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840
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Afan vs. De Guzman
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGLECT TO FILE CLAIM AFTER CLAIMANT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH
OF DECEDENT—Where a claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four or five
months thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, the fact that he was negotiating with one of
the heirs can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect (In re: Estate of Tiangco,
39 Phil., 967). Afan vs. De Guzman, 107 Phil. 839, No. L-14713 April 28, 1960
HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI
of Davao and LUIS TAN alias CHEN YEH-AN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Probate; Period of filing claims against the estate; Purpose
of fixing the period within which claims against the estate must be presented.—The range of the
period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for
the filing of claims. The probate court if the by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than
six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the day of the first publication of the notice
thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory. The purpose of the law, in fixing a
period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement
of the affairs of the deceased person and the person entitled to the same.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not
in accordance with the requirements of the rules, the period fixed in the rules is not less than 6
months nor more than 12 months from date of first publication of notice.—Since the notice issued
and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2,
Rule 86 of the Rules of
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* FIRST DIVISION.
187
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguas vs. Llemos
on; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property (Rule 88). Injury to
property is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which
personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R.,
1395). To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses is injurious to that party's
property (Javier vs.Araneta, L-4369, August 31, 1953). Hence, a suit for damages therefor
survives the death of the defendant. Aguas vs. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959, No. L-18107 August 30,
1962
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. V. CONCEPCION E
HIJOS, INC., and VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendants and appellants. HENRY W. ELSER,
defendant and appellee.
1.CONTRACTS; STIPULATIONS "POUR AUTRUI."—The general rule that a contract affects only
the parties and privies thereto does not apply to stipulations pour autrui.
2.ID. ; ID.; INTENT TO BENEFIT THIRD PERSON.—To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui,
it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third person, and it is not
sufficient that the third person may be merely incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
3.ID. ; ID. ; OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.—The ordinary rules of offer and acceptance are
applicable to stipulations pour autrui, and it is a cardinal rule that such stipulations must be
definitely accepted by the third person. The acceptance must be absolute, unconditional, and
identical with the terms of the offer.
4.MORTGAGES; LIABILITY OF PURCHASER OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY.—The doctrine
that the purchaser of mortgaged property thereby also assumes the liability for the entire
mortgage debt, and may be sued therefor by the creditor, has not been accepted in this
jurisdiction and is not in harmony with the provisions of the
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* FIRST DIVISION.
318
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. David
liability, and she may be sued for the whole debt.—We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law
and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his
action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound
themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death her liability is independent of and separate
from her husband’s; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the
claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent’s
estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97)
Same; Same; Same; Joint and several obligation distinguished from joint obligation.—In the case
at bar, appellant signed a joint and several obligation with her husband in favor of herein
appellee; as a consequence, the latter may demand from either of them the whole obligation. As
distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is liable only for a proportionate part
of the debt and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit, in a solidary
obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors.
Same; Same; Special Proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased debtors; Filing by creditor
of an action against the surviving solidary debtor alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed, proper.—And, in
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al., 107 Phil. 891, this Court ruled that the
Rules of Court provide the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased
debtor, “but there is nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a
condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the
creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure
to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against
the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence,
there is nothing improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors
alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor
wherein his claim could be filed.” Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. David, 133 SCRA 317, No. L-32425
November 21, 1984
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION, respondent.
Obligations and Contracts; Death of a Party; As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or
the debtor does not extinguish the obligation—obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except
when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation.—As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish
the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only
obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by
death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money
claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are
not actually
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* FIRST DIVISION.
180
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation
extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which
is not then acting as a probate court.
Same; Same; Surety; Since death is not a defense that a party or his estate can set up to wipe
out the obligations under a performance bond, the surety cannot use such party’s death to
escape its monetary obligation.—In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations
Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by
stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those
obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or
his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently,
petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance
bond.
Same; Same; Same; Although the contract of surety is in essence secondary only to a valid
principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct,
primary and absolute—he is directly and equally bound with the principal.—As a surety, petitioner
is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which provides as follows: “Art.
2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.” If a person binds himself
solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall
be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship.” x x x x x x x x x “Art. 1216. The
creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which
may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
collected.” Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA
493 (1990), stated thus: “x x x. The surety’s obligation is not an original and direct one for the
performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the
principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid
principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct,
primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. x x x.”
181
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Absolute Management Corporation
Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired
the land as an heir of its previous owner. He set up the defense that this claim should have been
filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand,
contended that his claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need
not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86). The Court held under these facts that a
claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract.
Citing Leung Ben v. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182 (1918), it explained that the term “implied contracts,” as
used in our remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-
contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is
included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of
the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his
estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Principle of Unjust Enrichment; A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the
law creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust
enrichment.—A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis of
certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil
Code provides an enumeration of quasi-contracts, but the list is not exhaustive and merely
provides examples. According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the
quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154 embodies the concept
“solutio indebiti” which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has
no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake.
Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two indispensable requisites:
first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something was
received when there was no right to demand it.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Actions; The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court; the
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* FIRST DIVISION.
768
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Olave vs. Reyes
of estate in the probate court.—The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the
estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persona. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to
apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and
timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of
the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the
payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall
share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Where the estate of a deceased person is already the
subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.” (Italics supplied). The law
is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior
approval of the probate court. Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767, No. L-29407 July 29,
1983
SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO, petitioner, vs. OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lawyers; Attorney’s Fees; Estate Proceedings; As a general rule, it is the executor or
administrator who is primarily liable for attorney’s fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal
services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate, and the
executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorney’s
fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate.—We
reiterate that as a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for
attorney’s fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in
relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement
from the estate for the sums paid in attorney’s fees if it can be
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* THIRD DIVISION.
450
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salonga Hernandez & Allado vs. Pascual
shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if the
executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney’s fees, the lawyer has two modes of
recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her
personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in
the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney’s fees as
an expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the
heirs and interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of
the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.
Same; Same; Same; A claim for attorney’s fees partakes the nature of an administration expense,
and the claim for reimbursement must be superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.—The
character of such claim for attorney’s fees bears reiteration. As stated in Escueta, 5 Phil. 405
(1905), it partakes the nature of an administration expense. Administration expenses include
attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the administration of the estate. It is an expense
attending the accomplishment of the purpose of administration growing out of the contract or
obligation entered into by the personal representative of the estate, and thus the claim for
reimbursement must be superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees
about the claim for attorney’s fees against the estate is anchored on the constitutional principle
that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.—The requisite notice to
the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the constitutional principle that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law. The fact that these persons were designated
in the will as recipients of the testamentary dispositions from the decedent establishes their rights
to the succession, which are transmitted to them from the moment of the death of the decedent.
The payment of such attorney’s fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may
effectively diminish the value of the testamentary dispositions made by the decedent. These
heirs, devisees, and legatees acquire proprietary rights by reason of the will upon the moment of
the death of the decedent, incipient or inchoate as such rights may be. Hence, notice to these
interested persons of the claims for attorney’s fees is integral, so as to allow them to pose
451
In the matter of the estate of J. H. Ankrom, deceased. HEIRS OF RAFAEL GREGOIRE, claimants
and appellants, vs. ALBERT L. BAKER, administrator and appellee.
1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS) INSOLVENT ESTATE; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
BY DECEDENT; REMEDY OF CREDITOR.—Where an 68tate in administration appears to be
insolvent, any creditor who believes that a conveyance of property executed in life by the
decedent was made in fraud of creditors may, by leave of the court, and upon giving bond to
indemnify the executor
76
76
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Gregoire vs. Baker
or administrator against costs, commence an action in the name of the executor or administrator,
and recover the property thus fraudulently conveyed away. The personal representative of a
decedent is not under the peremptory duty of starting such action himself.
2.JUDGMENT; APPEAL; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.—Orders made by a' court with reference
to the inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are
manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to
modification or change at any time during the course of the administration proceedings Such
orders are not conclusive of the rights of any one, and the order in question not final in the sense
necessary to make it appealable. Heirs of Gregoire vs. Baker, 51 Phil. 75, No. 27486 November
18, 1927
Sinforoso Pascual, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Ponciano S. Pascual et al., defendants and
appellees.
1.Executors and Administrators; Right to Sue and be Sued; Exception.—Under Rule 88, section
1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or
administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings, the heirs have no
standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event the heirs may act in his place. Here, the fictitious
sale is alleged to have been made to the defendants, one of them, M. S. P., being the executor
appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself
for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case
under the exception.
2.Actions; Annulment of a Contract of Sale; Venue.—It appearing that the sale made by the
deceased to the defendants is alleged to be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration, it should
be regarded as a nonexistent, not merely null, contract. And there being no contract between the
deceased and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to annul by action. The action brought
cannot thus be for annulment of contract, but is one for recovery of a fishpond, a real action that
should be, as it has been, brought in Pampanga, where the property is located.
3.Testate or Intestate Proceedings; Questions as to Title to Property; Case at Bar.—The general
rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate
proceedings. However, when, as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased claiming title under him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to
the former is or is not fictitious, may properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate
proceedings on or before the distribution of the estate among the heirs. This procedure is optional
to the parties concerned who may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience
in the preparation or presentación of evidence, and accordingly, the action brought by the
appellant is not improper. Pascual vs. Pascual et al., 73 Phil., 561, No. 48140 May 4, 1942
MARIA VELASQUEZ, MARY GEORGE, NELLIE GEORGE, NOBLE GEORGE, and MAYBELLE
GEORGE, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. WILLIAM GEORGE, ROBERT GEORGE, ANDRES MUÑOZ,
ISAGANI BRIÑAS and CIRILO ASPERILLA, defendants-appellees, ERLINDA VILLANUEVA,
mortgagee-defendant-appellee.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Where complaint sought to annul documents of title
vesting ownership of land to a mortgagee who is neither an officer, stockholder nor a corporate
director but a third party, jurisdiction over suit property belongs to the civil courts, not with the
Securities and Exchange Commission; Allegations of complaint determine jurisdiction of court and
the court which has already acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter is retained by it up to the
end of the litigation.—We agree with the plaintiffs-appellants. What the complaint sought to annul
were documents of title which vested ownership over the three parcels of land in question to
defendant-mortgagee Villanueva, who is neither an officer, a stockholder nor a director of the
corporation, but a third party. Clearly, the lower court had jurisdiction over the controversy. The
fact that the plaintiffs-appellants subsequently questioned the legality of the constitution of the
board of directors of the corporation did not divest the court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case. What determines jurisdiction of the court are the allegations in the complaint. If from
the same, the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter, jurisdiction is
retained up to the end of the litigation. (See Lat v. Phil. Long Distance Co., 67 SCRA 425)
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* FIRST DIVISION.
457
* FIRST DIVISION.
534
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valera vs. Inserto
was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of
the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an
ordinary civil action/' but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate
inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearing by the probate court on the issue arising from the parties'
conflicting claims over the fishpond, valid; Purpose of hearing; If a third person asserts a right to
the property contrary to the decedent's, the probate court has no authority to resolve the issue but
a separate action must be instituted.—The same norm governs the situation contemplated in
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of
its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond.
The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to
property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or
of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no
claim to the property and manifests willingness to turn it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the
Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate.
On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's,
the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be
instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court authorized to admit a complaint in intervention after
obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of
title to the properties.—Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court
could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention, after obtaining
the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the
fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto, But it did not. It dismissed the
complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
535
* THIRD DIVISION.
** Deceased.
60
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Ombudsman; Appeals; Supreme Court do not review the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.—It is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested by the Constitution. In short, we do not review
the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when
the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 569 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 133347 October 15, 2008