ORDER OF PREFERENCE

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioner,

- versus -
ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
September 2, 2005 G.R. No. 153798
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS
Respondent Aleli Corazon Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco,
hereinafter). She alleged, among other things, that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased
and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his
second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent.

Petitioner Belen Angeles opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of Aleli, be
made the administratrix of Franciscos estate. Belen alleged having married Francisco on August
7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was
ratified two (2) months later in religious rites.

Belen also averred that Aleli could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by
him. Pressing on, Belen further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate
child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Belen likewise
averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et
al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

Eventually, the trial court ruled that Aleli failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of
Francisco. Hence Aleli’s Petition was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and ordered the RTC to appoint Aleli as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.

ISSUE
Who has the preference to be appointed as administrator of the deceased estate?

RULING
Belen Angeles is preferred. Aleli failed to establish legitimate filiation with the deceased.

It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution,
to the decedents property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has
to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.
 STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
- versus -
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent

G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006

A surety companys liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of the
principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of that
liability.

FACTS

On May 24, 1989, Respondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with
Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways
and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Pasig City. It was agreed that Asahi was
to pay JDS P5,300,000.00. In order to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its
undertakings, JDS posted a performance bond of P795,000.00. JDS executed the performance
bond, holding JDS jointly and severally with Petitioner Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI).

Eventually, the project ensued. However, for several times, Asahi called the attention of JDS to
the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the
construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders
went unheeded by JDS.

Ultimately, Asahi rescinded the contract with JDS because of JDS’ noncompliance with the
terms of the contract. Asahi alleged that, as a result of JDS’s failure to comply with the
provisions of the contract, it had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it
incurred an additional expense of P3,256,874.00.

Hence, Asahi sent a letter to SICI filing its claim under the bond for not less
than P795,000.00. Another letter was sent reiterating the demand but both letters allegedly went
unheeded.

Asahi then filed a complaint against JDS and SICI. It sought from JDS payment
of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional expenses incurred by Asahi for the completion of
the project using another contractor, and from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment
of P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance bond.

Summons were served to SICI but the court was informed of the death of Jose D. Santos in 1990
and that JDS was no longer in its office address and its whereabouts are unknown.

SICI filed its answer, alleging that Asahi’s money claims against SICI and JDS have been
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.

In1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint of Asahi against JDS and SICI,
on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D.
Santos, Jr.

The CA ruled that SICIs obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the
death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE
Was the liability of SICI under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the
death of Santos, the principal?

RULING
No.
Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under
the surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the
bond.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation.[8] Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.[9] Only
obligations that are personal[10] or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by
death.[11]

Section 5 of Rule 86[12] of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
actually extinguished.[13] What is extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed before the
court, which is not then acting as a probate court.[14]

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of
law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities,
which merely passed on to his estate.[15] Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to
wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot
use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

The liability of SICI is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond

The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the contractor
with labor or materials for the prosecution of the work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on
the penal bond, pursuant to the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and
confirmed.[16]

Elucidating on Civil Code provisions on the matter, the Court in Garcia v. Court of
Appeals[18] stated thus:

x x x. The suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his
own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the
principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a
valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said
to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with
the principal. x x x.[19]

SO ORDERED.
PROJECT OF PARTITION
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and
REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial
Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992

ROMERO, J.:
FACTS
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento."
NOTE: The will is in Spanish. Nevermind, no habla Espanol.

1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said "testamento" in the possession
and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for
the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the CFI.

The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in due course,
the probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the
executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.

Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by the probate court in an order dated
January 8, 1971. Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings
in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be
adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the testate
proceedings.

In 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda.
de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed
an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over certain
lots in Talisay.

A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. In
due time, substitutes were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.

Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings
No. 8452 to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed
among others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that the order dated January 8,
1971(order of Partition) be reconsidered and amended.

Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares opposed the aforesaid motion.
They alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of
Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions
sought to be enforced are null and void.

On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate
proceedings.
ISSUE
Was the partition executed by the heirs of Maria Lizares valid? Yes

RULING
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 32

The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . A project of partition is
merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject.
It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled
thereto. 38

In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria
Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in
which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as
property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In
accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion
Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario
Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on
November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over the lots in
Talisay. These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of
partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the
guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed
to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit
him. 39 Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that
the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the
partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the
control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the
partition. 40 The question of private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded
by the partition and became a closed matter.

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in
the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become
final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41

It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest
rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

SO ORDERED.
WHO MAY ADOPT
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY
HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
FACTS
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of USA. In
1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all
surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple
even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption.

The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE
Are the spouses Hughes qualified to adopt under Philippine Laws?

RULING
It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt as the Family Code expressly
disqualifies an alien from adopting. However, aliens, not exempt, may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

Lenita, however, can qualify because she is a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No.
209, expressing as follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and
the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only
two instances —
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that
James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings.
This view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely
assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that
necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental
authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can
bring not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves.
We also realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the
physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has
in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is
given,1 we must obey its full mandate.

Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having to call the attention of the
appropriate agencies concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption,
a matter that evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph,
Family Code).

SO ORDERED.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WHEN AVAILABLE
JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner,
- versus –
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO
CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 160922 February 27, 2006

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth[2] reported to the
Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly
taken by 4 armed men from their residence at Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.[3] A couple of days later,
A Mission Order was issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In said
Order, appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct verification/validation of the
admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have violated the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under arrest.[4] Per records of
the BID, Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani. He was admitted as an
immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on March 17, 1993.[5]

A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested. The arresting officers, operatives of
the Bureau of Intelligence of the BID, relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who
pointed to Javed Kiani as the one who had furnished them with fake Alien Certificate
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR). Apparently, the forms used
were not official BID forms.

The BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet[7] against Javed Kiani alias Ahmad Singh before the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kianis wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus[10] for and in behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila, naming the BID and its
intelligence officers as respondents. She prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas
corpus directing respondents to produce the person of Javed Kiani before it in the soonest time
possible and to show the cause or legal justification for the latter’s detention and imprisonment,
if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises. She further alleged that her husband had intervened in the arrest
of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting officers resented such intervention.She insisted
that the arrest and detention of her husband were bereft of factual and legal basis, since at the
time, no deportation order had yet been issued against him.

The RTC issued an Order[14] granting bail for Javed Kiani on a bond, and ordered respondent
BID Intelligence Officers to file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and alleged
in their return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and ordered deported;
hence, the petition had become moot and academic. They refused to release Kiani although the
bond had already been posted.

The RTC issued an Order setting aside its order granting the Petition for the Writ of Habeas
Corpus. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi was barred from questioning the legality
of the arrest and detention of her husband, following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI;
as such, there was no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
The CA, on appeal, affirmed the RTC. The CA declared that a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus can no longer be allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged before
the BSI.

Hence, this case.

ISSUE
Should the Writ of Habeas Corpus be issued?

RULING

On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord with jurisprudence
when it dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals,[32]

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the
trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating
to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to
the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null
and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in
the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued
as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat
that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors
and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief
by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.[33]

In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her
husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him for violation of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever
irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a
motion for the dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration
Commissioner, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC. The RTC had no
authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner, much less set
aside the arrest of Javed Kiani.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if
the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court includes quasi-
judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[35]

SO ORDERED.
WRIT OF AMPARO; WHEN AVAILABLE

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and
CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino
Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through
Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.

Christina gave birth to Baby Julian. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses. Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment7 to the DSWD.

Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing about the birth of his son.
Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased
had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.

The DSWD issued a certificate10declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." In
2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina
Spouses). Supervised trial custody then commenced.

In 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD
asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her
family back together. However, the DSWD informed her that the certificate declaring Baby
Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality which terminated her parental authority
and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary
Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

The RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing
of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to
regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed
a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors

Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE
Is a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo the proper remedy for Christina to avail? No.

RULING
Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened
by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment
between her and Sun and Moon. She claims that she had been "blackmailed" through the said
Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child
thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also
reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they
deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances"
as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State ora political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance"
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore,
no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.37 Since
it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security
of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

SO ORDERED.
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTERIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

[G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005]

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba,
and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ROSENDO C. HERRERA, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS
On October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition[5] for cancellation
of the following entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit:
1. the surname Herrera as appended to the name of said child;
2. the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and
3. the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on
August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries are false
and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said
birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C.
Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.

The trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing, and directed the publication and
service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate, and to the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General.

At the scheduled hearing, Armi was not present. The return of the notice sent to her stated that
service was not be had as Armi was no longer residing in the given address.

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the name of the child, the
surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA;
and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong,
MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled. This order became final and executory.

In 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She
allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial court only on February 26, 1998, when San
Beda College, where her son was enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private
respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner minors surname from
Herrera to Alba.

Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza Towers
Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her residence
when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to 1988; and her
abode when petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985. Even after their separation, private
respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998; and that Unit 302 was conveyed to
her by private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his support to petitioner minor. According
to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth
certificate of their son, was entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by
her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418
Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice
therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported
cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as false statements coming from
a polluted source.[17]

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner failed to
prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court.
It further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his
mother.[18] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Armi despite summons not being
served upon her?
Yes. (Rule 108 petition is an action in rem.)

RULING

In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter
jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry
records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a
petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial
Court.[28] Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is
therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a
newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due
process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth
certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth
bears her signature, the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been entered with her
approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including
Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in
the petition. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.[29] The absence of
personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court
of Appeals correctly noted:
The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the
respondent court to try and decide the case. While nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition
during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the
case and of its authority to continue trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction,
once acquired continues until termination of the case.

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a
person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.[30]

SO ORDERED.