3D SPECPRO DIGESTS
Emilio dela Paz vs IAC | Gutierrez, Jr, J
G.R. No. 71537, September 17, 1987|
FACTS
 Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners for a
judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 901 in
the name of Ponciano de la Paz
 Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the
properties adjudicated to her and her mother as a result of a
partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and
approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1399.
 The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1399 was Ponciano's
testate estate.
 In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was
among the properties adjudicated to Loreto and her mother.
They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in
the probate proceedings but is actually community property of
the parties.
 The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were
admittedly compulsory heirs of Ponciano de la Paz who died in
1916
 Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano
 As regards petitioner Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim
that he is one of the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners, however,
allege that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano, he being
the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the
decedent.
 Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony
on March 12, 1984.
 On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-
examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, not
completed.
 The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the
continuance of the cross-examination on the ground that he still
had to conduct a lengthy cross-examination.
 On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction
of transcript" due to some errors in the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto.
The motion was granted.
 This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners''
counsel to manifest that he would not be able to undertake the
cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. The trial court
postponed the trial of the case to May 31, 1984 and later to July
5, and 11, 1984
 Trial resumed. The petitioners' counsel, however, asked for still
another postponement of the cross-examination to give him a
chance to go over the stenographic notes.
 During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the
petitioners, nor their counsel appeared despite due notice.
Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed
to present evidence ex parte before a commissioner.
 Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion
were allowed to cross-examine Loreto.
 On the scheduled hearing however, the petitioners' counsel
failed to appear, and the cross-examination of Loreto was
deferred for the fourth time.
 Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed
his repeatedly postponed cross-examination of Loreto. The
cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled
again on motion of the petitioners' counsel.
 Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended
complaint was filed for the purpose of substituting the
respondents as heirs of Loreto
 The petitioners moved verbally to strike off the record the
entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. Thus, they
filed a petition before the IAC, however the same was also
denied.
 The petitioners contend that the appellate committed grave
abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the trial court's orders
which denied the striking out of the testimony of original
plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the record.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
 W/N petitioners were deprived of their right to cross
examination when the court denied their motion to strike
off the record, the testimony of Loreto
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
 Well settled is the rule that the right of a party to confront and
cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a
fundamental right which is part of due process.
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 The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his
adversary in invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less
than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express
recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does
not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less
constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due
process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-
examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness
cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be
allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the
court in deciding the case.
 But also, it is ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party
can demand at all times.
 The right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity
to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record.
 In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine
Loreto was through no fault of the respondents. As can be
gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-
examination from the time she finished her direct testimony on
March 12, 1984
 The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-
examination but at times failed to appear during scheduled
hearings.
 The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date
due to the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's
testimony may be justified, but the same cannot be said for the
subsequent postponements requested by the petitioners.
 Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had
waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their own
fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her
testimony stands.
Villalon vs. IAC; GR 73751; Sept. 4, ‘86
Facts: A civil case for annulment of a deed of sale, among others,
was filed by Neval et al against Atty. Villalon. Previously, Neval et al
also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Villalon. During the
trial of the civil case, Atty. Villalon introduced in evidence some of
Neval et al’s testimonies in the disbarment proceeding which were
allegedly inconsistent with their testimonies in the civil case for the
purpose of impeaching their testimonies. The trial court granted
the Motion to Strike filed by Neval et al on the ground that its
admission would violate the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings; and that the same cannot be waived.
Issue: WON the attorney subject of a disbarment proceeding may
waive his right to its confidentiality and thus present the
inconsistent testimonies therein in a civil case.
Held: AFFIRMATIVE.
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners
of their right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties’
witnesses (granted under Secs. 15 & 16 of R. 132) by proving that
on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with
the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such
statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject
matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged
falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners’ favor, is the
same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the
said deed of absolute sale is sought.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and
confidential except for the final order which shall be made public,
that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by
the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal
and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general
principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to
public policy, among others.In fact, the Court also notes that even
private respondents’ counsel touched on some matters testified to
by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and which were the
subject of cross examination.
G.R. No. L-8332 November 13, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and
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CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants.
Eugenio Paguia, for appellants
Officee of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the 13th of
March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the
defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of Baliuag. The
justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and
found that there was probable cause for believing that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial
in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the
prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint,
which alleged:
That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of
Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally,
without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or
force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the
latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago
Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in
a violation of law.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause,
the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty
of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be
imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto
mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325
pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they
had already suffered in prison, and each to pay one-third part of
the costs. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to
this court and made the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the
accused to the private prosecutor's question referring to the
character of the witness.
II. The trial court erred in reaching the conclusion that the
crime prosecuted was committed and that the accused are
responsible therefor.
III. The trial court erred in sentencing the accused.
IV. The trial court erred in not having the accused testify in
their own behalf, as they offered to do, allowing them to testify in
the same way as he did the sole witness for the defense.
With reference to the first assignment of error, we find by referring
to page 75 of the record, that Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney
for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the
said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint
presented in said cause, the following question:
How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other
persons?
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the
ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the
purpose of his question by saying:
I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have
had occasion to defend him in various causes for assault.
Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the
character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a
strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present
cause. The objection is overruled."
To that ruling of the court the defendant duly accepted. Said
exception is assigned here as the first assignment of error. The only
argument which the appellant presents in support of his
assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the
question which was being discussed by the court and id not tend to
show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the
crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a
witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant,
the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper
question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness
and that such questions were for that purpose material and
pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that
on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago
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Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria
R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that
complaint had been presented against him for the offense of
assault and battery.
The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which
the crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this
witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R.
Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That
was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take
place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no
assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged
interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it,
and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly
lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault,
had assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor,
may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and
in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to
prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in
the complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat
Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there was occasion for the
inference of Claro Mercado.lawph!1.net
Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party
against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has
made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general
reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act
No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither
attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory
statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a
witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory
statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination
of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he
has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the
present case, the other offense to which the question above related
was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we
assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is
used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined
as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in
guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above
question was properly interposed and should have been sustained.
The question now arises, did the admission of the question
prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough
adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular
proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are
guilty of the crime. then the question and answer and the ruling of
the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of
the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not
prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by
the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the
witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the
complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other
assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action.
The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such
question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the
defendants.
The second and third assignments of error relate to the sufficiency
of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged. A question of fact
only is raised by these assignments of error. After a careful
examination of the proof, we are convinced that the same shows,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants are each guilty in
the manner and form charged in the complaint. We find no reason
for modifying the conclusions of fact reached by the lower court.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, an examination of
the record shows that but one witness was examined for the
defense: that was the said Santiago Mercado. At the close of the
examination of said witness, we find the following statement by the
accused:
The accused state that should they testify they would testify in the
same way as the witness Santiago R. Mercado, with whose
testimony they close their evidence.
Both parties close their evidence.
Even admitting that the accused, had they testified, would have
made the same declarations as those by the only witness, Santiago
Mercado, we are of the opinion that such declarations would not
have been sufficient, inasmuch as they would have added nothing
to the record, except an accumulation of proof, to have shown that
the defendants were not guilty of the crime charged. We find no
reason in the fourth assignments of error for modifying the
conclusions of the lower court.
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After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that
the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants
were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower
court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. 32394 and 32395 September 5, 1930
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
SANDAL, ARIMAO, LONSING, MAMA, and PAMPANG, Defendants-
Appellants.
Paulino Gullas for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCE�A, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The Moros Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama, and Pampang appeal
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Lanao
convicting them of murder committed on the 18th of February,
1929, upon the person of Eleno Lamorena, and sentencing each of
them to twenty years of cadena temporal, with the accessories of
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased jointly and severally in
the amount of P1,000, and to pay their proportional part of the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the date mentioned, in Abaga, District of Monungan, Province
of Lanao, Inambar, a Moro woman, heard the appellant Sandal call
the deceased, and later saw them engaged in conversation. While
the two were talking, appellant Pampang went up to them and with
a hammer struck the deceased on the back of the neck, felling him
to the ground. Sandal and the rest of the appellants, Lonsing,
Arimao, and Mama, then closed in on the fallen man beating him to
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moro Dimaponong testified that early in the morning of that day, he
saw Eleno, the deceased, in Tomas Permites' warehouse, while the
appellants were nearby constructing a house. When witness
returned to the warehouse, he saw neither the deceased nor the
defendants where he had seen them before. On that night as he
was going home, witness saw appellants near a sawmill, carrying
the corpse of Eleno, which they threw into the river. During the
inquiry made by the Constabulary lieutenant into Eleno's
disappearance, Dimaponong testified to this effect, and the corpse
was found in that part of the river indicated by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Pablo Hamoy in the post-mortem examination found the
following lesions: The right side of the neck and the right shoulder
were bruised; the neck was fractured and the right shoulder
dislocated; the right eye was bruised; marked cyanosis and acute
hemorrhage of both eyes which were somewhat sunken; marked
cyanosis of the lips with the incisors jutting forward and loose
cyanosis and hemorrhage of the gums, and hemorrhage of the
nose; cyanosis of the whole face, a wound in the left arm and
forearm, and a contusion on the breast and
abdomen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The following facts of record explain the motive of the assault:
When Tomas Permites went to Manila to look after certain matters
he left Eleno in charge of his interests in Monungan. While
Permites was in Manila, the appellants caused some injuries to his
carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a dispute with them. Eleno
sent word of what had happened to Permites in Manila, and when
the latter returned to Monungan, he verified the facts and filed a
complaint against the appellants. Eleno was to be the principal
witness, and the defendants knew it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The appellants denied the facts set forth and attempted to prove an
alibi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon consideration of the evidence for both sides, we agree with
the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants killed Eleno in
the manner described above. The court below did not err in
weighing the evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Another assignment of error alleged by the appellants in this
instance deals with the trial court's refusal to admit a certain
witness presented by the defense. The court took this stand for the
reason that this witness had been present during the hearing
notwithstanding the court's order that all witnesses leave the court
room. Under such circumstances it lies within the court's discretion
to admit or reject the testimony of the witness. And although we
are of opinion that the court below should have admitted the
testimony of this witness, especially when he stated that he did not
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hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to
show that this error has affected the appellants' defense. There is
nothing to show what this witness would have testified if admitted,
and so it cannot be held that his failure to testify has materially
affected the appellants' defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The appellants also assign as an error the fact that the trial court
failed to require the fiscal to exhibit the testimony given by the
witnesses during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
justice of the peace. But the only effect of this failure was to entitle
the defense to adduce secondary evidence touching the testimony
of said witnesses, for the purpose of attacking their veracity, should
they have been presented as witnesses during the
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Neither did the trial court commit an error in refusing the defense
an extension of time to present Doctor Feliciano, for this is a matter
wholly within the court's discretion, the abuse whereof has not
been shown, especially in view of the fact that it was not informed
of the nature of this witness's testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
People vs Sandal
Facts: When Tomas Permites went to Manila to look after certain matters he left
Eleno Lamorena in charge of his interests in Monungan. While Permites was in
Manila, Sandal, Lonsing, Arimao, Mama and Pampang caused some injuries to his
carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a dispute with them. Eleno sent word of
what happened to Permites in Manila, and when the latter returned to Monungan,
he verified the facts and filed a complaint against Sandal, et. al.. Eleno was to be the
principal witness. On 18 February 1929, in Abaga, District of Monungan, Province of
Lanao, Inambar, a Moro woman, heard Sandal call Eleno Lamorena, and later saw
them engaged in conversation. While the two were talking, Pampang went up to
them and with a hammer struck Lamorena (the deceased) on the back of the neck,
felling him to the ground. Sandal, Lonsing, Arimao, and Mama, then closed in on the
fallen man beating him to death. On that night Moro Dimaponong was going home,
he saw Sandal, et. al. near a sawmill, carrying the corpse of Eleno, which they threw
into the river. Upon the the inquiry made by the Constabulary lieutenant into Eleno's
disappearance, Dimaponong testified that Sandal, et.al. carried the corpse of Eleno
which they threw into the river. The corpse was found in that part of the river
indicated by Dimaponong. Doctor Pablo Hamoy in the post-mortem examination
found the following lesions: The right side of the neck and the right shoulder were
bruised; the neck was fractured and the right shoulder dislocated; the right eyes was
bruised; marked cyanosis and acute hemorrhage of both eyes which were somewhat
sunken; marked cyanosis of the lips with the incisors jutting forward and loose
cyanosis and hemorrhage of the gums, and hemorrhage of the nose; cyanosis of the
whole face, a wound in the left arm and forearm, and a contusion on the breast and
abdomen. Sandal, et. al. were charged for the crime of murder before the Court of
First Instance of Lanao. Sandal, et. al. denied the facts set forth and attempted to
prove an alibi. The trial court convicted Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama, and
Pampang of murder, and sentenced each of them to 20 years of cadena temporal,
with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased jointly and
severally in the amount of P1,000, and
to pay their proportional part of the costs. Sandal, et. al. appealed. Sandal, et.al.
assigned as an error the fact that the trial court failed to require the fiscal to exhibit
the testimony given by the witnesses during the preliminary investigation conducted
by the justice of the peace. Issue: Whether the witnesses during the preliminary
investigation should be presented as witnesses during trial. Held: Sandal, et.al.
assigned as an error the fact that the trial court failed to require the fiscal to exhibit
the testimony given by the witnesses during the preliminary investigation conducted
by the justice of the peace. But the only effect of this failure was to entitle the
defense to adduce secondary evidence touching the testimony of said witnesses, for
the purpose of attacking their veracity, should they have been presented as
witnesses during the trial.
ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE
HEIRS OF LACSA v. CA
FACTS:
this is consolidation of two civil cases in order to recover a parcel of land.
The first case:
 an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by
petitioner heirs against Aurelio Songco and John Doe.
 they alleged that they are the heirs of the original owner of the said parcel of land, Demetria
Lacsa.
 they claimed that Lacsa owned the said land which consisted partly of a fishpond and
uncultivated open lands.
 they claimed that the principal respondent was able to occupy and claim possession of the said
land through stealth and fraud and caused the said land to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof.
The second case:
 petitioners call for the cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction
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 they also allege that they are the heirs of the original owner of the parcel of land Demetria
Lacsa.
 in this case, they also allege that respondents later abandoned the land in dispute after the first
case was filed but they merely transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by respondents.
 also, that the documents which respondents rely for their title are spurious and were probably
fakes (Exhibits 3 and 7)
Respondents denied these material allegations.
They claim that the documents on which petitioners would base their claim are spurious such that the
Original Certificate of Title in favor of Demetria Lacsa was merely a RECONSTITUTED COPY; also such OCT
was later on cancelled in favor of Guevarra and Limpin, who were Lacsa's daughter and son in law
respectively. Said couple had in their favor a TCT which respondents claimed was later on superseded by a
TCT in favor of Inocencio Songco, the father of private respondents by virtue of a sale in favor of the latter.
The lower court held in favor of the respondents stating that Guevarra and Limpin did sell the said parcel
of land to the respondents.
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
WON the documents which repondents based their claim (Exhibit 3 and 7) can be considered as "ancient
documents" under Section 22 Rule 132. YES.
Arguments: Respondents based their claim on two documents:
a. Exhibit 3 - "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Esceritura de Particion Extrajudicial"
 it is in this document where the fishpond in question was adjudicated in favor of Demetria's
daughter Alberta.
b. Exhibit 7 - "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" wherein Alberta Guevarra and Limpin sold the said
fishpond in favor of Inocencio Songco. Petitioners claim that in order for these two documents to be
within the ancient document rule, exempting them from proof of due execution and authenticity, not only
must they be more than 30 years old, they must also be free from alteration and suspicions.
 they assert that since the first pages of the documents were not signed by the alleged parties
thereto this fact constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget alterations.
RATIO:
1. for a document to fall under the ancient document rule several requirements must be met:
a. more than thirty years old – the documents in question fulfill this requirement since they were
executed at 1923 (Exhibit 3 – extrajudicial partition) and 1924 (Exhibit 7 – absolute sale). (The case was
decided in 1991)
b. it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine – both copies of
the said documents were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Register of Deeds by the
Deputy Register of Deeds.
 there is also further certification with regards to the Pampango translation of Exhibit 3.
 being certified, these documents can also be considered as found in the proper custody.
c. the document must appear on its face to be genuine – petitioners in this case, did not present
conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of documents.
 they merely alluded to the fact that the signatures in the first pages of the documents were
lacking therefor could have easily led to their substitution.
 Court cannot uphold the surmise absent any proof whatsoever; a contract apparently honest
and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails it must present conclusive evidence of
falsification.
 moreover, the last requirement refers to the EXTRINSIC quality of the document itself.
 the lack of signatures, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to
detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were CERTIFIED as copied of the originals in
the file with the Register of Deeds are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
HELD: Petition denied.
G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990
RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF SPOUSES BERNABE
BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.
Synopsis:
Lot 11165 is a vast tract of land owned by different individuals. Records show that 725 square
meter portion of it was owned by Epitsacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales. Before he left to settle in
Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin Doroteo Bartolome. When spouses Epitacio and Maria
died, their grandchildren constructed a bamboo fence over the land own by the spouses.
On 1933, the Director of Lands instituted a cadastral proceeding, respondent Cid filed an
answer claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square meters. The land was
allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's
deceased husband, Bernabe. Her sister-in-law, Maria Bartolome filed a motion to intervene alleging that
she is a co-owner of the property and she was excluded in Cid’s petition. Thereafter, Cid filed a motion to
amend petition, alleging that the lands were acquire not through inheritance, but by purchase. Exhibit 4
was presented which is a document of sale between Maria Gonzales (petitioner’s grandmother) and
Ursula Cid of the portion of land in dispute. RTC ruled that petitioner Resureccion et. al were the owners
of the 772 square meter portion, the remaining are owned by the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome. But the CA
ruled that the entire Lot No. 11165 was owned by the respondent relying on the Exhibit 4 because it is an
ancient document.
Issue: WON Exhibit 4 is an ancient document, thus no other evidence of its execution and authenticity
need to be given.
The Supreme Court ruled in negative because the third requirement of “no alteration” was not present.
Based on the testimony of Dominador, son of Ursula, it was originally a 4 pages document But because of
the Japanese occupation, the 4th pages was lost. Supposedly, that page contains the signature of Maria
Gonzales.
According to the Court, the missing page had affected the documents authenticity, it contains vital proof
of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document
is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered
contents.
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 3D SPECPRO DIGESTS
Facts:
The record shows that a 725-square meter portion of said Lot No. 11165 first declared as his property by
Epitacio Batara under tax declaration No. 5708 dated May 23, 1906.
Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and Pedro. The latter died a
bachelor and without issue. Catalina, who married someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five children
named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In 1912, before he left Laoag to settle in
Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome, who owned
the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south.
On October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928,
filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660
square meters. The land was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo
Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased husband, Bernabe.
In 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a "motion to admit answer in intervention,"
alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been
excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition.
No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that she and her husband
purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1,
1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos
from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique; [b] another document dated February 18, 1913
executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of another lot also for
fifteen pesos; 24 and [c] still another deed executed by Maria Gonzales y Paguyo on February 9, 1917 in
favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75.
The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome.
The Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision adjudicating the eastern portion to the heirs
of the late Epitacio Batara (Resurreccion) and the remaining portion to the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome
(Ursula).
On Appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision "adjudicating the whole Lot No. 11165
in favor of" Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid, thereby reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Ilocos Norte, Branch XII at Laoag City. The decision was based on the findings of the court that the
document (Exhibit 4) presented by the respondent is an ancient document.
Issue:
WON the deed of sale presented (Exhibit 4) is an ancient document, thus no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need to be given.
Held:
No. The Exhibit 4 was not an ancient document. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be
given.
The Supreme Court ruled that the first two elements are present. But the Court of Appeals failed to
consider and discuss the third requirement; that no alterations or circumstances of suspicion are present.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his mother, Ursula Cid,
when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing the
signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. He stated that his mother told
him that the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao
City.
We hold, however, that the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance
cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165
in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of
the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if
not worse than a document with altered contents.
Moreover, Ursula only claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law,
Maria J. Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome sought intervention in the case and
demanded their rightful shares over the property. All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that
Exhibit 4 is an ancient document.
[G.R. No. 117221. April 13, 1999]
IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEA, and VICTOR V. REYES, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ANGEL D. ISRAEL, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling
computers and computer services. Petitioners Virgilio L. Pea and Victor V. Reyes were ranking officers of
IBM during the period pertinent to this case.
On April 1, 1975, private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office Products
Customer Engineer.For the next sixteen (16) years, he occupied two other positions in the company,[2]
received numerous awards,[3] and represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and
out of the country.[4]
On February 1, 1990, private respondent was assigned to the team supervised by petitioner Reyes.
On June 27, 1991, petitioner Reyes handed a letter to private respondent informing the latter that his
employment in the company was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual
tardiness and absenteeism.
Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private respondent filed a complaint
with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on July 18, 1991.
In his position paper filed on September 6, 1991, he claimed that he was not given the opportunity to be
heard and that he was summarily dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been duly
proven.
Petitioners denied private respondents claims. It was alleged that several conferences were held by the
management with private respondent because of the latters unsatisfactory performance in the company
and he was given sufficient warning and opportunity to reform and improve his attitude toward
attendance, but to their regret, he never did. It was alleged that private respondent was constantly told of
his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the companys internal electronic mail (e-mail) system.
According to petitioners, this system allows paperless or telematic communication among IBM personnel
in the company offices here and abroad.
ISSUES:
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT NO JUST CAUSE EXISTS NOR WAS THERE DUE
PROCESS OBSERVED IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BECAUSE THE COMPUTER
PRINTOUTS WHICH PROVE JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
Page 8 of 10
 3D SPECPRO DIGESTS
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF THE COMPUTER
PRINTOUTS WERE ADMISSIBLE, PETITIONER FAILED TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS.
RULING:
The petition has no merits. Petitioners argue that the computer print-outs submitted by them need not be
identified or authenticated according to the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to
be admissible in evidence. They contend that technical rules of evidence do not apply to
administrative/labor cases and because of a relaxation of the rules of evidence, private respondent was in
fact allowed by the labor arbiter to adduce additional evidence even after a decision had been rendered.
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license
to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at
least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The Statement of Profit and
Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a
certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents
which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC, dated April 15, 1994, is hereby AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 136211. March 31, 2005]
HEIRS OF VICENTE HIDALGO, SR., petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS:
PD No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. Pursuant to this law, several parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 26.2987 hectares, more or less, owned by the late Vicente F. Hidalgo, Sr., located in Milaor,
Camarines Sur, were placed under the OLT program of the government. The petitioners herein protested
the inclusion of these parcels of land to the OLT program because, according to them, the same had
already been sold to them before their father’s death on 17 April 1979. In view of the protest, the DAR
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office conducted an investigation on the matter. The investigation found out
that the sales made by Vicente Hidalgo, Sr., to his daughters Angela Hidalgo Palacio and Dominica Hidalgo
in the year 1972 were not registered with the Register of Deeds. The protest was denied by the DAR
Regional Director for Region V in his Order dated 20 January 1992. According to the Regional Director, a
sale prior to the effectivity of PD No. 27, if not registered, does not bind the DAR or any third party. It was
also mentioned that the third sale executed in 1974 in favor of Josefina Hidalgo Bergantin was an illegal
transaction which was designed to circumvent the law.
A motion for the reconsideration of the order was filed by Dominica Hidalgo in the form of a letter. It was
denied by the DAR Regional Office for Region V in an order dated 15 June 1994.
An appeal was made to the DAR, alleging among other things, that the tenant farmers had knowledge of
the sale to the heirs of Vicente Hidalgo, Sr. This, according to the petitioners, was already equivalent to
registration.
ISSUES:
The solitary issue that should be resolved in this case is whether or not there was a valid transfer of
ownership of the subject parcels of land to the heirs of Vicente Hidalgo, Sr., thereby exempting the same
from the coverage of the OLT Program of the government pursuant to PD No. 27.
RULING:
This factual finding of the DAR is entitled to great weight. Factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this
Court is not a trier of facts. The petitioners submit that the knowledge of the tenant farmers of the sales
between Vicente Hidalgo, Sr., and his heirs over the parcels of land was already equivalent to registration.
The respondents contented that it is the act of registration that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land which is titled under the Torrens System.
The factual findings of the DAR is entitled to great weight. Factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this
Court is not a trier of facts. Considering that there was no factual finding that the tenant farmers had
actual knowledge of the sales between Hidalgo and his heirs, then, our pronouncement in the case of
Antonio v. Estrella where there was a finding of fact that there was prior knowledge, is inapplicable.
The factual findings of the DAR, which were not disputed nor opposed by the Court of Appeals, that the
tenant farmers had no prior knowledge of the transfer of ownership before the effectivity of PD No. 27
shall not be disturbed.
The Department of Agrarian Reform through its Secretary is hereby empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations for the implementation of this Decree. Culled from the above expositions, it is our conclusion
that the parcels of land subject of the instant case are not exempt from the coverage of the OLT program
of the government.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1998 and its
Resolution dated 20 October 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO. AND TAGUM V. SWEET LINES
DOCTRINES:
• Issues may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so
long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant pleadings.
• Actionable documents must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the
genuineness of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party.
• Failure to specifically deny the existence of actionable documents amounts to an admission. Judicial
admissions are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same.
• Before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence.
• The right of action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and
may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other
circumstances which do not affect the cause of action.
• Performance or fulfilment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of action depends must be
sufficiently alleged, considering that the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action is upon
the person initiating the suit.
EMERGENCY RECIT
Petitioner Tagum Plastics (TAGUM), from Davao, imported polyethylene [basic plastic material] from F. E.
Zuellig in America. Co-petitioner Philippine American General Insurance (PHILAMGEN) is its insurer. The
shipment has to first arrive in Manila before it can be interisland shipped to Davao. Respondent Sweet
Lines was hired to ferry said shipment to Davao. Upon arrival at Davao, it was found that some of the
imported plastics were undelivered or damaged. Petitioners filed suit on the basis of the bills of lading.
Unfortunately, said bills of lading contain prescriptive periods of sixty (60) days to file for claims of
loss/damages. It also required notice to respondent carrier before judicial claims may be had. The bills of
lading, however, were not formally presented as evidence during trial. The RTC ruled in favor of importer-
petitioner, but the CA reversed on the basis of prescription. The SC upheld the CA, saying that even though
the bills of lading were not formally presented as evidence, the same were sufficiently referred to in the
pleadings of both parties. Hence, it was deemed judicially admitted and no evidence was required to
prove its existence.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Philippine American General Insurance Co. (PHILAMGEN) and Tagum Plastics (TAGUM) were
the insurers and importers, respectively, of an order of polyethylene (the basic material for your common
plastics).
Page 9 of 10
 3D SPECPRO DIGESTS
• The polyethylenes are to be shipped from F. E. Zuellig in the United States through an Indian ship, SS
Vishva Yash, and are to be received at Manila. After which, the subject matter is to be shipped to Davao,
TAGUM’s place of business.
• When the Indian vessel arrived at Manila, it sought the services of respondent Sweet Lines, Inc. for the
inter-island shipment to Davao.
• However, when the M/V Sweet Love, owned and operated by Sweet Lines, arrived at Davao, petitioners
found that the some of the imported polyethylene were undelivered or damaged.
• For this reason, petitioners filed suit against respondent Sweet Lines and the Davao Veterans Arrastre
which handled the cargoes at the Davao port.
o The basis for such suit are the bills of lading, which serves as the contract between parties that the
goods indicated therein are to be delivered complete in number and in the condition specified.
o Militating against the petitioners, however, is the prescriptive period included in the bills of lading. It
states that any action arising from shortage or damages must be brought within sixty (60) days from
accrual of right of action.
o Also, notice of claims for loss or damages is required to be given to the carrier before the institution of
judicial claims.
• The bills of lading were not formally offered as evidence; hence it was not shown that a contractual
prescriptive period was indicated therein.
• The Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners PHILAMGEN and TAGUM, but the CA reversed on the basis of
prescription. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled on the basis of prescription even without formal evidence of its
existence.
2. Assuming arguendo that a prescriptive period exists in the contract, on not finding such as null and void
for being contrary to public policy as contracts of adhesion.
3. Assuming further that such is valid and legal, in not finding that petitioners substantially complied
therewith.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, because such was sufficiently raised in the pleadings. Ruling on Prescription EVEN without formal
evidence of its existence.
• The litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts
sued upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the
determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.
• Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so
considered and controverted by the parties.
• Since petitioners are suing on the basis of contractual obligations indicated in the bills of lading, such
bills can be categorized as actionable documents which under the Rules of Court must be properly
pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of which are
deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party.
• Failure to specifically deny the existence of the instruments in question amounts to an admission.
• Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and
cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
• In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by respondent Sweet
Lines in its answer, except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in
evidence.
• Petitioner specifically replied to such defense in respondent’s answer, but it failed to controvert the
existence of the bills of lading. It is thus in the nature of a negative pregnant. Consequently, they impliedly
admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject stipulations. Petitioners MUST
SPECIFICALLY DENY THE EXISTENCE OR PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. This is petitioners’ reply to
respondent’s answer:
o “In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer, plaintiffs state that such
agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of adhesion and, consequently, the
provisions therein which are contrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering
defendant as valid defenses.”
• Petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the non-presentation of the bills of lading. Hence it is too late
in the day to now allow the litigation to be overturned on that score, for to do so would mean an over-
indulgence in technicalities. Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading does not
deserve serious attention.
2. NO, because contracts of adhesion, while frowned upon, are not absolutely illegal.
Are the prescriptive periods void for being contracts of adhesion?
• Petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive period which is in the nature of a limitation on
petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the
earlier case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
• BUT the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit has generally been upheld as such
stipulation merely affects the plaintiff's remedy and does not affect the liability of the defendant.
• In the absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of
the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time
for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that provided by the
statute of limitations.
• Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the right to recover, but
merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier period than would be necessary to defeat
it through the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations.
• The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability,
but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability
therefor.
3. NO, because petitioners have not substantially complied with the conditions precedent to their right of
action.
Is there substantial compliance by petitioner with regard to the prescriptive period?
• Before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of
the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law
must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse
party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition
• Stipulations in bills of lading requiring notice of claim for loss or damage is a condition precedent. The
carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation.
• The bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent, they are not limitations of action. Being
conditions precedent, their performance must precede a suit for enforcement and the vesting of the right
to file suit does not take place until the happening of these conditions.
Page 10 of 10