EN BANC
n
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF
MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the informal sector
has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the
informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized
phenomenon in the so-called Third
World. And it has many
consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many
governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have
wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems
in Asia or Latin America can gather proof
of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not
the same means developed by the
Spanish legal system. The informals have
their own papers, their own forms of
agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly
stated in the maps which they use for
their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the
countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and
you walk by field after field — in each
field a different dog is going to bark at
you. Even dogs know what private
property is all about. The only one who
does not know it is the government. The
issue is that there exists a "common law"
and an "informal law" which the Latin
American formal legal system does not
know how to recognize.
H by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
e Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
r administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
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1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands
currently in possession of persons and entities other than
the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable
as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order
to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of
original registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the
Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public
Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as
well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned,
has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our
current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
Constitution and the legal principles that have developed
our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade
us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban
— the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr.
did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further
manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the
truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic
of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented
by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject
property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves
this application for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-
D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description
now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced
in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and
executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and
for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored
in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with
the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners,
before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v.
Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion
in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter
dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was
published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural
lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en
banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on
oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for
the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as theProperty
Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that
such classification occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as
agricultural in character either because of
its use or because its slope is below that
of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the
Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the
registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated
their respective positions.
 With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners
reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted,
should be considered obiter dictum, since the land
registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners
further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated
in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
same observation that the preferred interpretation by the
OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently absurd. For its part, the
OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the
land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites
the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic, 15Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation, 17 as well as the earlier case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit
that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to
them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the
property had already been "converted" into private property
through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners
cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with
respect to Section 14 (2) are more extensive. The OSG notes
that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-
year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with
respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding
the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to
be made to the Public Land Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable,
timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for
town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration
in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Actacknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles" through "judicial
legalization". 22Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and
unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites
stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its
present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D.
No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced
byP.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was
changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain". The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
"agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a
larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession
was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court
in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first
promulgated in 1936, the period of
 possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of
Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the
various laws relative to the registration of property, including
lands of the public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public
domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves
or through their
predecessors-in-
interest have been
in open,
continuous,
exclusive and
notorious
possession and
occupation of
alienable and
disposable lands of
the public domain
under a bona
fide claim of
ownership since
June 12, 1945, or
earlier. SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14 (1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-
interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the
other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not
the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public
Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The
following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land
or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration
Decree]. Who may apply. — The
following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is
more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the
possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the
right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first
time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that
has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete
his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the
afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which
provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who
has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945.
In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted
under Section 48 (b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits
the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been
amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the
next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December
31, 2020 within which to avail of the
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve
(12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to
 the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons
from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the
President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law,
the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14 (a) of
the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration
of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands
certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that
the alienable and disposable character of
the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945", as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide
claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. 25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity
that would result if we adopt petitioner's
position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG's view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as
it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
not yet even considered an independent
state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation
of Section 14 (1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The
contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out
inNaguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to
the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion
on the scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since
the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in
the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly
overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case
of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated
that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. . ." That
statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14
(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not
establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not
even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein
had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June
1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect
to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt
as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor
of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be
distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in
the latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule
between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and
following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration inCeniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, private respondents
presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo
M. Inting, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be
within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map
2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980".
This is sufficient evidence to show the
real character of the land subject of
private respondents' application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case.
Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by
the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on
the ground that the property
still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in
question are forestal
land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of
imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the
first requirement in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is concerned, for they
were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, private respondents were able
to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land even before the year 1927.
As a rule, we are bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner
did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same
eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the
registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and
180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that
in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six
(6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine
(9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of
analysis with respect to Section 14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired
ownership over
private lands by
prescription under
the provisions of
existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following
discussion concerning Section 14 (2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion,
thus:
 Did the enactment of the Property
Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable
lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June
12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes
the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of
existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. [ 30 ] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.
[ 31 ] With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus,
even if possession of the alienable public
land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section
14 (2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their
registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession
only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can
properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code
provisions on prescription as the possible basis for
application for original registration under Section 14 (2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation
for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce
of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of
the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands.
The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
timber or mineral lands. caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil
Code concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the Civil
Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil
Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the
critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14
(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently
reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of
the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to
Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-
year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in
1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the concept of
an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
 This provision was repealed in 1977 with the
enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945
the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have
invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D.
1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Code — ordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed "through
uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year
period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after
1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year
period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material
difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated
under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application
the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth
a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without
any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty (30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our
earlier finding with respect to the present language of
Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the
thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration
became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly
refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our
interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is no similar demand
on our part in the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription". The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are
property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which
generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be
the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the
commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil
Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands
so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under
the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription;
and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by
prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states
that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when * it is "intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its
scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming
title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all
lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the
matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and
the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The
remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decreeand
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can
be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227,
entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting
the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn
is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. 41 The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps,
in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are
"alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of government
properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the
subject military lands have become alienable and disposable.
However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion
of the former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus,
at that time, the lands remained property of the public
dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status
as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity
that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial
because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or
duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades
us from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to
the Civil Code. As the application for registration under
Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified
as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent
rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of theProperty
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by
the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between
the thirty-year period under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year
period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year
period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
Registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription
under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14
(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior
nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with
respect to Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework
we set forth today is seeing how our land registration
procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by private persons
through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113,
which states that "[a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription", and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through
which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code.
The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just
title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil
Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property
of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is
there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the
same time, there are indispensable requisites — good faith
and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the
application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak
for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title
requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just
title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino
explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its
purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually
transferred ownership if the grantor had
been the owner. This vice or defect is the
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
one cured by prescription. Examples: sale
with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just
title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner
and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor
before the completion of the required period of
possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the
State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether
by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode
of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under
ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
period of possession preceding the classification of public
dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the
purpose of computing prescription. But after the property
has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed
under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor
automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of
the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation
of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to
the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it
is apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title
brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years
following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent
on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of
persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of
now. AcDaEH
V.
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the
lands should have been
alienable and disposable
during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under
Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
 Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private
property of the government.
The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription
under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration
Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by
which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted
adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at
least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12
June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence —
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular — is to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section
14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420
(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of
today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by
this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed
lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social
responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the
law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether
declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-
standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system
and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition
of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or
free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations
imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of
said properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title
has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system,
as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who
have individually or exclusively held residential lands on
which they have lived and raised their families. Many more
have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with
their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their
families and their communities as common law owners.
There is much to be said about the virtues of according them
legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to
translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such
lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up
to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to
sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such
lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses
into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual,
but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
known as the Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion
of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the
application for registration of a piece of land originally filed
by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant
Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that
the Property Registration Decree governs registration of land
under the Torrens system. It can only identify which titles,
already existing or vested, may be registered under the
Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to
land. It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree allows "those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the
lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision,
taking into account that the land they are seeking to register
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, a fact
which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree clearly and explicitly refers to "private lands",
without mention at all of public lands. There is no other way
to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree except that the land was
already private when the applicant for registration acquired
ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription therein
was not the means by which the public land was converted
to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant acquired
title to what is already private land, from another person
previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in
question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the
rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree applies only to what are
already private lands, then, there is no question that the
same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of
the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which
governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
Section 11. Public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of
imperfect or
incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial
legaliza
tion; or
(b) By
adminis
trative
legaliza
tion
(free
patent).
(Empha
sis
ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that
agricultural public lands may be disposed of by the State,
and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do
so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the
intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration
of the modes by which agricultural public land may be
disposed of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
as amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And,
undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring
agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and periods
prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property
Registration Decree can overcome the express restriction
placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by
which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law
specifically applying to lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as amended,
being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a
general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should
prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must
be stressed that the same cannot confer title to land and can
only confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has
already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural
public land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes
enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as
amended. TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act was amended several times, changing the period of
possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to
agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial
confirmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueño since
time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894.
Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was
retained. However, on June 22,
1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted
amending C.A. No. 141. This later
enactment required adverse possession
for a period of only thirty (30) years. On
January 25, 1977, the President
enacted P.D. No. 1073, further
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the
period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b)
and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945." 5(Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect
title to agricultural land of the public domain could be
acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential
Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by requiring possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the
public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect
title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the
requisite period of possession for acquiring imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no
longer determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years);
instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June
1945 or earlier) from which the possession should have
commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable
and disposable land of the public domain by prescription
under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus
acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, it would be sanctioning what is effectively a
circumvention of the amendment introduced by Presidential
Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by possession would again be made to depend on a
fixed term (i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30
years for extraordinary prescription), rather than being
reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application
for registration of the public agricultural land in question,
accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the
discussion in the majority opinion concerning the
contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect
titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the
time of filing of the application for judicial confirmation
and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held
in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land was likewise already declared
alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and declares
the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as
mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to
the dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said case on
the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion
expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon
a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point
not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,
or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.
Such are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed
in Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of land of the
public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto,
based on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to
prove that they possessed the subject parcels of land for the
period required by law; and (2) the application for
registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural
issue first, and held that the alleged infirmity in the
application constituted a misjoinder of causes of action
which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the
severance of the misjoined causes of action so that they
could be heard by the court separately. The Court though
took note of the belated publication of the notice of hearing
on the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of
the same was published. Such error was not only procedural,
but jurisdictional, and was fatal to the application for
registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of
the substantive issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether
Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land
they wish to register in their names for the period required
by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, requires possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered was
declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and
the period of possession prior to such declaration should not
be counted in favor of the applicants for registration, then
Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be deemed to have
possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite
period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of
an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, which could be the subject of judicial
confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said
case. It was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed
upon a cause, "by the way", or only incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon a question before the
Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause; or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter
dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an
imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition
in Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their
pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David
Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of
proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did not
necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the other
issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the
Court dismissed the application for registration of Jeremias
and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of
jurisdiction of the land registration court over the
application, in light of the absence of proper publication of
the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the
application given that the applicants failed to comply with
the requirements for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court
to expeditiously and completely resolve the cases before it
and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between
the parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically
ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto
could have easily believed that they could re-file their
respective applications for registration, just taking care to
comply with the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following
discourse in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 9 on what
constitutes, or more appropriately, what
does not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on
any point within the issues presented by
the case cannot be considered as obiter
dictum, and this rule applies to all
pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are
presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case,
and led up to the final conclusion, and to
any statement as to matter on which the
decision is predicated. Accordingly, a
point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is, or might have
been, made on some other ground, or
even though, by reason of other points in
the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on
the particular point, otherwise than it
did. A decision which the case could have
turned on is not regarded as obiter
dictum merely because, owing to the
disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another question,
nor can an additional reason in a
decision, brought forward after the case
has been disposed of on one ground, be
regarded asdicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one
of which is sufficient to determine the
ultimate issue, but the court actually
decides all such points, the case as an
authoritative precedent as to every point
decided, and none of such points can be
regarded as having the status of
a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully
argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make
statements of the court regarding other
propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and
this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in
the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead
up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the
opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value
as a precedent because the disposition of the case is or
might have been made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been the same if the court had held, on
the particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear
provisions of the law and established jurisprudence on the
matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition of an
imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
 (b) Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation
of title, except when
prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to
have performed all the
conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis
ours.) SCIcTD
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, by substantially reiterating Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title
thus acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The
following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that
possession of the land by the applicant for registration prior
to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and
registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of
theProperty Registration Decree, respectively, should only be
granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or
earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already
declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree, which would not run
afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said
laws or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority
opinion that the interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person
from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land declared
alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which
could be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne
in mind that the intention of the law is to dispose of
agricultural public land to qualified individuals and not
simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict
interpretation and application of both law and jurisprudence
on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and
applying Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
is well justified by the significant consequences arising from
a finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of
an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect
title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation
and possession of the land by a person and his
predecessors-in-interest for the period required and
considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the land
from the mass of public land. When a person is said to have
acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and goes
beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a
mere formality. 12 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized
in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended,
has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of the
public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing
of agricultural public land has its own specific requirements
which must be complied with. If a person is not qualified for
a judicial confirmation of an imperfect title, because the land
in question was declared alienable and disposable only after
12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he could
still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated
in the afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the
majority of the ruling in Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of
theProperty Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the
majority, to DENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the
Decision dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2
October 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing, for
absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration
of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions
on the application of prescription under Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree (PRD), and on the denial of SEC. 48. The following described citizens
the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan. of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling such lands or an interest therein, but
that the classification of a public land as alienable and whose titles have not been perfected or
disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in accordance completed, may apply to the Court of
with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and First Instance of the province where the
Naguit (Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision land is located for confirmation of their
is a new law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what the claims and the issuance of a certificate of
Constitution ordains and beyond the law that the Legislature title therefor, under the Land Registration
passed. Because the majority has not used the standards set Act, to wit:
by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2its
conclusions are based on a determination on what the law (a) Those who prior to the
ought to be — an exercise in policy formulation that is transfer of sovereignty from
beyond the Court's authority to make. Spain to the United States
have applied for the purchase,
The discussions of these grounds for dissent
composition or other form of
follow, not necessarily in the order these grounds are posed
grant of lands of the public
above. HDTCSI
domain under the laws and
Prefatory Statement royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the prosecuted the proceedings in
reading of the hierarchy of laws that govern public lands to connection therewith, but
fully understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent. have, with or without default
In the area of public law, foremost in this upon their part, or for any
hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution, whose Article XII other cause, not received title
(entitled National Economy and Patrimony) establishes and therefor, if such applicants or
fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding grantees and their heirs have
principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to occupied and cultivated said
the State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired by lands continuously since the
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from filing of their applications.
the State. 5
(b) Those who by themselves
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the or through their predecessors
classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and in interest have been in the
disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the open, continuous, exclusive,
Constitution, is the country's primary law on the and notorious possession and
matter. Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the occupation of agricultural
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands of the public domain,
lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition under a bona fide claim of
or concession, and the requirement that they should be acquisition or ownership,
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, except as against the
surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section, states that — Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen
Public lands suitable for agricultural hundred and ninety-four,
purposes can be disposed of only as except when prevented by
follows and not otherwise: war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively
(1) For homestead settlement;
presumed to have performed
(2) By sale; all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall
(3) By lease; be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of
(4) By confirmation of this chapter.
imperfect or
incomplete title; Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while
subsection (b) has been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
(5) By judicial legalization;
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)
(6) By administrative and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
legalization (free Public Land Act are hereby amended in
patent). the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and lands of the public domain which have
embodies a grant of title to the qualified occupant or been in open, continuous, exclusive and
possessor of an alienable public land. This section notorious possession and occupation by
provides: cHAIES the applicant himself or thru his
 predecessor-in-interest, under a bona is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, content, the PLA should prevail. 7
since June 12, 1945.
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was general is the Civil Code and its provisions on Property 8 and
enacted to codify the various laws relating to property Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance
registration. It governs the registration of lands under the because land, whether public or private, is property.
Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of acquiring
chattel mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides: ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of
disposition mentioned in the PLA.
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The
following persons may file in the proper Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is
Court of First Instance an application for entitled "Property in Relation to the Person to Whom it
registration of title to land, whether Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classifies property to be
personally or through their duly property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article
authorized representatives: 420 proceeds to further classify property of public dominion
into those intended for public use, for public service, and for
(1) Those who by themselves the development of the national wealth. Article 421 states
or through their that all other properties of the State not falling under Article
predecessors-in- 420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422
interest have been adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended
in open, for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
continuous, patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,
exclusive and property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property
notorious of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of
possession and all property belonging to private persons, either individually
occupation of or collectively.
alienable and
disposable lands Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is
of the public not mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring alienable
domain under a public land under the PLA, (Significantly, the PLA — under its
bona fide claim of Section 48 — provides for its system of how possession can
ownership since ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as
June 12, 1945, or acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title.)
earlier. Section 14 (2) of the PRD, however, specifies that "[t]hose
who have acquired ownership of private lands by
(2) Those who have acquired prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as among
ownership of those who may apply for land registration. Thus,
private lands by prescription was introduced into the land registration
prescription under scheme (the PRD), but not into the special law governing
the provisions of lands of the public domain (the PLA).
existing laws.
A starting point in considering prescription in
(3) Those who have acquired relation with public lands is Article 1108 of the Civil Code,
ownership of which states that prescription does not run against the State
private lands or and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides
abandoned river that "all things which are within the commerce of men are
beds by right of susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided;
accession or property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
accretion under patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
the existing laws. prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may
also come into play in the application of prescription to real
(4) Those who have acquired properties.
ownership of land
in any other In light of our established hierarchy of laws,
manner provided particularly the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution,
for by law. SEDIaH any consideration of lands of the public domain should
start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have lands belong to the State, and he who claims ownership
been lifted from, Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two carries the burden of proving his claim. 10Next in the
provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the grant,
the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a alienation and disposition of the lands of the public
substantive law that classifies and provides for the domain, and the PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The and the PRD are special laws supreme in their respective
PRD, on the other hand, specifically refers to the manner of spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The Civil Code, for
bringing registerable lands, among them alienable public its part, is the general law on property and prescription and
lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete
first is a substantive law, while the other terms, where alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are involved, the PLA is the primary law that should
govern, and the Civil Code provisions on property and
prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of
the PLA with a reiteration of the first principle that under
the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. 12 Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain. 13 We should never lose sight of
the impact of this first principle where a private ownership
claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and
changes over time, starting from the first PLA, Act No. 926;
the second public land law that followed, Act No. 2874; and
the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was
described in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands
of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading,
selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions
to enable persons to perfect their titles
to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the "issuance of patents to
certain native settlers upon public lands",
for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government's
title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term "public land" referred to
all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed
and has been carried over to the present PLA and its
amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement for
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable public land under
a bona fide claim of ownership also never changed. Still
another consistent public land feature is the concept that
once a person has complied with the requisite possession
and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is
automatically given a State grant that may be asserted
against State ownership; the land, in other words, ipso
jure becomes private land. 15 The application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow, based on
the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner
that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been
the period for reckoning the required occupation or
possession. In the first PLA, the required
occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title was 10 years preceding the effectivity of Act
No. 926 — July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier).
This was retained up toCA 141, until this law was amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22,
1957), 17 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This period
did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No.
1073 (PD 1073) 18 changed the required 30-year possession
and occupation period provision, to possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands subject of
imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the public domain
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. PD
1073 also extended the period for applications for free
patents and judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945"
appears to have been lost to history. A major concern raised
against this date is that the country was at this time under
Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering
from the uncertainties and instabilities that World War II
brought. Questions were raised on how one could possibly
comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier
occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the
then prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit
it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as
the enactment of the law (a Presidential Decree) was solely
through the President's lawmaking powers under a regime
that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for
the date is the possible impact of the interplay between the
old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was
enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the
law would affect the application of the old law which
provided for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30
years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on January
25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24,
1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for
unknown reasons, the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal
concerns; vested rights acquired under the old law (CA 141,
as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession
period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment.
We recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v.
Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-
year period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from
1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation
and possession should have started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply
to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that
the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
 takes place by operation of law, then
upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed
land in 1975. This follows the doctrine
laid down in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that
the law cannot impair vested rights such
as a land grant. More clearly stated,
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or
their predecessors-in-interest have
been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since January 24, 1947" may apply
for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus
provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-
off date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The
reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that
where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section
48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the
effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his
or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date
back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case, a
discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance and import
cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full
legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its
amendments were not confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073.
These decrees were complemented by Presidential Decree
No. 892 (PD 892) 20 — issued on February 16, 1976 — which
limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial
confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on
unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period
for filing applications for free patent and judicial
confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The
law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands
not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares
and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000
under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020. 23
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which
defines the administrative grant of title to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain through homestead
settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and RA
9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945
that the Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist
under the law for the grant of alienable lands of the public
domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act
No. 496 on June 11, 1978 to codify the various laws relative
to registration of property. Its Section 14 describes the
applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree,
among them —
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are
separately discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which
sets a cut-off date of June 12, 1945 and which, under the
conditions discussed above, may be read to be January 24,
1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA
in relation with Section 14 (1) of the PRD and, noted among
others, that "under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be
availed of only until December 31, 2020". This is in light
of RA 9176, passed in 2002, 24 limiting the filing of an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers
only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a mode of
registration. Where ownership right or title has already
vested in the possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48
(b) of the PLA grants by operation of law, Section 14 (2) of
the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of registration
of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of
the PLA vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders
the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position
of the Office of the Solicitor General that the public land to
be registered must have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in
Section 48 (b) — June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that
the alienable and disposable character of
the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945", as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide
claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity
that would result if we adopt petitioner's
position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG's view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as
it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
not yet even considered an independent
state.
Instead, the more reasonable
interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable
from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court noted that
while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in
1972 that the lands in question were
classified as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the bid at registration therein did
not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant
had filed his application in 1963, or nine
(9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus,
in this case, where the application was
made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable,
the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well
discredits Bracewell. It does the same with Republic v.
Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should have
therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process,
the ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who
wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these
cases, it however completely misses the point from the
perspective of whether possession of public lands classified
as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be
credited for purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the
PLA, and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD.
These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or
denied registration on the basis of whether the public land
has been classified as alienable and disposable at the time
the petition for registration was filed. Thus, except
for Naguit, these cases can be cited only as instances when
registration was denied or granted despite the classification
of the land as alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as
shown in the quotation above, this is one case that explained
why possession prior to the classification of public land as
alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who
filed his or her application for registration after the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but
where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that
the ponencia relied upon are its statutory construction
interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the
classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly
disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory
reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands into
agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural
lands can be alienated. 28 Without the requisite
classification, there can be no basis to determine which
lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not;
hence, classification is a constitutionally-required step
whose importance should be given full legal recognition
and effect. Otherwise stated, without classification into
disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass
of the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be
mineral or timber land that are completely inalienable and
as such cannot be possessed with legal effects. To allow
effective possession is to do violence to the regalian
doctrine; the ownership and control that the doctrine
denotes will be less than full if the possession that should be
with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any
authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which
grant can be claimed under its Section 48 (b), it is very
important to note that this law does not apply until a
classification into alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a
public land's classification as alienable and disposable, how
can possession under its Section 48 (b) be claimed prior such
classification? There can simply be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land that fully belongs to
the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
of CA 141. 29 If the land is either mineral or timber and can
never be the subject of administration and disposition, it
defies legal logic to allow the possession of these
unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the
classification of public land as alienable and disposable is
inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into
a claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is
essentially a civil law term that can best be understood in
terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific
definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of
possession. 30 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides
that "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the
declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain
cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully complements
what has been said above under the constitutional and PLA
reasons. It confirms, too, that the critical difference
the ponencia saw in theBracewell and Naguit situations does
not really exist. Whether an application for registration is
filed before or after the declaration of alienability becomes
immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession
can be recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-of
date — June 12, 1945. The ponencia assumes, based on its
statutory construction reasoning and its reading of Section
48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession
from June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been
classified as alienable at the time of application for
registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was
painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance.
Its full import appears from PD 1073 that amended Section
48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)
and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD
1073 did not expressly state what Section 48 (b) should
provide under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms
of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b). But
under the PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the
alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The
provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain that is described in terms of the character
of the possession required since June 12, 1945. This intent —
seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June
12, 1945 under the wording of the Decree — is clear and
should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands
under the PLA. Naguit's absurdity argument that
the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real,
since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the
declaration of alienability will not render the grant of
alienable public lands out of reach. The acquisition of
ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes
under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned
above, now allows the use of free patents. 31 It was
approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years
backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts may
qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA
are also open, particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — the absurdity —
of the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the
constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation
beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into
the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to
avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has
absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the
law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the
perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy
— a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If
only for this reason, we should avoid expanding —
through Naguit and the present ponencia — the plain
meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended byPD
1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly
discredits the ruling in Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an
incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to legal
correctness,Herbieto is in full accord with what we have
stated above; hence, it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an
incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective
legal possession prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable cannot strictly be obiter because it
responded to an issue directly raised by the parties.
Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have
fully resolved the case, but it cannot be faulted if it went
beyond this threshold issue into the merits of the claim of
effective possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than
the Naguit ruling that the ponencia passes off as the
established and definitive rule on possession under Section
14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that
no definitive ruling touching on Section 14 (1) can be
deemed to have been established in the present case since
the applicant Heirs could only prove possession up to 1948.
For this reason, the ponencia falls back on and examines
Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In short, if there is a perfect
example of a ruling that is not necessary for the resolution
of a case, that unnecessary ruling is the ponencia's ruling
that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
 Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only
to private lands. Thus, on plain reading, it does not apply to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that
Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way
of expanding the coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code
by directly applying civil law provisions on prescription on
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To
quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes
to enshrine as the definitive rule and leading case on
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.
With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and
thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on
a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being open, continuous and
exclusive, then the possessor may have
the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code
should be considered in the interpretation of Section 14 (2).
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce
of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1)
the Civil Code fully applies to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore
"private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, that these properties are within the commerce of
men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable
because of the above assumptions and its direct application
of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. This Section becomes
relevant only once the ownership of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain vests in the occupant
or possessor pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of the
PLA, with or without judicial confirmation of title, so that
the land has become a private land. At that point, Section
14 (2) becomes fully operational on what had once been an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the
public domain is clear from Article XII, Section 3 of the
Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself
provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal
with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution took it upon
itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state that
only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of the public
domain. It also laid down the terms under which lands of the
public domain may be leased by corporations and
individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress the
authority to classify agricultural lands of the public domain
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of the lands of
the public domain that may be acquired, developed, held or
leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the
choice on how it will act, specifically, whether it will pass a
general or a special law. On alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, Congress has, from the very
beginning, acted through the medium of a special
law, specifically, through the Public Land Act that by its terms
"shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber
and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws."
Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall
be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called
'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become property of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter
be enacted." 33 Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to
be a very specific act whose coverage extends only to lands
of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that
subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that
covers general rules on the effect and application of laws and
human relations; persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of acquiring
ownership; and obligations and contracts. 34 Its general
nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides
that: "In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the
PRD with respect to the latter's special focus — land
registration — and fully applies civil law provisions in so far
only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where
the Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in the case of
Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of
prescription under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD
have their own specific purposes and are supreme within
their own spheres, subject only to what the higher
Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the
PLA provides when the matter to be registered is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
 In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules
on property, including State property. It classifies property as
either of public dominion or of private ownership, 35 and
property for public use, public service and those for the
development of the national wealth as property of the public
dominion. 36 All property not so characterized are
patrimonial property of the State 37 which are susceptible to
private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be
overlooked that they refer to the properties of the State in
general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties. 40Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do
not refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. For
this specie of land, the PLA is the special governing law and,
under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall
apply only in case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question — can
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain at the
same time be patrimonial property of the State because they
are not for public use, public purpose, and for the
development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among
others, in the interaction discussed above between the PLA
and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on the other,
and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to
determine whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain has been made, then
the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA
recognizes is based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the
requirements of this Section are satisfied, the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain remains a State
property that can be disposed only under the terms of
Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the
question of whether — for purposes of prescription — an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription
does not run against the State. 42 In other words, there is
no room for any hairsplitting that would allow the
inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to
be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a
grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of
the patrimonial character of alienable and disposable public
lands under the norms of the Civil Code is rendered moot
and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain are owned by
the State, an applicant for land registration invoking Section
14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly show
that the land has been withdrawn from the public domain
through an express and positive act of the government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act
withdrawing a particular land from the mass of the public
domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing Public
Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance
with the required possession of agricultural public land
(under the first and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable
land of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the
manner and duration provided by law is equivalent to a
government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private
land. It is only at that point that the "private land"
requirement of Section 14 (2) materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the
original ponencia), I discussed ordinary acquisitive
prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone
unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that
prescription directly applies to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I
am happy to note that the present ponencia has adopted,
albeit without any attribution, part of my original academic
discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly
on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State and
prescription.
Specifically, I posited — assuming arguendo that
the Civil Code applies — that the classification of a public
land as alienable and disposable does not per se signify that
the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property,
to be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public
purpose or for the development of national wealth.
Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of
classification. The ponencia now concedes that "[T]here
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public use or the development of the national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear
case when the property has become private by the
government's own declaration so that prescription under the
Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no
inconsistency between this conclusion and the hierarchy of
laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To
reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and primary law
when a public land is classified as alienable and disposable,
and remains fully and exclusively applicable until the State
itself expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a
patrimonial property. At that point, the application of the
Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The
application of Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must
be given full application in considering lands of the public
domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the
Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed
by the consideration of applicable special laws — the PLA
and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the
public domain. The Civil Code and other general laws apply
to the extent expressly called for by the primary laws or to
supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that
the classification of public lands as alienable and disposable
does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is
wrong because:
 a. Under the Constitution's regalian
doctrine, classification is a
required step whose full
import should be given full
effect and recognition; giving
legal effect to possession prior
to classification runs counter
to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from
the time a public land is
classified as alienable and
disposable; thus, Section 48
(b) of this law and the
possession it requires cannot
be recognized prior to any
classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things
and rights which are
susceptible of being
appropriated may be the
object of possession." Prior to
the classification of a public
land as alienable and
disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot
have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring
alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain
under the Public Land Act; this
legal reality renders
the ponencia'sabsurdity
argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law
addresses the wisdom of the
law and is a matter for the
Legislature, not for this Court,
to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for
being based on legally-flawed premises and for being an
aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very
least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority
on the effective possession prior to classification since this
ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for
the resolution of the present case.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29,
2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186639. February 5, 2014.]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EMMANUEL
C. CORTEZ, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated February 17, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505. The CA affirmed
the Decision 3 dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-11496.
The Facts
On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez
(Cortez) filed with the RTC an application 4 for judicial
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located
at Barangay(Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro
Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110 square meters
and more particularly described as Lot No. 2697-B of the Pateros
Cadastre. In support of his application, Cortez submitted, inter
alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various
years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with
the annotation that the property is classified as alienable and
disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a
certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance
certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate dated March 21,
1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura
de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the
subject property to Felicisima Cotas — Cortez' mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of
General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte. SCHATc
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a
portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was
inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March
21, 1998, after his parents died, he and his siblings executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their
deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him was
the subject property. He alleged that the subject property had
been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that
the subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is,
in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD).
Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of
Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family of
Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since he came to know them.
On February 7, 2006, the RTC rendered a
Decision 5 which granted Cortez' application for registration, viz.:
WHEREFORE, finding the
application meritorious, the Court
DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and ORDERS the
registration of the applicant's title
thereto.
 As soon as this Decision shall
have become final and after payment of
the required fees, let the corresponding
Decrees be issued in the name of the
applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.
Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General, Land Registration Authority,
Land Management Bureau, and the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED. 6
In granting Cortez' application for registration of title to
the subject property, the RTC made the following ratiocinations:
From the foregoing, the Court
finds that there is sufficient basis to grant
the relief prayed for. It having been
established by competent evidence that
the possession of the land being applied
for by the applicant and his predecessor-
in-interest have been in open, actual,
uninterrupted, and adverse possession,
under claim of title and in the concept of
owners, all within the time prescribed by
law, the title of the applicant should be
and must be AFFIRMED and
CONFIRMED. 7
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the
CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for
registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the
requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner
pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel
of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented
that would establish his predecessors-in-interest's possession of
the same during the period required by law. That petitioner
claimed that Cortez' assertion that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of
the subject property for more than thirty (30) years does not
constitute well-neigh incontrovertible evidence required in land
registration cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have
been given weight by the RTC.
Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no
certification from any government agency that the subject
property had already been declared alienable and disposable. As
such, the petitioner claims, Cortez' possession of the subject
property, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.
On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision, 8 dismissed the petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC
Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled that Cortez was
able to prove that the subject property was indeed alienable and
disposable, as evidenced by the declaration/notation from the
BFD. DcSACE
Further, the CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession
of the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under
Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, 9 sufficed to
convert it to private property. Thus:
It has been settled that
properties classified as alienable and
disposable land may be converted into
private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusivepossession of at
least 30 years. Such property now falls
within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2) of PD 1529,
over which title by prescription can be
acquired. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529,
those who are in possession of alienable
and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as
open, continuous and exclusive for 30
years or more, may have the right to
register their title to such land despite
the fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
While it is significant to note
that applicant-appellee's possession of
the subject property can be traced from
his mother's possession of the same, the
records, indeed, show that his possession
of the subject property, following Section
14(2) [of PD 1529], is to be reckoned
from January 3, 1968, when the subject
property was declared alienable and
disposable and not way back in 1946, the
year when he inherited the same from
his mother. At any rate, at the time the
application for registration was filed in
2003, there was already sufficient
compliance with the requirement of
possession. His possession of the subject
property has been characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept
of an owner. 10 (Citations omitted)
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether
the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006,
which granted the application for registration filed by Cortez.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite
any specific provision of law under which authority Cortez'
application for registration of title to the subject property was
granted. In granting the application for registration, the RTC
merely stated that "the possession of the land being applied for by
[Cortez] and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual,
uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim of title and in
the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by
law[.]" 11 On the other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez'
application for registration was based on Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he
filed with the RTC, proffered that should the subject property not
be registrable under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, it could still be
registered under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(C.A. No. 141), or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073 12 in relation to Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the
Court deems it proper to discuss Cortez' application for
registration of title to the subject property vis-Ã -vis the provisions
of Section 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Applicants for original registration of title to land must
establish compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of P.D. No.
1529, which pertinently provides that:
Sec. 14.  Who may apply. —
The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1)  Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2)  Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the
Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal
requirements for the registration of the subject property under
Section 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land
acquired under Section 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073. "Under Section 14 (1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for
registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." 13
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence
a survey plan Csd-00-000633 14 (conversion-subdivision plan of
Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D, Pateros Cadastral Mapping) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained
the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map
No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as
alienable & disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development on Jan. 3,
1968. EcDSHT
However, Cortez' reliance on the foregoing annotation
in the survey plan is amiss; it does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property
remains part of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation, 15 the Court clarified that, the
applicant must at the very least submit a certification from the
proper government agency stating that the parcel of land subject
of the application for registration is indeed alienable and
disposable, viz.:
It must be stressed that
incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the present case, the only
evidence to prove the character of the
subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan
stating in effect that the said properties
are alienable and disposable. However,
this is hardly the kind of proof required
by law. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification
refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan
and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government
agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and
disposable. 16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, 17 the Court declared
that:
Respecting the third
requirement, the applicant bears the
burden of proving the status of the
land. In this connection, the Court has
held that he must present a certificate of
land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) or the
Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR.
He must also prove that the DENR.
Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is
 within the approved area per
verification through survey by the
CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by
the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established
by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present
evidence that the land she applied for
has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She
submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which
bears no information regarding the land's
classification. She did not bother to
establish the status of the land by any
certification from the appropriate
government agency. Thus, it cannot be
said that she complied with all requisites
for registration of title under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529. 18 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez
is not the kind of evidence required by law as proof that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from
the proper government agency as to the classification of the
subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence
showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the subject
property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to present any
incontrovertible evidence, Cortez' claim that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court
finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the same. Cortez failed
to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12,
1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mother's ownership and
possession of the subject property since 1946, the year in which
his mother supposedly inherited the same.
Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the
subject property since time immemorial, Cortez failed to present
any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest
indeed possessed the subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere
claim and not factual proof of possession. "It is a rule that general
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a
land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law
to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts
and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and
possession of the land." 19
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by
Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain why, despite his
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since time immemorial, it was
only in 1966 that his predecessors-in-interest started to declare
the same for purposes of taxation.
That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the subject property for fifty-seven (57) years at
the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would
likewise not entitle him to registration thereof under Section 14
(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original
registration of lands acquired by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws. "As Section 14 (2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically
provides, only private properties may be acquired thru
prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only
those properties, which are not for public use, public service or
intended for the development of national wealth, are considered
private." 20
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 21 the Court
however clarified that lands of the public domain that are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription
and, accordingly, eligible for registration under Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529, viz.:
The Civil Code makes it clear
that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by private persons
through prescription. This is brought
about by Article 1113, which states that
"[a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription," and that [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." HCEaDI
There are two modes of
prescription through which immovables
may be acquired under the Civil Code.
The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and
with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code
that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent
reason to impose such a rule. At the
same time, there are indispensable
requisites-good faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the
application of Articles 526, 527, and 528,
as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,
provisions that more or less speak for
themselves. 22 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be
an official declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by
prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials that
a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable
would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the period of
acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that
the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth. Thus:
Let us now explore the effects
under the Civil Code of a declaration by
the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted,
under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands
may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of
the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth"
are public dominion property. For as long
as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an
express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2),
and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth
that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized
by law. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Rizalvo, 24 the Court deemed it
appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz.:
On this basis, respondent
would have been eligible for application
for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30)
years. However, it is jurisprudentially
clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public
land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529 only begins from the moment the
State expressly declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. . . .
. 25 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that
are considered patrimonial may be acquired by prescription under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription
could commence, the property sought to be registered must not
only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be
declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use,
public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus,
absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be
property of public dominion. 26
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration
from the state attesting to the patrimonial character of the subject
property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has
begun to run against the State, much less that he has acquired
title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment
that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for 57 years at the time he
applied for the registration of title thereto. "[I]t is not the
notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated
periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an
official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its
private capacity or placed within the commerce of man for
prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be
overemphasized." 27
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
87505, which affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-
11496, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N-11496
is DENIED for lack of merit. cDSAEI
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, [February 5, 2014], 726
PHIL 212-228)
FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 163767. March 10, 2014.] application; 13 and that the land applied for, being actually a
portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River
Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, registration. 14
represented by THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner,vs.ROSARIO DE The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in
GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, respondent. behalf of the Government an opposition to the
application, 15 insisting that the land was within the unclassified
region of Paombong, Bulacan, as indicated in BF Map LC No. 637
dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the unclassified region
DECISION were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the
exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority of the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD); 16 and that the CFI did not acquire
jurisdiction over the application considering that: (1) the land was
beyond the commerce of man; (2) the payment of taxes vested no
BERSAMIN, J p: title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer. 17

This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof

Ruling of the CFI
by the applicant in proceedings for the registration of land under
Section 14 (1) and (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree). On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its
decision, 18 ordering the registration of the land in favor of
The Republic appeals the adverse decision the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently
promulgated on January 30, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals established her open, public, continuous, and adverse
(CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 10, 1981 by the possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30
erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan (now the Regional years, to wit:
Trial Court) in Registration Case No. 3446-M granting the
application of the respondent for the registration of her title
covering a parcel of land situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Since it has been established
Bulacan. 2 that the applicants and her predecessors-
in-interest have been in the open, public,
The respondent filed her application for land continuous, and adverse possession of
registration in the CFI in Bulacan. 3 The jurisdictional requirements the said parcel of land in the concept of
were met when the notice of initial hearing was published in the an owner for more than thirty (30) years,
Official Gazette for two successive weeks, 4 as evidenced by a that it, since 1926 up to the present time,
certification of publication. 5 The notice of initial hearing was also applicant therefore is entitled to the
posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan in a conspicuous place registration thereof under the provisions
in the municipal building of Paombong, Bulacan as well as on the of Act No. 496, in relation
property itself. 6 On June 2, 1977, at the initial hearing of the to Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
application, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposed an opposition in amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and
behalf of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Public Works. other existing laws.
Upon motion by the respondent and without objection from Fiscal
Reyes, the CFI commissioned the Acting Deputy Clerk of Court to WHEREFORE, confirming the
receive evidence in the presence of Fiscal Reyes. 7 order of general default issued in this
case, the Court hereby orders the
The records show that the land subject of the registration of this parcel of land Lot
application was a riceland with an area of 12,342 square meters 2633, Cad 297. Case 5, Paombong
known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by Cadastre[)] described in plan Ap-03-
plan Ap-03-001603; 8 that the riceland had been originally owned 001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records) and
and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio since 1907; 9 that on in the technical description (Exhibit F,
May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale, 10 had sold the page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de
land to Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of Romualda Guzman Vda. de Joson, of legal age,
Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent) had Filipino, widow and resident of Malolos,
inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, Bulacan.
the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and
possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against After the decision shall have
the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then; that the become final, let the corresponding
land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and decree be issued,
that the taxes due thereon had been paid, as shown in Official
SO ORDERED. 19
Receipt No. H-7100234. 11 HECTaA
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA,
In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes, 12 the Director
contending that the trial court had erred in granting the
of Lands and the Director of Forest Development averred that
application for registration despite the land not being the subject
whatever legal and possessory rights the respondent had acquired
of land registration due to its being part of the unclassified region
by reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost,
denominated as forest land of Paombong, Bulacan. 20 SDIaCT
abandoned or forfeited for failure to occupy and possess the land
for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
 Judgment of the CA
On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its
assailed judgment, 21 affirming the decision of the trial court
upon the following ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary
and testimonial evidence stood
unrebutted and uncontroverted by the
oppositor-appellant and they should
serve as proof of the paucity of the claim
of the applicant-appellee over the
subject property.
Upon the other hand,
oppositor-appellant, in a lackluster
fashion, advanced pro forma theories
and arguments in its Opposition which
naturally failed to merit any
consideration from the court a quo and
also from this Court. The indorsement
from the Bureau of Forest Development,
San Fernando, Pampanga to the effect
that the subject area is within the
unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan
does not warrant any evidentiary weight
since the same had never been formally
offered as evidence by the oppositor-
appellant. All the other allegations in the
Opposition field (sic) by the oppositor-
appellant failed to persuade this Court as
to the veracity thereof considering that
no evidence was ever presented to prove
the said allegations.
Such being the case, this
Court is not inclined to have the positive
proofs of her registrable rights over the
subject property adduced by the
applicant-appellee be defeated by the
bare and unsubstantiated allegations of
the oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED. 22
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue
(1)  WHETHER OR NOT THE
LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF
PRIVATE ACQUISITION; and
(2)  WHETHER OR NOT THE
TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION. 23
Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration
Decree state:
Section 14.   Who may apply.
— The following persons may file in the
proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives: cHSIAC
(1)  Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2)  Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 14 (1) deals with possession and occupation in
the concept of an owner while Section 14 (2) involves prescription
as a mode of acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, 24 the Court set the guidelines concerning land
registration proceedings brought under these provisions of
the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the
application and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in
her name by alleging that she and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time
immemorial. However, the Republic counters that the land was
public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The
determination of the issue hinges on whether or not the land was
public; if so, whether the respondent satisfactorily proved that the
land had already been declared as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; and that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic vs. Tsai, 25 the Court summarizes the
amendments that have shaped the current phraseology of Section
14 (1), to wit:
Through the years, Section
48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended
several times. The Court of Appeals failed
to consider the amendment introduced
by PD 1073. InRepublic v. Doldol,the
Court provided a summary of these
amendments:
The original
Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded
by R.A. No. 1942, which
 provided for a simple thirty- conformity with Section 14(1) of PD
year prescriptive period of 1529. 26
occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of Under Section 14 (1),therefore, the respondent had to
imperfect title. The same, prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and
however, has already been disposable land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or
amended by Presidential through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
Decree No. 1073, approved on continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
January 25, 1977. As the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June
amended, Section 48(b) now 12, 1945, or earlier. 27 It is the applicant who carries the burden
reads: of proving that the two requisites have been met. Failure to do so
warrants the dismissal of the application.
(b)  
Those who by The respondent unquestionably complied with the
themselves or second requisite by virtue of her having been in open, continuous,
through their exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
predecessors in since June 12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had
interest have been been passed on to her from her predecessors-in-interest; and
in open, tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale
continuous, evidencing the transfer of the property from Mamerto Dionisio to
exclusive, and Romualda Jacinto in 1926; 28 (2) Tax Declaration No. 4547
notorious showing that she had declared the property for taxation purposes
possession and in 1976; 29 and (3) Official Receipt No. H-7100234 indicating that
occupation of she had been paying taxes on the land since 1977. 30 The CFI
agricultural lands found her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-in-
of the public interest to have been open, public, continuous, and adverse in the
domain, under concept of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for
a bona fide claim more than 30 years, entitling her to the registration under the
of acquisition of provisions of Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No.
ownership, since 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236and other existing
June 12, 1945, or laws. 31 On its part, the CA ruled that the documentary and
earlier,immediatel testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the
y preceding the Republic. 32
filing of the
Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the
application for
respondent did not discharge her burden to prove the
confirmation of
classification of the land as demanded by the first requisite. She
title, except when
did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been
prevented by war
declared alienable and disposable by the State. During trial, she
or force
testified that the land was not within any military or naval
majeure. These
reservation, and Frisco Domingo, her other witness, corroborated
shall be
her. Although the Republic countered that the verification made
conclusively
by the Bureau of Forest Development showed that the land was
presumed to have
within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan as per BF
performed all the
Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927, 33 such showing was based
conditions
on the 1st Indorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the Bureau
essential to a
of Forest Development, 34 which the CA did not accord any
Government grant
evidentiary weight to for failure of the Republic to formally offer it
and shall be
in evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf
entitled to a
of the Government, argued that the land was a portion of the
certificate of title
Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control
under the
System, and could not be the subject of appropriation or land
provisions of this
registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant remained
chapter. (Emphasis
burdened with proving her compliance with the first requisite.
supplied) SECAHa
Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable
As the law now stands, a mere
and disposable classification of the land, the petitioner attached
showing of possession and occupation
as Annex A to her appellee's brief 35 the certification dated March
for 30 years or more is not sufficient.
8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Therefore, since the effectivity of PD
Resources-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be
(DENR-CENRO), 36 viz.: DTaSIc
shown that possession and occupation of
the piece of land by the applicant, by THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
himself or through his predecessors-in- parcel of land described on lot 2633
interest, started on 12 June 1945 or located at San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan
earlier. This provision is in total as shown in the sketch plan surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Carlos G. Reyes falls
 within the Alienable or Disposable Land
Project No. 19 of Paombong, Bulacan per
Land Classification Map No. 2934
certified on October 15, 1980.
However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000, 37 the CA
denied her motion to admit the appellee's brief, and expunged the
appellee's brief from the records. Seeing another opportunity to
make the certification a part of the records, she attached it as
Annex A of her comment here. 38 Yet, that attempt to insert
would not do her any good because only evidence that was
offered at the trial could be considered by the Court.
Even had the respondent's effort to insert the
certification been successful, the same would nonetheless be vain
and ineffectual. In Menguito v. Republic, 39 the Court pronounced
that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a
certification on the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain, to wit:
To prove that the land in
question formed part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is
inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map
No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing
on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-
000227).
This proof is not sufficient.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain,waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State....." (Emphasis
supplied.)
For the original registration of
title, the applicant (petitioners in this
case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless
public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a
title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown
by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case,
petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineer's notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority
to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared
alienable. 40 HTCSDE
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the
public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be
declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 we
explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established
to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. 42
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere
certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to
support the application for registration, because the applicant
must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as
alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. As the Court said in Republic v. Bantigue Point
Development Corporation: 43
The Regalian doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State. The applicant for land
registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of State
ownership by establishing through
incontrovertible evidence that the land
sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the
government.We held in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification
is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought
to be registered. The applicant must also
show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary has approved the land
classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that
an application for original registration
must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the
 original classification approved by the disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
DENR Secretary and certified as a true Classification Project No. 32-A,
copy by the legal custodian of the official per map 2962 4-I555 dated
records. December 9, 1980." This is
sufficient evidence to show
Here, respondent Corporation the real character of the land
only presented a CENRO certification in subject of private
support of its application. Clearly, this respondents' application.
falls short of the requirements for Further, the certification
original registration. 44 enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification
contradictory evidence, which
alone would have sufficed, the respondent's application would still
is true in this case. Worth
be denied considering that the reclassification of the land as
noting also was the
alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application
observation of the Court of
in court in 1976. The certification itself indicated that the land was
Appeals stating that:
reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.
The consequence of this is fittingly discussed in Heirs of Mario [n]o
Malabanan v. Republic,to wit: TaIHEA opposition was
filed by the
We noted in Naguit that it
Bureaus of Lands
should be distinguished from Bracewell v.
and Forestry to
Court of Appeals since in the latter, the
contest the
application for registration had been
application of
filed before the land was declared
appellees on the
alienable or disposable. The dissent
ground that the
though pronounces Bracewell as the
property still forms
better rule between the two. Yet two
part of the public
years after Bracewell,its ponente,the
domain. Nor is
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-
there any showing
Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.
that the lots in
Ceniza,which involved a claim of
question are
possession that extended back to 1927
forestal land. ..."
over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in Thus, while the
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,quoted Court of Appeals erred in
extensively from it, and following the ruling that mere possession of
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at public land for the period
registration in Ceniza should have failed. required by law would entitle
Not so. its occupant to a confirmation
of imperfect title, it did not
To prove that the
err in ruling in favor of private
land subject of an application
respondents as far as the first
for registration is alienable, an
requirement in Section 48(b)
applicant must establish the
of the Public Land Act is
existence of a positive act of
concerned, for they were able
the government such as a
to overcome the burden of
presidential proclamation or
proving the alienability of the
an executive order; an
land subject of their
administrative action;
application.
investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; As correctly found
and a legislative act or a by the Court of Appeals,
statute. private respondents were able
to prove their open,
In this case, private
continuous, exclusive and
respondents presented a
notorious possession of the
certification dated November
subject land even before the
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo
year 1927. As a rule, we are
M. Inting, the Community
bound by the factual findings
Environment and Natural
of the Court of Appeals.
Resources Officer in the
Although there are
Department of Environment
exceptions, petitioner did not
and Natural Resources Office
show that this is one of
in Cebu City, stating that the
them." cDTACE
lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and
 Why did the Court
in Ceniza,through the same eminent
member who
authored Bracewell,sanction the
registration under Section 48(b) of public
domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180
days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza,the
application for registration was filed
nearly six (6) yearsafter the land had
been declared alienable or disposable,
while in Bracewell,the application was
filed nine (9) years before the land was
declared alienable or disposable.That
crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell,a difference which the
dissent seeks to belittle. 45 (citations
omitted)
On the other hand, under Section 14 (2),ownership
of private lands acquired through prescription may be registered
in the owner's name. Did the respondent then acquire the land
through prescription considering that her possession and
occupation of the land by her and her predecessors-in-interest
could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of
their possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of
ownership for over 30 years?
Clearly, the respondent did not. Again, Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic is enlightening, to wit:
It is clear that property of
public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man. Lands of the public domain,
whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects
under the Civil Code of a declaration by
the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted,
under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands
may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of
the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth"
are public dominion property. For as long
as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth". AcHCED
Accordingly, there must be an
express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2),and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease
that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its
scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet
this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to
be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this
Court in the matter. The duty of the Court
is to apply the Constitution and the laws
in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law,
which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and
 pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles. 46

The period of possession prior to the reclassification of

the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessor. As pointedly clarified also in Heirs of Mario Malabanan
v. Republic: 47

Should public domain lands

become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or
duly promulgated proclamation that they
are no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession
prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in
counting the prescriptive period in favor
of the possessors? We rule in the
negative.

The limitation imposed by

Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that
the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial
may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to
the Civil Code. As the application for
registration under Section 14(2) falls
wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is
no way that possession during the time
that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify
registration. 48 EHSTDA

In other words, the period of possession prior to the

reclassification of the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant
because prescription did not operate against the State before
then.

WHEREFORE,the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the

decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 30,
2004; DISMISSES the application for land registration of
respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. de Joson respecting Lot 2633,
Cad-297 with a total area of 12,342 square meters, more or less,
situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the
respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Republic v. Vda. de Joson, G.R. No. 163767, [March 10, 2014])