Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO
DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971

LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in
his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as
Secretary, Department of National defense, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE

FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,

vs.

GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF GERARDO

TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY
SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine
Bar Association, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971

REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT. FILOMENO
M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his
capacity as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN
ORETA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971

GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et al., respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.

E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.

Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Fortunato de Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T.
David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.

Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.

Nuñez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.

E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.

Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.
Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for
November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates
and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including
practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries
which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No.
889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that

lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being
guided and directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage
of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and
have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging,
undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political
power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing
political social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government,
whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights
and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are
seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new
adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have
succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to
erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass
media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the
peaceful members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting
public safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly
attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and
serious injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to
maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as
 others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith.

Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the following persons, who,
having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its
validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:

1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners in Case No. L-
33964 — filed on August 24, 1971 — who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary — which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia
— to go and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
interrogation, and thereafter, detained;

2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 — filed, also, on August 24, 1971 — who was
picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then
detained;

3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 — or on August 28, 1971 — the same was amended to
include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that these
additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition
alleged nothing whatsoever as regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said
to be illegally deprived of their liberty;

4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 — filed on August 25, 1971 — who was similarly
arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the Constabulary;

5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 — on August 27, 1971 — upon the ground that
her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by
Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp Crame
stockade, Quezon City;

6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed — on August 30, 1971 — to intervene as one of the petitioners in
Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22,
1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and
brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon
the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by
members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna,
and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he
having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7
p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;

9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of St. Louis University,
Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara — in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance,
Philippine Bar Association — filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that
said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his
way to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and,
thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the
Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 — filed on September 7, 1971 — a 19-year old
student of the U.P. College in Baguio city — who, while allegedly on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on
August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to
Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos
C. Rabago — as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) — filed the
petition in Case No. L-34039 — on September 14, 1971 — against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on
August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal,
by agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon,
her husband was brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;

12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 — on October 26, 1971 — against said
Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS),
Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who
referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin
Castillo and another CIS against, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the
two (2), petitioner was detained illegally; and

13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 — filed on November 10, 1971 — who was apprehended, by
agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp Crame,
in the same City.

Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to answer the petitions therein,
which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 — which was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by
reference in the other cases, except L-34265 — alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and
detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their
continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this
country, and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in making said
declaration, the "President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the
various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full
account and disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security";
that the determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons"
and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to
Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "are under detention
pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are
still committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency and other
subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings
for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken
into custody on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that
petitioners come within the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventive
measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the
Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the
petitioners as well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired
and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of the
proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives
issued by proper authority."

These safeguards are set forth in:

1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in
connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught
inflagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National
Defense; that such authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears
satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject
to an afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless
supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary
or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons shall not be subject to greater
restraint than is necessary for their detention;

2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all units of his
command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than those specified in the
proclamation; that the same does not involve material law; that precautionary measures should be taken to forestall
violence that may be precipitated by improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the
proclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces
down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not
be harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's immediate family
shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the
Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in
connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and

4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to
hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.

Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang had been released
from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found that the evidence against them was insufficient."

In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of fact and
conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been
and is detained "on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance of
rebellion or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity of
which is not contested by him.

On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as
follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that

lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being
guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage
of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and
have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually] staging,
undertaking, [and] wagging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in
order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government,
and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one
whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose
notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts
are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teaching and beliefs;
 WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are
seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new
adherents from among our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have
succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to
erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media
organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted authorities,
against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful
members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on
August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to
maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all
others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and
[all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion]
thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.] 1

On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties
therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971.

Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by Proclamation No. 889-B,
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and
cities of the Philippine, namely:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.

2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol
5. Abra 19. Capiz
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
7. Batangas 21. Antique
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan.

B. SUB-PROVINCES:
 1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
2. Biliran

C. CITIES:

1. Laog 10. Bacolod

2. Dagupan 11. Bago
3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
5. Lipa 14. Bais
6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo
Occ.) 17. Roxas
8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu

20. Cebu 24. Tacloban

21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
22. Danao 26. Calbayog
23. Toledo

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the privilege of the writ in the
following provinces and cities:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur

2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
7. Agusan del Norte

B. CITIES:

1. Surigao 8. Tangub
2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
7. Oroquieta

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following
places:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay
3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
4. Kalinga-Apayao
 B. CITIES:

1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires

2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi

As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the following eighteen (18)
provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:

A. PROVINCE:

1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato

2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
9. Lanao del Norte

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Aurora 2. Quirino

C. CITIES:

1. Angeles 10. Manila

2. Baguio 11. Marawi
3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo

The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v.
Baker,2 and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castañeda,3 pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and
his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been
decided in the affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except
L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said cases could
have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however,
reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and should
inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ; but before proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the
inquiry to be undertaken, none of them having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5,
1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that —

... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to
satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations
Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons
detained or to be detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines,
which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen
 cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of
such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10,
par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are not
agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of
them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED
that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with cases Nos. L-
34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of
their respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971.

Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8, 1971, their willingness to
impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases, subject to appropriate security measures, the Court
met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners,
chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as
well as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col.
Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said Armed Forces, on
said classified information, most of which was contained in reports and other documents already attached to the
records. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occassionally, counsel for the petitioners,
propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time
within which to submit their respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and complemented by
some documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of
the aforesaid classified information.

In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties therein were heard
in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.

On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations — motions stating that on November 13, 1971,
the following petitioners were:

(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964

(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:

(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *

(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *

(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal:
 (1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **
(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying that the petitions in G.R.
Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution
of the remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said court — which was appended to said
manifestations-motions of the respondent as Annex 2 thereof — shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339,
is one of the defendants in said case.

Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, in his comment
dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on
the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and
that the main issue is one of public interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes,
one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose
respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is
not moot, not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ remains
suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply,
dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the above-named petitioners
rendered their respective petitions moot and academic.

Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated,
Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional
provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of our Constitution, reading:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same
may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:

The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of
"imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion — which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights —
petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was
predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements"
had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of
actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the
existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of the conspiracy and
the intent to rise in arms.

Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic by Proclamation No. 889-
A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said
Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by postulating the said
lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in
order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our
existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third "whereas" in
the original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of
rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security
of the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in
arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually
engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.

It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation and particularly, the
circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a
state of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having
in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself.
The pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly
emphasized — to justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence and
subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditions
obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A
has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.

II

Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the above-quoted
provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there
is actually a state of rebellion and
that4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order,
secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon the authority of Barcelon v.
Baker5 and Montenegro v. Castañeda.6 Upon the other hand, petitioners press the negative view and urge a
reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon
Martin v. Mott7 involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which — he being the commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces — may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the
privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign,
affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with
the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all government authority emanates.
The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more
weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the question: "Did the
Governor-General" — acting under the authority vested in him by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions — "act in conformance with such authority?" In
other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the
Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of correctness
which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short, the Court considered the question whether or not
there really was are rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under consideration.
Although some cases8 purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed
in said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction
that the conditions essential for the validity of said proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the
opposite view taken in other cases9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions
were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own
circumstances." 10 One of the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in Sterling
v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared
that:

.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private
rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an
appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a
case the Federal judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to its
exercise. .... 12

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus
that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of
the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon
further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to
inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by
the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates
the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" —
"when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period
the necessity for such suspension shall exist." 13 For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the
conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised.
These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and
the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the
Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise
in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially
democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element
of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the
right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce,
the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or
inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right — which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the
highest order — is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth
and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in
derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by
the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that
social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising publicly and taking
arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion — there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against
mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be — for dissidence amounting to
rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse — when the existence of such rebellion or
insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied — to uphold the finding of the Executive
thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving
him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule
of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent
danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.

As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines,
especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or
rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the
movement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the
devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the
Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat,
with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called HUKBALAHAP, during
the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation — which clashed several
times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210,
dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld
in Montenegro v. Castañeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950,
members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June
20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground —
stated in the very preamble of said statute — that.

... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes
a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; 17 and

... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but
international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there
is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country....

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee
of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —

The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass
organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines)
among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry;
the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted
all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand
of nationalism. 18
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which — composed
mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines
early in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted
People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter
alia:

The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a
people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the
worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is
genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous ...

xxx xxx xxx

The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist Party
of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are
favorable of asking the road of armed
revolution ... 19

In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National Defense — conducted
raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404
casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but the
NPA casualties more than doubled.

At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the
Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate
objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given
time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the
Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially
considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the
nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient
to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.

We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to
overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.

In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the size
of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public
safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate,
however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be
widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal
Code defining the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also,
from paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the
writ "wherever" — in case of rebellion — "the necessity for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of
Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only.
The case of In re Boyle 21involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a smaller area — a country of
the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of
the privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual
bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon
the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in
the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant 22 — the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to
determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its
power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases
the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review
decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said
decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for
the contested administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said
finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some
American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in bothjurisdictions,
have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or
"relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," 23 even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its
aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense in which the
term is used in judicial proceedings — before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test of
the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in
the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that:

... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy
adopted, with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are
both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ...

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General —

... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endanger by
the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President
did not act arbitrarily.

No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate
branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of
Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner
Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No.
889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior
to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts;
(c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21,
1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that
the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel for several petitioners
herein have admitted it.

With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the time of the suspension of
the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a
suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested
act of the Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to in some American cases to
justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction
by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly, illegal for
military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil courts were functioning normally.

Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not necessarily bear out
petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of
its logical effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of
them could not be located by the authorities, after August 21, 1971.

The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory that, according to
Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically
selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's
symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is
some demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its inhabitants. It would have
been highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much
bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.

We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New People's Army of the Communist
Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we consider that
it assumes that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's Army, and that
the latter is the only threat — and a minor one — to our security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous.

The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information and reports —
subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of
Seven 25 — to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a
swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of
uncooperative local official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and
3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970;
that the Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident,
the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the
bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at
Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo
Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the
Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.

Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that — as per said information and reports — the reorganized
Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the
paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the
people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive
and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of
armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the
CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the
youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations;
that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which
are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM)
and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred
forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater
Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and
twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major
demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five
hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front
organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed
agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that
twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the
injury of many more.

Subsequent events — as reported — have also proven that petitioners' counsel have underestimated the threat to
public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern
Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two
(2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed
group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela,
destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a
total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) BSDU
killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an
unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971,
there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which
a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have
been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by
Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and
offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation;
that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.

It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to intelligence findings,
definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the
Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army,
believed to have been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had
received intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations,
kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the
beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato
and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our
armed forces discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other
parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon
and Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data — except those related to events that happened
after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the
Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and
national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike
simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the
Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water
mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote,
he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.
He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was critical — as,
indeed, it was — and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it.
And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief.

Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege in the entire Philippines,
even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however, about the placed to be excluded from the
operation of the proclamation. He needed some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the
suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces, three (3) sub-
provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971, in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13)
cities; and, still later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total of forty-
eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a period of forty-five (45) days from
August 21, 1971.

Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared
a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No.
889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses
committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In
fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.

In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution,
three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called
out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

III

The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said Proclamation, as amended. In
other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended?

In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L-
34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013, were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently" —
meaning, perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them — upon the ground that, although there was reasonable
ground to believe that they had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient
to warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner
in L-33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose
benefit the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on said date,
"temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as Luzvimindo David, petitioner in
L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they
— together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large — having been accused, in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos
Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged — together with over fifteen (15) other persons, who
are, also, at large — with another violation of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City.
With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang — petitioners in L-33965 — who were released as early as August
31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr.,
Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were
released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby,
become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should, accordingly, be dismissed,
despite the opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the
privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, without just cause,
and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot. In any event, the common
constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint decision.

Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973,
Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The
suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for persons detained "for
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance thereof."

The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes,
Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with
a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and
Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with
said court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Proclamation No. 889,
as amended?

In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:

That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up to and including
August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in the Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt
acts became officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a
subversive association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a communist totalitarian
regime subject to alien domination and control;

That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party
of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:

1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the government,
engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public lands or
property from the law purposes for which they have been appropriated;

2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement activities not only

of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the united front
organizations of the Communist Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM), Movement for the Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang
Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students' Alliance for National Democracy
(STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural Association of the
University of the Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies,
demonstration and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to create
social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the people's confidence in
 the government; thru consistent propaganda by publications, writing, posters,
leaflets of similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar
means; or thru the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended to
promote the Communist pattern of subversion;

3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations, bombings,

sabotage, kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise the movement, build up its
morale and prestige, discredit and demoralize the authorities to use harsh and
repressive measures, demoralize the people and weaken their confidence in the
government and to weaken the will of the government to resist.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense:

a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public authorities;

b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief Executive;

c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;

d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;

e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15) years old.

Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, except that the second
paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the
same. 26

In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and subversion, of — in the
language of the proclamation — "other overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are
covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which the
detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been suspended.

Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles enunciated.

After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor
Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually
accused of an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step
would have been the following: The Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on
whether — as stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" — said petitioners had been apprehended and detained
"on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion."

It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 — or two (2) days before the proceedings relative to the
briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then
taken up — the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners. What is more, the
preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges contained in said complaints has already begun. The
next question, therefore, is: Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite
the formal and substantial validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are
actually charged with offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints
against them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being conducted therein?

The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and, so hold, that, instead
of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary
examination and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released could be ordered by the court of first
instance, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued,
should a probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners,
inasmuch as the preliminary examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to
establish that the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained upon
the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly
for the reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination
of the existence of probable cause, although ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of the
substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would
require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of
first instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings would be substantially the same
and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the
other.

Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion — in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the
effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The
detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..." — that the filing of the above-mentioned
complaint against the six (6) detained petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to
continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place
them fully under the authority of courts of justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his
liberty without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that, accordingly, We
should order their immediate release. Despite the humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been
espoused, the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it because:

(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid — and We so hold it to be —
and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not affect
the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us;

(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the validity and efficacy of the
suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges with the court
of first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners
so charged and that hey should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court — after conducting the
corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation — shall find that the prosecution has not established the
existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other
petitioners herein;

(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation — of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed
— is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view —
particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of
said preliminary examination and/or investigation — would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing
formal charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so
that courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection.

Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the constitutional right to bail is
affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon such
question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in settling
said question with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our view
thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without bail might still be decreed by the court of
first instance, should it hold that there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on the
right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that,
accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;

2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as
petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente,
Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are
concerned;

3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary
examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito
Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or,
otherwise, to order their release; and

4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned
preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection
therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.

5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 139255 : November 24, 2003

RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON,, Petitioner, v. HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ,

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the reversal of the Decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 267, in Special Proceedings No. 10948 dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner.

The Antecedents

SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police (PNP) filed an application with the RTC of Angeles
City, Pampanga, for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American
citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles listed therein at No. 17-21 Apple Street,
Hensonville Homes, Balibago, Angeles City, and the seizure thereof for violation of Article 176 of the Revised
Penal Code.2Judge Bernardita G. Erum granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 97-29 on November
29, 1997.3 The search was conducted on the said date; articles were seized and the petitioner and Bueta were
apprehended and detained. Among the articles found in the possession of the petitioner was U.S. Passport No.
Z4613110 issued on June 2, 1983 by the U.S. Embassy in Manila to and in the name of Raymond Michael Jackson,
born on October 17, 1951 in South Dakota; and U.S. Passport No. 085238399 issued on August 15, 1996 by the
New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana to and under the name of Steven Bernard Bator, born on August 20, 1949
in Detroit, Michigan.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Another application for a search warrant was filed by SPO3 Pedro B. Barsana, Jr. with the RTC of Makati City for
violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for the search of the premises at No. 5518 Second Floor,
Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner Pasay Road), Makati City under the contract of Raymond Jackson
a.k.a. Allen Miller and Bernard Bator and for the seizure of the articles described therein. Acting on the application
on November 28, 1997, Judge Pedro N. Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued Search Warrant No. 97-
029.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-2078 was filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Angeles City against the petitioner and Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.6cräläwvirtualibräry

When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond
Greene of the United States Embassy in the Philippines advised the Department of Justice on December 10, 1997
that the said passports had been cancelled.7Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner docketed as SDO No. BOC 97-46. On December 11,
1997, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order ordering the summary deportation of the petitioner to his
country of origin and directing the Chief of Civil Security Unit to implement the order within three days from notice
thereof, subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures - Office Memorandum No. ELM-97-
013.8 In the meantime, the name of the petitioner was included in the blacklist of the CID. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

Aside from the aforementioned criminal cases, other criminal cases were filed against Jackson with the RTC as
follows:

Criminal Case No. The Accused In What Court Cases

are Pending

1. 98-1155 Raymond Michael Jackson Makati RTC

alias Allen Miller Branch 133

2. 98-903 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC

Branch 135

3. 97-202 Raymond M. Jackson QC RTC

a.k.a. Allen Miller and Branch 83

Jaime Bueta

4. 98-1152 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC

Branch 13510cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 7, 1997, the Quezon City RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 97-202 after
posting a P6,000 bail.11cräläwvirtualibräry

On September 18, 1998, the Makati RTC issued an order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 directing the CID to hold
the departure of the petitioner from the Philippines in view of the pending criminal cases against
him.12 On September 28, 1998, the Makati RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 98-1152
after he posted bail in the amount of P40,000.13cräläwvirtualibräry

On October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CID for the reconsideration of the
BOC Order dated December 11, 1997 directing his deportation.14 He alleged inter alia that: (a) he was married to
Lily Morales by whom he had two children: Cristina Jackson and Judaline Jackson; (b) his status was converted into
that of a permanent resident on September 30, 1987 under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act, as amended with
Official Passport No. 3121487; (c) his deportation from the Philippines would deprive him of the opportunity to
defend himself in the criminal cases pending against him. He appended to his motion a copy of his marriage contract
with Lily Morales and their childrens birth certificates. On October 14, 1998, the CID issued an order denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

The petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the
CID which as of December 15, 1998 had not yet been resolved, 16pending the issuance of clearances from the NBI
and PNP, travel documents and an airplane ticket.

On May 18, 1999, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the Anti-Fraud Unit in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, issued a
certification that U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued to and under the name of Raymond Michael Jackson and No.
085238399 issued to Steven Bernard Bator had been cancelled because the persons appearing in the photographs
affixed in the said passports did not match those appearing in the photographs affixed in the original applications for
the issuance of the same.17 The CID issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 on May 21, 1999 for the petitioners
arrest for being an undesirable alien under Section 37(a), paragraph 9 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended,18 based on the hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 and the certification of Vice Consul
Tedd Archabal. The petitioner was arrested by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia of the Foreign Intelligence and Liaison
Office, PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who turned him over to the CID on the said
date.19cräläwvirtualibräry
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of the
CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus and the respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (b)
ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to whom the case would be raffled to conduct a hearing of the petition, to render
judgment and to serve a copy of its decision within two days from its promulgation. 20cräläwvirtualibräry

In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the respondents alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested
and detained at the CID on the basis of the summary deportation order issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997
and of the hold departure order of the Makati RTC in Criminal Case No. 98-1155; the petitioners petition for habeas
corpus was premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by
him.21 On July 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a
writ of habeas corpus.22cräläwvirtualibräry

The petitioner assails the decision of the RTC and prays for the reversal thereof, contending that:

A. RODRIGUEZ CANNOT ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST SINCE ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE THE
SAME.

B. ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT RODRIGUEZ CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST,

SUCH CAN ONLY BE ISSUED TO ENFORCE A FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION; HOWEVER, IN THE
INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION.

C. PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED.23cräläwvirtualibräry

The petitioner avers that under Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution, only judges are vested with
authority to issue warrants for the arrest of persons, including aliens. Even if it is assumed that the Commissioner of
the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest, this is limited only to those cases where a final order of
deportation had already been issued by the BOC, and only for the purpose of implementing the said order.
According to the petitioner, the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1999 is illegal; hence, null
and void. The petitioner was not apprised of any specific charges filed against him with the CID and was not heard
on the said charges as required by law before the order was issued. The petitioner asserts that there was no probable
cause for his arrest by the CID and that the respondents even violated the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of
Justice dated June 7, 1999.24 The petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Lao Gi v. CA25 to fortify his petition.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID is authorized under Section 37(a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens on the CIDs finding of the
existence of a ground for deportation. The petitioner cannot feign lack of due process because he filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the BOC
denied on October 14, 1998. When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued on May 21, 1999 to effect the arrest of
the petitioner, it was on the basis of a final and executory order of deportation. The RTC, for its part, held that (a)
the petition was premature because the petitioners petition with the CID to lift the summary order of deportation had
not yet been resolved by the BOC of the CID; (b) the petition for habeas corpus was inappropriate because the
petitioner was validly detained under a mission order issued by the Commissioner based on the order of deportation
issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997; (c) the petitioner is estopped from assailing his arrest and detention by
the CID.

The petition is dismissed.

Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a
writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. 26Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules
provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.27cräläwvirtualibräry

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to
be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such
supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained
person.28cräläwvirtualibräry

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such
restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the
petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such
process.29cräläwvirtualibräry

Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if it appears that the detained person is in
custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of restraint:

Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant
of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but
if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the
facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.

In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID
detention center at Bicutan, Paraaque City, under Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the
Order of the BOC dated December 11, 1997 which had become final and executory. The BOC found, after due
proceedings, that:

Records show that on 10 December 1997, Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the
Department of Justice that the U.S. passports which were confiscated from the abovenamed respondent when he was
arrested by PNP operatives in Angeles City on 30 November 1997 and purportedly issued to Raymond Michael
Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to have been tampered. As a consequence, said passports
were cancelled by the U.S. Embassy.

In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if
a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the
privilege to remain in the country.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the summary deportation of
NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON @ STEVEN BERNARD BATOR to his country of
origin subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum Order No. ELM-
97-013.

The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is hereby ordered to implement this Order within three (03) days from receipt
hereof.
Include respondents name on the Blacklist.

Give respondent a copy hereof.30cräläwvirtualibräry

The information relayed by U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene to the DOJ on December 10, 1997 was reiterated by
U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal in his certification forwarded to the DOJ on May 18, 1999, thus:

CERTIFICATION

I, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the United States hereby certify that United States Passport Number Z4613110
issued June 2, 1983 at the U.S. Embassy, Manila in the name of RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, born October
17, 1951 at South Dakota is a genuine United States Government document that has been altered and
photosubstituted.

I also certify that United States Passport Number 085238399 issued August 15, 1996 at the New Orleans Passport
Agency, Louisiana, in the name of STEVEN BERNARD BATOR, born August 20, 1949 at Detroit, Michigan, is a
genuine United States Government document that has been altered and photosubstituted, as well.

I further certify that a comparison of photographs affixed to U.S. Passports Number Z4613110 and 085238399
which were seized by Philippine National Police officers on or about November 29, 1997 from a man claiming to be
Raymond Michael Jackson and photographs affixed to the original applications for passports number Z4613110 and
085238399 in the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator on file with the U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC, revealed that these are not/not the same people. 31cräläwvirtualibräry

The petitioners arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to Section 37(a)(9) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which respectively reads:

SEC. 45. (d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material
fact;

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:

(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Forty-five and Forty-six of this Act, independent of
criminal action which may be brought against him:

In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,32 this Court held that such documents from a foreign embassy attesting to the
cancellation of the passports held by their national on the ground that the said passports were tampered with; hence,
cancelled were sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines:

The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of the petitioners contention that his passport could
not have been cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show
that the Philippine government was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.

Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese government belie the petitioners
submission that there was no evidence to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily,
these documents constitute sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the landmark case Forbes
v. Chuoco Tiaco, [t]he mere fact that a citizen or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him
from that allegiance which he owes to his government, and his government may, under certain conditions, properly
and legally request his return.33cräläwvirtualibräry
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in the CID and insist on being deprived by the
BOC of his right to due process as prescribed for in Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, thus:

(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion with the CID for the reconsideration of
the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC. The petitioner did not allege therein that he was not informed of the
charges against him. In fact, the petitioner did not even rebut the claim of the U.S. Vice Consul that the passport he
was carrying was tampered and had been already cancelled. Neither did he allege that he requested for the
reinstatement of his passport with the United States Embassy. Despite the finality of the deportation order of the
BOC, it still entertained the petitioners motion for reconsideration but denied the same on its findings that there were
inconsistencies in his sworn statement and the documents he presented in support of his motion, thus:

After going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order of 12 (sic) December 1997. Likewise, the
same had long become final and executory.

Furthermore, the grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are irrelevant. The alleged marriage of respondent
to a Filipina, a certain Lily Morales, with whom respondent allegedly begot two (2) children named Cristina and
Judaline both surnamed Jackson, and the supposed conversion of respondents status to permanent resident on 30
September 1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA No. 613, as amended), does not change the fact
that the two (2) US passports purportedly issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator which
were used by respondent, were tampered and subsequently cancelled by the U.S. Embassy. Respondent already lost
the privilege to remain in the country (Schonemann v. Comm. Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989).

It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn statement of respondent conducted by Special
Prosecutor Henry B. Tubban on 5 December 1997 with the documents attached in the motion. Hereunder are the
said inconsistencies:

1. Annex A of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract between the respondent and one Lily H.
Morales showing Manila City Hall as the place of marriage and which was held on 6 September
1984.

In the Sworn Statement, the respondent claimed to have entered the country for the first time only in 1988 (p. 1 of
sworn statement), that he married a certain Lily Morales sometime in 1989 in Angeles City (p. 2 of sworn
statement).

2. The motion stated that out of the union of the respondent with Ms. Morales, two (2) children named
Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, were born. In the sworn statement of the
respondent, he stated that they have five (5) children.

In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex A of motion), it was stated that Ms. Morales is 17 years of age, a minor.
However, below the personal circumstances of the respondent and Mrs. Morales is a statement in bold letters
that BOTH PARTIES ARE OF LEGAL AGES.

The foregoing creates a serious doubt on the allegations in the motion and on the authenticity of the documents
attached thereto. With more reason that the motion should be denied. 34cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a bail bond for his
provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his
permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under
the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID. 35cräläwvirtualibräry
The present as clearly as the petitioners petition to lift the order of deportation was as yet unresolved by the BOC
when he filed the petition for habeas corpus.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the RTC in Special
Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS,
BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY
BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM
VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and FIDEL V.
RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren M Mercado and Alexander Padilla for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus seeking the following relief:

WHEREFORE, petitioners pray this Honorable Court:

1. To immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to appear and produce the
bodies of Dr. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA
MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, forthwith
before this Honorable Court and to make due return of the writ therewith;

2. To issue, in addition or in the alternative to the writ of habeas corpus, a writ of mandamus
compelling the respondents to disclose the petitioners' present place of detention and to order the
respondents to allow counsel and relatives to visit and confer with the petitioners;

3. Pending the determination of the legality of their continued detention, to forthwith release the
detainees on bail upon such terms and conditions as the Court may fix, and after hearing, to order
petitioners' immediate release; and

4. To grant petitioners such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.

The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6, 1982 at about 1:45 p.m.
when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and
lst Lt. Baria, after securing a Search Warrant No. S-82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Viscaya conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid were
Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan,
Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's
residence which had been doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same day.

The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and
Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams.

On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by
the PC authorities.

The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter referred to sometimes as petitioners) were all detained at the PC/INP
Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of
August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained
petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however,
become moot and academic, and whereabouts of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina
Garcia-Padilla.

It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected
without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a search
warrant (No. 3-82) issued by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and nowhere
in said warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized
respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and other subversive
paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore,
illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA
383); that no criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees
were initially held at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6 up to August 10, 1982, but
were subsequently transferred by helicopter in the morning of August 10, 1982 to a place or safehouse known only
to respondents; that there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the
continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel
and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether
such commitment order has in fact been issued.

It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the
detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention from July 6 to August
10, 1982 at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya; however, when a certain Major Cristobal and Lt.
Marcos (alleged to be from the Camp Crame Intelligence Units) took full control of the investigation, counsels were
allowed to visit only on weekends; that when the detainees were transferred on August 10, 1982 to a place known
only to respondents, the detainees' counsels and relatives were not notified, raising the apprehension that petitioners'
constitutional rights to silence, to counsel and against self- incrimination are being violated; that counsels have tried
to locate if the detainees were taken to Camp Crame or Camp Bago Bantay but to no avail; that Major Forondo of
the PC Command in Nueva Viscaya informed Mrs. Josefina Padilla that the detainees were transferred to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, others to Echague, Isabela; that there seems to be a deliberate and concerted effort by
respondents to conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of detention, raising the apprehension that
respondents are using force, violence, threat, intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to obtain
confession and statements from the detainees in violation of their constitutional rights.

In the resolution of this Court en banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of habeas corpus was issued and respondents
were required to make a return of the writ. Hearing on the petition was set on August 26, 1982.

In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982. respondents, through the Solicitor General, alleged, to wit:
 I. AS TO HABEAS CORPUS

1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom Vasquez who was
temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982, are all being detained by
virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No.
1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17,
1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885.
...

2. The corresponding charges against the said detainees have been filed in court and before the
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they are pleading. A warrant of arrest against
detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of
Bayombong, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. ...

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON HABEAS CORPUS

3. The persons named in the above-mentioned Presidential Commitment Order were arrested and
are being detained for offenses with respect to which under Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the
Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of Martial
Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two autonomous
regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shag continue; and in all other places
the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to
persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposals to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts cannot inquire into the
validity and cause of their arrest and detention.

4. The power of the President in an emergency, such as that which necessitated the continued
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to order the detention of persons believed
engaged in crimes related to national security is recognized. (Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 83;
Luneta, et al. vs. Special Military Commission, No. 1, et al., 102 SCRA 56).

5. In the instant petition, petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla does not appear to have been
authorized by the thirteen (13) other detainees to represent them in the case at bar."

Accordingly, the petition was duly heard on August 26, 1982. After hearing, the Court issued the following
resolution, to wit:

G.R. No. 61388 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Insurance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los
Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan,
 Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada and Tom Vasquez; Josefina Garcia-
Padilla vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Lt. Col.
Miguel Coronel.)- The return of the writ of habeas corpus and answer to the prayer for mandamus
filed by the Solicitor General for respondents in compliance with the resolution of August 17,
1982 is NOTED.

At the hearing of this case this morning, former Senator Jose W. Diokno, Attorneys Alexander A.
Padilla and Efren H. Mercado appeared for petitioner. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and
Assistant Solicitor General Ramon A. Barcelona, appeared for the respondents. All of the
detainees, except Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, were present in
Court; Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de
los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan,
Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. and Juanito Granada. Attorney Alexander A. Padilla argued
for the petitioner. Solicitor General Mendoza argued for the respondents. Former Senator Diokno
argued in the rebuttal. The Court Resolved to require the Solicitor General to SUBMIT within five
(5) days from date the documents relevant to the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order.
Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

As required, the Solicitor General submitted the documents relevant to the issuance of the Presidential Commitment
Order on August 27, 1982, after which the case was submitted for resolution.

The fundamental issue here, as in all petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus, is whether or not petitioners' detention
is legal. We have carefully gone over the claims of the parties in their respective pleadings as well as in the oral
argument during the hearing on August 26, 1982, and We find that petitioners have not been illegally deprived of
their constitutional right to liberty, neither in the manner of their arrest, nor by their continued detention, and that the
circumstances attendant in the herein case do not warrant their release on a writ of habeas corpus.

1. At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6, 1982, records reveal that
they were then having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day.
Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9)
detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving in top of their conference table numerous
subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a
plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38
cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six
hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for
distribution, as sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that
circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without
a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under
existing jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence.

From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore,
without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of
the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging
a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In the language of Moyer vs. Peabody, 1 cited
with approval in Aquino, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, 2 the President " shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that
end that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of
those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but
are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power."

Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of Presidential
Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive. "When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter
involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment.
Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." 3 What should be underscored is
that if the greater violation against life itself such as killing, will not be the subject of judicial inquiry, as it cannot be
raised as transgressing against the due process clause that protects life, liberty and property, lesser violations against
liberty, such as arrest and detention, may not be insisted upon as reviewable by the courts.

3. Transcendentally important, therefore, is the question of whether the issuance of a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation
No. 2045 covered offenses. This question has to be set at rest promptly and decisively, if We are to break a
seemingly continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitioners being
filed in this Court one after the other.

The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of the offenses
covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a
means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of
public safety continues.

The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that
the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of
rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure
the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the
government and duly constituted authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along
which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which contingency does not present a legal
question on whether there is a violation of the right to personal liberty when any member of the invading force is
captured and detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to the life of the Nation besets
the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In the discharge of this awesome and sacred
responsibility, the President should be free from interference. The existence of warlike conditions as are created by
invasion, rebellion or insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond
dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or interference from whatever source. If
freedom from judicial review is conceded in the exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and of
granting pardon, denominated as political powers of the President, it should incontestably be more so with his
wartime power, as it were, to adopt any measure in dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be effective, the occasion for
its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound judgment of the President, at least
while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter,
likewise, which should be left for the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's
armed forces. The need for a unified command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic
military concept in the art of warfare.

4. From the clear language of the Lansang case, 4 "the function of Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. " If, however, the constitutional right to bail
is granted to the herein petitioners by the court, through the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of
court, what inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2045, of persons who come under its coverage.

The specific mention in the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along with invasion and imminent danger
thereof, shows that the terms "rebellion and insurrection" are used therein in the sense of a state or condition of the
Nation, not in the concept of a statutory offense. What, therefore, should determine the legality of imposing what is
commonly referred to as "preventive detention" resulting from the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is
the necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress or quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity for
such measure as a means of defense for national survival quite clearly transcends in importance and urgency the
claim of those detained to the right to bail to obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of
the constitutional grant of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasions expressly
mentioned in the charter. For what indeed could the purpose be of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus other than to restrict, at least for the duration of the emergency of invasion or rebellion, the right to personal
liberty, dictated as it is, in the greater interest of public safety and national security.

So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not only rebellion or insurrection as coming within the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also other offenses, including subversion which is not mentioned in
the Constitution, committed by reason or on the occasion of the rebellion, or in connection therewith, or in the
furtherance thereof. There need be no alarm over what libertarian jurists fear as violation of the constitutional right
to personal liberty when the President decrees the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Only those who give
cause for it will be subject to restriction of their liberty, as the necessity therefor arises in the interest of national
defense and survival. The constitutional guarantee of individual freedom is intact in all its plenitude and sanctity,
save only as the Constitution has envisioned the need for its limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the entire
population, as the Constitution itself permits in case of overwhelming and imperious necessity.

5. Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is the fact that the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been deliberately vested on the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
together with the related power to call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence and impose martial
law. 5The choice could not have been more wise and sound, for no other official may, with equal capability and
fitness, be entrusted with the grave responsibility that goes with the grant of the authority. The legislature was
considered in the alternative upon which to lodge the power, or to share in its exercise, but the distilled wisdom of
the Constitutional Convention finally made its choice for the President alone.

As previously noted, "invasion" which is not a statutorily-defined offense and "imminent danger thereof" as
mentioned in the Constitution indicate that "rebellion and insurrection" are also mentioned therein not in their
concept as statutorily-defined public crimes, but as a state or condition of extreme emergency resulting from the
existence of the aforesaid events. Now, if captured enemies from the invading force may not be charged with any
statutory offense that would provide the occasion to demand the right to bail, it is obvious that persons engaged in
rebellion or insurrection may not claim the right to be released on bail when similarly captured or arrested during the
continuance of the aforesaid contingency. They may not even claim the right to be charged immediately in court, as
they may rightfully do so, were they being charged with an ordinary or common offense. This is so because
according to legal writers or publicists, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "has the sole
effect of allowing the executive to defer the trials of persons charged with certain offenses during the period of
emergency." 6 This clearly means denial of the right to be released on bail on being charged in court with bailable
offenses.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to
bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested or captured, cease to be as committed
to the cause of the movement. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how rebellion is committed,
involving a great mass of confederates bound together by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued
participation in the criminal act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of the
movement of which he continues to be an ardent adherent and ally. It is simple logic then to hold that there should
be no legal compulsion for a captured rebel to be charged in court, only to be released on bail, while he is,
realistically and legally, still as much as part and parcel of the movement, continuing as it is, as those still engaged
in carrying on actively to attain their goal of overthrowing the established regime. Hence, it is easy to perceive how
impressed with absolute verity is the opinion expressed by two acknowledged authorities on Constitutional law in
our country, 7 which We quote:

... If the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended and detained in areas
where the privileges of the writ have been suspended or for the crimes mentioned in the executive
proclamation, the court will suspend further proceedings in the action.

Impeccable as it is, the opinion could not but find a resonant echo as it did in the recent case of Buscayno vs.
Military Commission; 8 decided after Proclamation No. 2045 was issued, which in terms clear and categorical, held
that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended with
respect to certain crimes as enumerated or described in the abovementioned Proclamation.

It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture government troopers or kidnap private
individuals, they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded by the herein petitioners, particularly
to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As a matter of common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are
not only not given the right to be released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be
liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is,
among others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of
their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have
over those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least,
minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy. It would, therefore, seem to be ignoring
realities in the name of misplaced magnanimity and compassion, and for the sake of humanity, to grant the demand
for respect of rights supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution by those who themselves seek to destroy that very
same instrument, trampling over it already as they are still waging war against the government. This stark actuality
gives added force and substance to the rationale of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
case of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it.

6. Invoking the Lansang case, 9 however, petitioners would ask this Court to review the issuance of the PCO against
them, intimating that arbitrariness attended its issuance because, relying on the evidence supposedly available in the
hands of the military, they claim they are not guilty of rebellion. They also contend that the provisions of LOI No.
1211 have not been complied with.

The Lansang case went no further than to pronounce the suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus on
August 21, 1971, valid and constitutional, on a finding that there was no arbitrariness attendant to the suspension. It
never intended to suggest that for every individual case of arrest and detention, the writ of habeas corpus is
available, even after the suspension of this privilege, to question the legality of the arrest and detention on ground of
arbitrariness. When a person is charged in court for an ordinary offense, the law does not authorize the filing of a
petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that there is absolutely no evidence to hold him for trial, which, in
effect, constitutes an allegation of arbitrariness in the filing of the case against him. The law has afforded him
adequate safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the requirement of determining the existence of a probable cause
by the judge before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The finding of such probable cause may not be immediately
brought for review by this Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, on the claim of arbitrariness. The matter is to be
decided on the basis of the evidence, and this Court is not the proper forum for the review sought, not being a trier of
facts. If such a procedure were allowed, it would be easy to delay and obstruct the prosecution of an offense by a
resort to a petition for habeas corpus based on arbitrariness, which most accuse, if not all, would be most inclined,
specially when they are out on bail. The petition now before Us is exactly one of this kind. If granted, the effect is to
transfer the jurisdiction of the trial courts in criminal cases to this Court, which is simply inconceivable. Moreover,
arbitrariness, while so easy to allege, is hard to prove, in the face of the formidable obstacle built up by the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Unexhilaratingly, this is the revealing experience of
this Court in the Lansang case, where it doubtlessly realized how hardly possible it is to adduce evidence or proof
upon which to show the President having acted with arbitrariness.

7. The last question relates to the legality of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued by the President on
July 12, 1982, tested by the conformity of its issuance to the procedure laid down under LOI 1211, petitioners
insisting that the LOI limits the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in or
charged with, the crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045. They contend that the procedure prescribed in the
LOI not having been observed, the PCO issued thereunder did not validate the initial illegal arrest of the herein
petitioners as wen as their continued detention.

It must be noted that LOI No. 1211, which provides the guidelines in the arrest and detention of persons engaged in,
or charged with, the crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045, charged with, the crimes mentioned contemplates
of three situations when an arrest can be made, to wit:

1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge;

2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of a law enforcement
agency after it is determined that the person or persons to be arrested would probably escape or
commit further acts which would endanger public order and safety. After the arrest, however, the
case shall be immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal or to the municipal, city, circuit,
or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the evidence warrants, shall
file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, we a warrant of arrest;

3. The military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency may apply to the President
thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential Commitment Order under the following
circumstances:

(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without

endangering public order and safety; or

(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by
virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and safety.

Petitioners appear to place entire reliance on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI No. 1211, ignoring paragraph 3 of LOI No.
1211, which provides:

3. The above notwithstanding, the military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency
may apply to the President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential Commitment
Order covering the person or persons believed to be participants in the commission of the crimes
referred to in paragraph 1 under the following circumstances:
 (a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without
endangering public order and safety; or

(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by
virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and safety.

The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the alleged necessity of judicial warrant before a
person may be arrested and detained is not well-founded. Neither is the contention that paragraph 3 of LOI 1211
applies only when judicial process is not possible. This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when
viewed in its entirety. Even in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the judgment of the
President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would endanger the public order or safety, a PCO is
justified. So, too, when release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger.

By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive of the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate objective
of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045.
The purpose is "to insure protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public order and
safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible overthrow of the government and duty
constituted authorities. " LOI 1211 does not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest
and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that
he (President) would subject himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal judicial processes in
the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary
investigation is conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an intention on the part of
the President in issuing LOI 1211 seems to do so in their view that LOI forms part of the law of the land under the
1976 amendment of the Constitution. 10 They would then contend that a PCO issued not in compliance with the
provisions of the LOI would be an illegality and of no effect.

To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the exercise of his
extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution,
whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason
that in his judgment requires immediate action. There can be no pretense, much less a showing, that these conditions
prompted the President to issue LOI 1211. Verily, not all LOI issued by the President should be dignified into
forming part of the law of the land.

In the event then that the judge believes no warrant shall issue, the President, under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045 and Letter of Instruction No. 1211, is not bound by such finding, as explicitly provided in paragraph 2 of LOI
1211. That the President avails of the facilities of the judicial machinery, as is the clear intent of LOI 1211, to aid
him in exercising his power to restrain personal liberty, as dictated by the necessities and exigencies of the
emergency, does not indicate any intention on his part to renounce or to allow even mere curtailment of his power
such that the judicial process will thereupon take its normal course, under which the detainees or accused would then
be entitled to demand their right of due process, particularly in relation to their personal liberty. 11 The issuance of
the PCO by the President necessarily constitutes a finding that the conditions he has prescribed in LOI 1211 for the
issuance of that PCO have been met, and intends that the detention would be pursuant to the executive process
incident to the government campaign against the rebels, subversives and dissidents waging a rebellion or
insurrection. The ruling in the Nava vs. Gatmaitan case,* as above intimated, must have shown him that to prosecute
the offense through the judicial process of forthwith instead of deferring it, would neither be wise nor expedient if he
were to deal effectively with the grave emergency at hand.

What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a view to reverting to the ruling
of Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952), that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts,
and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of
the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act." Judicial interference was thus held as permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President
acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if We consider that with
particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency he
has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Art. VII of the Constitution partakes of military measures,
the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the
presidential actions. On these occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and
its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable
only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not
fail them.

In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then Justice Fernando, now our learned Chief Justice, went along with
the proposition that the decision of the Executive in the exercise of his power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is his alone, and in his own language, is "ordinarily beyond the ken of the Courts." This is so, as the
Founding Fathers must have felt that in the particular situations at hand, the Executive and the Judiciary should
maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence of the doctrine of "political question, " as
determining the justiciability of a case. The wisdom of this concept remains well-recognized in advanced
constitutional systems. To erase it from our own system as seems to be what was done in the Lansang case, may
neither be proper nor prudent. A good example could be given in the exercise of the presidential power of pardon
which is beyond judicial review, specially under the new Constitution where the condition that it may be granted
only after final conviction has been done away with.

True, the Constitution is the law "equally in war and in peace," 12 as Chief Justice Fernando cited in his brilliant
separate opinion in the same Lansang case. Precisely, it is the Constitution that gives the President specific "military
power" in times of warlike conditions as exist on the occasion of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Both power and
right are constitutionally granted, with the difference that the guarantee of the right to liberty is for personal benefit,
while the grant of the presidential power is for public safety. Which of the two enjoys primacy over the other is all
too obvious. For the power is intended as a limitation of the right, in much the same way as individual freedom
yields to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of general welfare. The difference again is that
the power comes into being during extreme emergencies the exercise of which, for complete effectiveness for the
purpose it was granted should not permit intereference, while individual freedom is obviously for full enjoyment in
time of peace, but in time of war or grave peril to the nation, should be limited or restricted. In a true sense then, our
Constitution is for both peacetime and in time of war; it is not that in time of war the Constitution is silenced. The
Founding Fathers, with admirable foresight and vision, inserted provisions therein that come into play and
application in time of war or similar emergencies. So it is that, as proclaimed by the Constitution, the defense of the
State is a prime duty of government. Compulsory military service may be imposed, certainly a mandate that
derogates on the right to personal liberty. It, therefore, becomes self-evident that the duty of the judiciary to protect
individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the State perishes, the
Constitution, with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty, perishes with it.

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of legislation to the
President. 13 Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the
judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency
powers in recognition of the same necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's
sole and unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on
the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial inquiry of
presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh
impossible it is for the courts to contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives
occasion for the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing
Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two jealous powers with
tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine
of "political question" in reference to the power of judicial review. 14

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords further reason for the reexamination of the
Lansang doctrine and reversion to that of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda.
Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution, the
President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the Executive to
defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary
consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power
could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the United States for which
reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the Constitutional., 15 Incidentally, it seems
unimaginable that the judiciary could subject the suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same
inquiry as our Supreme Court did with the act of the President, in the Lansang case, to determine if the Congress
acted with arbitrariness.

We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive
prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of
"political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed
violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning the doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to every man should be
sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the
discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes
the protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it
reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would
not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.

Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners, their
continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released even after the filing of charges against
them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house
arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 235935, February 06, 2018

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, EDGAR R. ERICE, TEDDY

BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., GARY C. ALEJANO, AND EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, Petitioners, v.SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D.
ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
N. LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 236061, February 06, 2018

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, NOLI VILLANUEVA, RIUS VALLE, ATTY. NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, DR. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR. CRISTINA E.
PALABAY, BAYAN MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVES EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS AND ARLENE D.
BROSAS, ANAKPAWIS REPRESENTATIVE ARIEL B. CASILAO, ACT TEACHERS'
REPRESENTATIVES ANTONIO L. TINIO,AND FRANCISCA L. CASTRO, AND KABATAAN
PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, Petitioners, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO
DUTERTE, SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, HOUSE SPEAKER PANTALEON
ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF-OF-STAFF GEN. REY LEONARDO
GUERRERO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALDO DELA
ROSA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 236145, February 06, 2018

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, Petitioner, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, REPRESENTED BY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTER GENERAL REY L.
GUERRERO, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALDO M. DELA
ROSA, AND THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL III, AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER PANTALEON D.
ALVAREZ, Respondents.

G.R. No. 236155, February 06, 2018

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, DINAGAT ISLANDS REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE J. BAG-AO, RAY

PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, NOLASCO RITZ LEE B. SANTOS III, MARIE HAZEL E. LAVITORIA,
NICOLENE S. ARCAINA, AND JOSE RYAN S. PELONGCO, Petitioners, v. SENATE PRESIDENT
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN
N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)
SECRETARY (OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) EDUARDO M. AÑO, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty
will, after a time, give way to its dictates. - Alexander Hamilton

There is an ongoing rebellion in the Philippines. NPA rebels, Maute rebels, ASG rebels, BIFF rebels, Islamic
fundamentalists and other armed groups are on the loose. They are engaged in armed conflict with government
forces; they seek to topple the government; and they sow terror and panic in the community. To ignore this reality
and to claim that these are non-existent is to court consequences that endanger public safety.

A state of martial law is not the normative state. Neither does it take a perpetual form. It is an extraordinary power
premised on necessity meant to protect the Republic from its enemies. Territorial and temporal limitations germane
to the Constitutional prerequisites of the existence or persistence of actual rebellion or invasion and the needs of
public safety severely restrict the declaration of martial law, or its extensions. The government can lift the state of
martial law once actual rebellion no longer persists and that public safety is amply ensured. Should the government,
through its elected President and the Congress, fail in their positive duties prescribed by the Constitution or
transgress any of its safeguards, any citizen is empowered to question such acts before the Court. When its
jurisdiction is invoked, the Court is not acting as an institution superior to that of the Executive or the Congress, but
as the champion of the Constitution ordained by the sovereign Filipino people. For, after all, a state of martial law,
awesome as it is perceived to be, does not suspend the operations of the Constitution which defines and limits the
powers of the government and guarantees the bill of rights to every person.

The Case

These are consolidated petitions,1 filed under the third paragraph, Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution,
assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners in
G.R. No. 235935 alternatively, but not mandatorily, invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 pray for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing the one-year
extension.

The Antecedents

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, 2 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60)
days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that
impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 3 while the
House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050,4 both expressing full support to the Proclamation and
finding no cause to revoke the same.

Three separate petitions5 were subsequently filed before the Court, challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Decision rendered on July 4, 2017, the Court found sufficient factual bases for the
Proclamation and declared it constitutional.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a
Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 6extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

In a letter7 to the President, through Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana), the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended
the further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 "for compelling reasons based on current security assessment."
On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the President
"primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other
like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist
terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and
reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and
prosperity in Mindanao."8

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter 9 dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the
House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such
period as the Congress may determine. Urging the Congress to grant the extension based on the "essential facts" he
cited, the President wrote:
A further extension of the implementation of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the Philippine National Police (PNP), and all other law enforcement agencies
to quell completely and put an end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the same from escalating to
other parts of the country. Public safety indubitably requires such further extension, not only for the sake of security
and public order, but more importantly to enable the government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger
task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic growth and development.10
Attached to the President's written request were the letters of Secretary Lorenzana 11 and General
Guerrero12 recommending the one-year extension.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both
Houses No. 413 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. In granting the President's
request, the Congress stated:
WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the
period of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute
brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and
training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been
monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took
advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up
terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerrilla warfare against the security sector
and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the
country's democratic form of government with Communist rule.

WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the Congress of the Philippines to extend, at
the initiative of the President, such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress of the
Philippines, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it;

WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines
in a Joint Session by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its Members, has
determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety indubitably requires the further extension of the
Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao; Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in a Joint Session
Assembled, To further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a period of one (1) year from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.14
The Parties' Arguments

A. Petitioners' case

Based on their respective petitions and memoranda and their oral arguments before this Court on January 16, 2018
and January 17, 2018, petitioners' arguments are summarized as follows:
(a) The petitioners' failure to attach the Congress' Joint Resolution approving the extension is not fatal to the
consolidated petitions. Such failure is justified by the non-availability of the Resolution at the time the petition was
filed. In any case, the Rules on Evidence allow the Court to take judicial notice of the Resolution as an official act of
the legislative.15

(b) The doctrine of presidential immunity does not apply in a sui generis proceeding under Section 18, Article VII as
such immunity pertains only to civil and criminal liability. 16 In this proceeding, the President is not being held
personally liable for damages, or threatened with any punishment. If at all, he is being held to account for non-
compliance with a constitutional requirement.17

(c) The principle of conclusiveness of judgment is not a bar to raising the issue of the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the extension, being different from the factual and legal issues raised in the earlier case of Lagman v.
Medialdea.18 At any rate, the Court's decision in Lagman is transitory considering the volatile factual
circumstances.19 Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas (Fr. Bernas) emphasized during the deliberations on the 1987
Constitution that the evaluation of the Supreme Court in a petition which assails such factual situation would be
"transitory if proven wrong by subsequent changes in the factual situation." 20

(d) As to the scope and standards of judicial review, petitioners in G.R. No. 236145 assert that the standard for
scrutiny for the present petitions is sufficiency of factual basis, not grave abuse of discretion. The former is, by
constitutional design, a stricter scrutiny as opposed to the latter. Moreover, the Court is allowed to look into facts
presented before it during the pendency of the litigation. This includes, for example, admissions made by the
Solicitor General and the military during oral arguments, as they attempted to show compliance with the
constitutional requirements.21

In contrast, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 argue that the standard to be used in determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the extension is limited to the sufficiency of the facts and information contained in the President's
letter dated December 8, 2017 requesting for the extension and its annexes. 22

(e) As to the quantum of proof, petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 insist that clear and convincing evidence is necessary
to establish sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law instead of the "probable cause" standard set
in Lagman. In comparison to the initial exercise of the extraordinary powers of proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, their extension must have had the benefit of sufficient time
to gather additional information not only on the factual situation of an actual rebellion, but also the initial exercise of
the Executive during its initial implementation.23 Petitioners further argue that given its critical role in the system of
checks and balance, the Court should review not only the sufficiency of the factual basis of the re-extension but also
its accuracy.24

(f) As to the onus of showing sufficiency of the factual bases for extending martial law, petitioners in G.R. Nos.
235935 and 236145 contend that the President bears the same. Petitioners in G.R. No. 236155, however, argues that
both the President and the Congress bear the burden of proof.

(g) In relation to the Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law
or any extension thereof, the military cannot withhold information from the Court on the basis of national security
especially since it is the military itself that classifies what is "secret" and what is not. The Court's power to review in
this case is a specific and extraordinary mandate of the Constitution that cannot be defeated and limited by merely
invoking that the information sought is "classified." 25

(h) The Congress committed grave abuse of discretion for precipitately and perfunctorily approving the extension of
martial law despite the absence of sufficient factual basis.26 In G.R. No. 235935, petitioners impute grave abuse of
discretion specifically against the "leadership and supermajority" of both Chambers of Congress, arguing that the
extension was approved with inordinate haste as the Congress' deliberation was unduly constricted to an indecent 3
hours and 35 minutes. The three-minute period of interpellation (excluding the answer) under the Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress was inordinately short compared to the consideration of ordinary legislation on second reading.
Further, a member of Congress was only allowed a minute to explain his/her vote, and although a member who did
not want to explain could yield his/her allotted time, the explanation could not exceed three minutes.27 Petitioners in
G.R. No. 236061 highlighted the limited time given to the legislators to interpellate the AFP Chief, the Defense
Secretary and other resource persons and criticized the Congress' Joint Resolution for not specifying its findings and
justifications for the re-extension.28

(i) The Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, not a series of extensions amounting to perpetuity. As regards the Congress' discretion to
determine the period of the extension, the intent of the Constitution is for such to be of short duration given that the
original declaration of martial law was limited to only sixty (60) days. 29 In addition, the period of extension of
martial law should satisfy the standards of necessity and reasonableness. Congress must exercise its discretion in a
stringent manner considering that martial law is an extraordinary power of last resort. 30

(j) The one-year extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus lacked sufficient factual basis because there is no actual rebellion in Mindanao. The Marawi siege and the
other grounds under Proclamation No. 216 that were used as the alleged bases to justify the extension have already
been resolved and no longer persist.31 In his letter of request for further extension, the President admits that the
Maute rebellion has already been quelled and the extension is to prevent the scattered rebels from gathering and
consolidating their strength.32 Moreover, the President himself had announced the liberation of Marawi and the
cessation of armed combat.33

(k) The President and his advisers' justifications, which were principally based on "threats of violence and
terrorism," "security concerns" and "imminent danger to public safety," do not amount to actual invasion or
rebellion as to justify the extension of martial law. They merely constitute "imminent danger." Since the framers of
the 1987 Constitution removed the phrase "imminent danger" as one of the grounds for declaring martial law, the
President can no longer declare or extend martial law on the basis of mere threats of an impending rebellion. 34

(1) The extension should not be allowed on the basis of alleged NPA attacks because this reason was not cited in the
President's original declaration.35

(m) The alleged rebellion in Mindanao does not endanger public safety. The threat to public safety contemplated
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is one where the government cannot sufficiently or effectively
govern, as when the courts or government offices cannot operate or perform their functions. 36

(n) Martial law should be operative only in a "theater of war" as intended by the drafters of the Constitution. For a
"theater of war" to exist, there must be an area where actual armed conflict occurs which necessitate military
authorities to take over the functions of government due to the breakdown, inability or difficulty of the latter to
function. The insurrection must have assumed the status of a public and territorial war, and the conditions must
show that government agencies within the local territory can no longer function. 37 Without any of the four objectives
that comprise the second element of rebellion,38the acts of "regrouping", "consolidation of forces", "recruitment" and
"planning" stages, or the continuing commission of the crimes of terrorism, robbery, murder, extortion, as cited by
the President in his December 8, 2017 letter, cannot be said to be the "theater of war" referred to by the framers of
the Constitution.39

(o) There is no need to extend martial law to suppress or defeat remnants of vanquished terrorist groups, as these
may be quelled and addressed using lesser extraordinary powers (i.e., calling out powers) of the President.
Moreover, respondent General Guerrero failed to state during the oral arguments what additional powers are granted
to the military by virtue of the proclamation and suspension and instead limited himself to the "effects" of martial
law. Respondents simply failed to demonstrate how martial law powers were used. In short, there is no necessity for
martial law.40

In their Memorandum, petitioners in G.R. No. 236145 propounded two tests (i.e., proportionality and suitability) in
determining whether the declaration or extension of martial law is required or necessitated by public safety.
The Proportionality Test requires that the situation is of such gravity or scale as to demand resort to the most
extreme measures. Petitioners cited AFP's own admission that there are only 537 out of 8,813 barangays or 6.09%
that are currently being controlled by rebel groups in Mindanao. On the other hand, the Suitability Test requires that
the situation is such that the declaration of martial law is the correct tool to address the public safety problem.
Considering that the AFP Chief of Staff could not cite what martial law powers they used in the past, and what
martial law powers they intend to use moving forward, the present circumstances fail both tests.41
(p) Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 allege that martial law and the suspension of the writ trigger the commission of
human rights violations and suppression of civil liberties. In fact, the implementation of the same resulted to
intensified human rights violations in Mindanao.42 In support of the same allegations, petitioners in G.R. No. 236061
attached a letter-report from Salinlahi on human rights violations committed as a consequence of martial law in
Mindanao. They emphasize that martial law is a scare tactic, one that is not intended for the armed groups
mentioned but actually against the dissenters of the government's policies. 43

(q) Finally, in support of their prayer for a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935
allege that they are Representatives to Congress, sworn to defend the Constitution, with the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the subject re-extension. They claim that petitioner Villarin, who is a resident of Davao City, is
personally affected and gravely prejudiced by there-extension as it would spawn violations of civil liberties of
Mindanaoans like him, a steadfast critic of the Duterte administration. They also assert that the injunctive relief will
foreclose further commission of human rights violations and the derogation of the rule of law in
Mindanao.44 Petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 likewise prays for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction in order to
protect their substantive rights and interests while the case is pending before this Court.45

B. Respondents' case

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that:

a) Petitioners' failure to submit the written Joint Resolution extending the martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is fatal since it is indispensable to the Court's exercise of its review power. 46

b) The Cullamat and Rosales Petitions were filed against the President in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.47

c) The Court already ruled in Lagman that there is actual rebellion in Mindanao. Thus, the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment pursuant to Section 47(c),48 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bars the petitioners from re-
litigating the same issue.49

d) Given that the Court had already declared in Lagman that there is rebellion in Mindanao, the onus lies on the
petitioners to show that the rebellion has been completely quelled. 50

e) The invocation of this Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution is
misplaced. As held in Lagman,51 the "appropriate proceeding" in Section 18, Article VII does not refer to a petition
for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII, as it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or extension.52

f) Petitioners failed to allege that rebellion in Mindanao no longer exists, which is a condition precedent for the
filing of the instant petition. They only pointed out the President's announcement regarding the liberation of Marawi
from "terrorist influence." They did not mention the rebellion being waged by DAESH-inspired Da'awatul
Islamahiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed
Lawless Groups (ALGs), remnants of the groups of Hapilon and Maute, the Turaifie Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the ASG, and the New People's Army (NPA), as cited in the President's December 8,
2017 letter to Congress.53

g) The determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis to justify the extension of martial law became the duty of
Congress after the President's request was transmitted. The question raised had assumed a political nature that can
only be resolved by Congress. 54

h) The manner in which Congress approved the extension is a political question, outside the Court's judicial
authority to review. Congress has full discretion on how to go about the debates and the voting. The Constitution
itself allows the Congress to determine the rules of its proceedings. The Court does not concern itself with
parliamentary rules, which may be waived or disregarded by the legislature. 55
i) Proclamation No. 216 and the subsequent extensions granted by Congress enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, which petitioners failed to overcome by proving that the extension is without basis. The
presumption cannot be ignored, especially since the Court held in Lagman, that it considers only the information and
data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration and will not undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.56

j) Even if the Court were to entertain the allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress in approving
the one-year extension, the same is without merit. Both houses of Congress gave due consideration to the facts
relayed by the President which showed that rebellion persists in Mindanao and that public safety requires the
extension. The extension was approved because of the stepped-up terrorist attacks against innocent civilians and
private entities.57

k) The period for deliberation on the President's request for further extension was not unduly constricted. The
extension or revocation of martial law cannot be equated with the process of ordinary legislation. Given the time-
sensitive nature of martial law or its extension, the time cap was necessary in the interest of expediency.
Furthermore, an explanation of one's vote in the deliberation process is not a constitutional requirement. 58

1) The Constitution does not limit the period for which Congress can extend the proclamation and the suspension,
nor does it prohibit Congress from granting further extension. The 60-day period imposed on the President's initial
proclamation of martial law does not similarly apply to the period of extension. The clause "in the same manner"
must be understood as referring to the manner by which Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, i.e.,
Congress must also observe the same manner of voting: "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session." Furthermore, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition in the
Constitution, the Court cannot prevent Congress from granting further extensions. 59

m) The burden to show sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law is not with the President.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that the extension of martial law falls within the prerogative of
Congress.60

n) Even assuming that the burden of proof is on the President or Congress, such burden has been overcome.
Although the leadership of the Mautes was decimated in Marawi, the rebellion in Mindanao persists as the surviving
members of the militant group have not laid down their arms. The remnants remain a formidable force to be
reckoned with, especially since they have established linkage with other rebel groups. With the persistence of
rebellion in the region, the extension of martial law is, therefore, not just for preventive reasons. The extension is
premised on the existence of an ongoing rebellion. That the rebellion is ongoing is beyond doubt. 61

o) In the context of the Revised Penal Code, even those who are merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion, as coddlers, supporters and financiers, are guilty of the crime of rebellion. 62

p) As a crime without predetermined boundaries, the rebellion in various parts of Mindanao justified the extension
of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.63

q) Under the Constitution, the extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus are justified as long as there is rebellion and public safety requires it. The provision does not require that the
group that started the rebellion should be the same group that should continue the uprising. Thus, the violence
committed by other groups, such as the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI Maguid, and DI Toraype (Turaifie) should be taken
into consideration in determining whether the rebellion has been completely quelled, as they are part of the
rebellion.64

r) The President has the sole prerogative to choose which of the extraordinary commander-in-chief powers to use
against the rebellion plaguing Mindanao. Thus, petitioners cannot insist that the Court impose upon the President the
proper measure to defeat a rebellion. In light of the wide array of information in the hands of the President, as well
as the extensive coordination between him and the armed forces regarding the situation in Mindanao, it would be an
overreach for the Court to encroach on the President's discretion. 65

s) Among the differences between the calling out power of the President and the imposition of martial law is that,
during the latter, the President may ask the armed forces to assist in the execution of civilian functions, exercise
police power through the issuance of General or Special Orders, and facilitate the mobilization of the reserve force,
among others.66

t) While the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) has powers that can be used to fight terrorism, the ATC, however,
becomes relevant only in cases of terrorism. Thus, for the purpose of involving itself during a state of martial law,
the ATC must first associate an act of rebellion with terrorism, as rebellion is only one of the means to commit
terrorism.67

u) The phrase "theater of war" in relation to martial law should be understood in a traditional Groatian sense, which
connotes that "war" is "an idea of multitude" and not limited to the concept between two nations in armed
disagreement.68 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not require the existence of a "theater of war" for a valid
proclamation or extension of martial law.69

v) There is no need to show the magnitude of rebellion, as placing the requirement of public safety on a scale will
prevent the application of laws and undermine the Constitution. 70

w) The alleged human rights violations are irrelevant in the determination of whether Congress had sufficient factual
basis to further extend martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As ruled in Lagman,
petitioners' claim of alleged human rights violations should be resolved in a separate proceeding and should not be
taken cognizance of by the Court.71 Moreover, the alleged human rights violations are unsubstantiated and
contradicted by facts. According to the AFP Human Rights Office, no formal complaints were filed in their office
against any member or personnel of the AFP for human rights violations during the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao. The online news articles cited in the Cullamat Petition have no probative value, as settled in Lagman.

x) Martial law does not automatically equate to curtailment and suppression of civil liberties and individual freedom.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. The
Constitution lays down safeguards to protect human rights during martial law. Civil courts are not supplanted. The
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent
or directly connected with the invasion. Any person arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days. Various statutes also exist to protect human rights during martial law, such as, but not limited to, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7483 on persons under custodial investigation, R.A. No. 9372 on persons detained for the crime of
terrorism, and R.A. No. 9745 on the non-employment of physical or mental torture on an arrested individual. 72

y) A temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation or the
extension of martial law is not provided in the Constitution. Although there are remedies anchored on equity, a TRO
and an injunctive relief cannot override, prevent, or diminish an express power granted to the President by no less
than the Constitution. If a TRO or injunctive writ were to be issued, it would constitute an amendment of the Charter
tantamount to judicial legislation, as it would fashion a shortcut remedy other than the power of review established
in the Constitution.73

z) Petitioners' allegations do not meet the standard proof required for the issuance of injunctive relief. Neither can
the application for injunctive relief be supported by the claim that an injunction will foreclose further violations of
human rights, as injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Petitioners also failed to show that
the alleged human rights violations are directly attributable to the President's imposition of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.74

Ruling of the Court

Procedural Issues:

Failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is not fatal to the petitions.

Section 1,75 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the
legislative department without the introduction of evidence.
"Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because
these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as matters of fact without need
of further evidentiary support." 76

Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, thus, this Court can take judicial notice thereof. The
Court also notes that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated Comment. 77 Hence, We
see no reason to consider petitioners' failure to submit a certified copy of the Resolution as a fatal defect that
forecloses this Court's review of the petitions.

The President should be dropped as party respondent

Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our jurisprudence. The President may not be
sued during his tenure or actual incumbency, and there is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the
Constitution or law.78 This privilege stems from the recognition of the President's vast and significant functions
which can be disrupted by court litigations. As the Court explained in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.:79
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.80
Accordingly, in David, the Court ruled that it was improper to implead former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, where she declared a state of
national emergency, and General Order No. 5, where she called upon the AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country.

It is, thus, clear that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145 committed a procedural misstep in including the
President as a respondent in their petitions.

The Congress is an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions.

Of the four petitions before the Court, only G.R. No. 236145 impleaded the Congress as party-respondent.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." In Marmo, et al. v. Anacay,81 the Court explained that:
[A] party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his
interest is such that a final decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy
in a situation where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a
person whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable determination of the
controversy between or among the contending parties.82 (Citation omitted)
In these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically
the approval of the President's request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 and
236155 have also put in issue the manner in which the Congress deliberated upon the President's request for
extension. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the
subject matter of these cases. Consequently, it was procedurally incorrect for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935,
236061 and 236155 to implead only the Senate President and the House Speaker among the respondents.

Arguably, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III and House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez can be said to have an interest in
these cases, as representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively. However, considering
that one of their main contentions is that the "supermajority" of the Congress gravely abused their discretion when
they allegedly railroaded the adoption of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, it stands to reason and the requirements
of due process that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935 and 236061 should have impleaded the Congress as a
whole.83 Needless to say, the entire body of Congress, and not merely the respective leaders of its two Houses, will
be directly affected should We strike down the extension of martial law. Thus, We hold that in cases impugning the
extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto.
It is true that a party's failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of the action,
as said party may be added, by order of the court on motion of the party or motu propio, at any stage of the action or
at such times as are just. However, it remains essential - as it is jurisdictional - that an indispensable party be
impleaded before judgment is rendered by the court, as the absence of such indispensable party renders all
subsequent acts of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.84 Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. In
their absence, the judgment cannot attain real finality.85

We are, thus, unprepared to trivialize the necessity to implead the entire Congress as party-respondent in this
proceeding, especially considering that the factual scenario and the concomitant issues raised herein are novel and
unprecedented.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Congress was impleaded as a respondent in G.R. No. 236145 and the OSG has
entered its appearance and argued for all the respondents named in the four consolidated petitions, the Court finds
that the "essential" and "jurisdictional" requirement of impleading an indispensable party has been substantially
complied with.

The Court is not barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of
rebellion in Mindanao

Citing the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, respondents contend that petitioners could no longer raise the
issue of the existence of rebellion in Mindanao, in light of this Court's ruling in Lagman86 and Padilla v. Congress.87

Reliance on the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is misplaced.

Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation of any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits.88 In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.

In this case, despite the addition of new petitioners, We find that there is substantial identity of parties between the
present petitions and the earlier Lagman case given their privity or shared interest in either protesting or supporting
martial law in Mindanao. It is settled that for purposes of res judicata, only substantial identity of parties is required
and not absolute identity. There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest between a party
in the first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 89

As to the second requirement, We do not find that there is identity of issues between
the Lagman90 and Padilla91 cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.

In Padilla, petitioners sought to require the Congress to convene in a joint session to deliberate whether to affirm or
revoke Presidential Proclamation No. 216, and to vote thereon. After consideration of the arguments of the parties,
We ruled that under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to
revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
We clarified that there is no constitutional requirement that Congress must conduct a joint session for the purpose of
concurring with the President's declaration of martial law.

In Lagman, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216 was the primary issue raised before Us. We held that the
Proclamation was constitutional as the President had sufficient factual basis in declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. We found that based on the facts known to the President and
the events that transpired before and at the time he issued the Proclamation, he had probable cause to believe that a
rebellion was or is being committed, and reasonable basis to conclude that public safety was endangered by the
widespread atrocities perpetrated by the rebel groups.

In contrast, the consolidated petitions at hand essentially assail the Congress' act of approving the President's
December 8, 2017 request and extending the declaration of martial law in Mindanao from January 1 to December
31, 2018. In support of their case, petitioners argue that rebellion no longer persists in Mindanao and that public
safety is not endangered by the existence of mere "remnants" of the Maute group, ASG, DAESH-inspired DIWM
members.

Although there are similarities in the arguments of petitioners in the earlier Lagman case and the petitions at bar, We
do not find that petitioners are seeking to re-litigate a matter already settled in the Lagman case with respect to the
existence of rebellion. A reading of the consolidated petitions reveals that petitioners do not contest the existence of
violence committed by various armed groups in Mindanao, to wit:
LAGMAN PETITION (G.R. No. 235935)
43. It is very unfortunate that in their contrived efforts to justify the extension of martial law in Mindanao, President
Duterte and his military and police advisers with the support of partisans in the Congress have molded the so-called
remnants or residue, miniscule as they are, into apparent menacing ogres.

xxxx

53. A litany of alleged "skirmishes" does not necessarily constitute armed public uprising against the government.

54. They may only indicate banditry, lawless violence and terroristic acts of remnants or residure of vanquished
combatants.
CULLAMAT PETITION (G.R. No. 236061)
58. The question now therefore is, the instant case, does the actual rebellion being perpetrated by the armed groups
enumerated in the 08 December 2017 letter of President Duterte to the House of Representatives and the Senate,
compromise public safety that would warrant the imposition of martial law?
ROSALES PETITION (G.R. No. 236145)
67. In short, the bases (for the extension of martial law in Mindanao) were: first, the supposed continuous rebuilding
of the remaining members of the Daesh-inspired DIWM, who are "in all probability, ... presently regrouping and
consolidating their forces" or are, at the very least, continuing their efforts and activities "geared towards the
conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public uprisings"; second, the supposed "plan" by members of the
Turaifie group to conduct bombings; third, the supposed continuing acts of violence of the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters; fourth, the continuous commission of acts of terrorism by members of the Abu Sayaff Group;
and fifth, the intensification of the "decades-long rebellion" by the New People's Army (NPA).

68. With all due respect, and without diminishing the threat posed by any of the foregoing, none of these
constitute actual rebellion or actual invasion. Moreover, it mistakes the distinction between the need for military
force which is effected through the use of the calling out powers of the President, on one hand, and the need for
imposing martial law on the civilian population, on the other.

69. Since the five (5) identified groups were/are in the "regrouping", "[consolidation] of forces", "recruitment",
"planning" stages, or are continuing the commission of crimes (terrorism, robbery, murder, extortion) without any of
the four (4) objectives that comprise the second element of rebellion, there cannot be said to be a "theater of war"
already contemplated by the framers of the Constitution as would cripple the normal operation of civilian law.
MONSOD PETITION (G.R. No. 236155)
72. There is no indication that "public safety requires" the further imposition of martial law. The instances cited as
justification for the extension requested do not demonstrate gravity such that ordinary powers and resources of the
government cannot address these. What Marawi needs at this point is effective and responsive rehabilitation in an
atmosphere of freedom and cooperation. It does not need martial law to rise from the ashes of war and turmoil.

73. At most, these incidents show several protracted incidents of violence and lawlessness that is well within the
powers and authority of the government armed forces and police force to suppress without resort to extraordinary
powers, which the government has been continuously doing for decades as well. Martial law is neither a
commensurate measure to address these incidents, nor preventive measure to thwart the spread of lawless violence
in the country. The mere invocation, therefore, of rebellion or invasion, will not be the sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if it cannot be factually
demonstrated that it is actually happening and necessitated by the requirements of public safety in a theater of war.
From the foregoing, it appears that petitioners merely question the gravity and extent of these occurrences as to
necessitate the continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao. In other words, the issue put forth by
petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion
which would trigger the President's initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar
refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial law.

That petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the rebellion in these consolidated
petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of the Court's judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for
a declaration of martial law. The following exchange during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
MR. BENGZON. I would like to ask for clarification from the Committee, and I would like to address this to
Commissioner Bernas.

Suppose there is a variance of decision between the Supreme Court and Congress, whose decision shall prevail?

FR. BERNAS. The Supreme Court's decision prevails.

MR. BENGZON. If Congress, decides to recall before the Supreme Court issues its decision, does the case become
moot?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. BENGZON. And if the Supreme Court promulgates its decision ahead of Congress, Congress is foreclosed
because the Supreme Court has 30 days within which to look into the factual basis. If the Supreme Court comes out
with the decision one way or the other without Congress having acted on the matter, is Congress foreclosed?

FR. BERNAS. The decision of the Supreme Court will be based on its assessment of the factual situation.
Necessarily, therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court on that is a transitory judgment because the
factual situation can change. So, while the decision of the Supreme Court may be valid at that certain point of
time, the situation may change so that Congress should be authorized to do something about it.

MR. BENGZON. Does the Gentleman mean the decision of the Supreme Court then would just be something
transitory?

FR. BERNAS. Precisely.

MR. BENGZON. It does not mean that if the Supreme Court revokes or decides against the declaration of martial
law, the Congress can no longer say, "no, we want martial law to continue" because the circumstances can
change.

FR. BERNAS. The Congress can still come in because the factual situation can change.
Verily, the Court's review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual scenario used as basis for
its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be
re-examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an
extension of a state of martial law.

The Court's power to review the extension of martial law is limited solely to the determination of the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. The first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part, an
innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as the court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded
jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally
considered as political if such act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In seeking the Court's review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216 on the strength of the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 alternately invoke the Court's expanded
(certiorari) jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII.

In Lagman,92 We emphasized that this Court's jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is
special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 93 and 594 of Article VIII. It was further stressed
therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas
under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
exercise of emergency powers. Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. We held that to apply the standard of
review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court's constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII,
which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent
of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition
invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the Congress' extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is
limited only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution
provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under Section 18, Article VII,
which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to
determine whether to extend such proclamation or suspension.

Substantive Issues

Congressional check on the exercise of martial law and suspension powers

Under the 193595 and 197396 Constitutions, the Congress had no power to review or limit the Executive's exercise of
the authority to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Borne of the country's
martial law experience under the Marcos regime, such power was subsequently established in the 1987 Constitution
as part of a system of checks and balance designed to forestall any potential abuse of an extraordinary power lodged
in the President as Commander-in-Chief of the country's armed forces.

The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the President's proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, in
pertinent part, states:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call. (Emphasis ours)
Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:
First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made." 97 The Congress' decision
to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.

Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President's initiative, for
such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during the
deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a "joint executive and legislative act" or a "collective judgment"
between the President and the Congress:
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.

MR. AZCUNA. Thank you, Madam President.

I would like to offer an amendment to Section 15, line 7 of page 7. After the word "or," insert a comma (,) and add
the phrase: AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT, so that the amended portion will read: "may revoke such
proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President, or AT THE INSTANCE OF
THE PRESIDENT extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

May we know the reaction of the Committee? The reason for this Madam President, is that the extension should not
merely be an act of Congress but should be requested by the President. Any extension of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should have the concurrence of both the President and Congress. Does
the Committee accept my amendment?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee accepts that amendment because it will, at the same time solve the concern of
Commissioner Suarez, aside from the fact that this will now be a joint executive and legislative act.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. May I just pose a question to the Committee in connection with the Suarez amendment? Earlier
Commissioner Regalado said that that [sic] point was going to be a collective judgment between the President and
the Congress. Are we departing from that now in favor of giving Congress the plenipotentiary power to determine
the period?

FR. BERNAS. Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this in consultation with the
President, and the President would be outvoted by about 300 Members.

MR. OPLE. Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective judgment of that point upon the
expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the final decision to Congress, we are
also preserving the idea that the President may not revoke what Congress has decided upon.98 (Emphasis ours)
At the core of the instant petitions is a challenge to the "joint executive and legislative act," embodied in the
President's December 8, 2017 initiative and in the latter's Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, which further extended
the implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners assail not only the sufficiency of the
factual basis of this extension, but also the manner in which it was approved.

The manner in which Congress deliberated on the President's request for extension is not subject to judicial
review

Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of martial law in Mindanao and
characterized the same as done with undue haste. Petitioners premised their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules
adopted by both Houses, in regard to the President's request for further extension, provided for an inordinately short
period for interpellation of resource persons and for explanation by each Member after the voting is concluded.

The assailed provisions refer to Section 7 of Rule V and Section 14 of Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Session of
Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, which
provide:
Rule V (CONSIDERATION OF THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT DATED DECEMBER 9, 2017
CALLING UPON THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO FURTHER EXTEND THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, FROM 01
JANUARY 2018 TO 31 DECEMBER 2018, OR FOR SUCH OTHER PERIOD OF TIME AS THE
CONGRESS MAY DETERMINE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION)
Section 7. Any Member of the Congress may interpellate the resource persons for not more than three minutes
excluding the time of the answer of the resource persons.

xxxx
Rule VIII (VOTING ON THE MOTION TO FURTHER EXTEND THE PERIOD OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS)
Section 14. After the conclusion of voting, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House shall forthwith
announce the results of the voting. Thereafter, any Member of the Congress who wishes to explain his/her vote may
consume a maximum of one (1) minute: Provided, that a Member who does not want to explain may yield his/her
allotted time to another Member of the same House: Provided, further, that any Member of the Congress shall be
allowed a maximum of three (3) minutes.
No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the right to promulgate its own
rules to govern its proceedings, to wit:
Section 16. (3) ) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (Emphasis ours)
In Pimentel, Jr., et. al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole,99 this constitutionally-vested authority is recognized as a
grant of full discretionary authority to each House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its
own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except
on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

This freedom from judicial interference was explained in the 1997 case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,100wherein the
Court declared that:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. 101
In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional
violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right
under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case
of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. 102 explained that the limitation of this
unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there
must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained.103

The rules in question do not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending
martial law certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may
consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual
situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the
President's request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.104
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they may be revoked, modified or waived at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts. 105 Absent a showing of "violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals," the Court will not intrude into this legislative realm.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Congress.106

Furthermore, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the rules that governed the Joint Session were in fact
adopted, without objection, by both Houses of Congress on December 13, 2017. 107 So also, the Transcript of the
Plenary Proceedings of the Joint Session showed that Members of Congress were, upon request, granted extension
of their time to interpellate.

Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis ours)
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may
extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however,
should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of
times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should be upon the President's initiative;
that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that
it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

A cardinal rule in statutorv construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation, but only for application. 108 Thus, whenever there is a determination that
the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the Congress may exercise its authority to grant such extension as may be requested by the
President, even if it be subsequent to the initial extension.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it
clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension
shall be "for a period to be determined by the Congress." If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to limit the extension to sixty (60) days, as petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 theorize, they would not have expressly
vested in the Congress the power to fix its duration.

The Court cannot accept said petitioners' argument that the 60-day limit can be deduced from the following clause in
Section 18, Article VII: "the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension." The
word "manner" means a way a thing is done109 or a mode of procedure;110 it does not refer to a period or length of
time. Thus, the clause should be understood to mean that the Congress must observe the same manner of voting
required for the revocation of the initial proclamation or suspension, as mentioned in the sentence preceding
it, i.e. "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session." This is clear
from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
MR. REGALADO. x x x

So I will repeat from line 26: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, CONGRESS MAY extend SUCH PROCLAMATION for a
period to be determined by Congress..."

MR. AZCUNA. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.

MR. AZCUNA. May I suggest the insertion of the words CONGRESS MAY IN THE SAME MANNER, so as to
emphasize that will also be Congress voting jointly and there would also be a need of at least majority vote of
all its Members for extension.

THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?

MR. REGALADO. Yes, the amendment is accepted it makes the provision clearer. 111(Emphasis ours)
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in his book entitled "Reading the Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts,"112 succinctly explained the dangers of construction that departs from the text of a statute, particularly
as to the allocation of powers among the branches of government. He stated:
Some judges, however, refuse to yield the ancient judicial prerogative of making the law, improvising on the text to
produce what they deem socially desirable results-usually at the behest of an advocate for one party to a dispute. The
judges are also prodded by interpretative theorists who avow that courts are "better able to discern and articulate
basic national ideals than are the people's politically responsible representatives". On this view, judges are to
improvise "basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not
expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution."

To the extent that people give this view any credence, the notion that judges may (even should) improvise on
constitutional and statutory text enfeebles the democratic polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan warned in the
1960s, an invitation to judicial lawmaking results inevitably in "a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial
independence and, on the other, of legislative responsibility, thus polluting the bloodstream of our system of
government." Why these alarming outcomes? First, when judges fashion law rather than fairly derive it from
governing texts, they subject themselves to intensified political pressures - in the appointment process, in their
retention, and in the arguments made to them. Second, every time a court constitutionalizes a new sliver of law - as
by finding a "new constitutional right" to do this, that, or the other - that sliver becomes thenceforth untouchable by
the political branches. In the American system, a legislature has no power to abridge a right that has been
authoritatively held to be part of the Constitution - even if that newfound right does not appear in the text. Over the
past 50 years especially, we have seen the judiciary incrementally take control of larger and larger swaths of
territory that ought to be settled legislatively.
It used to be said that judges do not "make" law - they simply apply it. In the 20th century, the legal realists
convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law. To the extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise
already possessed and the foolish could not be trusted with. It was true, that is, that judges did not really "find" the
common law but invented it over time. Yet this notion has been stretched into a belief that judges "make" law
through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted statutes. Consider the following statement by John P.
Dawson, intended to apply to statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges should have a part in creating law creating it as they apply it. In deciding the
multifarious disputes that are brought before them, we believe that judges in any legal system invariably adapt legal
doctrines to new situations and thus give them new content.
Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in which judicial decisions have a stare decisiseffect, a court's
application of a statute to a "new situation" can be said to establish the law applicable to that situation that is, to
pronounce definitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But establishing this retail application
of the statute is probably not what Dawson meant by "creating law," "adapting legal doctrines," and "giving them
new content." Yet beyond that retail application, good judges dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not
"give new content" to the statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, awaiting application to
myriad factual scenarios. To say that they "make law" without this necessary qualification is to invite the taffy-like
stretching of words - or the ignoring of words altogether. (Emphasis ours)
Even on the assumption that there is a gap in our Constitution anent the frequency and period of the Congress'
extension, and there is a need for this Court to exercise its power to interpret the law, We undertake the same in such
a way as to reflect the will of the drafters of the Constitution. "While We may not read into the law a purpose that is
not there, We nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment."113 We refer thus to the
Constitutional Commission's deliberations on the matter, viz:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. I concur with the proposal of Commissioner Azcuna but may I
suggest that we fix a period for the duration of the extension, because it could very well happen that the initial
period may be shorter than the extended period and it could extend indefinitely. So if Commissioner Azcuna could
put a certain limit to the extended period, I would certainly appreciate that, Madam President.

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you Madam President. May we suggest that on line 7, between the words "same" and
"if", we insert the phrase FOR A PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN SIXTY DAYS, which would equal the
initial period for the first declarationjust so it will keep going.

THE PRESIDENT. What does the Committee say?

MR. REGALADO. May we request a clarification from Commissioner Suarez on this proposed amendment? This
extension is already a joint act upon the initiative of the President and with the concurrence of the Congress. It is
assumed that they have already agreed not only on the fact of extension but on the period of extension. If we put It
at 60 days only, then thereafter, they have to meet again to agree jointly on a further extension.

MR. SUAREZ. That is precisely intended to safeguard the interests and protect the lives of citizens.

MR. REGALADO. In the first situation where the President declares martial law, there had to be a prescribed period
because there was no initial concurrence requirement. And if there was no concurrence, the martial law period ends
at 60 days. Thereafter, if they intend to extend the same suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation
of martial law, it is upon the initiative of the President this time, and with the prior concurrence of Congress. So, the
period of extension has already been taken into account by both the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the
first situation where the President acted alone without prior concurrence. The reason for the limitation in the
first does not apply to the extension.

MR. SUAREZ. We are afraid of a situation that may develop where the extended period would be even longer than
the initial period, Madam President. It is only reasonable to suggest that we have to put a restriction on the matter of
the exercise of this right within a reasonable period.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, following that is the clause "extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it." That by itself suggests a period within which the suspension shall be extended,
if the invasion is still going on. But there is already the cut-off 60-day period. Do they have to meet all over again
and agree to extend the same?

MR. SUAREZ. That is correct. I think the two of them must have to agree on the period; but it is theoretically
possible that when the President writes a note to the Congress, because it would be at the instance of the President
that the extension would have to be granted by Congress, it is possible that the period for the extension may be there.
It is also possible that it may not be there. That is the reason why we want to make it clear that there must by a
reasonable period for the extension. So, if my suggestion is not acceptable to the Committee, may I request that a
voting be held on it Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, may I just propose something because I see the problem. Suppose we were to
say: "or extend the same FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY CONGRESS" - that gives Congress a
little flexibility on just how long the extension should be.

xxxx

THE PRESIDENT. Is that accepted by Commissioner Suarez?

MR. SUAREZ. Yes, Madam President.

MR. OPLE. May I just pose a question to the Committee in connection with the Suarez amendment? Earlier
Commissioner Regalado said that that point was going to be a collective judgment between the President and the
Congress. Are we departing from that now in favor of giving Congress the plenipotentiary power to determine the
period?

FR. BERNAS. Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this in consultation with the
President, and the President would be outvoted by 300 Members.

MR. OPLE. Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective judgment of that point upon the expiration
of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, the participation of the President, is that when we put all of these encumbrances on the
President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion and rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may
be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut
the Gordian knot by just declaring a revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the
insurrection. That is the reason I am in favor of the present formulation. However, if Commissioner Suarez insists on
his amendment, I do not think I will stand in the way.

Thank you, Madam President.

MR. SUAREZ. We will accept the committee suggestion, subject to style later on.

xxxx

MR. PADILLA. According to Commissioner Concepcion, our former Chief Justice, the declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act. If that be so, and
especially under the following clause: "if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it," I do
not see why the period must be determined by the Congress. We are turning a purely executive act to a legislative
act.

FR. BERNAS. I would believe what the former Chief Justice said about the initiation being essentially an executive
act, but what follows after the initiation is something that is participated in by Congress.

MR. CONCEPCION. If I may add a word. The one who will do the fighting is the executive but, of course, it is
expected that if the Congress wants to extend, it will extend for the duration of the fighting. If the fighting goes on, I
do not think it is fair to assume that the Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially since in this matter the
Congress must act at the instance of the executive. He is the one who is supposed to know how long it will take him
to fight. Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to his asking for another extension, if
necessary.114 (Emphasis ours)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez's proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the
Commission's members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the
duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the
determinative factor is as long as "the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires" such extension.

The President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists;
and (b) public safety requires the extension.

A. Rebellion persists

Rebellion, as applied to the exercise of the President's martial law and suspension powers, is as defined under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,115viz:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Rebellion thus exists when "(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the
purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i)
the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives." 116

The President issued Proclamation No. 216 in response to the series of attacks launched by the Maute Group and
other rebel groups in Marawi City. The President reported to the Congress that these groups had publicly taken up
arms for the purpose of removing Mindanao from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and establishing a
DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province in Mindanao.

In Lagman,117 the Court sustained the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216, holding that the President had
probable cause to believe that actual rebellion exists and public safety required the Proclamation. The Court held:
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No.
216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there
was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and
prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged
his burden of proof.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x
On July 22, 2017, upon the President's initiative, Congress extended Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

The ensuing question, therefore, is whether the rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The word "persist" means "to continue to exist," "to go on resolutely or stubbornly in spite of opposition,
importunity or warning," or to "carry on." 118 It is the opposite of the words "cease," "discontinue," "end," "expire,"
"finish," "quit," "stop" and "terminate."119

The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him
to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its "remnants" have been resolute in establishing a
DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and
logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. Thus, in his December 8, 2017 letter to Congress,
the President stated:
First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their Groups have continued to rebuild
their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion. You
will please note that at least one hundred eighty-five (185) persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have
remained at-large and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their forces.

More specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their protectors,
supporters and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment,
financial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in
the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared
towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of
establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also
in the whole of Southeast Asia.

xxxx

Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga Peninsula
remain as a serious security concern. Reports indicate that this year they have conducted at least forty-three (43) acts
of terrorism, including attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), harassments, and kidnappings which
have resulted in the killing of eight (8) civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded. 120(Emphasis ours)
In recommending the one-year extension of Proclamation No. 216 to the President, AFP General Guerrero cited,
among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies, thus:
1. The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of
Central, Western and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their
forces in Marawi City;121(Emphasis ours)
The data presented by the AFP during the oral arguments bolstered the President's cause for extension and clarified
what the government remains up against in the aftermath of the Marawi crisis. According to the AFP:
The Dawlah Islamiyah is the Daesh-affiliate organization in the Philippines responsible for the Marawi Siege. It is
comprised of several local terrorist groups that pledged allegiance to Daesh leader Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi.

xxxx

After the successful Marawi Operation, the Basilan-based ASG is left with 74 members; the Maute Group
with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11; and the Turaifie Group has 22members with a total of 166 firearms.

However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially stormed Marawi
City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective areas of
concentration.

ASG Basilan-based recruited more or less 43 new members in Basilan; more or less 250by the Maute Group in the
Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid Group in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the Turaifie
Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives
of terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; financial gain as
new recruits were given an amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to 50,000.00; and, as radicalized converts.

These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics, marksmanships and bombing operations at the
different areas of Mount Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials
[sic] were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations.

Furthermore, the situation has become complicated with the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing
on the porous maritime boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men. As of this
period, 48 FTFs were monitored joining the Daesh-inspired groups, particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and
Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao. The closeness of these two groups is predominant with @Abu DAR who has
historically established link with Turaifie.

On Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents, these have increased to 100% for the 2nd Semester.122 (Emphasis
ours)
The AFP's data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members
of the Dawlah Islamiyah.123

These accounts ineluctably show that the rebellion that spawned the Marawi crisis persists, and that its remaining
members have regrouped, substantially increased in number, and are no less determined to turn Mindanao into a
DAESH/ISIS territory.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 argue that "remnants" or a residue of a rebel group cmmot possibly mount a
rebellion. The argument, however, fails to take into account the 185 persons identified in the Martial Law Arrest
Orders who are still at large; the 400 new members whom said remnants were able to recruit; the influx of 48 FTFs
who are training the new recruits in their ways of terrorism; and the financial and logistical build-up which the group
is cunently undertaking with their sympathizers and protectors. It likewise fails to consider that the new Dawlah
Islamiyah members number nearly the same as the group that initially stormed Marawi City, and while the
government succeeded in vanquishing 1,010 rebels following the siege, 124 it took several months to accomplish this
even under martial law. Thus, it will be imprudent nay reckless to downplay or dismiss the capacity of said remnants
to relentlessly pursue their objective of establishing a seat of DAESH/ISIS power in Mindanao.

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236155 have asserted that the rebellion no longer persists as the President
himself had announced the liberation of Marawi City, and armed combat has ceased therein. Petitioners in G.R. No.
236061 added that Col. Romeo Brawner, Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force Ranao, was also quoted as
saying that the Maute-ISIS problem was about to be over. The statements, however, were admittedly made on
October 17, 2017,125 nearly two months before the President's request for extension in December 2017. Such
declaration does not preclude the occurrence of supervening events as the AFP discovered through their
monitoring126 efforts. It is not inconceivable that remnants of the Dawlah Islamiyah would indeed regroup, recruit
new members and build up its arsenal during the intervening period. The termination of a rebellion is a matter of
fact. Rebellion does not cease to exist by estoppel on account of the President's or the AFP's previous
pronouncements. Furthermore, it is settled that rebellion is in the nature of a continuing crime. 127 Thus, members of
the Dawlah Islamiyah who evaded capture did not cease to be rebels.

So also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no
longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress' Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while
the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in
Mindanao, thus:
Senator Drilon. Meaning, the question that we raised, Mr. President, are the declarations of the President, His
Excellency, and the secretary of national defense changed since the time that the situation was described on October
23 of this year? Has the situation changed or is it the same situation today that the Marawi City has been liberated
from terrorists [sic] influence that there has been a termination of combat operations in Marawi City?

Hon. Lorenzana. May I answer that, Mr. President. Mr. President, the situation in Marawi has substantially
changed from the time that our troops were fighting the ISIS-inspired Maute Group and that's the reason why there
is now this post-conflict need assessment as being conducted in Marawi. However, as situations developed later on,
the ISIS-inspired other groups in Mindanao are also active like the BIFF in Central Mindanao and also in some other
parts of the BaSulTa islands.

Now, the reports now, Mr. President, is that they are actively recruiting again, recruiting actively, recruiting some
of the Muslim youths in the area and that is what we are saying that the rebellion has not stopped. It just moved
to another place.

xxxx

Representative Tinio. x x x
Mr. Speaker, hindi po ba sinabi ni Presidente sa kanyang sulat that the AFP has achieved remarkable progress in
putting the rebellion under control at hindi po ba sinabi niExecutive Secretary na substantially neutralized na raw
and Maute-Daesh? Pwede po bang ipaliwanag ito ng mga resource persons?

The Speaker. The panel may respond.

Hon. Lorenzana. Mr. President, ang sagot po doon sa G. Congressman ay ganito - ang sinasabi po
naming substantially reduced na iyong strength or clear na iyong Marawi of any terrorists ay Marawi lang po
iyon. It does not include the whole of, the other parts of Mindanao that are also subject to the influence of
these terroristic groups. Sabi nga ng Supreme Court ay, ang nangyayari sa Marawi ay nag-spill over na rin sa
ibang Iugar doon sa Mindanao kaya nga sinustain nila iyong declaration ng Martial Law.

x x x x128 (Emphasis ours)

In Lagman, We recognized that "rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds," and "for the crime of
rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should congregate in one place x x x and
publicly rise in arms against the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose." We held that the grounds
on which the armed public uprising actually took place should not be the measure of the extent, scope or range of
the actual rebellion when there are other rebels positioned elsewhere, whose participation did not necessarily involve
the publicity aspect of rebellion, as they may also be considered as engaged in the crime of rebellion.

In a similar vein, the termination of armed combat in Marawi does not conclusively indicate that the rebellion has
ceased to exist. It will be a tenuous proposition to confine rebellion simply to a resounding clash of arms with
government forces. As noted in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,129 modern day rebellion has other facets than just the taking up
of arms, including financing, recruitment and propaganda, that may not necessarily be found or occurring in the
place of the armed conflict, thus:
x x x The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other
regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the
country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modem setting. It does not consist
simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes
subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.
Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed
and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities including
sabotage and intelligence-all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the
battle fronts. x x x.130
Furthermore, as We explained in Lagman, "(t)he crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots." Thus:
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion. Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance." Direct assault, murder, homicide,
arson, robbery, kidnapping just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of
rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge." Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common
crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829]
which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense". "All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or
general law, which arc mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in
the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves." (Citations omitted)
In any case, Secretary Lorenzana has stressed that notwithstanding the termination of armed combat in Marawi,
clashes between the rebels and government forces continue to take place in other parts of Mindanao. Thus, during an
interpellation at the December 13, 2017 Joint Session in Congress, he stated:
Senator Pangilinan. x x x

It would have been a very different situation altogether if the fighting was still ongoing. If there is stiJl that siege,
then we can see that the situation is extreme and therefore, we can proceed with an extension.

xxxx

Hon. Lorenzana. Mr. President, may I reply to the good senator.

Sir, maybe your perception here is not as bad as what is happening on the ground, but the troops report
otherwise.

You know, wala na sigurong hakbakan diyan sa Marawi, but there are still clashes almost everyday in other
parts of Mindanao. The clash with the BJFF in Central Mindanao continues almost everyday. Iyong mga
engkwentro din sa mga ibang lugar saEastern Mindanao with the CPP-NPA ay nandoon pa rin. Basilan, Jolo ay
ongoing pa rin iyan.

x x x x131 (Emphasis ours)

During the oral arguments, AFP General Guerrero also confirmed that there were actually armed encounters with the
remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired DIWM.132

Accordingly, it would be error to conclude that the rebellion ceased to exist upon the termination of hostilities in
Marawi.

Other rebel groups

The extension has also been challenged on the ground that it did not refer to the same rebellion under Proclamation
No. 216.

It is true that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Turaifie Group and the New People's Army
(NPA) were not expressly mentioned either in Proclamation No. 216 or in the President's Report to Congress after
he issued the Proclamation. However, in Lagman, the government clearly identified the BIFF, based in the Liguasan
Marsh, Maguindanao, as one of the four ISIS-linked rebel groups that had formed an alliance for the unified mission
of establishing an ISIS territory in Mindanao, led by ASG-Basilan leader, Isnilon Hapilon, who had been appointed
emir of all ISIS forces in the Philippines. The other three rebel groups were the ASG from Basilan, Ansarul Khilafah
Philippines (AKP), also known as the Maguid Group, from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, and the Maute Group
from Lanao del Sur.

Furthermore, while it named only the Maute Group and the ASG, the President's Report made express reference to
"lawless armed groups" as perpetrators of the Marawi siege resolved to unseat the duly-constituted government and
make Mindanao a DAESH/ISIS province. The Report also indicated, as additional reasons for the Proclamation, the
"extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed groups" and the "network and
alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men" in Mindanao.133 Thus,
though not specifically identified in the Proclamation or the President's Report, the BIFF and the Turaifie Group are
deemed to have been similarly alluded to.

Indeed, absolute precision cannot be expected from the President who would have to act quickly given the urgency
of the situation. Under the circumstances, the actual rebellion and attack, more than the exact identity of all its
perpetrators, would be his utmost concern. The following pronouncement in Lagman, thus, finds relevance:
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report
as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the
urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to
be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in
peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the
words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late
in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to
curtail.
In the same vein, to require the President to render a meticulous and comprehensive account in his Proclamation or
Report will be most tedious and will unduly encumber his efforts to immediately quell the rebellion.

The efforts of the Turaifie Group and its allies134 in the ISIS-inspired135 BIFF to wrest control of Mindanao
continued even as the government was able to put the Marawi crisis under control.
In his December 8, 2017 letter to the Congress, the President stated:
Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the
Cotabato area. Turaitie is said to be Hapilon 's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and
the Southeast Asia.136
Furthermore, as the AFP reported during the oral arguments, the BIFF "continues to inflict violence and sow terror
in central Mindanao," and as one of the AFP's primary targets for disbandment, "the group will likely continue its
hostile operations in a bid to retaliate, fight for its relevance and demonstrate its resiliency." 137

The AFP has likewise confirmed that the Turaifie Group is one of several terrorist groups responsible for the
Marawi siege, and that it has so far successfully recruited 70 new members in its unwavering pursuit of a
DAESH/ISIS wilayat in Mindanao.

The Court, thus, finds that the government has sufficiently established the persistence of the DAESH/ISIS rebellion.

The inclusion of the rebellion of the New People's Army (NPA) as basis for the further extension of martial law in
Mindanao will not render it void. Undeniably, the NPA aims to establish communist rule in the country while the
DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebels intend to make Mindanao the seat of ISIS power in Southeast Asia. It is obvious,
however, that even as they differ in ideology, they have the shared purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. The violence the NPA has continued to commit in Mindanao, as revealed by the Executive, hardly
distinguish its rebels from the architects of the Marawi siege. Both have needlessly and violently caused the death of
military forces and civilians, and the destruction of public and private property alike. Thus, in his request for the
further extension of Proclamation No 216, the President informed the Congress that:
Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied with addressing the challenges posed by the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and other Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took advantage
of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist attacks
against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public
government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's
democratic form of government with Communist rule.

This year, the NPA has perpetrated a total of at least three hundred eight-five (385) atrocities (both terrorism and
guerilla warfare) in Mindanao, which resulted in forty-one (41) Killed-in-Action and sixty-two (62) Wounded-in-
Action (WIA) on the part of government forces. On the part of the civilians, these atrocities resulted in the killing of
twenty-three (23) and the wounding of six (6) persons. The most recent was the ambush in Talakag, Bukidnon on 09
November 2017, resulting in the killing of one (1) PNP personnel and the wounding of three (3) others, as well as
the killing of a four (4)-month-old infant and the wounding of two (2) civilians.

Apart from these, at least fifty-nine (59) arson incidents have been carried out by the NPA in Mindanao this year,
targeting businesses and private establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billion-worth of properties. Of
these, the most significant were the attack on Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City on 09 April 2017 and the
burning of facilities and equipment of Mil-Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao
Oriental on 06 May 2017, which resulted in the destruction of properties valued at P1.85 billion and P109 million,
respectively.138 (Emphasis ours)
Given the scale of the attacks perpetrated by the communist rebels, it is far from unreasonable for the President to
include their rebellion in his request for the further extension of martial law in Mindanao. The NPA's "intensified"
insurgence clearly bears a significant impact on the security of Mindanao and the safety of its people, which were
the very reasons for the martial law proclamation and its initial extension.

It will also be noted that when Proclamation No. 216 was issued, the Government and the NPA were undergoing
peace negotiations. Thus, the President could not have included the NPA's rebellion in the Proclamation even
granting he had cause to do so. The Office of the Solicitor General declared during the oral arguments that because
of the peace negotiations, the NPA was "not explicitly included" as a matter of comity. 139 The Executive's data
showed that despite the peace talks, the NPA continued its hostilities and intensified its tactical offensives,
prompting the President to terminate the peace negotiations on November 23, 2017. In his December 8, 2017 letter
to Congress, the President wrote:
As a direct result of these atrocities on the part of the NPA, I was constrained to issue Proclamation No. 360 on 23
November 2017 declaring the termination of peace negotiations with the National Democratic FrontCommunist
Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (NDF-CPP-NPA) effective immediately. I followed this up with
Proclamation No. 374 on 05 December 2017, where I declared the CPP-NPA as a designated/identified terrorist
organization under the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012, and the issuance of a directive
to the Secretary of Justice to file a petition in the appropriate court praying to proscribe the NDF-CPP-NPA as a
terrorist organization under the Human Security Act of 2007. 140
It is readily apparent that the inclusion of the NPA's rebellion in the President's request for extension was
precipitated by these turn of events, as well as the magnitude of the atrocities attributed to the communist rebels. It
would make no sense to exclude or separate the communist rebellion from the continued operation of martial law in
Mindanao when it also persists in the same region. Thus, the Court finds that the President's decision to add the
NPA's "intensified" insurgence to the DAESH/ISIS rebellion, as further basis to request for the extension, was not
uncalled for.

In any event, seeking the concurrence of the Congress to use martial law to quell the NPA's rebellion, instead of
issuing a new martial law proclamation for the same purpose, appears to be more in keeping with the Constitution's
aim of preventing the concentration of the martial law power in the President. The extension granted by the
Congress upon the President's request has become a joint action or a "collective judgment" 141 between the Executive
and the Legislature, thereby satisfying one of the fundamental safeguards established under Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.

B. Public safety requires the extension

In Lagman, the Court defined "public safety" as follows:

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of
and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any
physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds. (Emphasis
ours)
The question, therefore, is whether the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a
significant danger, injury or harm to the general public. The Court answers in the affirmative.

The following events and circumstances, as disclosed by the President, the Defense Secretary and the AFP, strongly
indicate that the continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao is necessary to protect public safety:

(a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large. Remnants of the Hapilon and
Maute groups have been monitored by the AFP to be reorganizing and consolidating their forces in Central
Mindanao, particularly in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan, and strengthening their financial and
logistical capability.142

(b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based ASG, the Maute Group, the Maguid Group and
the Turaifie Group, comprising the DAESH-affiliate Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi siege,
was left with 137 members and a total of 166 firearms. These rebels, however, were able to recruit 400 new
members, more or less, in Basilan, the Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao. 143

(c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship, bombing and tactics in different areas in Lanao del
Sur. Recruits with great potential are trained in producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and urban
operations. These new members are motivated by their clannish culture, being relatives of terrorists, by revenge for
relatives who perished in the Marawi operations, by money as they are paid P15,000.00 to P50,000.00, and by
radical ideology.144

(d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as instructors to the recruits. 145 Foreign terrorists from
Southeast Asian countries, particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the porous
borders of the Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebel
groups.146
(e)In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered Southern Philippines to
augment the remnants of the Maguid group in Saragani province. In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH--
inspired FTFs entered the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute groups in the Lanao
province. In January 2018, an unidentified Egyptian DAESH figure was monitored in the Philippines. 147

(f) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations. 148 Other. FTFs attempted to enter the main battle area in
Marawi, but failed because of checkpoints set up by government forces. 149

(g) "The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and their allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of
Central, Western and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their
forces in Marawi City."150 There were actually armed encounters with the remnants of said groups. 151

(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the
ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao,
including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato." 152

(i) The Turaifie group conducts roadside bombings and attacks against government forces, civilians and populated
areas in Mindanao.153 The group. plans to set off bombings in Cotabato. 154

(j) The Maute Group, along with foreign terrorists, were reported to be planning to bomb the cities of Zamboanga,
Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao.155

(k) The remaining members of the ASG-Basilan have initiated five violent attacks that killed two civilians. 156

(l) In 2017, the remnants of the ASG in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga Peninsula, conducted 43 acts of
violence, including IED attacks and kidnapping which resulted in the killing of eight innocent civilians, three of
whom were mercilessly beheaded.157 Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity.158

(m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the unification of the Sulu and Basilan-based ASG to achieve the common goal of
establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayat in Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such as IED
bombings, in urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga, Isabela and Lamitan.159

(n) By AFP's assessment, the ISIS' regional leadership may remain in the Southern Philippines and with the defeat
of ISIS in many parts of Syria and Iraq, some hardened fighters from the ASEAN may return to this region to
continue their fight. The AFP also identified four potential leaders who may replace Hapilon as emir or leader of the
ISIS forces in the Philippines. It warned that the Dawlah Islamiyah will attempt to replicate the Marawi siege in
other cities of Mindanao and may conduct terrorist attacks in Metro Manila and Davao City as the seat of power of
the Philippine Government. With the spotlight on terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Southeast Asia
following the Marawi siege, the AFP likewise indicated that the influx of FTFs in the Southern Philippines will
persist. The AFP further referred to possible lone-wolf attacks and atrocities from other DAESH-inspired rebel
groups in vulnerable cities like Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan and Zamboanga.160

The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection to terrorism, and their resoluteness in
wresting control of Mindanao from the government, pose a serious danger to Mindanao. The country had been
witness to these groups' capacity and resolve to engage in combat with the government forces, resulting in severe
casualties among both soldiers and civilians, the displacement of thousands of Marawi residents, and considerable
damage to their City. In a short period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have
managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that initially stormed Marawi. Their
current number is now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP five months to
neutralize. To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups before We consider them a significant
threat to public safety is neither sound nor prudent.

(o) Furthermore, in 2017 alone, the BIFF initiated 116 hostile acts in North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and
Maguindanao, consisting of ambuscade, firing, arson, IED attacks and grenade explosions. 66 of these violent
incidents were committed during the martial law period and by the AFP's assessment, the group will continue to
inflict violence and sow terror in central Mindanao.161
(p) In 2017, the ASG, which is the predominant local terrorist group in the Southern Philippines based in Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga, with its 519 members, 503 firearms, 66 controlled barangays and 345 watch-
listed personalities, had perpetrated a total of 13 acts of kidnapping against 37 individuals, 11 of whom (including 7
foreigners) remain in captivity. Their kidnap-for-ransom activities for last year alone have amassed a total of P61.2
million.162

(q) Mindanao remains the hotbed of communist rebellion considering that 47% of its manpower, 48% of its
firearms, 51% of its controlled barangays and 45% of its guerrilla fronts are in this region. 163 Of the 14 provinces
with active communist insurgency, 10 are in Mindanao. Furthermore, the communist rebels' Komisyon Mindanao
(KOMMID) is now capable of sending augmentation forces, particularly "Party Cadres," in Northern Luzon. 164

(r) The hostilities initiated by the communist rebels have risen by 65% from 2016 to 2017 despite the peace
talks.165 In 2017 alone, they perpetrated 422 atrocities in Mindanao, including ambush, raids, attacks, kidnapping,
robbery, bombing, liquidation, landmine/IED attacks, arson and sabotage, that resulted in the death of 47
government forces and 31 civilians.166 An ambush in Bukidnon in November 2017 killed one PNP personnel, two
civilians and a four-month old baby. 59 incidents of arson committed by the Communist rebels against business
establishments in Mindanao last year alone destroyed P2.378 billion worth of properties. Moreover, the amount they
extorted from private individuals and business establishments from 2015 to the first semester of 2017 has been
estimated at P2.6 billion.167

(s) Among the most significant attacks by the communist rebels on business establishments took place in April and
May 2017 when they burned the facilities ofLapanday Food Corporation in Davao City and those of Mil-Oro
Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental, which resulted in losses amounting to P1.85
billion and P109 million, respectively. According to the AFP, business establishments in the area may be forced to
shut down due to persistent NPA attacks just like in Surigao del Sur. 168

(t) By AFP's calculation, the aforesaid rebel groups (excluding the 400 newly recruited members of the Dawlah
Islamiyah) are nearly 2,781-men strong, equipped with 3,211 firearms and control 537 barangays in Mindanao.

The magnitude of the atrocities already perpetrated by these rebel groups reveals their capacity to continue inflicting
serious harm and injury, both to life and property. The sinister plans of attack, as uncovered by the AFP, confirm
this real and imminent threat. The manpower and armaments these groups possess, the continued radicalization and
recruitment of new rebels, the financial and logistical build-up cited by the President, and more. importantly, the
groups' manifest determination to overthrow the government through force, violence and terrorism, present a
significant danger to public safety.

In Lagman, the Court recognized that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has possession of intelligence reports,
classified documents and other vital information which he can rely on to properly assess the actual conditions on the
ground, thus:
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is for the President
as [C]ommander-in-[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be
satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ." Significantly, respect to these so-called
classified documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative,
and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces.
As his December 8, 2017 letter to the Congress would show, the President's request for further extension had been
based on the security assessment of the AFP and the PNP. Notably, the President also acknowledged that the
grounds or "essential facts" cited in his letter were of his "personal knowledge" as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. The President's request to Congress also referred to the monitoring activities that led to the Executive's
findings, which the AFP confirmed during the January 17, 2018 oral argument.

According to Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, the President made his request to the Congress after a careful
personal evaluation of the reports from the Martial Law Administrator, Martial Law Implementor, the PNP, the
National Security Adviser and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), as well as information
gathered from local government officials and residents of Mindanao. 169

On December 12, 2017, the AFP separately gave the Senate and the House of Representatives a briefing on the
Executive Department's basis for requesting the further extension of Proclamation No. 216. 170

At the Joint Session, of the Congress held on December 13, 2017 Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, Defense
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, AFP General Guerrero, PNP Chief Ronald Dela Rosa, the head of the NICA, the
National Security Adviser, as well as the Secretaries of the Department of Justice, the Department of Public Works
and Highways, Department of Labor and Employment, Transportation and Communication, and the Chairman of the
Task Force Bangon Marawi, were present and sworn in as resource persons. 171 Secretary Medialdea highlighted to
the Congress the reasons cited by the President in his request, and during the course of the session, he, Secretary
Lorenzana, AFP General Guerrero and Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Menardo Guevarra responded to
interpellations from a number of Senators and Representatives on the propriety and necessity of further extending
martial law in Mindanao.

The Joint Session also provided an occasion for the Representative from the Second District of Lanao del Sur to
confirm the recruitment activities of the "remnants" of the Maute and Hapilon groups, thus:
Representative Papandayan. x x x

Kami po sa Lanao del Sur, ako ay umuwi last week, aking kinausap ang aking mgabarangay at mga barangay
chairman sa aming distrito. Pinahanap ko kung mayroon pang natitirang remnants o mga kasamahan ng Maute at
saka Hapilon. Ang mga barangay chairman po ay nag-report sa akin na mayroon po at sila po ay nagre-recruit
ngayon, na nag-aalok din sila ng pera sa mga nare-recruit nila.172
Following its deliberation on the request for further extension, the Congress, in joint session, resolved to further
extend Proclamation No. 216 for one year, with 240 members voting for, and 27 against, 173 the President's initiative.
In approving the extension, Congress agreed with the factual considerations of the Executive, as can be gleamed
from the 4th and 6thWhereas clauses of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

The information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, "the
Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment; in turn, the Executive
Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court." 174

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the AFP gave its "briefing" or "presentation"
during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, "based on intelligence reports
gathered on the ground," from personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified
official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. 175According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for
updates, was given to the Congress.176 As it stands, the information thus presented has not been challenged or
questioned as regards its reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in
Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient
factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4.

Necessarily, We do not see the merit to the petitioners' theory in the Cullamat petition that the extent of threat to
public safety as would justify the declaration or extension of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ must be of such level that the government cannot sufficiently govern, nor assure public
safety or deliver government services. Petitioners posit that only in this scenario may martial law be constitutionally
permissible.

Restrained caution must be exercised in adopting petitioners' theory for several reasons. To begin with, a hasty
adoption of the suggested scale, level or extent of threat to public safety is to supplant into the plain text of the
Constitution. An interpretation of the Constitution precedes from the fundamental postulate that the Constitution is
the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer.177 The consequent duty of the judiciary then is to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.178This must be so considering that the Constitution is the mother of all
laws, sufficient and complete in itself. For the Court to categorically pronounce which kind of threat to public safety
justifies the declaration or extension of martial law and which ones do not, is to improvise on the text of the
Constitution ideals even when these ideals are not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written
Constitution.179 Such judicial improvisation finds no justification.

For another, if the Court were to be successful in disposing of its bounden duty to allocate constitutional boundaries,
the Constitutional doctrines the Court produces must necessarily remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides
oftime.180 The adoption of the extreme scenario as the measure of threat to public safety as suggested by petitioners
is to invite doubt as to whether the proclamation of martial law would be at all effective in such case considering
that enemies of the State raise unconventional methods which change over time. It may happen that by the time
government loses all capability to dispose of its functions, the enemies of the government might have already been
successful in removing allegiance therefrom. Any declaration then of martial law would be of no useful purpose and
such could not be the intent of the Constitution. Instead, the requirement of public safety as it presently appears in
the Constitution admits of flexibility and discretion on the part of the Congress.

So too, when the President and the Congress ascertain whether public safety requires the declaration and extension
of martial lavv, respectively, they do so by calibrating not only the present state of public safety but the further
repercussions of the actual rebellion to public safety in the future as well. Thus, as persuasively submitted by Fr.
Bernas in his Amicus Curiae Brief181 in Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo:182
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the
Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word m Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of
the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to
public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is
submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as
basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is
about past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable
douht of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the
President's capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose of the
Constitution. (Emphasis ours)
The requirement of the Constitution is therefore adequately met when there is sufficient factual basis to hold that the
present and past acts constituting the actual rebellion are of such character that endanger and will endanger public
safety. This permissive approach is sanctioned not only by an acknowledgment that the Congress is and should be
allowed flexibility but also because the Court is without the luxury of time to determine accuracy and precision.

No necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President's exercise of military powers

We refuse to be tempted by petitioner Rosales' prodding that We set two tests in reviewing the constitutionality of a
declaration or extension of martial law. In her memorandum, 183 she clarifies the two tests, as follows:
1. Proportionality Test requires that a situation is of such gravity or scale as to demand resort to the most extreme of
measures, i.e. a situation where the ordinary police powers of the State are no longer sufficient to restore, secure or
preserve public safety; and

2. Suitability Test requires that a situation is such that the declaration of martial law is the correct tool to address
safety problem.
It is sufficient to state that this Court already addressed the same argument in Our decision in Lagman. The
determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of
factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court's power of review, as provided under Section 18,
Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and
how these military powers should be exercised.

Safeguards against abuse

Martial law is a law of necessity. "Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at the same time limits the
scope of martial law."184 Thus, when the need for which Proclamation No. 216 was further extended no longer
exists, the President can lift the martial law imposition even before the end of the one-year period. Under the same
circumstances, the Congress itself may pass a resolution pre-terminating the extension. This power emanates from
the Congress' authority, granted under the Constitution, to approve the extension and to fix its duration. The power
to determine the period of the extension necessarily includes the power to shorten it. Furthermore, considering that
this Court's judgment on the constitutionality of an extension is "transitory," or "valid at that certain point of time,"
any citizen may petition the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for its continued implementation
should the President and the Congress fail or refuse to lift the imposition of martial law. During the deliberations on
the 1987 Constitution, it was explained:
FR. BERNAS. The decision of the Supreme Court will be based on its assessment of the factual situation.
Necessarily, therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court on that is a transitory judgment because the factual
situation can change. So, while the decision of the Supreme Court may be valid at that certain point of time, the
situation may change so that Congress should be authorized to do something about it.185(Emphasis ours)
Petitioners fear that the one-year extension of martial law will only intensify the human rights violations committed
by government forces against civilians. To place a territory under martial law is undeniably an immense power, and
like all other powers, it may be abused.186 However, the possibility of abuse and even the country's martial law
experience under the Marcos regime did not prevent the framers of the 1987 Constitution from including it among
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is in recognition of the fact that during critical times when
the security or survival of the state is greatly imperiled, an equally vast and extraordinary measure should be
available for the President to protect and defend it.

Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987 Constitution endeavored to institute a
system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of the martial law and suspension powers, and to
establish safeguards to protect civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of the privilege of habeas
corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires such declaration or suspension.

(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding 60 days.

(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit a Report in person or in writing
to Congress.

(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can revoke the proclamation
or suspension.

(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation or suspension.

(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. He should ask the Congress' approval.

(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members, can extend the proclamation or suspension tor such period as it may determine.

(i) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved when the invasion or rebellion persists
and public safety requires it.

(j) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, or the
extension thereof, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.

(k) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.

(l) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.

Accordingly, the Bill of Rights187 remains effective under a state of martial law. Its implementers must adhere to the
principle that civilian authority is supreme over the military and the armed forces is the protector of the
people.188 They must also abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full
respect for human rights.189
(m) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.

(n) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

(o) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained should be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he should be released.
As Commissioner De Los Reyes explained during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution:
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.

My vote is yes. The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and delicate nature. A
free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to impose martial law is certainly
felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is
limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of the
actual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I
interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and
may be abused. All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to
point out any other hands in which this power will be more safe [sic] and at the same time equally effectual.
When citizens of the State are in arms against each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the
laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. I vote yes. 190 (Emphasis ours)
Human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of martial law and suspension powers cannot by any
measure be condoned. The Court lauds petitioners' vigilance to make sure that the abuses of the past are not repeated
and perceived abuses of the present will not go unnoticed. However, as the Court settled in Lagman, alleged human
rights violations committed during the implementation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus should be resolved in a separate proceeding. It, thus, bears noting some of the remedies,
requirements and penalties imposed under existing laws, meant to address abuses by arresting or investigating public
officers.

In Lacson v. Perez,191 the Court had occasion to rule:

Moreover, petitioners' contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and
147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their
resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subject to warrantless arrest is
not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court. x x x Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting
officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting
officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail
themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3,
Rule 65, Rules of Court).192
R.A. No. 7438,193 which defines the rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodiaJ investigation, imposes
the following penalties on errant arresting or investigating officers:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. - (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to
inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00) or a penalty. of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both.
The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such
investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of
his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or
from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6)
years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
Under R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007, rebellion may be subsumed in the crime of terrorism; it is
one of the means by which terrorism can be committed.194 R.A. No. 9372 imposes specific penalties for failure of
the law enforcement personnel to deliver the suspect to the proper judicial authority within the prescribed period, for
violating the rights of the detainee, and for using torture in the interrogation or investigation of a detainee, viz:
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three Days. - The penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law
enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected
person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.

xxxx

SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law enforcement personnel, or any
personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of
an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is
duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or leader of the law enforcement unit
having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

xxxx

SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and Interrogation of a
Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or
torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected
person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20)
years of imprisonment.

When death or Serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a consequence of the use of such
threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as
a consequence of the infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty shall be twelve
(12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
R.A. No. 9372 also gave the Commission on Human Rights the following authority and duty:
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall give the highest
priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in relation to the
implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute
public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil and political rights of persons
suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
R.A. No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009 provides that: "Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an 'order of
battle' shall not and can never be. invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment."195

The same law also expressly prohibits secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar
forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. For this purpose, it requires the Philippine
National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement agencies concerned to
make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding
data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest and
incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. The list is to be made available to the public at all times. 196

R.A. No. 9745 likewise defined the following rights of a torture victim in the institution of a criminal complaint for
torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time
a complaint for torture is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made
available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein,

(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a
consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through
its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the
investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and

(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in
order to avoid further trauma.
It further imposes the following penalties on perpetrators of torture as defined therein:
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the
following acts:

(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;

(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;

(3) Torture with rape;

(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane,
imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and

(5) Torture committed against children.

(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of mental/psychological
torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the
victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame.

(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture resulting in
psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described In paragraph (b) of this section.

(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture,
the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a
foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; or shall have become permanently incapacitated
for labor.

(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture,
the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or
shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90)
days.

(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty
(30) days but not more than ninety (90) days.

(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its m1mmum and medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of
torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.

(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and maintain secret
detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar fonns of
prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be carried qut with impunity.

(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP
and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the
public an updated list of detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees
incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
This Court has likewise promulgated rules aimed at enforcing human rights. In A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,197this Court
made available the remedy of a writ of amparo to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity. Similarly, in A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC,198 this Court also crafted the rule on the writ of habeas data to
provide a remedy for any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

It also bears to note that the Philippines, is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),199 which is embodied in the International Bill of Human Rights. 200 As such, it recognizes that everyone has
the right to liberty and security of one's person.201 That no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; or
that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law, are just among the thirty (30) articles, mentioned in the UDHR setting forth the human rights and
fundamental freedoms to which all men and women, everywhere in the world, are entitled, without any
discrimination.

Significantly, during the Congress' December 13, 2017 Joint Session, the Executive Department, through Secretary
Lorenzana, made an express commitment to submit a monthly report to the Congress regarding the extended
implementation of martial law in Mindanao.202 Although not required under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the submission of such report' is an ideal complement to the system of checks and balance instituted
therein. It will clearly assist the Congress in evaluating the need to maintain or shorten the period of extension of
martial. law in Mindanao; it will also serve as an additional measure to check on possible abuses or human rights
violations in the Executive's enforcement of martial law.

Petitioners failed to comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ

The purpose of a preliminary injunction under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Ruls of Court, 203 is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.204 Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. 205Status quo is
the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. 206 By jurisprudence, to be entitled
to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and
urgent necessity tor the writ to prevent serious damage;207 and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.208

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents' gross transgressions of the
Constitution when they extended the martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges
that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in Mindanao
"which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of
the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military forces".

These grounds, however, cannot carry the day for the petitioners. Basic is the rule that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof.209 These allegations cannot constitute a right in esse, as understood in
jurisprudence. A right in esse is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,210 one clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.211 The existence of a right to be protected, and the acts against which the
writ is to be directed are violative of said right must be established. 212

The alleged violations of the petitioners' civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners
failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise
failed to establish the nexus between the President's exercise of his martial law powers and their unfounded
apprehension that the imposition "will target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed uprising or
struggle". Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the "civil liberties" specifically refer to, and how the extension
of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these "civil liberties" in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently,
petitioners' right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of
an injunctive writ.

In Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (PHIL.), Inc. v. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., et. al.,213 this Court held
that no automatic issuance of an injunctive relief will result by the mere allegation of a constitutionally protected
right. We explained, thus:
Mere allegation or invocation that constitutionally protected rights were violated will not automatically result in the
issuance of injunctive relief. The plaintiff or the petitioner should discharge the burden to show a clear and
compelling breach of a constitutional provision. Violations of constitutional provisions are easily alleged, but trial
courts should scrutinize diligently and deliberately the evidence showing the existence of facts that should support
the conclusion that a constitutional provision is clearly and convincingly breached. In case of doubt, no injunctive
relief should issue. In the proper cases, the aggrieved party may then avail itself of special civil actions and elevate
the matter.214
Indeed, this Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof
and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. 215 We emphasize that the grant or denial of
an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in
evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof. In The
Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,216 this Court stressed the indispensability of establishing the requirements
for injunctive writ:
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate
that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or
regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter,
rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief
cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits. Considering that injunction is an exercise of
equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively
assess all the equities of the situation, including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and private
parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are
accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction. against
future enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship. 217 (Citations omitted and italics in the
original)
Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners' theory. Such purported
human right violations cannot be utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to
declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners' plea would result into judicial
activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers.

As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such trangressions can be addressed in a separate
and independent court action.218 Recall that the imposition of martial law does not result in suspending the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function. Hence, petitioners can lodge a
complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against
erring parties.

A Final Word
The imperative necessity of .Martial Law as a tool of the government for self-preservation is enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. It earned a bad reputation during the Marcos era and apprehensions still linger in the
minds of doubtful and suspicious individuals. Mindful of its importance and necessity, the Constitution has provided
for safeguards against its abuses.

Martial law is a constitutional weapon against enemies of the State. Thus, Martial law is not designed to oppress or
abuse law abiding citizens of this country.

Unfortunately, the enemies of the State have employed devious, cunning and calculating means to destabilize the
government. They are engaged in an unconventional, clandestine and protracted war to topple the government. The
enemies of the State are not always quantifiable, not always identifiable and not visible at all times. They have
mingled with ordinary citizens in the community and have unwittingly utilized them in the recruitement,
surveillance and attack against government forces. Inevitably, government forces have arrested, injured and even
killed these ordinary citizens complicit with the enemies.

Admittedly, innocent civilians have also been victimized in the cross fire as unintended casualties of this continuing
war.

These incidents, however, should not weaken our resolve to defeat the enemies of the State. In these exigencies, We
cannot afford to emasculate, dilute or diminish the powers of government if in the end it would lead to the
destruction of the State and place the safety of our citizens in peril and their interest in harm's way.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4
and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

July 25, 2017

G.R. No. 231671

ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P.

ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, and SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioners
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by
Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, as represented
by House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231694

FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TANADA, BISHOP EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, BISHOP

BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO. ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH
BULANGIS and CASSANDRA D. DELURIA, Petitioners,
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, President, Senate of the Philippines, and
PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, Speaker, House of the Representatives, Respondents

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent Congress
of the Philippines (the Congress), composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to convene in joint
session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 201 7 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
(President Duterte). Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state of martial law and suspended
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not e:xceeding sixty (60) days
effective from the date of the proclamation's issuance.

In the Petition for Mandamus of Alex.antler A. Padilla (Padilla), Rene A.V. Saguisag (Saguisag), Christian S.
Monsod (Monsod), Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Rosales), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), and Senator Leila M. De Lima
(Senator De Lima), filed on June 6, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231671 (the Padilla Petition), petitioners seek a
ruling from the Court directing the Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation
No. 216, and to vote thereon.1

In the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Wigberto E. Tanada (Tanada), Bishop Emeritus
Deogracias Iniguez (Bishop Iniguez), Bishop Broderick Pabillo (Bishop Pabillo ), Bishop Antonio Tobias (Bishop
Tobias), Mo. Adelaida Ygrubay (Mo. Y grubay), Shamah Bulangis (Bulangis), and Cassandra D. Deluria (Deluria),
filed on June 7, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231694 (the Tañada Petition), petitioners entreat the Court to: (a)
declare the refusal of the Congress to convene in joint session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216
to be in grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ
of mandamus directing the Congress to convene in joint session for the aforementioned purpose. 2

Respondent Congress, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Consolidated Comment on
June 27, 2017. Respondents Senate of the Philippines and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senate
President Pimentel), through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, separately filed their Consolidated Comment
(Ex Abudanti Cautela) on June 29, 2017.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity
of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the
Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives, through House Speaker Pantaleon D.
Alvarez (House Speaker Alvarez).

According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the declaration of a state of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from
the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities,
institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other
local and foreign armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow
lawless violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate purpose of establishing a
DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province in Mindanao.

Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security officials of the government were
thereafter invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House of Representatives for a conference briefing
regarding the circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the President's proclamation and report.

On May 29, 2017, the briefing before the Senate was conducted, which lasted for about four (4) hours, by Secretary
of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenza (Secretary Lorenzana), National Security Adviser and Director General of
the National Security Council Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. (Secretary Esperon), and Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) General Eduardo M. Afio (General Año). The following day, May 30, 2017, the
Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 388, 3 which expressed
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No. 390, 4 which called for the
convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives to deliberate on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.

P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative
votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 495 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to
Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.’"6

P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it as
opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its approval and adoption. 7

On May 31, 201 7, the House of Representatives, having previously constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole
House,8 was briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary
Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door briefing, the House of
Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to
Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'"9 The House of Representatives proceeded to divide its members on
the matter of approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members who were in
favor of passing the subject resolution secured the majority vote. 10
The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to
deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was
rejected.11

These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

The Padilla Petition

Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is required to convene in joint session,
deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the Constitution" and submit the following arguments
in support of their petition:

[I] THE PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE HONORABLE COURT'S
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.

[i] THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.

[ii] PETITIONERS, AS PART OF THE PUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYERS, POSSESS LEGAL STANDING TO
FILE THIS PETITION.

[iii] PETITIONER [DE LIMA], AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS, HAS LEGAL STANDING TO FILE THIS
PETITION.

[iv] THE CASE AND THE ISSUE INVOLVED ARE RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.

[II] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS, AND CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN
JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.

[i] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT
SESSION.

[ii] THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS IS FOR CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.

[iii] THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMED IN FORTUN v. GMA THAT CONGRESS HAS THE "AUTOMATIC
DUTY" TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.

[iv] LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT ALSO RECOGNIZES CONGRESS' DUTY TO CONVENE IN JOINT

SESSION.

[III] THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE VII,
[SECTION] 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS A MANDATORY, MINISTERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF
CONGRESS, WHICH CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.12

Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy in this instance and that their case is ripe for
adjudication. According to petitioners, the resolutions separately passed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, which express support as well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216,
injure their rights "to a proper [and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of martial law" and that the
continuing failure of the Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a continuing injury to their rights.13
Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they all have locus standi in their "assertion of a public right"
which they have been deprived of when the Congress refused and/or failed to convene in joint session to deliberate
on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senator De Lima adds that she, together with the other senators who
voted in favor of the resolution to convene the Congress jointly, were even effectively denied the opportunity to
perform their constitutionally-mandated duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, to deliberate on the
said proclamation of the President in a joint session of the Congress.14

On the propriety of resorting to the remedy of mandamus, petitioners posit that ''the duty of Congress to convene in
joint session upon the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not require the exercise of discretion." Such mandate upon the Congress is allegedly a purely ministerial
act which can be compelled through a writ of mandamus.15

As for the substantive issue, it is the primary contention of petitioners that a plain reading of Article VII, Section 18
of the Constitution shows that the Congress is required to convene in joint session to review Proclamation No. 216
and vote as a single deliberative body. The performance of the constitutional obligation is allegedly mandatory, not
discretionary.16

According to petitioners, the discretionary nature of the phrase "may revoke such proclamation or suspension" under
Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution allegedly pertain to the power of the Congress to revoke but not to its
obligation to jointly convene and vote - which, they stress, is mandatory. To require the Congress to convene only
when it exercises the power to revoke is purportedly absurd since the Congress, without convening in joint session,
cannot know beforehand whether a majority vote in fact exists to effect a revocation. 17

Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 this Court described the "duty" of the Congress to convene
in joint session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint session when former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the Congress clearly recognized its duty to
convene in joint session.19

The mandate upon the Congress to convene jointly is allegedly intended by the 1986 Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to serve as a protection against potential abuses in the exercise of the President's power to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is "a mechanism purposely designed by the
Constitution to compel Congress to review the propriety of the President's action x x x [and] meant to contain
martial law powers within a democratic framework for the preservation of democracy, prevention of abuses, and
protection of the people."20

The Tañada Petition

The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:

I. A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION

THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE
PRESIDENT IS MANDATORY.

II. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND
INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL LAW.

III. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND
THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

IV. THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS BE
CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. 21
Similar to the contentions in the Padilla Petition, petitioners maintain that they have sufficiently shown all the
essential requisites in order for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review, in that: (1) an actual case or
controversy exists; (2) they possess the standing to file this case; (3) the constitutionality of a governmental act has
been raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutionality of the said act is the very lis mota of the
petition.

According to petitioners, there is an actual case or controversy because the failure and/or refusal of the Congress to
convene jointly deprived legislators of a venue within which to raise a motion for revocation (or even extension) of
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and the public of an opportunity to be properly informed as to the bases
and particulars thereof.22

Petitioners likewise claim to have legal standing to sue as citizens and taxpayers. Nonetheless, they submit that the
present case calls for the Court's liberality in the appreciation of their locus standi given the fact that their petition
presents "a question of first impression - one of paramount importance to the future of our democracy - as well as
the extraordinary nature of Martial Law itself." 23

Petitioners contend that the convening of the Congress in joint session, whenever the President declares martial law
or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is a public right and duty mandated by the Constitution. The
writ of mandamus is, thus, the "proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution." 24

For this group of petitioners, the Members of the Congress gravely abused their discretion for their refusal to
convene in joint session, underscoring that "[w]hile a writ of mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, or to compel the performance of a discretionary act, this admits of certain
exceptions, such as in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority,
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy." 25

As to the merits, petitioners assert that the convening of the Congress in joint session after the declaration of martial
law is mandatory under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whether or not the Congress is in session or there
is intent to revoke. It is their theory that a joint session should be a deliberative process in which, after debate and
discussion, legislators can come to an informed decision as to the factual and legal bases for the declaration of
martial law. Moreover, "legislators who wish to revoke the martial law proclamation should have the right to put
that vote on historical record in joint session - and, in like manner, the public should have the right to know the
position of their legislators with respect to this matter of the highest national interest." 26

Petitioners add that a public, transparent, and deliberative process is purportedly necessary to allay the people's fears
against "executive overreach." This concern allegedly cannot be addressed by briefings in executive sessions given
by representatives of the Executive Branch to both Houses of the Congress. 27

Petitioners further postulate that, based on the deliberations of the Members of the ConCom, the phrase "voting
jointly" under Article VII, Section 18 was intended to mean that a joint session is a procedural requirement,
necessary for the Congress to decide whether to revoke, affirm, or even extend the declaration of martial law. 28

Consolidation of Respondents' Comments

Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of
revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.29 In the absence of such duty, the non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual
case or controversy that may be the subject of judicial review. 30 Additionally, respondents argue that the petitions
raise a political question over which the Court has no jurisdiction.

Petitioners' avowal that they are citizens and taxpayers is allegedly inadequate to clothe them with locus
standi. Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Petitioners must show that they have a direct and personal interest in the Congress' failure to convene in joint
session, which they failed to present herein. A taxpayer's suit is likewise proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of the Congress. However, in these cases, the funds used in the implementation of martial
law in Mindanao are taken from those funds already appropriated by the Congress. Senator De Lima's averment of
her locus standi as an incumbent member of the legislature similarly lacks merit. Insofar as the powers of the
Congress are not impaired, there is no prejudice to each Member thereof; and even assuming arguendo that the
authority of the Congress is indeed compromised, Senator De Lima still does not have standing to file the present
petition for mandamus because it is not shown that she has been allowed to participate in the Senate sessions during
her incarceration. She cannot, therefore, claim that she has suffered any direct injury from the non-convening of the
Congress in joint session.31

Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as enshrined under Article III, Section 7 of
the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security are considered as a valid exception to the right
to information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's right to participate in the deliberations
of the Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial law declaration may be restricted in the interest of national
security and public safety.32

Respondents allege that petitioners failed to present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only
issue when the act to be compelled is a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or
respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station.33

According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty to convene in joint session
whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in the absence of a
clear and specific constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18 does not use the words ''joint
session" at all, much less impose the convening of such joint session upon the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting when the
action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the proclamation or suspension. 34

Indeed, prior concurrence of the Congress is not constitutionally required for the effectivity of the proclamation or
suspension. Quoting from the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution pertaining to Article VII, Section 18,
the Congress points out that it was the intention of the said framers to grant the President the power to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days without
the concurrence of the Congress. There is absolutely nothing under the Constitution that mandates the Congress to
convene in joint session when their intention is merely to discuss, debate, and/or review the factual and legal basis
for the proclamation. That is why the phrase "voting jointly" is limited only in case the Congress intends to revoke
the proclamation.35 In a situation where the Congress is not in session, the Constitution simply provides that the
Congress must convene in accordance with its rules but does not state that it must convene in joint session.
Respondents further refer to the proper procedure for the holding of joint sessions.

Respondents brush aside as mere obiter dictum the Court's pronouncement in the Fortun case that it is the duty of
the Congress to convene upon the declaration of martial law. That whether or not the Congress should convene in
joint session in instances where it is not revoking the proclamation was not an issue in that case. Moreover, the
factual circumstances in the Fortun case are entirely different from the present cases. The Congress then issued a
concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a joint session as the intention - at least as far as the Senate was
concerned - was to revoke the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao. The Fortun case then cannot be considered a legislative precedent of an "automatic
convening of a joint session by the Congress upon the President's proclamation of martial law."36

Respondents argue that the remedy of certiorari is likewise unavailing. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.37 The Congress has the duty to convene and vote jointly only in
two (2) instances, as respondents have already explained. The Congress had even issued their respective resolutions
expressing their support to, as well as their intent not to revoke, President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. There
then can be no evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty on the part of the Congress if there is
no duty to begin with.38

Respondents respectfully remind the Court to uphold the "constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government."39 The Court may not intervene in the internal affairs of the Legislature and it is not within
the province of the courts to direct the Congress how to do its work. Respondents stress that this Court cannot direct
the Congress to convene in joint session without violating the basic principle of the separation of powers. 40

Subsequent Events

On July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a Manifestation, calling the attention of
the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day period of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22,
2017. Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day period, petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant cases for
the guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.

On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and, with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor
versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

After a meticulous consideration of the parties' submissions, we synthesize them into the following fundamental
issues:

I. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated petitions;

II. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review;

III. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution; and

IV. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present cases.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court's jurisdiction over these

consolidated petitions

The principle of separation of powers

The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of government. It is implicit in the manner
that our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch
of government. In Belgica v. Ochoa,41 this Court had the opportunity to restate:

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[ e ]ach department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."
Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of separation of powers
and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power
must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check
the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed as
an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive
issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,
particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the President declares martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over
the petitions. It is the prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is." 42 It is worth repeating here that:

[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.43 (Emphases supplied.)

Political question doctrine

Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers, they argue that these petitions involve
a political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true that the Court continues to recognize questions of
policy as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review. 44 However, in a long line of cases,45 we have given a
limited application to the political question doctrine.

In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,46 we emphasized that the Court's judicial power as conferred
by the Constitution has been expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." Further, in past cases, the Court has exercised its power of judicial review noting that the
requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by
which a constitutional duty or power was exercised.47

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,48 we explained the rationale behind the Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Citing former
Chief Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion in his sponsorship speech for Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, we reiterated that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

Existence of the requisites for judicial review

Petitioners' legal standing

Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following capacities: (1) Padilla as a member of the
legal profession representing victims of human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a human rights
lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of the Philippine
Constitution and member of the 1986 Con Com, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of human rights violations
committed under martial law declared by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a
lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human rights
advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 231694, while petitioner Tañada sues in his capacity as a Filipino citizen and former
legislator, his co-petitioners (Bishop Iniguez, Bishop Pabillo, Bishop Tobias, Mo. Ygrubay, Bulangis, and Deluria)
all sue in their capacity as Filipino citizens.

Respondents insist that none of the petitioners have legal standing, whether as a citizen, taxpayer, or legislator, to
file the present cases.1avvphi1

The Court has consistently held that locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. The question is whether the
challenging party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy so as to assure the existence of
concrete adverseness that would sharpen the presentation of issues and illuminate the court in ruling on the
constitutional question posed.49

Petitioners satisfy these standards.

The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to interfere and see that a public offense be
properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.50 When a citizen exercises this "public
right" and challenges a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action, he represents the public
at large, thus, clothing him with the requisite locus standi. He may not sustain an injury as direct and adverse as
compared to others but it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or
relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. 51

Verily, legal standing is grounded on the petitioner's personal interest in the controversy. A citizen who files a
petition before the court asserting a public right satisfies the requirement of personal interest simply because the
petitioner is a member of the general public upon which the right is vested. 52 A citizen's personal interest in a case
challenging an allegedly unconstitutional act lies in his interest and duty to uphold and ensure the proper execution
of the law.53

The present petitions have been filed by individuals asserting that the Senate and the House of Representatives have
breached an allegedly constitutional duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No.
216. The citizen-petitioners' challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional act in violation of a public right, done in
behalf of the general public, gives them legal standing.

On the other hand, Senator De Lima questions the Congress' failure to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216, which, according to the petitioners, is the legislature's constitutional duty.

We have ruled that legislators have legal standing to ensure that the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and
privileges of the Members of the Congress remain inviolate. 54 Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action - or in these cases, inaction - which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.55

Actual case or controversy

It is long established that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. There is an actual
case or controversy where there is a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, where the
contradiction of the rights can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 56

There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the petitioners' assertion that the
Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216; and, on the
other, the respondents' view that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the part of the Congress.

Petitioners seek relief through a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari. Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 57 Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available
only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.58 With respect to the Court, however, certiorari is broader in scope and reach, and it may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board, or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.59

As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of their constitutional
duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication
exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but, in fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 60

Respondents aver that the Congress cannot be compelled to do something that is discretionary on their part nor
could they be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the absence of any mandatory obligation to jointly convene on
their part to affirm the President's proclamation of martial law. Thus, petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in their petitions for mandamus and/or certiorari; consequently, no actual case or controversy exists.

There is no merit to respondents' position.

For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and give due course to the petitions, it is sufficient that the
petitioners set forth their material allegations to make out a prima facie case for mandamus or certiorari.61 Whether
the petitioners are actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs prayed for is exactly what is to be determined by the
Court after careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and submissions.

Liberality in cases of transcendental importance

In any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless,
exercise its power of judicial review in cases of transcendental importance.

There are marked differences between the Chief Executive's military powers, including the power to declare martial
law, as provided under the present Constitution, in comparison to that granted in the 1935 Constitution. Under the
1935 Constitution,62 such powers were seemingly limitless, unrestrained, and purely subject to the President's
wisdom and discretion.

At present, the Commander-in-Chief still possesses the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and to proclaim martial law. However, these executive powers are now subject to the review of both the
legislative and judicial branches. This check-and-balance mechanism was installed in the 1987 Constitution
precisely to prevent potential abuses of these executive prerogatives.

Inasmuch as the present petitions raise issues concerning the Congress' role in our government's system of checks
and balances, these are matters of paramount public interest or issues of transcendental importance deserving the
attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents.63

Mootness

The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that the Congress be directed to
convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to affirm or revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably
have been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60) days that the President's martial law declaration
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the
subsequent extension by the Congress of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the
Court's own decision in Lagman v. Medialdea,64 wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the factual bases for
Proclamation No. 216 under the original period stated therein.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the jurisprudential rules regarding mootness were succinctly summarized, thus:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

xxxx

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving
a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.65 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)

It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court to proceed with the resolution of
these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the preceding discussion, these cases involve a
constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A definitive ruling from this Court is imperative not
only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify the parameters of congressional
conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the factual precedents that gave rise to
these cases.

The duty of the Congress to vote jointly

under Article VII, Section 18

We now come to the crux of the present petitions - the issue of whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the
President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Philippines or any part thereof.

The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except
to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18

of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)

Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces,66 in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and
lawless violence.67 However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to
proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the
same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power through the two other co-equal and
independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well
as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.

There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of the
Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz.:

a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;

b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President;

c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in the same manner. extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and

d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.

There is no question herein that the first provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the
issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25,
2017.

The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual circumstances which are not
availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the initial proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and the 17th Congress was still in session68 when
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017.

It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. According to the plain-meaning rule
or verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or "speech is the index of
intention[,]" and verba legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." 69

In Funa v. Chairman Villar,70 the Court also applied the verba legis rule in constitutional construction, thus:

The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must he given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by
the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. If
possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save where technical terms are
employed. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates the verbal legis rule in this wise:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that
is where we begin. It is to he assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions arc couched express the
objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it. based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphases supplied.)

The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants
the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the
provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed
as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, 71 but in order to
revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting
jointly, favor revocation.

It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject
to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting
will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution,72 still, the
requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the
provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is
obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.

The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to revoke the
President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.

The Court recognized in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary73 that:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A. doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced· the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

However, in the same Decision, the Court issued the following caveat:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give US no light as to the views. of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.'' The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.74 (Emphasis supplied.)

As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant provision in Article VU,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas co1pus. Based on
the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look beyond the plain language of the provision and
decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Nonetheless, the deliberations on Article VII, Section 18
of the 1986 ConCom does not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it mandatory for the Congress to
convene in joint session following the President's proclamation and/or suspension, so it could deliberate as a single
body, regardless of whether its Members will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.

What is evident in the deliberations of the 1986 ConCom were the framers' intentions to (a) remove the requirement
of prior concurrence by the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to
revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.

As the Commander-in-Chief clause was initially drafted, the President's suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus required the prior concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress to be
effective. The first line read, "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion[;]" and the next line, "In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members
of the Congress, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."75
The Commissioners, however, extensively debated on whether or not there should be prior concurrence by the
Congress, and the exchanges below present the considerations for both sides:

MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of
martial law there is no need for concurrence of the majority of the Members of Congress because the provision says
"in case of actual invasion and rebellion." If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de
Castro said, there is need for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a
concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. They say that in case of
rebellion, one cannot even take his car and go to the Congress, which is possible because the roads are blocked or
barricaded. And maybe if the revolutionaries are smart they would have an individual team for each and every
Member of the Congress so he would not be able to respond to a call for a session. So the requirement of an initial
concurrence of the majority of all the Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be
impractical as I can see it.

Second, Section l5states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.

And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it
is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as
aprerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. x x x

The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase "and, with the concurrence
of at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress..."

MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
also the declaration of martial law.

MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that .this would be an exclusive prerogative of
the President?

MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be shortened by the
Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the
proclamation.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. x x x

We are back to Section 15, page 7, lines 1 and 2. I just want to reiterate my previous proposal to amend by deletion
the phrase "and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of Congress."

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. x x x

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto
the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular
phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellatioi1s regarding
this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of
actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time
fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right
of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during
those first 60 days.

MR. SUAREZ. Given cur traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive right to the
President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factor of
determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened
to us during the past ac ministration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as
President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10(2) of
the Constitution, wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision.

Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the Communists and other armed
aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force, have assumed the
magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.

And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by Ferdinand E.
Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:

Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and properties, widespread
lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been
brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power
in the Philippines in order to take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed
the proportion of an actual war against our people and the legitimate government...

And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law in our
country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase "and, with the
concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress"?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history
and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right
to determine the factual bases because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court
may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the country. And
here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And
I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things
mentioned.

MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?

MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What we are looking for
are safeguards that are reasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or
rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect the country in that situation, it would be
unreasonable to ask that there should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically
terminated at the end of such 60 days.

xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative check on this
awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?

MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those conditions.

MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority.

MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of Congress would be
available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.

MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency.

MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the event of an
invasion or a rebellion.

MR. SUAREZ. No. But in both instances, we would be seeking to protect not only the country but the rights of
simple citizens. We have to balance these interests without sacrificing the security of the State.

MR. MONSOD. I agree with the Gentleman that is why in the Article on the Bill of Rights, which was approved on
Third Reading, the safeguards and the protection of the citizens have been strengthened. And on line 21 of this
paragraph, I endorsed the proposed amendment of Commissioner Padilla. We are saying that those who are arrested
should be judicially charged within five days; otherwise, they shall be released. So, there are enough safeguards.

MR. SUAREZ. These are safeguards after the declaration of martial law and after the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.

MR. MONSOD. That is true.76 (Emphases supplied.)

Ultimately, twenty-eight (28) Commissioners voted to remove the requirement for prior concurrence by the
Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, against only twelve (12) Commissioners who voted to retain it.

As the result of the foregoing, the 1987 Constitution does not provide at all for the manner of determination and
expression of concurrence (whether prior or subsequent) by the Congress in the President's proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant cases, both Houses of the
Congress separately passed resolutions, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure, expressing their
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.

In contrast, being one of the constitutional safeguards against possible abuse by the President of his power to
proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides for how the Congress may exercise its discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or
suspension, that is, "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session."

The ConCom deliberations on this particular provision substantially revolved around whether the two Houses will
have to vote jointly or separately to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; but as the Court reiterates, it is undisputedly for the express purpose of
revoking the President's proclamation and/or suspension.

Based on the ConCom deliberations, pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder, the underlying reason
for the requirement that the two Houses of the Congress will vote jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and
to facilitate the process of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I want to ask the Committee a clarifying question on line 4 of page 7 as to
whether the meaning here is that the majority of all the Members of each House vote separately. Is that the intent of
this phrase?

xxxx

FR. BERNAS. We would like a little discussion on that because yesterday we already removed the necessity for
concurrence of Congress for the initial imposition of martial law. If we require the Senate and the House of
Representatives to vote separately for purposes of revoking the imposition of martial law, that will make it very
difficult for Congress to revoke the imposition of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. That is just thinking aloud. To balance the fact that the President acts unilaterally, then the
Congress voting as one body and not separately can revoke the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, voting jointly.

FR. BERNAS. Jointly, yes.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. May I comment on the statement made by Commissioner Bernas? I was a Member of the Senate
for 12 years. Whenever a bicameral Congress votes, it is always separately.

For example, bills coming. from the Lower House are voted upon by the Members of the House. Then they go up to
the Senate and voted upon separately. Even on constitutional amendments, where Congress meets in joint session,
the two Houses vote separately.

Otherwise, the Senate will be useless; it will be sort of absorbed by the House considering that the Members of the
Senate are completely outnumbered by the Members of the House. So, I believe that whenever Congress acts, it
must be the two Houses voting separately.

If the two Houses vote "jointly," it would mean mixing the 24 Senators with 250 Congressmen. This would result in
the Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House. This violates the purpose of having a Senate.

FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in proposing this, I am consciously proposing
this as an exception to this practice because of the tremendous effect on the nation when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is imposed. Since we have allowed the President to impose
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we should make it a little more
easy for Congress to reverse such actions for the sake of protecting the rights of the people.

MR. RODRIGO. Maybe the way it can be done is to vest this function in just one of the Chambers - to the House
alone or to the Senate alone. But to say, "by Congress," both House and Senate "voting" jointly is practically a vote
by the House.

FR. BERNAS. I would be willing to say just the vote of the House.

MR. RODRIGO. That is less insulting to the Senate. However, there are other safeguards. For example, if, after 60
days the Congress does not act, the effectiveness of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ ceases. Furthermore, there is recourse to the Supreme Court.

FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that there is this recourse to the Supreme Court and there is a time limit, but at the
same time because of the extraordinary character of this event when martial law is imposed, I would like to make it
easier for the representatives of the people to review this very significant action taken by the President.
MR. RODRIGO. Between the Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House numerically and the House voting
alone, the lesser of two evils is the latter.

xxxx

MR. GUINGONA. x x x

In connection with the inquiry of Commissioner Monsod, and considering the statements made by Commissioner
Rodrigo, I would like to say, in reply to Commissioner Bernas, that perhaps because of necessity, we might really
have to break tradition. Perhaps it would be better to give this function of revoking the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the writ or extending the same to the House of Representatives, instead of to the Congress. I
feel that even the Senators would welcome this because they would feel frustrated by the imbalance in the number
between the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives.

Anyway, Madam President, we have precedents or similar cases. For example, under Section 24 of the committee
report on the Legislative, appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, and bills authorizing increase of public debt are
supposed to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Besides, we have always been saying that it is the
Members of the House of Representatives who are mostly in touch with the people since they represent the various
districts of our country.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. I would prefer to have the vote of both Houses because this is a very serious question that must be
fully discussed. By limiting it alone to the House of Representatives, then we lose the benefit of the advice and
opinion of the Members of the Senate. I would prefer that they would be in joint session, but I would agree with
Father Bernas that they should not be voting separately as part of the option. I think they should be voting jointly, so
that, in effect, the Senators will have only one vote. But at least we have the benefit of their advice.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. I was the one who proposed that the two Houses vote separately because if they vote jointly, the
Senators are absolutely outnumbered. It is insulting to the intelligence of the Senators to join a session where they
know they are absolutely outnumbered. Remember that the Senators are elected at large by the whole country. The
Senate is a separate Chamber. The Senators have a longer term than the Members of the House; they have a six-year
term. They are a continuing Senate. Out of 24, twelve are elected every year. So, if they will participate at all, the
Senate must vote separately. That is the practice everywhere where there are two chambers. But as I said, between
having a joint session of the Senate and the House voting jointly where it is practically the House that will decide
alone, the lesser of two evils is just to let the House decide alone instead of insulting the Senators by making them
participate in a charade.

MR. REGALADO. May the Committee seek this clarification from Commissioner Rodrigo? This vC1ting is
supposed to revoke the proclamation of martial Jaw. If the two Houses vote separately and a majority is obtained
in the House of Representatives for the revocation of the proclamation of martial law but that same majority cannot
be obtained in the Senate voting separately, what would be the situation?

MR. RODRIGO. Then the proclamation of martial law or the suspension continues for almost two months. After
two months, it stops. Besides, there is recourse to the Supreme Court.

MR. REGALADO. Therefore, that arrangement would be very difficult for the legislative since they are voting
separately and, for lack of majority in one of the Houses they are precluded from revoking that proclamation. They
will just, therefore, have to wait until the lapse of 60 days.
MR. RODRIGO. It might be difficult, yes. But remember, we speak of the Members of Congress who are elected by
the people. Let us not forget that the President is also elected by the people. Are we forgetting that the President is
elected by the people? We seem to distrust all future Presidents just because one President destroyed our faith by his
declaration of martial law. I think we are overreacting. Let us not judge all Presidents who would henceforth be
elected by the Filipino people on the basis of the abuses made by that one President. Of course, we must be on
guard; but let us not overreact.

Let me make my position clear. I am against the proposal to make the House and the Senate vote jointly. That is an
insult to the Senate.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman yield to a question?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. So, in effect, if there is a joint session composed of 250 Members of the House plus 24 Members
of the Senate, the total would be 274. The majority would be one-half plus one.

MR. MONSOD. So, 148 votes.

MR. RODRIGO. And the poor Senators would be absolutely absorbed and outnumbered by the 250 Members of the
House. Is that it?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is one of the implications of the suggestion and the amendment is being made nonetheless
because there is a higher objective or value which is to prevent a deadlock that would enable the President to
continue the full 60 days in case one House revokes and the other House does not.

The proposal also allows the Senators to participate fully in the discussions and whether we like it or not, the
Senators have very large persuasive powers because of their prestige and their national vote.

MR. RODRIGO. So, the Senators will have the "quality votes" but Members of the House will have the "quantity
votes." Is that it?

MR. MONSOD. The Gentleman is making an assumption that they will vote against each other. I believe that they
will discuss, probably in joint session and vote on it; then the consensus will be clear.

xxxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, the purpose of the amendment is really to set forth a limitation because we have
to avoid a stalemate. For example, the Lower House decides that the declaration of martial law should be revoked,
and that later on, the Senate sitting separately decides that it should not be revoked. It becomes inevitable that
martial law shall continue even if there should be no factual basis for it.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, if this amendment is adopted, we will be held responsible for a glaring inconsistency
in the Constitution to a degree that it distorts the bicameral system that we have agreed to adopt. I reiterate: If there
are deadlocks, it is the responsibility of the presidential leadership, together with the leaders of both Houses, to
overcome them.77 (Emphases supplied.)

When the matter was put to a vote, twenty-four (24) Commissioners voted for the two Houses of the Congress
"voting jointly" in the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and thirteen (13) Commissioners opted for the two Houses "voting separately."
Yet, there was another attempt to amend the provision by requiring just the House of Representatives, not the entire
Congress, to vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus:

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an amendment?

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. On Section 15, page 7, line 4, I propose to change the word "Congress" to HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES so that the sentence will read: "The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension or extend
the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it."

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, the proposed amendment is really a motion for reconsideration. We have already
decided that both Houses will vote jointly. Therefore, the proposed amendment, in effect, asks for a reconsideration
of that vote in order to give it to the House of Representatives.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, the opposite of voting jointly is voting separately. If my amendment were to
vote separately, then, yes, it is a motion for reconsideration. But this is another formula.

xxxx

MR. DE CASTRO. What is the rationale of the amendment?

MR. RODRIGO. It is intended to avoid that very extraordinary and awkward provision which would make the 24
Senators meet jointly with 250 Members of the House and make them vote jointly. What I mean is, the 24 Senators,
like a drop in the bucket, are absorbed numerically by the 250 Members of the House.

xxxx

MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President, we need the wisdom of the Senators. What is at stake is the future of our
country - human rights and civil liberties. If we separate the Senators, then we deprive the Congressmen of the
knowledge and experience of these 24 men. I think we should forget the classification of "Senators" or
"Congressmen." We should all work together to restore democracy in our country. So we need the wisdom of 24
Senators.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I just answer. This advice of the 24 Senators can be sought because they
are in the same building. Anyway, the provision, with the amendment of Commissioner Monsod, does not call for a
joint session. It only says: "the Congress, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session" - it does not say "joint session." So, I believe that if the Members of the House need the counsel of the
Senators, they can always call on them, they can invite them. 78 (Emphasis supplied.)

The proposed amendment was not adopted, however, as only five (5) Commissioners voted in its favor and twenty-
five (25) Commissioners voted against it. Thus, the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both Houses of the Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.

Significantly, the Commissioners only settled the manner of voting by the Congress, i.e., "voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members," in order to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but they did not directly take up and specify in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution that the voting shall be done during a joint session of both Houses of the
Congress. In fact, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo expressly observed that the provision does not call for a joint
session. That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension in a joint
session can only be inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly"
amendment that the Members of the House of Representatives will benefit from the advice, opinion, and/or wisdom
of the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint session of both Houses. Such inference is far from
a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session, under all circumstances, when the
President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even when Congress
does not intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.

There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session as the provision on revocation
under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into operation in light of the resolutions,
separately adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance with their respective rules of procedure,
expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.

The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of Representatives already
separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express
support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to revoke
the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come into
operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session.

Practice and logic dictate that a collegial body will first hold a meeting among its own members to get a sense of the
opinions of its individual members and, if possible and necessary, reach an official stance, before convening with
another collegial body. This is exactly what the two Houses of the Congress did in these cases.

The two Houses of the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives, immediately took separate actions on
President Duterte's proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 216, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. The Consolidated
Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), filed by the Senate and Senate President Pimentel, recounted in detail the steps
undertaken by both Houses of the Congress as regards Proclamation No. 216, to wit:

2. On the date of the President's declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, Congress was in session (from May 2, to June 2, 2017), in its First Regular Session of the 17 th Congress, as
evidenced by its Legislative Calendar, otherwise known as Calendar of Session as contained in Concurrent
Resolution No. 3 of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.x x x

3. During the plenary session of the Senate on the following day, 24 May 2017, privilege speeches and discussions
had already been made about the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This prompted Senator Franklin M. Drilon to move to invite the Secretary of National Defense, the National
Security Adviser and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to brief the senators in closed session
on what transpired in Mindanao. Submitted to a vote and there being no objection, the Senate approved the motion.
xxx

4. On 25 May 2017, the President furnished the Senate and the House of Representatives, through Senate President
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, respectively, with copies of his report (hereinafter,
the "Report") detailing the factual and legal basis for his declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.

5. On or about 25 May 2017, invitation letters were issued and sent by the Senate Secretary, Atty. Lutgardo B.
Barbo to the following officials requesting them to attend a briefing for the Senators on 29 May 2017 at 3:00 p.m. at
the Senators' Lounge at the Senate in a closed door session to describe what transpired in Mindanao which was the
basis of the declaration of martial law in Mindanao: (a) Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana, Secretary of National
Defense (hereinafter, "Secretary Lorenzana"); (b) Secretary Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., National Security Adviser
and Director General of the National Security Council (hereinafter, "Secretary Esperon"); and (c) General Eduardo
M. Año, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereinafter, "Gen. Año"). The said letters stated that
the Senators requested that the President's Report be explained and that more details be given about the same. Xxx

6. On 29 May 2017, about 3:30 p.m., a closed door briefing was conducted by Secretary Lorenzana, Secretary
Esperon and other security officials for the Senators to brief them about the circumstances surrounding the
declaration of martial law and to inform them about details about the President's Report. The briefing lasted for
about four (4) hours. After the briefing, the Senators had a caucus to determine what could be publicly revealed.

7. On the same day, 29 May 2017, the House of Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of the
Whole on 31 May 2017 to consider the President's Report.

8. On 30 May 2017, two (2) resolutions were introduced in the Senate about the proclamation of martial law. The
first one was P.S. Resolution No. 388 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No. 388") introduced by Senators Sotto, Pimentel, Recto,
Angara, Binay, Ejercito, Gatchalian, Gordon, Honasan, Lacson, Legarda, Pacquiao, Villanueva, Villar and Zubiri
which was entitled, "Expressing the Sense of the Senate, Supporting the Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole
of Mindanao" and Finding no Cause to revoke the Same." The second one was P.S. Resolution No. 390 (hereinafter,
"P.S.R. No. 390") introduced by Senators Pangilinan, Drilon, Hontiveros, Trillanes, Aquino and De Lima which was
entitled, "Resolution to Convene Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May
2017 entitled, "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Whole of Mindanao." x x x

9. Discussions were made on the two (2) proposed resolutions during the plenary deliberations of the Senate on 30
May 2017. The first resolution to be discussed was P.S.R. No. 388. During the deliberations, amendments were
introduced to it and after the amendments and the debates, P.S.R. No. 388 was voted upon and it was adopted by a
vote of seventeen (17) affirmative votes and five (5) negative votes. The amended, substituted and approved version
of P.S.R. No. 388, which was then renamed Resolution No. 49, states as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. 49

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE NOT TO REVOKE, AT THIS TIME,
PROCLAMATION NO. 216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED, "DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW
AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
MINDANAO."

WHEREAS, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, provides that:

"... in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (President) may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law...";

WHEREAS, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State
of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao," on May 23,
2017 (the "Proclamation");

WHEREAS, pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on May 25, 2017, and within forth-eight hours after the
issua.11ce of the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to the Senate his report on the factual and legal basis of
the Proclamation;

WHEREAS, on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by the Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security Council (NSC) on the factual circumstances
surrounding the Proclamation as well as the updates on the situation in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, on the basis of the information received by the Senators, the Senate is convinced that President Duterte
declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao because
actual rebellion exists and that the public safety requires it;

WHEREAS, the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series
of 2017;

WHEREAS, the Proclamation does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, which among others, guarantees
respect for human rights and guards against any abuse or violation thereof: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of the Senate, that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 at this time.

Adopted. x x x"

xxxx

10. Immediately thereafter, P.S.R. No. 390 was also deliberated upon. After a prolonged discussion, a vote was
taken on it and nine (9) senators were in favor and twelve (12) were against. As such, P.S.R. No. 390 calling for a
joint session of Congress was not adopted. x x x

11. In the meantime, on 31 May 2017, the House of Representatives acting as a Committee of the Whole was briefed
for about six (6) hours by officials of the government led by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea
(hereinafter, "Executive Secretary Medialdea"), Secretary Lorenzana and other security officials on the factual
circumstances surrounding the President's declaration of martial law and on the statements contained in the
President's Report. During the evening of the same day, a majority of the House of Representatives passed
Resolution No. 1050 entitled, "'Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte As It Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled, 'Declaring A State of Martial
Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao."' In the same
deliberations, it was likewise proposed that the House of Representatives call for a joint session of Congress to
deliberate and vote on the President's declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. However, after debates, the proposal was not carried. x x x. 79

It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke such a proclamation vested by the
Constitution on the Congress. Each House timely took action by accepting and assessing the President's Report,
inviting over and interpellating executive officials, and deliberating amongst their fellow Senators or
Representatives, before finally voting in favor of expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216
and against calling for a joint session with the other House. The prompt actions separately taken by the two Houses
of the Congress on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 belied all the purported difficulties and delays such
procedures would cause as raised in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen). As earlier pointed out, there is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by the
Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and absent a specific mandate for the Congress to hold a joint session in the event of concurrence, then
whether or not to hold a joint session under such circumstances is completely within the discretion of the Congress.

The Senate and Senate President Pimentel explained in their Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), that, by
practice, the two Houses of the Congress must adopt a concurrent resolution to hold a joint session, and only
thereafter can the Houses adopt the rules to be observed for that particular joint session:

It must be stated that the Senate and the House of Representatives have their own respective Rules, i.e., the Rules of
the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives. There is no general body of Rules applicable to a joint
session of Congress. Based on parliamentary practice and procedure, the Senate and House of Representatives only
adopt Rules for a joint session on an ad hoc basis but only after both Houses have already agreed to convene in a
joint session through a Concurrent Resolution. The Rules for a Joint Session for a particular purpose become functus
officio after the purpose of the joint session has been achieved. Examples of these Rules for a Joint Session are (1)
the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Candidates in the May 9, 2016 Election adopted on 24 May 2016; and (2) the Rules of the Joint Session
of Congress on Proclamation No. 1959 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, Except for Certain Areas) adopted on 09 December 2009.
The only time that the Senate and the House of Representatives do not adopt Rules for a joint session is when they
convene on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session to receive or listen to the State of the Nation Address of
the President and even then, they adopt a Concurrent Resolution to do so.

The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both Houses to first adopt a Concurrent Resolution to hold a
joint session. This is achieved by either of two (2) ways: (1) both the Senate and the House of Representatives
simultaneously adopting the Concurrent Resolution - an example would be when the two (2) Houses inform the
President that they are ready to receive his State of the Nation Address or (2) For one (1) House to pass its own
resolution and to send it to the other House for the latter's concurrence. Once the joint session of both Houses is
actually convened, it is only then that the Senate and the House of Representatives jointly adopt the Rules for the
joint session. x x x80 (Emphases supplied.)

With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives adopting a concurrent resolution, no joint session by the two
Houses of the Congress can be had in the present cases.

The Court is bound to respect the rules of the Congress, a co-equal and independent branch of government. Article
VI, Section 16(3) of the 1987 Constitution states that "[e]ach House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
The provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in
the formulation, adoption, and promulgation of its rules; and as such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference.81 Moreover, unless there is a clear showing by strong and convincing
reasons that they conflict with the Constitution, "all legislative acts are clothed with an armor of constitutionality
particularly resilient where such acts follow a long-settled and well-established practice by the
Legislature."82Nothing in this Decision should be presumed to give precedence to the rules of the Houses of the
Congress over the provisions of the Constitution. This Court simply holds that since the Constitution does not
regulate the manner by which the Congress may express its concurrence to a Presidential proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Houses of the Congress have the discretion
to adopt rules of procedure as they may deem appropriate for that purpose.

The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress already separately
expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility and
the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote
jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely different scenario if either of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in which case,
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to vote
jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension. Given the foregoing parameters in applying Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Justice Leonen's concern, expressed in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, that a deadlock may result in the future, is completely groundless.

The legislative precedent referred to by petitioners actually supports the position of the Court in the instant cases. On
December 4, 2009, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1959, entitled "Proclaiming a State
of Martial law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, except
for Certain Areas." The Senate, on December 14, 2009, adopted Resolution No. 217, entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Sense of the Senate that the Proclamation of Martial Law in the Province of Maguindanao is
Contrary to the Provisions of the 1987 Constitution." Consequently, the Senate and the House of Representatives
adopted Concurrent Resolutions, i.e., Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 14 and House Concurrent Resolution No.
33, calling both Houses of the Congress to convene in joint session on December 9, 2009 at 4:00 p.m. at the Session
Hall of the House of Representatives to deliberate on Proclamation No. 1959. It appears then that the two Houses of
the Congress in 2009 also initially took separate actions on President Macapagal-Arroyo's Proclamation No. 1959,
with the Senate eventually adopting Resolution No. 217, expressing outright its sense that the proclamation of
ma11ial law was unconstitutional and necessarily implying that such proclamation should be revoked. With one of
the Houses favoring revocation, and in observation of the established practice of the Congress, the two Houses
adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session to vote on the revocation of Proclamation No. 1959.

For the same reason, the Fortun case cannot be deemed a judicial precedent for the present cases. The factual
background of the Fortun case is not on all fours with these cases. Once more, the Court points out that in
the Fortun case, the Senate expressed through Resolution No. 217 its objection to President Macapagal-Arroyo's
Proclamation No. 1959 for being unconstitutional, and both the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted
concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session for the purpose of revoking said proclamation; while in the cases
at bar, the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and House Resolution No.
1050, respectively, which expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, and both Houses of the
Congress voted against calling for a joint session. In addition, the fundamental issue in the Fortun case was whether
there was factual basis for Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it was mandatory for the Congress to convene in
joint session; and even before the Congress could vote on the revocation of Proclamation No. 1959 and the Court
could resolve the Fortun case, President Macapagal-Arroyo already issued Proclamation No. 1963 on December 12,
2009, entitled "Proclaiming the Termination of the State of Martial Law and the Restoration of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao." Furthermore, the word "automatic" in the Fortun case
referred to the duty or power of the Congress to review the proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, rather than the joint session of Congress.83

Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The Congress, if
not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension convene in accordance
with its rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to
convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason required to convene immediately if in
session.

The Court is not persuaded.

First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To ensure that the Congress will be able to act
swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution provides that it should convene within twenty-
four (24) hours without need for call. It is a whole different situation when the Congress is still in session as it can
readily take up the proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular sessions, as what happened in these
cases. Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not explicitly state that
the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states that the Congress "convene
in accordance with its rules," which can only mean the respective rules of each House as there are no standing rules
for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to convene immediately to act on
Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress promptly took action on Proclamation No. 216, with the Senate
already issuing invitations to executive officials even prior to receiving President Duterte's Report, except that the
two Houses of the Congress acted separately. By initially undertaking separate actions on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 and making their respective determination of whether to support or revoke said Proclamation,
the Senate and the House of Representatives were only acting in accordance with their own rules of procedure and
were not in any way remiss in their constitutional duty to guard against a baseless or unjustified proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President.

There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot hold the Senators
and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate
records completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49
(formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While it is true that the House of Representatives
voted on House Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with its rules. Per the Rules of the House
of Representatives:

RULE XV
 Voting

Sec. 115. Manner of Voting. -The Speaker shall rise and state the motion or question that is being put to a vote in
clear, precise and simple language. The Speaker shall say "as many as are in favor, (as the question may
be) say 'aye'". After the affirmative vote is counted, the Speaker shall say "as many as are opposed, (as the question
may be) say 'nay"'.

If the Speaker doubts the result of the voting or a motion to divide the House is Carried, the House shall divide. The
Speaker shall ask those in favor to rise, to be followed by those against. If still in doubt of the outcome or a count by
tellers is demanded, the Speaker shall name one (1) Member from each side of the question to count the Members in
the affirmative and those in the negative. After the count is reported, the Speaker shall announce the result.

An abstention shall not be counted as a vote. Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by these rules, a
majority of those voting, there being a quorum, shall decide the issue.

Sec. 116. Nominal Voting. - Upon motion of a Member, duly approved by one-fifth (1/5) of the Members present,
there being a quorum, nominal voting on any question may be called. In case of nominal voting, the Secretary
General shall call, in alphabetical order, the nan1es of the Members who shall state their vote as their names are
called.

Sec. 117. Second Call on Nominal Voting. - A second call on nominal voting shall be made to allow Members who
did not vote during the first call to vote.1avvphi1 Members who fail to vote during the second call shall no longer be
allowed to vote.

Since no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution No. 1050, then the votes of the individual
Representatives cannot be determined. It does not render though the proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.

The Congress did not violate the right of the

public to information when it did not
convene in joint session.

The Court is not swayed by petitioners' argument that by not convening in joint session, the Congress violated the
public's right to information because as records show, the Congress still conducted deliberations on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, albeit separately; and the public's right to information on matters of national
security is not absolute. When such matters are being taken up in the Congress, whether in separate or joint sessions,
the Congress has discretion in the manner the proceedings will be conducted.

Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process on the proclamation of martial law:
one that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They insist that the Congress must be transparent,
such that there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the proclamation's factual bases and
subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and where each member's position on the issue is heard and
made known to the public.

The petitioners' insistence on the conduct of a "joint session" contemplates a mandatory joint Congressional session
where public viewing is allowed.

However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public,84 but each House may decide to
hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject matter to be discussed and deliberated upon.

Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 82. Sessions Open to the Public. - Sessions shall be open to the public. However, when the security of the
State or the dignity of the House or any of its Members are affected by any motion or petition being considered, the
House may hold executive sessions.

Guests and visitors in the galleries are prohibited from using their cameras and video recorders. Cellular phones and
other similar electronic devices shall be put in silent mode.

Section 83. Executive Sessions. - When the House decides to hold an executive session, the Speaker shall direct the
galleries and hallways to be cleared and the doors closed. Only the Secretary General, the Sergeant-at- Arms and
other persons specifically authorized by the House shall be admitted to the executive session. They shall preserve
the confidentiality of everything read or discussed in the session. (Emphasis supplied.)

Rule XLVII of the Rules of the Senate similarly sets forth the following:

SEC. 126. The executive sessions of the Senate shall be held always behind closed doors. In such sessions, only the
Secretary, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and/or such other persons as may be authorized by the Senate may be admitted to
the session hall.

SEC. 127. Executive sessions shall be held whenever a Senator so requests it and his petition has been duly
seconded, or when the security of the State or public interest so requires. Thereupon, the President shall order that
the public be excluded from the gallery and the doors of the session hall be closed.

The Senator who presented the motion shall then explain the reasons which he had for submitting the same.

The minutes of the executive sessions shall be recorded m a separate book. (Emphasis supplied)

From afore-quoted rules, it is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are considered confidential and
must be discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public therefrom.

That these matters are considered confidential is in accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the exercise of
their right to information, the government may withhold certain types of information from the public such as state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security matters.85 The Court has also ruled that the
Congress' deliberative process, including information discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session,86may
be kept out of the public's reach.

The Congress not only recognizes the sensitivity of these matters but also endeavors to preserve their confidentiality.
In fact, Rule XL VII, Section 12887 of the Rules of the Senate expressly establishes a secrecy ban prohibiting all its
members, including Senate officials and employees, from divulging any of the confidential matters taken up by the
Senate. A Senator found to have violated this ban faces the possibility of expulsion from his office. 88This is
consistent with the Ethical Standards Act89 that prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public."90

Certainly, the factual basis of the declaration of martial law involves intelligence information, military tactics, and
other sensitive matters that have an undeniable effect on national security. Thus, to demand Congress to hold a
public session during which the legislators shall openly discuss these matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is
to effectively compel them to make sensitive information available to everyone, without exception, and to breach the
recognized policy of preserving these matters' confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled
from Congress altogether.

That these are the separate Rules of the two Houses of the Congress does not take away from their persuasiveness
and applicability in the event of a joint session.1âwphi1 Since both Houses separately recognize the policy of
preserving the confidentiality of national security matters, then in all likelihood, they will consistently observe the
same in a joint session. The nature of these matters as confidential is not affected by the composition of the body
that will deliberate upon it - whether it be the two Houses of the Congress separately or in joint session.

Also, the petitioners' theory that a regular session must be preferred over a mere briefing for purposes of ensuring
that the executive and military officials are placed under oath does not have merit. The Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries In Aid of Legislation91 require that all witnesses at executive sessions or public hearings who
testify as to matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or affirmation. The proper implementation of this
rule is within the Senate's competence, which is beyond the Court's reach.

Propriety of the issuance of a writ of

mandamus or certiorari

For mandamus to lie, there must be compliance with Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of Court, to wit:

SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the perfom1ance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent,

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requirements for a petition for mandamus to prosper:

[T]hus, a petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and
not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.92 (Emphases added.)

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must however,
be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. 93

Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of
legislative duty,94 we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous cases. In this particular instance,
the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene in joint session absent
a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions
already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold
a joint session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.

In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.

As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question
the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.96 It bears to mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a writ
of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very same act - which, in the Tañada Petition, the non-convening by the
two Houses of the Congress in joint session - is contradictory, as the former involves a mandatory duty which the
government branch or instrumentality must perform without discretion, while the latter recognizes discretion on the
part of the government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. Nevertheless, if
the Court is to adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it still finds the same to be without merit. To reiterate, the
two Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after deliberations among their Members
and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. Premises considered, the
Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38570 May 24, 1988

DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G. RAMOS, respondents.

Antonio de los Reyes for petitioner.

Lazaro A. Marques for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant
effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings
should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound
discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely
exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be
allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the
parties, specially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence
and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex partejudgment.

... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever
possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a dismissal
which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85
Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil.
Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (1960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110
[1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio, 105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la
Gerna, L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be exercised soundly
with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v.
Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside (
Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Coloma 190, 362 P. 2d 1050
[1961]), especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably
negligent and no injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd
680).<äre||anº•1àw> (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA
590, 595).

It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement and the setting aside of orders
previously issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the judge to whom they are
addressed, but always predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby
(Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no substantial rights
are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the
hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell Corp.
v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30, 1961). (Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708,
712).
In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for cancellation of one of three (3) hearing dates,
the very first such plea made by that party, upon a ground not entirely unmeritorious in the premises, and under such
circumstances as would not be productive of any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to
the defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal was unwarranted and relief therefrom
must be accorded.

The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by Domingo Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court
of First Instance at Quezon City. 1 In that action Padua sought to recover damages for the injures suffered by his
eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by
Antonio G. Ramos (private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.

Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his evidence on December 6,
1973. He gave testimony on direct exqmination in the course of which reference was made to numerous documents,
marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109. 2 At the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the
previously scheduled hearing of December 12,1973 was cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was reset on
December 17, 1973. 3 However, the hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of
defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more slated to "take place on
March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." 4

After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as above narrated, it was
plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on March 1,
1974, 5 copy of which was personally served on defendants' lawyer 6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another
hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella, Civil Case
No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case once and for all," and that
the cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13,
1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No opposition
was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the ground that the motion had not been properly set for
hearing, the clerk having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon receipt ... for the consideration of the
Court," 7or some other ground. Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional
step of sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his
application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied
the application and dismissed the case. His Honor's Order, dictated on that day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows: 8

When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff nor counsel appeared. The plaintiffs
wife, however, appeared in Court and informed the Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to attend
to a very important case in the provinces.

The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open court after consulting his calendar
and hence the Court will not grant the postponement on the ground that the plaintiffs counsel had a
very important case in the provinces. Neither did the plaintiff himself appear.

In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.

Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was denied.10 Hence, this petition.

The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel had twice applied for and been granted
postponements of the trial; that plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for postponement five (5) days prior to
the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the very first such motion filed by him; that although the motion
for postponement could have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not surprising
considering that their counsel had himself already obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground for cancellation
was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day, March 6,
1974, which had been pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to terminate; that
the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case to proceed
on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of
the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should
be as it is hereby annulled.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the Court a quo dated March 6, 1974, dismissing
the petitioner's complaint, and the Order dated March 13, 1974 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; Civil Case No. Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial
Court which has replaced Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which the action was pending at the time of
dismissal, is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of the petitioner's action and decide the same on the merits in due
course.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.

Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:p

A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial1 led this Court to act affirmatively on
a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a case then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of
time that had elapsed, it is readily discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-nigh unavoidable. The
accusation for robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as December
31, 1951. The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal
was filed on December 8, 1955.2 For a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the
Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a
rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case.3 Such a resolution
was amended by a second resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel of appellants, now
petitioners, to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be received
and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4 Accordingly,
the case was returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing
was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for
such hearing.5 It was further alleged that when thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from
satisfactory, characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime; there
was even a failure to identify the two accused.6 Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set
aside as required by the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 7 At
that stage, five more years having elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases
against them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to
May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy
trial.8 Respondent Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for
petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the
answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were substantially admitted. However,
a special and affirmative defense raised was that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the
Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office exercising judicial functions and that without the
Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed that under the circumstances, it was not
adequately shown that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to a speedy
trial, so zealously guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect. There
is thus merit in the petition.

1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento,9 "means one
free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may
within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if
culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible
with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of
a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11 The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine
announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm
announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled
to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty,
by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 14

In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v. Castañeda, 15 where it was
shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take
place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the
accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example
of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see
that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for
frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information had been
dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the original complaint was filed during which
time on the three occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once
the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have been heard. 17 The same
result followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused
having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year
and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a
new information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case
was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.

There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v.
Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying
his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on
the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for
reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The
accused moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated
the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a
trial at the earliest opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an
unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily
delayed." 20The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until
an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution
does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where
once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest decision in point, Acebedo v.
Sarmiento, 22presented an even clearer case. The information for damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959.
There the matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion
in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when the trial
was commenced. When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the
postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court
sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.

Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid
decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to
dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be
tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should
be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to
suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of
August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the
sole basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by
this Court time and time again.

2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met. The decisive question has been answered.
There is an affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance should be
attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the Philippines that the Court of Appeals
should have been made the party respondent. What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right. It did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in
the pleading may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most important
safeguards granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form over substance. At any
rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the
defenses that could have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They
certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy rial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one
of those situations then where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities
should give way to the realities of the situation." 23

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R
entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order
of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the second
motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case
against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.

Makalintal, C.J, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ, concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.

Chas A. McDonough, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:

That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully and criminally, and employing force, lie and
have carnal intercourse with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the offense
of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be
imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:

I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance
from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the
substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.

II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal disease produced by
contact with a sick man.

III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.

IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.

From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was,
on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of
Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been in the habit of visiting the house of the
sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after having taken a bath, returned to her
room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that
after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private
parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the
sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was
at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of
September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were
collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at
first. later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau
of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed
that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the ground that
because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her
with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had sufficient intelligence and
discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and credit. With the conclusion of the
lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur. The defense in the lower court attempted to show that the
venereal disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described in the
present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the contention. Judge Lobingier, in
discussing that question said:

We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease might, in exceptional
cases, arise from other carnal contact. The medical experts, as well as the books, agree that in ordinary
cases it arises from that cause, and if this was an exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the
defense to bring it within the exception.

The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments. The
defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease
could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do the story told by Oliva,
we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and
brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed said obnoxious disease from the defendant is
not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.

The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the purpose of compelling
him to pay to the sister of Oliva a certain sum of money.

The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of Oliva threatened to
have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to believe that the sister, after having
become convinced that Oliva had been outraged in the manner described above, would consider for a moment a
settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest women do not consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of their
near relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere money.

In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of
Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as
proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to
testify against himself. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question in his sentence, said:

The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an
object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the
introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.

The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination was made by
competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly
could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence
against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of
the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the
same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated,
taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall
not be required to give testimony against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is not a new question,
either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
court upon this question, said:

But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look
at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far
a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or
by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.

The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of New Jersey, in the
case of State vs. Miller (71 N.J. law Reports, 527). In that case the court said, speaking through its chancellor:

It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was confined, to testify to
wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the accused, although he also testified that he had the
accused removed to a room in another part of the jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made by
the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no sense a compelling of the accused
to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes had been forcible and the wounds had been
thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of their character and appearance would not have been
objectionable.

In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of the house where the
crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand would have produced the bloody print.
The court said, in discussing that question:

It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the accused and the bloody
prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was committed, the hand of the accused having
been placed thereon at the request of persons who were with him in the house.

It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the jury and the testimony
of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case decided by the supreme court of New Jersey in
the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N.J. Law Reports, 271). The defendant caused the prints of the shoes to be
made in the sand before the jury, and the witnesses who had observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the
commission of the crime were permitted to compare them with what the had observed at that place.

In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.

To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician or a medical expert
who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead insanity as a defense, where such medical
testimony was against necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making such examination.
(People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by the appellants would also prevent the courts
from making an examination of the body of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have been
received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body has been
established by a long line of decisions.

The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of his guilt.

Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
 If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form
exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools
and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be
obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles —
a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege,
. . . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)

The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating
them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)

The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even, for the
purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be
permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege
granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused,
is not testimony but his body his body itself.

As was said by Judge Lobingier:

The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an
object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the
introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.

The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the Government from
examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.

We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal disease, as above
stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a case like the
present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof. Such crimes as the present are generally proved by
circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative proof, for the reason that such
crimes are generally committed in secret. In the present case, taking into account the number and credibility of the
witnesses, their interest and attitude on the witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general circumstances
surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that both parties were found to be suffering from a common disease,
we are of the opinion that the defendant did, on or about the 15th of September, 1910, have such relations as above
described with the said Oliva Pacomio, which under the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code makes him
guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos," and taking into consideration the fact that the crime which the
defendant committed was done in the house where Oliva Pacomio was living, we are of the opinion that the
maximum penalty of the law should be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for by law is six years of prision
correccional. Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower court and sentencing the
defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

Alfredo Calupitan, and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.

Assistant City of Fiscal Felix for respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:

The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.

The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial
before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of
Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to
the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to
obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that
portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and
practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's Instructions to the Philippine
Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section
3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel
for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant
case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical
question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.

The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the conservative courts emphasize greatly the
humanitarianism of the constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that its mantle may
cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs
[1858], 50 N. C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah Nordstrom [1893], 7
Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650; Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant
with this view and almost directly in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A woman was charged
with the crime of infanticide. The corner directed two physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to
determine whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened
with force, yielded, and the examination was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled
out. The court said that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares
that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing, the court said:
"They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant,
and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with
the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court
the right to compel the prisoner now to submit to an examination they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has
had a child? It is not possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus
obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner."

It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that, greatly impressed with the
weight of these decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant
case was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the court should lay down the general rule
that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth
having disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and having been able, as
we think, to penetrate through the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional guaranty
and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of the
case.

In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to us more progressive in nature. Among
these can be prominently mentioned decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of these
Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States
([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth
Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." (See also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in
Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S., 585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has
seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional
limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against
his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36
Phil., 735, and the derivatory principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as authority.)

Although we have stated s proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest tribunal in the United
States, we cannot unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the opinion Mr. Justice
Holmes, to which we have alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that "we need not consider how far a court
would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself." Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the
exact location of the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this very broad constitutional
field. But here before us is presented what would seem to be the most extreme case which could be imagined. While
the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse
and it fitted him is not a violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of Nuevada could go so
far as to require the defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands could permit substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered in evidence, none
of these even approach in apparent harshness an order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in
all of its sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent to the retention of a principle which
would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional
provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.

So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the Philippines, being
in the agrreable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of
reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and precedent. Moreover, we believe that an
unbiased consideration of the history of the constitutional provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in exact
accord with the causes which led to its adoption.

The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early days, but not
in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised
against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions
with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the
textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to
the fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the
United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide — but no wider — a scope as it existed in old
English days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a
judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard
L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610 found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U.
S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil., 143.)

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on what
is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purgue the community
of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence,
and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is
intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No
accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under
the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a
falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused
except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.

Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law cause of the Constitution every
person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to
one's sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a
woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.
Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S., 250) said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and
yet, as well suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the
inherent which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty
of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them;
and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.
Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public
welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.

The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal trials have
sometimes seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal
as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose extension of constitutional guaranties
we are here prepared to voice our protest.

Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy
and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided.
Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be
taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection
to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be
seen.

Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person
of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the
limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs
shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929

FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela,respondents.

Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.

The respondents in their own behalf.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to
appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the respondents contend
that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal
and later granted by the court below, and again which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of
section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil.,
718); United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel
for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in
question.

Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal,
may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.

And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision
contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.

Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision invoked by the
petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against which these proceedings
were taken.

Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a
declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General
Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.

As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law, which is the
original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle
contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United States, but
expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common conception.
 In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the constitutional
clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by
one constitution from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving
evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings have a common conception, in
respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863,
1923 ed.)

As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.

The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great
when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their
invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by
word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L.,
paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)

The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner
for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision
under examination.

Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or
signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury
maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.

It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering
himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.

Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the defendant to write his
name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.

But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned here with the
defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification,
and still less as it a question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an
investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let it further be noted that in the case of
Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.

We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was
obtained before the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs. Molineux (61
Northeastern Reporter, 286).

Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse vs. Com., the
defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.

We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant's right to decline to write,
and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said decision referred to (page 307 of
the volume cited):
 The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to accede to the latter's
request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus produced can be excluded from the
case. (Emphasis ours.)

For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that the
defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:

The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.

He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his having signed papers not in the case, and was
asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior to the note in suit, and whether he
would not write his name there in the court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on objection, and it is of
these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the questions was to bring into the case extrinsic
signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think that the judge was correct in ruling
against it.

It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:

Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is the removal or replacement of
his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done. Requiring him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body
. . ." but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We note that in the
same paragraph 2265, where said authors treats of "Bodily Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great
variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among them that of People vs.
Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the
defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and has
even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.

Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present
case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of
documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor
Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):

. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or
to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness ( i.e. as a person
appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused
under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded. (And he cites the case of People vs.
Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119; 38 N.E., 1003)

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.

And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels,
because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not
exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this reason the same eminent author, Professor Wigmore,
explaining the matter of the production of documents and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:

For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be already
in existence and not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of the person in
 response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness;
because in virtue it would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the
articles produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is
not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of
his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do
not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.

With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other
witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be
understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do.

The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, maybe waived by any
one entitled to invoke it. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and cases noted.)

The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), were the defendant did not opposethe
extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him.

In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its decision on
the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it
was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this
court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she
was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something
preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case,
where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his
handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit
something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and
it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in
existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.

Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil.,
735), wherein the defendant was not compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth the
morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish, much less make,
prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his own condemnation.

Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting
for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN
OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.

Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this
Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which
resulted in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There
is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the
two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.

The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon which the judgment of conviction
herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No.
H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused
were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P.
Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe. 2

Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the
accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun
Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not
guilty.1äwphï1.ñët

On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Quezon City.

The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here reproduced:.

COURT:

The parties may proceed.

FISCAL GRECIA:

Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].

ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:

I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the Fiscal in
presenting him as his witness. I object.

COURT:

On what ground, counsel? .

ATTY. CARBON:

On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being
notified by the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing
that it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.

COURT (To the Fiscal):

You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state
witness?.

FISCAL GRECIA:

I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.

I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.

ATTY. CARBON:

As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.

COURT:

The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his
client about the giving of his testimony.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: [after the recess]

Are the parties ready? .

FISCAL:

We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.

ATTY. CARBON:

As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client.

I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I
have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.

If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his
objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the
question would incriminate him.

Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.

But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.

ATTY. CARBON:

I submit.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so
sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.

This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.

For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this
witness will bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.

COURT:

The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.

ATTY. CRUZ:

I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only
listed in the information.

I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.

COURT:

That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within
which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.

The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
 Call the witness to the witness stand.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police
Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:

ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:

WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:

This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.

The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:

'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.'

COURT:

That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution
eventsto establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.

ATTY. IBASCO:

I submit.

COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3

And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".

Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may be briefly
narrated as follows:

A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With
Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez
asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on
November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that
he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car
for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis
Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez
P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money.
His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to
someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio
would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan.
He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët

In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the
afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the
interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on
the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the
car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the
drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun
Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.

As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to
that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.

At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater.
Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he
requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. 4

Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures
with some fans and come back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the
pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place
where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police.
Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.

Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00
cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration
of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in
Caloocan.

From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio, may be condensed as
follows:

In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed him that there
was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it
could be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.

To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes
who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and
Chavez then went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing
Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check
aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar
and Cailles agreed to give the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would
sign a promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next
day. Four or five days afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the
deposit. And so, Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.

About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for another P3,000.00.
Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He
also sent a check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.

On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if Sumilang was ready
with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador.
He immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that
Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.

The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents
commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend,
"Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru
Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his
money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.

After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt
already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did.
This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.

When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale, the registration
papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the
wheel.

Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He
saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him
for P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what
they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he
promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the
car was impounded.

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he
paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere
buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.

As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in
court.

As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of
fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 5 The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:

It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-
accused down with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick
together what with the newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger
Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man
who has had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information, the
Court would be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned a man no
less notorious than himself.7

The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car, he had no one but Roger
Chavez to blame.

The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the
balance of the contract price for the car.

The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for Roger Chavez, to show
cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason
for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof
lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.

On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also stated that if she were allowed
to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that
its conclusion is erroneous.8

On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move
to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed
to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is
confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid
Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for
execution of judgment.

It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.

Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to grips with the
main problem presented.

We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was compelled to
testify against himself. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in
which case, these should not be pursued here.

1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right — constitutionally
entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," 9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court
where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against
himself." .

It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a republican
government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom." 11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this
constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the
continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even
in England. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always
ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials,
notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give
rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be
founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a
popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American
jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the
American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part
of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed.,
819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in
the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this
constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States"; as having "its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines
"to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial
examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged."

So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our
scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru
Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well
as the innocent and foresighted." 16

It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is
mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the
Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it
would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to
extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor
may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a
confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise
of his own free, genuine will.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18

2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was
called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement
that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right
of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that
accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The
foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness
may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all
questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate
him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint
trial.23

And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it
was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.
 If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his
objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the
question would incriminate him.

Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.

But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.

Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p.
355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed" — to conviction.

The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand" — wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived
him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness
stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.

3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once
apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement
given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement detailed the plan and
execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he
himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27

The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily
around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution".
Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution
witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that
"even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez
"testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-
confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët

4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being
accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be
taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.

It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to
questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a
defendant's constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the
beginning is a continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët

There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been
fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.

The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a
shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains
valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30

5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. 34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function
of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant. 36Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect well
a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of
another constitutional right, in this wise:

Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel,
compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's
authority. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of
the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented
by Counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A court's
jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to
complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is
unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and
one imprisoned thereundermay obtain release of habeas corpus. 41

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture
of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42

6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for
another offense. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from
confinement. The position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with
respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was
prosecuted and convicted.

Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of
Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled "People
of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from
custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said
Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge
herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.

No costs. So ordered.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accused-

appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sansano-Suyat Law Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging accused-appellant of
having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter,
with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. He interposed the defense of denial and alibi that he was at
home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. Trial ensued. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a
decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim actual damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex
crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information showed that there was no
allegation of any qualifying circumstance. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the
evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. In
the absence in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, accused-appellant cannot be convicted
of murder. Nevertheless, the Court held that the circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken
together, led to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and no other else, killed the victim and that he was
guilty therefor. The Court found accused-appellant guilty of homicide. As to the crime of rape, the Court found no
convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of the victim were caused in the course
of coitus or by a male organ.
Accused-appellant's alibi and bare denial deserved no consideration. Even assuming that accused-appellant's
claim was true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate
vicinity. The place where the body of the victim was found buried was a few meters from his house, and can be reached
in a short while. aHTcDA
The assailed decision of the trial court was modified by the Supreme Court.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF

NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM; CONVICTION OF ACCUSED OF AN
OFFENSE HIGHER THAN THAT CHARGED IS AN UNAUTHORIZED DENIAL OF SAID RIGHT. — In the
absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of
murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or
information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but
an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which he is
tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense
with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the
complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.
 2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; NOT VIOLATED IF PICTURES OF ACCUSED
WERE TAKEN EVEN WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; PURELY MECHANICAL ACTS ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION. — We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits
"I", "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while
[GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the
assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination
is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been
held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from
his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;
to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;
and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.
3. ID.; ID.; ARREST; ANY OBJECTION, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY THEREIN MUST BE
INTERPOSED PRIOR TO ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED WAIVED. — With
respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. The records show no objection was
ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial. GALLARDE's assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his
alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the
voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.
It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. It is
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the
accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. Verily,
the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
4. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; PLACE, TIME AND DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME
NOT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE. — There is also no merit in
GALLARDE's argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of
the commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal. The place, time and date of the commission of the
offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal
knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.
Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged
was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of
limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATION OF PLACE AND COMMISSION OF CRIME IN THE INFORMATION,
WHEN SUFFICIENT. — The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. The rule merely requires that the information shows that
the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even take judicial notice that
said place is within its jurisdiction.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRECISE DATE OR TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME NEED NOT BE PROVED;
PROXIMATE TIME OF COMMISSION OF OFFENSE ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — As to the time of
the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does not require the prosecution
"to prove any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice
the defendant." Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the
commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed
by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by the examining
physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6
May 1997.
7. ID.; EVIDENCE; ABSENCE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY ABSOLVE
ACCUSED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; WHEN CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — We agree with the trial court that the
evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct
evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused
from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
8. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF ACCUSED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. — The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused. The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of
cases of rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and the rapist who are
present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult
since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against
the accused are usually circumstantial. The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken
together, leads to no other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty
therefor.
9. ID.; ID.; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION PERTAINS TO PROOF OF IDENTITY AND NOT PER SE TO
BEING AN EYEWITNESS TO COMMISSION OF CRIME; TYPES. — We cannot sustain the contention of
GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual
commission of the crime. It does not follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA,
nobody can be said to have positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity
and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be
able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person
or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This
is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is
that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones
allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be
convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and
unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the
absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
10. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; TO PROSPER, REQUIREMENTS OF TIME AND PLACE MUST BE
STRICTLY MET. — GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who
could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of
denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight
in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical
presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of EDITHA was found buried was
a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of
alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
11. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES WHO HAVE NO
MOTIVE TO FALSIFY THEIR TESTIMONIES SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDENCE. — No evil motive has been
established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely
testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus
entitled to full faith and credit. Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their
testimonies should be given credence.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE WITH HOMICIDE; IN ORDER TO BE CONVICTED OF MURDER IN
CASE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT CHARGE OF RAPE, THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST BE
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED AND PROVED. — We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion
of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term
"homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and
includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, it is settled in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of
murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged
and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
13. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION OF RAPE NOT PROVED; CASE AT BAR. — As to the crime of rape, there
is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution's evidence therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial
court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHA's private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence
of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape. Our doubt on the commission of rape
is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the
hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony
of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the
penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any object other than the penis of a person.
14. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; APPLICATION THEREOF. —
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be
imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
15. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES AND CIVIL INDEMNITY AWARDED IN CASE
AT BAR. — As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be
construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current case law,
should be awarded.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:

 This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding
accused-appellant Radel Gallarde 1 (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
in Criminal Case No. T-1978, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
Editha Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages. 2
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an
information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: cdtai
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at
Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter,
with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury
her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA TALAN. 3
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. 4 Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial conference. cdasia
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente,
Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The
relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellee's Brief as
follows:
In the evening of May 26 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in
Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant
Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime
Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10
year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer
(TSN dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As
they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate.
Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at
appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house
(Id., pp. 4-6). dctai
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed
her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon
Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger
arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her
(Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew
Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to
look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire (TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp.
8-10 and 24).
When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away from appellant's house, one
of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Editha's left foot slipper (TSN dated October 22, 1997,
pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the toilet
about 6 meters away from appellant's house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his
short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad
Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-16). cda
 Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her."
When told — "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha." appellant responded "I let her go and
brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where did you come
from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" appellant answered "I was with Kiko, I
was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
appellant's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking (Id., pp. 16-20).
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy.
Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen talking
with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22). Cdpr
Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her
slipper, she saw Editha's right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found near the house of
appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).
Around 3 meters farther from Editha's right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It
was old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day (TSN
dated Sept. 25, 1997, p. 25).
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide
hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted rubber
tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this loose soil!"
Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out.
The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now
here already dead!" Mindful of appellant's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle.
He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN dated
Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-5). cdrep
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One
of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was
recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).
The cause of Editha's death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed
"suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated
with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated Oct. 23, 1997, pp. 22-
23)." 5
On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial and the alibi
that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old,
single, a former construction worker. He knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a sister because she used
to come to his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither raped nor killed Editha. 6
On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE admitted
that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parent's house, particularly in the kitchen. He was there because
he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and had dinner in the kitchen.
After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk. He knows
Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez
saw him inside his (Gallarde's) toilet on the night of May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain
and later he was turned over to the PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in
the rape and killing of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was
wearing short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and
he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was
recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented by any
lawyer. prcd
 GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered Editha
Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know that Editha's parents
suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them. However, he did not go to them to tell them he
was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was still alive when
he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home. From the time he arrived, he never left again that
night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact. 7
On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of murder
only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It observed:
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangin's testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained
slit wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion of
her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina was blood, coupled with
dirt. Had there been observed the presence of even just a drop of seminal fluid in or around her
vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and rupture resulted from phallic
intrusion. Without such observation, however, "carnal knowledge" as element of rape would be
an open question.
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code because GALLARDE's alleged inebriation
on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27 October 1997
fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the matter of moral damages to the discretion
of the court. The trial court was not inclined to award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends to disclose
that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected child."
Accordingly, in its decision 8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
hereby convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late
Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. 9
His motion for reconsideration, 10 having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution 11 of 28 February
1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us. cdphil
We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.
In his Appellant's Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court committed the
following errors:
1. In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide.
2. In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was
responsible for the death of Editha Talan.
3. In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 12
We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no
allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex
crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, 13 it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted
of the other. 14 In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the
charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial
of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. 15 It is fundamental
that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 16
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot
be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in
the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information
for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. 17
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial, was
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA. cdasia
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. 18 The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a
judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal
liability. 19 Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 20
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence,
as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must
be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the
guilt of the accused. 21
The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with homicide.
The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and the rapist who are present at the scene of the
crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no
longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually
circumstantial. 22
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion
than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor. We quote with approval the
lower court's enumeration of the circumstantial evidence in this case: cdrep
1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to frequent his place.
2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged
themselves in beer.
3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5) meters east
of the Talan kitchen.
4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of Editha's
hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and that Editha
returned to the kitchen.
5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp. She told
him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the same direction
Gallarde took.
6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he was seen
wearing shorts in his own toilet.
7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her lifeless
body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind Gallarde's residence.
 8. Before Editha's body was discovered, a searcher found a girl's slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6 inches
long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallarde's house.
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and size as the first one.
Both slippers were Editha's, the searchers recalled.
10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C') was thereafter found in the field near Exh. "B-1." It was an
old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers.
12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta told them
that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.
13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and beside the
thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and knees were soiled.
14. At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he answered
revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go and brought her back to
the dike and let her go home."
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he was with
Kiko and he slept at the latter's house, which answer Mario Bado promptly refuted
saying, "Vulva of your mother . . . Kiko was with me drinking." Bado and Kiko were not
at the place of the Talans that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez sans
protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Editha's cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from her
nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.
From the lower portion of Editha's vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.
Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.
The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Editha's nose and
mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her face, and that in
30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the vaginal injuries
contributing to her death. 23
As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution's evidence therefor, but
not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHA's private part and
thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission
of rape. 24 Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the
laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male
organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration
and the rupture could have been caused by the penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused
by any object other than the penis of a person. LLphil
We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant since
there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not follow that although nobody saw
GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said to have positively identified him. Positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused
in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen
the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator
of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part
of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain,
leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of
all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to
the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is
absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 25 If resort to circumstantial evidence would not
be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the
community would be denied proper protection. cdasia
As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case and enumerated
by the trial court positively established the identity of GALLARDE, and no one else, as the person who killed
EDITHA.
We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and "K") taken of
GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already
under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination 26 proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 27 The essence of the right against self-incrimination
is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. 28 Hence, it has
been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; 29 and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken
from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; 30 to expel morphine from his mouth; 31 to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; 32 and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. 33
There is also no merit in GALLARDE's argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal.
The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape with
homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason
thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime
provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint
or information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court. 34
The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if it can
be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court. 35 The rule merely requires that the information shows that the crime was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even take judicial notice that said place is
within its jurisdiction. 36
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does
not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is not so remote
as to surprise and prejudice the defendant." 37
Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the
commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed
by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by the examining
physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6
May 1997.38
Likewise, GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who
could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of
denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight
in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. 39
Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical
presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of EDITHA was found buried was
a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of
alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 40
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them
to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so
actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. 41 Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive
or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence. 42
With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 43 The records show no
objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial. 44 GALLARDE's assertion that he was denied due
process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active
participation in the trial thereafter. 45 It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. 46 It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him. 47 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused. 48
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and is punished withreclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall
be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period
ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion
temporal as maximum. LexLib
As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be
construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current case law,
should be awarded.
WHEREFORE the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, in
Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty of the crime of murder is
hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period ofreclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual
damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan. LLphil
Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and
ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro
A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause,1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been
accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided
in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional
provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and
broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion:
"The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of
the individual intended to be served." 4

Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held
that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness
stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court
in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded
against in an administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.

Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee,
who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless
in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners
was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being
quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually
restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his
willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of
prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent
Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the
judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling
for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses
interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought.
Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.

There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the
administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as
intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23, 1965
sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to
be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-
founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent
Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.

1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal
v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that
an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act,9the
complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which
request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against
him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse,
not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."

It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public
officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly
the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal
or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation.

To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court
opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is
equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.

2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions
the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a
right, to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence
that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.ñet
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare:
"The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12Only
last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it
is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an
individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice
Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14

It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is
predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial
opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas:
"The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who
spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately
raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994

PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Estelito P. Mendoza for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.

Filemon Flores for J. Lorenzo Vergara.

PUNO, J.:

The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has been granted immunity
is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance are important rights in conflict: the right of an individual who has
surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to the State to be exempt from further prosecution; the right of
the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity
it has granted to an accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an
impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the PCGG to an accused.

First, the facts.

On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III,
Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) as amended, docketed as Case No.
11960 in the respondent court, as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and March 1986, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan, accused Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., J. Lorenzo Vergara, Ramon F. Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag,
Jr., Jose C. Crisanto, Jr., acting in various capacities as management officials of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and/or
Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI), all government-owned and controlled corporations, as well
as Dolores Potenciano of BLTB, acting in concert in the performance of their duties, in utter
neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities, and with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating
with one another and with accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, son-in-law of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third
degree, and Fernando Balatbat, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board resolution and in disregard of better offers,
promote and facilitate the sale of a major portion of the public utility assets of the Pantranco
Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION
(P775,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the North Express Transport, Inc. (NETI),
which the accused knew to be a newly organized paper corporation with a purported paid-up
capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS and owned and controlled by accused
 Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, by misleading, inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of
Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI into approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a
Purchase Agreement with manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions which
made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI without any down payment,
and which, inter alia, allowed NETI to operate PNEI's franchises and utilize, even before the
execution of the said Purchase Agreement, not only the PNEI assets subject of the proposed sale,
but also other utility buses and properties of PNEI not covered by the sale, thereby allowing NETI
to derive an income from said operation between the period of actual delivery and execution of the
Purchase Agreement of the sum of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P85,689,180.00) PESOS before the actual payment of
the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS down payment, thereby giving
accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or preferences and
causing undue injury to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED MILLION (P400,000,000.00) PESOS, and such other amounts as may be awarded by
the Court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except for petitioner Araneta, all the accused in Criminal Case

No. 11960 were arraigned. Their trial started on September 20, 1988.

In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged in New York with
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States
and concealing the investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction of the
Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara
and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and by
United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November 14, 1988 and August 11,
1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG
Chairman Mateo Caparas. After their interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against
the former First Couple. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. They agreed.

On May 16, 1990, the Philippine Government through the PCGG, and the petitioners formalized their separate
agreements in writing. The agreement with petitioner Mapa provided:

WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself available as a witness in the case
entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in the on-
going trial of the case;

WHEREAS, MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil and criminal cases which the
REPUBLIC has filed or intends to file in relation to this participation in various contracts that are
alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
in violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make himself available as witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to file
against MAPA under the terms and conditions herein below set forth.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as
follows:

1. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America
vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."
 2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants MAPA immunity from investigation,
prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and information
are given, including any offense and commission of which any information, directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for
perjury and/or giving false testimony.

3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of the cases
both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against MAPA within the purview of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of
MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding
or investigation.

4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and relying on
MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of his commitment to fully
cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America
vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked,
and of no force and effect.

5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to MAPA and his
exclusion from PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigations has been
undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as an admission by MAPA of any criminal or civil
liability.

The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated:

WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make himself available as a witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in the
on-going trial of the case;

WHEREAS, Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. 11960 entitled "People vs. Gregorio Ma.
Araneta, et al.", now pending before the Sandiganbayan, Second Division;

WHEREAS, on the basis of VERGARA’s express intent to make himself available as witness in
the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in the light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the
REPUBLIC approved to grant immunity to VERGARA under the terms and conditions
hereinbelow set forth.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as
follows:

1. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."

2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants VERGARA immunity from investigation,

prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and information
are given, including any offense and commission of which any information, directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for
perjury and/or giving false testimony.
 3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of
VERGARA’s participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal
of VERGARA from Criminal Case No. 11960.

4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to VERGARA on the basis of and relying
on VERGARA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of h is commitment
to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed
revoked, and of no force and effect.

5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution to VERGARA
and his exclusion from Criminal Case No. 11960 has been undertaken in the exercise of the
PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein
shall be construed as a admission by VERGARA of any criminal liability.

On the same day, May 16, 1990, former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote to petitioner Mapa the following
letter:

Dear Sir:

With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the Republic of the Philippines on
May 16, 1990, we would like to confirm
that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to cause the dismissal of the case entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, et. al., " Criminal Case No. 11960 of
the Sandiganbayan. We understand that in that case the prosecution is in the process of closing its
evidence with the submission of its offer of documentary evidence and that it is your intention
thereupon to submit a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the prosecution to prove its case. We affirm
that if, because of the situation of the case, it would not be possible for the Republic to file the
necessary motion to cause the dismissal thereof, then we shall upon submission of your Motion to
Dismiss offer no objection to its favorable consideration by the court in relation to you.

We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the U.S. prosecutors the grant of
immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive than that granted to Mr. Jaime C. Laya.

V
e
r
y
t
r
u
l
y
y
o
u
r
s
,

(SGD.) M.A.T. Caparas

A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.

The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to testify against the
Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the PCGG. But despite their
availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result
was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former
President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.

The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 before the respondent
court. On the basis of the immunity granted to them, petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22,
1990. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio B. Dionido and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no
objection to petitioners' Motion, viz:

That herein accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara were granted immunity by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government from criminal liability arising from cases which
PCGG had or intends to file against them;

The PCGG, therefore, interposes no objection to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by accused
Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara in Criminal Case No. 11960-PCGG by reason of the
immunity aforestated.

Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, by a vote of 4-1. 1Petitioners
were undaunted. On April 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was followed on May 23, 1991, by
a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation reiterating
PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent court, however, refused to budge from
its prior position. It denied petitioners' motions.

Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion in denying their
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration. They pose the following issues:

2.00.a. Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No. 11960 make the immunity
granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No. 11960?

2.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG, which would become basis of the
grant of immunity, be submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it may determine whether such
information is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or liability of a respondent, defendant or an
accused in an action involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth?

2.00.c. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as
witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them?

2.00.d. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that when it was granted, the
prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 11960 had already rested its case?"

The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of Atty. David Castro as Chairman of PCGG. In
its Comment dated January 6, 1992, the PCGG somersaulted from its stance supporting the petitioners. Its Comment
states:

1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has indeed granted Messrs. Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., and Jesus Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation, prosecution and punishment
for any offense for which civil and criminal cases have been or to be filed against them within the
purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A but such immunity is conditional.
 2. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said petitioners shall give to said
Commission by way of information and testimony in cases now pending or to be filed before the
Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to prove the latter's acquisition or accumulation of
property or properties in violation of existing laws.

3. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa, Jr. and Jesus Vergara to testify in favor of the
government and against other defendants on matters referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both defendants (emphasis supplied).

It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply of petitioners dated June 10, 1992, where it
adopted the respondent Sandiganbayan's questioned Resolution and Concurring Opinions dated
March 6, 1991. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity' from criminal liability and/or prosecution is a
matter subject to the court's judicious determination and approval, after applying the test of compliance and the
standard of reasonableness with the rigid requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14-A,
as amended." The Solicitor General defended the stance of the PCGG and the respondent court.

We find merit in the petition.

The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents immunity from suits, has a long
history.

We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. Article XVI, section 3 provides
that "the State may not be sued without its consent." The classic justification for the non-suability of the State is that
provided by Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: ". . . there can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends." 2 Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary
immunities, viz: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains the rationale for this immunity in the following
manners: ". . . The first is intended to ensure representation of the constituents of the member of the Congress by
preventing attempts to keep him from attending its sessions. The second enables the legislator to express views
bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to
support his statements with the usual evidence required in the court of justice. In other words, he is given more
leeway than the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged for the public good." 3 The
President was also immunized from suit during his tenure in the 1973 Constitution.

Aside from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of
crimes with high political, social and economic impact against the people. Some of these statutory grants are related
in the impugned Resolution. Thus, PD 749 provides:

Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211,
212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said
codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws,
rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who
willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense
with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the
giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That this immunity
may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are given against a person
who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission
of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed
by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public
official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; And, Provided, finally, That the
following conditions concur:
 1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above- mentioned
provisions of law, rules and regulations;

2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer;

3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;

4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.

Likewise, under PD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created to conduct a fact-finding inquiry in the
Aquino-Galman double murder case, was given the power to compel testimony of a witness. In exchange for his
testimony, such a witness was extended transactional immunity from later prosecution. Section 5 of said PD No.
1886 states:

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not
be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is
compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce
evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or
removal from office.

Indeed, as early as April 16, 1951, R.A. 602, establishing a minimum wage law, extended transactional immunity to
persons who testify or produce books, papers or other records and documents before the Secretary of Labor or a
Wage Board. A similar but not identical power is given to the prosecution under section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused to be utilized as a state witness.

Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of statutory immunity
granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the used-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional
immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use
immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. 5 In Kastigar vs. US, 6 the
rationale of these immunity grants is well explained, viz:

The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other
governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The power to
compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment
requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .

xxx xxx xxx

But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions from the
testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
 self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and
marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it
protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to
safeguard the values that underlie the privilege.

Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence, are not
incompatible with these values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to
testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many
offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those
implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, and their
primary use has been to investigate such offenses . . . (E)very State in the Union, as well as the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The commentators, and this
Court on several occasions, have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective
enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .

We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity
from criminal prosecution. The pertinent sections provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes that
such testimony or provision of information would tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide
information.

The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement,
or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'

Sec. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation
conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any
case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his
civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats
such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.

There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and 5. Section 4 deals with
the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling witness to testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the
power which PCGG can wield to secure information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness
compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the
friendly witness is completely immunized from prosecution.

The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under

section 5, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is not disputed that they furnished information
to the PCGG during their interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers and US prosecutor La Bella. Due to their
cooperation, they were extended immunity from prosecution by the PCGG. In return, they flew to New York to
testify in the RICO trial of Imelda Marcos. As they were witnesses for the prosecution, their expenses were
shouldered by the PCGG itself. At the last minute, however, US prosecutor La Bella decided to dispense with their
testimony. The rest is history. The prosecution failed to convict Mrs. Marcos.

The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of
the petitioners. We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent court. To be sure, we have grappled with this once
slippery issue in the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81, and we held:

We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to look into the validity of the
immunity granted by the PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was extended to his son, petitioner-
intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.

xxx xxx xxx

The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth
must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14. Necessarily, the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases must include the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant immunity pursuant
to the provisions of Executive Order No.14.

It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired jurisdiction to try and decide Case No. 11960
where petitioners stand accused of violating RA 3019. It has started receiving the evidence of the prosecution
against the petitioners. Petitioners, with the conformity of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a motion to
dismiss addressed to the respondent court. The motion to dismiss is thus a mere incident well within the jurisdiction
of the respondent court to resolve.

The next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range of the power of the respondent court to
review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting immunity to petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E.O. No. 14,
as amended.

Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of review is plenary in reach. It
is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the grant of immunity made by the
PCGG by supplanting the latter's judgment. The submission will warrant the respondent court in examining the
intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony, i.e., whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in
which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question.
Likewise, it will give a warrant to the respondent court to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the witness'
information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant
or accused.

We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the texture of E.O. No. 14, as
amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in
respondent court. In instances, where the intent is to endow courts of justice with the power to review and reverse
tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers the power in clear and certain language. Thus, under section 9 of
Rule 119, the prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge an accused to be a state
witness but its decision is made subject to the approval of the court trying the case. It has to file a proper motion and
the motion may be denied by the court if the prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the requirements of the
rule on discharge of a witness. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere
with the discretion of the prosecution on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is eloquently silent
with regard to the range and depth of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the
PCGG granting a section 5 immunity. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and
unlimited power to reverse PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity. Legitimate power can not
arise from a vacuum.

We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the
PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any
other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The
basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. The
decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a
tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who,
otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who
should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right
to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction
of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in
the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct
the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and
among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even
and perpetually level.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity made by
the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass upon its procedural
regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided
information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions;
(b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful
manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in
question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot
substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to
be a court catering untilted justice.

Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as
amended.

The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases
against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the information in the course of interviews conducted by PCGG
lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.

Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as mandated by the
Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not limit said information to be given only in a case where the
informant is himself an accused or a respondent. Such a reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly
restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.

It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the judgment of the
PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or accumulated their properties and were
"necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after
their interview, the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the
petitioners. It forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from prosecution.
In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or
respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation." In the case of petitioner
Vergara, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was
reiterated by former Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, as related
above. The parties' agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled to New York to testify in the RICO
cases against the Marcoses. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their expenses. All these circumstances prove the
judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner"
with which the Marcoses acquired their wealth.

Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the
Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the
parties' implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to
the prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available
as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to testify
by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was brought about
by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the
Marcoses. Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own,
justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG
itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. When the respondent court denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its
previous position as it again joined the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this petition for
review on certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.

We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they
were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the
PCGG from granting immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of
immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives, the PCGG is well
within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and
releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its
acquisition and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this result. Thus, we have
consistently held that laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They
constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. To
be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 has yet to be established beyond doubt. The PCGG
itself does not appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal
case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was granted immunity not only because of the information he gave to
the prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or
intends to file against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". . . in light of
Republic's reviewof Vergara's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960 . . . ." After reviewing its evidence against
the petitioners, PCGG appears to have sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its former
chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 after
PCGG rest its evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to prove its case." In his May 16, 1990 letters to the
petitioners, he assured them that "we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration." This is a patent
admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.

Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against
the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex
gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-
incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.

The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not the least of these
abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the
recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of
all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime
for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate
the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes
were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what
has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly,
these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price
for it — the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-
incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the
force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The
government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated March 7, and June 3, 1991 are annulled and set
aside and the Amended Information against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 is ordered dismissed. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.