RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands).
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).
The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat
Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking
to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged
that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only
and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the
passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from
territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or
more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time
to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of
this case.
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several
rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at
any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was
not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment,
stating that the decision in this case had become final and
executory on May 18, 2010.
ISSUE:
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an
express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary
legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into
law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a
local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat
cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified
by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather
than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must
be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its
letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is
not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within
the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal,
courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its
legislators.
Law Creating Dinagat Province Valid? (2011 update)
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’
population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers
and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006,
the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of
the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and
the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed
the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office
on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial
officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G.
Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte,
filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R.
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No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355
alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large
chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA),
and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local
Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of
250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an
approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC
minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The
Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more
islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the
said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. “There is no
dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the
rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law,” held the Court. (GR No.
180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of
the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme
Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April
12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act
No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is
declared VALID.
According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of barangays,
land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with
respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land
area, are provided for.”
“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to
be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from
the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442
and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it
is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption
should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In
fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of
islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold
the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
xxx“Consistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which
consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of
the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the
minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it
consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would
mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference
to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed
of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of
self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic
services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove
more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer
territory of a province is scattered because the islands are
separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a
contiguous land mass.”
xxx “What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator
of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing
that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has
been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province.” (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050,
April 12, 2011)
xxx “What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator
of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing
that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has
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been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province.” (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050,
April 12, 2011)
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th,
RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA
No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city. Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision
to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago
from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,”
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition
and argued that the petition raises a political question over which
the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not
a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the
court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress
is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No.
8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the
President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other
petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It
is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their
right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down
the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
ISSUES:
1. Do the petitioners have standing in raising the constitutionality
of RA 8528? – YES.
2. Does the court has jurisdiction over the issue, or is it a political
question? – YES.
3. Is RA 8528 constitutional? – NO.
RATIO:
1. On standing.
The petitioners have standing with regards to the issue, because
they sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The mayor,
Mr. Miranda, will now be under administrative supervision of the
Provincial Governor. All the mayor’s executive orders are to be
reviewed. His powers as mayor are to be limited by the act. The
other petitioners are to sustain direct injury as well. As residents
and voters in the city of Santiago, their right to be heard in the
conversation of their city is to be trampled by not holding a
plebiscite with regards to the issue.
2. On the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
Under Sec 1 Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the
court to settle controversies regarding department’s use of
discretion amounting to abuse of jurisdiction.
3. On the constitutionality of RA 8528.
The changes that will result in the downgrading of Santiago City
from being an independent component city, to a component city
cannot be characterized as insubstantial: taxes collected from the
city will be shared with the province, resolutions and ordinances
will have to be reviewed by Provincial Board, City Government’s
share will be diluted since certain portions will accrue to the
Provincial Government. Downgrading it, without the involvement
of the people, will run against the spirit of Sec 10 Art X of the 1987
Constitution.
Having significant changes introduced to the political and social
climate of the province would need a plebiscite for it to push
through, according to Rule II Art 6 Par F1 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code, because
that gravity of changes already amount to a ‘conversion’. Even the
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991 agrees
that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory, since it promotes
autonomy to the local government units.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Buena, J.:
1. Conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution nor in
the Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code.
Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code included
conversion in the enumeration of the modes of changing the
status of local government units.
2. A mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the Local
Government Code cannot expand the terms and provisions clearly
expressed in the basic law to be implemented.
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3. During the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee on Local
Government decided to withdraw the proposed amendment that
required plebiscite. The Court thus not require a plebiscite if
Congress did not require it.
4. The Court must consider the ramifications of declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 on Republic Act No.
6726 (1989) and Republic Act No. 6843 (1990), respectively
allowing the voters of the City of Oroquieta (Misamis Oriental) and
San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to vote and be voted for any of the
respective provincial offices, in effect downgrading them from
independent component cities to component cities. The resulting
confusion on the political structures of the local government units
involved would surely be disastrous to the order and stability of
these cities.
5. Every law has in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality
and in case of doubt, the Court must exert every effort to prevent
the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the
legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on juticiable and
political question.
Decision: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said
law.
The plea that the court back off from assuming jurisdiction over
the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question
has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which defines judicial power as including the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut
between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this
Court in many cases.
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of
the Province of Camarines Norte vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays
Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit,
Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in
the Municipality of Labo, same province.
Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the
conduct of a plebiscite. The said resolution provides that the
plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely the
barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte.
In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority
of the votes cast were against the creation of the Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa. Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte,
seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout the
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was
a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and
illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should
have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e.
the 12barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo
I,Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have
included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality
of Labo, Camarines Norte.
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is
to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to
be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.
ISSUE:
Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas
of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?
Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
"in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of
the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said
plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would
participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such
political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in
the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was
concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution.
Summary:
A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted and
the voters rejected its creation. The governor questioned the result
and challenged the inclusion of the voters of the mother
municipality in the plebiscite.
Rule of Law:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by the majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected—Section 10, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
Is the result of the plebiscite valid?
Ruling:
Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
"in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of
the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
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inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well
as those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte.
Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge
the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No.
7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has
yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic
issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation
did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered
by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide,
or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city’s land area
“shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”
The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen
to an actual case or controversy.
In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city.
Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress
in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city
or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of
the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.
Cawaling vs. COMELECG.R. No. 146319, October 26,
2001Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No.8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant
thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed
into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By
Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed
the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner
filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment
of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal
requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
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campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A.
No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:1. The
creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation
to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that
only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2)
subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and
the(b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon,
thereby violating the "one subject-one bill "rule prescribed by
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality
or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as
what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two
municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City
of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of
the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger
of local government units to create a province city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the
Code.
ISSUES: 1. WON RA 8806 is unconstitutional – NO
2. WON the Plebiscite was a NULLITY – NO THE LGC AND
THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES MERGER AND
DIVISION AS A MODE OFCREATION OF A CITY
Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion
but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which
petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger of
existing local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation… (may
requirements pa re. contiguous area, land area, population etc.
pero di ko na sinama kasi di importante sa issue)Verily, the
creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the
Code.
AS TO THE COMPELLING REASON TO CREATE
SORSOGON CITY FROM BACON AND SORSOGON
This goes into the wisdom of the law which is something that we
do not litigate.
AS TO THE ONE BILL, ON TITLE RULE
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is
not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon
City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the
necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created.
Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of
abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have
deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
AS TO THE PLEBSICITECOMELEC pegged the period NOT
FROM THE DATE OF APPROVAL of the law (Aug 16, 2000), but
from the date of COMPLETION OF THE PUBLICATION PERIOD
(September 1, 2000).
This is because the same Act, RA 8806, states: SECTION 65.
Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation.
From said date, the conduct of the plebiscite was well within
the 120day period. SC agreed with the COMELEC, and added the
ratio by citing Section 10 of the LGC which provides:
"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date, ”The court cited the Ruling in TANADA v ANGARA
re. importance of publication for laws to take effect.
The SC said that to give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation
would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication,
which scenario is precisely abhorred in Tañada.
AS TO THE LACK OF INFORMATION CAMPAIGN
No sufficient proof was provided on this issue. Hence, the SC used
the presumption of regularity in favor of COMELEC.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
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