Rosa Lim v.
People of the Philippines, 340 SCRA 497 (Septemer 18,  Lim’s defense was that the checks were never issued to Seguan
2000)
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value;
"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
FACTS:
 Rosa Lim bought various jewelries worth 300,000 PHP and
241,668 on separate dates from Maria Antonia Seguan's store. Lim
issued two (2) separate checks, both drawn on Metrobank, for the
payment of the items.
 When Seguan deposited the two (2) checks with her bank, they
were returned with a notice of dishonor because Lim's account was
closed.
 Upon demand, Lim promised to pay Seguan the amount of the
dishonored checks, but she never did.
 Both the RTC and CA found Lim guilty of violating BP 22 and was
sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment for each of the two (2)
violations and to pay two (2) fines, each amounting to 200,000
PHP.
and that they had no pre-existing transaction. The checks were
issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere "guarantee" and as a "security
arrangement" to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on
consignment basis.
ISSUE: WON Lim is guilty of violation of BP 22.
HELD: Yes.
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the checks
were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction.
The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a
security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on
consignment basis.
The Court held that these defenses cannot save the day for her. The first
and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability,
she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of
issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account
were insufficient. She did not prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
Unlike in estafa, under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was
issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. The damage
done is to the banking system.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1689 April 6, 1980
INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF SWINDLING OR
ESTAFA
WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of swindling and other
forms of frauds in rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon (s)", and
farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public;
WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds contributed by
stockholders or members of such rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)", or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, erodes the confidence of
the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes the public
interest, and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the
nation;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said crimes be checked,
or at least minimized, by imposing capital punishment on certain forms of
swindling and other frauds involving rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)", farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on
funds solicited from the general public;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby decree and order as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty
imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of
the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 6th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
People v. Raul Acosta y Laygo, 326 SCRA 49
(February 18, 2000)
FACTS:
 Complainant’s grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, in the belief that
Acosta and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from
him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their belongings.
 In the afternoon of February 27, 1996, witness Aquino saw Acosta
and approached him. When she asked why he was carrying a stove
and a knife, he replied that he would burn the house of
complainant.
 In the morning of February 28, 1996, witness Videña, saw
complainant's house burning. She noticed the presence of
appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. Appellant
was just watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it.
When the fire truck arrived, the house was already razed to the
ground.
 After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find
any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained
undetermined. However, trial court found appellant guilty with the
crime of arson.
ISSUE: WON circumstantial evidences can justify appellant’s conviction for
the crime of arson.
HELD:YES. Appellant's conviction for the crime of arson rests on
circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt
in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson,
SC agreed with the trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the
following circumstances duly proved and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not
absolutely necessary, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the
credibility of the witnesses. It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the
afternoon of February 27, 1996, complainant's grandson, stormed the house
of appellant and his wife and burned their belongings. When appellant was
informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified,
appellant threw a tantrum.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by
his previous attempt to set on fire a bed inside the same house (private
complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Witness Aquino testified
that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she asked appellant
what he was going to do with the stove he was carrying that time, he
answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant. When
she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of
private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed and then lighted a fire
with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished the fire
with a broomstick. The two later left the house.
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before
the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the burning house during the
height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28,
1996, witness Videña, through the holes of the GI sheets, saw appellant
latter that day standing alone inside private complainant's yard watching the
house burning. Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-
looking expression.
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point
to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of February 28, 1996, private
complainant went with witness Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson.
They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked
him why he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned
your house?"
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "in the crime of
arson, the enormity of the offense is not measured by the value of the
property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to
destruction."
People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Baluntong
March 15, 2010
Facts:
Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the
complete destruction of the said house, the death of Celerina Solangon and
Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Joshua Savarez,
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Trial Court
found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death
to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether the courts are correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder
and frustrated murder
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one
is rendered finding appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole and other civil damages modified.
In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan
teaches:
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor:
(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the
resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may
be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
± homicide/murder and arson.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending the Law on Arson, reads:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following: (2) Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main objective was
to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the
means to accomplish the goal.
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill
the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with
frustrated murder. Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on
fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with “Double Murder
with Frustrated Murder,” appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only
difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248(3) of the Revised
Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As
reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the
occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a
mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the
offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is
imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, (February
11, 2011)
Facts:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda.
De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-
law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused
feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein
deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney (in the
pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the
sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In
relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case.
As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art
332 of the Revised Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration
of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a
relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated
in the law. He further counters that the same law makes no distinction that
the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of spouse at the time
the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida
Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not
on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship
between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed
from the protective mantle of Art 332.
Issue: WON William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of
his relationship to Manolita.
Held: No.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the
said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender
in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves
the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.
Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332
considering that the crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex
crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of public document and
does not anymore concern private relations of family members. He then can
be held criminally liable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EULALIO
BOHOS, ET AL., defendant-appellant.
-Rape to mga bes
Forcible Abduction with Rape under Articles 335 and 342 of the Revised
Penal Code with the attending aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
taking advantage of superior strength and number with no attending
mitigating circumstance.
FACTS:
Myrna dela Vega, 16 years old left her residential home at Kapabagan,
Lanao del Norte in the afternoon to see a movie. Eventually it was already in
the evening when Myrna left the movie house to go home. Myrna walked in
the highway is the same route she usually takes in going home. By that time,
the highway was already deserted and the people were already asleep.
Suddenly she noticed four men \ approaching her. She tried to run away but
she was immediately overtaken by the four en. A cargo truck bound for Iligan
City was stopped and she was dragged along with it. The four men rode with
her at the rear of the truck. As two men held her arms, a handkerchief was
then place inside her mouth. Her panty was removed and right there on the
truck, one of men abused her sexually. The truck stopped at a house were
se was taken and raped again twelve times as te four me took turns in
raping her three times each. After that night, Myrna’s hands and feet were
tied. The following morning however, the four men untied Myrna and each
one again took turns in raping her. All in all Myrna was raped 17 times.
Accused Felix Pakis Teotimo Babanto, Eulalio Bohos and Agustin Nodado
were found guilty of 13 counts of complex crime of Forcible abduction with
rape.
ISSUE: WON the trial court was correct in ruling that the accused were guilty
of 13 counts of complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD
NO.
There was only forcible abduction, with rape and that was the one allegedly
committed on the truck or jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in the
house against her will would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer
be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. In
other words, the crimes of rape should be detached from, and considered
independently of, that of forcible abduction with rape and, therefore, the
former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
The crimes thus proved to have been committed are forcible abduction with
rape and sixteen (16) separate rapes attended by the aggravating
circumstances of superiority and use of a motor vehicle without any
mitigating circumstance. Thus, the judgment appealed from is modified in
that Eulalio Bohos is sentenced to suffer not thirteen (13) but seventeen (17)
death penalties
Domingo vs. Rayala, 546 Scra 90
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the
chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder,
part of her neck then tickled her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not
constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a
demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.
Issue:
WON Rayala committed sexual harassment.
Held:
Yes.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section
3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. –
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is

committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;

. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or

. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.

Even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section
3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this
provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But
it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor
be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing
Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly
for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.