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16. NABARD.
20. Bibliography.
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The major finding of the project is that rural sector has suffered from policy
neglect, poor design and weak implementation of delivery system. The services
provided have been inadequate as well as inconvenient, inappropriate, unsafe,
unaffordable and causing a great deal of inconvenience. In relative terms, most
attention has been paid to provision of agricultural credit to and mobilization of
deposits from the wealthy people in rural areas. Provisions of insurance, credit for
non-farm purposes and for the landless and small farmers and the mobilization of
savings of the poor and poorest in rural areas have not received much attention from
the policy makers.
Last but not the least, there is a need to create synergies and linkages between
different organizations involved in providing rural financial services i.e. savings,
credit, insurance and transfer of funds. The innovative financial products, based on
best practices in national and for international experience and suited to different kind
of clients are helpful in improved delivery of services.
RURAL AND AGRICULTURE CREDIT
1. EMPLOYMENT
3. CAPITAL FORMATION
Capital formation depends upon savings and investment. People in rural areas
tend to save money, however, small amount it may be. The savings of rural
people who largely depend upon agriculture facilitates investment and hence
generates capital formation in the country.
4. FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Agriculture product like tea, tobacco, spices, etc. contribute a good share in
India’s exports in 1960-1961 the share of agriculture and allied product in the
total exports of India was about 44%. In 2002-2003 export earnings was about
13%.
5. GOVERNMENT REVENUE
Muhammad Yunus’ ideas about lending to the poor to lift millions out of
poverty. Have changed lives in his native Bangladesh and beyond. Known as the
“banker to the poor,” Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, has helped people
rise above poverty by giving them small, usually unsecured loans through his
Grameen Bank.
Through Yunus’s efforts and those of the bank he founded, poor people around
the world, especially women, have been able to buy cows, a few chickens or the cell
phone they desperately needed to get ahead.
From 1993 to 1995, Yunus was a member of the International Advisory Group
for the Fourth World Conference on Women, a post to which he was appointed by the
U.N. secretary general. He has served on the Global Commission of Women’s Health,
the Advisory Council for Sustainable Economic Development and the U.N. Expert
Group on Women and Finance.
Grameen Bank was the first lender to hand out microcredit, giving very small
loans to poor Bangladeshis who did not quality for loans from conventional banks.
No collateral is needed and repayment is based on an honor system.
Grameen, which means rural in the Bengali language, says the method
encourages social responsibility.
A LOOK AT GRAMEEN BANK
WHAT IS IT: The Grameen Bank hands out microcredit, or very small loans, to the
poor peoples of Bangladesh who, do not qualify for loans from conventional banks.
No collateral is needed and repayment is based on an honor system.
WHO QUALIFIES: Anyone can qualify, but they must belong to a five-member
group. Once the first two members begin to pay back their loans, the others can get
theirs. While there is no group responsibility for returning the loans, the bank believes
it creates a sense of social responsibility, ensuring all members pay back their loans.
WHO OWNS THE BANK: The government of Bangladesh owns 6 percent of the
bank while the borrowers own the other 94 percent.
WHAT ARE THE NUMBERS: The bank has handed out $ 5.72 billion since its
inception to 6.61 million people had been repaid $ 5.07 billion. Women account for
97 percent of the loan takers. Grameen Bank has 2,226 branches, works in 71,371
villages and has a total staff of 18,795.
OTHER INFORMATION
Earns Profit-Ever since Grameen Bank came into being, it has made profit
every year except in 1983, 1991 and 1992. It has published its audited balance-sheet
every year, audited by two internationally reputed audit firms of the country.
Low Interest Rates: Government of Bangladesh has fixed interest rate for
government-run micro credit programmes at 11 per cent at flat rate. It amounts to
about 22 per cent at declining basis. Grameen Bank’s interest rate is lower than
government rate.
There are four interest rates for loans from Grameen Bank : 20% (declining
basis) for income generating loans, 8% for housing loans, 5% for student loans, and
0% (interest-free) loans for Struggling Members (beggars). All interests are simple
interest, calculated on declining balance method. This means, if a borrower takes an
income-generating loan of say, Tk 1,000, and pays back the entire amount within a
year in weekly installments, she’ll pay a total amount of Tk 1,100, i.e. Tk 1,000 as
principal, plus Tk 100 as interest for the year, equivalent to 10% flat rate.
Deposit Rates:
Grameen Bank offers very attractive rates for deposits. Minimum interest
offered is 8.5 per cent. Maximum rate is 12 per cent.
BEGGARS AS MEMBERS
Begging is the last resort for survival for a poor person, unless he/she turns
into crime or other forms of illegal activities. Among the beggars there are disabled,
blind, and retarded people, as well as old people with ill health. Grameen Bank has
taken up a special programme, called Struggling Members Programme, to reach out
to the beggars. About 100,505 beggars have already joined the programme. Total
amount disbursed stands at Tk. 107.16 million. Of that amount of Tk. 74.39 million
has already been paid off.
CHALLENGES FOR RURAL & AGRICULTURE
CREDIT IN THE PAST REFORMS ERA
PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY
Indian farmers especially the small and marginal farmers use outdated
technology. They do not use latest technology such as tractors, land tillers. This is
mainly due to problem of finance. Only the large farmers do get loans to purchase
tractors, land tillers, etc. as a result of this, the agriculture productivity of small
farmers does get affected.
Indian farmers especially the small and marginal farmers use poor quality of
seeds. They use farm seeds rather than laboratory developed seeds. The use of HYV
seeds is limited in India. As a result of this the agriculture productivity is low in India.
PROBLEM OF FERTILIZERS
AGRICULTURE INDEBTEDNESS
A good no. of Indian farmers, especially the small and marginal farmers are
subject to indebtedness. As a result the production and productivity of their land gets
affected as they continue to repay debts, and are not in position to undertake farm
development activity.
The small farmers continue to obtain loans from moneylenders at high interest
rates due to the difficulties in obtaining loans or credit from organized sector like
banks. Some of the farmers are also ignorant about bank facilities. It is said that
Indian farmers born in debt lives in debt and dies in debt.
PROBLEM OF MONEYLENDERS
The farmers depend upon the unorganized sector the money lenders for their
credit requirements. They borrow funds at high interest, ranging from 15% to 50%
per annum and even more. Again the moneylenders manipulate the loan records and
cheat the illiterate farmers.
However it is to be noted that over the years the share of intuitional finance in
agriculture credit has increased.
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO
THE RURAL CREDIT SCENARIO
In the early 1970s the Central Government observed that despite a wide
banking network and development initiatives in the first 25 years since Independence,
a critical gap still existed in meeting the credit needs of the rural poor. To find a
solution, the Government appointed a working group on rural credit, the Narasimhan
Committee, in July 1975. The committee observed that the cost structure of
commercial banks, the attitude of bank employees and the lack of a professional
approach in the co-operative credit system were the main stumbling blocks to rural
credit. The committee also observed that the deposits collected by banks from rural
areas were not totally deployed there. The panel, therefore, recommended the creation
of a new set of regionally-oriented rural banks which would combine a co-operative’s
local feel and a commercial bank’s business acumen.
NEED FOR REGIONAL RURAL BANKS
Mobilize rural savings and canalize them for supporting productive activities
in rural areas.
The regional rural banks were to form with: Central Government (50 per
cent), State governments (15 per cent) and commercial banks (35 per cent) (as
per the recommendations of Narshiham committee). The number of RRBs rose from
just six in 1975 to 196 by 1987, covering 476 districts. They financed only the weaker
sections of the rural community – small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers,
small traders, and so on. Along with commercial banks, RRBs participated
enthusiastically in poverty alleviation schemes (IRDP, for example) and
disadvantaged area (drought-prone regions and deserts) development programmes.
They quickly became an important and integral part of the rural credit system.
However, their financial viability was initially overstretched by policy rigidities
coupled with a low capital base in an environment of inadequate infrastructure and
deeper social and economic disparities.
After the financial sector reforms, several measures to improve the viability of
RRBs were initiated. More importantly, re-capitalization to cleanse their balance
sheets was taken up in 1993-94. Other important reforms are as follows:
INTRODUCTION
The institution of Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) was created to meet the
excess demand for institutional credit in the rural areas, particularly among the
economically and socially marginalized sections. Although the cooperative banks and
the commercial banks had reasonable records in terms of geographical coverage and
disbursement of credit, in terms of population groups the cooperative banks were
dominated by the rural rich, while the commercial banks had a clear urban bias. In
order to provide access to low-cost banking facilities to the poor, the Narasimham
Working Group (1975) proposed the establishment of a new set of banks, as
institutions which “combine the local feel and the familiarity with rural problems
which the cooperative possess and the degree of business organization, ability to
mobilize deposits, access to central money markets and modernized outlook which
the commercial banks have”. The multi-agency approach to rural credit was also to
sub serve the needs of the input-intensive agriculture strategy (Green Revolution)
which had initially focused on ‘betting on the strong’ but by the mid-seventies was
ready to spread more widely through the Indian countryside.
In addition the potential and the need for diversification of economic activities
in the rural areas had begun to be recognized, and this was sector where the RRBs
could play meaningful role. The RRBs Act, 1976 succinctly sums up this overall
vision to sub-serve both the developmental and the redistributive objectives:-
The RRBs were established” with a view to developing the rural economy by
providing, for the purpose of development of agriculture, trade, commerce, industry
and other productive activities in the rural areas, credit and other facilities,
particularly to small and marginal farmers, agricultural laborers, artisans and small
entrepreneurs, and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto”
The year 1990 marks the end of the expansion phase of regional banking,
beyond which there has been no growth in the number of Regional Rural Banks
(including branches).
The expansionary phase of the late seventies and the eighties while more
focused on outreach was not devoid of blueprint for viability of the RRBs, unlike
what the mainstream academia and press claim to be the case. It was understood that
the RRBs to survive as credit institutions could not remain unviable for long time,
though the RRBs might not become viable in the initial years. This expectation was,
however, tempered by the prevalent situation on the field and the ultimate objectives
for which these specialized institutions were created. It was realized early that
question of viability of the RRBs could not be the same as other business ventures. A
business unit has all the freedom to take decisions on many matters such as opening
branches, deploying its resources, staff recruitment, its purchases, methods
rendering services etc. But the RRBs could not be flexible in many of their affairs;
even their clientele was specific, scattered, remote and not assisted by anyone.
Keeping in view the objectives, structure and the nature of operations of the RRBs,
these institutions could certainly not be evaluated on the basis of mere financial
viability. There was a general agreement that the viability of the RRBs had to be
assessed in terms of composite criteria including increase in business per branch,
recovery rate, productivity of staff, cost effectiveness of operations, closer
monitoring, socioeconomic upliftment and improvements in the standards of living of
the clientele. Again in respect to the viability question, there was considerable
flexibility accorded to banks on the time dimension. It was estimated that the RRBs
would need about seven years to become viable, though for the RRBs with large
number of infant branches even this period might not be adequate. Between 1980 and
1987, while the number of RRBs increased a little more than two-fold the number of
branches of RRBs increased more than four-fold. It was not totally unexpected
therefore that by the end of the 1980s several of these banks were showing losses on
their books.
Table 2:- Purpose wise Advances of RRBs, Outstanding (end of Sept, 1990)
Rs. Crores
1 Short Term (crop loan) 615
6 Consumption Loan 54
8 Indirect Advances 43
Total 3555
ROLES & LIMITATIONS OF
REGIONAL RURAL BANKS
PROVISION OF CREDIT
The main function of RRBs is to provide short term and long-term finance to
farmers. The finance is provided for the following purposes:
Short term finance to meet working capital needs such as payment of wages,
purchase of seeds and fertilizers, transportation expenses, etc.
Medium term finance to meet medium term needs such as purchase of cattle,
digging of wells etc.
Long term finance to meet fixed capital needs such as purchase of land,
purchase of tractors, etc.
They provide finance at low interest rates. This has resulted in less
dependence on money lenders in respect of agricultural credit.
The RRBs finances research and development in the field of agriculture. Such
R & D activities help to develop new and better inputs, techniques and technology, as
a result, better quality of seeds, fertilizers and farm equipment is developed. This
helped to improve the production and productivity of agricultural crops.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS
RRBs have helped in improving the life in rural areas. They provide social
education to farmers and others in villages so that they give up their bad habits like
gambling, drinking liquor etc.
Through workshops and documentaries the RRBs have made attempts to
make rural masses about social evils like child marriages, reckless spending during
festivals, marriages etc.
MARKETING SERVICES
The RRBs assists the farmers in their marketing activities. They provide
advice to the farmers in respect of proce, packing, transportation; etc. the marketing
advice helps the farmers to take proper marketing decisions. This in turn helps the
farmers to get better prices for their products.
SUPPLY OF FUNDS
The RRBs not only provide funds, but they also make efforts to supply good
quality inputs like seeds ,fertilizers, pesticides, etc. this helps to improve the
productivity of land. The inputs are provided at good rates as part of the discount on
bulk purchases is passed on to the farmers.
The institutional agriculture credit in India is faced with many problems. The
Indian continues to depend on the money lenders for his financial requirements in
spite of the institutional framework.
The various problems are:
INADEQUATE FINANCE
PROBLEM OF SECURITY
Normally the banks insist on security to sanction loans to the farmers. The
security may be in form of land or other assets. The small and marginal farmers find it
difficult to obtain funds as they have limited amount of land to offer as security.
The banks often face problem of untrained manpower in rural areas. The staff
and the officers often lack knowledge of the financial requirements of the farmers and
again they may have a negative attitude towards the farmers. In order to achieve
about the financial requirements of the farmers.
PROBLEM OF RECOVERY
There is the problem of recovery of credit provided to the farmers both the
rich farmers as well as the poor ones. The large and rich farmers deliberately avoid
repaying loans and the small farmers find it difficult to repay their loans. Also quite
often, there is political pressure on the banks to write off the loans. This result in
demotivation to the banks to provide credit in rural areas.
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
The officials of banks adopt corrupt practices. They often provide finance to
their friends and relatives. Small and marginal farmers face great difficulty in
obtaining finance. Hence they have to depend upon the money lenders for their
financial requirements. Not only the officials favour their friends and relatives to
obtain loans. But they are also corrupt in sanctioning loans. They do ask for the bribes
and adopt other corrupt practices at the time of sanctioning, and disbursement of
loans.
REGIONAL RURAL BANKS
AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
In the year 1989 for the first time, the conceptualization of the entire structure
of Regional Rural Banks was challenged by the Agricultural Credit Review
Committee (Khusro Committee), which argued that these banks have no justifiable
cause for continuance and recommended their mergers with sponsor banks. At the
time such a policy move was politically unthinkable, so the Reserve Bank and the
Government of India quite prudently pushed the khusro committee report under the
carpet without a public debate. With the onset of the neo-liberal economic reforms
and the liberalization of the financial system, the RRBs came under the scanner ones
again, but this time in a policy regime that was too willing to let the market principles
rule.
One of the regulations that the RRBs faced was regarding the limited area of
operations and their narrow client base. In 1993, RBI gave permission to
RRBs to relocate branches that were consistently making losses for more than
three years. This policy provided an opportunity to the RRBs shift branch
premises to more commercially promising areas from localities where they
had incurred sustained losses. As Table 3 indicates, between 1996 and 2003,
about 459 offices of RRBs were closed and relocated to semi-urban and urban
centers so that the overall number of branches of RRBs would remain
constant.
In addition, there were relocations within the rural areas from remote
locations to commercial places (not captured by the data). The transfer of
banking business to semi-urban and urban centers was even more drastic with
a 6 percent decline in share of rural areas in credit amount outstanding, over
the seven years, as the banks adjusted their clientele.
Table 3:- Relocation OF RRBs Business from Rural to Semi-Urban & Urban
Areas
Sources: RBI, Basic Statistical Returns, March 1996 and March 2003.
Before the initiation of banking reforms, lending from the RRBs was largely
restricted to the priority sector. From September1992 onwards, the RRBs were
allowed to finance non-target groups to the extent not exceeding 40 percent of
their incremental lending. This limit was subsequently enhanced to 60 percent
in 1994.As a result; the RRBs diversified into a range of non-priority sector
(NPS) advances, including jewel and deposit-linked loans, consumer loans
and home loans. The RRBs adopted new innovations for credit delivery with
lower risk of default such as self-help Group linked lending, non priority
sector collateralized lending, Kisan Credit Card scheme for landed
agriculturists, etc. As a proportion of total advances, priority sector lending
dipped from around 70 percent in 1990 to 57 percent in 2001.Even among the
categories that were eligible as priority sector, the attempt was to minimize
credit risk and make easy loans. Between 1995 and 2003, while short term
agriculture credit under the priority sector increased at about 29 percent per
annum, term loans declined by 2.6 percent a year.
The RRBs in following the trend set by the commercial banks increased the
share of investment assets in the portfolio. Not only did the share of
investments in government securities increase beyond the SLR norms,
simultaneously there was diversion of an increasing share of the investment
portfolio into other approved securities such as PSU bonds and debentures.
The importance of investments in the portfolio of the RRBs can be gauged
from the fact that the interest on investments was about 52 percent of the total
income in 2003 while interest on advances was 37 percent of the income.
Mujumdar (2001) attacks this reverse flow of funds from the rural to the urban
areas as the most retrogressive policy initiated by the RBI. Priority sectors –
including agriculture, small industry, retail trade, the whole range of non- farm
activities in the rural sector – have no access to the capital market and hence
the emphasis should be to promote flow of resources from the urban to the
rural areas. However, an indulgent RBI has yielded to the biased perspective
that there aren’t enough avenues to invest bank resources in the rural sector.
RURAL BANKING FACES TWIN CHALLENGES
Banking in rural India is faced with the twin challenges of regulation and
distribution. Regulation with respect to banking has been designed for delivery in
urban India and distribution required more manpower to be deployed in rural areas.
Initiatives like cheque transaction – where the electronic image and not the actual
cheque is sent – have in mind the urban customer, about 500-600 million people in
India still do not have bank accounts. For the rural segment, one needs to design no-
frills products and deliver hard core value. The other handicap was that while Rs 1-
crore business in microfinance required 30 people in terms of manpower, the same
volume of business in other portfolios required only one person. Also, contract
farming and supply chain integration has not gone the way they should have. Power,
telecommunications, banking and transportation had reduced the urban-rural divide.
Besides traditional banking services, people in the rural and semi-urban areas are
expressing interest in liability and investment products. Rural India is fast
transforming a nation of savers into a nation investor.
MORE RECENT MEASURES
It is only in the past few years that the unwanted effects of reform measures
on rural banking have begun to be recognized in certain official quarters. That the
improved performances of the RRBs – 163 out of 196 RRBs were earning profits in
2003-2004 was largely a result of the banks abrogating their credit intermediation role
rather than a sign of their genuine health and vibrancy is pitifully obvious. Moreover,
the agrarian distress and stagnation of the rural economy has become too stark and
imminent and, of course, the political ramifications of the crisis can no longer be
ignored.
Among the various official committees that were set up review the situation
and make policy recommendations on the future course of development of the RRBs,
the Parliamentary Estimates Committee (2002-03) had come up with a number of
useful suggestions to tackle the shrinking credit delivery to the priority sector and the
rural areas:
Among RRBs which are making absolute profit, the credit-deposit ratio
should not be lower than 75% and for those which are making profits but still
have accumulated losses, an increasing trend of the ratio should be ensured
and their investment portfolio should get reduced accordingly.
The priority sector lending by RRBs has been declining and as per latest
figures, priority sector lending to agriculture and other allied activities comes
to about 57 % of the total lending……..There could be no rationale for fixing
the same norms for lending to priority/agricultural sector by the RRBs as in
the case of commercial banks. The RBI should apply proper checks to ensure
that the present level of 57% of lending by the RRBs to the priority sector is
not allowed to decline further. And it should look into the …….desirability of
enhancing the percentage of lending to the priority sector.
The committee is constrained to note that the percentage of loans to small and
marginal farmers out of total loans disbursed by the RRBs has been declining
steadily. The RRBs do not maintain separate details of number of accounts of
small and marginal farmers. In the absence of such information it is difficult
to understand as to how RRBs ensure credit disbursement to small/marginal
farmers and other weaker sections of society as per the guidelines issued by
the Government/the RBI. The committee recommended that the RRBs should
take steps for compiling and maintaining data regarding credit facility
extended to small and marginal farmers and other weaker sections of the
society to monitor that credit facilities being provided by the RRBs reach the
targeted beneficiaries.
On the issue of NPAs of the RRBs, the committee expressed its dissatisfaction
at the current levels. While the official statistics highlights the decline in NPAs from
34 percent in March 1996 to 3.99 percent in March 2006.Very few of the above
recommendations were, in fact, accepted by the RBI/Government of India. From the
year 2003-04, the RBI revised upwards the lending target for priority sector to 60
percent of the total advances for the RRBs. Ambitious overall credit targets were laid
down for the RRBs by the Union Government.
The farm credit target for the RRBs at Rs 11,900 crore for the fiscal year
2005-2006 is 40 percent higher than Rs 8,500 crore target set during the fiscal year
2004-2005. But little else happened. In reviewing the action taken by the RBI/GOI on
the proposals of the Estimates Committee (2002-2003), the committee in 2004-2005
finds that ’no specific action has been taken’ on most of the major recommendations.
There is a need for policy refinement regarding further merger of RRBs. The
Vyas Committee had recommended merger of all RRBs in the same State.
Currently, RRBs of the same sponsor bank are merged at State-level. By April
2007, the number of RRBs was reduced to 96. If sponsor banks are to have the
requisite initiative to support their RRBs fully, they would need assurance that
there will be no further mergers. The Committee is of the view that further
merger of all RRBs at State-level is not required. It may also not be desirable
if there has to be a firm reinforcement of the rural orientation of these
institutions with a specific mandate on financial inclusion. The Committee,
therefore, recommends that the process of merger should no proceed beyond
the level of sponsor bank in each State.
As on 01 April 2007, RRBs were covering 535 districts. They may be directed
to cover all unbanked areas in these districts, taking the village as a unit, either
by opening a branch (wherever feasible) or through the BF/BC model in a
time bound manner. As on 01 April 2007, 87 districts in the country were not
covered by RRBs and their area of operation may be extended to cover these
districts.
COMPUTERIZATION
With a view to facilitate the seamless integration of RRBs with the main
payment system, there is a need to provide computerization support to them.
Banks will be eligible for support from the Financial Inclusion Funds on a
matching contribution of 50% in regard to districts other than tribal districts
and 75% in case of branches located in tribal districts under the Tribal Sub
plan.
Further ,now that RRBs are being merged and are becoming large size
entities, it is necessary that their Boards of Management are strengthened and
powers delegated to them on policy and business operations ,viz. introduction
of new liability and credit products, investment decisions, improving market
orientation in raising and deployment of resources, non-fund based business,
career progression, transfer policy etc.
TAX INCENTIVES
From 2006-07, RRBs are liable to pay income tax. To further strengthen the
RRBs, profits transferred to reserves could be exempted from tax till they
achieve standard capital adequacy ratios. Alternatively, RRBs may be allowed
tax concessions to the extent of 40% of their profits, as per provisions under
sec.36 (1) (viii) of the Income Tax Act.
The strategy recommended earlier for NRFIP for commercial banks would be
equally applicable for RRBs. The process of undertaking a survey,
identification of excluded households, dissemination of the information,
settings of bank-wise/ branch-wise targets etc., could be followed. RRBs will
have certain handicaps in executing the plan. They would require promotional,
funding and technology support in different areas as outlined below. RRBs
may Endeavour to cover to a large part of their incremental lending thru’ the
group mode (SHGs/JLGs) as it will enhance their outreach to the financially
excluded. Lending thru’ group mode would also keep NPAs at low level.
RRBs should serve, with the support of NABARD, GoI, RBI and the sponsor
banks, as active financial inclusion players especially in areas with high levels
of financial exclusion. In order to build up the skills and expertise of the
personnel of RRBs, NABARD has played a crucial role since the inception of
RRBs. But for the efforts of NABARD and initiative of sponsor banks besides
RRB managements themselves in HR development and in implementation of
the reform package, the changes in business performance of RRBs would not
have been possible. The work could be accomplished by NABARD working
in close tandem with GoI and RBI besides the sponsor banks. NABARD
would continue to give special priority to RRBs to train their staff through the
training institutions like the bankers Institute of Rural Development (BIRD) at
Lucknow and the Regional Training Colleges at Mangalore and Bolpur,
specially set for meeting the training requirement of RRBs. NABARD my
design suitable training programmes to enable RRBs to meet the challenges in
post merger environment. This training may also cover members of the Board
of RRBs. This support should be provided by NABARD working in close
tandem with GOL, RBI and the sponsor banks.
PILOT TESTING OF BF/BC MODEL BY RRBS:-
They are managed by the respective state governments under cooperative Act.
There are basically three-tier cooperative structures in most of the states. Primary
Agricultural Cooperatives at grass-root level, District cooperative Bank at District
level and State Cooperative Banks at State level with each supporting the lower one.
The co-operative credit system has come under increasing pressure from the
emerging competitive scenario of low interest rate regime. Cooperative Banks have
also continued to suffer from several weaknesses that do not augur well for building-
up their ability to compete with banking structure in the emerging liberalized
environment.
In part they have not been successful due to excessive political interference in
their management. It may be noted that the elected boards of 478 cooperative banks
out of 1186 were superseded for a variety of reasons including political interference.
RRBs on the other hand are the result of a Parliamentary Act and they are
managed by the sponsor bank (which has the experience of running a big bank) with
an equity stake of 35%.
The Central Government and the local State Government hold 50% and 15%
equity stake in RRBs. The board of RRBs constitutes the officials of NABARD and
RBI. Each RRB, like cooperatives is confined to a single or two districts of the
country. RRBs were sought to be a blend of cooperatives and commercial banks.
State governments have no/limited role in the management of the bank.
THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP
It is obvious that the RRBs are being restructured along the same lines as the
commercial banks. Is the step necessary? Hold that it is not. Even if one were to
believe in a case for CRAR for commercial banks on the lines that the new freedom
given to banks to determine their portfolio, including investments in stock markets
might result in high levels of risks in the system, which the regulars believe can be
contained through capital requirements, same logic cannot be applied to the RRBs
simply because such Portfolio choices can never be allowed for these institutions. On
the other hand, given that the income recognition and asset classification norms have
already caused these institutions to shy away from credit activities to an unacceptable
extent, further prudential norms involving high risk-weight on most loaning business
can only exacerbate these tendencies further.
The Vyas committee II (June2004), on the other hand, has forwarded a more
logical solution. After weighting the various options for amalgamation, it decided that
it could not consider “the option of merger with the sponsor bank, as it would go
against the rationale of third channel for rural credit with a clear rural focus and
regional orientation.” Instead, it recommended merger of RRBs so as to create a
zonal bank for RRBs in the North-East and Rural banks at the state level for the rest
of the country. These banks would work on a stand alone basis and the sponsor banks
plus NABARD would contribute to equity. In the latest document on the subject, the
Internal Working Group on RRBs (RBI, 2005) has also proposed consolidation of the
RRBs as the merged entities will have a larger area of operation and the merger
process will help in strengthening some of the weak RRBs. Eliminating the option of
merger of RRBs with sponsor banks, the group has put forth two option: merger
between RRBs of the same sponsor bank in same state and merger of RRBs
sponsored by different banks in same state.
Independent of the official deliberations, the All Indian Regional Rural Banks
Employees Associations (AIRRBEA) has proposed that the RRBs be amalgamated to
form zonal or state-level RRBs. They have cited two strong reasons to make the case.
“The RRBs must be restructured into zonal or state level RRBs under any public
sector apex banking institutions or NABARD, so as to ensure the unity of command
and cross subsidization…... As in any banking institution, if the central balance sheet
is prepared at the apex level, the losses of the few RRBs (in the Eastern, North-
Eastern and Central regions)…..can easily be taken care of with the huge aggregate
profit of a majority of the RRBs.” Further, a national body like that of NABARD
should monitor the activities of such RRBs. Opposing the demands of All-India RRB
officers Federation for amalgamation of RRBs with the sponsor banks as the only
route to sustainability, AIRRBEA has demanded de-linking of the RRBs from the
sponsor banks so as to ensure functional autonomy for the rural banks, and to relieve
the burden of ‘sole’ commercial orientation so that the rural credit activities can be
pursued more freely. (Emphasis ours)
The AIRRBEA statement clearly takes the issue of ownership beyond the
current preoccupation with profitability, and asserts that not only can viability issues
be handled better by restructuring the RRBs along the lines suggested by them, but
more importantly it can enable improved performance vis-à-vis credit activities,
which is the urgent need today. The control of sponsor banks on RRBs needs to be
seriously revaluated. At a time when the sponsor banks are themselves constrained to
make cuts in the manpower and credit to agriculture or the SSI sector, they are unable
to extend the help to the RRBs on which their sponsorship was premised. In a view, it
is necessary that along with the Vyas Committee recommendations, which have
astutely defined the post-merger banking structure in terms of state-level banks, the
policymakers also take into consideration the legitimate demand for functional
autonomy and to rid the RRBs of the ‘sole’ commercial orientation such that the
present decline of rural banking might be reversed.
REGIONAL RURAL BANKS TODAY
At the end of fiscal 2005-2006, there were 133 RRBs spread over 23
states/Union Territories and with a network of 14,494 branches, accounting for 44.5
per cent of the total rural network of all scheduled commercial banks (including
RRBs). The rural and semi-urban branches of RRBs constitute 98 per cent of their
network. Their deposits and advances as on March 31, 2003, were Rs. 71,329 crore
and Rs.22, 028 crore respectively. Thus RRBs have done well in mobilizing rural
deposits and infusing the thrift habit in their clients.
Out of 196 RRBs, in 2002-2003 the number of profit making banks stood at
167 in 2001-2002 as compared with 170 in 2000-2001.However 111 RRBs out of
total 133 registered profits in the year 2005-06. The combined Net Profit of RRBs for
the year 2001-2002 aggregated Rs.608 crores as against the combined net profit of
Rs.601 crores in the previous year. The aggregate accumulated losses of RRBs
declined from Rs.2752.59 crores as on 31 March 2001 to Rs 2637 crores as on 31
March 2006.
The bulk of the loans from RRBs have been to priority sectors, which
accounted for over 70 per cent of the total. Agriculture alone took up 46 per cent of
the priority sector advances. The involvement of RRBs in providing credit support to
small and retail trade and other non-farm rural activities is better than that of co-
operative and commercial banks. As on March 31, 2002, the outreach of RRBS in
terms of number of deposits and advances was 50.02 million and 11.94 million
respectively. Clientele for loans and deposits in the rural sector are low-value, but
large volume. RRBs have served this clientele in a more productive and efficient
manner vis-à-vis other Banks.
Per-employee, 885 accounts are handled by RRBs against the national average
of 464 accounts per employee in the banking industry.
RRBs have also taken a lead role in financing of Self Help Groups (SHGs)
mostly comprising of women leading to their economic and social empowerment. The
share of RRBs in SHG-Bank linkage programme is equally commendable as under:
BACKGROUND
NABARD was established on 12th July 1982 to implement the National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development Act 1981. It replaced the Agricultural Credit
Department (ACD) and Rural Planning and Credit Cell (RPCC) of Reserve Bank of
India, and Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation (ARDC).
MISSION
STRUCTURE
OVERVIEW
Investment for artisans, small scale industries, tiny sector, village and cottage
industries, handicrafts, handlooms, power looms, etc.
Activities of voluntary agencies and self help groups working among the rural
poor.
1 1995-96 83.000
2 1996-97 128.484
3 1997-98 261.364
4 1998-99 467.486
ELIGIBLE INSTITUTIONS
PURPOSES
Some of the major purposes covered under investment credit are farm
mechanization, minor irrigation, plantation / horticulture, animal husbandry, storage /
market yards, fisheries, post harvest management, food / agro processing, non-farm
sector including rural industries, microfinance, purchase of land ( for small/marginal
farmers, share croppers etc.), rural housing and disbursements under poverty
alleviation programmes like SGSY and SC/ST Action plan etc. Hi-tech projects and
agri – export zones are identified as thrust areas and NABARD helps in techno-
financial appraisal of such projects besides providing refinance.
In recent years, refinance support has been extended to new activities like
financing of diesel generator sets in Madhya Pradesh and LPG kits to rural
households all over the country.
CRITERIA
The refinance is provided to SCARDBs, SCBs, CBs and RRBs. However, the
beneficiaries of the programme are partnership concerns, companies, state-owned
corporations or cooperative societies. But, finally the assistance reaches the
individuals, who are members of the primary credit institutions.
The refinance is usually 50% to 95% of the project cost. The balance will be
met by the banks or the concerned state governments or the Government of India in
the case of SCARDBs.With a view to ensure credit flow to certain thrust areas, the
quantum of refinance is enhanced to 100% as in the case of special category
beneficiaries like SC/ST members and self help groups
SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS
OVERVIEW
OBJECTIVES OF INSPECTION
To ensure that the business conducted by this banks is in conformity with the
provisions of the relevant acts, rules, regulations bye-laws etc.
In 1995-96 RIDF-I set up with a corpus fund of Rs. 2000 crore for the purpose
of financing rural infrastructure projects such as irrigation projects, construction of
rural roads and bridges, etc. The RIDF fund has been continued in subsequent years.
The RIDF IX (last in the Series) was introduced in 2003-04.
The RIDF came to an end with the commencement of the Lok Nayak Jai
Prakash Narayan fund in February 2004.
The fund came into existence in Feb-2004.It replaced the RIDF.NABARD has
prepared this scheme with the following three components:
Activities includes minor irrigation, rain fed agriculture, and flood control,
public sector cold storage facilities, etc. Eligible clients are state
Governments, state undertakings, and local bodies.
Activities includes priority areas like micro irrigation, rain fed agriculture,
post-harvest related support, agriculture marketing, investment credit, etc.
Eligible clients are corporate, NGOs, and individual, etc.
This scheme was introduced in 1998-99 with a view to facilitate the flow of
timely and adequate short-term credit to the farmers. This scheme is operated through
cooperative banks, RRBs and commercial banks. The cooperative banks, RRBs and
commercial banks together issued about 414 lakh KCCs involving credit of about
Rs.97, 710 crore up to March 2004.
NABARD has been active in promoting and linking more and more self-help
groups (SHGs) to the banking system. The banks provide finance to SHGs.
NABARD provides 100% refinance assistance to banks at an interest rate of 6.5%
p.a. for financing SHGs.
The concept pf SHGs promoted by NABARD for financing the poor was
introduced in 1991-92 under this scheme, the SHGs are linked with formal credit
agencies (banks). By March 2004, over 1.7 crore rural poor families accessed
financial services and credit through 10.79 lakh credit linked SHGs. Around 90% of
these SHGs are exclusive women SHGs. More than 30,000 branches and 500 banks
which participate in the programme have extended loans amounting to Rs.3,904 crore
by March 31,2004 backed by refinance support of Rs.2,124 crore from NABARD.
MILESTONES OF NABARD
Farmers now enjoy financial access and security through 582.50 lakh Kisan
Credit Cards that have been issued through a vast rural banking network.
District Rural Industries Project (DRIP) has generated employment for 23.34
lakh persons with 10.95 lakh units in 105 districts.
NABARD TODAY
Prepares on annual basis rural credit plans for all the districts in the country.
These plans form the base for annual credit plans of all rural financial
institutions.
Their branches have covered a whole gamut of agricultural activities like crop
production, horticulture, plantation crops, farm mechanization, land development and
reclamation, digging of wells, tube wells and irrigation projects, forestry, construction
of cold storages and godowns, processing of agri-products, finance to agri-input
dealers, allied activities like dairy, fisheries, poultry, sheep-goat, piggery and rearing
of silk worms. The branch also has farmer’s meet in villages to explain to farmers
about various schemes offered by the bank.
To give special focus to agriculture lending Bank has set up agri business unit.
Bank has also agri specialists in various disciplines to handle projects/ guide farmers
in their agri ventures. Advances are given for very small activity covering poorest of
the poor to hi-tech activities involving large fund outlays. They are the leaders in agri
finance in the country with a portfolio of Rs. 18,000 crores in agri advances to around
50 lakhs farmers.
State Bank of India has sponsored 30 RRBs, which operate in 102 districts of
16 States viz. Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chattisgarh,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orrissa, Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh, with a
network of 2336 branches.
PURPOSE
Agriculturists, Tenant farmers and share Croppers who actually cultivate the lands are
eligible for these loans. All categories of farmers – Small/Marginal (SF/MF) and
others are included.
LOAN AMOUNT
Loan amount is worked based on the cost of cultivation incurred for each crop per
acre of crop cultivated and 90% of the cost of cultivation (Scale of Finance) is given
as loan.
KISAN CREDIT CARD SCEME (KCC) :-
PURPOSE
To extend adequate and timely support to farmers for their short term credit needs.
Farmers with excellent repayment record for 2 years and new farmers with sizeable
deposits with branches for 3 to 4 years are eligible. Borrowers with good track record
in other Banks are also eligible. Farmers who have defaulted in repayment but have
liquidated the outstanding are also eligible.
LOAN AMOUNT
Loan amount is decided based on the cropping pattern, ancillary and contingency
needs of the farmer for the full year. 90% of the cost of cultivation (Scale of Finance)
is given as loan per acre. 100% of the cost is available as loan up to Rs. 50,000/- and
85% of the cost is available as loan above Rs. 1, 00,000/-
FARM MECHANISATION SCHEMES
PURPOSE
Credit for purchase of farm equipment and machinery for agricultural operations. The
scheme covers activities ranging from purchase of tractors and accessories, trailers.
Power tillers, combine harvesters, power sprayers, dusters, threshers etc.
Farmers owning mare than minimum acreage of perennially irrigated lands are
eligible (for power tillers 2 acres, for tractors 4 acres for > 35 HP and 6 acres for
above 35 HP and for combine 8 acres). Eligibility for purchase of other farm
equipment is decided on the income generated by the agri activity undertaken by.
LOAN AMOUNT
Up to Rs. 50,000/- 100% of the cost of the asset is provided as loan. Above Rs.
50,000/- up to 85% of the cost of the asset provided as loan.
LAND DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES
PURPOSE
To provide credit solution for land development projects in the form of direct finance
to cultivators for better productivity.
Loans under this head cover various activities like land clearance ( removal bushes,
trees, etc.), land leveling and shaping, contour/ graded bunding, bench terracing for
hilly areas, contour stone walls, staggered contour trenches, disposal drains,
reclamation of saline/ alkaline soils and fencing etc.
LOAN AMOUNT
Up to Rs. 50,000/- 100% of the cost of the asset / project cost is provided as loan.
Above Rs. 50,000/- up to 85% of the cost of the asset / project is given as loan.
LOAN AGAINST WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS / COLD STORAGE RECEIPTS
PURPOSE
LOAN AMOUNT
The lone amount will be 60% of the value (minimum support price) of the produce
stored.
MINOR IRRIGATION SCHEMES
PURPOSE
To provide credit for creating irrigation facilities from underground / surface water
sources. All structures and equipments connected with it are also financed. Loans
cover various activities like digging of new wells (open/bore wells), deepening of
existing wells (traditional/in well bore), energisation of wells (oil engine/electrical
pump set), laying of pipe lines, installing drip/ sprinkler irrigation system and lift
irrigation system.
All farmers having a known source of water which can be exploited for irrigation
purpose.
LOAN AMOUNT
Up to Rs. 50,000/- 100% of the cost of the asset/ project cost is provided as loan.
Above Rs. 50,000/- up to 85% of the cost of the asset / project is provided as loan.
OTHER SCHEMES INCLUDES
2. No. of RRBs 90 83 58
having
accumulated
losses
3. Accumulated 2725 2715 2637
losses
4. No. of RRBs in 163 166 111
profit
5. Net NPA (%) 8.55% 4.84% 3.99%
111 RRBs out of total 133 registered profit in the year 2005-06.
Recovery percentage has been improving from 73% during 2003-04 to 80%
during 2005-06.
Per branch productivity has increased from Rs. 5.71 crore on 31 March 2004
to Rs. 7.66 crore on 31 March 2006.
Per staff productivity has increased from Rs. 1.19 crore on 31 March 2004 to
Rs. 1.62 crore on 31 March 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
NEWS PAPERS
WEBSITES
www.indiatogether.org
www.thehindubusinessline.com
www.nabard.org
www.sbi.co.in