John of St. Thomas, O.P.

Course of Thomistic Philosophy

According to the Exact, True, and Genuine Thought
of Aristotle and the Angelic Doctor

Natural Philosophy

Part I: Of Mobile Being in Common

Translation © John G. Brungardt

Translated from the 2nd Edition of P. Beatus Reiser, O.S.B.
Marietti 1948

Latest Revision January 27, 2019

Table of Contents

Temporary Translator’s Introduction 3

Theses in Natural Philosophy 5

The First Part of Natural Philosophy

Introductory Materials 7
Letter to the Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Proœmium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Order of the First Part of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Question 1 About the Science of Philosophy and the Order of Knowing 13

Article 1 Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Article 2 Whether Philosophy is of one species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Article 3 Whether being is the first thing known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2
 Temporary Translator’s Introduction
T
he following pages contain an ongo-
ing translation of John Poinsot’s philo-
sophical magnum opus in natural phi-
losophy, the treatises crowning his Cursus Philo-
sophicus Thomisticus. The works on logic that
precede his natural philosophy have been trans-
lated in large part by Yves R. Simon, John J.
Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst as The Material
Logic of John of St. Thomas (cited in this book as
Material Logic), as well as by John Deely in Trac-
tatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot
(cited in this book as Tractatus de Signis). As
will hopefully be narrated in a later edition of
this introduction, the second part of the tradi-
tional quadripartite course in natural philoso-
phy, the one which dealt with the De Caelo or
the local motion of the fundamental parts of the
universe, what we might call physical cosmology,
was suppressed by John of St. Thomas, coinci-
dentally in the same year as Galileo’s condemna-
tion. It is unknown, but unlikely, whether it sur-
vived. The first part, to be contained in this vol-
ume, treats of subjects from Aristotle’s Physics
or mobile being in common; this is sometimes
termed general natural philosophy and in the
late 19th-and early 20th-centuries, due to mis-
guided Wolffian influences, was misnamed Cos-
mologia. The third part considers the subject of
Aristotle’s De Generatione, or the changes due
to alteration that lead to substantial change; our
3
closest modern science to this one is chemistry.
The fourth part treats of questions arising from
Aristotle’s De Anima, what we now call rational
or philosophical psychology, and which served as
the medieval introduction to biology.
The translation follows the Latin of Beatus
Reiser, O.S.B., in the revised Marietti edition of
1929. The margin numbers in the main text cor-
respond to the page numbers of Reiser’s edition.
All references to other places in the Latin Cursus
Philosophicus are given to these page numbers,
with capitalized “question” and “article” indica-
tions; e.g., Q. 1, A. 1. The editions of Simon et al.
and Deely are referred to throughout as simply
Material Logic and Tractatus de Signis, respec-
tively.
There are two types of notes to the text.
The footnotes are from the Reiser text and are
marked by lower-case letters. The translator’s
note are endnotes, and are marked by Arabic
numerals. These are listed at the end of every
question or major section. If resources permit,
the reprinted edition, published by Hildesheim in
2008, may be consulted. Reiser’s footnotes indi-
cating textual variants are not included. Where I
have retained Reiser’s footnotes, I have occasion-
ally expanded them for clarity and added, with-
out notice, reference to modern editions of St.
Thomas’s Latin texts (where, e.g., Reiser cites
only older, outdated editions such as the Parma
edition). Any extended quotations to Aristotle or
other authors to which Poinsot refers are placed
in the translator’s endnotes, where appropriate
editions and references are given. As for the
planned appendices to the translation, as of this
writing, they will include a translation of Caje-
tan’s On the Subject of Natural Philosophy, from
the Latin text of De Koninck and Gaudron, as
well as a “Table of Theses” that Poinsot defends
in the course of the treatise. During the process
of translation, this Table will be placed after the
Table of Contents.

4
 Theses in Natural Philosophy

Question 1, Article 1: Whether mobile being Question 1, Article 3: Whether the more uni-
is the formal object of Philosophy
1. The material subject or object belonging to
Philosophy is natural or mobile body, while
the formal object is explicated through mo-
bile being or the mobile as such. (see p. 15)
2. When it is said that mobile being is the for-
mal subject of Physics, the “mobile” is not
taken for formal mobility, but as an apti-
tude or at its roots, such that mobile being
is likewise that mobile quiddity or proximate
foundation of mobility. (see p. 17)
3. Mobile being, of which Physics treats per se,
includes not only substantial change but also
accidental change, such that the “mobile” as
to the term abstracts from substance and
accident and looks not only to the princi-
ples of substantial change but also acciden-
tal change, granting that as a subject the
“mobile” is a substance. (see p. 18)
versal, and therefore being itself as such, is the
first thing known by our intellect
1. It is impossible that the first thing known
by our intellect in this life be some singular
thing known in the mode of a singular. (see
p. 27)
2. The first notion knowable by our intellect
proceeding in a natural and imperfect way
is the quiddity of material things under
some maximally indistinct [confuso] predi-
cate, which predicate is being, not some spe-
cific or generic degree, and this is to know
a whole by actual indistinct cognition. (see
p. 27)

Question 1, Article 2: Whether Philosophy,

in its account as a science, is of one indivisible
species

1. The answer is in the affirmative, and many

Thomists follow this view, such as Domingo
de Soto as well as Bañez. Granted, Cajetan
holds the opposite opinion. (see p. 24)

5
The First Part of Natural Philosophy
 Letter to the Reader to limit it on account of the magnitude of the
difficulties and the contradictions to the teach-
To our readers: ing of St. Thomas, nor were we able to enlarge it
so that we might attend to every little thing, but

W
1 e commit to your light and judg- we strove to explain the principles themselves so 2
ment this First Part of Natural Phi-that one can penetrate any particular issue what-
losophy, not only as our teaching— soever and, without a long or tediously attentive
insofar as it has been given to us to understand— study, be satisfied in many others. However, he
but also in a Thomistic order. Indeed, so that we who without any labor or contemplation wishes
might emulate the method of St. Thomas in Phi- to remove for himself all his difficulties in some
losophy and also in order that the handmaiden, book, and yet scorns all sustained application in
following in the footsteps of her mistress, might reading, to him I quote the saying from the words
teach by the very order of arrangement in as of St. Jerome, that “no one is compelled to read
many parts as in the Summa Theologica, we have what he does not want; that I wrote for those who
divided this natural science by assigning to each asked me, not for those who would scorn me, for
part its proper subject matter and treatise, as the grateful not the carping, for the earnest not
we have noted at the very outset of the book. the indifferent.” 1
Moreover, so that the discussion and clarifica-
tion of this teaching might be led to a deeper Farewell.
level, that is, into the profundity of disputation,
the riches of our work distribute themselves in
perhaps a more unrestricted and somewhat more
prolix way, and this knowing that our simpleness
of style and lack of cleverness could not contend
with or rival those of greater skill, who presume
in some short little book, as in a little ditch, to
conceal and absorb the whole sea of the natural
sciences rather than to explain them.
However, not professing to be the first of au-
thors, and thus attempting to weather the cross-
ing of this vast open sea of the whole of nature, it-
self rough and full of great and arduous questions
like breakers, we in writing have enlisted the help
of the books of the commentators and expositors,
and so take care that we might neither be dashed
by a sudden whirlwind nor thrown overboard and
drowned by the deep and wide waves. And having
in mind either the seasick reader averse to prolix-
ity or the more scrupulous objecting to brevity,
they ought to consider that neither were we able

7
 Proœmium
P
3 hilosophy, if the name be taken accord-
ing to the whole breadth of its meaning,
encompasses all knowledge, for Philos-
ophy is said to be, as it were, the “love of” or
the “friend of science,” for which reason human
wisdom is called Philosophy by St. Thomas in
the proœmium to the Ethics.a And so, Philoso-
phy is the general science encompassing within
itself all science naturally acquirable, especially
speculative knowledge, the love of which is prop-
erly the love of science because of its great love
of knowing.
Moreover, a threefold distinction in kind in
speculative science is enumerated by the Philoso-
pher and St. Thomas.b These are: natural sci-
ence, mathematics, and metaphysics; moreover,
logic is also placed under this division by reduc-
tion, since it does not concern objects of specula-
tion but treats of the tools of speculation. These
three sciences differ according to diverse grades
of knowability, as we said in Q. 27 concerning
the books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.c For
natural science treats of sensible things in mo-
tion and subject to change, whence it only ab-
stracts from singular matter. Mathematics treats
of quantity insofar as it is abstracted from mo-
tion and sensible matter invested with accidents.
Metaphysics treat of being as such, as abstracted
from all matter, whether sensible or intelligible,
that is, even from primary matter as such, which
is only perceived by the intellect.
Moreover, Philosophy taken this broadly is de-
fined in various ways by different authorities. For
a
St. Thomas, In Ethic., lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 1 (Leon.47-
1:3).
b
Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI.7, 1064b1; St. Thomas, In
Meta., lib. 11, lect. 7, and see Super Boetium De Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 1.
c
See Q. 1, A. 1 (Reiser ed. vol. 1, p. 820b).
8
some define Philosophy from the etymology of
the name, that is, “love of wisdom.” Others define
it from its mode of proceeding, that is, “knowl-
edge of things as they are,” that is, through their
causes. Yet others define it from its subject mat-
ter, saying that it is “the knowledge of things hu-
man and divine.” Lastly, others define it by the
effect to which it leads us, saying that Philosophy
is “the contemplation of death,” that is, removing
a man from temporal affairs and bodily passions.
At present, however, we are not dealing
with Philosophy taken with such breadth of
scope, but, leaving aside mathematics and meta-
physics, we are concerned only with natural sci-
ence, whose object comprehends every natural
being, that is, every mobile being according to
some bodily motion or extension, for the motion
of purely spiritual beings does not pertain to this
kind of science.
Now, to this end, we divide this science into
four parts following in summary the order in
which Aristotle proceeded:
The first part treats of mobile being in
common; for one proceeds scientifically from the
more common to the less common things. And 4
this part contains the eight books which they call
Of the Physics or Of Natural Hearing.
The remaining three parts consider mo-
bile being in particular, each according to the
three species of motion distinguished into three
kinds of mobile beings, as St. Thomas notes in
the proœmium to the books On Generation and
Corruption.d The first is local motion, the sec-
ond alteration (which is ordered to generation),
and the third is growth (which is proper to liv-
ing or animate things). The first motion includes
the consideration of the simple bodies, out of
d
See St. Thomas, In De Gen., lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 1
(Leon.3:261).
which this universe is made. And thus after the
books Of the Physics the Philosopher treats of
the heaven and the earth, that is, of all simple
bodies, to the extent that they are coordinated
and situated in the universe. For the universe
is constituted by these above all else, for mixed
bodies have their place according to manner of
the element predominant in them. The second
motion of alteration, which is ordered to gener-
ation, concerns corruptible bodies not insofar as
they are coordinated as to their arrangement in
the universe, but to the extent that they are sub-
ject to generation and corruption (whether sub-
stantial or accidental). Thus, the third part of
Philosophy treats of generation. Lastly, the third
motion, namely the growth and nutrition which
is proper to living things, concerns all grades of
life or the soul which occasion it, and attains to
the grade of intellectual life, which is found in
our kind of soul. This is treated in the books On
the Soul. Thus, the whole of natural science is
divided into these four parts.

9
 The Order of the First Part of Philos- subject is that which nature constitutes, which
ophy arises from the principles explicated in the first
book, namely matter and form. Thus he con-

T
5 he first part of philosophy, as we siders nature. The principles or means, more-
said, treats of mobile being in common. over, by which things are to be demonstrated
Since Aristotle made this consideration about natural being or about nature, are the
scientifically, its order—which is most of all to be four causes, namely the material, formal, ef-
attended to in science—must be kept in mind. ficient, and final causes. For thereupon depend
all those things which are demonstrated in this
Book I book. This he does in the second book.

Therefore, to the consideration of mobile be- Book III

ing in common Aristotle prefaces first of all cer-
tain preliminaries and principles, from which Third, he proceeds to explain the proper pas-
we are able to discern what a natural being is and sions3 belonging to natural being, which is mo-
how it exists. For a natural being will be consti- tion, due to which it is most of all called mo-
tuted, above all, from principles as the elements bile being, and this consideration occupies the
of such a being. Concerning which, various of the rest of the books of the Physics. The consider-
ancients’ opinions place diverse origins and prin- ation of mobile being is twofold: the first abso-
ciples in natural things. He calls these principleslutely, according to itself, and the second com-
and not causes, through which a natural being paratively or with respect to what is extrinsic
comes about, but those out of which it is and upon which it depends, namely a consideration
into which it is resolved, whether one considers of movers and mobiles. Regarding the first con-
a natural being in becoming or generation, or as sideration, he first treats of motion in common
already existing and insofar as it is composed of and of its properties, then he treats of motion in
them. And thus, as to composition, he assigns to particular as to its species and parts by which it
principles, namely matter and form; as to gener- is divided or made continuous.
ation, however, he adds a third principle, namely These topics about motion in common and
privation, to the extent that generation proceeds those which accompany and are consequent to it
from the non-existence of a form or its privation intrinsically he treats in the third book, first ex-
as a terminus from which and to the existence of plaining the definition of motion, then action and
a form as the terminus to which, in some subject passion (which are concomitant to motion and
or matter. This he explains in the first book. without which there is no motion), and third the
account of the finite and the infinite (which are
Book II necessarily and intrinsically consequent to mo-
tion by reason of continuity and succession of
Second, the Philosopher treats of those things parts).
which must be presupposed in this science con-
cerning the subject and principles, or middles, by
which this science demonstrates.2 However, the

10
 Book IV
The extrinsic properties of motion, how-
ever, he considers in the fourth book. Now, there
are two such, by which accrue to motion and
measure it extrinsically, namely place and time,
as St. Thomas also notes at the beginning of
6 Physics IV.a For motion is measured both in re-
gard to local motion and also in regard to its du-
ration in time. Moreover, when treating of place
he also treats of the void, which is its privation.4
Books V and VI
Having considered motion and its properties,
both intrinsically and extrinsically, in book V
and VI the Philosopher begins to treat of its di-
visions. Now, first, he considers its essential and
intrinsic division into species; second, he consid-
ers its division as it pertains to the parts of con-
tinuous quantity, in which motion is realized. The
first division is pursued in Book V, which shows
that there are three species of motion, namely
local motion, alteration, and growth. Likewise, it
treats of both the specific and individual unity
of motion, and of the contrariety of motions, be-
cause contrariety arises between diverse species.
The second division of motion, namely as it per-
tains to the continuous parts of motion, he treats
in Book VI, where he concerns himself with the
divisibility of motion both as to the notion of
the means by which the mobile moves and the
account of the time in which it moves, and how
the continuum is not composed from indivisibles,
and consequently neither is motion.
All these topics, from Book III to Book VI,
pertain to the consideration of motion according
a
See St. Thomas, In Phys., lib. IV, lect. 1, n. 1
(Leon.2:146).
11
to itself and belong to it absolutely, both in itself
and in its properties and divisions.
Books VII and VIII
It is left to the remaining books to explain
those things which belong to motion in the com-
parison of movers and mobiles. And Book VII
considers the order of mobiles to movers, ex-
tending all the way to the first moved thing and
the first mover, because there exist no infinite
series.5 Likewise, he considers the requisite con-
ditions between mover and mobile, namely that
they be together and near, and consequently he
compares motions among themselves as to swift-
ness and slowness.
Next, he considers in Book VII the charac-
ter of the first motion and the first mover,
where he ends the consideration of mobile being,
showing that the first mover is eternal, and where
he also treats of the eternity of the first motion
and the eternity of the universe produced by it.
Likewise, he shows that the first motion is local,
circular motion, and lastly he shows that the first
mover has infinite power and lacks magnitude,
and is therefore incorporeal and indivisible.
We are to consider all these topics in the
present book in the same order as the books
of Aristotle. Beforehand, however, we preface a
question concerning the science of Philosophy as
a proemial question, so to speak, as well as one
concerning the order which ought to be kept in
the progress of knowledge and science.
Translator’s Endnotes

1. St. Jerome, Apology Against Rufinus, Book

2, ch. 33 (Migne PL 23:476). Translated by
W.H. Fremantle, from Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip
Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian
Literature Publishing Co., 1892).

2. The word “middles” here translates media;

see Aristotle Posterior Analytics I.10, II.1, II.11;
see St. Thomas, In Po. An., lib. II, lect. 1
(Leon.1:326ff).

3. This idea of a “proper passion” is a philo-

sophical term of art, and is used to signify that
which accrues to an underlying subject, which
is “affected” by the accident that it possesses by
nature. Hence, “properties” also translates affec-
tionibus later in this paragraph.

4. Translates vacuus.

5. Translates processus in infinitum.

12
 Question 1
About the Science of Philosophy and the Order of Knowing
W
(6) e lay aside at present many of those
things that are customarily disputed
concerning the science of Philosophy,
since their resolution was provided for in the
proœmial questions of the book on Logic and
can be made known easily from the last ques-
tions concerning the Posterior Analytics.a These
questions are as follows: whether Philosophy is
necessary for us, whether it is a science, whether
it is practical or speculative, and similar ques-
tions settled in like fashion.1 It is clear to us
that Philosophy is necessary for the careful, thor-
ough, correct, and scientific examination of nat-
ural things. That it is truly a science is evident
from the many demonstrations that arise in the
progress of this science. Finally, that it is specu-
lative is evident both from the end of this science
(which is the investigation and knowledge about
natural truths and not their making), as well as
from the principles by which it proceeds (which
manifest the truth by way of resolution and do
not teach one to make something by way of com-
position).2
7 Wherefore, only three things which are proper
to this science remain to be explained. The first
regards its formal and material object, as to what
a
See Logic, IIa, Q. 1, A. 1 (Reiser ed. vol. 1, p. 251b);
and ibid., Q. 26, A. 1 (p. 791b).
13
it might be. The second is about its unity, as
to whether it is one as an indivisible species or
whether, due to the diverse objects that belong
to it, it is divided into diverse species (e.g., if
the one which treats of the heavens is of a differ-
ent species from that which treats of generation
or of the soul, or whether the whole is of one
species). The third concerns the order of know-
ing and what is the first thing known by our in-
tellect, which Aristotle treats at the beginning of
this book in place of a proœmium.
Article 1 Whether mobile being is the
formal object of Philosophy
S
o that the difficulty at issue might
be known, note two terms in the title
of this article. First, there is “mobile be-
ing,” 3 second, there is “formal object.” 4 Mobile
being is not taken in a compound way as an
aggregate of “being” and “mobility” as two, but
simply for a quiddity: that to which mobility be-
longs. However, the quiddity of mobile or natural
or natural being and nature differ, because as the
Philosopher says in Physics II.1, nature is called
“a principle of motion and rest,” b and a natural
being is that which “has in itself such a principle
b
Aristotle, Physics II.1, 192b20.
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
of motion.” a Whence, nature is not called the ob-
ject of Philosophy, but rather natural or mobile
being, because it treats of mobile things or quid-
dities, which are based on nature itself. And just
as nature is taken in Physics not for the essence of
a thing only (which belongs to any thing whatso-
ever), but for that which is a principle of motion
(and not of any motion whatsoever, but of the
imperfect and with succession and process from
potency to act), so also natural or mobile being
is taken for that which has in itself a principle
of such physical and imperfect motion. We will
have more to say about this in Q. 9, treating of
the definition of nature.b
The second term is the formal object. For
granting that mobile being, mobile body, mo-
bile or natural or sensible substance are identi-
cal, by reason of which identity some reduce this
difficulty almost to the mode of speaking (and
on this one can see the Conimbricenses Q. 4,
Proœm. A. 1; and Carmelite Disp. 1, Proœmium
to the Whole of Philosophy, Q. 1, §2, and oth-
ers),5 nonetheless as to their formal notion, which
is distinguished from the material notion in the
sciences, this difficulty is not about the mode
of speaking but about reality. For granting that
a mobile or mutable physical thing must be a
body and a substance, nonetheless the formality
of body is explicated otherwise than the formal-
ity of mobile being. For “body” formally desig-
nates the root of quantity and is thus defined by
an order to divisibility; “mobile,” however, taken
at its root designates the root of mutation or
passage from potency to act, which certainly re-
quires divisibility as a condition and not as a for-
mal notion if it occurs with succession and con-
tinuity, as happens in physical motion. Thus we
a
Ibid., 192b32.
b
See Q. 9, A. 1.
14
see that neither nature nor motion are defined
using “body” nor to they explicate it, but nature
is called a principle of motion and rest, while
motion is called the act of a being in potency
(which is only explained by an order to an im-
perfect being, not body). Finally, we can make
a similar observation when explaining the formal
notions of other things. For granting that every
colored thing is a body, we nonetheless do not 8
say that the formal object of sight is a colored
body, but “colored” explicates the formal object
while “body” the material or implied object. And
every intelligible is a being, yet nonetheless the
notion of “being” does not formally explicate the
object of the intellect except materially and pre-
sumptively. The same can thus be understood in
the case of mobile body and mobile being.
Wherefore, the present difficulty con-
sists in two things. The first consists in discerning
the formal and material notion of the object of
Physics, namely, whether the notion of mobility
pertains to the formal object, while the notion
of body pertains to the material object. The sec-
ond concerns the extension of this object, namely
whether it embraces per se and formally every
mobile (both as to substantial change and as to
accidental change), or whether it only includes
the per se mobile as to substantial change (that
is, mobile to substantial form as to a term and
as pertaining to substantial principles, motion re-
garding accidents being treated only reductively
by the physicist and as deduced from the first,
that is, from substantial change).6
Granted, there are many opinions flung about
concerning the determination of the object of
Philosophy (as can be seen in the aforementioned
places of the Conimbricenses and Carmelites),
nonetheless the particular opinions come down
to three. Some assert the object to be mobile
being, others mobile body, and others natural or
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
sensible body (granting that they all say that the
other views amount to the same thing and differ
only as to the mode of speaking). Likewise even
among the Thomists, some think that the per se
and formal object of Philosophy is only mobile
being as regards substantial change and pertain-
ing to substantial principles, others think that
its per se and adequate object includes both sub-
stantial and accidental change, concerning which
one can see Cajetan’s little work On the Subject
of Natural Philosophy.a,7
F
irst: The material subject or object
belonging to Philosophy is natural
or mobile body, while the formal
object is explicated through mobile being
or the mobile as such. Thus, mobile being and
mobile body are related just as are colored and
body in sight, where the colored is the formal
notion and body is the material, for body is not
attained by sight under every notion, but only
insofar as it is colored.
The first part of the conclusion is be-
yond controversy, since it is agreed that the limits
of Philosophy are restricted to corporeal things
and it does not treat per se of substances sepa-
rate from all matter. For otherwise it would have
an abstraction similar to Metaphysics, which ab-
stracts from sensible and intelligible matter.8
And likewise it does not treat of quantity alone
abstracted from all matter. For then it would co-
incide with Mathematics and not treat of body
as a subject for motion, which is, at any rate,
sensible body. And if Physics treats of God and
the angels, it does not consider them as mobile
but as movers, insofar as corporeal motions are
reduced to them and are dependent upon them.
(Marietti; Parma, XX, 438).
However, Physics does not consider the separate
a f
The full title: Tractatus de subiecto naturalis
Philosophiæ unica quæstione contentus.
15
substances in themselves.
The second part of the conclusion is
held by St. Thomas, particularly in texts where
he expressly treats of this issue, as is clear in the
proœmium of The Physics, where he says that
“[the subject of Philosophy] is mobile being sim-
ply speaking. However, I do not say mobile body,
because the fact that every mobile is a body is
proven in this book, and yet no science proves its 9
own [subject].” b,9 He expressly teaches the same
thing in Opsuc. 42, ch. 14.c,10 See also his first
lecture on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VI, where he
teaches that the object of Physics is mobile be-
ing or, also, mobile substance, that is, a mobile
quiddity, as he explains in that text.d And in his
fourth lecture on Aristotle’s Metaphysics XI, he
teaches, following the philosopher, that Physics
theorizes about beings as in motion.e And if in
some texts it seems that St. Thomas says that the
subject of Physics is mobile body (as in Summa
Theologiae, Ia, q. 84, a. 1, c.; or De Veritate, q.
14, a. 8, ad 16) nonetheless, in those places he
is not speaking formally of the object of Philos-
ophy, but materially or presumptively.f
The foundation of this conclusion is taken from
the following, which were hinted at just above,
namely that motion is the proper and adequate
property that the physicist demonstrates of his
subject.11 However, motion is not defined by ex-
plicating its order to body or substance but to
mobile being, for it is defined as “the act of a be-
ing in potency,” as is clear in Book III.a There-
b
St. Thomas, In Phys., lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 4 (Leon.2.4).
c
See On the nature of genera, (Parma, XVII, 18ff).
d
See St. Thomas, In Meta., lib. 6, lect. 1, n. 1155
e
See St. Thomas, ibid., n. 2209 (Marietti; Parma, XX,
592); and Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI.4, 1061b28.
See (Parma, IX, 241).
a
See Q. 14, A. 1.
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
fore, the formal notion of the subject of physics
does not explicate the notion of body. For what is
formally the subject of a science is also explained
in the formal definition of the property belonging
properly to it, to which property it bears a rela-
tionship. Therefore, since the notion of body is
not explicated in the definition of motion, but the
notion of a being in potency, body does not per-
tain to the formal notion of the subject (granting
that in reality it is true that there is no mobile
in physical motion except what is a body). Yet
nonetheless, under the formality which pertain
to Physics, it is such that, even if per impossibile
there were some mobile that were not a body,
even this would be treated by Physics, just as
if per impossibile there were some colored extent
that were not a body, it would be seen by the
eye.
Secondly, the foundation of this conclusion is
from that argument emphasized by St. Thomas
above.b That is, it is proven in Physics that a
mobile is a body, and yet not science proves its
own formal object. Therefore the formal object is
not body under the formality and explication of
body, but under the notion of mobile being. By
this proof both things are hinted at: both that
the notion of body pertains to the material ob-
ject (in that it is proven of every mobile), and
that it is not the formal notion, because no sci-
ence is able to prove such (in that every proof
proceeds under some formal notion, and conse-
quently such a notion is not proven but proves,
and thus is presupposed). Yet such things be-
ing presupposed, one is easily able to prove that
such a material object belongs [to Physics], be-
cause once assuming such a formal notion one
proceeds to investigate and show that material
object which is proportionate to it. And thus the
b e
St. Thomas, In Phys., lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 4 (Leon.2.4).
16
Philosopher shows that every mobile must be a
body, because it must be divisible, as is clear in
Physics Book VI.c,12 And thus having treating of
mobile being in common in these eight books, he
begins to descend to the particular explication of
diverse mobile beings that pertain to the objects
contained under the material subject, beginning
with the books of the De Cœlo by clarifying the
notion of “body.” Therefore it is assumed that
body is placed on the side of the material sub-
ject. 10
You say: It is not inconsistent that some sci-
ence prove its formal object a posteriori, just as
Theology proves that God exists. For the notion
of an indemonstrable principle does not require
that it be indemonstrable even a posteriori but
only a priori, as we said in Logic, Q. 24.d,13 And
so through divisibility, as through the a poste-
riori, the notion of body is proven in Physics.
Whence the Philosopher did not prove formally
that the mobile is a body, but every that every
mobile is divisible and has parts. However, divis-
ibility is not the actual notion of body but only
belongs to it by reason of quantity. Indeed, prox-
imate divisibility can even be taken away from
quantity, as we said in Logic Q. 16 and as is clear
in the case of the sacramental presence of the
Body of Christ.e,14 Therefore, Physics does not
prove the notion of body, but one of its accidents.
In reply: No science is able to prove its own
formal object, even as to whether it exists, from
its very own formal notion. For this would be
to prove something by using itself. The formal
notion and principle of something, through which
such a proof arises, must be assumed. But if a
science proves the formal object, it does so either
c
See Aristotle, Physics, VI.1, 231a21–232a22.
d
See Logic, IIa, Q. 24, A. 4 (I.767a36).
See Logic, IIa, Q. 16, A. 1 (I.546a43).
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
by borrowing from another science (as Theology
proves the existence of God from metaphysical
arguments), or by some a posteriori argument
that pertains only by reduction to such a science
and not formally and per se, as we showed at
greater length in Logic when treating the books
of the Posterior Analytics.a,15 However, Physics
shows that the mobile is a body or divisible from
the formal and intrinsic notion of motion itself,
not by borrowing from another science, because
every motion must have parts and, accordingly,
is partly in act and partly in potency.
To the argument that the Philosopher does not
prove that the mobile is a body, but rather that it
is divisible and to that extent proves a posteriori
that it is a body, I reply that when some prop-
erty is proven of a thing, and not proven from the
quiddity of that thing from which such a prop-
erty flows, it is a most manifest sign that such
a quiddity from which the property flows does
not belong to the formal notion of the science
in question. If indeed it is not proven through
that quiddity, it thus comes to the same thing to
prove such a property and to prove the essence
itself. Therefore, since both divisibility and mo-
bility arise from the notion of body, if divisibility
is proven from mobility (insofar as the latter re-
quires the former), one does not attend formally
to the actual notion of body under the notion by
which it is a body (that is, insofar as it is the
foundation of divisibility), but under the notion
by which it is a mobile quiddity. Whence it is
the same thing to prove the notion of divisibility
and the notion of body, insofar as body is the
root of divisibility. For proceeding from the very
quiddity of mobility is not to proceed from the
notion of body itself insofar as it is the root of
divisibility, but insofar as it is the foundation of
a
See Logic, IIa, Q. 25, A. 4 (I.791a44).
17
mobility, and this is to be a mobile being. Thus,
motion according to its nature and per se does
not belong to the genus of quantity or divisibil-
ity, as St. Thomas says in his commentary on
Boethius’s De Trinitate and on Aristotle’s Meta-
physics.b This is just as if some science were
to treat of the intelligible as such and to prove
that the intelligible in act must be spiritual and 11
not bodily, because it is abstracted from matter.
Such a science would not have as its formal object
“spiritual entity,” even though it would necessar-
ily presuppose it, because it would not attend to
it formally or in opposition to corporeal entity,
but insofar as it grounds an order to the intel-
lect. Thus Physics, which treats of the mobile,
does not formally attend to body insofar as it is
the root of divisibility, but insofar as it proceeds
from potency to act, from non-being to being. For
this pertains to change, which formally speaking
is to not attend to body, but to the very becom-
ing and being according to change, which is the
whole mobile being.
S
econd: When it is said that mo-
bile being is the formal subject of
Physics, the “mobile” is not taken
for formal mobility, but as an aptitude or
at its roots, such that mobile being is like-
wise that mobile quiddity or proximate
foundation of mobility. Cajetan also notes
this in his little work On the Subject of Natural
Philosophy.
The argument is clear, because otherwise
the physicist would consider accidents, for mo-
bility is the proximate or formal accident. Thus,
he would not treat of substance nor of substantial
generation, nor indeed would he treat of nature
per se, the contrary of which we will say about
b
See St. Thomas, SBdT, q. 5, a. 3, ad 5; In Meta., lib.
5, lect. 15.
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
the second book, for nature is a principle of mo-
tion and rest primarily and per se. Whence the
F
formal subject of Physics does not consist in mo-
bility formally considered, but at its root. This
is because mobility formally taken, which is an
accident, is not a first principle of motion but a
proximate and formal one.
You say: Therefore the formal object of
Physics is not only mobile being, but also nat-
ural substance, whether mobile substance or mo-
bile body.
In reply: The formal object mobile sub-
stance, taking “substance” for the quiddity or
first root of mobility, as St. Thomas says in
his commentary on the Metaphysics, and this is
the same as mobile being formally speaking.a,16
Moreover, if “substance” is taken to as explain-
ing that quiddity through the mode of the first
category, that is as a subsistent nature, this does
not explain the formal notion but rather the ma-
terial or concomitant notion of the subject of
physics, just as sight looks at the colored in the
concrete, which cannot but be substance or some-
thing having the mode of a substance. Substance
does not belong to the formal notion of the ob-
ject of sight, but to the material notion as some-
thing sensible per accidens. So, Physics per se
and formally attends to mobile being, insofar as
this explicates the quiddity of the first principle
of motion, which could not be a first principle
unless it were a substance. Nonetheless, it is not
defined or formally attained under the formality
of substance and therefore it does not wholly ex-
clude substance but, as it were, includes it as a
material subject, just as Mathematics treats of
quantity in itself, insofar as it grounds propor-
tions and measures, and yet it does not formally
consider it insofar as it is an accident and ac-
a
See St. Thomas, In Meta., lib. 6, lect. 1, nn. 1156–58. Sylvester of Ferrara in Q. 2 of his treatise on the
18
cordingly inherent, granted that quantity is not
found without the notion of accident.
inally: Mobile being, of which
Physics treats per se, includes not
only substantial change but also
accidental change, such that the “mobile”
as to the term abstracts from substance
and accident and looks not only to the
principles of substantial change but also
accidental change, granting that as a sub-
ject the “mobile” is a substance.
This conclusion is not accepted by all. For
some say that Physics only adequately treats of
mobile being as to substantial change. Now, so
as to account for the heaven, which is wholly 12
incorruptible and ungenerable and yet belongs
per se to Physics, they say that the heaven is
not substantially changeable proximately but re-
motely and radically, namely by reason of its
matter. Thus, they must posit that the matter
of the heaven is of the same species with sublu-
nary matter. Now, they do all this so that they
might preserve the same natural principles in re-
gards to the object of this science. Otherwise, if
diverse principles were considered (some for sub-
stances and others for accidents), it would not be
clear how they are united in one science. Nor can
it be said that the principles of accidents are re-
duced to the principles of substance, for this does
not work with respect to one of the principles,
namely privation. For the privation of substan-
tial form is not at the root of every accidental
privation, as is clear in the case of the heaven,
in which there is a privation of accidental form
(namely, to “where,” 17 ) which is not grounded on
the privation of a substantial form, because the
heaven is not capable of this.
But yet, this conclusion is posited by Cajetan
in his On the Subject of Natural Philosophy, by
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
Physics, and by other Thomists.18 Likewise it is
the opinion of St. Thomas in the Summa Theolo-
giae, Ia, q. 66, a. 2, that the matter of the heaven
is of a different kind than sublunary matter. Nor
can the opposite view be defended, because then
it would not be “remotely”—that is, by reason
of their matter—that the heaven is substantially
changeable. Nonetheless, even abstracting from
this opinion, the posited view follows, both be-
cause Physics treats per se the form of the heaven
and not only of its matter (which, nonetheless,
is not a principle of substantial change), and
because it treats of the heaven itself, which is
composed of matter and form, albeit it is in-
corruptible and distinct from corruptible body.
Therefore, it is irrelevant that it has substantially
changeable matter. If that treatise, which treats
of the heaven and belongs per se to physics, con-
siders the heaven insofar as it is incorruptible, it
thus does not consider the notion of matter as
changeable with respect to substantial form (in-
deed, such substantial privation is, rather, wholly
excluded from it), since the incorruptibility of the
heaves is considered per se. Therefore, the trea-
tise De Caelo, rather than considering the notion
of radical and remote substantial changeability
by reason of matter, excludes it (which must be
thoroughly pondered by the opposing opinion).
Nonetheless, it considers the heaven as a mobile
being, subject to accidental change insofar as it
is changes from one place to another.
However, in what way the principles of sub-
stantial and accidental change are united in the
formal object of this science (which the opposing
view cannot understand), we answer that it is
true, and that the principles are not the same en-
titatively except by proportion and analogically.
St. Thomas clearly teaches this in his commen-
tary on the Metaphysics, both Book I and Book
XII, where he shows, following the Philosopher,
19
that the principles of all categories of things are
not the same except by proportion.a This is clear
since in the genus of substance, for substantial
change to occur, one requires matter which is
pure potency, the privation of substantial form,
and the substantial form which is able to be gen-
erated. However, in accidents the matter which
is able to change is not pure potency but a sub-
ject having a substantial form, the privation of
an accidental form, and the accidental form it-
self. These principles are not the same except by
proportion, just as substance and accident are 13
proportionately the same. Moreover, they can
be said univocally and come together into one
science, because they take on the same formal
notion of knowability, just as also Metaphysics
treats of substance and accident in a univocal
way, not because they agree in the notion of be-
ing as such but because they agree in the same
formal abstraction from all matter.19 Similarly,
therefore, Physics treats of substance and phys-
ical accidents and the principles of both, as the
agree in the same formality of abstraction from
singular matter only, while granting that acci-
dent and substance do not agree in some higher
universal notion and are only predicable analog-
ically.
Nor is it the case that Physics abstracts from
substance and accident on account of this mo-
bile subject which it considers, as it were, the
subject of mobility. For, granting that motion or
mobility that of which Physics treats can termi-
nate in a substance or an accident, nevertheless
the subject receives and grounds this mobility as
the first and per se principle of motion, is not
an accident but a nature. As such it necessarily
belongs to a substance, granting that the formal
a
See St. Thomas, In Meta., lib. 1, lect. 17, n. 221ff,
and lib. 12, lect. 4, n. 2470.
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy

notion by which it is attained is only explicit as tuting man, and one expresses the object of such
a mobile quiddity and not a substance. a science in a more formal way by saying that it is
“rational animal,” rather than by saying that it is
Solution to the Opposing Arguments
“rational being.” Therefore, in like manner, one
First Argument: Mobile being cannot be expresses the quiddity of the object of Physics
taken in all its breadth, as comprehending both more in a more formal way by saying body or
mobile accident and substance, but is restricted mobile substance, than by saying mobile being.
to only substance or mobile body. Therefore, mo- Therefore, if one does not say substance or body
bile being is not to be posited as the formal sub- here, because such is the genus of a mobile thing,
ject, but mobile body. much less ought one so say “being,” because it is
The consequence is clear, because if the sub- higher than body.
ject is not extended to every mobile both sub- Response: As was said, mobile being is not
stantial and accidental, but only to the substan- taken as abstracted from substance and accident,
tial, it would be in vain to call mobile being speaking of the mobile subjectively, but only in-
the formal subject and not substance of mobile sofar as it explicates the quiddity of the mobile
body. The antecedent is proven as follows. If the thing, which implicitly and materially is the same
object of Philosophy is taken in all its breadth, as mobile body, since it is proven in Physics that 14
as comprehending accident and substance, there every mobile is a body. But in expressing the
would remain no properties to be demonstrated, formal notion of such an object one says “mobile
because a property is an accident, e.g., motion being” rather than “mobile body,” because for-
or mobility. Therefore if Physics treats of acci- mally Physics only attends to mobile quiddity,
dents as its subject and not of substance only, which the name of “mobile being” sets forth.
property will coincide with subject and what is And to the reply: The term “mobile being” can
more there will be no properties demonstrated be taken in two ways. In one way, it can be taken
in Physics, because every physical property is an as if to name a compound thing or something
accident. Therefore mobile accidents do not be- constituted from a higher analogical level and a
long to the subject, but only substance. lower difference, leaving out intermediate genera,
Against this one might say that substance as when we take individual generically as this
and mobile body are materially or implicitly the substance, this body, leaving out the intermedi-
subject of Physics, not formally and explicitly, ate levels. In another way, one can take “mobile
and thus by “mobile being” one does not signify being” not as some compound constituted from
something common to both substance and acci- a higher level of being and a lower level of mo-
dents as mobile but only the root mobile quid- bility, but insofar as it is the same mobile being
dity which has for its genus substance or body as the mobile only, as if to say a thing or mo-
(of which Physics does not treat formally). How- bile quiddity which in reality is a substance and
ever, against this is the fact that a science which a body, yet not expressed under the concept of
treats of some species treats per se of the genus substance or body but under the notion of a mo-
as constitutive of such a species, yet not in all of bile quiddity. We do not say that the subject of
its breadth, just as the science which considers Physics is mobile being in the first way but in the
human beings treats per se of animals as consti- second way, and thus mobile being is not some-

20
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
thing broader and more abstract than substance
or mobile body, nor does it comprehend in itself
as a subject body substance and accident, but
it is something narrower than substance, deter-
mining and explicating it not according to every
available notion of substance or body, but pre-
cisely insofar as it is mobile. This is as if to say
that everything that is considered in Physics is
concerning substance and body insofar as they
fall under mobility or insofar as they ground it,
where substance is taken only materially.
As to what is added concerning a science treat-
ing of some species and thus also treating of the
genus as constitutive of it, the answer is that,
first, it certain treats of it but not formally to the
same degree. It only considers the genus insofar
as it falls under that species as a formal object.
Likewise, Physics treats of body and mobile sub-
stance, but not formally to the same degree, but
as drawn from the notion of mobile being, that is,
mobile quiddity. As to the “being” in the formal
object, we have already said that it is not ex-
plained by body or substance, and that it is not
that being is taken in the mode of some higher-
level notion, but in the mode of explicating the
mobile quiddity and not positing something nu-
merical in addition to it. Furthermore, it is not
true that “mobile” names an essential difference
with respect to body or substance, but only a
property grounded in body. Thus, “mobile” ex-
presses not how Physics treats of mobility itself,
which is a property, nor of the body itself abso-
lutely, but as grounding that property of mobil-
ity. One expresses the actual notion of the formal
object in a more formal way in more purely by
saying “mobile” or “mobile being” (which is the
same as if to say the foundation of mobility),
rather than by saying “mobile body,” where one
denotes that the very notion of body also en-
ters into the formality of the object of Physics
21
as body, and not only as mobile. Lastly, it is
more known to us that something is mobile than
that it is a body (even if body is its genus), be-
cause one proves divisibility and the notion of
body through motion. Therefore the formal no-
tion should not be explicated through “body,”
but only through “mobile” or through “mobile be-
ing,” because the formal notion must be the most
known thing in a science.
What if one were to insist, on the other hand,
that “mobile” at its root and taken in place of
substance is not more known than mobility it-
self or accidental change. Indeed, we need to ex-
press this subject by circumlocution, saying “mo-
bile being,” which is a sign of that very quid-
dity which is not known to us. I would answer
that this can stand, because if in the notion of
substance, as expressed by this name, it is not
thus known per se as when it is expressed by the
name “mobile quiddity,” we will not say, conse- 15
quently, that the formal object is substance or
mobile body as expressed by the name of body
or of substance, but as expressed by the name of
quiddity or mobile entity (granting that in reality
it is a substance or a body). For this is to grant
that mobile quiddity is the most known thing.
Second Argument: The formal subject of a
science is that in which all the properties and ac-
cidents are formally resolved. But the physicist
resolves mobile accidents to mobile substance as
if to the per se root, because the principle of acci-
dents is substance insofar as it is substance. Nor
does the physicist attend to some accident per se
and formally, as sight to the colored and hearing
to sound, but it attends per se to substance and
mobility at its root. Therefore the formal sub-
ject of Physics is expressed in a more formal way
through substance or mobile body than through
mobile being.
One might say that this object is signified by
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
the name of “mobile being” because it is not re-
stricted to the principles of substantial change,
but attains even the principles of accidental
change and therefore abstracts from substantial
and accidental changeability. Against this is the
fact that if on account of that notion one says
that mobile being is the subject rather than sub-
stance of mobile body, then by the same argu-
ment the formal object is not said to be mo-
bility at its root, which is an accident, but is
said to be something abstracting from acciden-
tal and substantial changeability just as those
very principles abstract from substantial and ac-
cidental principles. However, such abstraction is
not determinate to mobility at its root, nor is
it something univocal, but something analogous
abstracting from substance and accident which
could not be univocal in its notion of knowabil-
ity unless it were rendered to such an abstraction
as belongs to Metaphysics. Lastly, some physical
property which answers to what is abstracted is
not assignable under that abstraction, for mo-
tion or mobility as to accidents, since it is an
accident, only follows upon substance and not to
something abstracted from substance and acci-
dent.
Response: To the principal argument, we re-
ply that physical accidents are resolved formally
to mobile substance insofar as substance is called
the quiddity of mobility at its not, but not inso-
far as substance expresses the categorical, generic
grade of a subsisting thing, for this only mate-
rially belongs to Physics. It is implied that it
is a substance as the root of mobility, but not
formally expressed. Whence, it is not related as
sight to the colored or hearing to sound, because
this attends to something included under an ac-
cident, while Physics attends to something con-
tained under substance. Granted, neither does
the object of the senses express an accident for-
22
mally, and neither does the object of Physics ex-
press substance formally but rather implies it.
To the other additional parts of the objection,
we answer to prove that the things to which mo-
tion belongs and which are the terms of physical
mobility are not only substances but accidents
and substances, and therefore something analo-
gous, as even Cajetan concedes in his aforemen-
tioned work,20 while maintaining that they are
univocal as to the notion of their knowability as
we said above.a From this it does not follow that
“mobile” as the subject and root of mobility, and
not as the terminus to which the motion belongs,
abstracts from substance and accident, but only
is something contained under substance, grant- 16
ing that it does not express it formally. This is
because both the principles of accidental change
as well as substantial change are rooted in sub-
stance and converge there, while they are not
the same formal principles since they relate to
forms and privations of diverse genera. Whence
the properties which are demonstrated in Physics
do not follow upon something abstracted from
substance and accident, but they follow upon
something determinately contained under sub-
stance or body, even though the actual generic
notion of substance or body is not expressed in
the formal object, but only that which belongs to
the notion of motion or the principle of motion,
in whose definition potency and act are included
and not the formality of substance.
Final Argument: Because, (1) by “mobile”
one includes more things that are treated in
Physics, and, (2) Physics treats of many things
which are not comprehended under “mobile,” and
finally (3) many other sciences besides Physics
treat of mobile being. Therefore by ‘mobile” one
does not express the adequate object of Physics.
a
See above, p. 19.
 Q. 1, A. 1. Whether mobile being is the formal object of Philosophy
The antecedent of the first part (1) stands be-
cause “mobile” even includes the angels, which
are mutable both as to substance (through cre-
ation and annihilation), and through local mo-
tion, cognition, etc. As to second part (2), it
stands because Physics does not only treat of
the mobile, but also of what rests, for nature is
a principle of motion and rest. Likewise it be-
longs to Physics to consider rest, most of all be-
cause motion is ordered to rest. Likewise it even
touches upon God as the prime mover and the in-
tellectual soul not only as conjoined to the body
but also as separate from it. Therefore it treats
of immobile things. As to the third part (3), it
stands because Astronomy21 also treats of mo-
bile being (namely of the heaven and the mo-
tions of the planets), and Medicine treats of the
body as healable (which includes the motion of
alteration). Therefore, the mobile is common to
others sciences and consequently it is not exclu-
sive to Physics.
Response: As we said above,a the “mobile”
can be taken in two ways, in one way in its whole
breadth, as naming motion both physically and
metaphysically (that is, motion which is an activ-
ity or perfect operation), and in another way as
naming motion which is an imperfect act, which
arises with some divisibility insofar as it is partly
in potency and partly in act. Only mobile in this
second sense pertains to Physics, nor are the an-
gels called mobile by such a motion. For creation
does not have a subject out of which something
comes to be, and thus it is not physical motion.
Nor is annihilation true motion, but the suspen-
sion of God’s concurrent causality.22 Moreover,
the operations of the angels as to the subject
from which they arise are spiritual and indivis-
ible, and either are not distinct from immanent
a
See p. 15.
23
acts or originate wholly from them, and thus they
do not belong to that divisible and imperfect mo-
tion which is the concern of Physics.
To the second part it should be said that rest,
since it is the privation of motion, must be known
through the opposite form to which it is reduced,
that is, to motion. Nor is every rest the end of
motion, as is clear in the motion of the heaven
and in the motion of life , which are more per-
fect than rest. For when rest conserves the thing
resting, then is motion per se ordered to rest, not
because it is a privation, but because it is a con-
servation. However, the physicist does not treat
of God or the intellect per se, but only touches
upon them insofar as they are movers and princi-
ples of physical motion and does not investigate 17
them as to their quiddity and essence. But the
terminus of Philosophy is the rational soul, which
is also the form of a physical body, as is said
in Book II of the Physics.b,23 However, to be a
form also belongs to it in the state of separation,
granted that it does not enform anything.
To the third part it should be said that the as-
tronomer does not consider the heaven and the
planets insofar as they are mobile beings, but in-
sofar as their motions are measurable and their
appearances exhibit diverse proportions, which
pertains more to the mathematician than to
the physicist. Moreover, the medical practitioner
treats of the body as healable, which certainly
implies motion and comes about through motion,
and thus he presumes Physics and is subordinate
to it. However, formally he does not consider per
se motion as motion, but as ordered to health.
Just as the artist is not able to make a statue
except through some motion, and yet does not
formally consider the notion of motion but the
b
See Aristotle, Physics, II.2, 194b9–15. See also St.
Thomas, In Phys., lib. 2, lect. 4, n. 10 (Leon.2.66–67).
 Q. 1, A. 2. Whether Philosophy is of one species

symmetry of the shape, so also the medical prac- Physics itself we would have to distinguish var-
titioner considers the balancing of the humors, ious species, because it treats of greatly diverse
which, of course, comes about through motion. topics, such as the infinite, the continuous, place,
time, and various species of motion. Granted, all
Article 2 Whether Philosophy, in its
of these have a connection with mobile being as
account as a science, is of
such, and yet the same is also true with respect
one indivisible species
to the other books, which treat of these mobile
beings and motions in particular and thus they

T
he answer is in the affirmative,
and many Thomists follow this view, have a connection with mobile being as such. For
such as Domingo de Soto as well as a science which treats of some genus also teats
Bañez. Granted, Cajetan holds the opposite of the species contained under it, just as Meta-
opinion.a physics, which treats of being, also treats of the
Moreover, this conclusion is taken from St. predicaments [categories] and causes contained
Thomas, who in the proœmia of the Physics, De under being, and nonetheless is of one indivisible 18
Caelo, and De Generatione distinguishes all of species.
these treatises as if they were parts of one natu- The foundation a priori for this conclu-
ral science, concerning which one of these treat of sion, however, is that diverse species of the sci-
the entire object in common, which in the others ences are not taken solely from the diversity
is applied to particular objects under such a com- of things in themselves, but from a diverse ab-
mon one. However, this does not vary the species straction or mode of knowing and illuminating
of the sciences—otherwise the parts of Theology objects. For if the diversity of things is con-
would constitute diverse species of Theology. In- sidered materially and entitatively, the part of
deed, there could not be one science of an indi- Metaphysics which treats of God would differ in
visible species if the diverse treatises and parts species from the part that treats of created sun-
varied its species. For no science allows to what- stance or accident. Likewise, that part of Physics
ever degree an infima species which does not pro- which treats of matter and form would differ
ceed in a certain order from the more common to from that which treat of the first mover, and
the less common, and among these those which the part which considers the infinite from that
are simpler or more universal are treated prior which treats of place and void. Other like exam-
to the ones which are less common. Therefore, a ples could be multiplied.
diversity of parts or treatises alone in a science Thus, a diversity in abstraction grounds a di-
does not vary its species. Moreover, in natural verse species of science and mode of illuminating,
science there is only a diversity of parts pertain- since this arises from a diversity of principles, for
ing to the order of parts or treatises about vari- the illumination of conclusions is derived from
ous objects, as St. Thomas indicates in the places the principles, as we considered at greater length
a
cited. And if this sufficed to diversify the species in Q. 27 about the Posterior Analytics. How-
24
of a science, then even in the eight books of the ever, since the principles by which properties
are proven of a subject are definitions, therefore
a
See the introduction to his commentary on Summa
a
Theologiae, IIa–IIae, q. 162. See Q. 27, A. 1; (Reiser ed. vol. 1, p. 823b22).

24
 Q. 1, A. 2. Whether Philosophy is of one species
the diverse species of knowing and manifesting
things that are known are reduced to diverse
modes of defining. For it would not suffice [for
that diversity] to keep defining and treating of
more and further things, but to define and treat
them in various and different ways. For it belongs
to even one science to define many things and to
treat of multiple quiddities, insofar as they are all
defined under one mode, as we have shown in the
place in our Logic just cited, from St. Thomas’s
commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VI, lect.
1.b However, all definitions, whether treated in
the Physics or in the De Generatione or else-
where, proceed under the same abstraction and
formality. For they are defined according to the
notion of or as ordered25 to motion, and they
only differ in that in the Physics those things are
defined which pertain to motion in common, and
in the other books those which pertain to the
particular notions and species of motion. A sign
of this is that the principles which are treated in
the Physics are used in the De Caelo and the De
Generatione. Nor is it the case that these latter
books imply some science that is subalternated
to the science in the Physics, for they do not add
a difference that is accidental and extraneous to
motion in common, but something intrinsic and
essential. Therefore, if they use the principles of
Physics in common, they pertain to the same sci-
ence. For the same science which treats of some
genus in common, treats of its essential species.
Otherwise, there would always be different sci-
ences for treating of something in general and in
its various essential species, yet we see the oppo-
site in Metaphysics and Theology and the other
sciences. These not only treat of one species of
thing, but of many, insofar as they agree in some
common account, insofar as they are endued with
b c
See ibid., p. 822b21.
25
the same mode of defining and consequently of
illuminating conclusions.
Against this two objections are
raised: First from the authority of St. Thomas
(In Post. An., lib. I, lect. 41)c , where he says
that “the natural body is one genus of the
scientifically knowable, and mathematical body
is another genus. Hence there are diverse first
principles for each of these genera and, con-
sequently, diverse sciences. Furthermore, each
of these genera is distinguished into diverse
species according to diverse modes and aspects
of intelligibility.” 26 But a natural body is the
object of Philosophy; therefore according to St.
Thomas, under this generic object are contained
many species and “aspects of intelligibility.” 27
Therefore, there are diverse species of science.
The second: In “mathematical body” there are
diverse species of sciences, for instance, Geome- 19
try and Arithmetic, on account of diverse specific
abstractions from sensible matter. Therefore also
diverse abstractions among natural body consti-
tute diverse sciences. Moreover, it is well known
that the abstraction is different when one con-
siders the physics of the heavens, which move by
local motion alone, and in the case of generable
and corruptible things (for the motion of gener-
ation is concerned rather with matter and ma-
terial conditions than which local motion). Like-
wise, the soul has a greater separation from the
conditions of matter, particularly in view of the
rational soul, which in its being28 is spritual and
independent from matter in existence29 .
In response: First, St. Thomas expressly
does not say that mobile being, which is the
object of Philosophy,30 is a genus of knowable
things and is divided into diverse species, but
he says that natural body is. Moreover, granting
See Leon.1.307, n. 12.
 Q. 1, A. 3. Whether being is the first thing known
that natural body and mobile being as equivalent
in their supposition (since every mobile being is
a body), nonetheless the formal notion of mobile
being unifies all things which Philosophy treats
under the single notion of mobility, because it
examines or abstracts from matter in the same
way. However, natural body is related to Philos-
ophy materially, and is open to diverse formal
notions and to diverse scientific considerations,
as in Medicine and in Philosophy. For Medicine,
while it formally does not treat of natural body
(insfoar as it is mobile being taken generally or
specifically), nonetheless it treats of natural body
as healable. Health, while it is acquired through
various motions, is nonetheless not formally the
focus of Medicine insfoar as it is a motion but in-
sofar as motion is ordered to health, as explained
in the preceding article.a
To the second, Mathematics and Philosophy
possess disparate defining notions, since Mathe-
matics does not treat of quantity as to its quid-
dity. Continuous and discrete quantity can, in
fact, have this quiddity in common according
to some principle and mode of knowledge, and
are treated as such in Metaphysics when it con-
siders the quiddity of quantity and its species.
Yet Mathematics considers proportions and mea-
sures, which vary in discrete and continuous
quantity as follows, namely, they are reduced
to diverse principles and to diverse abstractions
and modes of defining. This is so because mea-
surement through magnitude is in no way ap-
propriate to the mode of measuring belonging to
counting. For the latter proceeds in a more ab-
stract mode, because a magnitude measures by
way of containing (as a place does), a number
by the intellect numbering. Whereas in Philos-
ophy all things are reduced and treated insofar
a
See above, p. 23; (Reiser ed. vol. 2, p. 17a16).
26
as they are commonly under the account of mo-
tion and the mobile, and there can only be dif-
ferences as belonging to the common account of
the mobile as such and the species contained un-
der it. In such cases, however, diverse abstrac-
tion of local motion and generation do not con-
stitute diverse sciences, because local corporeal
motion, which Physics alone treats, is equally
sensible and is reduced to the same principles
of mobility as the motion of generation or of liv-
ing things. For all these are treated under the
account of the mobile quiddity. Medicine, how-
ever, while it can only proceed under abstraction
from individual matter, nonetheless does not fall
under the same mode of abstraction, nor under
the formal account of the mobile, but of the heal-
able. Hence it proceeds more concretely and ap-
proaches nearer to singular things and to prac-
tice, because it considers health as the healble
through motion. Granted, while treatment only
takes place through motion,31 it is not consid-
ered under the formality of motion, but under
the formality of the proportion and balance of
the humors.
Article 3 Whether the more univer- 20
sal, and therefore being it-
self as such, is the first
thing known by our intel-
lect
I
n the beginning of the first book of
the Physics, the Philosopher proposes
as a proœmium to his text a consider-
ation of the order of our knowledge from more
common things to less common things. In sum-
mary the teaching of Aristotle can be reduced
to three distinctions and three propositions.