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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1939 > September 1939 Decisions > G.R. No. 46252 September
30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEONOR DE MOLL
068 Phil 626:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 46252. September 30, 1939.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONOR DE MOLL, Defendant.
FRANCISCO ANCHUELO complainant-appellant.
Francisco Anchuelo in his own behalf.
Marcelo Y. Garchitorena for defendant.
Solicitor-General Tuason for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; "ESTAFA" ; DISMISSAL OF THE CASE UPON PETITION OF THE
FISCAL. — The facts stated in the motion of the provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur, quoted in the decision
which facts are unreservedly admitted by the appellant himself in his brief, clearly show that the
dismissal of the case in the court of its origin was justified. With such evidence a9 that mentioned in the
aforesaid motion of the fiscal, it is not only doubtful but certain that the outcome of the proceeding, had
it been continued, would have been adverse to the prosecution, the accused would have been acquitted,
and the fiscal would have lost the case, since, in every criminal proceeding, the criminal liability of the
accused must be established by conclusive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFENDED PARTY NOT ENTITLED TO APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL. — The
offended party in a criminal case is not entitled to appeal from an order of dismissal rendered or issued
by the court in a preliminary investigation, upon motion of the fiscal based On the insufficiency of
evidence. If the of- fended party appeals under the said circumstances, he does so undoubtedly not for
the main purpose of seeking the punishment of the accused, but to enforce his alleged right to an
indemnity for damages. This action, to which he is entitled for the purpose of seeking indemnity, is
subordinate to that of the fiscal, which is to ask for the punishment of the accused, and the said officer is
the one charged with the prosecution and punishment of said accused, and, of course, with the direction
and control of said action or proceeding. After all, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil

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Division
September-1939
Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 46562 September 13, 1939 - BARDWIL
BROS. v. PHIL. LABOR UNION
068 Phil 436
G.R. No. 46673 September 13, 1939 - ANDRES P.
GOSECO v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
068 Phil 444
G.R. No. 45596 September 18, 1939 - MARCOS
LIPANA v. DOMlNGO LAO Y OTROS
068 Phil 451
G.R. No. 46412 September 18, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. MANOJI
068 Phil 471
G.R. No. 46497 September 18, 1939 - ANTONIO S.
SANAGUSTIN v. CONRADO BARRIOS
068 Phil 475
G.R. No. 46170 September 20, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. FERMIN PUNTO
068 Phil 481
G.R. No. 46780 September 20, 1939 - FISCAL OF
CAMARINES NORTE v. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAMARINES NORTE
068 Phil 483
G.R. No. 46108 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED
action independently of the criminal action, as this is in perfect accord with the provisions of article 117,
in connection with article 117, of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure of September 14, 1882, which
must be understood to be still in force as a supplement to the Code of Criminal Procedure, as expressly
provided by article 1 of said Code, the same not being in conflict with any of its provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF OFFENDED PARTY TO DEMAND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED. — With the dismissal of the case ordered by the lower court, no right was denied the
appellant. He is still entitled to demand enforcement of the civil liability of the accused in a separate
case, and this is the proper thing for him to do, because were he to insist in the prosecution of the case
and should the accused be acquitted therein, his efforts would have been completely in vain, since
acquittal of a crime necessarily implies exemption from all liability, including the civil one, if the latter is a
necessary consequence of, or arises from, the former.
DECISION
DIAZ, J.:
There are two questions to be decided in this case, by virtue of the appeal taken by the person claiming
to be the offended party, Francisco Anchuelo, to wit: (1) whether or not the order of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, dated March 28, 1938, dismissing said case while it was pending therein, at
the instance of the provincial fiscal who filed a motion to that effect on account of insufficiency of
evidence and for the reason that the proper action is a civil and not a criminal action, is in accordance
with law, and (2) whether or not said offended party could appeal from said order.
The appellant contends that said order is not in accordance with law and supports his opinion by the
reasons stated by him in his brief.
The case in question was filed by the appellant in the court of origin to charge Leonor de Moll with the
crime of estafa. The complaint filed by him alleged as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That during the month of October, 1936, in the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, said accused, alleging herself to be the owner of shares of stock completely
released by the San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc., for the purpose of defrauding the complainant and his
predecessors in interest, sold 5,000 shares to Natividad Mateo, 5,000 shares to Emilia Tiongson and
1,000 shares to the undersigned, having received from the above-named two persons and from the
undersigned, respectively, the sum of P240, as advance payment therefor.
"That said Emiliana Tiongson and Natividad Mateo endorsed their shares bought of Leonor de Moll to the
complainant, but the latter afterwards found out that the shares in question had not been paid for by
Mrs. Moll to the aforesaid company and are not duly released by the latter in favor of said Leonor de Moll,
to the prejudice of the undersigned in the sum of P240.
"Contrary to law.
"Naga, Camarines Sur, February 14, 1938.
(Sgd.) "FRANCISCO ANCHUELO
"Complainant"
As soon as the court received the above-quoted complaint, it endorsed the same to the fiscal for the
latter to conduct the necessary investigation, and said official, after having done so, later filed his motion
for dismissal on March 26, 1938, couched in the following terms: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal has investigated this case. The complainant presented the
following documents, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Received from Mrs. Emiliana T. de Austria the sum of one hundred pesos (P100) Philippine currency on
account of the sum of two hundred pesos (P200) representing the value of five thousand (5,000)
completely released shares of the San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc. sold by me to said lady at P0.04 per
share, which form part of the shares purchased by me from said Corporation, as evidenced by Receipt
No. 202 issued to me by said San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc. The balance will be paid by the
purchaser within the period of 30 days from this date, after which I shall execute the corresponding
document for the transfer of the shares sold to the purchaser. — Tigaon, Camarines Sur, October 10,
1936. — (Sgd.) LEONOR DE MOLL.’
"‘Received from Mrs. Natividad Mateo, the sum of one hundred pesos (P100) on account of the sum of
two hundred pesos (P200) representing the value of five thousand (5,000) completely released shares of
the San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc. sold by me to said lady at P0.04 per share, which form part of the
shares purchased by me from said Corporation, as evidenced by Receipt No. 202 issued to me by said
San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc, The balance will be paid by the purchaser within the period of 30 days
from this date, after which I shall execute the corresponding document for the transfer of the shares sold
to the purchaser. — Tigaon, Camarines Sur, October 10,1936. — (Sgd.) LEONOR DE MOLL.’
"‘Know All Men By These Presents: That I, Leonor de Moll, Filipino citizen, married to Mr. Sebastian Moll,
of age, native, resident of and with post-office address in the municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippine Islands, with ample powers, by marital authority, to enter into contracts,
hereby state: that in consideration of the sum of forty pesos (P40) Philippine currency received by me to
my complete satisfaction from Mr. Francisco Anchuelo, married to Marcela Reyes, Filipino citizen, of age,
native, resident of and with post-office address in Naga, Camarines Sur, Philippine Islands, hereby SELL,
ASSIGN and CONVEY to said Mr. Francisco Anchuelo, his heirs, assignees and successors in interest, one
thousand (1,000) completely released shares of the San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc., which form part
of the shares purchased by me from said corporation, as evidenced by Receipt No. 202 issued to me by
said San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc. — I hereby confer upon the corresponding official of the San
Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc. ample powers required by law to make the necessary transfer of said one
thousand (1,000) shares in his books in the name of the purchaser Mr. Francisco Anchuelo. — And in
witness whereof, I hereunto affix my signature in the municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, P. I., this 5th
day of October, 1936. — (Sgd.) LEONOR DE MOLL. Signed in the presence of: (Sgd.) PABLO (Illegible). —
(Sgd.) MARCELO Y. GARCHITORENA. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. — PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. — In the
municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, P. I., on this 5th day of October, 1936, personally appeared before
me Doña Leonor de Moll, whom I certify to be known to me as the same person who executed the
foregoing deed of sale of one thousand shares of the San Rafael Mambulao Mining, Inc., composed of
only one page, and acknowledged this same document to be her own free and voluntary act and deed.
She is exempt from cedula certificate by reason of her sex. — Before me. — (Sgd.) MARCELO Y.
GARCHITORENA — Notary public. — Until December 31, 1936. — Book 5. — Document No. 53. — Page
85. — Series of 1936.’
068 Phil 485
G.R. No. 46109 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. NICOLAS CARPIO
068 Phil 490
G.R. No. 46197 September 22, 1939 - KINKWA
MERIYASU CO. v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
068 Phil 501
G.R. No. 46302 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. TORIBIO C. COSTES
068 Phil 503
G.R. No. 46578 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. ANICETO MARQUEZ
068 Phil 506
G.R. No. 46580 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. PEDRO DE GUZMAN
068 Phil 508
G.R. No. 46602 September 22, 1939 - YAP TAK
WING & CO. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD
068 Phil 511
G.R. No. 46686 September 22,
TRANQUILINO RUBIS v. PHILIPPINE
SWEEPSTAKES
068 Phil 515
G.R. No. 46715 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. EMILIO DE JESUS
068 Phil 517
G.R. No. 46068 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. EUSTAQUIO CAROZ
068 Phil 521
G.R. No. 46650 September 23, 1939 - MARIO
BENGZON v. AUDITOR GENERAL
068 Phil 527
G.R. No. 46652 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. CASIMIRO CONCEPCION
068 Phil 530
G.R. Nos. 46802-46812 September 23, 1939 -
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RESURRECCION B. PEÑAS
068 Phil 533
G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939 - PAMPANGA
BUS CO., INC. v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION
068 Phil 541
G.R. No. 46668 September 26, 1939 - GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHIL. v. PAMPANGA SUGAR MILLS
068 Phil 547
G.R. No. 46729 September 25, 1939 - KAPISANAN
NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA PANTRANCO v. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
068 Phil 552
Adm. Case No. 879 September 27, 1939 - PEDRO DE
GUZMAN v. TOMAS B. TADEO
068 Phil 554
G.R. No. 46080 September 27, 1939 - GUILLERMO
A. CU UNJIENG v. HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORP.
068 Phil 559
G.R. No. 46094 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. FERNANDO C. QUEBRAL
068 Phil 564
G.R. No. 46237 September 27, 1939 - ROSALIO
MARQUEZ v. BERNARDO CASTILLO
068 Phil 568
G.R. No. 46350 September 27, 1939 - TAN CHAY v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.
068 Phil 572
G.R. No. 46470 September 27, 1939
" COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES. — DEPARTMENT JUSTICE. — SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION. — MANILA COMMISSIONER. — September 27, 1937. — Mr. F. ANCHUELO. — Naga,
Camarines Sur. — SIR: For your information and in reply to your communication of September 1, 1937, I
am quoting hereunder the following pertinent explanations given by the San Rafael Mambulao Mining Co.
in connection with the subscriptions of Mrs. Leonor de Moll: — Our record shows that said Mrs. Moll has
subscription to the capital stock of this corporation amounting to P7,300 as per Provisional Receipt No.
202. On this subscription only 25 per cent or P1,825 has been paid. Such being the case, any transfer
made by Mrs. Moll to a third party cannot be recognized by us inasmuch as, so long as the full par value
of her subscription is not fully paid up, no valid transfer can be effected in our books. The pertinent
provision of law regarding this point reads as follows: — "No share of stock against which the corporation
holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable on the books of the corporation." (Par. 2, sec. 35, Act No.
1459, as amended.) — At the same time, please be informed that there is a pending garnishment against
the subscription of Mrs. Moll by a third party, for which reason even if the balance of her subscription is
fully paid up, no transfer can be made by this Company, until garnishment is lifted. — In view of the
foregoing, this Office regrets its inability to intervene in this case. — Very respectfully, For the
Commissioner: — (Sgd.) N. ROXAS, Technical Assistant.’
"‘SEBASTIAN MOLL. — TIGAON, CAMARINES SUR. July 2, 1937. — Mr. FRANCISCO ANCHUELO. — Naga.
— MY DEAR SIR: I received your only letter just yesterday and I assure you that upon my return from
Manila I shall bring you your certificate corresponding to the one thousand shares of San Rafael
Mambulao. Your attentive (illegible) . — (Sgd.) LE0NOR DE MOLL.
"‘We, Emiliana Tiongson and Natividad Mateo, hereby state: That the ten thousand (10,000) San Rafael
Mambulao shares sold to us by Mrs. Moll, for which we have advanced the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), have been endorsed by us to Mr. Francisco Anchuelo from the month of September, 1936, and for
the consequent legal effects, we subscribe this document at Naga, Camarines Sur, this 18th days of
February, 1938. — (Sgd.) EMILIANA TIONGSON. — (Sgd.) NATIVIDAD MATEO.’"
The facts stated in the above-quoted motion of the provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur, which are
1939 - unreservedly admitted by the appellant himself in his brief, clearly show that the dismissal of the case in
CHARITY the court of its origin was justified. With such evidence as that mentioned in the aforesaid motion of the
fiscal, it is not only doubtful certain that the outcome of the proceeding, had it been continued, would
have been adverse to the prosecution, the accused would have been acquitted, and the fiscal would have
lost the case, since, in every criminal proceeding, the criminal liability of the accused must be established
by conclusive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The second question is: Was the disputed order of the lower court appealable as to Francisco Anchuelo?
This question has already been decided by this court in the case of Gonzalez v. Court of First Instance of
Bulacan (G. R. No. 45233, 36 Off. Gaz., 2059), and there is no reason to decide it again, much less, to
decide it differently, because the law on the matter continues to be the same as before.
In said case we stated and held, and we again do so now in the present case, that the offended party in
a criminal action is not entitled to appeal from an order of dismissal rendered or issued by the court in a
preliminary investigation, upon motion of the fiscal based on the insufficiency of evidence. If the offended
party appeals under the said circumstances, he does so undoubtedly not for the main purpose of seeking
the punishment of the accused, but to enforce his alleged right to an indemnity for damages. This action,
to which he is entitled for the purpose of seeking indemnity is subordinate to that of the fiscal, which is
to ask for the punishment of the accused, and the said officer is the on charged with the prosecution and
punishment of said accused, and, of course, with the direction and control of said action or proceeding.
After all, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal
action, as this is in perfect accord with the provisions of article 111, in connection with article 117, of the
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure of September 14, 1882 which must be understood to be still in force
as a supplement to the Code of Criminal Procedure, as expressly provided by article 1 of said Code, the
same not being in conflict with any of its provisions.
The fiscal should be the only judge to determine whether the prosecution of a case should go forward
after a preliminary investigation, or another one conducted by the fiscal himself, taking into consideration
the evidence he has at his disposal in support of his information. It is of no avail to insist that instead of
this practice, the one indicated in the case of Baes v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, G. R. No. 45780),
decided on December 29, 1937), should be followed, because there is no parity between the facts roved
in said case and those proved in the Gonzalez case. In the Baes case, the question raised was whether or
not the facts alleged in the information were sufficient to constitute an offense, while the question raised
herein, as the one raised in the Gonzalez case, supra, is whether or not the evidence in the possession of
the fiscal was sufficient to secure the conviction of the accused.
It is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the fiscal to prosecute to its termination a
proceeding initiated by him by means of an information, or by another, by means of a complaint, if after
the preliminary investigation said official finds that the evidence relied upon by him to justify such step is
insufficient. To compel the fiscal to do so, ignoring his opinion relative to the insufficiency of his evidence
and his recommendation to dismiss the case in the meantime, would be tantamount to urging the
acquittal of the accused. Instead of the appeal that may be interposed by the offended party from the
dismissal of the criminal proceeding sought by the fiscal for insufficiency of the evidence, there is open to
him the course provided by the law itself for the purpose of enforcing his rights (arts. 111 and 117 of the
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, supra), without impairing the action of the fiscal, and that is to bring
the necessary civil action separately, because an adverse judgment or an absolution in a civil action does
not imply or later constitute a defense of res judicata, nor can it be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of
the accused, if after the civil action, said fiscal succeeds in completing his evidence to assure the
conviction of the accused in a criminal proceeding.
Section 107 of General Orders No. 58, contains this provision, which is pertinent to this case: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense
to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason
of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provisions of this order; but such person may appear
and shall be heard either individually or by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon
conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the damages occasioned by his wrongful
act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promotor fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the right of
the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right."
cralaw virtua1aw library
The part purposely italicized by us should be noted because it is of special significance to the question
under consideration.
With the dismissal of the case ordered by the lower court, no right was denied the appellant. He is still
entitled to demand enforcement of the civil liability of the accused in a separate case, and this is the
proper thing for him to do, because were he to insist in the prosecution of the case and should the
accused be acquitted therein, his efforts would have been completely in vain, since acquittal of a crime
necessarily implies exemption from all liability, including the civil one, if the latter is a necessary
- JUAN consequence of or arises from the former.
 CASTILLO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
For all the foregoing considerations, it is held that the order in question is in accordance with law and was
068 Phil 577 not appealable by Francisco Anchuelo, either as offended party or as a complainant.
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF Wherefore, it is hereby affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
THE PHIL. v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA

068 Phil 580 Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Laurel, and Moran, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 46553-46555 September 27, 1939 - Separate Opinions

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEON FABILLAR

068 Phil 584 CONCEPCION, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

G.R. No. 46615 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. ALBERTO AQUINO
068 Phil 588
G.R. No. 46727 September 27, 1939 - PAMBUSCO
I dissenting: I dissent from the majority opinion as to the second question discussed therein, for the
reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion against the decision and resolution on the motion for
reconsideration rendered in the case of People v. Vivencio Orais Et. Al. (G. R. No. 45431).
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS I dissenting from the majority opinion for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in criminal case
G. R. No. 45233, which I consider as reproduced herein.
068 Phil 591

G.R. No. 46168 September 29, 1939 -

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. OF THE PHIL. v.
DELFIN MAHINAY
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068 Phil 597

G.R. No. 46336 September 29, 1939 - REVEREND

ULRIC ARCAND v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. QUICK SEARCH

068 Phil 601

G.R. No. 46458 September 29, 1939 - ERLANGER &

GALINGER v. HERMENEGILDO G. ALAGAR 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
068 Phil 610
1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
G.R. No. 46725 September 29, 1939 - PEOPLE OF 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
THE PHIL. v. MAXIMINO AQUINO
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
068 Phil 615 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948

G.R. No. 46023 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
THE PHIL. v. JESUS FLORENDO 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964

068 Phil 619 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
G.R. No. 46252 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. LEONOR DE MOLL 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
068 Phil 626
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
G.R. No. 46298 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
THE PHIL. v. DATU AMBIS
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
068 Phil 635

G.R. No. 46390 September 30, 1939 - CASIMIRO

TIANGCO v. PROCESO FRANCISCO

068 Phil 639

Main Indices of the Library ---> Go!
G.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939 - ALEJANDRO
DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO.

068 Phil 643

G.R. No. 46451 September 30, 1939 - PAZ CHUA v.

SECRETARY OF LABOR

068 Phil 649

G.R. No. 46484 September 30, 1939 - SANTIAGO

SAMBRANO v. RED LINE TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.

068 Phil 652

G.R. No. 46724 September 30, 1939 - CRESCENCIO

REYNES v. ROSALINA BARRERA

068 Phil 656

G.R. No. 46728 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF

THE PHIL. v. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO

068 Phil 659

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