Republic of the Philippines Almeda, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 44693.
It charges him with having
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18428 August 30, 1962
MARIANO G. ALMEDA, SR., and VALERIANA F. ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez and Associates for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction, filed by
petitioners seeking to set aside and declare null and void the orders, dated March
15, 1961 and May 8, 1961, of the respondent Judge Jesus Y. Perez of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 44693 of said court. The first order
allowed the filing of an amended petition for forfeiture against petitioners; the
second denied a motion for the reconsideration thereof and for the dismissal of the
amended petition for forfeiture.
In October, 1961, Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza, filed a complaint
with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. with having
acquired, during his incumbency as government employee, cash and properties
from unknown sources in the total amount of P121,407.98 which acquisitions,
according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and
other lawful income of said Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law.
Pursuant to the provisions of said Act, a preliminary investigation was conducted
by a committee of investigators designated by the Secretary of Justice. In a
resolution of said investigators, dated November 4, 1960, it was certified that there
is reasonable ground to believe that from 1950 to 1959, Mariano G. Almeda, Sr.
acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Assistant Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation, and to his other lawful income.
On the basis of the findings of the investigators, the Solicitor General, representing
the Republic of the Philippines as petitioner, filed on November 12, 1960, with,
Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for forfeiture against Mariano G.
committed while engaged in the performance of his official and, in consequence of
said graft, had acquired properties and made cash disbursements from 1950 to
1959 grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. His wife was included as a co-
respondent in her capacity as wife of Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. and as co-owner of
their conjugal properties.
Petitioners herein filed their answer on December 1960 and thereafter the case
was set for hearing, but February 15, 1961, the Solicitor General filed a "Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture". The judge granted the motion but rejected
the inclusion of Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as party respondent. On March 25, 196 the
Solicitor General filed the amended petition for forfeiture, adding other counts and
items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements thus increasing the
alleged cash from unexplained sources received by the respondent from the years
1950-59 to P208,682.45, as against respondent's salary and other lawful income of
only P59,860.97. Respondents, petitioners herein, objected to the amendment on
the ground that the new counts or charges already been investigated and
dismissed after investigation, and respondents had not been given a new
preliminary investigation with respect to the new counts or charges that the
proceeding under Republic Act No. 1379 being criminal in nature, the petition may
not be amended as substance without respondents' consent. It is also claim that
the amendments were presented only to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of
the respondents, and that the new counts or charges could not be included
because one year had already elapsed after a general election in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1379. After the filing of memoranda by the parties
the respondent judge issued the order sought to be reviewed, authorizing the
presentation of the second amended petition but without including therein Mariano
F. Almeda, Jr. as a party respondent. The court ruled as follows:
The Court finds no merit to the contention that the amended petition seeks
to include new counts which were previously dismissed by the
investigating Fiscals because no such dismissal appears in the resolution
of said investigating fiscal and moreover, the only function of the
investigating fiscals in the preliminary investigation was to determine
whether or not there is probable cause that respondents have acquired
properties beyond their means. The items of receipts and disbursements
or acquisitions referred to as new counts by the respondents are but
allegations in detail respecting the main allegation that respondents
unlawfully acquired the properties described in the amended petition. The
new allegations of receipts and disbursements embodied in the amended
petition objected to by the respondents merely supplement or amplify the
facts of unlawful acquisition originally alleged in the original petition. These
amendments hence relate back to the date of the filing of the original
petition so that the prohibition contained in Rep. Act 1379 that no petition
shall be filed within one year before a general election cannot apply with
 respect to the new items of receipts and disbursements. The Court finds
no merit in the respondents' contention that the amended petition should
not be admitted on the allegation that this proceeding is penal in nature
and no amendment as to matters of substance can be admitted after the
respondents have filed their answer because this is a civil case and the
rules respecting amendments in civil cases and not of informations in
criminal cases should govern the admission of amendments in this case.
The mere fact that a preliminary investigation is required to be held in a
proceeding of this nature does not make the same a criminal proceeding.
Hence, the rule that amendments of pleadings are favored and should be
liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice should be applied.
With reference to the objection that no preliminary investigation was
conducted insofar as the new respondent Mariano P. Almeda is
concerned, the Court finds said objection to be well-founded because no
preliminary investigation was in fact conducted insofar as said new
respondent is concerned in violation of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act 1379.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the petitioner to file, within ten
days, a second amended petition without including therein, Mariano F.
Almeda as party respondent or make reference therein with respect to said
person.
SO ORDERED.
The principal contention of the petitioners herein, respondents in the court below,
is that Republic Act No. 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence the
presentation of the amended petition without the benefit of a previous preliminary
investigation under the Act cannot be allowed; that the amendment would have the
effect of presenting charge (under Republic Act No. 1379) within one year from the
date of a general election; and lastly that amendment may not be made on a
matter of substance after the defendants had pleaded.
A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379 readily discloses that the
proceeding for forfeiture is in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the petitioners.
A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is
civil or criminal, thus:
. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and
may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they
are in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its
nature it cannot be considered as civil. If however, the proceeding does
not involve the conviction of wrongdoer for the offense charged the
proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so
provision where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is
not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for recovered in a
civil action. (37 CJS, Forfeitures, Sec. 5, pp. 15-16).
In the first place a proceedings under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does, not
terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure
outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus
there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The
preliminary investigation which is require prior to the filing of the petition, in
accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a
preliminary investigation in a criminal in a criminal case. If the investigation is only
similar to that in a criminal case, but other steps in the proceedings are those for
civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it
been a criminal proceeding there would been, after a preliminary investigation, a
reading of information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a trial thereafter, with the
publication of the judgement in the presence of the defendant. But these
proceedings as above set forth, are not provided for in the law. 1äwphï1.ñët
Section 12 of the law provides a penalty to the public officer, but said penalty is
against the employee or officer for the transfer or conveyance of any unlawfully
acquired properties. The law therefore penalizes an officer for transferring or
conveying properties unlawfully acquired but does not do so for making the
unlawful acquisition; it merely imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties
unlawfully acquired.
As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the law, is
not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the properties illegally
acquired, and as the procedure outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil
actions, amendment of the charges or the petition for forfeiture may be made as in
ordinary civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial or in the
course of trial without need of another investigation. It also follows that
amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the petition
without obtaining the consent of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs. So
ordered.
Bengzon, CJ., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19052 December 29, 1962
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondent City of Manila.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, to restrain the Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111 of
said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as the whole
proceedings in said criminal case. .
On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed
with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with
"graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer
and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets
and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". On September 6,
1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5)
members, consisting of former Justice Marceliana R. Montemayor, as
Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and
Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the
charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its
report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the
investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of
complainant Col. Maristela, or considered petitioner herein to take the witness
stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected,
personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the
aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the
witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such
questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully
refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. Hence, in a
communication dated September 18, 1961, the Committee referred the matter
to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper.
On September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a "charge" reading as follows:
The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt
under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to
sections I and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, committed as follows:
That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation
conducted at the U.P. Little Theater:, Padre Faura, Manila, by
the Presidential Committee, which was created by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with
law to investigate the charges of alleged acquisition by
respondent of unexplained wealth and composed of Justice
Marceliano Montemayor, as Chairman, and Justices
Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug and Generals
Basilio Valdez and Guillermo Francisco, as members, with the
power, among others, to compel the attendance of witnesses
and take their testimony under oath, respondent who was
personally present at the time before the Committee in
compliance with a subpoena duly issued to him, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and contumaciously, without any
justifiable cause or reason refusal and fail and still refuses and
fails to obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the
witness stand, be sworn and testify as witness in said
investigation, in utter disregard of the lawful authority of the
Committee and thereby obstructing and degrading the
proceedings before said body.
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily
adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee and
accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until such
time as he shall obey the subject order of said committee.
This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned
to Branch XVIII thereof, presided over by respondent Judge. On October 2,
1961, the latter issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause and/or
answer the charge filed against him within ten (10) days. Soon thereafter, or on
October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the
charge and/or order to show cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City Fiscal
has neither authority nor personality to file said char and the same is null and
void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed without a preliminary
investigation, and, civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of
civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts
charged constitute no offense for section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due process, in that it is vague
and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable
therefor and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be treated also
contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court (3) that more than one
offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be
punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court an
as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the
Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness
stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the
latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
By resolution dated October 14, 1961. respondent Judge denied said motion to
quash. Thereupon, or on October 20, 1961, petitioner began the present action
for the purpose adverted to above, alleging that, unless restrained by this
court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for contempt, and that
such action would not be appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation
being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation
to preliminary investigations (Section '08-C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under
section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. contempt against an
administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that
petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that, tinder the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may
refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse,
not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand
(3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the
issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the
aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was
created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there
seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of
petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that
the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law,
which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to
partake of the nature of a penalty.
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without
compensation, in consequence of a default an offense, and the term is
used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is
imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the
parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of
conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain
the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such a
offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the
specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599)
(Emphasis ours.)
In Black's Law Dictionary a "forfeiture" is defined to be "the incurring of
a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of
violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some
requirement of law." It may be said to be a penalty imposed for
misconduct or breach of duty. (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek
no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to
be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to
the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a
punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal
proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is
upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such
proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far
considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory
production of his books and papers. ... (23 Am. Jur. 612; emphasis
ours.)
Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the late decisions are to
the effect that suits for forfeitures incurred by the commission of
offenses against the law are so far of quasi-criminal nature as to
be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of ... that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... It
has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the various
State Constitution, that a witness or party called as witness cannot be
made to testify against himself as to matters which would subject his
property to forfeiture. At early common law no person could be
compelled to testify against himself or to answer any question which
would have had a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture or to
form a link in a chain of evidence for that purpose, as well as to
incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection against
compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to
forfeiture, such protection was claimed and availed of in some early
American cases without placing the basis of the protection upon
constitutional grounds. (23 Am. Jur., 616; emphasis ours.)
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in
the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no
judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or
reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some
aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-
criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares, that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as
against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be
proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited. (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368; emphasis ours.)
lawphil.net
The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence
which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally
to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend
to expose him to a ... forfeiture .... (58 Am. Jur., See. 43, p. 48;
emphasis ours.)
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a
witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and
penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of
property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a
proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in
nature, .... (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49: emphasis ours.)
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by
merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The
privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to
answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to
answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to
the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to
answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is
virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke
the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all
questions. (C.J.S., p. 252; emphasis ours.)
A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a
penalty or to answer any question as a witness which would subject
him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed
as a vindication of the public justice of the state.
In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision
against compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled
to answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a
penalty orforfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is
imposed in vindication of the public justice the state as a statutory fine
or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance,
even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought
 in a criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure
applicable to ordinary civil remedy. (98 C. J. S., pp. 275-6.)

Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the
information, in a proceeding to declaration a forfeiture of certain property
because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil
proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for
penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for the
purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer
was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in
substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all
cases in which the action prosecution is not to establish, recover or
redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the
commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is a action, suit or cause
instituted to punish an infraction the criminal laws, and, with this object in
view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case
...". This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151).
Hence, the Lawyer Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive
examination of pertinent cases, concludes that said constitutional provision
applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a
redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a
public wrong and to deter others from offending in likewise manner. ...".

We are unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428
(August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents'
answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition
may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal
procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture
proceeding in civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the
purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing the
substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional
right against self-incrimination.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby
enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,

Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74225 April 17, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SIMPLICIO BERDON,
GAUDIOSA BERDON and LUIS BERDON, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bernardito A. Florido for private respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The Republic assails as erroneous the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming that of the Court of First Instance which
dismissed the petition for forfeiture of unexplained wealth under Republic
Act No. 1379 filed against private respondents herein.
The dismissed petition charged Simplicio Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil
Engineer assigned to Regional Office No. VII of the Bureau of Public
Highways in Cebu City, with having acquired unexplained wealth in
violation of Republic Act No. 1379. It alleged that during the period from
1963 to 1969 he and his wife Gaudiosa Mangubat Berdon purchased
parcels of land and constructed a house, the purchase prices and costs of
which were not commensurate to their incomes, savings or declared
assets. Pleaded as defendants in the petition were Berdon, his wife, and
Luis Berdon, his father. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, which valued
the unexplained wealth at P124,495.82, thus sought the forfeiture of the
properties and the issuance of a writ of attachment. Upon orders of the trial
court, the properties enumerated in the petition were attached.
During the course of the trial, the following evidence was adduced by the
parties:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence for the petitioner as testified to by Joselito
Magno and Atty. David Macayayong may be summarized as
follows:
That on the basis of a letter complaint sent to the Office of
the President by a certain George Valde against Simplicio
Berdon, the Complaint and Investigation Office,
Malacañang, Manila, sent Joselito Magno and Atty. David
Macayayong to conduct an actual field investigation on Mr.
Simplicio Berdon. Both investigators went to Cebu City,
Danao City and the Northern Towns of Bogo and Borbon,
Cebu and secured pertinent documents relative to the case
such as the service record of the respondent Simplicio
Berdon (Exh. 'B') copies of sworn statement of financial
condition, assets, income and liabilities of respondent-
spouses Berdon, Exhibit "C" for the year 1962; Exhibit "D"
for 1963; Exhibit "E" for 1965; Exhibit "F" for 1967 and
Exhibit "G" for 1969. Copies of documents regarding the
acquisition of respondent Simplicio Berdon were also
obtained, to wit: Exhibit 'H' which is a Deed of Absolute Sale
of a parcel of land in favor of respondents-spouses Berdon
for a consideration of P3,700.00 executed on July 19,1967;
Exh. "I" is a contract to sell by installments of a parcel of
land of the Singson Village Subdivision, Cebu City, in favor
of respondent Simplicio Berdon for a monthly installment of
P107.00, more or less, and with a total consideration of
P9,000.00; Exh. "J" is a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of
agricultural land dated September 6,1967 also in favor of
respondent Simplicio Berdon for a consideration of
P3,000.00; Exh. "K" is another Deed of Absolute Sale of a
parcel of land situated in Cebu City, containing an area of
623 square meters in favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon
for the sum of P15,825.00 executed on November 9, 1967;
Exh. "L" is a Deed of Sale With Right to Repurchase within a
period of 5 years of a parcel of agricultural land situated at
Managasa, Borbon, Cebu executed by Fidel Sepulveda in
favor of respondent Simplicio Berdon on November 27,
1967 for a consideration of P5,000.00; Exh. 'M' is another
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase within the period of
three (3) years of a parcel of agricultural land also situated
at Managasa, Borbon, Cebu, executed by Felicidad S.
Guiachon on December 7, 1967 in favor of respondent
Simplicio Berdon for a consideration of P3,000.00; Exh. "N-
1" is a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Managasa, Borbon, Cebu, executed by Elias M.
Dosdos on December 17, 1967 in favor of respondent
Simplicio Berdon for the sum of P25,000.00; Exh. "Y" is a
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by
Felicidad S. Guiachon on July 4, 1968 in favor of respondent
Simplicio Berdon for a sum of P5,000.00; Exh. "P" is another
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by Fidel
Sepulveda on November 8, 1968 in favor of Simplicio
Berdon for the sum of P10,000. 00 and Exh. "O" refer to a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 18, 1969 of a parcel
of land situated at Bogo, Cebu in favor of respondent
Simplicio Berdon; Exh. "S" refer to a Deed of Extrajudicial
partition of a parcel of land acquired by respondent Luis
Berdon for a consideration of P1,000.00. This parcel of land
is included since the respondent Luis Berdon had no known
source of income and this land must have been purchased
by the respondent Simplicio Berdon but under the name of
respondent Berdon; and Exh. "R" is a Declaration of Real
Property, a residential house of strong materials owned by
respondent Simplicio Berdon with an assessed value of
P34,480.00. An analysis and evaluation of respondent
Simplicio Berdon's financial condition, income, assets and
liabilities reflected in Exhs. "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G" from
1962 to 1969 show an unexplained total income of
P105,495.92. Not included in the computation is the sum of
P1,000.00 which was the consideration of the parcel of land
purchased in the name of respondent Luis Berdon so that
the total unexplained income of respondent Simplicio
Berdon for the years 1962 to 1969 is P109,495.92. The total
amounts paid by respondents spouses in the several real
properties purchased and/or constructed by them amounts
to P101,305.00 as shown in Exhs. "H", "I" , "J" , "K", "L", "M",
"N-1", "O" and "P", "Q" and "R" plus the aforementioned sum
of P1,000.00 purchased for a parcel of land in the name of
Luis Berdon (Exh. 'S'). Since the money used to purchase
those real properties came from an unexplained income
these properties should be forfeited in favor of the state.
The evidence for the respondents as testified to by
respondents spouses Simplicio Berdon and Gaudiosa
Mangubat Berdon is as follows:
Respondent Mrs. Berdon is employed as a pharmacist at
the Danao General Hospital (Exh. '4'). Her parents who have
several landholdings in the municipality of Borbon, Cebu
(Exh. '9') extended to respondents spouses a loan in the
sum of P5,000.00 (Exh. '10-A') to buy the house and lot in
Danao City. Aside from this amount respondents spouses
were given by Mrs. Berdon's mother the sum of P3,000.00
to repair said house which was already very dilapidated.
Respondents deny having owned a moviehouse in Bogo,
Cebu. Moreover, Mrs. Romualda Mangubat, respondent
Mrs. Berdon's mother, owns the moviehouse.
Respondent Simplicio Berdon testified that he started in the
government service as construction foreman in the year
1955. Since then he has been in the government service
and rose from the ranks when he was promoted to the
position of Assistant Staff Civil Engineer in the Ministry of
Public Highways, Region 7. Aside from respondents
spouses' income as government employees they have also
other income, and for which they have paid taxes thereon
under Presidential Decree 370 (Exhs. '12' and '12- A') and
Presidential Decree 631 (Exhs. '13' & '13-A'). In
respondents-spouses' statement of assets and liabilities as
of December 31, 1967, the P20,000.00 disbursed as
insurance premiums was erroneous. This amount
represents the face value of the insurance policy of
respondent Simplicio Berdon (Exh.'15'). Insurance premiums
should have been only P427.66 semi-annually (Exh. '15-A').
The respondent Simplicio Berdon also denied petitioner's
allegation that the purchase price of the parcel of land he
bought from a certain Elias Dosdos was P45,000.00. The
truth is that he paid only P25,000.00 as shown in Exhs. "16"
 & "16-A". The residential house of respondents spouses
situated in Lahug, Cebu City, actually costs about
P25,000.00 as shown in the building permit of said house
(Exhs. '17' and '17-A') and respondents spouses were able
to obtain a real estate loan of P14,000.00 from the GSIS to
finance the construction of said building (Exhs. '18' & '19').
Sometime on November 7, 1967, the respondent Simplicio
Berdon obtained a personal loan from former Congressman
Ramon Durano in the sum of P100,000.00 under a
Memorandum of Agreement (Exhs. '20') which amount he
used to purchase the several parcels of agricultural lands in
1967 and 1968. The marriage contract of the respondents
spouses marked Exh. "21" showed that Congressman and
Mrs. Durano stood as sponsors of the wedding of
respondents spouses. Defendants spouses had also
obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (Exh. '22') which they used to purchase the lot in
Bogo, Cebu containing an area of 359 sq. m. (Exh. '23')
mentioned in petitioner's Exh. "O".
Respondent Luis Berdon was not presented. However,
Exhibit "11" which is a medical certificate issued by the
municipal health officer of Bordon, Cebu was presented to
show that the general physical condition of the respondent
Luis Berdon cannot sustain long distance land travel. Exhs.
"5" and "9" were also presented showing that the
respondent Luis Berdon is a retired school teacher and a
declared owner of several parcels of land situated in
Bordon, Cebu, respectively. (pp. 67-76, Record on Appeal).
[IAC Decision, pp. 3-7; Rollo, pp. 34-38.]
On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial court dismissed the
petition, holding that respondents have no unexplained wealth.
The Republic appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. The appellate court, finding no reversible error in the
decision appealed from, affirmed said decision. Said court found that, on
the basis of the evidence presented, "the assets acquired by the
respondent-spouses in excess of their income and receipts from their
employment in the Government were satisfactorily explained, thus justifying
the conclusion of the trial court that respondent-spouses do not have
unexplained wealth subject to forfeiture under Republic Act 1379." [IAC
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 38.]
Hence, the instant recourse by the Republic to this Court through a petition
to review the appellate court's decision.
Republic Act No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the
State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Thereof,"
provides inter alia:
Sec. 2. Filing of petition. — Whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired....
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Judgment. — If the respondent is unable to show to
the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such
property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of
the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be released
within six months before any general election or within three
months before any special election. The Court may, in
addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive
Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
Clear from these provisions is that the law creates a presumption against
the public officer or employee who acquires property grossly
disproportionate to his income, i.e. that the property was unlawfully
acquired. However, this presumption is juris tantum. It may be rebutted by
the public officer or employee by showing to the satisfaction of the court
that his acquisition of the property was lawful.
In the instant case, both the trial and the appellate courts had found
satisfactory the private respondents' explanation of their acquisition of the
properties and consequently held that they do not have any unexplained
wealth as contemplated by the law.
emphasized, however, that in determining whether or not there is
unexplained wealth within the purview of R.A. No. 1379 the courts are not
bound by the statements of assets and liabilities filed by the
respondent. ** On the contrary, this statute affords the respondent every opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, how he had acquired the property in question [Sec. 5, R.A. No. 1379.]

The Solicitor General contends that the findings of the appellate court are
not supported by the evidence and, hence, should not bind the Court. The
Court finds the contention unmeritorious, as the evidence indeed obviates
a finding of unexplained wealth.
The Court has carefully gone over the evidence presented by private
respondents, and like the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court,
finds the acquisition of the subject properties satisfactorily explained.
While respondent spouses had acquired properties and constructed a
house the costs of which were disproportionate to their combined incomes
from their employment in the government it had been proved that such
were financed through a donation and loans, to wit:
(1) a P3,000.00 donation and a P5,000.00 loan from the parents of Mrs.
Berdon who owned several parcels of land and a moviehouse [TSN,
October 3,1979, pp. 11-17; Exh. "9"];
In sum, the presumption under See. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 that the subject
properties were unlawfully acquired had been successfully rebutted by
private respondents through competent evidence. Hence, the Intermediate
Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial court's decision dismissing
the Republic's petition.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and its
decision dated March 31, 1986 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., and Feliciano, J., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., took no part.

(2) a P14,000.00 loan from the Government Service Insurance System

[Exhs. "18" and "19"];

(3) a P6,000.00 loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines [TSN,
November 21, 1979, pp. 21-22; Exhs. "22" and "23"]; and,

(4) a P100,000.00 loan from Congressman Ramon Durano, a wedding

sponsor of respondent spouses [TSN, November 20, 1979, pp. 18-19; Exh.
"21"], for the purchase of agricultural land to be planted with sugarcane
(although only a total amount of approximately P60,000.00 was actually
released) [TSN, November 21, 1979, pp. 17-19; Exh. "20"].

The Solicitor General also makes much of the fact that the statements of
assets and liabilities filed by private respondent Simplicio Berdon covering
the years material to the case did not accurately reflect the donation and
the loans granted to private respondent spouses and that Simplicio's
testimony in effect contradicts the entries in said statements. It must be