Datukan
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its
Salibo after his pilgrimage in SA learned that police officers of Datu Hofer station in Maguindanao for
suspecting that he is Butukan Malang who was one of the 197 accused in Maguindanao Massacre.
He presented himself and explained that he was not Butukan and the it is impossible for him to participate in
the Massacre as he was in SA at that time.
To support it, he presented his passport, boarding passes and other documents and so he was initially assured
that the police would not arrest him. But later, he was apprehended and they tore off the page 2 of his
passport that evidenced his departure. He was detained at Datu Hofer PS for 3 days.
He was then transferred to CIDG in Cotabato where he was detained for another 10 days. While in there, he
was allegedly made to sign and affix his thumbprint on docs.
Aug 20, 2010, he was finally transferred to Camp BagongDiwa.
Sept 17, 2010, he filed before the CA a petition for HC stating that they got the wrong guy.
CA issued the writ of HC and it ordered the warden to file a return one day before the sched. hearing and
produce the person of Salibo at 10am set on Sept 27.
On the scheduled hearing date, the JGs brought Salibo before the TC but the warden failed to file a return/. He
also appeared w/o a counsel. Thus, the hearing was cancelled and was set 2 days after.
Sept 29, the warden appeared w/ Atty. Villante, the legal officer of BJMP.
Salibo then questioned the appearance of Atty. Villante and argued that only the OSG has the auth. to appear
on behalf of the respondent. The hearing then was cancelled. Reset: Oct 1
Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and IsarPepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex
and argued that Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a
valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was “no longer availing.
The trial court:
29
found that Salibo was not “judicially charged” under any resolution, information, or amended
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge
Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or
Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his
liberty under process issued by a court.
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27,
31
2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate. A Philippine
passport bearing Salibo’s picture showed the name “Datukan Malang Salibo.”
33
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo “established that [he] was out of the country” from November 7,
34
2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines
35
confirming Salibo’s departure from and arrival in Manila onboard its flights. A Flight Manifest issued by the
Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.
the trial court granted Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appealby the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s Decision.
According to the Court of Appeals,Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s
arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.
Salibo’s proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
ISSUES:
whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo’s Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals
H: Contrary to petitioner Salibo’s claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
50 51
members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial
Court or any of its presiding judges.
the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court.
2. whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained
under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to
Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang Salibo” will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this
case.
A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information and
Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the
same person.
Villavicencio v. Lukban
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by
the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;
At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some
170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the
women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application
for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of
the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were
not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at
good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales.
The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of
Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao,
and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he
did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the
Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their
liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the
city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
1. The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of
the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to
sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their
behalf.
2. The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or
should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid
unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not
shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to
advance their plea before that court.
he forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they
were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived his right.
If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person
who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo
to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated
November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the
writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right
to be present.
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent
and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police
and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse
of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest
of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even
being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished
Court reasoned further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called
upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality, then the more the writ of habeas
corpus should be enforced.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right
not to be forced to change their place of residence.
The then mayor of Manila Justo Lukban loses this case.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
*a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated
Rubi and other Manguianes residing in the Province of Mindoro alleged that they were being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions were said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one of their fellow tribe, Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for running away from the
reservation.
Manguianes, as Non-Christian tribe, were considered as very low in culture, have shown no desire for
community life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization. That the purpose of containing them in a
reservation, as stated by the Solicitor General, is for their advancement, education, and to introduce civilized
custom among them.
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if
they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very
low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed
in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was
made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of liberty and imprisonment due to violation of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.

Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to
Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws and confinement in accordance with the said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.
Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among
the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except bydue process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.