates
(Kleroi) during the early Hellenistic citystates which that were ruled by the Stände, and
originally also in Rome (as the law for incapacitation for debtors shows). It also happened with
the estates of knights, farmers, monasteries, and especially the clientele of the guild businesses,
or merchant guilds.
So the Stände restrict the free market, and the power of naked property, which is
important for class formation and, as a result, forces back the process of class formation. The
results of this process vary greatly. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily soften the contrasts in
31
economic standings; indeed, often, it is quite the opposite. In any case, one cannot speak of an
actually free market competition as we know it today wherever the Stände organizations
permeate a community [Gemeinschaft] as strongly as they did in all political communities
[Gemeinschaften] of Antiquity and the Middle Ages.
But even more farreaching than the direct exclusion of certain goods from the market is
the conflicting relationship between the Stände and the economic order. For instance, on the one
hand, the notion of honor which that is peculiar to the Stand absolutely abhors the haggling,
which, on the one handhowever, is essential to the market. But one has to note that, on the other
hand, honor particularly abhors haggling between members of the same Stand, and furthermore
haggling can even be taboo for members of certain Stände, in general. Therefore, there are
Stände everywhere, usually the most influential, for which any open straightforward
participation in acquisition through market activities is stigmatized.
So with some oversimplification one could argue:
‘“Classes’” are stratified according to their relations to production and acquisition of
goods.
‘Stände’ are stratified according to the principles of their ‘consumption’ of goods which
that are needed for living out the style of life of the Stand.
32
Also, professions and occupations (Beruf34) are Stände. This kind of Stand normally
imputes successfully social ‘“honor”’ by virtue of living a specific ‘“lifestyle,’,” which is usually
prescribed by the occupation. Beruf, Stand, and cClass are different but at the same time they
blend together and certainly they do overlap. Especially those Stände communities
[Gemeinschaften] who that are most strictly segregated in terms of ‘“honor,’,” like the Indian
castes, show today a relatively high degree of indifference to pecuniary income, although within
very rigid limits. For instance, the Brahmins seek such income by many different means.35
Therefore, only a general assertion is made regarding the basic economic conditions in
which Stände stratification emerges. Only a relatively stable base for acquisition and distribution
of goods promotes Stände stratification. Destabilization by technical and economic change and
upheaval, however, threatens Stand stratification and pushes the ‘“class situation’” into the
foreground.
During eras of technological and economic transformation, typically the naked class
situation typically becomes particularly important. On the other handHowever, any slowing
down or restructuring in economic stratification process leads in a short time to the reawakening
of Stand cultures. As a result, the significance of social ‘“honor”’ reemerges.
33
(c) Parties
The genuine home of ‘“classes’” lies within the ‘“economic order,’,” and the genuine home of
the Stände is within the ‘“social order,’,” that is, within the sphere of the distribution of
‘“prestige and honor,’” respectively. Within these spheres, ‘“cClasses’” and ‘Stände’ mutually
influence each another and [they also influence] the legal order. In turn, the legal order
influences the classes and Stände. ‘“Parties,’,” however, are primarily at home within the sphere
of ‘“power.’.”
Party actions are geared towards attaining social ‘“power,’,” which means that they are
dedicated towards influencing a communal Gemeinschaft action, regardless of its content. In
principle, parties can exist in a sociable ‘“club’” as well as in a ‘“state.’.” The Gemeinschaft
action of parties always contain an element of rationally focused Gesellschaft action, in contrast
to the cClasses and Stände where this mix is not vital. This is because the Gemeinschaft action
by ‘“parties’” is always aimed towards a methodically and tactically chosen goal.36 This goal can
be ‘“factual,’,” like the implementation of a program to reach an ideal or for material reasons. Or
the goal can be personal, for example, to gain sinecures, and power, which bring honor to the
leaders and the followers of the part. In general, the Gemeinschaft action of ‘“parties’” aims at all
these goals simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within communities
[Gemeinschaften] that are developed along the principles of Gesellschaft, meaning societies that
have some kind of a rational order and cadre of persons who are ready to enforce that order. The
34
goal of the party is to influence this apparatus and, if possible, form the apparatus out of party
followers [to the exclusion of competitors].
In individual cases, parties can represent interests determined by ‘“class situations’” or
‘“Stände situations’” and thus recruit their followers accordingly. But they neither have to be
pure ‘“class’” parties nor pure ‘Stände’ parties. In some cases, this only applies partly, but in
most cases not at all.
Parties can have ephemeral or enduring structures, and the parties’ means to attain power
can be quite diverse. They may range from naked violence of any kind, to campaigning for votes
with coarse or subtle means using money,; social influence,; power of speech,; leading questions,
suggestion, and crude hoaxes, up to and including rougher or more elaborate tactics of
obstruction within parliamentary bodies.
The parties’ sociological structure differs depending on whether communal action is
generated in the Gemeinschaft, which they seek to influence, or whether the [political]
community [Gemeinschaft] is stratified by Stände or classes. But, above all, parties differ
depending on how this governance is structured, because their party leaders [Führer] typically
strive to seize power.
However, in a general sense, the parties as defined here are not only just the products of
typically modern forms of rule [Herrschaft]. Also, we define the ancient and medieval parties as
35
such, despite the fact that their structure differs substantially from that of modern parties.
Therefore, it is impossible to state anything about the structure of parties without discussing the
structural forms of social domination [Herrschaft] per se. This is because parties are bodies
which that always struggle for dominion [Herrschaft] and they themselves are very frequently
organized in a very strict ‘“authoritarian”’ fashion. In order to understand parties, we need to
discuss this central social phenomenon, that is, the structures of social domination [Herrschaft],
to which we want to turn to now. 37
‘ “ Classes
III. Conclusion: The scope of ,’
,”
‘ “ Stände
,”
,’ and
‘ “ Parties
”’
But before we discuss these questions, one more general statement regarding the nature of
‘“cClasses,’,” ‘“Stände,’,” and ‘“pParties”’ needs to be added. Thus, despite the fact that classes
need an all encompassing development of Gesellschaft ties, political Gemeinschaftaction still
exerts its influence within ‘“classes,’,” ‘“Stände,’,” and ‘“parties.’.” It does not mean that parties
are bound to the limits of any individual political community [Gemeinschaft]. On the contrary, at
all times, the process of becoming a rational Gesellschaft [Vergesellschaftung] has commonly
reached far beyond the frontiers and boundaries of political communities, even when the reason
for becoming a rational Gesellschaft was geared towards a joint use of military force [Gewalt]. In
many cases, this was the typical agenda over the centuries. Examples stretch from the solidarity
of interests among the oligarchies and the democrats in Ancient Greece, among the Guelphs and
the Ghibellines38 during the Middle Ages, and within the Calvinist party39 during the period of
36
the religious struggle to the solidarity of the landlords (the International Congress of Agrarian
Landlords40). This principle applies among princes (the Holy Alliance of 1815,41 the Karlsbad
Decrees of 181942), socialist workers, and conservatives (the longing of the Prussian
conservatives for Russian intervention in the 1850s43).
Nevertheless, the aim of the development of Gesellschaft ties is not necessarily the
establishment of a new international or political unit (i.e., territorial rule [Herrschaft]); rather, it
is the development of Gesellschaft ties mainly influencing already preexisting political units.44
Note
Translation of this essay was begun (from Weber, 1921/1956/1980) at Zeppelin University in
Friedrichhafen, Germany, in spring 2008, by Dagmar Waters, Tony Waters, Elisabeth Hahnke,
Maren Lippke, Eva LudwigGlück, Daniel Mai, Nina RitziMessner, and Christina Veldhoen.
Dagmar Waters, Tony Waters, and Lucas Fassnacht did the final translations and editing in
summer 2008 in Auburn, California, before it was published in Tthe Journal of Classical
Sociology (see Waters and Waters 2010). Revisions were made by Dagmar Waters, Benjamin
Elbers, and Dagmar Waters in 2014, in order to fit the original translation into this collection.
<<Notes>>
37
1
Weber’s ‘soziale Ehre’ is translated variously as ‘“prestige,’,” ‘“honor,’,” and ‘“reputation.’.”
2
Weber repeatedly uses the English word “boss” to describe professional party leaders in the United States in
particular. He uses it in a negative fashion as being a “boss” implies both corruption, and being a part of a
party machine. See also “Politics as Vocation,” pp. XXX-XX, and “Bureaucracy,” pp. xxx-xxx. <AQ: Please
update the date range after typesetting.
Global note: Please note – whenever the page range/no. from this volume is mentioned, would it be better to add
“in this volume” for clarity? Please indicate wherever “in this volume” should appear. Yes, in this volume (or
chapter) should appear for clarity sake)>
3
‘“Class situations”’ is introduced here as the German word ‘“Klassenlage.’.” It is our belief that Weber
intended this to mean that the term was in effect defined by the three conditions above. Gerth and Mills insert
the following definition into their text, which comes from elsewhere in Weber’s writings:
<EXT>These points refer to ‘“class situation,’,” which we may express more briefly as the typical
chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences, in so far as this
chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills
for the sake of income in a given economic order. The term ‘“class”’ refers to any group of people
that is found in the same class situation. (Weber, 1947a: 181). <EXT>
4
By Tthe Law of Marginal Utility, Weber is referring to the Austrian School economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk
(1851–1915). See Max Weber (2001a), “Klassen, Stände, Partein,” in Gesamtausgabe Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, Band 22–1, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen with Michael Meyer, p.:253, fn. 3.
5
In modern terms, Weber is comparing the nature of wage laborers who have “security of employment” rights,
to piece worker, and hourly workers who work “at will” of the employer. Weber’s point is that these working
conditions result in fundamentally different relationships between an employer and an employee.
6
Weber seems to be referring to the situation in Ancient Rome. See pp. XXX-XXX in this essay.
7
In this example, Weber describes the difference between people who are slaves among cattle herders who are
mobile, and therefore have fungible assets (both cattle and slaves), who can are both “alienable” and therefore
can be used as collateral in bank loans, and traditional feudalism where serfs were not separable from the land.
Weber explains that in the situation of cattle herders, both people and cattle are assets, and therefore can be
seized as property by banks when the cattle owners default on their loans. It is not clear from the text to what
time or situation Weber is referring.
8
This sentence is a clear reference to Marx.
9
The German word Murren is an apparent reference to the “murmuring” of the Israelites against Moses. See
Exodus 16:2.
10
A labor union could be an example for this.
11
The ‘“talented author”’ Weber refers to is Oppenheimer (see Weber 2001a:257).
12
The type of legal order that Weber refers to is one that protects property, specifically the rights of individuals
to control production. The legal order also protects the communal Gemeinschaft actions of the guilds and
other relevant occupational monopolies as discussed on pp. XX below.
13
For example, Stände (see next paragraph).
14
Lucius Sergius Catilina (108 BC–62 BC) was a Roman politician of the first century BC who is best known for
the Catiline conspiracy. In his attempt to capture control of the Roman sSenate, he sought to have debts
cancelled at a time when the price of bread was rising rapidly in the city of Rome due to fighting in the Italian
countryside. This led to the devastation of farm areas, shortage of money, and the activities of pirates. The
debt forgiveness policy promoted by Catilina was favored by the urban poor, as well as the wealthy who had
lived on borrowed money.
15
The putting-out system of manufacture involves merchants who provide raw materials such as yarn to home -
bound workers on credit. The manufacturer then purchases the finished product (e.g., woven cloth) back from
the workers as a finished good, paying them a piece rate for their labor. This, as Weber implies, is a primitive
form of capitalism.
16
Weber’s point here is that the business executives are the visible face of the class struggle for the worker,
even thought they too are on salary, and do not realize the benefits of increased profits.
17
See paragraph 3 of the Iintroduction to this essay, and references to ‘“the American boss”’ and ‘stereotypical,
large-scale, speculatingin “Politics as Vocation”: on pp. XXX-XXX of Chapter 7. <AQ: Please check this
note.>
18
This example from Switzerland cannot be verified;, see Weber 2001a:260, fn. 11.
19
Weber uses the Latin term ‘Konnubium’ here, using a historic legal terminology for a marriage, which is
legitimatized by socially accepted, common, but and also official laws.
20
In developing this example, Weber actually uses both German and English. Presumably this is to reflect the
uniqueness of the American example. Terms in which Weber writes in English include ‘“the street,’,”
‘“society,’,” and ‘“gentleman’.” The following example apparently reflects Weber’s personal experiences
when travelling in the United States in 1904 (see Weber 2001a:261, fn. 12).
21
Latin for ‘“at first sight.’.” In this context, it is used in the legal sense of ‘“evidence that is valid until
recalled.’.”
22
During the German emperor’s days, a person was ‘satisfaktionsfähig’ (capable of giving satisfaction) when
he was officially eligible to carry a weapon, thus being able to solve issues by fighting a duel. People from
lesser ‘Stände’ were not permitted to carry weapons, and therefore did not share the status necessary to satisfy
questions of honor through dueling, much less marry with the higher Stand.
23
Weber is referring to the organizations by the descendants of the “first settlers” of Virginia, Pilgrim
Massachusetts, and Dutch New York, respectively. Such organizations assert the putatively ancient roots of
such Stände.
24
See Turner 20112:81–83. Turner (2012:82) refers to the role that dietary restrictions have on the segregation
that among groups that are otherwise intermingled. <AQ: Please note – Turner 2012 is not given in
“References.” Please check and add details here and in the references.> Should be Turner 2011.
25
At this point, Weber emphasizes the classical origins of such concepts of beauty and excellence by inserting
the Greek words Kallia and Agathia. Kalokagathia is a concept that denoted the successful integration of
moral, artistic, intellectual, and physical creativity and excellence. The term is used in the Socratic dialogues
by Plato, The Symposium and tThe Apology of Socrates. See, for example, The Apology of Socrates, para. 20a
(Cchap. 4) and 21d (Cchap. 7), and The Symposium, para. 222a. <AQ: Please provide the publication details
for the books given here, if needed/available. Also, please note – they are not given under References.> These
are common on-line resources in the public domain. Do we really need them in the ref list?
26
John 18:36: ‘“My kingdom is not of this world.’.”
27
Reference unclear (see Weber 2001a: 264, fn. 21).
28
‘“Resentment”’ is used by Nietzsche in a specific sense. See Turner (2012).
29
According to Nietzsche,:
<EXT>You will have already guessed how easily the priestly way of evaluating can split from the
knightly-aristocratic and then continue to develop into its opposite. Such a development receives a
special stimulus every time the priestly caste and the warrior caste confront each other jealously and
are not willing to agree amongst themselves about the winner.… . . . As is well known, priests are the
most evil of enemies— – but why? Because they are the most powerless. From their powerlessness,
their hate grows among them into something immense and terrifying, to the most spiritual and most
poisonous manifestations. . . .… Human history would be a really stupid affair without that spirit
which entered it from the powerless. (Nietzsche, 2009 [1887]: essay 1, sec. 7)
http://nietzsche.classicauthors.net/GenealogyMorals/GenealogyMorals7.html<EXT>
30
Reference to Weber 2001a:264. While Weber regards Buddhism as shaped by the positively privileged,
proud, and martial warrior castes, Nietzsche describes Buddhism as inherently peaceful and gentle.
31
Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681) was an important Spanish playwright and dramatist. He wrote at a
time when the older feudal order was strong and could, according to Weber, bestow symbolic honor even on
the low status peasantry—certainly they would not be called “riff-raff” as Shakespeare did! See also Weber
2001a:267, fn. 28–29. <AQ: Weber, 2001a?>
32
See, for example, in The Taming of the Shrew (IV.1.13) where Shakespeare (1564–1616) uses the word
‘“peasant’” as an insult.
33
Weber uses the word unbefleckt, which is a specific and sarcastic reference to Immaculate Conception.
34
The German term ‘Beruf’ (literally ‘“someone has been called’”) has greater implications than the English
terms “occupation” or “profession.” The Beruf is one’s calling in life and serves a greater purpose than just a
‘“job’” (i.e., the mere earning of money). In Germany, the Beruf often is crucially to one’s identity. The
importance of this concept is reflected in professional associations that serve the members of one Beruf.
Weber describes these associations as Stände. In the Middle Ages, the equivalent of such associations were
‘“guilds.’.” For a more in-depth elaboration on this concept, see “Politics as Vocation,” p. XXX;, and M.
Weber ([1904–1905] 2009), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber [1904–1905]2009)., 4th
ed., translated by Stephen Kalberg (New York: Oxford University Press).
35
See Weber’s own descriptions of the emergence of the Brahman caste see in M. Weber, (1[1978] 1968), “The
Distribution of Power within the Political Community: Class, Status, Party,” in Economy and Society, ed.
Roth, G. and Wittich, C., translated by Fischoff, E., Gerth H, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, :
501–504). Also Weber 2001a:269, fn. 33.
36
In effect, Weber is saying that while the goals of the parties are rooted in the Gemeinschaft, the means to
achieve them are found in the tactically chosen Gesellschaft.
37
Reference unclear, as Weber speaks of ‘“social”’ domination. It is possible that this sentence was added by
the first editors (see Weber 2001a:270, fn. 34).
38
The Guelphs and Ghibellines were political groups from southern Germany who fought in northern Italy
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuryies. They were loyal to the Pope in Rome, and the Holy Roman
Emperor in Vienna, respectively. Guelphs tended to come from trading families while the Ghibellines came
from the landed aristocracy.
39
This is apparently a reference to the many Calvinist movements that began in sixteenth-century Geneva and
spread to many countries of Europe and North America, where a number acquired political power.
40
This is an apparent reference to the associations of landlords that became political forces in Prussia, and later
Germany, in the nineteenth century (Weber 2001a:271, fn. 38).
41
The alliance between Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
42
The Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 were issued by a group of German princes, and meant to restrict the press,
universities, and other liberal institutions that could potentially challenge their power. See also Weber
2001a:279, fn. 40.
43
Prussian conservatives sought assistance from the Russian Tsar following the German Revolution of 1848.
See also Weber 2001a:279, fn. 42.
44
Weber’s essay ends abruptly at this point. “Classes, Stände, Parties” has the feeling of being a fragment,
particularly toward the end. Weber’s writing about parties in this essay is particularly brief. Still, it is an
excellent summary connecting the overarching concept to Classes and Stände. See also Weber 2001a:272, fn.
42.

Classes Staende Parties by Max Weber Tra

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Typescript from Chapter 4 from Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society, Edited and Translated

The Distribution of Power Within the Community: Classes, Stände, Parties

Dagmar Waters, Benjamin Elbers, and Tony Waters (2013-2014)

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