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Reviewer(s):
Abstract Summary:
Size: 1 inch o.d. Length: about 559 inches Volume: less than 2 gallons
Type: Burst Disk: SR-H 1.50" Std Sanitary Ferrule Manufacturer: Fike
System Documentation
Quality Assurance
Append all quality verification records required by the identified code (e.g. examiner's
certification, inspector's certification, test records, etc.) See following page:
Applicable Code, NDE Inspection, and Design Criteria:
The scintillator transported by this piping system has to maintain very good
optical properties; each shipment of mineral and pseudocumene as well as
the finished scintillator has been measured for optical properties as part of
the quality assurance plan. Contamination from the piping system could
potentially ruin the scintillator by introducing contaminates into the liquid.
In fact, contamination from piping and instrumentation, which had been
cleaned prior use, did cause the first batch of vertical slice five scintillator to
become contaminated and unusable.
Table 1 in FESHM 5031.1 does not list scintillator or mineral oil and
provides no guidance for selecting a governing code. The Policy statement
in FESHM 5031.1 applies and therefore, it is up to the originator of this
engineering note to assign the applicable code. Based on the temperature,
pressure, chemical composition and cleanliness requirements of the
scintillator, the most applicable code is BPE-2007. For this reason, the
piping is designed as sanitary piping as covered by ASME BPE-2007.
As a result of the use of the sanitary fittings, the tubing is readily visually
inspected internally and externally. All external surfaces of all welds have
been visually examined as required by code. Paragraph MJ-7.2.4 states
“This Standard does not require radiography unless specified by the owner /
user or other applicable code”. Therefore, radiography has not been
performed to the tube attachment welds. If fact, the branch connections are
not able to be radiographed according to discussions with a radiographic
examination service provided at Team Industrial Services (219-838-0505)
recommended PT inspection (Dye –penetrant) and the tube to union welds
are difficult to locate because of the post weld electropolish; it is difficult to
determine where the weld is as the entire surface is smooth and polished.
Discussion:
3929.590-MD-466885
3929.590-MD-466886
3929.590-MD-466887
3929.590-ME-466889
3929.590-MD-466904
3929.590-MD-466905
3929.590-MD-466906
http://www-admscad.fnal.gov/MSDMain/cgi-bin/TP_PPDifind-web.pl
Pump Curve:
Pump is listed as having a 4 inch diameter impeller. Therefore, the shut in
pressure from the pump is 64 feet of head. For scintillator with a specific
gravity of 0.88, the discharge pressure at shut in is 24.4 psig.
From Jim Musser’s document, each filling machine has a maximum fill rate
of 3 gallons per minute (gpm). Up to four machines will be made and used
on the near detector. Therefore, the scintillator pump will operate very near
the shut-in point at between 3 and 12 gallons per minute. Note that most
centrifugal pumps are not designed to operate near the shut in point.
While operating the pump so close to shut in is not a good solution, this does
not adversely affect the piping system.
Relief (Rupture Disk) Sizing per FIKE Technical Bulletin:
Liquid: Mineral Oil, treat as a non-viscous liquid and use the calculation per
API RP520 as shown in the Fike Technical Bulletin:
Reynolds Number:
Except where noted this document will address the specific requirements of ASME Section VIII, Division 1 2004 Edition
2006 Addenda (ASME Code). Many of the requirements are fundamentally the same throughout each of the sections
however there are differences with regard to sizing, certification, and marking, mostly stemming from the 1998 change in
Section VIII, Division 1 when UD certification and flow resistance testing were incorporated.
Rupture discs are typically manufactured to order where each order represents a lot. The ASME Code defines 3 methods
of acceptance testing for rupture discs. The most common method requires that at least two discs from the lot be burst
tested at the specified disc temperature. The results of these tests must fall within the rupture tolerance.
The coefficient of discharge method (KD) uses the calculated flow capacity of the device based on the minimum net flow
area (MNFA) and then de-rates that capacity by a KD of 0.62. This method is applicable only under the following
conditions:
• The disc discharges to atmosphere
• The disc must be installed within 8 pipe diameters of the vessel nozzle
• The length of discharge piping must not exceed 5 pipe diameters
• The nominal diameters of the inlet and outlet lines are equal to or greater than the nominal diameter of the device.
This sizing method incorporates not only the rupture disc device but also takes into account the vessel nozzle, inlet
piping, and exit piping for a simple system within the constraints shown.
The resistance to flow method (KR) has been adopted by the ASME Code for sizing relief systems when other methods do not
apply. The rupture disc is treated as just another piping component within the relief system. The resistance of the rupture
disc is denoted by a KR valve established by test during the certification process. The ASME Code requires that the calcu-
lated relieving capacity of the system be multiplied by 0.90 to allow for uncertainties inherent in this method.
Due to the variation in the opening characteristics of many rupture disc types between compressible and incompressible
media the flow resistance for a given rupture disc is given as a KRG (for gas), KRL (for liquid), and/or KRGL (for gas
or liquid). Since the opening, and subsequently the flow resistance, is primarily determined by the initial opening
characteristics, it is recommended that the KR value be selected based on the state of the media directly in contact with
the rupture disc at the time of rupture. A listing of Fike KR values can be found in TB8104.
The combination capacity method is applicable when a rupture disc device is used upstream of a pressure relief valve (PRV) in
conjunction with the requirements as noted below. The PRV is sized using normal sizing procedures and then the capacity
of the valve is de-rated by the default combination capacity factor of 0.90. The rupture disc size must be equal to or greater
than the nominal pipe size of the PRV inlet.
Alternatively to the default combination capacity factor, a certified combination capacity factor can be established by testing
specific rupture disc / pressure relief valve combinations and registering these test results with the National Board of Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (National Board). A listing of Fike certified combination factors can be found in technical
bulletin TB8103.
MANUFACTURER CERTIFICATION
The ASME Code has provisions for the application of the UD Code symbol to rupture disc devices. The authorization to
use the UD stamp is based on an audit by the ASME designee (National Board) of various manufacturing, testing, and
quality assurance systems. This audit is repeated at a minimum of every 3 years to insure ongoing compliance.
• The 3 size method requires bursting 3 discs from 3 different sizes within a product family as the minimum burst
pressure for each size. The resulting KR value can be used for all sizes and pressures of the product family, however
for the tested sizes the burst pressure must be equal to or greater than the tested pressures.
• Certified KR value cannot be less than the average flow resistance plus 3 times the average of the absolute values of
the deviations of individual flow resistances from the average flow resistance.
The ASME Code allows rupture disc devices to be used in multiples or as a secondary device
to other rupture disc devices or pressure relief valves (shown in fig. 2). In this case, the
secondary device is sized to prevent the pressure in the vessel from rising more than 16%
or 4 psi, whichever is greater, above the MAWP. The burst pressure of the secondary device
may be marked at a pressure not exceeding 105% of the MAWP.
Another application allowed by the ASME Code is the use of a rupture disc in combination
with a pressure relief valve (shown in fig. 3). In this application, the rupture disc device seals
the pressure relief valve from the vessel contents or downstream vapors. The disc/valve
combination may be used as a primary or secondary relief device. The ASME Code provides
guidelines for the use of disc/valve combinations.
A rupture disc may be installed between a pressure relief valve and the vessel provided:
• The combination provides ample capacity to meet the overpressure requirements.
• The marked capacity of the valve is de-rated by a combination capacity factor of
0.90 or a factor certified for the specific disc/valve combination.
• The space between the rupture disc and valve is provided with a pressure gage, try cock,
free vent, or suitable telltale indicator. This arrangement must be capable of detecting a
leak and/or preventing a buildup of pressure in the space because any pressure buildup
will affect the relieving pressure on the process side of the disc.
A rupture disc may also be installed on the outlet of a pressure relief valve provided:
• The space between the valve and rupture disc is vented or the valve is designed so any
accumulated pressure on the outlet of the valve will not affect the opening pressure of
the valve.
• The marked burst pressure of the disc plus any downstream backpressure does not
exceed the set pressure of thevalve.
• The rupture disc provides sufficient capacity to permit flow through the valve without
exceeding the allowable over pressure.
The bonnet of the relief is vented.
When an additional hazard can be created by excessive pressure buildup due to exposure
of a pressure vessel to fire or other unexpected source of external heat, rupture disc devices may be
applied. These devices must be sized to prevent the pressure in the vessel from rising more
than 21% above the MAWP. The burst pressure may be marked at a pressure not exceeding
110% of the MAWP.
When a rupture disc device is primarily intended to protect a pressure vessel against
exposure to fire or other unexpected sources of external heat, and when the vessel has no
permanent supply connection, and when the vessel is used for storage of non-refrigerated
liquefied compressed gasses at ambient temperatures, then the rupture disc device shall be
sized to prevent the vessel pressure from rising more than 20% above the MAWP. The
marked burst pressure shall not exceed the MAWP.
The objective of this bulletin is to provide detailed guidance for sizing rupture discs using standard methodologies
found in ASME Section VIII Div. 1, API RP520, and Crane TP-410. To assist in the sizing process, Fike offers
DisCalc™, a web based sizing program. See www.fike.com.
OVERPRESSURE ALLOWANCE
When sizing pressure relief devices, the ASME Code defines the maximum pressure that may build up in the pressure
vessel while the device is relieving. This pressure varies depending on the application of the device. The following
table defines the various overpressure allowances. See technical bulletin TB8100 for ASME application requirements.
External Fire
Primary Secondary (Unexpected Source
External Fire
(Sole Relieving Device) (Multiple Devices) (Storage Vessels Only)
of External Heat)
Ref. UG-125(c) Ref. UG-125(c)(1) Ref. UG-125(c)(2) Ref. UG-125(c)(3)
Coefficient of discharge method (KD) - The KD is the coefficient of discharge that is applied to the theoretical flow rate
to arrive at a rated flow rate for simple systems.
Resistant to flow method (KR) - The KR represents the velocity head loss due to the rupture disc device. This head loss
is included in the overall system loss calculations to determine the size of the relief system.
Combination capacity method - When a rupture disc device is installed in combination with a pressure relief valve
(PRV), the valve capacity is derated by a default value of 0.9 or a tested value for the disc/valve combination. See
technical bulletin TB8105 for specific application requirements when using rupture disc devices in combination with
PRV’s. A listing of Fike certified combination factors can be found in technical bulletin TB8103.
TABLE 1 - TABLE 2 -
Gas Constants Gas Flow Constant C for Sonic Flow
Gas or Vapor Molecular Weight k = cp/cv k C k C
Air 28.97 1.40 1.00 315 1.40 356
Acetic Acid 60 1.15
Acetylene 26.04 1.26 1.02 318 1.42 358
Ammonia 17.03 1.33 1.04 320 1.44 360
Argon 40 1.67
Benzene 78.1 1.12 1.06 322 1.46 361
N-Butane 58.12 1.094
ISO- Butane 58.12 1.094 1.08 325 1.48 363
Butane 56.1 1.10 1.10 327 1.50 365
Carbon Monoxide 28 1.40
Carbon Disulfide 76 1.21 1.12 329 1.52 366
Carbon Dioxide 44.01 1.30
1.14 331 1.54 368
Chlorine 70.9 1.36
Cyclohexane 84.16 1.09 1.16 333 1.56 369
Ethane 30.07 1.22
Ethyl Alcohol 46.07 1.13 1.18 335 1.58 371
Ethyl Chloride 64.5 1.19
1.20 337 1.60 373
Ethylene 28.05 1.26
Helium 4 1.66 1.22 339 1.62 374
Hydrochloric Acid 36.5 1.41
Hydrogen 2.016 1.41 1.24 341 1.64 376
Hydrogen Sulfide 34.07 1.32 1.26 343 1.66 377
Methane 16.04 1.31
Methyl Alcohol 32.04 1.20 1.28 345 1.68 379
Methyl Chloride 50.48 1.20
Natural Gas (Avg.) 19 1.27 1.30 347 1.70 380
Nitric Acid 30 1.40 1.32 349 2.00 400
Nitrogen 28 1.404
Oxygen 32 1.40 1.34 351 2.10 406
Pentane 72.15 1.07
Propane 44.09 1.13 1.36 352 2.20 412
Sulfur Dioxide 64.06 1.29 1.38 354
Water Vapor 18.02 1.324
Page 2
STEAM SIZING
Calculation per ASME Section VIII
Steam:
W 51.5 A P K D K N KN = Correction factor for steam
W KN = when P d 1500 psia
A
51.5 P K D K N § 0.1906 P 1000 ·
KN = ¨ ¸ when P > 1500 psia and P d 3200 psia
© 0.2292 P 1061 ¹
Calculation per API RP520 K SH = See Table 3 for superheat steam correction factors. For saturated steam use 1.0.
Steam:
W
A
51.5 P K D K N K SH
TABLE 3 -
Superheat Correction Factors, KSH (API RP520 Part 1 Table 9)
Burst Temperature °F
Pressure
(psig) 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
15 1.00 .98 .93 .88 .84 .80 .77 .74 .72 .70
20 1.00 .98 .93 .88 .84 .80 .77 .74 .72 .70
40 1.00 .99 .93 .88 .84 .81 .77 .74 .72 .70
60 1.00 .99 .93 .88 .84 .81 .77 .75 .72 .70
80 1.00 .99 .93 .88 .84 .81 .77 .75 .72 .70
100 1.00 .99 .94 .89 .84 .81 .77 .75 .72 .70
120 1.00 .99 .94 .89 .84 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
140 1.00 .99 .94 .89 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
160 1.00 .99 .94 .89 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
180 1.00 .99 .94 .89 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
200 1.00 .99 .95 .89 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
220 1.00 .99 .95 .89 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
240 - 1.00 .95 .90 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
260 - 1.00 .95 .90 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
280 - 1.00 .96 .90 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
300 - 1.00 .96 .90 .85 .81 .78 .75 .72 .70
350 - 1.00 .96 .90 .86 .82 .78 .75 .72 .70
400 - 1.00 .96 .91 .86 .82 .78 .75 .72 .70
500 - 1.00 .96 .92 .86 .82 .78 .75 .73 .70
600 - 1.00 .97 .92 .87 .82 .79 .75 .73 .70
800 - - 1.00 .95 .88 .83 .79 .76 .73 .70
1000 - - 1.00 .96 .89 .84 .78 .76 .73 .71
1250 - - 1.00 .97 .91 .85 .80 .77 .74 .71
1500 - - - 1.00 .93 .86 .81 .77 .74 .71
1750 - - - 1.00 .94 .86 .81 .77 .73 .70
2000 - - - 1.00 .95 .86 .80 .76 .72 .69
2500 - - - 1.00 .95 .85 .78 .73 .69 .66
3000 - - - - 1.00 .82 .74 .69 .65 .62
Page 3
LIQUID SIZING
Calculation per ASME Section VIII
Types of KR
Because many rupture discs have different opening characteristics depending on whether they are opened with a
compressed vapor or incompressible liquid, there are certified KR values that are denoted by the applicable service
media. The KR values for different media are a result of differences in how the rupture disc opens with different
media and test methods that have been standardized in ASME PTC25. A list of Fike certified KR factors can be
found in technical bulletin TB8104.
• Air or gas service – KRG
Use KRG when the media is a gas or vapor, or when the media is liquid but there is a significant vapor volume
directly in contact with the disc at the time of rupture
• Liquid service – KRL
Use KRL when the media is liquid and the liquid is against the disc at the time of rupture
• Air or gas and liquid service – KRGL
KRGL can be used for any service conditions
Page 4
The following examples will illustrate how KR values are used to establish the flow capacity of a pressure relief
piping system.
RI,'3,3(.
Vapor Sizing (;,7())(&7
(/%2:.
The following example, see Figure 1, assumes that k = cp/cv = 1.4 .
which results in a conservative calculation. The example shown is based
on Crane TP-410 methods. It also assumes a steady state relieving condition
RI,'3,3( ),.(65;*,
where the vessel volume is large relative to the relieving capacity. . +2/'(5.5
Figure 1
The Darcy Equation defines the discharge of compressible fluids through valves, fittings and pipes. Since the flow rate
into the example vessel is defined in SCFM, the following form of the Darcy equation is used:
Page 5
To determine Y, first it must be determined if the flow will be sonic or subsonic. This is determined by comparing the
actual ΔP/P1’ to the limiting ΔP/P1’ for sonic flow. Crane Table A-22 shows limiting factors for k=1.4 for sonic flow at
the known value of KT. If (ΔP/P1’)sonic < (ΔP/P1’)actual, then the flow will be sonic.
KT 7.33
§ 'P ·
¨ ¸ 0.754
© P1' ¹ sonic
Since (ΔP/P1’)sonic = 7.62, then ΔP = 0.754 * P1’ = 0.754 * 1114.7 = 840.5 psig
Calculating the system capacity is completed by substituting the known values into Crane 410 Equation 3-20.
'P P1'
qm' 678 Y d 2
K T1 SG
840.5 1114.7
678 0.680 3.068
2
qm'
7.33 960 1
qm' 50,074 SCFM
The ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1, paragraph UG-127(a)(2)(b), also requires that the
calculated system capacity using the resistance to flow method must also be multiplied by a factor of 0.90 or less to
account for uncertainties inherent with this method.
Page 6
LIQUID SIZING
For this example Figure 2 is assumed, water will be considered the flow media. The example shown is based on Crane
TP-410 methods. It also assumes a steady state relieving condition where the vessel volume is large relative to the
relieving capacity.
RI,'3,3(
Given information: .
SLSH
As in the previous example, head losses due to friction in the piping and the head losses due to fittings are proportional
to the sum of the flow resistances:
hL ¦K
§ V2 ·
hL ¦ K ¨¨ ¸¸
© 2 g ¹
Page 7
Frictional loss coefficients and fitting loss coefficients for the example are as follows:
Piping Component or Feature Flow Resistance Value (K) Reference
Piping Frictional Losses
K=fL/D; f = .019 (Crane 410 Pg A-26)
1 ft of 2” Sch. 40 Pipe K1’ pipe = 0.11
L = 1 ft, ID = 2.067/12 ft
K=fL/D; f = .019 (Crane 410 Pg A-26)
20 ft of 2: Sch. 40 Pipe K20’ pipe = 2.21
L = 20 ft, ID = 2.067/12 ft
K=fL/D; f = .019 (Crane 410 Pg A-26)
40 ft of 2” Sch. 40 Pipe K40’ pipe = 4.41
L = 40 ft, ID = 2.067/12 ft
Fitting Losses
Entrance - r/d = 0.10 Kent - 0.09 Crane 410 Pg A-29
Fike 2” SRL - GI Rupture Disc KRGL = 0.59 National Board Cert. No. FIK-M80031
2” Sch. 40 Standard 90° Elbow Kel = 0.57 Crane 410 Pg A-29
Pipe exit - Sharp Edged Kexit = 1.00 Crane 410 Pg A-29
Total Losses KT = 8.98
Thus,
§ V2 ·
hL 8.98¨¨ ¸¸
© 2 g ¹
Vvessel = 0 ft/sec
Zvessel = 0 ft
Zvessel = 1 ft + 20 ft = 21 ft = elevation change of piping
Pexit = 0 ft/sec
ȡ1 = ȡ2 = 62.3 lb/ft3 for water at room temperature
V2 89.82 ft/sec
The friction factor used earlier in the calculations for piping frictional losses assumed that the flow in the pipes was
fully turbulent flow. The value of the friction factor is related to the Reynolds Number (Re) of the resulting flow
(Ref: Crane 410 pg 1-1). For Re< 2000, the flow is laminar and the friction factor is a function of Reynolds Number,
only. For Re >4000, the flow is fully turbulent and the friction factor is also a function of the character of the piping
wall (relative roughness).
Page 8
The friction factor used earlier must be verified. First calculate the Reynolds Number:
Re
V d
89.82 2.067 1
12
v .000011
V = fluid velocity = 89.82 ft/sec
d = pipe diameter = 2.067 in/12 in/ft
v = kinematic viscosity = 0.000011 ft2/sec
Since the Reynolds Number is >4000, the flow is turbulent, and the friction factor is now a function of the relative
roughness of the pipe. From Crane 410 Figure A-23, the friction factor, f, for 2” commercial steel pipe in fully turbulent
flow is 0.019. This verifies the original assumption for friction factor.
If the flow had been laminar, Re <2000, the friction factor is calculated as:
f 64
Re
If this friction factor had not been close to the same value used to determine frictional loss coefficients used earlier,
the calculation must be repeated and iteratively solved until the assumed friction factor equals the calculted friction
factor.
Now that the fluid velocity is known, the volumetric flow rate can be calculated.
Q A V
Where:
Q = volumetric flow rate (ft3/sec)
A = area of pipe (ft2) - Sd2/4
V = fluid velocity (ft/sec)
Substituting values,
Q =
4
S 2.067
12
2
89.82
Qcalc = 2.09 ft /sec = 125.6 ft3/min
3
References:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, Division 1
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, PTC25
American Petroleum Institute, RP520
Crane Valves, Technical Paper 410
Crane Valves, Crane Companion Computer Program
Fike Technical Bulletin TB8100 ASME Code and Rupture Discs
Fike Technical Bulletin TB8103 Certified Combination Capacity Factors
Fike Technical Bulletin TB8104 Certified KR and MNFA Values
Fike Technical Bulletin TB8105 Best Practices for RD & PRV Combinations
DIERS Project Manual
CCPS Guidelines for Pressure Relief Effluent Handling Systems
Page 9
NOvA NDSB Scintillator Fill Procedure
&
Hazard Analysis
Overview:
Roughly 25,000 gallons of liquid scintillator will be required to fill the NOvA near detector.
This material will be delivered to Fermilab in five 6,000 gallon tanker trucks over an estimated
period of one month beginning on or about August, 15, 2010. A single tanker truck will arrive
at the Near Detector Service Building (NDSB) and will be placed in secondary containment.
Because of the long offloading time (3 days) the driver will be excused from attendance to the
load and will instruct NOvA personnel how to safely operate valves, make connections and
offload safely from the vehicle. The driver will return with the next full load when the first
tanker has been emptied. A sample of the scintillator will first be taken from the tanker and
analyzed for attenuation length. If the attenuation length is acceptable, connections to the
building fill plumbing will be made. A cam and groove hose of 1 ½” diameter will be connected
to the lower outlet of the tanker and run to a building inlet penetration between the roll door
and personnel access door on the north side of the NDSB. The connection to the building
will be contained. The scintillator pump will be located immediately inside the building at the
penetration. Piping leaving the pump is 1” stainless steel and is installed on the outside of the
catwalk so as to be over the secondary containment area. This piping runs the length of the
six detector blocks in the building and has three down going legs. Each leg is fitted with four
valved scintillator take-off connections at the upper and lower catwalk levels. Four fill machines
are attached to these take-offs via dry-seal connections and ½” diameter Teflon lined braided
stainless steel hoses. The scintillator passes through a strainer, a flow controller valve and a
positive displacement flow meter before leaving the fill machine via a ½” diameter Teflon lined
braided stainless steel hose. At the end of the delivery hose a specially built nozzle delivers the
scintillator into the fill port of the detector module.
The detector is constructed around two types of modules; the horizontal module of 51 gallons
nominal capacity and the vertical module of 58 gallons nominal capacity. These modules are
grouped into planes of three horizontal modules and planes of two vertical modules. There are
1
15 horizontal module planes alternated with 16 vertical module planes in what is known as a
block. There are six blocks in the complete near detector, plus a muon tail catcher. Each block
holds approximately 4,151 gallons. The flow rate of each fill machine is around 1 gallon per
minute so modules will require about an hour apiece to fill including overhead in set-up , data
recording, cleaning and general operations procedures. A block has 77 modules in it so with
four machines running at once, a block may be filled in about 2.4 days time. A tanker will fill
about 1.4 blocks which will require about 3.4 days time. A second tanker will be called for near
the end of the offloading of the first and so forth until the detector is completely filled. The
complete detector is built of 497 modules having a total volume of 26,793 gallons and an
average volume per module of 53.9 gallons.
During filling of a module, air laden with scintillator vapors will be displaced from the module
volume and issue from a vent in the manifold. Manifold vents will be plumbed together with
black (light tight) 3/8” I.D. PVC hose and barbed fittings. Each block of 77 modules will be
plumbed to a single outlet which will leave the block on the catwalk face at the lower left side.
This line is coupled to the next block at its lower right horizontal vent line. The blocks will be
connected in serie and brought out to a 55 gallon scintillator drum. The drum will be in the
containment area and will serve as a sump for any possible overflow which might occur during
filling. It will further serve as a containment for any overflow that might happen during a large
temperature excursion during the years of detector operation. Vapor will leave the drum and be
plumbed with 3/8” I. D. PVC hose which will follow the incoming stainless steel pipe to the
pump area. The vapor line will exit the building under the overhead door at the floor seal. Once
outside the building, the line will exit into a five gallon pail filled with activated charcoal granules
designed to absorb scintillator vapor or atmospheric moisture as the volume of vapor above the
25,000 gallons in the detector changes with temperature. During filling, the outlet of the five
gallon pail will be attached to the tanker top port and will provide dry make-up air for the
scintillator volume being withdrawn from the tank. When the tanker departs the filter will
discharge to the atmosphere.
Specific areas of concern: During filling, hoses will necessarily be moved around and trip hazard
from these will be present. The fill operations area of the catwalk will be chained off and floor
signage warning of trip hazard will be placed at the chain when filling operations are underway
to avoid risk to other personnel and visitors from this hazard. The machine will be located at
the rail of the catwalk and the inlet hose secured to this rail. The fill hose will be routed over the
rail for any free length and strain relieved to the rail during filling. The power and control line
will cross the catwalk under a rubber cable duct to protect them and reduce trip hazard.
When filling the uppermost horizontal detectors, workers will have to ascend a roll-around
ladder and make and break connection with the manifold using both hands to hold the nozzle
and guide it into place. The use of a fall safety harness tied off to the catwalk structure during
these operations will reduce the risk of a fall from the ladder.
2
Scintillator is a skin irritant, and impervious gloves will be worn during all activity involving
scintillator transfer. An MSDS for Bicron BC-517P (equivalent to NOvA scintillator) will be
available to each worker at all times.
Small leaks from the fill machine itself will be contained by use of a bucket bolted to the base of
the machine. The bucket will be fitted with an overflow tube at half height which will be routed
to the secondary containment area. Both ends of the fill machine hoses (the nozzle and the inlet
Dryseal connection) will be routed over the secondary containment area during use and the
nozzle will be over the bucket during storage.
Transfer of insulating materials produces charge separation and static electricity. The NOvA
scintillator has an anti-static material added in quantity sufficient to render it conductive to
approximately 60 pS/m. This level of conductivity is defined as semiconductive
by the 2000 edition of the NFPA 77 Recommended Practice on Static Electricity. This means
charge separated by transfer will recombine due to the ohmic resistivity of the material,
reducing the risks associated with generation of static electricity. The scintillator has been
commercially tested and found to be essentially impossible to spark-ignite. The speed at which
fluid is transported determines the amount of charge separation. The NOvA filling protocol
results in a maximum fluid velocity of 1m/s , much below the 7 m/s maximum loading rate
specified in NFPA77. The delivery pipe from the pump onward is conductive and bonded to
building ground. The tanker will be attached to the same ground when filling is underway to
maintain the vehicle at earth potential. No significant static electricity hazard is expected from
the filling operations at the NDSB.
Because the level of fill in each module is not visible to the individual filling, an optical
detection system is installed on each fill nozzle. This system will be tested prior to deployment
at the NDSB and will be retested before each use in a module as part of quality assurance in the
fill program. The method is described in the filling procedures section. Should this system fail, an
independent backup overflow containment system is incorporated into the fill machine. This
consists of a vent at the fill nozzle connected to the module at all times by design during filling.
This vent is routed out and along the fill line and to a bubbler located on the fill machine which
provides a gas tight seal during normal filling operations. If for any reason the gas pressure in
the module should rise above 1 psi., the bubbler would begin to discharge the overpressure to
the building air. This serves as an immediate alert that the pressure in the vent system is above
1 psi and filling should be stopped and the vent system repaired. The exposure of workers to
this amount of vapor should it ever happen will not exceed the TLV (Threshold Limit Value) for
BC-517P which is 25 ppm for pseudocumene, the most volatile component of NOvA scintillator.
These values are guidelines set by the American Council of Government Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) and may be exceeded for short times by OSHA permission during an 8 hours shift if rest
periods are permitted. Building ventilation will disperse such vapor within minutes. Should the
optical filling level system fail at all three levels , an overfill condition in the module might occur
3
and scintillator will be routed out the nozzle vent line to the bubbler where it will over fill the
bubble, discharging into the fill machine containment bucket .
The fill machine operates on 120VAC supplied from the wall outlets along the catwalk. The
third wire safety ground enters the NEMA 13 control box and is bonded to the box metal via
a 10-32 machine screw with lockwasher and nut securing a crimped and soldered ring terminal
to the bared metal surface of the box. The box is bolted with four ¼-20 steel bolts to aluminum
rails which are bolted to the aluminum plumbing base plate. The ground is continued through
the base plate to the stainless steel plumbing system at the exit point to the stainless steel
braided hose which continues the ground to the stainless steel nozzle block which is screwed to
the operator housing. A continuous ground path is formed with sufficient current carrying
capacity to provide a low impedance return path for any AC current leakage up to and beyond
the current rating of the fill machine power supply fuse of 1 Ampere. Increased protection will
be provided by the use of a GFCI quad outlet box extension cord plugged into an existing outlet
on the wall and run under the protective duct to the railing where the four fill machines obtain
power.
The fill machine is defined by FESHM 5041-1 as “ Low Power Electrical Utilization Equipment”
The fill machines have been constructed at Indiana University for Fermilab using approved and
listed electrical components. UL and NEMA information on each component is available.
Any revisions to the fill equipment required by FESH safety committees or designates will be
made before the final inspection required by part 3. of FESHM 5040-1 is carried out and the
machines are placed in service.
The pump designated for scintillator handling will be installed over containment and will be
wired to the NDSB mains in accordance with all relevant Fermilab electrical safety policies . The
pump control solid state relay and fusing will be located inside of an approved NEMA 13 steel
equipment enclosure and be firmly secured to the building wall. The cover will be screwed
shut for normal operations but may be opened for inspection as required. Complete
documentation of the enclosed circuit will be provided. All control system wiring will also
comply with Fermilab electrical safety policies and be available for inspection.
4
Near Detector Scintillator Filling Procedure
Initial Conditions:
A job site walk down will have been conducted, and hazard analysis completed and approved,
for both the tanker hookup procedure and the scintillator filling procedure, fill machines
delivered , inspected and approved and all required documents provided to FESH. Provisional
Operational Readiness Clearance and later ORC will have been granted for both the fill
procedure and the tanker hookup procedure. The work plan/ hazard analysis will be posted
in the NDSB and Indiana University personnel will be on site and equipped to prepare the
filling system for startup operations. The emergency call list will be posted by the telephone
on the catwalk wall. The pumping system and all plumbing will be in a state of nominal
readiness. The first tanker of scintillator will have been delivered to the NDSB and the driver of
the vehicle will have parked it in accordance with Fermilab Tank Truck Loading and Unloading
Procedures Rev. 1, Feb. 3, 2010, where applicable. The driver of the vehicle will have instructed
NOvA personnel in the safe operation of all necessary valves, connections and bonding
equipments required to unload the scintillator. All containments will be in place for the tanker
and connections. Should the weather be rainy or threaten rain the start will be
postponed.
Startup Operations:
Prior to filling operations the scintillator distribution system will have been checked for leak
tightness. Mineral oil will be used to test the fixed piping and pump station. The fill
machines will have been checked for leak tightness prior to delivery. Two 55 gallon drums
assigned for waste scintillator shall be on site . The first will be placed in the secondary
containment area on a drum truck to move it around in the area as needed. A second drum
will be in place on pallet containment and marked “waste scintillator” for use by fill
personnel to dispose of small quantities of scintillator properly outside the secondary
containment area. Spill cleanup materials will be on hand, and a discussion of what will be
done for leaks at each point will have occurred. The complete vent line from block “A” fill
input to the tanker air input will have been tested to insure integrity before any connection
is made to the tanker. The line will have the proper fitting installed for the tanker air inlet
and this fitting will be then blocked for the leak test that follows.
5
Vent System Leak Test
Obtain full N2 tank and regulator with hose output and fitting for 3/8” I.D. vent line.
1. Set N2 regulator to slightly greater than 1 psi.
2. Attach the output to the bubbler input with a 3/8” I.D. Tee fitting.
3. Connect the open end of the Tee fitting barb to a Tee fitting on Block “A” vent line at the
filter connection outside the NDSB. See that all fill caps are securely in place on the block
and that an unbroken connection exists between the block output vent line , sump drum,
filter and output to the tanker. Connection to the tanker should not be made during this
leak test.
4. Open the regulator main valve and observe the bubbler to see gas bubbles at a low rate.
Adjust the regulator pressure to obtain a gentle stream of bubbles.
5. Turn off the main valve at the N2 tank. Observe the bubbler and notice how quickly liquid
reenters the bubbler tube, indicating loss of pressure due to leakage. Should leaks be found
they will be remediated before continuing. These will be at individual fill caps which may be
loose or at vent lines left disconnected unintentionally. When the line is leak tight at 1 psi,
flow of gas is verified by insertion of the end of the vent line into a head of 12” of mineral oil
and seeing a stream of bubbles . Total vent line backpressure will be noted at the bubbler.
6. When these tests are passed , remove the bubbler and gas source. The line is ready for
attachment to the tanker inlet.
Prior to filling, filling personnel will have received training from the driver regarding use of
tanker fluid offloading procedures and hardware. The team will practice quick shutdown of
the primary shutoff valve until personnel are comfortable with the rapid shut-off of this
valve and containment of the small volumes of scintillator lost during breaking the
connection at this point.
6
c. Place 1 gallon jug below spigot and draw off 1 gallon of purge material. Transfer this
to the waste scintillator drum.
d. Place a known clean 1 gallon glass sample jug below spigot and draw off 1 gallon
sample .
e. Label sample jug with incoming load identification information and hand off sample
to sample test technical personnel for prompt testing.
f. Close tanker valve. Remove sample spigot and store in clean container designated
for this use. A 2 gallon pail will be held under the connection as sample spigot is
removed. Recap the tanker outlet fitting. Wipe down fittings with a clean rag.
Dispose of lost scintillator in the waste scintillator drum.
9. Fit the 3” to 1 1’2” hose adaptor and connect the 1 ½” hose to the tanker outlet and to the
building inlet connection.
10. Open the tanker valve while monitoring the 1 ½” supply line and connections for leaks.
11. Energize the scintillator pump with the tanker valve open and the building valve open. A
monitor will be stationed by the building valve and have control over the pump power.
12. Inspect piping for leaks.
The next step in the procedure will be to purge and rinse the fill machines with scintillator. The
four machines will be located at the lower level of the catwalk near block “A”.
13. Attach each machine to a take-off connection and open the valve for that connection.
14. Inspect for leaks.
15. For each fill machine, power on and set volume limit to one gallon on the totalizer according
to instructions found in the GBT Installation and Operation manual .
16. Hold nozzle over a five gallon pail and depress the manifold detect switch.
17. Depress the “Fill” button, and verify proper operation of the volume limit for each machine.
The entire fill system will now have been purged and rinsed. Because of the closed nature of the
system and fill machines , purging and rinsing should not be required again except for the initial
purge of the tanker valve on arrival of a new load.
7
on a hand truck that will be stationed either along the bottom catwalk at the rail for horizontal filling
operations or on the upper catwalk at the rail for vertical filling operations.
The fill nozzle contains multiple features designed for safe flow control and to prevent unintended
flow when disconnected or overfilling when connected. It couples to a detector manifold fill port with a
double 0-ring seal that provides complete oil containment under normal operating conditions.
Immediately upstream of the module manifold fill port is a normally closed solenoid valve (ASCO
#8210P087V-24-99) which may be energized to open ONLY when a short throw Square D limit switch is
closed and the level sensors are indicating an under-filled condition. The 3 level sensing detectors
employ 2mm prisms glued to 2 acrylic optical fibers. One fiber is terminated in an LED and the other in
an optical sensor. If the prism is not immersed, the prism provides a return path for light to the optical
sensor, and therefore a signal detected above threshold at the sensor indicates that the scintillator has
not reached the level of this prism. When the prism is immersed , the optical coupling is broken, and
therefore lack of a signal above threshold indicates that the scintillator has reached the level of this
prism. Three prisms inserted to different depths in the manifold provide redundancy and meet the
different filling level requirements for the horizontal and vertical modules. The nozzle is equipped with a
spring loaded latching lever that hooks under the rim at the base of the fill port and secures the nozzle
to the module during fill operations. When this latch is engaged, the Square D limit switch touches down
on the top manifold surface, enabling fluid flow if the level sensors indicate an under-fill condition. If no
fluid is present in the manifold, flow may be started by pressing and releasing the momentary push
button on the top of the fill nozzle. At that point flow through the GPI meter begins and the flow rate
and accumulation is monitored by the batch flow controller. The desired flow rate is set at the dial of the
Kates flow controller and can be varied continuously from 0.1 to 3.0 gpm independent of inlet or outlet
pressure (note; the fluid pressure at the inlet to the Kates controller is required to be greater than 10
psig to assure accurate flow rate as set). When the batch flow controller preset has been reached,
power to the solenoid is switched off and the valve closes. The optical level sensors in this mode serve
as backups and should they be contacted by the rising oil, the valve is also closed. The nozzle control
panel has a switch marked “HORIZ LEVEL” which when thrown to the outside of the nozzle housing will
defeat the lowest prism sensor in the manifold allowing filling to the slightly higher level required by the
horizontal mounting of the module. A blue LED by this switch will illuminate when the nozzle is in the
horizontal fill mode. A second switch on this control panel is marked “DET LEVEL” and may be turned
either on or off. In the on position the nozzle functions as described above, i.e. levels are detected and
shut off occurs. In the off position levels are indicated by LED but shut-off action is NOT ENABLED. This
allows the operator to fill manually to any level desired by pushing the green fill button once to start
flow and once again to stop flow. Flow may be stopped by pushing the green fill button under any
switch conditions. Filling is indicated by the white LED marked “FILL”. Levels are indicated by three LEDs
marked “LO” (green), “MED” (yellow) and “HI” (red) which illuminate when oil reaches the respective
level.
8
assigned to filling operations at all times. Workers will have practiced simple totalizer operations
with the machine after startup but before beginning the actual fill detailed here. Prior to the start
of vertical module filling, the four fill machines will be moved to the railing at the block “A” location
on the upper catwalk, and power supplied via a single line GFCI quad extension cord run from the
wall across the catwalk under protective duct. The area around the machines will have a post and
cordon chain to discourage access to the area during filling. A trip hazard floor sign will be placed
inside the cordoned area. Fall protection harnesses will be used at all times while working on the
bridge.
A sticker system will be employed to track filling progress on each module. If a module has no
sticker, it is empty of scintillator. If a module has a sticker, it has the initial fill installed and if a
module has a sticker with a slash or initials on it, it is “topped off” and ready for service. The sticker
will be placed just after the nominal fill is done and the fill port is capped off as part of quality
assurance in the fill program.
9
7. Push the nozzle “Fill” button once and verify that the “FILL” LED illuminates. The totalizer display
will indicate fill progress.
8. Record the date, tanker number, block, plane and module being filled and the final fill quantity.
9. When a module is filled to its final level, the filled module will be capped off and a sticker placed by
the port with a clear mark indicating final fill complete.
At a flow rate of 1gpm, each module will take 1 hour to hook up, record, fill and close. Workers will
have time on their hands yet must always remain vigilant for problems with the work. At the end of the
shift , a fill may not be complete and at that time the worker simply pushes the “Fill” button once more
to stop filling. The “FILL” LED will extinguish and the valve for that machine will be closed for the day.
The next day fill will be resumed simply by opening the valve and pushing the “Fill” again. The totalizer
will recall where it was even if power is cut to the building.
For the first shifts in this mode, a post job review will be conducted to determine how to improve
procedures and what problems have been encountered. If work procedures are altered or changes
made, the HA must be revised and reviewed by all concerned.
The nozzles should be returned to the fill machines and stowed whenever the bridge is to be moved.
NOvA scintillator is a mild irritant to the eyes and skin and respiratory tract. Section VIII of the MSDS for
the product recommends the use of chemically impervious gloves, clothing and boots. If the material is
spilled on your body it is best to wash it off with soap and water promptly. If a quantity is spilled on your
clothes it is best to remove the soiled items and wash with soap and water to avoid irritation of skin.
Whenever a scintillator spill of any size occurs the following steps shall be taken:
10
1. Evaluate the health and safety of people at the spill site. If people need medical assistance of if
the spill is >5 gallons outside the secondary containment, call x3131 from a safe location.
2. Stop the flow of scintillator. NOvA Shutoff valves should be clearly marked.
3. Contact the correct people (as listed in the instructions below) , and follow any further
instructions from them.
4. Contain and clean up the scintillator. Store the waste in proper containers.
11
HAZARD ANALYSIS FORM
This form can be used by Fermilab Employees, Fermilab Supervisors, Fermilab Task Managers and Construction
Subcontractors. This is a dynamic document which may require modification as the project moves from start
to finish and should be readily available at the site where the work is being performed.
Note: Not all sections of the first page are applicable to every job or task, complete what is necessary for your
specific job or task.
Job Title Commission NOvA Near Detector Scintillator Fill Systeml Fill NOvA Near Detector
Phone L -_ _ _ _ _ ~
Page ' -_ _ _ _ _ _ ~
ATLEAST~GNATURESAREREQUIRED
o Accepted Date
Print Name
WARNING: This paper copy rnoy be obsolete soon after it is printed. The current version of this FESHM Chapter is found at
http://'UlWW-esh.fnal,~plsldefou/tlfshmanuals.html
Description of Work:
Commission Scintillator Fill System for NOvA Near Detector
Fill NOvA Near Detector with Scintillator
Personal Protective Equipment: (Check protective equipment required for the job)
INitrile
~ Other required PPE (specify): IXI Fall protection equipment (specify):
r
Equipment required for the job: (List the tools needed to perform the job.)
Work plan history information: (List any lessons learned incidents from this job, tips from previous jobs)
Improvement/Feedback: At the conclusion of the job, the Task Manager, Supervisor and / or Project Leader shall
work with those involved to consider lessons learned and receive in order to improve future work plans.
Check one:
o Yes we have considered lessons learned and accepted feedback on this job and will communicate such information
so that in future work plans may be improved.
Yes we have considered lessons learned feedback and determined that future work plans do not need to be
improved.
3. Set N2 regulator slightly greater 1. Overpressure vent system 1. Diagram of hookup will be
than 1 psi. and hookup to bubbler provided.
using T fitting.
4. Connect N2/Bubbler line to block 1. Overpressure vent system 1. Diagram of hookup will be
“A” vent line with above T provided.
5. Install fitting and block off 1. No hazard seen.
6. Open regulator main valve and 1. Gauge front blowout. 1. Keep face away from front of
adjust regulator for slightly 2. Spill of mineral oil from bubbler. gauge when opening main valve.
greater than1 psi. input. 2. Adjust pressure up slowly from
zero. Spill kit will be on hand.
7. Turn off main valve and inspect 1. No hazard seen.
bubbler. Open blocked tanker end
of line and inspect bubbler.
8. Remove bubbler from system and 1. Fall hazard when ascending 1. Use handrails , wear hardhat and
install line to top of tanker. descending tanker ladder. have spotter.
9. Bond tanker to building ground. 1. Shock hazard should bond to 1. Test bond each time it is made to
tanker fail during offloading. NDSB ground. Inspect bond lead
and connectors each time bond is
made.
10. Sample to be drawn and tested. 1. No hazard seen
11. Remove tanker outlet cap/clean. 1. Foot injury from cap drop. 1. Closed toe shoes required.
2. Scintillator spill/splash 2. Secondary containment provided
at tanker truck. Personnel must
wear hard hat, safety glasses ,
gloves and lab coat during all
operations involving scintillator
transport.
12. Install sample spigot and open 1. Scintillator spill if spigot not 1. As above.
tanker valve. secured when valve is opened.
13. Draw off 1 gallon scintillator 1. Scintillator spill if container is 1. Transport scintillator in protective
dropped in transport . rubber carrier.
14. Draw off 1 gallon sample. 1. Scintillator spill if container is 1. Transport scintillator in protective
dropped in transport. rubber carrier.
15. Label sample and transfer to 1. As above 1. As above
technician
16. Close tanker valve. 1. Spill potential if valve is not closed 1. Secondary containment provided
Remove sample spigot. completely when spigot removed. at tanker truck. Pail held beneath
Recap tanker outlet. 2. Foot injury from spigot drop or spigot at removal.
cap drop. 2. Closed toe shoes required.
17. Operate tanker valve quickly with 1. No hazard seen.
cap on.
18. Tanker valve closed. 1. Spill potential if valve not closed 1. As above.
Cap removed. completely when cap is removed.
3” to 1 ½” adaptor fitted. 2. Foot injury from cap, adaptor or
1 ½” fill hose fitted to tanker and hose fitting drop.
NDSB inlet.
12
19. Tanker valve opened. 1. Spill potential if connections made 1. Secondary containment provided
improperly or hose is damaged. at tanker truck and at NDSB inlet
connection point. The operation
will be monitored with personnel
at tanker valve.
20. Inspect for leaks. 1. Possible drips of scintillator from 1. Wear hard hat, and protective
piping during pressurization. clothing .
21. Move four fill machines to catwalk 1. Machines will have to traverse 1. During ascent with machine under
rail near block “A” staircase. Strain and slip hazard. tow, staircase will be clear of
other personnel. Lift will proceed
slowly, one stair tread at a time
with one hand on the railing
during the operation.
22. Attach machine to take-off point. 1. Strain from attaching connection. 1. Proper technique practiced and
Open valve at that point. 2. Scintillator leaks from machine nipple rotated towards operator.
when valve is opened. 2. Monitor machine and valve.
23. Fill machine powered and limits 1. No hazard seen.
set for flow total.
24. Fill machine purged. 1. Potential for contact with 1. Wear safety glasses, gloves and
scintillator lab coat.
25. Inspect fill machine , repeat purge 1. Potential for contact with
and inspection for remaining scintillator.
three machines.
13
Description Hazards/Environmental Aspects Precautions/Safety Procedures
For Scintillator Filling Operations at NDSB:
1. Workers read and sign HA. 1. Workers must comply with safety 1. Follow the instructions , use the
Workers receive PPE and pre-job program and know the job PPE and participate actively in the
briefing. Work in pairs. procedures and hazards to avoid pre-job briefing. Ask questions
many of the hazards listed here. about procedures. Work with your
Hazard if no compliance. job partner to foster safe
operations.
2. Four fill machines moved to lower 1. Machines will have to traverse 1. During ascent/descent with
catwalk rail. staircase. Slip and strain hazard machine under tow, staircase will
be clear of other personnel.
Lift/lower will proceed slowly, one
stair tread at a time, with one
hand on the railing during the
operation.
3. Modules recorded , totalizer set to 1. No hazard seen.
proper volume. (46 gallons)
14
I have reviewed this hazard analysis and I understand the hazards and required precautionary
action. I will follow the requirements of this hazard analysis or notify my supervisor or Fermilab
contact if I am unable to do so.
1 8/4 /2010
18/412010
WARNING: This paper ropy mIly be obsolete soon rifler it is printed. The cumnt version of this FESHM Chapter is found at
http://www-esh.fnal govlplslde,faultlesh malluals.html
Page 1 of 4
Date: April 4, 2006
Revised February 4, 2009
SAINT-GOBAIN CRYSTALS
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS: Vapors of heated material are heavier than air and may
travel back to a source of ignition.
AVOID: Avoid contact with strong oxidizers (e.g. nitric acid, permanganates, etc.)
ROUTES OF ENTRY
EFFECTS OF OVEREXPOSURE
INHALATION: May irritate the upper respiratory tract. Severe overexposure may cause
cardiac abnormalities.
INGESTION: May cause gastrointestinal irritation.
NOTE: N/A
CARCINOGENICITY:
INGESTION: DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING! Get immediate medical attention. If vomiting occurs
material can be aspirated into the lungs causing chemical pneumonitis which can be fatal.
THIS PRODUCT MAY CONTAIN A TOXIC CHEMICAL (OR CHEMICALS) SUBJECT TO THE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 313 TITLE III OF THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986 AND 40 CFR PART 372.