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1, 2004
Educational Research
R B
RMIT University
While debate about the meaning of hermeneutics and phenomenology for educa-
tional research continues (Ehrich, 1999; Kerdeman, 1999; Maykut & Morehouse,
1994; Patton, 1990), the notion of lived experience, and its application to reflective
practice, has become a feature of much that goes by the name of phenomenological
within this area. The prevalence of the lived experience model can be attributed in
large part to the influential work of Max van Manen in translating phenomenology
and hermeneutics from the philosophical arena into the context of educational
research. His research model, based on the notion of lived experience, has provided
a basis for educational researchers to reflect on their own personal experience as
educators, educational theorists, managers and policy makers.
Meanwhile, ongoing debates are occurring within higher education on the nature
of reflective practice generally (Bleakley, 1999; Usher & Edwards, 1994; Scott &
Usher, 1996; Ecclestone, 1996; Schon, 1991). A number of these theorists also
draw, like van Manen, on what could be broadly described as phenomenological
or post-phenomenological thought—that of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger,
Hans Georg Gadamer, and, at a stretch, Jacques Derrida. But, while these debates
have included a critique of the role and status of personal experience within knowl-
edge production, this critique does not seem to have been extended into the
context of research on lived experience. Moreover, neither does it appear that
the debate around reflective practice has been taken up in relation to the broader
question of the meaning of phenomenology and hermeneutics for educational
research generally. There is a need to address this hiatus and evaluate the notion
of lived experience in relation to these debates.
Does lived experience offer educational researchers an effective model upon which
to base reflective practice and, moreover, one that fully utilises the potentialities of
phenomenological thought?
This paper will address this question through an examination of how the other
of lived experience, non-lived experience, is constituted within reflection on lived
experience. What are the implications for educational research of how reflection
on lived experience is framed in relation to what does not count as lived experience?
In addressing these questions, an opportunity is provided to rethink the possible
role and scope of phenomenology within educational research.
The notion of lived experience came to prominence within education, as
mentioned above, through the work of Max van Manen, particularly his 1990
volume, Researching Lived Experience. Van Manen attributes his notion of lived
experience to Husserl’s concept of the Lebenswelt, or life-world. A brief account of
Husserl’s notion of life-world will demonstrate the centrality of lived experience to
phenomenology.
While Willis uses ‘scare quotes’ and other such devices to indicate the slippery and
loaded nature of terms such as presence, immediate and bracketing, the logocentric
connotations remain. Moreover, is the problem of logocentrism in lived experience
models of phenomenology merely a matter of terminology or is there a deeper
structural problem?
Perhaps this valuing of practice over theory, and the immediate over the second-
ary, is an inevitable consequence of a model of inquiry that aims to challenge the
ascendancy of rationalism. Clearly, much of the appeal of phenomenology lies in
the fact that it offers an alternative to the positivistic models of inquiry that have
emerged through modern science. And, indeed, phenomenologists should challenge
those epistemological models. What is problematic, however, is that in the division
between what does and does not count as lived experience, a corresponding dichotomy
between practice and theory seems to occur whereby certain types of experience
are promoted—and treated as authentic—at the expense of others.
individual, or indeed collective, experience does not and cannot stand alone
as an authentic knowledge source but is constructed and re-constructed
within history, context and discourse. (1997, p. 141)
The approach of Johnston and Usher is to challenge the humanist model by re-
theorising experience as ‘ “always-already” signified and dynamically inter-related
with knowledge and action’ (1997, p. 152). In other words, experience does not
provide a platform from which culture, history and discourse can be observed, as
it is precisely from such things that it itself emerges.
Existential Phenomenology
This issue takes us back to Husserl and the phenomenological legacy on which van
Manen draws. The polarisation that exists in van Manen’s hermeneutic phenome-
nology between lived experience on the one hand and the theoretical and concep-
tual on the other might be understood as symptomatic of a deeper problem within
Husserl’s notion of the life-world. To understand this we need to turn to Martin
Heidegger, Husserl’s student and successor in terms of making the shift from
phenomenology to what some have called post-phenomenology (Ihde, 1993).
Heidegger was critical of Husserl’s notion of the life-world because he thought
that it lent itself too readily to a subjectivistic model of understanding. That is, he
felt that the emphasis on the subject’s intuitive relation to things perpetuated the
idealism of Descartes—the tendency to treat the world as a world for consciousness.
In contrast, for Heidegger, as subjects with the constitution of Dasein (being-there)
we are always already in the world, and this occurs through a complex nexus of
involvement that cannot be explained merely through reference to one region of
existence alone—such as intuition.
In his early work, such as Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to depart from
the Cartesian model—in which consciousness is treated as somehow separate and
autonomous from the world—by describing Dasein’s everyday comportment toward
the world in terms of use (1996). That is, Dasein tends to approach things primarily
in terms of what they can do, or as equipment. His famous example of this is the
hammer. A hammer is primarily perceived in terms of what it does, and therefore,
in relation to a nail. Hammers are things for hitting nails, while nails are things for
holding surfaces together, and so on ad infinitum. It is only when the hammer
breaks, or we step back from its everyday use that we might begin to abstract the
hammer—or indeed any such instrument—from its everyday context.
While for Heidegger our ordinary everyday interaction with things is primarily
purposeful, this should not be misunderstood as entailing an opposition between
theory and practice. This point has been made by Jeff Malpas, where he claims
that, for Heidegger:
our ordinary involvement in the world would seem typically to call upon
both engaged and disengaged modes of access to things—everyday practice
involves the encounter with things as both Zuhandenes and Vorhandenes.
(1998, p. 94)
The distinction between Zuhandenes, or ready-to-hand, and Vorhandenes, present-to-
hand, is Heidegger’s and it points to the different ways that things (any thing) can
be grasped or encountered. While the former relates most closely to the notion of
direct intuitive engagement, the latter is more characteristic of the disengagement,
or detachment, of modern science. The crucial point made by Malpas, however,
is that for Heidegger the structural feature of our involvement with the world that
this distinction points to is one of unity: the two, while different, are interconnected
and inseparable. In the words of Catriona Hanley:
The two modes of being-in-the-world, theory and practice, theoria and
poiesis, vorhanden and zuhanden, are both rooted in transcendence … [and]
transcendence is the fundamental comportment of Dasein on the basis of
which it can relate to any other being. (2001)
Dasein’s transcendence means that it understands itself in relation, that is, to the
meaning of being. Unlike other creatures, Dasein is able to engage with the possi-
bilities of the world (and, by extension, to have a world at all since the world is
that horizon in which there is possibility). Since for Heidegger theory and practice,
or vorhanden and zuhanden, indicate different ways in which things can be encoun-
tered, both of these modes occur in and through Dasein’s transcendence. Tran-
scendence, as Hanley says, is ‘the primordial praxis of Dasein that roots theory and
practical comportment’ (2001).
Transcendence is the key to understanding the relationship between theory and
practice in Heidegger. This is because it is only in relation to transcendence, or
that which enables Dasein to make sense of the world, that both theory and practice
can be understood as what they are: two integrated parts of the same project:
being-in-the-world, or relationality. It is this point, or insight, that phenomenol-
ogies of lived experience, in prioritising one mode of being in the world over
another, miss. As a consequence, they also fail to fully realise the possibilities of
phenomenological hermeneutics. Lived experience does not designate a subjective
or mental state, but rather, the condition of being in relation (to the Other).
Conclusion
It is not that science and the everyday do not involve different ways of relating to
things; the question is, what is the relation between the two. Indeed, this question
was there at the beginning of phenomenology with Husserl. His purpose was not
to reject science, but, on the contrary, to radically reinvigorate it. Husserl’s aim
was to recover the forgotten ground of the life-world and, therefore, to ground
science in that from which it emerges. For Husserl, then, the objectivising, theo-
rising and measuring practices of science should not be abandoned, but rather, re-
situated in, and informed by, the world of perception and interest, valuation and
action that constitutes our everyday experience of the world. It is about putting the
two into dialogue.
While my suggestion is not that education research should take up Husserl’s
particular model of phenomenology, I do believe that there is a lesson contained
within it. This is that phenomenology has a role to play in informing as well as
transforming other models of inquiry, such as those abstracting and objectivising
practices promoted by positivism. This gets lost sight of, I believe, in the way that
the notion of lived experience gets set up in opposition to theoretical sources of
knowledge, rather than as a way of problematising that very opposition. There
is an opportunity for phenomenological research to engage more with the tensions
between theory and practice, and abstraction and immediacy, in a way that perhaps
other theoretical frameworks are less equipped to do.
This leaves the question of what becomes of lived experience as a source of data
for educational researchers. The work of Usher, Edwards, Scott and Bleakley,
discussed earlier, offers researchers various models of reflective practice that incor-
porate personal experience without treating it as a privileged—or unproblematic—
data source. It also needs to be noted, however, that lived experience, or what it
points to—the concreteness of everyday being-in-the-world—is itself a privileged
category within phenomenology. Phenomenologists primarily concern themselves with
the structures of experience as they are presented to consciousness without the filter
of theory and deduction. While there may be a tension here, recognising the sig-
nificance of lived experience and, at the same time, its problematical status, does not
seem to me to be incompatible. On the contrary, it may just serve to galvanise in the
mind of the phenomenologist the key problematic at the heart of phenomenology:
that of just how one goes about getting ‘to the things’, as Husserl’s slogan demands.
Note
1. It is perhaps ironic that, for reasons that I will not go into here, Husserl’s phenomenology—
despite the attempt to be grounded in the concreteness of the world—continued the idealism
of Kant and Descartes. Heidegger attempted to address this with his ‘existential’ phenome-
nology, but the tension within phenomenology as idealist or empirical remains.
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