1
EUGENIO vs. CSC et al
FACTS:
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was
given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the
CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service
Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the
petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE:
WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD:
The petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1,
1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only
be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition
of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to
1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read
together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the
respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was notmade to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
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purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to (2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members
attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), (3) The Office of Legal Affairs
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: (4) The Office of Planning and Management
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or (5) The Central Administrative Office.
its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program (6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department (7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as (8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the (9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic (10) The Office of Human Resource Development
reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the (11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the (12) The Office of Personnel Relations
board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached (13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
corporation or agency. (14) The Office of Retirement
NOTES: (15) The Regional and Field Offices
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides: SEC. OF DOTC. V. MABALOT
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed FACTS:
by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are 19 February 1996: then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum
necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board
organization as the need arises. (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to effect the transfer of regional
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a
offices: regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of
(1) The Office of the Executive Executive Order No. 202.
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13 March 1996: herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and
without effect.”
29 January 1997: Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-
1025, establishing DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order
No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, as the Regional Office of the LTFRB.
Mabalot filed a Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of Department Order No.
97-1025
31 March 1999: the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos.
96-733 and 97-1025 of the respondent DOTC Secretary null and void and without any
legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment
on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining
appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government.
Instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of validity of
the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
ISSUES:
WON the administrative issuances of the DOTC Secretary are valid.
WON the DOTC Sec encroached on the powers of the legislature.
WON the administrative issuances are violative of Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 are legal
and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates that “The President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed...”
Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993)
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the
creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The Administrative Code of 1987 also provides legal basis for the Chief Executive’s
authority to reorganize the National Government.
NO, the office was created by authority of law, not by Congress. The President -
through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the
present case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department,
particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36
ordering his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the
creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, it is as if the President himself carried out the
creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC
Secretary, as alter ego of the President, directly and merely sought to implement the
Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.
The personality of the heads of the various departments is in reality but the projection
of that of the President. Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular
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course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers that a public office
may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution
(fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of
law, thus, Congress can delegate the power to create positions.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to
the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an
Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency
such as the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. In this case, the DOTC Secretary
issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 36 of the President
Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case was decreed in the
interest of the service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of
the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region, thus in good faith.
NO. The assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate Sections 7 and 8, Article
IX-B of the Constitution. Considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-
735, the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to
perform the additional duties and functions while performing the functions of their
permanent office. Also, an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary
functions of one’s principal office is an exception to, or not within the contemplation,
of the prohibition embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.
No evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that the appointive officials
and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or indirect
compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution
BIRAOGO VS PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
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(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended),
R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such
bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there
is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No.
1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
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1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,
any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In
private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters
of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power
of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers.
If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s
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power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make
for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
FACTS:
This petition seeks to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13 (Abolishing the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and
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Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For
Legal Affairs, Office of the President)
prohibit respondents from administratively proceeding against petitioner based on the
executive order.
PGMA issued EO No. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and
vesting it with the power to investigate cases for possible graft and corruption against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President
(embodied in Sec 4 and 8 of EO No. 12)
It was at the time of President Benigno Aquino III when EO No. 13 was issued which
abolished the PAGC and transferred its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave
misconduct against Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, due to the purchase by the LWUA of 445k shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.
Pichay was ordered by Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. to submit their respective written
explanations under oath.
Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that a same case is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
1. WON E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature (to create
a public office, to appropriate funds) usurping the power of the congress (to delegate
quasi-judicial powers) encroaching upon the powers of the Ombudsmanviolating the
guarantee of due process and equal protection clause
RULING: NO!
1. In creation of an office
Pichay contends that the President is not authorized under any law to create the IAD-
ODESLA and that by creating such, the President has usurped the powers of congress
(to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to
administrative agencies) and that of the Ombudsman. He avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process
requirement and equal protection clause.
SC: No! The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department
as provided by E.O. 292 (Admin Code of 1987) under Sec 31 in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.
E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions:
Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices by abolishing or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another
Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies
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Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the
executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292.
The rationale behind President’s authority was explained in Domingo v. Zamora→ It
is the task of the Office of the President as the nerve center of the Executive Branch
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency"
The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is within the prerogative of the President pursuant to E.O.
292.
Section 31(1) gives the President a power in dealing with the internal structure of the
Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition,
consolidation or merger of units.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper
Section 31 (1) of EO 292→ President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one
unit to another.
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292→ President's power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.
In the case at bar, applying the rule above:
Under E.O. 12 (w/ch created PAGC), it was composed of a Chairman and (2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I and was placed
directly "under the Office of the President."
The ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an
office within the Office of the President Proper.
Both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by
way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under E.O. 292.
Pichay contends issuance of E.O. 13 did not involve the abolition of an office but the
creation of one w/ch is not included in the legal definition of reorganization by the
Court
SC: No! The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply
transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office
In Canonizado v. Aguirre→ reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units therein. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions
A valid reorganization must also be done for purposes of economy and efficiency.
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In this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper
was pursued with such purposes in mind→ E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization
the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy
and efficiency in the bureaucracy→ there was initial appropriation of P22 Million for
the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual budget and no added funding of such a
considerable amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the
IAD-ODESLA.
The budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions
would come from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under
the GAA 2011.
There is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President
simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
3. In delegation of quasi judicial powers
Pichay contends that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which
is reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express
grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies.
SC: No! While the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-
ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations.
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to
"submit its report and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-
finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-
finding investigator is valid under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution (faithful
execution clause)
4. In encroachment on the powers of the Ombudsman
The IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when
it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the
earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and
allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers
to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It
is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time,
take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
The case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA
from proceeding with its investigation shouldn’t be invoked.
The Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
The Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the merits of a criminal
accusation, WHILE, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that
of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so
until acted upon by the President.
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DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual bases of the President’s
exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power
RULING:
Yes. In IBP v. Zamora, while the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article
VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power
to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit,
the discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of
power, Lansang v. Garcia adopted the test that judicial inquiry can go no further than
to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct, but that the President
 12
did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis and
that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v ZAMORA
FACTS:
On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another
memo providing that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti
smuggling operations in all land areas and inland water and waterways outside the areas
of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO
191 entitled “Deactivation of the EIIB.” The order of deactivation was motivated by
the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other
exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223 providing
for the separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to
a bona fide reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division,
or consolidation of positions.
ISSUES:
Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department?How shall
the reorganization be carried out?
RULING:
YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus,
agencies, or offices in the executive department are under the President’s power of
control. Hence he is justified in deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in
carrying out reorganizations when a certain law grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book
III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in
order to achieve economy and efficiency. b. The reorganization should be carried out
in good faith. The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions
of EIIB are also being performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that
the deactivation of EIIB was intended to lessen the expenses of the government.
DOMINGO VS ZAMORA
 13
FACTS:
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.
81[3] (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
EO 81 provided thus:
Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program and Activities to the PSC. All the functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to sports development as provided for in Sec.
16 of EO 117 (s. 1987) are hereby transferred to PSC.
Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. The DECS shall have
jurisdiction and function over the enhancement of Physical Education (P.E.) curriculum
and its application in whatever form inside schools.
Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary agency tasked to formulate policies and
oversee the national sports development program, the management and implementation
of all school-based sports competitions among schools at the district, provincial,
regional, national and international levels, in coordination with concerned public and
private entities shall be transferred to the PSC.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales
for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No.
01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff
to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning
the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS
effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by
Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an
undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents issuance
of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the
DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this
Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sports
development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue
a temporary restraining order against respondents to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity),
otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted on
August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the
functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the
PSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:
SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. All functions, programs and activities of the Department
of Education related to sports competition shall be transferred to the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC). The Program for school sports and physical fitness shall remain
part of the basic education curriculum.
The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby abolished. The
personnel of the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC, are hereby transferred to the
 14
PSC without loss of rank, including the plantilla positions they occupy. All other
BPESS personnel shall be retained by the Department.
ISSUE:
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.
RULING:
We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.
As manifested by both petitioners[4] and respondents,[5] the subsequent enactment of
RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155
abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition
to the PSC, petitioners now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra
vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS.[6]Moreover, since RA 9155
provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained by the
DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and preserves[7] their right
to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point
out that Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292,[8] EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to
reorganize the Office of the President.The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President
must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is
immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive
Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and
 15
(3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the
DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office
of the President.[9] Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to sports development[10] to the PSC, making
EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section
31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the
Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition
of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employees cessation in office, but in
such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to
exist.[11] On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the
employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another
department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees who were not
transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other
offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now
mandates that these employees shall be retained by the Department.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA
FACTS:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be
less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be
granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including
government boards of government-owned or controlledcorporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan.
19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive
benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive
bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of
the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of
 16

the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. in the uneven distribution of government resources.
ISSUE: The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of presidential of executive departments.
control over the executive departments PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
RULING: PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are FACTS:
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
departments, bureau or offices under him. promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International
of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
exercising his power of control over executive departments. ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the
incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their expanding the coverage of said law.
employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting ISSUE:
 17
Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the
RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments
pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law
of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Customary
international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or
customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution,
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international
law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all
states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the
Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-
binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have
not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of
the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions
cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the
petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how
such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors,
the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the
Milk Code.
MMDA V. GARIN
FACTS:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer,
who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August
1995.
 18
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to
then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and
expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for
preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power.
RULING:
Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of
1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as
a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-
wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No.
4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose,
the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
 19
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of
local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose."
REPUBLIC VS EXTELCOM
FACTS:
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional
authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own
initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the
phrase “on its own initiative” were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed
with the UP Law Center.
ISSUE:
WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force
and effect in granting provisional authority.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing
of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and
effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.
CARIÑO V. CHR
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter’s attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They
complained to CHR.
ISSUE:
WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING:
No. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine
with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed
upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court
having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals
to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution
to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and
 20
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving
civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try
and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
EPZA VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FACTS:
EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and
before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the
premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or
its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted
the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro,
filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying
for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the
information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights.
CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such
acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed
private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and
fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another
injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.
EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to
issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the
Commission (CHR).
Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging
that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A
 21
temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist
from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the
restraining order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art.
13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is
mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection.
ISSUE:
WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing
the acts complained of.
HELD:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by
the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and
the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT.
In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the
CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.”
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which
the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court
in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court
 22
within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction
is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.
BRIGIDO SIMON, JR VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FACTS:
In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners), in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor and was sent and received by
the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated).
In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to
vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give
way to the “People’s Park.”
On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the
demolition.
On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and ordered said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light housing materials
and food under the Commission’s supervision and again directed the petitioners to
“desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead
to a citation for contempt and arrest.”
On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the petitioners before the CHR
questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It was stated that the CHR’s authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political
rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage in
business.”
On Sept. 25 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying
out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to
desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it was not the intention of the
Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating
civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the PH.” Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights.
HELD:
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Yes! The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and
from implementing the penalty for contempt.
The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then
Pres. C. Aquino via EO 163, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any
attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggests that the scope of
human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what
is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.
The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring:
“to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense,
to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to
a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. It may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.”
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage,
the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant
to citizenship.
In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the delegates
envisioned a CHR that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. One of the delegates, for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoner and the prevention
of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit
to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.”
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished
are the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
PRson a land which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is
a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb can not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact,
extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed visavis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the PRs can fall within the
 24
compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended
by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority
in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to
cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who
decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
EVANGELISTA VS JARENCIO
FACTS:
Evangelista, petitioner, is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others,
provides:
“The agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to
summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.”
Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service Officer of Manila) was issued a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the office of the
PARGO to testify in a certain investigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he
filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for prohibition, certiorari and restraining order
assailing its legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restraining order. Hence, this action.
ISSUE:
WON the PARGO enjoys the authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding
investigation
HELD:
YES
(1) Agency is with authority to enforce subpoenas issued. “Rightly, administrative
agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, WON
adjudication is involved, and WON probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending
charge, but upon which to make one if discovered evidence so justifies. Because judicial
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to
issues on litigations, it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with
seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry”
(2) Authority delegated by statute. “The administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence,
but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are
 25
delegated by statute to an administrative body, it too may take steps to inform itself as
to whether there is probable violation of the law.
In sum, it may be stated that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if
the inquiry is:
(a) within the authority of the agency
(b) the demand is not too indefinite
(c) the information is reasonable relevant”
(3) Information sought reasonably relevant to the investigations. “There is no doubt
that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the PARGO upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Govt of Manila in anomalous
transactions fall within the PARGO’s sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be elicited from respondent Manalastas of which he is claimed to be in
possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.”
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for
the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998.
After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers
proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of
office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which
sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal
order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the
winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and
proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion
of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of
the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation
of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari
seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
ISSUES:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and
SPC No. 98- 206
SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board
of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the
Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as
congressman.
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
RULING:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed
by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15
of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of
 26
the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of
an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner
in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law,
nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15
allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members
of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest
error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the
winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of
the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction
over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the
exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the
proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of
law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice
and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's
allegations.
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case
because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse
the actions of the board of canvassers.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's
proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number
and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct
registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has
deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the
Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent
and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate
of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to
hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether
the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the
 27

exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but
does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore,
acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due
process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is
ANNULLED.