CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
a.Memorize Article 12 in relation to Sec. 6 of RA 9344
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during
a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has
acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this
Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the
court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding
paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise,
he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful insuperable cause
Article 12 of the RPC is deemed repealed by the provision of RA
9344 declaring a child 15 years of age or under exempt from criminal
liability. The law provides that:
1
“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.”
B. Distinguish between the effect of a justifying circumstance
and an exempting circumstance regarding the existence of a
crime and civil liability.
1.A person who acts by virtue of a justifying circumstance does
not transgress the law, that is he does not commit any crime in
the eyes of the law, because there is nothing unlawful in the act
as well as in the intention of the actor. The act of the person in
itself is both just and lawful.
In justifying circumstances, there is neither a crime nor a criminal.
No civil liability, except in paragraph 4 (causing damage to
another in state of necessity).
1.In exempting circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal
liability. The act is not justified but the actor is not criminally
liable. There is civil liability except in paragraphs 4 and 7
(causing an injury by mere accident; failing to perform an act
required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable
cause) of Art 12 which does not mention par 4 and 7.
C. State the basis for each of the exempting circumstances.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
In exempting circumstances, there is a crime committed but
no criminal liability arises. Technically, one who acts by virtue of
any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime, although
by the complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability
arise.
Burden of proof – any of the circumstances mentioned in Art
12 is a matter of defense and the same must be proved by the
defendant to the satisfaction of the court.
*In all the exempting circumstances, intent is wanting in the
agent of the crime. Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom
and the use of intelligence. Hence, in paragraph 1, 2 & 3 of Art
12, the imbecile, insane, or minor, not having intelligence, does
not act with intent. The person acting under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art 12, not
having freedom of action, does not act with intent. In paragraph 4
of Art 12, it is specifically stated that the actor causes an injury by
mere accident without the intention of causing it.
D. Explain Par. 1 of Article 12.
The exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility is based on
the complete absence of intelligence, an element of
voluntariness.
E. Distinguish between and insane person and an imbecile.
While the imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal
liability, the insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he
acted during a lucid interval.
During lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence.
An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental
development comparable to that of children between two and
seven years of age. An imbecile within the meaning of Article 12
2
is one who is deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
E.1. Discuss People v. So, G.R. No. 104664, 28 August 1995.
PEOPLE V ELYBOY SO Y ORBES
Before us is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XLIX in Criminal Case No. 91-95478, convicting
the appellant Elyboy So of the crime of murder and imposing on him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 10 June 1991, Elyboy So was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the death of Mario Tuquero. The
information reads:
That on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
Mario Tuquero y Alas by then and there stabbing him several times
with a fan knife on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
said Mario Tuquero Y Alas mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.1
On 19 July 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded
"NOT GUILTY."2
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court handed down its
decision on 17 January 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of "Murder" qualified by treachery, as defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby condemns the
said Accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
all the accessory penalties of the law. The Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mario Tuquero in the amount of
P50,000.00. The period during which the Accused was detained in
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the City Jail shall be credited to him in full provided that he agreed in
writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations
of the City Jail of Manila. With costs against the Accused.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts established by prosecution's evidence are summarized in
the People's brief as follows:
On June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So met his lady friend,
Teresita Domingo, in a jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig. Since
Elyboy's house which is located in 2969-D Ramon Magsaysay
Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila, is walking distance to Teresita's house
located in 2050 Abad Santos Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Teresita
requested Elyboy to bring her home (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nov.
12, 1991, p. 7).
While walking along Araullo Street on their way to Teresita's house,
they passed by the house of Elyboy's first cousin, Esteban, Edgar,
and Emy, all surnamed So (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 8-9).
When they passed by his cousins' house, he saw his cousin Edgar
with Ronnie Tan and three (3) others and noticed that a drinking
spree was taking place in front of the house (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp.
9-10).
Upon seeing Elyboy, Edgar greeted him by saying: "Bingbong
Crisologo is coming (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 10). He then invited
Elyboy to have a drink and requested that his lady companion be
introduced to them (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 11). Elyboy answered: "I
cannot introduce her to you because she is mine." (tsn, Oct. 23,
1991, p. 12).
Elyboy then proceeded to bring Teresita directly to her house (tsn,
Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
Immediately after bringing Teresita to her house, Elyboy passed by
his cousins' house to honor their invitation (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
After an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of
beer which the latter declined because it was already past 10:00 p.m.
and he was on his way home already. Edgar convinced him to drink
just a little and to stay awhile so he could also meet his future
3
brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero, who will arrive later with his sister
Emy. Elyboy was prevailed upon to stay on as he was also interested
in meeting Mario (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 14).
Before Emy and Mario arrived, Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to
watch the dance in the playground which was part of the fiesta
celebration. At the playground, Esteban met Edgar, Elyboy and
Ronnie and informed them that Emy and Mario had arrived and
instructed them to buy beer
(tsn, October 23, 1991, pp. 15-18).
Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie proceeded to buy beer while Esteban
went home ahead of them (tsn, October 23, 1991, p. 19).
After buying beer, they proceeded to the house. Upon arriving in the
house, Emy introduced Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario (tsn, Oct. 23,
1991, pp. 14-20).
Mario Tuquero worked as a manager of a restaurant in Paris, France,
and arrived in the Philippines on March 7, 1991. Emy So, who is a
registered nurse, met Mario sometime in March, 1991 and they
started living in as husband and wife in her parents' house at 1920,
Araullo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, also in the same month until June,
1991. However, Mario was legally married to a certain Evelyn
Tuquero and this fact was not known to Emy (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp.
37-39, 42-43, 54-55).
The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario and
Emy resumed their drinking spree. However, after the group
consumed four (4) cases of beer and before 3:00 a.m., Emy felt
sleepy and went inside (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 52; Oct. 23, 1991, p.
21).
While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by the
noise coming from the group outside their house (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
p. 59).
It turned out that Elyboy had a misunderstanding and altercation with
somebody and he was shouting loudly, disturbing the neighbors in
the process (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 59, 63).
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After pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home
because his loud voice was disturbing the neighbors (tsn, Sept. 4,
1991,
pp. 62-63).
After he was pacified and advised to go home, Elyboy ran towards
home (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 62-63).
At around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991 Mario and Emy decided to leave
for Fairview Subdivision, Quezon City, in order to get papers of a
vehicle owned by Mario that they will bring out of the Bureau of
Customs (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30-31, 60).
While Mario and Emy were waiting for a taxi at the corner of
Magsaysay Avenue and Pureza Street, Elyboy suddenly appeared
from behind and stabbed Mario at the back several times with an
eleven inch fan knife with a white handle (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30,
32, 67; Sept. 9, 1991, p. 25).
Emy shouted for help (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
When Mario was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on
his back. Elyboy took advantage of this circumstance and repeatedly
stabbed Mario on the front part of his body (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
Emy pleaded to Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario but Elyboy ignored her
and continued delivering stabbing blows at Mario (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
p. 34).
Elyboy fled from the scene of the crime and ran to a dark alley (tsn.,
Sept. 4, 1991, p. 34; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 40).
Emy called for a taxi that passed by and brought Mario Tuquero to
the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital
(tsn., Sept. 1991, p. 34).
Elyboy stayed in the alley for about thirty (30) minutes until the
policemen arrived at the scene of the crime and shouted at him to
surrender. After a while, Elyboy went out of hiding and shouted at the
policemen not to fire because he is surrendering. When Elyboy
surrendered, he was blushing and uneasy and naked from the waist
up because he removed his shirt to wipe the blood on his face (tsn,
4
Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 6, 13; Nov. 12, 1991,
p. 3).
Elyboy was then brought by the policemen to Precinct No. 8 of the
Western Police District and the fan knife used was surrendered by
Barangay Chairman Aida de los Santos to the police authorities (tsn.,
Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 7, 25).
As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered several stab
wounds numbering eighteen (18) on the different parts of his body
with at least four (4) fatal wounds causing his death (tsn., Sept. 4,
1991, pp. 8-23).4
Appellant vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution.
According to him, while they were drinking and talking about France,
Esteban So suddenly stood up and said that the reason he was not
able to work in France is because his surname was "So". Appellant
felt aggrieved as he recalled the time when he lived with Esteban So
and his family and was driven out by them. He was told that his only
link to them is the surname "So". Then when Esteban So pulled a
knife and Edgar So broke bottles of beer and Mario Tuquero pulled
out "something" from his socks, appellant, fearing for his life, fled.
Appellant claims that Esteban So and Mario Tuquero chased him but
were not able to catch him.5
Appellant further narrated that when he tried to go back to his
cousin's house and talk to them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So
at the corner of Pureza and Magsaysay Streets. Suddenly Mario
Tuquero attacked him with a knife but because Tuquero's thrust was
slow, he was able to evade it. He grabbed the knife and proceeded to
stab Tuquero repeatedly. He ignored the pleas of Emy So but finally
stopped when four (4) persons in a jeep passed by and shouted at
him. He ran into a dark alley until the police came and brought him to
the police precinct.6
Appellant claimed self-defense and in the instant appeal assigned the
following errors:
I
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 5

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED SELF- appellant who had
DEFENSE IN THE INSTANT CASE. ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge. The defense has not
II shown such degree of partiality on the part of prosecution witness
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE Emy So as would cast doubt on her credibility and impeach her
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO IS testimony, especially when said testimony is "not inherently
UNDESERVING OF CREDIT, IMPROBABLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE. improbable in itself".10 Emy So testified thus:
III xxx xxx xxx
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE COURT:
WAS TREACHERY IN THE INSTANT CASE. You mentioned of a grudge between your family and that of the
IV Accused and this referred to the surname, So. What was the trouble
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE all about?
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY ON THE PART OF WITNESS:
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO. Actually, there was no grudge with respect to the family name So.
V They really have a grudge in our family, Your Honor.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ACCUSED- COURT:
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.7 What was that grudge all about?
We deny the appeal. WITNESS:
Appellant's second assigned error, in essence, raises the issue of Their family is a broken family and ours is intact, Your Honor. And
credibility of witnesses. Whose testimony is more believable and they live only from hand-outs from relatives and also from us, Your
reliable, prosecution witness Emy So's narration or appellant's Honor.
version? Appellant would like us to believe that Emy So's testimony COURT:
was biased in favor of her brothers and the victim who was her So, what was the grudge about? You even help them. You even
common-law-husband8 and aggravated by an alleged grudge helped the Accused. What was the grudge all about?
harbored by her family against appellant's family. WITNESS:
We give no credence to appellant's argument. Long settled in I just do not know really why they have such ill feelings towards us. I
criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of think it's jealousy "inggit", Your Honor.
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the xxx xxx xxx
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses You are not concerned with Elyboy he being not a resident in your
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying community?
during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of WITNESS:
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the No, ma'am.
case.9 In the instant case, although Emy So readily admitted that her ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
relationship with appellant was "not close", she explained that it was
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
That is because you have grudge over this person. Referring to the
Accused, is that correct?
WITNESS:
No, ma'am, we are not so close that's why.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Another question. Is it your habit not to be concerned with the welfare
of your relatives?
WITNESS:
I have concern to my other relatives, Your Honor.
COURT:
How about the Accused, you are not concerned with him?
WITNESS:
No, Your Honor.
COURT:
Why, because of the fact between your family and their family?
WITNESS:
It could be said that way, Your Honor, because since then, he is a
problem child that's why my feelings towards him is not so intimate
anymore.11
The fact alone that the victim was Emy So's live-in partner does not
impair her testimony. The Court has time and again ruled that mere
relationship of the witness to the victim does not automatically impair
his credibility and render the testimony less worthy of faith and
credit.12 In People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and Manolo,13 we put it thus:
. . . It is settled that the relationship of the key witness to the victim
does not necessarily disqualify him for being biased and interested. A
son or a wife is not incompetent to testify simply because of his or
her relationship to the victim. In other words, the relationship of the
witnesses to the victim does not per se affect their credibility. Their
testimony must be evaluated and assessed according to its own
merit and if not otherwise offset by more credible evidence on record
or any other revealed intrinsic defect should be given credit.
6
Appellant's strategy to discredit Emy So on ground of bias and
interest to exculpate himself from criminal liability cannot succeed.
Appellant maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-
defense and invokes in his favor the constitutional presumption of
innocence claiming that, despite his plea of self-defense, the
prosecution retains the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.14 This argument deserves no credit in light of the established
and time-honored rule that when self-defense is invoked, the burden
of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified
and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing. He must prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.15
In People v. Jotoy,16 we stated:
It is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. However, when the accused invokes self-defense,
the onus probandi is shifted and he is duty bound to prove the
elements of the plea by clear and convincing evidence otherwise,
conviction is inescapable.
We shall now proceed to determine whether or not appellant has
completely and satisfactorily proven the elements of self-defense.
The initial and crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim for absent this essential element,
no claim of self-defense can be successfully interposed. If there is no
unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the
second requisite of self-defense would have no basis.17
Appellant's claim that the victim, Mario Tuquero, attacked him with a
knife fails to convince us. The record reveals glaring and serious
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
inconsistencies in appellant's testimony that makes it totally unworthy
of credence.
Appellant testified that he was able to wrest the knife from Tuquero
because the latter's thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his
statement during the same cross-examination, that the incident
happened so fast and that Tuquero's attack was sudden.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw Mario near the corner of Magsaysay
and Pureza, how far were you in relation to him the first time that you
saw him?
WITNESS:
I think about 1 and 1/2 armslength, sir, because I was on the other
side and Mario was also on the other side and we exactly met at the
corner, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw him bringing out something from his
waistline, what did you do?
WITNESS:
The incident happened so fast, sir. After pulling out something from
his waistline, immediately thereafter, he made a thrust on me but I
was able to grab the knife from him sir. (Emphasis ours.)18
Further, we share the incredulity of the trial court that the victim
stabbed appellant in slow motion:
Even the testimony of the Accused denigrated his claim that he acted
in self-defense. For, when he testified before the Court, the Accused
claimed that Mario Tuquero stabbed him but that Mario Tuquero
failed to hit the accused because Mario Tuquero stabbed the
accused slowly and the Accused was able to evade the thrust and
that the latter, thereupon, wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero. It is
sheer lunacy for the Accused to asseverate that Mario Tuquero
stabbed the Accused in slow motion . . .19
Even if we allow appellant's contention that Tuquero was the initial
unlawful aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense.
7
After appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the
unlawful aggression had ceased. After the unlawful aggression has
ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even
wound the former aggressor.20
As correctly pointed out by the trial court:
. . . More, there is no evidence in the record that, after the Accused
wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero, the latter still did any overt act
to indicate that he still tried to grab or wrest back the knife from the
Accused or, in any manner, persist in inflicting any harm on the
Accused. On the contrary, after the Accused wrested the knife from
Mario Tuquero, the Accused repeatedly stabbed Mario Tuquero in
the front portions of his body even after Mario Tuquero embraced the
Accused to hang on for dear life. At the time the Accused stabbed
Mario Tuquero, the latter's initial unlawful aggression had already
ceased and that there was, therefore, no more need for the Accused
to still stab Mario Tuquero and stab him with impunity. . .21
We reiterated the same rule in People v. Gomez:22
But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the
accused with a knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still
hold that there was no self-defense because at that point when
accused was able to catch and twist the hand of the deceased, in
effect immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had already ended.
Thus, the danger having ceased, there was no more need for the
accused to start stabbing the deceased, not just once but five (5)
times.
and in People v. Gomez:23
There was no self-defense where the accused was able to obtain
possession of the weapon from the deceased and there was no
necessity to stab the latter for aggression had already ceased.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and
negated by the physical evidence on record. The victim sustained
eighteen (18) stab wounds on different parts of his body. Of the
eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal stab wounds.24 The presence of a
large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 8

location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined
effort to kill the victim.25
We quote with favor the observations of the trial court in this regard:
In this case, the evidence in the record buttresses the testimony of
Emy So, on the one hand, and belied and deprecated the testimony
of the Accused on the other. As can be gleaned from the Necropsy
Report of Dr. Florante Baltazar, (Exhibits "B" and "C"), the deceased
sustained no less than eighteen (18) stab wounds. Four (4) of the
stab wounds sustained by the deceased were on the posterior
aspects of his body, namely, stab wounds No. 4 (Exhibit "C-4"), stab
wound No. 13 (Exhibit "B-13"), stab wound No. 15 (Exhibit "C-15")
and stab wound No. 18 (Exhibit "C-18") and the rest of the stab
wounds sustained by the victim were on the anterior portions of his
body. These jibe with the testimony of Emy So that the Accused
suddenly darted from behind Mario Tuquero and stabbed him on the
posterior aspects of his body and, when Mario Tuquero slipped
because his shoe slid, and fell on the ground, face up, the Accused
then stabbed Mario Tuquero anew successively on the anterior
aspects of his body.
On the other hand, if the Accused acted merely on self-defense, it is
incomprehensible that he would stab Mario Tuquero no less than
eighteen (18) times (Exhibits "B" and "C"), not only on the anterior
but also on the posterior aspects of his body.26
Considering the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by
appellant on the victim, the testimony of the prosecution witness Emy
So that appellant unexpectedly and suddenly attacked the victim
from behind and the fact that appellant suffered not a single injury,
we agree with the trial court that the killing was attended by
treachery. This clearly illustrates that appellant, in the commission of
the crime, employed means, methods and form in its execution which
tended directly, and especially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.27
Not content with a self-defense plea the defense likewise seeks to
exempt appellant from criminal liability by claiming that appellant was
insane at the time he stabbed the victim.
The claim is unmeritorious.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a
crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving it.28
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance,
there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in the
commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.29
The testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent
Service of the National Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and
attending physician of appellant when he was confined at the
National Center for Mental Health from June 8, 1985 to December 2,
1985, only established the previous confinement of appellant at the
NCMH and that appellant showed signs of psychosis or insanity at
the time. The rest of his testimony consisted merely of assumptions,
possibilities and generalities:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why did you attend to this Elyboy So?
WITNESS:
He was admitted June 8, 1985 to the service of the Child and
Adolescents Service, ma'am.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why?
WITNESS:
He showed signs of psychosis or insanity, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
What are the characteristics of this kind of illness Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 9

Even this illness it is assumed that this patient will have episodes of If they were told about a behavior that they are showing that is
insanity for the rest of his life especially if he will not unacceptable, they will react to that in a disproportionate way,
take the medicines that will prevent the episodes of insanity. ma'am.
(Emphasis ours.) ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: What do you mean by disproportionate way?
And you said that this patient per your record was discharged on WITNESS:
December 3, 1985. Do we understand that from the time of his It will not be proportionate that the amount of stimulus meaning, to
discharge, he was already healed or recovered from that kind of say that they will overreact.
insanity? ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
WITNESS: Is violence a kind of over reaction to a given stimulus?
I can only say that at the time of the last check up he was doing well WITNESS:
three (3) months after that, he was discharged because he failed to Patients who are suffering from this condition has more proclivity to
come back for his check-up, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.) violence than the general population.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: xxx xxx xxx
You mentioned that this will be for the rest of his life. COURT:
WITNESS: Doctor, you told that he was discharged. Was he told to come back
For many patients, it is like that. It is very exceptional that they will be for further treatment?
able to recover or completely cured from it, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.) WITNESS:
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: Yes, Your Honor, that is standard that we tell to everybody.
When you say for the rest of his life, do we understand that this will (Emphasis ours.)
be recurrent? COURT:
WITNESS: And how often is he supposed to come back for treatment in the case
Yes, ma'am. of the Accused Elyboy So?
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: WITNESS:
What are the causes that will trigger the recurrency of this kind of After six (6) months he failed to come. He was supposed to come
illness? every month after his passe which was given on August 1, 1985,
WITNESS: Your Honor.30
Generally, the main characteristic of this patients who are suffering xxx xxx xxx
from this illness is, they are very sensitive to any kind of social Further and more importantly, the testimony of Dr. Galvez is bereft of
censures and criticisms. any evidence that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: or discernment at the time or at the very instant when he stabbed the
Could you enlighten what do you mean by social censures? victim.
WITNESS: Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of
appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 10

very moment the act was committed.31 In the present case, the FISCAL PERALTA:
testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to appellant's treatment six (6) years And do you think doctor that could have been the reason why he
before the incident happened. already failed to report on a monthly basis considering that he was
Moreover, Dr. Galvez admitted that after appellant's last check-up already in college and actually finished his college degree?
sometime in 1985, or six (6) years before the crime was committed, ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
he was doing well and relieved from psychosis: That might be misleading, Your Honor, considering that the testimony
xxx xxx xxx of the doctor, he said that he should report six (6) months after the
COURT: discharge but he took his college degree for several years thereafter.
When he came back, after his discharge, was he given medication? COURT:
WITNESS: The only point of the fiscal is that, is that an indication of having been
Yes, Your Honor. cured. If he was able to take and finish even college. Go ahead.
COURT: WITNESS:
How did you find his behavior when he came back for medication? It would look that during that period, he would have been cured and
WITNESS: there are some also who although that they may not be entirely cured
As per record, he was doing well, Your Honor. (Emphasis ours.) would be able to get a degree, make the standards of education and
COURT: there are some who could also get the standard of employment
When you say doing well, what exactly do you mean by that? despite their craziness. "Medyo naitatago or nakakaya." Psychosis is
WITNESS: something in many patients it is very obvious. You could see that
He was relieved from psychosis at that time, Your Honor. (Emphasis they are really grossly disorganized "talagang sira." But there are
ours.) some who has some ability to keep it just there and maintain a
xxx xxx xxx proper social behavior and be able to achieve socially acceptable
FISCAL PERALTA: functioning in society.
If the Patient was discharged in 1985 and finished his college degree COURT:
in four (4) years, do you think that by that time he was already cured In other words, that illness is dormant.
of his sickness? WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
It will look like that, sir. (Emphasis ours.) COURT:
FISCAL PERALTA: And it emerges in some point of time?
What do you mean it will look like that? WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
It will look that while there are various types of clinical courses, COURT:
meaning, the development of an illness in a patient and if the patient So, it is possible doctor that the decease is there but at the same
was able to finish college, then the outcome of the treatment that was time, the patient is able to study?
given to him in 1985 was quite good. WITNESS:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 11

Yes, Your Honor. The possibilities are these he was cured entirely WITNESS:
cured during the period or the decease is just there and it is not Like this, sir. He was embracing me, my right hand was freed.
affecting his behavior. So there are two (2) possibilities.32 (Emphasis INTERPRETER:
ours) Witness demonstrated by stretching his right hand, swinging it from
A perusal of appellant's testimony further negates his plea of insanity. the right side to the front towards his body.
His recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the FISCAL PERALTA:
stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his And how many times also did you stab the back portion of the body
testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. His memory of the victim?
conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted WITNESS:
on the victim. This, appellant attributes to insanity but we are far from I could not recall also, sir.
convinced. A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and FISCAL PERALTA:
conclusively prove that he is legally so.33 And when you stopped stabbing the victim when you said four (4)
xxx xxx xxx men boarded a jeep and shouted "itigil na, itigil na"?
FISCAL PERALTA: WITNESS:
Afterwards, when you got hold of the knife, you repeatedly stabbed It was during the time when both of us fell down. I was on top of him
him? and I stabbed him on his chest, sir. That was when four (4) persons
WITNESS: arrived and shouted "itigil na, itigil na," and I stopped,
Yes, sir, because after I got hold of the knife, I was able to wrest it sir.34
from him. And with the use of my right hand, I repeatedly stabbed xxx xxx xxx
him. At the time his left arm was embracing me and I repeatedly ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
stabbed him with my right hand from the left swinging it to the right in And what did you do when you were not hit?
front, hitting him on the front of his body, sir. WITNESS:
FISCAL PERALTA: By the time I evaded his thrust I was able to get hold of his palm,
How many times did you stab him on the front portion? ma'am.
WITNESS: ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
I don't know, sir, because I was out of myself. And when you were able to get hold of his palm, what happened?
FISCAL PERALTA: WITNESS:
After repeatedly stabbing the front portion of his body, you said that Because I was so made of what he did, when I was able to grab and
you also stabbed him at the back? get hold of the knife, I hit him, ma'am.
WITNESS: INTERPRETER:
When he was already embracing me, sir, my right hand was freed Witness demonstrating by raising his right hand upward on the level
and that was the time when I stabbed him at the back. of his breast swinging his right hand towards the right.35
FISCAL PERALTA: xxx xxx xxx
And how did you stab him at the back? In People v. Renegado,36 we held thus:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment
he was unaware or unconscious of what he was doing, that he
"regained his senses" when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling
him: "Loreto, don't do that," and only then did he realize that he had
wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For it is most unusual for
appellant's mind which was in a perfect normal state on Monday
morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at that particular moment
when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting
very sanely that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went
to the canteen in a jovial mood "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin
in his hand"; he saw the persons inside the canteen namely, Venecia
Icayan, Lolita Francisco, Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of
the latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for the
prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on
the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: "ano ka", he saw
Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push
a chair towards him; he became "confused" because he remembered
that Lira threatened to kill him if he would see him again; at this point
he "lost his senses" and regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs.
Tan saying: "Loreto, don't do that", and he then found out that he had
wounded Lira. If appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We
cannot understand why his memory stood still at that very crucial
moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the snap of a finger as it
were after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim . . .
(Emphasis ours.)
and in the later case of People v. Aquino,37 we ruled:
The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed
upon his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken
120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks
of marijuana before the commission of the crime. This admission
substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he was
under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim
and, on the occasion there of killed her. It is, therefore, beyond cavil
that assuming appellant had some form of mental illness, it did not
12
totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning
faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts
any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the
dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are replete with documented
records, and we are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where
mental illness has been feigned and invoked to provide a defense for
the accused in a criminal prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)
In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The State, thus,
continues, its guard against sane murderers who seek to escape
punishment through a general plea of insanity.38
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
E. 2. Discuss People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29
November 1950
PEOPLE V FORMIGONES (1)
FACTS:
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in
Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From
there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as
harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the head of the
stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house &
stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right
lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo
then took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living room &
then lay down beside her. In this position, he was found by the
people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest
daughter, Irene Formigones.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his
statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he
often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he
suspected the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
that his wife had become indifferent to him. During the preliminary
investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI, he
also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His counsel presented the
testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was
confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange & that he
behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk
around stark naked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothes etc…
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an
IMBECILE & therefore exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of
the crime, thus exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes,
although he was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could still
distinguish between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that
a person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC
A12 so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment & freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime. (Note that definition is same as insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement,
assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed
either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who
could feel the pangs of jealousy & take violent measures to the extent
of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were justified, is of
little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he
killed his wife, & at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate
13
said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble &
expense of catching him & securing his conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation
(having killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the
lower court’s judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that
appellant will be credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he
has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances
PEOPLE V FORMIGONES (2)
ISSUE: Formigones is an imbecile and therefore exempted from
criminal liability under Article 12 of the RPC. Appeal from judgement
of the Court of First Instance. (Alberto is guilty of parricide)
RULING
Appellant (Formigones) guilty of parricide and SC affirms the
judgement of lower court with the modification that Formigones will
be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has
undergone
reduced penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Appellant will
pay cost.
FACTS
-Nov. 1946, Alberto Formigones (appellant) with his wife, Julia
Agricola, and five children moved to live in the house of this half-
brother, Zacarias Formigones.
-Formigones moves his family to Sipocot, to find employment as
harvester of palay
.-Dec. 28, 1946, late afternoon, took his bolo and stabbed his wife
Julia in the back – wife died.
-The wife fell in the stairs where she was sitting before she was
stabbed.
- Alberto Fomigones carried his wife up the house and laid her on
the living room floor and lay down beside her. (This is how people
found them)
-Irene Formigones, witness the stabbing and shouted for help.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
-Alberto signed a written statement wherein he admitted of killing his
wife (during constabulary investigation).
-Alberto’s motive for killing his wife was due to jealousy. Alberto
suspected his wife and brother (Zacarias) are having an affair.
-Zacarias was living in he’s grandmother but he frequently visits
Alberto and his family. Zacarias would also spend the night there.
This aroused the suspicions of Alberto.
-Preliminary investigation conducted by justice of peace of Sipocot,
Alberto pleaded guilty.
-Trial case in the court of first instance, Alberto entered a plea of not
guilty.
O Counsel of Alberto presented a testimony of two jail guard that
Alberto behavedlike an insane person
-he removes his clothes and goes naked in the prison; sometimes he
would remain silent and indifferent in his surroundings; he
refuses to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by
the guards; he would sing with his fellow prisoners or alone.
O Dr. Francisco Gomez, examined Alberto and in his opinion, Alberto
is suffering from feeblemindedness and is not an imbecile and that
he knows what is right and wrong.
O Trial court rejected that Alberto is an imbecile and is excepted from
criminal liability under Article 12 of the RPC.
O Trial court’s ruling the same as the lower court.
-Article 12 of RPC
-to be excepted from criminal liability, Alberto must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will when he
committed the crime. Imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of act should be absolutely deprived as a person of
intelligence or freedom of will. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties is not excepted.
-Deaf-mute does not equal to imbecility or insanity.
-Allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proven.
14
-Strange behavior of Alberto is attributed to him being feebleminded
or his remorse for having killed his wife.
-A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take
violent measures of killing his wife, whom her suspected of being
unfaithful, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
-However, the court sympathizes Alberto for being feebleminded
(lack of mental powers).
-Paragraph 2, rule 3 of Article 63 of RPC provides that when the
commission to act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
Mitigating circumstances
O The fact that Alberto is feebleminded warrants the finding in his
favor of the mitigating circumstances provided in either paragraph
8 or 9 of article 13 of RPC.
-“suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense
or communication with his fellow being,” or such illness “as would
diminish the exercise of his will power”
o additional mitigating circumstance, paragraph 6 or article 13
–“that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
-Alberto killed his wife due to jealousy.
F. EXPLAIN PAR. 2 OF ARTICLE 12 IN RELATION TO SEC. 6 OF
RA 9344.
The phrase “under nine years” should be construed “nine
years or less;” as may be inferred from the next subsequent
paragraph which does not totally exempt a person “over nine
years of age” if he acted with discernment.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
RA 9344, otherwise known as “Juvenile and Welfare Act of
2006,” raised the age of absolute irresponsibility from nine to 15
years of age.
Under Section 6 of the said law, a child 15 years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subject
to an intervention program as provided under Section 20 of the
same law.
The exempting circumstance of minority is based also on the
complete absence of intelligence.
G. EXPLAIN PAR. 3. OF ARTICLE 12 IN RELATION TO SEC. 6
OF RA 9344.
Paragraph 3, Article 12 of the RPC is deemed repealed by the
provision of RA No. 9344 declaring a child 15 years of age or under
exempt from criminal liability. The law provides thus:
“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
15
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.”
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age who acted without discernment exempt from
criminal liability
A minor under 18 but above 15 must have acted with discernment to
incur criminal liability. The minor is presumed to have acted without
discernment since the phrase “unless he/she acted with discernment”
indicates an exception to the general rule that a minor under 18 but
above 15 has acted without discernment.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a minor
who is over 15 but under 18 years of age has acted with
discernment, in order for the minor not to be entitled tho this
exempting circumstances.
Life of human being is divided into 4 periods
1. The age of absolute irresponsibility – 15 years and below
(infancy).
2. The age of conditional responsibility – 15 years and 1 day to 18
years.
3. The age of full responsibility – 18 years or over (adolescence) to
70 (maturity).
4. The age of mitigated responsibility – 15 years and 1 day to 18
years, the offender acting with discernment; over 70 years of age.
A child in conflict with law
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
A person who at the time of the commission of the offense is below
18 years old but not less than 15 years and one day old.
Meaning of discernment
The capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense
to understand the differences between right and wrong and the
consequences of the wrongful act.
Determination of discernment
Shall take into account the ability of a child to understand the moral
and psychological components of criminal responsibility and
consequences of the moral act; whether a child can be held
responsible for essentially antisocial behavior.
Basis of paragraph 3 – complete absence of intelligence.
h. Read and explain Secs. 38 and 40 of RA 9344.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years
(18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
16
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was
promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that,
consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended,[154] the aforestated provision does not apply to one who
has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the
decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D.
No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court
(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since
R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of
a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with
the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.[157]
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations[158] on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to
cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law.
The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old
is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense,
and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC),
or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;
but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should
still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous
crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised
Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same
position.[160]
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a
suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The
suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161]
Section 40[162] of the law and Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear
on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25)
years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act,
the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was
still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order
that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community. The age of the child in
17
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other
training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.[164]
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the
court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years
of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.
I. DISCUSS, STATE THE ELEMENTS OF, AND EXPLAIN EACH
OF THE REMAINING FOUR EXEMPTING
circumstances.
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
Elements:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 18

2. With due care; 1. That an act is required by law to be done;

3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 2. That a person fails to perform such act;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it. 3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or
insuperable cause.
Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible
force. J. EXPLAIN PAR. 4 OF ARTICLE 12.

Elements: Discussion:

1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
1. Act must be lawful, therefore when a person acting in self-defense
discharges a firearm in a thickly populated place in the city of Manila
being prohibited and penalized by Article 155 of RPC, he cannot
invoke the exempting circumstance in par. 4.

Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable 2. A person must not be guilty of negligence.
fear of an equal or greater injury.

Elements:

1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than or
at least equal to, that which he is required to commit;

2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the

ordinary man would have succumbed to it.

For the exempting circumstance of an uncontrollable fear to be

invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (a)
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least
equal to that committed.

Any person who fails to perform an act required by law,

when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.

Elements:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 19

3. Accidents – something that happens outside the sway of our will, Facts:
and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the accused,
beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt
If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in the wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. him. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his
workers and asked one,"Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the
Basis of par. 4 – lack of negligence and intent. Under this
body, which they did by putting it amidst the tallcogon grass, and
circumstance, a person does not commit either an intentional felony
later burying in an old well. Only one shot was heard that morning
or a culpable felony.
and a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
j.1. Discuss U.S. v. Tañedo, G.R. No. L-5418, 12 February found at the scene of the crime prior to the trial, the accused denied
1910. all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The
CFI of Tarlac found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited
(1)
the deceased into the forest and intentionally shooting him in the
PETITIONER: U.S chest So far as can be ascertained, there was no enmity and no
unpleasant relations between them. There appears to have been no
RESPONDENT: CECILIO TAÑEDO motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The only possible
reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be
found in the fact of a sudden quarrel
W/N the entrapment YES between them during the hunt. That
operation conducted by the 1. Prior surveillance is not a idea is wholly negative by the fact that
police was valid, considering condition for an entrapment the chicken and the man were shot at
that there was no prior operation’s validity the same time, there having been only
surveillance and the police 2. Flexibility is a trait of good one shot fired. Hence, the decision was
did not know the subject of police work. However the
appealed
the operation police carry out its entrapment
operations, for as long as the Issue:
rights of the accused have not
been violated in the process, Whether or not the court is correct in
the courts will not pass on the ruling that there is criminal liability
wisdom thereof. The police Held:
officers may decide that time is
of the essence and dispense
with the need for prior
surveillance.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
NO, If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
In the case where there is no evidence of negligence upon the part
of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in
the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is
there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the
death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious
upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is
not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing. The burden
is upon the State to show that it was intentional.
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a
prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury, and
since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent which
constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Judgment is reversed.
K. EXPLAIN PAR. 5 OF ARTICLE 12.
This exempting circumstance presupposes that a person is compelled
by means of force or violence to commit a crime.
Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must
produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all
resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such,
incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the
resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his
20
members to act and his mind to obey. Such a force can never consist
in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be
a force which acts upon him from the outside and by a third person.
The irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or passion, or
obfuscation. It must consist of an extraneous force coming from a
third person.
Basis – complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not
act with freedom.
K.1. DISCUSS PEOPLE V. LORENZO, G.R. NO. L54414, 09
JULY 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE,
accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
Facts: Barangay Captain Elias Monge, his family & Francisco Fabie,
their farm helper were home preparing for the barrio dance when
Loreno & a man in a dark sweater came by their house, saying there
was a letter from the chief (hepe). Elias let them in & when they
read the letter, it said that they were NPA. They were made to lie on
the ground while other men went in the house. The alleged NPA
members robbed the family of several belongings. Moreover, the
man in the dark sweater raped the 2 daughters of Elias, Cristina &
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 21

Monica. Elias, Cristina, Monica & Fabie positively identified Loreno as being raped. Furthermore, Loreno brought Beata, Elias’s wife to the
1 of the robbers. Fabie also identified Marantal. different rooms to open the trunks and closets, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And lastly, Loreno tried to
Issue: WON Loreno and Marantal are exempted from criminal liability
molest Cristina after being raped by the man in dark sweater.
under the defenses of Article 12(5) and (6)
When Marantal kicked Fabie when the latter saw his face, it was due
Held: No. Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed
to the fact the Fabie had recognized him & the blows which he gave
that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or
to Fabie who was still tied was a warning not to report his presence
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury.
& participation in the crime. Furthermore, there was no showing that
They admitted that they were in the house of Elias that night but
Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest nor did an act to prevent
they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five
the commission of the crimes. All these demonstrated the voluntary
companions who claimed to be members of the NPA, with the threat
participation & the conspiracy of the appellants. Not only was their
that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be
defense untenable, but the facts show that that there was
killed. This was found untenable.
conspiracy.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
L. EXPLAIN PAR. 6 OF ARTICLE 12.
one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not This exempting circumstance presupposes that a person is compelled
act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a to commit a crime by another, but the compulsion is by means of
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. intimidation or threat, not force or violence.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent
For the exempting circumstance of an uncontrollable fear to be
and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (a)
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
equal to that committed.
or self-defense in equal combat.
The accused must not have opportunity for escape or self-defense –
Loreno and Marantal had admitted their participation in the
a threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias and is
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
family. Facts inconsistent with the appellants’ defense were
or self-defense in equal combat.
established: (a) having been armed with a firearm, (b) Loreno
positioning himself near the post of the balcony without prior Distinction between irresistible force and uncontrollable fear –In
instructions, (c) Loreno furnishing the rattan to tie the victims, and irresistible force, the offender uses violence or physical force to
(d) Loreno pointing his gun to the other victims when Monica was compel another person to commit a crime; in uncontrollable fear, the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 22

offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to On or about 6 o'clock in the evening of June 12, 1952, Felix,
commit a crime. Semañada, then 19 years of age, and in company of 2 Huks, i.e.,
Commanders Wennie and Heling, all armed, arrived at the house of
Basis – Complete absence of freedom. “Actus me invite factus non
the spouses Serapio Villate and Nieves Magtibay, situated at barrio
est meus actus.” (“An act done by me against my will is not my act."
Sastre, Gumaca, Quezon, where they had a store. The couple were
L.1. DISCUSS PEOPLE V. SEMAÑADA, G.R. NO. L-11361, 26 taking their supper when Felix Semañada ordered Serapio Villate to
MAY 1958. go down and, apparently because the latter resisted the order, he
was brought down to a distance of about an arm's length from his
G.R. No. L-11361 May 26, 1958
house. Once there he was seized and hogtied by Commanders
Wennie and Heling with a string used for fishing. As his companions
held the victim Semañada stabbed Villate several times with a sharp
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, pointed bolo measuring about a palm's length (dangkal). The torture
vs. lasted for about 30 minutes causing the victim to cry in agony "aroy,
aroy". His wife, Nieves Magtibay, who hails from the same barrio of
FELIX SEMAÑADA, alias SEMAÑADA, alias COMMANDER DANTE, Semañada, actually saw the stabbing from the opening of an upstair
defendant-appellant. a window and she ran to her husband's aid but she was not able to
help him because of the 2 Huks that were unknown to her, one of
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Frine C.
whom blocked her way while the other hit her with the butt of his
Zaballero for appellee.
gun on the upper lip, as a result of which her upper lip was cut and
Edgardo Z. Olivera for appellant. she lost 3 front teeth.

FELIX, J.: After the killing of Serapio Villate, Felix Semañada and his
companions went up the victims house. There Semañada pushed
Sometime in 1950 Felix Semañada, alias Semañada, alias
Nieves Magtibay to a corner, threatened to kill her and demanded
Commander Dante, a young boy of 17 years of age, joined the
from her the shotgun of the deceased. The three also ransacked the
Hukbalahap organization, which was composed of 4 units, namely,
couples wardrobe, after which they left with the shotgun valued at
the organization, the contacting, the liquidation and the courier
P250.00 and other merchandise and money of a total value of P900.
groups, and Semañada was assigned to form part of the latter group,
The widow also left the place to report the incident to her brother-in-
whose duty was to deliver letters and messages. Apparently, Felix
law Daniel Villate, who in turn reported the matter to the Philippine
Semañada was unhappy and discontented and oftenly scolded by his
Constabulary, and that same evening the authorities found the
parents, so he easily yielded to the propaganda of the Hukbalahap
deceased Serapio Villate lying dead, face downward and hogtied.
organization, for he did not have the opportunity to obtain any
academic schooling except up to Grade II.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
A post-mortem examination of the cadaver disclosed that a total of
51 wounds were inflicted on the thorax and abdomen of the
deceased, 50 of which were superficial and only one fatal, for it
penetrated the abdomen, with a depth of 5 inches, one inch long and
one centimeter wide (Exhibit A).
The widow, however, kept silent as to the identity of Felix Semañada
as one of the malefactors until he surrendered to the authorities in
Nagcarlang, Laguna, on December 5, 1955. Upon learning that said
Huk was already in the custody of the law, she revealed to the
authorities that the person who stabbed her husband to death in the
evening of June 12, 1952, was Felix Semañada and explained that
the reason for her long silence was her fear that while Semañada
were at large living in the mountains, she might be liquidated if he
would learn that a charge for murder was filed against him by the
widow of the deceased.
Due to this revelation and after the corresponding investigation a
complaint for "robbery in band with murder" was filed in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon, against Felix Semañada,
alias Semañada, alias Commander Dante et al., without naming the
said 2 other commanders who were still at large unidentified. After
proper proceedings the Justice of the Peace Court, convinced that
the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
imputed to him, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon where the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding
information this time against Felix Semañada, alias Semañada, alias
Commander Dante alone, charging him with the crime of robbery
with homicide, defined and punished by Article 294 in connection
with Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 18.
23
Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty but after hearing
the Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide, defined and punished under Article 294,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, with the attendance of 3
aggravating circumstances with none mitigating to offset the same,
and sentenced him to die in the electric chair, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Serapio Villate in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay
the further sum of P900.00, value of the cash and goods robbed
from the deceased, with costs.
Defendant did not appeal from this decision but this case was
nevertheless, brought to this Court under the provisions of Section 9
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, for review and judgment as law and
justice shall dictate.
In this instance counsel for the defense maintains that the lower
Court erred:
1. In holding that the accused-appellant Felix Semañada is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with murder,
although the evidence of the prosecution is wholly insufficient as it is
improbable and contrary to common experience;
2. In giving weight and merit to the evidence of the prosecution to
the effect that widow Nieves Magtibay kept silent as to identify
assailant until the accused surrendered to the authorities for fear that
she might be liquidated also by the accused with as living in the
mountain as a Hukbalahap;
3. In concluding that the wounds have been inflicted one by one,
torturing the deceased for one-half hour constituting all aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, although there is no evidence to support
said conclusion;
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
4. In not extending to the accused-appellant the benefit of Article 12,
paragraphs 5 and 6, although the evidence shows that he acted
under the influence of uncontrollable fear or compulsion of an
irresistible force;
5. In holding the accused-appellant liable for the acts of his
companions when he had neither knowledge of the intention to kill
the deceased nor had he actually participated in its commission; and
6. In not holding and extending to the accused the mitigating
circumstances of (1) lack of instruction; (2) for having acted under
the influence of grave fear not entirely uncontrollable under
paragraph 1, article 13, in connection with paragraph 6 of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code; and (3) voluntary surrender of the
accused to the authorities on December 5, 1955, within paragraph
10, of article 13 of the Revised. Penal Code.
The version of the defendant as to the execution of the crime at bar
is as follows:
On or about June 12, 1952, at about 3 o'clock p.m., while Felix
Semañada was in barrio Labnig, Gumaca, Quezon, waiting for letters
to be delivered, Commanders Wennie and Heling of the liquidation
unit arrived. The 2 commanders ordered him to accompany them to
barrio Sastre, but he refused on the ground that as a courier he had
his own duty to do, but the said commanders took their firearms,
pointed them toward him saying that he would be killed if he refused
to guide them to the house of Serapio Villate. He was told that they
were just to visit Serapio Villate without showing any intention of
killing that man. Had he not been forced to go to with them to barrio
Sastre, he would not have gone with them. They arrived at barrio
Sastre at about 6 o'clock in the evening and when they were about
24
20 arm-length away from the house of Serapio Villate, the 2
commanders Wennie and Heling ordered him to stay guard near the
road; while thus guarding alone, he could have escaped but he did
not for fear that if he did so he would be liquidated by the 2
notorious commanders and, beside that, he had no reason to escape,
as he was made to believe that they were going there only for a visit.
As a matter of fact, while thus guarding the road he heard neither
cries nor shouts from the house of Villate. On the other hand, he
hold not have gone to town because he would have been arrested by
the army.
On December 5, 1955, in Nagcarlang, Laguna, upon realizing the
evils of communism and having grown up to understand the beauty
of democracy, he surrender voluntarily to Sgt. Regalado of the 26th
B.C.T. He said that he wanted to live peacefully and to start a new
life.
In consonance with this version defendant disclaims any criminal
liability for the death of Villate and the robbery in the latter's house.
He admitted having been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
being committed, but he says that it was so, because he was under
the influence of a great fear. Consequently — counsel for the
defense argues — that in so far as the defendant is concerned, the
circumstances of treachery and cruelty cannot be appreciated against
him, because the killing was not executed by him, aside from the fact
that the testimony of the widow Nieves Magtibay, who averred to
have seen the defendant stabbing the deceased for 30 minutes
deserves no credence because from the opening of the window thru
which she allegedly was peeping, she was unable to see the
defendant, specially if it is considered, that her view was intercepted
by at least 3 persons.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Counsel further maintains that even if convicted of the crime charged
defendant is entitled to the benefits of the mitigating circumstances
of (1) lack of instruction; (2) having acted under the influence of fear
not entirely uncontrollable to be exempting under Article 12,
paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, but coming within the
purview of Article 13 paragraph 1 of the same legal body; and (3)
voluntary surrender to the authorities on December 5, 1955, which
also may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article
13, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, for it constitutes a
circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to the circumstance
of voluntary surrender to a person in authority or agent covered, by
paragraph 7 of said article 13.
Upon going over the evidence on record, We find no reason for the
widow Nieves Magtibay to testify falsely against the defendant herein
and to impute to him the commission of so heinous offense. She
knew very well the defendant and was able to identify him fully. Any
way, the matter devolves into a case of credibility of witnesses and
the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing their demeanor
while testifying in his presence and is in a better position than the
appellate Court to gauge their credibility, has given full credence to
the testimony of said widow.
As to the circumstance of lack of instruction, the Solicitor General
states that the test for the mitigating circumstance is not illiteracy
alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence (People vs. Ripas, et
al., * G.R. No. L-6246, promulgated May 28, 1954), and the record
discloses that far from his claim that he suffers from lack of
instruction, he possesses an intelligence worthy of a lawyer
considering his ability, for one unschooled, to distinguish between
implications and innuendos. At any rate, lack of instruction is not
mitigating in cases of robbery (U.S. vs. Pascual, 9 Phil., 491; People
vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil., 154; People vs. De la Cruz, et al., 77 Phil.,
25
44), although it might be under certain situations in cases of murder
(People vs. Taluk, et al., 65 Phil., 696) and homicide (People vs.
Hubero, 61 Phil., 64).
With respect to the alleged "uncontrollable fear or compulsion of an
irresistible force", which appellant says the lower court did not
consider in his favor, the Government contends that the purported
uncontrollable fear was a mere fabrication and that appellant was a
willing participant in the criminal design. Moreover, fear or duress in
order to be a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one's life or limb. It should not be inspired by
speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A person should not commit a
very serious crime on account of a flimsy fear (People vs. Quilloy, 88
Phil., 53), and the evidence on record does not show that defendant
really acted by such uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
Anent the circumstance of voluntary surrender or of a similar or
analogous circumstance We hold that defendant cannot claim it in his
favor in the case at bar, because he did not surrender to the
authority or its agents by reason of the commission of the crime for
which he is herein prosecuted, but for being a Huk who wanted to
come within the pale of the law (see People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27,
33-34).
On the strength of the foregoing considerations We find Felix
Semañada, alias Semañada, alias Commander Dante, guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery (which include nocturnity and aid of
superior strength), dwelling and cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly increasing the sufferings of the victim. He should,
therefore, be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death which,
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
however, cannot be imposed upon him for lack of the required
number of votes necessary for the imposition of said penalty.
Wherefore, the decision of the lower Court rendered in this case and
brought to Us in consultation is hereby affirmed, although the
penalty imposed upon the defendant is lowered to life imprisonment
(reclusion perpetua), in accordance with the provisions of the last
paragraph of Section 9 of Republic Act. 296, known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, with the corresponding accessories of the law and the
payment of the costs. It is so ordered.
M. EXPLAIN PAR. 7 OF ARTICLE 12.
Basis:
The circumstance in paragraph 7 of Article 12 exempts the
accused from criminal liability because he acts without intent, thee
third condition of voluntariness in intentional felony
In all the exempting circumstances, intent is wanting in the agent of
the crime
It presupposes the exercise of free and the use of
intelligence. Hence in Paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of Article 12, the
imbecile, insane or minor, not having intelligence, does not act with
intent. The person acting under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 12, not having freedom of action,
does not act with intent. In paragraph 4 of Article 12, it is specifically
stated that the actor causes an injury by mere accident without
intention of causing it.
N. WHAT IS AN ABSOLUTORY CAUSE?
Absolutory cause are those where the act committed is a
crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is not
penalty imposed
26
O. WHAT IS ENTRAPMENT?
- Entrapment is a form of arrest where police resort to ways
and means to capture a criminal in the act of committing a crime.
Its most common form is the "Buy-bust Operation." It has become
increasingly common because of the proliferation of smuggling,
drugs and other illegal operations. There is, however, a precaution
when using entrapment as a means of arrest. Its effectivity is
apparently obvious, but can give way to abuse as well. It is
recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused
and partakes the nature of a confession by avoidance. It's a
positive defense.
- Entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order
to trap or capture a lawbreaker
P. WHAT IS INSTIGATION?
- Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he,
otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him
- Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an
offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had
no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it
were it not for the initiatives by the inducer.
Q. DISTINGUISH INSTIGATION FROM ENTRAPMENT?
REYES:
There is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation, for a while in the latter case the instigator practically
induced the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment, ways and means
are resorted to for the purpose of trapping the lawbreaker in the
execution of his criminal plan. Entrapment is no bar tot he
prosecution and conviction of the law breaker. But when there is
instigation, the accused must bee acquitted
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to
trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant
into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In
entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests to the accused who adopt the idea and carries it into
execution. The legal effect of entrapment do not exempt the criminal
from liability. Instigation does.
In instigation, a public officer or a private detective induces
an innocent person to commit a crime and would arrest him upon or
after the commission of the crime by the latter. It is an absolutory
cause.
In entrapment, a person has planned, or is about to commit,
a crime and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to
trap and catch the criminal. Entrapment is not a defense.
GN:
INSTIGATION
A law enforcement agent i
nduces an innocent person
to commit a crime and would
arrest him upon or after the
commission of the crime.
The law enforcement
agent conceives the
commission of the
crime and suggests
it to the accused.
An absolutory cause.
27
Q.1. DISCUSS PEOPLE V. CASIO, G.R. NO. 211465, 03
DECEMBER 2014.
PEOPLE V. CASIO (1)
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a
nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI
George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1
Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of
police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys,
pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.
IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the
police blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and rented
adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the
transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the
accused noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation occured
and upon the signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors
were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
ENTRAPMENT
A person has planned, or is
Issue:
about Whether
to commit or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
a crime
and ways are resorted to
by a public officer to trap
and catch the criminal.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking
Idea to commit the crime
in comes
persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
from the offender.
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
Not an absolutory
transportation, transfer,cause.
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who acted as
decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled
her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she needed money.
AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by
the testimonies of the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic
Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption
is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes
28
shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified
Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No.
8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large
scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian
or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked person
or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in
prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
6. When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies; and
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in
persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 29

team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her

PEOPLE V. CASIO (2)
DOCTRINE
Difference between entrapment and instigation is where the intent to
commit the crime originates. In entrapment, the idea and resolve to
commit the crime originate from the accused himself. The authorities
merely provide mechanisms to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in actual commission of the crime. On the other hand,
in instigation, the authority conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests to the accused who adopts and carries it into action.
Entrapment is lawful, instigation is not.
of her constitutional rights.
• Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she
was instigated into committing the crime. The police did not
conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their subject
was.Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged victims
• Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should
be acquitted because the prosecution did not present evidence that
would prove she had a history of engaging in human trafficking or
any other offense. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she
was a laundry woman

SUMMARY Petitioner was caught trafficking minors via offering their

ISSUE
services to the undercover policemen in an entrapment operation.
• W/N the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid,
She alleged that she was instigated in committing the crime because
considering that there was no prior surveillance and the police did
no prior surveillance was conducted by the authorities.
not know the subject of the operation

RELEVANT FACTS • International Justice Mission (IJM),a • W/N the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond
nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence presented to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City • PO1 show that accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking
Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to
be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM provided
them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.
• PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district. Accused
noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?). After having an agreement,
accused returned with 2 minor girls.
• PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with
them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1
Veloso handed the marked money to accused.
• As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a
missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
W/N the prosecution was
able to prove accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
even though there was no
evidence presented to show
that accused has a history of
engaging in human trafficking
1. Two tests in determining the
validity of entrapment
operations:
a. Objective test
- considers the nature of the
police activity involved and the
propriety of police conduct.
- focus of the inquiry:
inducements used by
government
agents, on police conduct
- test of entrapment is whether
the conduct of the law
enforcement agent was likely to
induce a normally lawabiding
person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to
commit the offense
b. Subjective test/ origin of intent
test
- focus of the inquiry: accused's
predisposition to commit the
offense charged, his state of
mind and inclination before his
initial exposure to government
agents
- emphasizes the accused's
propensity to commit the offense
30
2. Entrapment vs Instigation
a. Entrapment
- law officers employ ruses
and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal
while in the actual
commission
of the crime
- the mens rea originates
from the mind of the criminal.
The
idea and the resolve to
commit the crime comes from
him
b. Instigation
- the accused is induced to
commit the crime
- the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it
into execution.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
3. Under the subjective test,
accused was predisposed to
commit the offense because
she initiated the transaction
- It was the accused-
appellant who commenced
the transaction with PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso by
calling their attention on
whether they wanted girls
for that evening, and when
the officers responded, it
was the accused- appellant
who told them to wait
while she would fetch the
girls for their perusal.
4. Under the objective test,
the entrapment would still be
valid. The police merely
proceeded to D. Jakosalem
Street in Barangay
Kamagayan. It was accused
who asked them whether they
wanted girls. There was no
illicit inducement on the part
of the police for the accused
to commit the crime.
31
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A.
Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a),
qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346.92
The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows: Accused is
ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
(1) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a
nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI
George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1
Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of
police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys,
pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.
IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the
police blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and rented
adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the
transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the
accused noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation occured
and upon the signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors
were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking
in persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who acted as
decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled
her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she needed money.
AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by
the testimonies of the witnesses.
32
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic
Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption
is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes
shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified
Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No.
8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large
scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian
or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked person
or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 33

5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
prostitution with any member of the military or law 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise
enforcement agencies; of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the
6. When the offender is a member of the military or law consciousness of his acts.
enforcement agencies; and 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in and analogous to those above mentioned.
persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus S. WHAT ARE THE CLASSES OF MITIGATING
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). CIRCUMSTANCES? EXPLAIN EACH.
Ordinary - that whereby the penalty is lowered to the
R. MEMORIZE ARTICLE 13. minimum period. They are those enumerated under Article 13 for this
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating code
circumstances; Privileged- one whereby the penalty prescribed whether the
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the divisible or indivisible is lowered by one or more degrees
requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in Specific - applies to a specific felony like concealment of dishonor in
the respective cases are not attendant. the case of abortion by the pregnant woman herself
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded T. DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AN ORDINARY MITIGATING
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. CIRCUMSTANCE AND A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a CIRCUMSTANCE.
wrong as that committed. Ordinary
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the 1. Can be offset by generic aggravating circumstance
offended party immediately preceded the act. 2. Penalty is lowered to the minimum periods of the penalty
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of prescribed except in cases where there are two ordinary
a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, mitigating and no aggravating circumstance in which case, the
ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. penalty is lowered by one degree only
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as 3. Not considered when what is prescribed is single indivisible
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. penalty (but is considered when the penalty prescribed is
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a composed of two indivisible penalties under Article 63)
person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed Privileged
his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for 1. Cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance
the prosecution; 2. Penalty is lowered by degrees
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise 3. Always considered no matter what penalty is imposed
suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Z. EXPLAIN EACH OF THE 10 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
DISCUSS THEIR REQUISITES.
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
A. SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF RELATIVE/DEFENSE OF
STRANGER – UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION MUST BE PRESENT
FOR ART 13 TO BE APPLICABLE. OTHER 2 ELEMENTS NOT
NECESSARY. IF 2 REQUISITES ARE PRESENT – CONSIDERED
A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
EXAMPLE: JUAN MAKES FUN OF PEDRO. PEDRO GETS PISSED
OFF, GETS A KNIFE AND TRIES TO STAB JUAN. JUAN GRABS
HIS OWN KNIFE AND KILLS PEDRO. INCOMPLETE SELF-
DEFENSE BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THERE WAS UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION AND REASONABLE MEANS TO REPEL WAS
TAKEN, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART
OF JUAN. BUT SINCE 2 ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT, IT
CONSIDERED AS PRIVILEGED MITIGATING.
B. STATE OF NECESSITY (PAR 4) AVOIDANCE OF GREATER
EVIL OR INJURY; IF ANY OF THE LAST 2 REQUISITES IS
ABSENT, THERE’S ONLY AN ORDINARY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
EXAMPLE: WHILE DRIVING HIS CAR, JUAN SEES PEDRO
CARELESSLY CROSSING THE STREET. JUAN SWERVES TO
AVOID HIM, THUS HITTING A MOTORBIKE WITH 2
PASSENGERS, KILLING THEM INSTANTLY. NOT ALL
REQUISITES TO JUSTIFY ACT WERE PRESENT BECAUSE
HARM DONE TO AVOID INJURY IS GREATER. CONSIDERED AS
MITIGATING.
C. PERFORMANCE OF DUTY (PAR 5)
34
EXAMPLE: JUAN IS SUPPOSED TO ARREST PEDRO. HE THUS
GOES TO PEDRO’S HIDEOUT. JUAN SEES A MAN ASLEEP.
THINKING IT WAS PEDRO, JUAN SHOT HIM. JUAN MAY HAVE
ACTED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY BUT THE CRIME
WAS NOT A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF.
CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
A. MINORITY OVER 9 AND UNDER 15 – IF MINOR ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT, CONSIDERED MITIGATING
EXAMPLE: 13 YEAR OLD STOLE GOODS AT NIGHTTIME. ACTED
WITH DISCERNMENT AS SHOWN BY THE MANNER IN WHICH
THE ACT WAS COMMITTED.
B. CAUSING INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT – IF 2ND REQUISITE
(DUE CARE) AND 1ST PART OF 4TH REQUISITE (WITHOUT
FAULT – THUS NEGLIGENCE ONLY) ARE ABSENT,
CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING BECAUSE THE PENALTY IS
LOWER THAN THAT PROVIDED FOR INTENTIONAL FELONY.
EXAMPLE: POLICE OFFICER TRIES TO STOP A FIGHT
BETWEEN JUAN AND PEDRO BY FIRING HIS GUN IN THE AIR.
BULLET RICOCHETED AND KILLED PETRA. OFFICER
WILLFULLY DISCHARGED HIS GUN BUT WAS UNMINDFUL OF
THE FACT THAT AREA WAS POPULATED.
C. UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR – ONLY ONE REQUISITE
PRESENT, CONSIDERED MITIGATING
EXAMPLE: UNDER THREAT THAT THEIR FARM WILL BE
BURNED, PEDRO AND JUAN TOOK TURNS GUARDING IT AT
NIGHT. PEDRO FIRED IN THE AIR WHEN A PERSON IN THE
SHADOWS REFUSED TO REVEAL HIS IDENTITY. JUAN WAS
AWAKENED AND SHOT THE UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. TURNED
OUT TO BE A NEIGHBOR LOOKING FOR IS PET. JUAN MAY
HAVE ACTED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FEAR BUT SUCH
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
FEAR WAS NOT ENTIRELY UNCONTROLLABLE. CONSIDERED
MITIGATING
2. THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR
OVER 70 YEARS. IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HE SHALL BE
PROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF ART 192 OF PD 903
APPLICABLE TO:
A. OFFENDER OVER 9, UNDER 15 WHO ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT
B. OFFENDER OVER 15, UNDER 18
C. OFFENDER OVER 70 YEARS
AGE OF ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD BE DETERMINED AS HIS
AGE AT THE DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME, NOT DATE OF
TRIAL
VARIOUS AGES AND THEIR LEGAL EFFECTS
A. UNDER 9 – EXEMPTIVE CIRCUMSTANCE
B. OVER 9, BELOW 15 – EXEMPTIVE; EXCEPT IF ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT
C. MINOR DELINQUENT UNDER 18 – SENTENCE MAY BE
SUSPENDED (PD 603)
D. UNDER 18 – PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
E. 18 AND ABOVE – FULL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
F. 70 AND ABOVE – MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; NO
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY; EXECUTION G. OF DEATH
SENTENCE IF ALREADY IMPOSED IS SUSPENDED AND
COMMUTED.
35
3. THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO
GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED (PRAETER
INTENTIONAM)
CAN BE USED ONLY WHEN THE FACTS PROVE TO SHOW THAT
THERE IS A NOTABLE AND EVIDENT DISPROPORTION
BETWEEN MEANS EMPLOYED TO EXECUTE THE CRIMINAL
ACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
INTENTION: AS AN INTERNAL ACT, IS JUDGED BY THE
PROPORTION OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED TO THE EVIL
PRODUCED BY THE ACT, AND ALSO BY THE FACT THAT THE
BLOW WAS OR WAS NOT AIMED AT A VITAL PART OF THE
BODY.
JUDGE BY CONSIDERING (1) THE WEAPON USED, (2) THE
INJURY INFLICTED AND (3) THE ATTITUDE OF MIND WHEN THE
ACCUSER ATTACKED THE OTHER.
EXAMPLE: PEDRO STABBED TOMAS ON THE ARM. TOMAS DID
NOT HAVE THE WOUND TREATED, SO HE DIED FROM LOSS OF
BLOOD.
NOT APPLICABLE WHEN OFFENDER EMPLOYED BRUTE
FORCE
EXAMPLE: RAPIST CHOKED VICTIM. BRUTE FORCE OF
CHOKING CONTRADICTS CLAIM THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION
TO KILL THE GIRL.
ART 13, PAR 3 ADDRESSES ITSELF TO THE INTENTION OF THE
OFFENDER AT THE PARTICULAR MOMENT WHEN HE
EXECUTES OR COMMITS THE CRIMINAL ACT, NOT TO HIS
INTENTION DURING THE PLANNING STAGE.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
IN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS – IF VICTIM DOES NOT DIE, THE
ABSENCE OF THE INTENT TO KILL REDUCES THE FELONY TO
MERE PHYSICAL INJURIES. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS
MITIGATING. MITIGATING ONLY WHEN THE VICTIM DIES.
EXAMPLE: AS PART OF FUN-MAKING, JUAN MERELY
INTENDED TO BURN PEDRO’S CLOTHES. PEDRO RECEIVED
MINOR BURNS. JUAN IS CHARGED WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES.
HAD PEDRO DIED, JUAN WOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
NOT APPLICABLE TO FELONIES BY NEGLIGENCE. WHY? IN
FELONIES THROUGH NEGLIGENCE, THE OFFENDER ACTS
WITHOUT INTENT. THE INTENT IN INTENTIONAL FELONIES IS
REPLACED BY NEGLIGENCE, IMPRUDENCE, LACK OF
FORESIGHT OR LACK OF SKILL IN CULPABLE FELONIES.
THERE IS NO INTENT ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDER WHICH
MAY BE CONSIDERED AS DIMINISHED.
BASIS OF PAR 3: INTENT, AN ELEMENT OF VOLUNTARINESS IN
INTENTIONAL FELONY, IS DIMINISHED
4. THAT THE SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON THE
PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED
THE ACT.
PROVOCATION – ANY UNJUST OR IMPROPER CONDUCT OR
ACT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY, CAPABLE OF EXCITING,
INCITING OR IRRITATING ANYONE.
BASIS: DIMINUTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTENT
REQUISITES:
A. PROVOCATION MUST BE SUFFICIENT.
36
1. SUFFICIENT – ADEQUATE ENOUGH TO EXCITE A PERSON
TO COMMIT THE WRONG AND MUST ACCORDINGLY BE
PROPORTIONATE TO ITS GRAVITY.
2. SUFFICIENCY DEPENDS ON:
THE ACT CONSTITUTING THE PROVOCATION
THE SOCIAL STANDING OF THE PERSON PROVOKED
TIME AND PLACE PROVOCATION TOOK PLACE
3. EXAMPLE: JUAN LIKES TO HIT AND CURSE HIS SERVANT.
HIS SERVANT THUS KILLED HIM. THERE’S MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE BECAUSE OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION.
4. WHEN IT WAS THE DEFENDANT WHO SOUGHT THE
DECEASED, THE CHALLENGE TO FIGHT BY THE DECEASED IS
NOT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION.
B. IT MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE OFFENDED PARTY
1. WHY? LAW SAYS THE PROVOCATION IS “ON THE PART OF
THE OFFENDED PARTY”
2. EXAMPLE: TOMAS’ MOTHER INSULTED PETRA. PETRA KILLS
TOMAS BECAUSE OF THE INSULTS. NO MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE BECAUSE IT WAS THE MOTHER WHO
INSULTED HER, NOT TOMAS.
3. PROVOCATION BY THE DECEASED IN THE FIRST STAGE
OF THE FIGHT IS NOT MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE WHEN THE ACCUSED KILLED HIM AFTER HE
HAD FLED BECAUSE THE DECEASED FROM THE MOMENT HE
FLED DID NOT GIVE ANY PROVOCATION FOR THE ACCUSED
TO PURSUE AND ATTACK HIM.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
C. PROVOCATION MUST BE IMMEDIATE TO THE ACT., I.E., TO
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME BY THE PERSON WHO IS
PROVOKED
WHY? IF THERE WAS AN INTERVAL OF TIME, THE CONDUCT
OF THE OFFENDED PARTY COULD NOT HAVE EXCITED THE
ACCUSED TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, HE HAVING
HAD TIME TO REGAIN HIS REASON AND TO EXERCISE SELF-
CONTROL.
THREAT SHOULD NOT BE OFFENSIVE AND POSITIVELY
STRONG BECAUSE IF IT WAS, THE THREAT TO INFLICT REAL
INJURY IS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WHICH MAY GIVE RISE
TO SELF-DEFENSE AND THUS NO LONGER A MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
5. THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE TO THE ONE
COMMITTING THE FELONY (DELITO), HIS SPOUSE,
ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS, LEGITIMATE, NATURAL OR
ADOPTED BROTHER OR SISTERS, OR RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY WITHIN THE SAME DEGREE.
REQUISITES:
1. THERE’S A GRAVE OFFENSE DONE TO THE ONE
COMMITTING THE FELONY ETC.
THAT THE FELONY IS COMMITTED IN VINDICATION OF SUCH
GRAVE OFFENSE.
2. LAPSE OF TIME IS ALLOWED BETWEEN THE VINDICATION
AND THE ONE DOING THE OFFENSE (PROXIMATE TIME, NOT
JUST IMMEDIATELY AFTER)
3. EXAMPLE: JUAN CAUGHT HIS WIFE AND HIS FRIEND IN A
COMPROMISING SITUATION. JUAN KILLS HIS FRIEND THE
NEXT DAY – STILL CONSIDERED PROXIMATE.
37
PROVOCATION
VINDICATION
MADE DIRECTLY ONLY TO THE PERSON COMMITTING THE
FELONY GRAVE OFFENSE MAY BE ALSO AGAINST THE
OFFENDER’S RELATIVES MENTIONED BY LAW
CAUSE THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE PROVOCATION NEED NOT
BE A GRAVE OFFENSE OFFENDED PARTY MUST HAVE
DONE A GRAVE OFFENSE TO THE OFFENDER OR HIS
RELATIVES
NECESSARY THAT PROVOCATION OR THREAT IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDED THE ACT. NO TIME INTERVAL MAY BE
PROXIMATE. TIME INTERVAL ALLOWED
MORE LENIENT IN VINDICATION BECAUSE OFFENSE
CONCERNS THE HONOR OF THE PERSON. SUCH IS MORE
WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION THAN MERE SPITE AGAINST
THE ONE GIVING THE PROVOCATION OR THREAT.
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE AND PASSION AND
OBFUSCATION CAN’T BE COUNTED SEPARATELY AND
INDEPENDENTLY
6. THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL
AS NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR
OBFUSCATION
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION IS MITIGATING: WHEN THERE
ARE CAUSES NATURALLY PRODUCING IN A PERSON
POWERFUL EXCITEMENT, HE LOSES HIS REASON AND SELF-
CONTROL. THEREBY DISMISSING THE EXERCISE OF HIS WILL
POWER.
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION ARE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY WHEN THE SAME ARISE FROM
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
LAWFUL SENTIMENTS (NOT MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
WHEN DONE IN THE SPIRIT OF REVENGE OR LAWLESSNESS)
REQUISITES FOR PASSION & OBFUSCATION
A. THE OFFENDER ACTED ON IMPULSE POWERFUL ENOUGH
TO PRODUCE PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
B. THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF
LAWLESSNESS OR REVENGE
C. THE ACT MUST COME FROM LAWFUL SENTIMENTS
ACT WHICH GAVE RISE TO PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
A. THAT THERE BE AN ACT, BOTH UNLAWFUL AND UNJUST
B. THE ACT BE SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE A CONDITION OF
MIND
C. THAT THE ACT WAS PROXIMATE TO THE CRIMINAL AC
D. THE VICTIM MUST BE THE ONE WHO CAUSED THE PASSION
OR OBFUSCATION
EXAMPLE: JUAN SAW TOMAS HITTING HIS (JUAN) SON. JUAN
STABBED TOMAS. JUAN IS ENTITLED TO MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF P&O AS HIS ACTUATION AROSE FROM A
NATURAL INSTINCT THAT IMPELS A FATHER TO RUSH TO THE
RESCUE OF HIS SON.
THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR A FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY IS
NOT THE PROPER SOURCE OF P&O.
EXAMPLE: A POLICEMAN ARRESTED JUAN AS HE WAS
MAKING A PUBLIC DISTURBANCE ON THE STREETS. JUAN’S
ANGER AND INDIGNATION RESULTING FROM THE ARREST
CAN’T BE CONSIDERED PASSIONATE OBFUSCATION BECAUSE
THE POLICEMAN WAS DOING A LAWFUL ACT.
38
THE ACT MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE A CONDITION OF
MIND. IF THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL WAS
TRIVIAL AND SLIGHT, THE OBFUSCATION IS NOT MITIGATING.
EXAMPLE: JUAN’S BOSS PUNCHED HIM FOR NOT GOING TO
WORK HE OTHER DAY. CAUSE IS SLIGHT.
THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF P&O WHEN MORE THAN 24 HOURS ELAPSED BETWEEN
THE ALLEGED INSULT AND THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY,
OR SEVERAL HOURS HAVE PASSED BETWEEN THE CAUSE OF
THE P&O AND THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, OR AT LEAST
½ HOURS INTERVENED BETWEEN THE PREVIOUS FIGHT AND
SUBSEQUENT KILLING OF DECEASED BY ACCUSED.
NOT MITIGATING IF RELATIONSHIP IS ILLEGITIMATE
THE PASSION OR OBFUSCATION WILL BE CONSIDERED EVEN
IF IT IS BASED ONLY ON THE HONEST BELIEF OF THE
OFFENDER, EVEN IF FACTS TURN OUT TO PROVE THAT HIS
BELIEFS WERE WRONG.
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION CANNOT CO-EXIST WITH
TREACHERY SINCE THE MEANS THAT THE OFFENDER HAS
HAD TIME TO PONDER HIS COURSE OF ACTION.
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION ARISING FROM ONE AND THE
SAME CAUSE SHOULD BE TREATED AS ONLY ONE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE
VINDICATION OF GRAVE OFFENSE CAN’T CO-EXIST W/
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION IRRESITIBLE FORCE
MITIGATING EXEMPTING
NO PHYSICAL FORCE NEEDED REQUIRES PHYSICAL FORCE
FROM THE OFFENDER HIMSELF MUST COME FROM A 3RD
PERSON
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
MUST COME FROM LAWFUL SENTIMENTS UNLAWFUL
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION PROVOCATION
PRODUCED BY AN IMPULSE WHICH MAY BE CAUSED BY
PROVOCATION COMES FROM INJURED PARTY
OFFENSE, WHICH ENGENDERS PERTURBATION OF MIND,
NEED NOT BE IMMEDIATE. IT IS ONLY REQUIRED THAT THE
INFLUENCE THEREOF LASTS UNTIL THE CRIME IS COMMITTED
MUST IMMEDIATELY PRECEDE THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME
EFFECT IS LOSS OF REASON AND SELF-CONTROL ON THE
PART OF THE OFFENDER SAME
7. THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED
HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENTS, OR
THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE
THE COURT PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION.
2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT:
A) VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED
B) VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HIS GUILT
IF BOTH ARE PRESENT, CONSIDERED AS 2 INDEPENDENT
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. MITIGATE PENALTY TO A
GREATER EXTENT
REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:
A) OFFENDER NOT ACTUALLY ARRESTED
B) OFFENDER SURRENDERED TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY
OR THE LATTER’S AGENT
C) SURRENDER WAS VOLUNTARY
39
SURRENDER MUST BE SPONTANEOUS – SHOWS HIS
INTEREST TO SURRENDER UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE
AUTHORITIES
SPONTANEOUS – EMPHASIZES THE IDEA OF INNER IMPULSE,
ACTING WITHOUT EXTERNAL STIMULUS. THE CONDUCT OF
THE ACCUSED, NOT HIS INTENTION ALONE, AFTER THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, DETERMINES THE
SPONTANEITY OF THE SURRENDER.
EXAMPLE: SURRENDERED AFTER 5 YEARS, NOT
SPONTANEOUS ANYMORE.
EXAMPLE: SURRENDERED AFTER TALKING TO TOWN
COUNCILOR. NOT V.S. BECAUSE THERE’S AN EXTERNAL
STIMULUS
CONDUCT MUST INDICATE A DESIRE TO OWN THE
RESPONSIBILITY
NOT MITIGATING WHEN WARRANT ALREADY SERVED.
SURRENDER MAY BE CONSIDERED MITIGATING IF WARRANT
NOT SERVED OR RETURNED UNSERVED BECAUSE ACCUSED
CAN’T BE LOCATED.
SURRENDER OF PERSON REQUIRED. NOT JUST OF WEAPON.
PERSON IN AUTHORITY – ONE DIRECTLY VESTED WITH
JURISDICTION, WHETHER AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR AS A
MEMBER OF SOME
COURT/GOVERNMENT/CORPORATION/BOARD/COMMISSION.
BARRIO CAPTAIN/CHAIRMAN INCLUDED.
AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY – PERSON WHO BY DIRECT
PROVISION OF LAW, OR BE ELECTION, OR BY APPOINTMENT
BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY IS CHARGED WITH THE
MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AND THE PROTECTION AND
SECURITY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY AND ANY PERSON WHO
COMES TO THE AID OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
RPC DOES NOT MAKE DISTINCTION AMONG THE VARIOUS
MOMENTS WHEN SURRENDER MAY OCCUR.
SURRENDER MUST BE BY REASON OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME FOR WHICH DEFENDANT IS CHARGED
REQUISITES FOR PLEA OF GUILTY
A) OFFENDER SPONTANEOUSLY CONFESSED HIS GUILT
B) CONFESSION OF GUILT WAS MADE IN OPEN COURT
(COMPETENT COURT)
C) CONFESSION OF GUILT WAS MADE PRIOR TO THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
PLEA MADE AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND AFTER TRIAL HAS
BEGUN DOES NOT ENTITLE ACCUSED TO HAVE PLEA
CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
PLEA IN THE RTC IN A CASE APPEALED FROM THE MTC IS
NOT MITIGATING – MUST MAKE PLEA AT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY
PLEA DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NO PLEA
AT ALL
EVEN IF DURING ARRAIGNMENT, ACCUSED PLEADED NOT
GUILTY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AS
LONG AS WITHDRAWS HIS PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO THE
CHARGE BEFORE THE FISCAL COULD PRESENT HIS
EVIDENCE
PLEA TO A LESSER CHARGE IS NOT MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE BECAUSE TO BE VOLUNTARY PLEA OF
GUILTY, MUST BE TO THE OFFENSE CHARGED
PLEA TO THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE AMENDED INFO,
LESSER THAN THAT CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFO, IS
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
40
PRESENT RULES OF COURT REQUIRE THAT EVEN IF
ACCUSED PLEADED GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE, ITS
MANDATORY FOR COURT TO REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEING LIKEWISE
ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE, INTER ALIA,
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
8. THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND OR
OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT W/C
THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE OR
COMMUNICATION W/ HIS FELLOW BEINGS.
BASIS: ONE SUFFERING FROM PHYSICAL DEFECT WHICH
RESTRICTS HIM DOES NOT HAVE COMPLETE FREEDOM OF
ACTION AND THEREFORE, THERE IS DIMINUTION OF THAT
ELEMENT OF VOLUNTARINESS.
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN EDUCATED AND UNEDUCATED
DEAF-MUTE OR BLIND PERSONS
THE PHYSICAL DEFECT OF THE OFFENDER SHOULD
RESTRICT HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE OR
COMMUNICATION WITH FELLOW BEINGS, THIS HAS BEEN
EXTENDED TO COVER CRIPPLES, ARMLESS PEOPLE EVEN
STUTTERERS.
THE CIRCUMSTANCE ASSUMES THAT WITH THEIR PHYSICAL
DEFECT, THE OFFENDERS DO NOT HAVE A COMPLETE
FREEDOM OF ACTION THEREFORE DIMINISHING THE
ELEMENT OF VOLUNTARINESS IN THE COMMISSION OF A
CRIME.
9. SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS WOULD DIMINISH
THE EXERCISE OF THE WILL-POWER OF THE OFFENDER W/O
DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS.
BASIS: DIMINUTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTENT
REQUISITES:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
A) ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER MUST DIMINISH THE
EXERCISE OF HIS WILL-POWER
B) SUCH ILLNESS SHOULD NOT DEPRIVE THE OFFENDER
OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS
WHEN THE OFFENDER COMPLETELY LOST THE EXERCISE OF
WILL-POWER, IT MAY BE AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
DECEASED MIND, NOT AMOUNTING TO INSANITY, MAY GIVE
PLACE TO MITIGATION
10. AND ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE
AND ANALOGOUS TO THOSE ABOVE-MENTIONED
EXAMPLES OF “ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE”:
A) DEFENDANT WHO IS 60 YEARS OLD WITH FAILING
EYESIGHT IS SIMILAR TO A CASE OF ONE OVER 70 YEARS
OLD
B) OUTRAGED FEELING OF OWNER OF ANIMAL TAKEN FOR
RANSOM IS ANALOGOUS TO VINDICATION OF GRAVE
OFFENSE
C) IMPULSE OF JEALOUS FEELING, SIMILAR TO PASSION
AND OBFUSCATION
D) VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY, SIMILAR TO
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
E) EXTREME POVERTY, SIMILAR TO INCOMPLETE
JUSTIFICATION BASED ON STATE OF NECESSITY
NOT ANALOGOUS:
A) KILLING WRONG PERSON
B) NOT RESISTING ARREST NOT THE SAME AS VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER
C) RUNNING AMUCK IS NOT MITIGATING
41
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH ARISE FROM:
A) MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE OFFENDER
EXAMPLE: JUAN AND TOMAS KILLED PEDRO. JUAN ACTED W/
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. ONLY JUAN WILL BE ENTITLED
TO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
B) PRIVATE RELATIONS WITH THE OFFENDED PARTY
EXAMPLE: JUAN STOLE HIS BROTHER’S WATCH. JUAN SOLD IT
TO PEDRO, WHO KNEW IT WAS STOLEN. THE CIRCUMSTANCE
OF RELATION AROSE FROM PRIVATE RELATION OF JUAN AND
THE BROTHER. DOES NOT MITIGATE PEDRO.
C) OTHER PERSONAL CAUSE
EXAMPLE: MINOR, ACTING WITH DISCERNMENT ROBBED
JUAN. PEDRO, PASSING BY, HELPED THE MINOR.
CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY, MITIGATES LIABILITY OF
MINOR ONLY.
SHALL SERVE TO MITIGATE THE LIABILITY OF THE
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES TO WHOM
THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE ATTENDANT.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHER EXEMPTING NOR
MITIGATING
A) MISTAKE IN THE BLOW
B) MISTAKE IN THE IDENTITY OF THE VICTIM
C) ENTRAPMENT OF THE ACCUSED
D) ACCUSED IS OVER 18 YEARS OLD
E) PERFORMANCE OF A RIGHTEOUS ACTION
EXAMPLE: JUAN SAVED THE LIVES OF 99 PEOPLE BUT
CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE LAST PERSON, HE IS STILL
CRIMINALLY LIABLE
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
aa. No intention to comit so grave a wrong. Garcia v. People,
G.R. No. 171951, 28 August 2009.
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the
Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the
appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an
Information that alleges as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA
@ Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul
one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
42
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel
Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit
of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K.
Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down
as the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until
Chy requested a second time that the group acceded. Unknown to
Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in
the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac
dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the
marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya
Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off again.
This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a napangas
ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is
really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group
convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr.
and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the 26th and
28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the
memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a
Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him
off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group headed to the store of
Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they
move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store
of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have some
drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who,
incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being
summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly punched
him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
[inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to
you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to
parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it,
struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy
causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house
and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina
about the mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon
reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody
answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and
found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed
that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9)
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his
favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount
of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death
indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱200,000.00)
PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and burial;
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO
THOUSAND (₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus
the cost of this suit.
43
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision
dated December 20, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and
the July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE
RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE
OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT
RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART
FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the
death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the
factual findings of the trial court because the judge who penned the
decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution
evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred
from, misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead,
he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries.
Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel,
who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner
disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise since the latter was found to
have died of myocardial infarction. In support, he amplifies the
testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s medical condition
could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at
most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none
of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s
assessment of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of
Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
prosecution as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to
consider the petitioner’s appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune
to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from which to
secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual
44
findings of the trial court do not find support in the evidence on record
or where the judgment appealed from was based on a
misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant
case as would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-
interference with the determination of the credibility of witnesses. He
points out that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge
who received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the
situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records
reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings
upon motion of no less than the petitioner himself. Consequently,
petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse
consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow
petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a
travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than
subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by
the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who
was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a
valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over
the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings.
Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense,
he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was
recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning,
too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the
testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its
entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely
on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies
of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of
law.19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the
following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the
left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms.,
upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left
hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper
lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No
hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut
sections show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of
hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion of the
anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries,
gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty
(30%) percent. Histopathological findings show mild fibrosis of the
myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to
dark purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown
central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish frothy
materials noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary
edema and hemorrhages.
45
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show
congestion. Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic
infiltration.1avvphi1
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and
other partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his
undated Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the
deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He
argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause
his death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of
the records would acquaint us with the causal connection between
the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In open
court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial
infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction
that is because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented
the flowing of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the
hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that made
us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial infarction,
and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself.
(Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an
artery of the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the
thickening and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result
from sudden emotion in a person with an existing arteriosclerosis;
otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified
on direct examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,]
considering that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of
hypertension, no previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no
previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement
[cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or
formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and
thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to
coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is
elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part
of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the
mouth and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by
emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast,
so much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
46
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased
died because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of
the deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the
emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate
constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner
had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
(c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actor’s wrongful acts.31lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the
victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was
previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s
liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine
laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some
internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the
foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is
responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration
as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis
supplied.)35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the
unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended;36 "el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the
circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the
death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since
he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition
simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the
Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally
and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was
in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the
imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion
temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the trial court properly
imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
47
of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of
Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of
₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the
time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account.
For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v.
Malinao:42
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the
the victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would
have been received
by the heirs for support.43
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the
salary which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At
the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross
monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of ₱127,200.
But, in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced
his life expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s
salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records are bereft
of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate
actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living
expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net income to be 50% of the
gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of
Manuel Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning
capacity, computed as follows:
2/3
Net x
earni (80
ng = -
capa 51)
city x
[₱1
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 48

27, of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered

200 to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity;
- ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and
1/2 ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
(₱1
27, No pronouncement as to costs.
200 SO ORDERED.
)]
2/3 Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the
x PhilippinesG.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009
(29
= )x FACTS:
₱6 The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy
3,6 asked them to quiet down to whichGarcia commented that Chy was
00
being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two
19
days
1/3
x later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister,
=
₱6 Esquibel. Chy was about to come out
3,6
00 of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched
₱1, him. Chy continued to parry theblows and when he found an
229 opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the
=
,60 policeregarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty
0 in breathing. He was found later unconscious onthe kitchen floor,
salivating.Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that
the injuries he caused were not as violent innature as to have caused
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as
the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of
stipulated by the parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46 Anent
homicide. Theautopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the
moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and
striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have
homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.47 However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the
amount of moral damages should be reduced to ₱50,000. victim’s heart is healthy. What could
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the
Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.- violence inflicted upon him.
CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award ISSUE:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed shouldbe appreciated
RULING:
The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil
as the death of the victim does notexempt him from criminal
liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law,
saidcondition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article
13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.Nevertheless, said
circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact
that thephysical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have
naturally and logically caused the actual death
of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.
Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should
be in the minimum period, that is,reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial
courtproperly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, asminimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
bb. Provocation. Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978, 14 July
2004.
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 11, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the
August 16, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC
convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was
49
also ordered to pay private offended party P19,361.15 as actual
damages and P10,000 as attorney’s fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at
Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab
one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a
mortal wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused thereby
performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced
because of the timely and effective medical attendance
administered on the said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation
with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.3
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter
ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the
records, are as follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was
with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely, Eligario
"Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong" Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay,
Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol. They were all headed for
Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was
raining, so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca
Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing
Zulueta’s pants and said, "There’s a monkey among us." Everybody
laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin
Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry
and pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and said, "Even if you are
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
stronger and older, if you will be hit by my fist, you will crawl."
Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, "You all watch out in
Balaguan." He pulled Franklin Generol to join him and said, "Let’s go,
there are many boastful people here." Thereafter, petitioner and
Franklin left the group.
At six o’clock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in
Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the house of one
Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer
away from petitioner’s own, they saw petitioner already carrying a
bolo waiting for them.
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered,
"Here are the brave ones." Roy and his companions ran away but
Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and
said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the collar and
stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke
up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent
surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a
certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizen’s Armed Force Geographical Unit
(CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police
station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around
seven o’clock in the evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While
lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they
had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he
knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when
the latter’s wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told
her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went down the house and
asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy
thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked
Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner.
50
Petitioner tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door
shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, petitioner’s wife held the door
to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a
stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but
he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy
in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness.
According to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill
him.
The trial court discounted petitioner’s story of self-defense. It found
that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger
to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. The
dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding accused ARTURO ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the offense charged. Consequently, taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
the provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months
and Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the
private offended party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another
sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fee without, however, subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial
court the following assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF
DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE
SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE
62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE, WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY
ONE DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR
MORE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It pointed
out that assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was the
aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when
petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent
unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense
becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 696 of the Revised Penal
Code finds no application in this case. It explained that there can be
no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
It held, however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during trial
that after the incident he surrendered himself to the CAFGU and later
on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole
ground that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously
failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers
the imposable penalty by one degree when two or more mitigating
circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger
when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning
as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying
the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his
children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning
processes, says the petitioner.
51
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the mitigating circumstances of provocation and
passion or obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it was he
who initiated the attack. The OSG insists that it was not the victim
who went to petitioner’s house, but petitioner who went to where the
victim was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
categorically state who started the attack, it can be reasonably
gleaned from their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the
aggressive encounter. This finding of fact is amply supported by the
evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or
obfuscation present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking
the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation
to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more
so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Petitioner
stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while
petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient
provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended
the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are
not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule
that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they
should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.7 From the
facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances
arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should
not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods. –…
...
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
...
The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 508 of
the
Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The penalty for
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article
64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision
correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the
Indeterminate Sentence Law herein applicable, the minimum term of
the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated
homicide should be within the range of arresto mayor in any of its
periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months,
while the maximum term should be within the range of prision
correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed
is concerned. Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. He is also ORDERED to pay the private
52
offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages, and P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
cc. Immediate vindication of a grave offense. People v. Rosel,
G.R. No. L-46095, 10 Oct. 1938.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUSTODIA ROSEL, defendants-appellant.
The accused-appellant Custodia Rosel was convicted of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs of the offended party Francisco Baldostano in
the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs. From said judgment of
conviction he appealed to this court and, in support of his appeal, in
his brief alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:
1. In not acquitting him on the ground that he merely acted in
defense of himself;
2. In finding that he wounded Francisco Baldostano with
treachery, notwithstanding that there is no evidence in the
record showing the presence of such circumstance; and
3. In holding that no justifying, exempting or mitigating
circumstances whatever were present in the commission of
the crime.
The facts which gave rise to the prosecution of the appellant for the
said crime of murder are, according to the record, briefly as follows:
On the night of February 14, 1938 several persons, among them
Francisco Baldostano, were gathered for a small celebration in the
house of Hilario Ilada in the barrio of Guyo, municipality of Catubig,
Province of Samar. Some entertained themselves by singing when
the accused Custodia Rosel, Esperato Orsolino, Ignacio Alberne and
Pedro Gorlon arrived. Appellant greeted everybody in the house. In
answer Francisco Baldostano said rather sarcastically that strangers
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
should leave the place, adding in the following words more or less: "It
is good I have means of livelihood. I have a rice land. You stranger
(addressing the appellant) live at the expense of your wife." There
was no doubt that he referred to the appellant because he addressed
the latter when he said, "You stranger . . . etc.", and because
appellant was not a native of the place. Appellant resented the
greeting or remark which Francisco Baldostano made concerning him
demanded an explanation. Were it not for the intervention of some
persons present, he would have attacked Baldostano at the very
moment. He left for his house a little afterwards and returned about
one-half hour later. Upon seeing that Francisco Baldostano was
engrossed in conversation with some of those who still remained in
the house, he propped his left arm against the railing of the stairs and
stabbed Baldostano from below in the left armpit with the bolo with
which he was armed and withdrew immediately. The wound thus
inflicted on Francisco Baldostano caused his death eight days later.
So unexpected was the attack of which he was the object on the part
of the appellant that he was not able to lower his arm to protect his
armpit or to lean forward to dodge the attack. This, undoubtedly,
constitutes treachery because the same is present when means,
methods or forms are employed in the execution of the crime which
tend directly and specially to insure its commission without risk to the
person of the aggressor resulting from the defense which the
offended party might make.
Testifying in his behalf, appellant declared that on the day after
wounding Francisco Baldostano he presented himself to policemen
Melecio Melendres and Juan whose surname he could not recall. It
does not appear, however, that he informed them of the crime he had
committed for which reason they did not place him under
arrest.lâwphi1.nêt
The remarks of the deceased Francisco Baldostano under the
circumstances in which he made them were highly offensive to the
appellant and to any other person in his place. It is not strange that
53
they engendered obfuscation in him and impelled him to act, as he
did, in the immediate vindication of a grave offense.
Considering the facts proven, our conclusion is that the crime
committed by the accused and appellant is that of murder. However,
there being present the fifth mitigating circumstance in the
commission thereof, without any aggravating one to offset it, the
judgment rendered against him should be modified.
Wherefore, modifying the judgment appealed from appellant is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one
day prision mayor to seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusion temporal. In all other respects, said judgment is affirmed
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004.
FACTS:
Arturo Romera and his friends were heading to Biasong to play
volleyball. On their way there, One of them, Franklin Generol made
fun of Bebing Zuluetas. The victim, Roy Mangaya-ay sided with
Zuluetas and scolded Generol. Romera who sided with Generol
threatened the others then left.
The victim and his friends arrived in Balaguan, a kilometer away from
Antonio Mangaya-ay's house, Romera was seen carrying a bolo
waiting for them. Romera chased them and the victim, who slipped,
was stabbed. The victim woke up at the provincial hospital after
surgery.
Romera's testimony was as follows: The victim, who was drunk, went
to Romera's house and disturbed his family. When Romera opened
the door, the victim thrust him bolo at him and telling him he would kill
Romera. Romera went outside and prevented the victim from
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
entering. Outside, the victim tried to hacked Romera again in which
he deflected the blow and then stabbed the victim.
Romera contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when
the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as he
opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo
wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim
also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found
that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger
to his life.
Romera was convicted of frustrated homicide.
The CA affirmed the trial court's decision and reiterated that the
unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession
of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.
ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstances of provocation and
passion or obfuscation present in this case
RULING:
YES. Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and
hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient
provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his
thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in
danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations
and while he was still in a fit of rage.
The Court also stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation
are not two separate mitigating circumstances. They should be
treated together as one mitigating circumstance.
54
dd. Passion and obfuscation. People v. Bello, G.R. No. L-18792,
28 February 1964.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO BELLO, defendant-appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in its
Criminal Case No. 592-G, for murder.
The information filed against the accused alleged four (4) aggravating
circumstances, namely: treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime,
and superior strength. The trial court made a finding of "treachery,
evident premeditation and in cold blood and without any provocation";
however, the dispositive portion of the appealed decision states as
follows:
... the Court finds the accused Guillermo Bello guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined an punished by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances of (1) nighttime, (2) abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, (3) superior strength offset only by his surrender to
the authorities and hereby sentence him to DIE by electrocution in
the manner provided by law ordering his heirs, after his death, to
indemnify the heirs o the deceased Alicia Cervantes in the sum of
P3,000.00, wit costs.
The record bears out, the Office of the Solicitor General does not
challenge, and the counsel de oficio agree with, and adopts, the
following findings of fact of the trial court:
From the evidence adduced at the hearing of the case, it has been
established to the satisfaction of the Court (1) that on September 17,
1954, the accused Guillermo Bello, a widower who at that time was
about 54 years of age, took a young peasant lady named Alicia
Cervantes, about 24 years old his common-law wife; (2) that from
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
that day they lived together apparently in blissful harmony as man
and wife without the benefit of marriage bearing, however, no child,
...; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had no means of
substantial livelihood except that of making "kaingin" and who
apparently was then in financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to
accept an employment as entertainer in a bar and restaurant
establishment known as Maring's Place situated the corner of
Aguinaldo and Bonifacio Streets, Gumaca, Quezon (4) that Alicia
Cervantes entered the service of Maring's Place on that day as a
public hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated with his young
bride used to watch her movements in Maring's Place everyday; (6)
that on May 16 he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in Gumaca
with a man whom the accused found later was caressing his
common-law wife inside the movie house; (7) that being in love with
her he took her out from the movie and warned her to be more
discreet in her personal conduct in Gumaca; (8) that Alicia Cervantes
continued to serve at Maring's Place as a public hostess; (9) that on
May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. the accused went to Maring's Place to
ask for some money from Alicia; (10) that Maring, the owner of the
place, and Alicia refused to give money, Maring telling him to forget
Alicia completely because he was already an old man, an invalid
besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11) that having failed to
obtain financial assistance from his paramour, accused left the place
somewhat despondent and went home passing Bonifacio Street; (12)
that on his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and Luis
Marasigan who greeted the accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo
the following: "So this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring
for white slave trade"; (13) that these remarks of Luis Marasigan
naturally brought grief to the accused, to drown which he sought
Paty's place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses of tuba; (14) that
from Paty's place he went to Realistic Studio which is in front of
Maring's Place and from there watched the movements of Alicia; (15)
that at about 9:00 o'clock that night he entered Maring's Place and
without much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the
55
manner of a boa strangulating its prey and with his right hand
stabbed Alicia several times with a balisong; (16) that seeing Alicia
fallen on the ground and believing her to be mortally wounded, he
fled and went to the municipal building and there surrendered himself
to the police of Gumaca.
Both the prosecution and the defense also agree that the crime
committed is not murder but only homicide, but they disagree in the
qualifying or aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The
prosecution holds that the crime is homicide, aggravated by abuse of
superior strength, but offset by voluntary surrender. On the other
hand, the defense maintains that the accused is entitled to the
additional mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The
trial court held a different conclusion, as earlier stated.
While it cannot be denied that Alicia was stabbed at the back, the
wound was but a part and continuation of the aggression. The four
(4) stab wounds (the 3 others were in the breast, hypogastric region,
and in the left wrist as shown in the certificate of the Municipal Health
Officer) were inflicted indiscriminately, without regard as to which
portion of her body was the subject of attack. The trial court itself
found that the stab in the back was inflicted as Alicia was running
away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed (People v.
Cañete, 44 Phil. 478).
Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused
had been carrying a balisong with him for a long time as a precaution
against drunkards, and without any present plan or intent to use it
against his common-law wife. That he watched her movements daily
manifest his jealous character, but there is no evidence that from this
jealousy sprouted a plan to snuff out her life.1äwphï1.ñët
The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the
part of the accused, and, not possessing it, he could not take
advantage of it. True that he was armed with a balisong, but he was
old and baldado (invalid), while Alicia was in the prime of her youth,
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
and not infirm. The facts are not sufficient to draw a comparison of
their relative strength. Possession of a balisong gives an aggressor a
formidable advantage over the unarmed victim, but the physique of
the aggressor ought also to be considered. At any rate, taking into
account the emotional excitement of the accused, it is not clearly
shown that there was "intencion deliberada de prevalerse de la
superioridad o aprovecharse intencionadamente de la misma" (Sent.
TS. 5 Oct. 1906), i.e., deliberate intent to take advantage of superior
strength.
The crime was committed at nighttime, but the accused did not seek
or take advantage of it the better to accomplish his purpose. In fact,
Maring's Place was bright and well-lighted; hence, the circumstance
did not aggravate the crime. (U.S. vs. Ramos, et al., 2 Phil. 434; U.S.
vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958.)
We can not understand how the trial court came to couple the crime
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and
obvious ungratefulness. There is nothing to show that the assailant
and his common-law wife reposed in one another any special
confidence that could be abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the
other that ought to be respected, and which would bear any relation,
or connection, with the crime committed. None is inferable from the
fact that the accused was much older than his victim, or that he was
penniless while she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave
him money, since both lived together as husband and wife. Neither is
it shown that the accused took advantage of any such special
confidence in order to carry out the crime.
Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, which could have
qualified the crime as murder, were not present, and since the
generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence and obvious ungratefulness have not been established,
the accused can only be liable for homicide.
56
Both defense and prosecution agree that the accused-appellant is
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender to the authorities. The remaining area of conflict is reduced
to whether the accused may lay claim to a second mitigating
circumstance, that of having acted on a provocation sufficiently
strong to cause passion and obfuscation. The defense submits that
accused is so entitled, because the deceased's flat rejection of
petitioner's entreaties for her to quit her calling as a hostess and
return to their former relation, aggravated by her sneering statement
that the accused was penniless and invalid (baldado), provoked the
appellant, as he testified, into losing his head and stabbing the
deceased. The state disputes the claim primarily on the strength of
the rule that passion and obfuscation can not be considered when
"arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions" (U.S. vs.
Hicks, 14 Phil. 217).
We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the
circumstances disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the
lower court found that the accused had previously reproved the
deceased for allowing herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose
conduct was forcibly driven home to the accused by Marasigan's
remark on the very day of the crime that the accused was the
husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for purposes of
prostitution," a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's
feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba)
before visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her to leave her
work. Alicia's insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused,
therefore, was not motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life
henceforth, but showed her determination to pursue a lucrative
profession that permitted her to distribute her favors indiscriminately.
We can not see how the accused's insistence that she live with him
again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be properly
qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of
a higher level than gainful promiscuity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is,
modified. This Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by
two (2) mitigating circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and
(b) voluntary surrender, and, therefore, imposes upon him an
indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years
of prision mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the heirs of
Alicia Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs.
So ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. GUILLERMO BELLO, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. Guillermo was a 54 year old widower, and
Alicia’s senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s employment at Maring’s
Place, the couple led a ‘blissful’ life. Due to poverty, Alicia became an
entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and Guillermo used to
watch her there everyday; very much smitten by her beauty[1].
However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater
with a man, and surprised the man caressing her inside the movie
house. Guillermo dragged her outside.
Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for
money, but the owner, Maring (who was fantastically creative enough
to name the bar after him), told him to go home and to leave Alicia
alone because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk home
empty handed, but upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across
the Marasigan brothers who mocked him with the above stated
57
remark. The self-loathing Guillermo proceeded to Paty’s place and
downed give glasses of Tuba.
By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place
and did then and there stab Alicia several times. Realizing what he
had done, he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to the police there. He
was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City of
murder attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
alevosia, and abuse of confidence and ungratefulness; The penalty
for which is death; thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation, albeit his relationship with
the victim being merely a common-law marriage?
HELD:
Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the
offender must arise from legitimate and moral sentiments. Since
common-law marriages are considered unlawful in the Philippines,
Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be appreciated
as a mitigating circumstance.
To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances
of this case with that of U.S. v Hicks. In the said case, the common-
law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her relations with the American, and
contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr. Hicks shot his
ex-common-law-wife when she refused to go home with him and
resume their relationship. Since they were not married, she was
entitled to do so. What she did – cruel as it may be – was legal in the
eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were not appreciated in such a
case, since:
1. The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law
husband, as they were not united in holy matrimony. He
had no right to compel her to go with him. Remember
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 58

that the first requirement of passion or obfuscation is that Contrary to law. 3

there be an unlawful act, sufficient to produce diminution
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial
of self-control or the exercise of will power.
ensued.
EE. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND CONFESSION OF GUILT.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of
PEOPLE V. FONTALBA, G.R. NO. L-3126, 05 JULY 1935.
Consolacion Javier Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of the victim
and accused-appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as
FF. DEAF AND DUMB. PEOPLE V. NAVARRO, 97 PHIL. 990.
follows:

gg. Illness of the offender. People v. Javier, G.R. No. 130654, 28 Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste
July 1999. Javier were legally married on December 18, 1954. 4 In their forty-
one years of marriage, they begot ten children. Accused-appellant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
and Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their
vs.
daughters, Alma Javier.5
EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997
morning, Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near her parent's house
of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,2 in Criminal
about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother, Florentina
Case No. A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of
shouting "Arayatan dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is
the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
going to kill me). After she heard her mother scream for help,
death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma who,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as actual weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the
expenses.1âwphi1.nêt
time of the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused- Alma then proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is
appellant with the crime of parricide reads as follows: located about seventy to eighty meters away from their parents'
house. The three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel,
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of
who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother and his father,
Santo Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital. At
the intent to and being then armed with a bolo, did then and there
this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use of
and that their father confessed to him that he killed his wife and there
personal violence, by hacking with the said weapon one
after allegedly stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their
FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a
bedroom, drenched in her own blood. 6
result of which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly
caused her death immediately thereafter, to the damage and Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's
prejudice of the heirs of the victim. husband, and her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help. 7
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto.
Tomas Police Station in La Union, testified in the investigation he
conducted with SP04 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza
regarding the incident of June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a
call for assistance from the barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas
because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The police
authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in Brgy.
Tugod, Sto.Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom
floor covered with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children,
Pacho testified that Manuel told him that his father confessed to
killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to him the bolo covered with
blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was allegedly used
by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical findings
indicated that the victim suffered from multiple injuries and her neck
was almost cut off from her body. 9
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing
his wife in their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified
the bolo as the same one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A"
and which he used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the
court that he killed his wife because he could not sleep for almost a
month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went
totally blank and he did not know what he was doing. 10 He claims
that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and
on April 15, 1997 rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the
accused, Eduardo Javier y Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death; to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of the victim and
59
P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty, considering the presence of two
mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and
obfuscation. 12 While accused-appellant does not question the
decision of the trial court in rejecting his defense of insanity, he
argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time
of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged
period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an
illicit relationship with another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded
him to commit the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
accused-appellant cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness
in the absence of a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-
appellant cannot likewise be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation in the absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but
interposed as defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
However, the trial court rejected this defense of insanity for failure of
the defense to prove that accused-appellant was indeed insane at
the time of the incident. The defense never presented any medical
record of the accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist ever
presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the
defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating
circumstances of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus
weakening the case of accused-appellant.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he
had been suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading
him to commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife,
Florentina. The defense went on to cite medical literature on the
effects of total and partial sleep loss to support his contentions. 13
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be
appreciated, the law requires the presence of the following requisites:
(1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender; and (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of
consciousness of his acts. 14
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of
illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the
accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss
of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental
condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare
allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that
accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his
exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the
acts he committed. First, he remembered killing his wife in their
bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice;
he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with
the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and he remembered being
brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital circumstances
surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the
time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full
control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was
suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-
power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the
mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-appellant.
60
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and
obfuscation to mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
to obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. 15 The foregoing elements were not proved to be present
in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even
stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause
which produced alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his
testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor did he explain
the cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no
justifiable basis for applying to him this mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation as the cause which produced it has not
been established. 16
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his
suspicions regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it
possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to
whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts
will generally not be disturbed by the appellate court because it is in
the best position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence
considering that it observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
witnesses during the trial. In the case at bar, the trial court was able
to observe the behavior of accused-appellant and it stated that his
recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so impeccable that
only a person in his right mind can make it.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides
that:
Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or
his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not
punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the
application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the
presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.17
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant
did not allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence
show that the prosecution was able to prove any aggravating
circumstance. 18 Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is appreciated
by this Court in favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the accused-
appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of
P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court as one of civil indemnity
instead of as moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La
Union, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y
Basin should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
61
hh. Analogous circumstances. People v. Genosa, G.R. No.
135981, 14 January 2004.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer
for acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome
(BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because
there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected
attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on
appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke
down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and
10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the
aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason
and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances
arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 62

on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of Cadaveric spasm.
her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
The Case protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25,
the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture
1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration
(Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa
of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of
hemorrhage.
the Decision reads:
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the shedding of the epidermis.
Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, which caused his death.[4]
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance
and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty
with the penalty of DEATH. during her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was
tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
The Facts
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]

The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:

Version of the Prosecution
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay
Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, prosecutions version of the facts in this wise:
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19,
hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided
their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex,
herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however,
appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight
after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer
before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before
reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out
that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went
inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until
9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the
Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to
which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last
time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the
Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and was always
closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close
friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to
look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy
check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to
their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money
to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was
waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of
their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking
the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was.
Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant
did not want to talk to him.
63
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him
about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben
and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench
but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen
door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it.
Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive
smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying
on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his
briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went
out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben,
identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin,
then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report
regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom
where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped
with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had
his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was,
leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and
six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It
had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end.
The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its
stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the
postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte
responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had
been dead for two to three days and his body was already
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage
due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after
work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who
was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there.
They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel
went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently
disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with
the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep
her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about
to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands
and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed
for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return
home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of
the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her
You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer
but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long
blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben
with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant
then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick
up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
64
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband
by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun
was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19,
1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos,
Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration, and was working, at the time of her husbands death,
as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had
three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school;
they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they
were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their
relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors
from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents,
together with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would
become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not
remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben
and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk,
Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in
1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the
house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for
Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning,
Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw
blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for
Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying
that Ben and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in
Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic
became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that
after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3)
misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a
table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using
a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded
and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third
incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the
bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for
medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November
15, 1995 After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting
place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they
went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each.
After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and the
usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on
masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and
runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in
65
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling
loudly. Outside their house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to
feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel,
conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will never
hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am
innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from
the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were
always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic
Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her
back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a
long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a
wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one
(1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became
cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he
would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and
sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run
home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out,
promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said
after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter
the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said
Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at
least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to
Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the
hands of Ben.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the
Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a
quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and
through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with each
other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but
had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr.
Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting
on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window
of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the
spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding
with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He
said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the
room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again,
please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas
while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about
fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to
be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always
quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and
then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their
house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was
alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to
our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to
call me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr.
Sarabia further testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness
pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to
66
her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured
too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of
Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic
went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched
in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but
could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted
her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be
battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa house at
about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was
already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk
because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.
Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily.
(Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time
Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be
afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time
when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and
I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran
into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he
got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window
grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left
Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient
many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr.
Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there
were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic.
These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of
Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention
of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at
Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic
which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6)
incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he
could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime
committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to
examine the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is
capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the
Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben
died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought
his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning,
but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they might have
settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she
was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was
born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her
husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her
and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was
67
violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she
said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard
by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony;
that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did
not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a
job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not
tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a
safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo,
Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the
gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used
to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with
the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he
kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw
that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after
an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa
residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health
Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her
responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases,
such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of
cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took
the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the
police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she
saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to
the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury
involving the skeletal area of the head which she described as a
fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or
3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic
Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with
intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July
1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16
December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the
last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic
review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer,
Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel,
attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of
her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter
dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same
through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief
68
Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without
counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February
2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-
received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned
counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and
finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr.
Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the
country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable
Court partly granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and
remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to
forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the
copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and
testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if
she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the
clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her
clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for
twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected presently
to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the
Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a
member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in
Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from
the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association
of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological
Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of
Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic
Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling]
Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and
nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research
about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy
Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo).
The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on
battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the
socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases
over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of
variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
69
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of
incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse
to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually
has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of
themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually
think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a
battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken
homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also
has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have
superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very
hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very
low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices
like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The
batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-
pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also,
they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot
of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered
woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt
that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope
her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence:
some leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of
them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also
happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening
day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse
occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests
she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a
battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence
which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such
feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a
broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all
the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did
not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the
abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of
herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has
since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a
Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the
Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of
psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice,
he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where
he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was
called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned
to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
70
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the
University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society;
the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was
presented twice in international congresses. He also authored The
Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which
was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical
textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant;
was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant;
and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional
disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain
and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish
medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr.
Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family
relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen
probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience
with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping,
pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not
very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional
stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under
the anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by
overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She
tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an
individuals illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and
love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what
is around him within the environment. And it becomes his own
personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he
is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in
himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of
the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-
experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual
cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
71
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress
disorder try to defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually
pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has
reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an
interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes.
He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a
help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report,
dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said
that at the time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was
that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying
to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that
point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the
trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she
was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the
private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution
of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial
a quowere elevated.[9]
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave
credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the
deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was
killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at
the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to
this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in
part appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to
report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to
submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
72
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence,
were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally
being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the
case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this
Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-
defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and
Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore
liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by
beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa
was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further
gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered
husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the
children of Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to
Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of
a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an
aggravating circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the
traditional elements in determining the existence of self-defense and
defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate
penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether
appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2)
whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature,
if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As
consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome
of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of
discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that
would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any
73
event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial
court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-
defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the
defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and
conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony
and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this
Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to
reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an
obviously hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the
lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge
about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his
judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with
dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to
condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which
he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben
Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-
presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this
Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with
the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court
if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the
brother of appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben
had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to
these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant
herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1)
the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no
admission was in fact made.[19]Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof
that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct
cause of Bens death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a
pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has
admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his
nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial,
to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death.
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not
dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence
that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this
case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the
novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence
may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal
requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly
appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of
74
the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior,
did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring
testimony from appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the
solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the
discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary
to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court
nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children
as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the
flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her
brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of
her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts
appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final
resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability,
invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the
accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove
any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts
the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence,
the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man
in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in
any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-
esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female
sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the
tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false
hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by
the so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.
The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of
kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What
actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that,
75
to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the
escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and
passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse
her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical
abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control
and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent
stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer
becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an
acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so
are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail.
Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are
likely to get hurt.[30]
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that
he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person
whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair,
she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the
chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help,
are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after
she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting
her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she
is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of
tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is
better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense
presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-
rending experience as follows:
76
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year
he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your
husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive
and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and
sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate
each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced
and after that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and
abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 77

xxxxxxxxx Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are
found in the chart of your clinic?
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A I did.
A Of course my husband.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
for the record.
A Yes, sir.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R)
xxxxxxxxx lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;

[Court] /to the witness 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain
and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A Everytime he got drunk.
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury
physician: Dr. Caing;
inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how
frequent was the occurrence? 5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora; and
A Everytime he got drunk.
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
week?
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were
A Three times a week.
the attending physician, is that correct?
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Yes, sir.
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
quarrel me. [32]
A Yes, sir.
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the
Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who
testimony on chronic battery in this manner: attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left
axilla?
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 78

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with A It was on November 6, 1995.
something rough substance if force is applied.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A Yes, sir.
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court,
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? was the patient pregnant?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation A Yes, sir.
of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy
breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
was she?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
xxxxxxxxx
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an
Q What did she tell you? examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which
these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her complicates her pregnancy.
husband.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
xxxxxxxxx
A One day.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
happened? xxxxxxxxx

A As per record, yes.

Q What was the date?

CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that
you were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and
she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period
from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23)
times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was given to
her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and
emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is
emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the
patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is
causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all
comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
79
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases
in hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the
blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was
180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the
Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple
quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would
run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon
her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been
asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter
feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten
oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard
something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into
Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill
atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her
help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned
to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again
afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 80

house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when A Bilwang.
she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at
A Renting.
least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at
fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process Bilwang?
a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15,
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to
1995 in the evening?
sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was again
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested
then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears
Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, that the same thing will happen again last year.
where was his father, then my second child said, he was not home
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with
yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that
you?
he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived
from school, I prepared dinner for my children. A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995? Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A Yes, sir. A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not
allow her because of Ben.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
A Yes, 8 months.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
A Eight (8) months.
Q Did you come back to your house?
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 81

A Marie Bianca. not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a
bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A Yes, sir.
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What time?
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q How do you described this bolo?
Q What was he yelling all about?
A 1 1/2 feet.
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you?
A For chopping meat.
What else did he do if any?
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel
was carrying that bolo?
him.
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you
know? Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I
him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat fell to the bedside.
me again.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if
A I screamed for help and then he left.
any?
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I
want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he A Yes, sir.
was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was
switch off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light
going?
when the children were there. At that time I was also attending to my
children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for A Outside perhaps to drink more.
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 82

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time? (At this juncture the witness started crying).

A I packed all his clothes. ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A I wanted him to leave us. A Yes, sir.

Q During this time, where were your children, what were their Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
reactions?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then
me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and
bedroom holding my neck. I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about
you? How did he drag you?
to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
COURT INTERPRETER: other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to
pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
forcibly in her front neck)
COURT INTERPRETER:
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where did he bring you?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
be nobody to nag me.
A Outside.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
Q In what part of the house?
A Yes, sir.
A Dining.
Q What is there in the drawer?
Q Where were the children during that time?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
A My children were already asleep.
COURT INTERPRETER:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as
an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a
battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former
briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife?
Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life was
like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years,
that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of
instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to
physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was
the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The
83
husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going
home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She
also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the
reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband
was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she
was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because
she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when
it was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely
elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting
evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999,
where you talked to her about three hours, what was the most
relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The
most important information were escalating abuses that she had
experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you
already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial
knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her
husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are
also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed
in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered
[her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in
that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about
being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on
saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the
Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had
been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered
person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the
battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person
who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it happened
because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
84
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as
follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality
test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying
prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is
she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality
test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a
person that I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are
the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo
Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on
his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said
that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything
looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until
Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was
often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed
toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At
first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of
her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that
her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for
twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was
battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in
vain. Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice
and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her
feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant
battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in
the Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely
abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining
her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly
pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and
necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated
without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue
to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her
to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman
to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she
not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of
85
the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint
should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person.
What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her
research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the
killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests,
making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the
battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x
x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that
they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they
provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered
woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-
blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful.
He had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations,
having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such
cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence
cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could
result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused,
battered persons may believe that they are essentially helpless,
lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering
incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability
to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can
do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the
University of Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control
over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more
likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than
trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of
beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their
86
own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will
alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow
responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes
that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter
is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears
that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific
evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she
had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to
find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More
specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of
violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In
relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death
of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase
of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up
prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens
relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent)
stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run
away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her
out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that
believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her
and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben
to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional
stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on
him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both
of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate
the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert
witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully,
albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of
the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or
spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all
-- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat,
the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the
essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.
87
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not
in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further
that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered
woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to
kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack --
or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony
of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape
to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was
a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually
have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount
to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the
existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can
be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified
under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any
other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem
88
it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal
in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including
that which has not been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic,
Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November
29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband
posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be
ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained
that the effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and]
repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
[71]
disorder. Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering.
Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged
administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the
victim and another one is the public and social support available to
the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that
disorder....
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CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in
terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the
head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating
the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the
individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this
situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like
for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus.
So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or
[a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed
or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be
thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The
[acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months
you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six
(6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering
but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is
89
how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert
witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman
syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted
upon appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down
her psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological
paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the
exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting
diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a
mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held
that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal
equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the
unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a
cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that
she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her
unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming
her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room,
her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt
her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of
fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation,
she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she
took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there
was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have
recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos
testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a
victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole
thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks
of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control
of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what
Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her
from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
90
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the
same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical
nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the
violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the
incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but
likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally
produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery
must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court
imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this
qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when
he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads
us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will
be nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
91
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then
he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and
I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the
drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about
to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to
pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and
I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what
happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was
frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him,
the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the
nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with
him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of
my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of
treachery. There is no showing of the victims position relative to
appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is
92
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to
have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the
party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory
act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of
using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when
she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the
method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be
lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of
the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances
are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree,
and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended
the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA
which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum
shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just
and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum;
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and
1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman
syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--
vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on
how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort
beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts.
To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take
a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants
counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can
only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We
cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
93
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our
main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau
of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being
held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981
Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981
CRIM WEEK 4 |APOLINAR| BANCE | GARCIA | ROMINA 94

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14
of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and
wounded his husband which ultimately led to his death. According to
the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual –
grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating
circumstance because the quarrel or argument that preceded the
killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five times, but that Ben would always follow her
and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why
Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he
was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant,
after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering
from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-
defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of
the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:

For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all
the elements of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome,
to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven
to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering