DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO IMPROVE PERFORMACE OF GEOSYNTHETIC

REINFORCED MECHANICALLY STABILIZED EARTH WALLS IN TRANSPORTATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

by

BRADEN M. PETERS

B.S., Colorado School of Mines, 2001

A thesis submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School of the

University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

Civil Engineering Program

2017
This thesis for the Master of Science degree by

Braden M. Peters

has been approved for the

Civil Engineering Program

by

Chengyu Li, Chair

Jonathan Wu, Advisor

Peter Hoffman

Date: May 13, 2017

ii
Peters, Braden M. (M.S., Civil Engineering Program)

Design Considerations to Improve Performance of Geosynthetic Reinforced Mechanically

Stabilized Earth Walls in Transportation Infrastructure

Thesis directed by Professor Jonathan Wu

ABSTRACT

For approximately 40 years, Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) walls have become

increasingly popular and generally accepted as a standard earth retaining structures. MSE

walls are an economic solution to grade separation needs and are being constructed at a

rate of hundreds of thousands of square feet annually. National and International

organizations have published guidelines for the design and construction of MSE walls.

Although catastrophic failure of MSE walls is rare, many walls have exceeded the intended

performance criteria leading to costly repairs or ongoing maintenance. (Samtani and

Nowatzki, 2016) estimate a serviceability failure rate of 10% and structural failure rate of

1%, Valentine (2013) estimated that the failure rate of Geosynthetic Reinforced MSE (GMSE)

walls in the U.S. is as high as 5%, and the National Concrete Masonry Association (NCMA) has

estimated a 2% to 8% failure rate nationally for GMSE walls. This is unacceptable for

engineered structures in transportation facilities.

So why are failure rates so much higher than other earth retaining structures? The

common conclusion amongst engineers is incompetent construction, (e.g., inappropriate

backfill, poor compaction, improper grading, etc.). By evaluating a variety of observed

adverse wall performance, this report concludes that the majority of failures could have

iii
been avoided in design. Based on an understanding of important design considerations and

applying an acceptable level of risk, overall GMSE wall performance can be improved.

The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.

Approved: Jonathan Wu

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. MECHANICALLY STABILIZED EARTH WALLS ............................................................. 1

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

Objective and Scope ................................................................................................. 3

Definition of Failure .................................................................................................. 4

Limitations................................................................................................................. 5

II. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AND CURRENT PRACTICE ................................................. 6

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6

Summary of AASHTO (2014) Design Guidance ......................................................... 7

Summary of FHWA (2009) Design Guidance ............................................................ 8

Summary of NCMA (2010) Design Guidance ............................................................ 9

Overview of Current Practice.................................................................................. 10

Reinforced Backfill Material............................................................................... 11

Geosynthetic Reinforcement ............................................................................. 14

Design Methods ................................................................................................. 17

Construction Inspection ..................................................................................... 23

III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF GMSE WALLS .................................... 24

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 24

v
Literature Review of Compilation Studies .............................................................. 25

Geotechnical Engineers should Design MSE Walls and Prepare Plans and

Specifications ..................................................................................................... 26

Disregarding Lessons Learned ........................................................................... 27

Geosynthetic-Reinforced Earth Retaining Walls Poor Performance ................. 30

Frequent contributions to MSE wall Failures .................................................... 31

Geosynthetic Reinforced Structure Failures Forensic Studies........................... 33

Nationwide Survey on MSE Wall Abutment Status ........................................... 36

Extensive GMSE Wall Failure Review................................................................. 36

Coordination between the EPC/EPCM Contractor and MSE Engineer.............. 38

Literature Review of Individual Case Studies.......................................................... 39

Clayey Poorly Draining Soils – Adequate Plans and Design Case Study ............ 40

MSE Wall Success - Good Communication Case Study...................................... 42

Under-Designed Drainage Structure – Surface Water Flow Case Study ........... 44

Inadequate Design Assumptions and Submittal Review – Settlement and

Consolidation Case Study................................................................................... 46

Incorrect Evaluation of Settlement– Differential Settlement Case Study ......... 49

Inadequate Reinforcement Length – Excessive Displacement Case Study ....... 51

Literature Review of Geosynthetics in MSE Walls .................................................. 53

vi
 Use of Multitiered Geosynthetic -Reinforced Soil Walls ................................... 53

Success of Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil ........................................................... 56

Use of GRS Structures for Retaining Walls ........................................................ 57

Comparison of Modeling Methods for Geogrid Reinforced MSE Walls ............ 58

Comparison between GMSE and GRS Design Theories ..................................... 59

Quality Management for Successful GMSE Walls ............................................. 61

Design Criteria for Closely Spaced GMSE Walls ................................................. 62

Literature Review of MSE Wall General Reports .................................................... 63

Reliability of MSE Internal Stability Modelling .................................................. 64

Owner Controlled Aspects ................................................................................. 64

Collaboration and Systematic Approach to Design and Construction .............. 67

Risk of Failure Probability .................................................................................. 68

Teaching Retaining Wall Design ......................................................................... 69

Sustainability Assessment of Cantilever Retaining Wall vs. MSE Wall .............. 69

MSE State-of-the Practice Internal Design Review ............................................ 70

General Remarks Based on Literature Review ....................................................... 71

Discussion and Recommendations ......................................................................... 75

Design Considerations ............................................................................................ 76

Design Methods ................................................................................................. 76

vii
 Site Characterization .......................................................................................... 78

Wall Component Selection ................................................................................ 78

Communication and Experience ........................................................................ 81

Construction............................................................................................................ 82

Submittals .......................................................................................................... 83

Quality Control and Quality Assurance (QC/QA) ............................................... 84

Discussion on Risk ................................................................................................... 85

Design Risks that Effect Performance ................................................................ 85

Construction Risks that Effect Performance ...................................................... 86

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................... 88

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 92

viii
 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE
Table 2-1 MSE Wall Select Granular Reinforced Fill Requirements (FHWA, 2009,
Table 3-1) ……………...........................….………………………………………………………..12

Table 2-2 Recommended Limits of Electrochemical Properties for Reinforced Fills

with Geosynthetic Reinforcements (FHWA, 2009 Table 3-4)………………………. 14

Table 3-1 Generic Causes and Observed Technical Errors of MSE Failure (Wu and Chou
2013, Table 3)…………………………………………………………………………………………..… 35

ix
 LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

Figure 2-1 Basic Geometry and Forces for MSE Walls (Samtani and Nowatzki (2016),
Figure 2.2) …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11

Figure 2-2 Long-term geosynthetic reinforcement strength concepts (FHWA, 2009,

Figure 3-6)…………………………………………………………………………………………….……. 16

Figure 2-3 Potential External Failure Mechanisms for an MSE Wall (FHWA, 2009) …….. 20

Figure 2-4 Determination of Kr/Ka for the simplified Method (WSDOT, 2001)……..…….. 23

Figure 2-5 Photo of Failure of a 45 foot GMSE Wall (from Bachus and Griffin 2011,
Figure 2………………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 29

Figure 3-1 Basic Failure Mechanisms (Koerner and Koerner 2013, Figure 5)……………..… 39

Figure 3-2 Photo of Failure of Wall A (Scarborough 2005, Figure 1)………………………….....42

Figure 3-3 Surface water overtopping MSE Wall (Top) and Failed MSE wall (Bottom),
(Haramy, et al., 2010)………………………………………………………………………..………..46

Figure 3-4 Vertical Settlement (Top Left), Severe Longitudinal Cracking (Top Right), and
Bulging Baskets (Bottom) (Dodson, 2010……………………………………………………. 49

Figure 3-5 MSE Wall and Caisson Configuration and Sloped Reinforcing Strip Detail (Kim,
et al., 2010, Figure 3)………………………………………………………………………….……… 51

Figure 3-6 Model Predicted Total Displacement (291 mm) (from Hossain, et al. [2012],
Figure 10)……………………………………………………………………………………………….…. 53

x
Figure 3-7 Basic Difference between a) MSE and b) GRS Wall Designs (VanBuskirk 2010,
Figure 1) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..61
Figure 4-1 Relationship among Fines, Water in the Reinforced Fill Zone and Design and
Construction QC/QA (NCHRP, 2013)…………………………………………………………… 77

xi
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION

% Percent

ηi Load Modifier

γi Load factor

φ Resistance factor

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

ASD Allowable Stress Design

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

B.S. Bachelors of Science

CMP Corrugated Metal Pipe Culvert

EH Lateral Forces from the Retained Soil

EQ Seismic Loading

ES Surcharges

EV Weight of the Reinforced Fill

F.S. Factor of Safety

FHWA Federal Highways Administration

GAI Geosynthetic Accreditation Institute

GEC Geotechnical Engineering Circular

GMSE Geosynthetic Reinforced MSE

GSI Geotechnical Society Institute

GRS Geosynthetic Reinforced Soil

HDPE High Density Polyethylene

EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction

xii
EPCM EPC construction management

Ka Active Earth Pressure Coefficient

Ko At-Rest Earth Pressure Coefficient

Kr Active Earth Pressure Coefficient within Reinforced Fill

LAP Laboratory Accreditation Program

LRFD Load Factor Resistance Design

MDOT Montana Department of Transportation

mm millimeter

M.S. Masters of Science

MSE Mechanically Stabilized Earth

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NCMA National Concrete Masonry Association

No. Number

PET Polyethylene Terephthalate

PI Plasticity Index

PVC Polyvinyl Chloride

QA Quality Assurance

QC Quality Control

Qi Nominal force effect

RFCR Reduction Factor – creep

RFD Reduction Factor – durability

RFID Reduction Factor – installation damage

Rn Nominal resistance

Rr Factored resistance = φRn

xiii
RSS Reinforced Soil Slopes

SRW Segmental Retaining Wall

Tal long-term nominal tensile strength

Tult ultimate tensile strength

TxDOT Texas Department of Transportation

WSDOT Washington State Department of Transportation

xiv
 CHAPTER I

MECHANICALLY STABILIZED EARTH WALLS

Introduction

For approximately 40 years, Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) walls have become

increasingly popular and generally accepted as a standard earth retaining structures. MSE

walls are an economic solution to grade separation needs and are being constructed at a

rate of over one million square feet annually, likely representing over half of all retaining

walls on transportation facilities (Federal Highways Administration [FHWA], 2009). MSE

walls in transportation facilities have been used for sound walls, rock fall barriers, to

support roadways/railroads/runways, to support bridges, as culvert or bridge headwalls,

and to a lesser extent, retain cut slopes. MSE walls are highly desired because they are

simple and rapid to construct, economical, more tolerable to deformations, and perform

better under seismic loading compared with other types of retaining walls (FHWA, 2009).

MSE walls are a relatively new technology, and as such, have experienced some

growing pains. Modern day MSE walls were brought to the United States in the 1970s when

a steel strip reinforcement system, developed by French Architect Henri Vidal, was built in

California. Shortly after, geotextile reinforced walls were constructed followed by the first

use of geogrid in 1981. By 1983, geogrids were extensively used for earth reinforcement

(FHWA, 2009). The rapid development has led to the advancement of numerous systems

(proprietary and non-proprietary), differing analysis approaches (earth pressure, limit

equilibrium, and continuum mechanics) and various design methods (Coherent Gravity,

Tieback Wedge, Simplified, At-Rest Earth Pressure (Ko)-Stiffness, and Structure Stiffness

1
methods).

National and International organizations continually publish updated guidelines for

the design and construction of MSE walls. In the United States, American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), FHWA, and National Concrete

Masonry Association (NCMA) have published guidelines based on historical performance of

MSE walls. These guidelines specify a practical design methodology that limits MSE wall

deformations.

The design methodology generally revolves around evaluating the stability of

potential failure mechanisms. Failure mechanisms can be grouped into external and

internal stability and primarily evaluated using either Allowable Stress Design (ASD) or more

recently Load Factor Resistance Design (LRFD). Common failure mechanisms evaluated

include limiting eccentricity, sliding, bearing, pullout and tensile resistance of the

reinforcement, facing elements, and global stability.

Although complete catastrophic failure of MSE walls is rare, many walls have

exceeded the intended performance criteria leading to costly repairs or ongoing

maintenance. (Samtani and Nowatzki, 2016) estimate a serviceability failure rate of 10

percent (%) and structural failure rate of 1%, Valentine (2013) estimated that the failure rate

of Geosynthetic Reinforced MSE (GMSE) walls in the U.S. is as high as 5%, and the NCMA has

estimated a 2% to 8% failure rate nationally for GMSE walls. This is much higher that other

earth retaining structures, and particularly concerning for transportation facilities. By

evaluating a variety of observed adverse wall performance issues, overall MSE wall

performance can be improved.

2
 Discussions on high rates of poor MSE wall perforce are nothing new. Several

publications have extensive lists of causes of failures including budget constraints, team

communication, water infiltration, poor backfill, lack of inspection, corrosion, etc. This

undertaking differs from past efforts in that it provides (a) thorough documentation of

observed wall distresses specific to GMSE walls in transportation facilities (b) quantifiable

design considerations for the most common problems, and (c) a risk base discussion for

better communication between the owner, engineer, and contractor. Risk defined as being

the probability of adverse performance. Because designs with very low probability of

serviceability failure are very costly, a practical level of risk should be determined. The

experience gained from the included case studies will allow the engineer to apply the

recommendations with an understanding of the underlying risks.

Objective and Scope

The objective of this thesis is to identify important design and construction

considerations of GMSE walls that lead to adverse wall performance on transportation

projects. Conclusions and recommendations will be developed based on reports of

observed adverse GMSE wall performance. Through a clear presentation of results of this

study, a practitioner can learn from previous failure and develop an understanding of

important considerations. By being aware and applying these ‘lessons learned,’ overall

GMSE wall performance can be improved.

The scope of work to attain the stated objective is as follows:

3
 • Perform a literature review to collect information pertaining to GMSE wall

guidance, current state-of-the-practice, and reports of adverse wall

performance.

• Identify types of adverse performance and establish comprehensive

conclusions pertaining to the cause of failure.

• Provide implementable design recommendations for better performance of

GMSE walls.

• Identify and discuss risks associated with GMSE walls so that the owner,

engineer, and contractor can better communicate.

The focus of this study is on GMSE walls used in transportation facilities, not MSE

walls with inextensible reinforcement’s or designed following guidelines other than AASHTO

or FHWA. However, brief discussions concerning these alternatives are included for

comparison or context.

It is assumed that the reader has a basic comprehension of the site characterization,

analysis, design, and construction of GMSE walls and is familiar with the guidance

documents. The extensive reference list is included for additional information.

Definition of Failure

For this document, failure is defined as unacceptable horizontal or vertical

deformation of the wall face or supported zone that adversely affects the performance of

the GMSE wall requiring a significant repair or continued maintenance. Deformations

exceeding two inches are typical of GMSE walls considered to be undergoing failure.

4
 Limitations

Recommendations are based on interpretations and conclusions drawn from the

literature review and the author’s own engineering judgement. These interpretations are

not intended as a substitute for one’s own engineering judgement. Nothing in this report is

to be inferred as a replacement of the AASHTO, FHWA, or NCMA guidance documents.

5
 CHAPTER II

GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AND CURRENT PRACTICE

Introduction

A review of literature was conducted to determine the current practice for GMSE

wall design and construction techniques on transportation projects in the United States.

AASHTO, FHWA, and NCMA have published guidelines based on historical performance of

GMSE walls. AASHTO and FHWA are widely accepted for both private and public projects,

whereas NCMA is primarily used for private and commercial works. Because AASHTO and

FHWA guidelines are sometimes considered conservative, especially with respect to fill

requirements, a review of NCMA is included in this report for comparison. NCMA guidelines

are not considered a suitable substitution on transportation projects.

AASHTO was the first national standard for bridge design and construction dating

back to 1931 utilizing the Working Stress Design philosophy. This guidance has since

evolved to include the LRFD philosophy and a wide range of structures including GMSE

walls. Revised editions are typically published every four years with supplementary interim

specifications of tentative revisions published each year. AASHTO (2014) is the frequent

reference for this report citing a section, article, figure, table, or equation when needed.

Section 11.10 presents the specifications for MSE wall design in the left column with select

commentary, designated by a C, in the right column.

FHWA Geotechnical Engineering Circular (GEC) 011 is FHWA’s primary technical

guideline for selecting, designing, specify, monitor, and contract MSE walls and Reinforced

Soil Slopes (RSS) on transportation facilities. The 2009 FHWA manual is a significant update

6
from ASD, presented in the 2001 FHWA-NHI-00-043 manual, to LRFD philosophy. The

referenced FHWA (2009) document is presented as a series of chapters and subsections

that are continuous across two volumes. Volume I primarily contains design considerations

of MSE walls with Volume II presenting RSS considerations and the six especially useful

appendixes, labeled A through F.

NCMA organization originally published guidelines in 1993 specifically for GMSE

walls with modular block facing and geosynthetic reinforcement with 100% coverage.

NCMA is an international trade organization that represents produces and suppliers and is

dedicated to the promotion of manufactured concrete products. The current 3rd edition,

published in 2010 and subsequent best practices guide published in 2016 is intended to

provide and engineering approach for design and construction of segmental retaining walls

(SRWs). A reinforced SRW is a MSE wall with a dry-staked, dry-cast machined produced

concrete unit. NCMA (2010) and NCMA (2016) are presented as a series of sections and

subsections that are intended to cover all components and unique features of SRW systems.

There are significant differences between NCMA (2010) and AASHTO (2014)/FHWA (2009)

that typically lead to less conservative construction requirements.

Summary of AASHTO (2014) Design Guidance

AASHTO (2014), Section 11.10 specifies that MSE walls may be used when traditional

gravity walls are considered, especially where substantial settlement is anticipated, expect

where access to utilities would disrupt reinforcements, scour may potentially undermine

the wall, or aggressive conditions may degrade wall components. ASSHTO (2014) specifies

design of internal, external, compound, and facing stability; however, does not provide

7
geometrically complex guidelines and refers the reader to FHWA (2009) for tiered, back-to-

back, and walls with trapezoidal sections.

AASHTO (2014) requires a uniform minimum reinforcement length of 70% of the

wall height with an 8 foot absolute minimum, unless accurate site specific soil strengths are

known amongst other conditions. AASHTO (2014) commentary states that this requirement

has no theoretical justification but is based on historical practice with acceptable horizontal

deformations.

AASHTO (2014) designs evaluate the service limit state, soil failure (external

stability), structural stability (internal stability), and seismic conditions. AASHTO (2014) also

provides guidance on drainage, subsurface erosion, and special loading conditions.

Movement and stability at the service limit state includes evaluating for settlement, lateral

displacement, and overall stability (limit equilibrium slope stability analysis). Safety against

soil failure is evaluated at the strength limit state for limiting eccentricity, sliding, bearing,

and overturning. Safety against structural failure is evaluated at the strength limit state for

reinforcement pullout and tensile resistance of the reinforcement.

Summary of FHWA (2009) Design Guidance

FHWA (2009) follows LRFD methodology and generally agrees with AASHTO (2014)

design approach by evaluating the internal, external, compound, and facing stability. Both

guidelines have similar criteria for soil strength and reinforcements, including following the

Simplified Method for evaluating internal stability of both extensible and inextensible

reinforcements developed in the late 1990’s ((Washington State Department of

Transportation [WSDOT], 2001). However, some confusion remains between AASHTO and

8
FHWA design requirements in presentation, terminology, nomenclature, equations,

variables, and other idiosyncrasies (e.g., determination of soil aggressiveness).

FHWA (2009) presents specific recommendations for MSE project criteria, site

evaluation, wall selection, facing considerations, costs, and monitoring. The manual also

provides specific guidelines for contracting, construction methods, materials, and inspection

of MSE walls and RSS. FHWA (2009) lists general potential disadvantages of reinforced soil

structures as requiring a relatively large space for excavation, the use of select granular fill,

and often requires a shared design responsibility between material suppliers and owners.

Summary of NCMA (2010) Design Guidance

NCMA (2010) utilizes the ASD approach which contrasts with the AASHTO

(2014)/FHWA (2009) LRFD approach. In addition, the guidelines present less stringent

criteria for many of the wall components that typically lead to less conservative

construction requirements. Some of these criteria include a smaller minimum

reinforcement length (0.6H), neglects long term creep, less strict backfill requirements, no

soundness requirements on backfill, always uses the Coulomb Equation for lateral earth

pressure, and specifies a lower Factor of Safety (F.S.) for overturning.

NCMA (2010) does provide valuable detailed descriptions, mechanical properties,

and engineering performance of SRW units including dimensions, mix designs, compressive

strengths, tolerances, connections, layout, and facing stability (e.g., crest toppling,

surcharge loading, etc.). The guidelines also include extensive design considerations for

surface and subsurface drainage and outline the roles and responsibilities of the owner,

9
architect, civil engineer, geotechnical engineer, SRW engineer, construction inspector, and

structural engineer.

Overview of Current Practice

MSE walls are an economic gravity structure constructed of compacted soil with

horizontal reinforcement inclusions (reinforced zone) and various facing elements. The

inclusions add lateral stability and tensile capacity to form a composite mass. The inclusions

are made of metallic or polymeric strips, grids, or sheets typically placed horizontally,

perpendicular to the facing. Fills primarily consisting of well graded, low plasticity, granular

soils are recommended to limit deformations. The weight of the reinforced fill designated as

load type “EV” resists the lateral forces from the retained soil designated as load type “EH”,

surcharges “ES”, and seismic loading “EQ” (AASHTO 2014). Gravity structures require

competent foundation soils or deep foundations to limit total or differential settlements.

MSE basic geometry and forces from the retained soil in LRFD format are shown in

Figure 2-1.

10
 Figure 2-1. Basic Geometry and Forces for MSE Walls (Samtani and
Nowatzki (2016), Figure 2.2)

Reinforced Backfill Material

AASHTO (2014) specifies that backfill materials should be granular, free draining

material. Because of the uncertainties associated with using empirical soil strength

parameters and unknowns with regard to quality of inspection or construction control,

many transportation agencies have adopted conservative reinforced fill criteria, generically

referred to as select fills. According to AASHTO (2014) much of the experience with MSE

walls with respect to internal stress, pullout, and failure surface shape is heavily influenced

by granular soil properties. In addition, cohesive soils are difficult to compact and are likely

to experience creep over the life of the structure. Ongoing creep could result in excessive

deformations or even collapse, especially in situations where hydrostatic water pressures

are likely to develop.

11
Table 2-1. MSE Wall Select Granular Reinforced Fill Requirements (FHWA, 2009, Table 3-1).

According to FHWA (2009), MSE walls should be reasonably free from organic or

other deleterious material and conform to the fill requirements presented in Table 2-1.

Special considerations should also be given to low durability material partials (shale, mica,

gypsum, etc.), rock fills, and drainage as even low fines content material may not be free

draining. Compaction specifications should also specify a lift thickness and range of

acceptable moisture contents. To prevent facing movement, special compaction zone

utilizing lighter equipment and thinner lifts should be considered (FHWA, 2009).

According to AASHTO (2014) and FHWA (2009), thousands of MSE walls with

reinforced fills meeting the criteria above have performed excellently. A maximum

effective friction angle of 34 degrees and cohesion of zero is usually assumed as the peak

12
shear strength parameters (FHWA, 2009). Project specific testing may be used to justify

higher internal friction angle values, but not to exceed 40 degrees. This limit has been

determined from comparison of full scale wall data with common design methods (e.g.,

simplified method). It is anticipated that assumed internal friction angles in excess of the

40-degree limit would greatly underestimate reinforcement loads (AASHTO, 2014).

Loosening the restrictions on select fills for MSE walls has been greatly debated,

especially with respect to the amount of fines content (% passing the number (No.) 200

sieve). The intent is to significantly reduce costs and/or environmental impacts by using

lower quality fills or reusing on-site native soils. NCMA (2010) suggests a 35% fines content

criterion but allows up to 50%, National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP,

2013) urges that AASHTO maximum fines content should be increased from 15% to 25%, a

few State Department of Transportations (DOTs) allow fines content greater than 15%

(NCHRP, 2013), and Samtani and Nowatzki (2016) suggests that MSE walls for

transportation facilities can be successfully constructed using established design methods

with fines content up to 50%. The caveats of these suggestions being appropriate fill

material selection, material design parameters, compaction control, and effective drainage.

The electrochemical index properties of the reinforced fill and native soils must be

correlated to the corrosion/degradation of the reinforcements to achieve the 75-year

design life specified by AASHTO. Limits for electrochemical criteria of reinforced fills used

with geosynthetic reinforcements have been developed by FHWA (2009a), as shown in

Table 2-2. The actual degradation of geosynthetic reinforcements with time will depend on

the specific polymer amongst other factors (configuration, stress, etc.) leading to

13
uncertainties as to their durability (FHWA, 2009a). Research on corrosion of metallic

reinforcements has led to more stringent requirements on reinforced fills but is not the

focus of the report; therefore, are not presented.

Table 2-2. Recommended Limits of Electrochemical Properties for Reinforced Fills

with Geosynthetic Reinforcements (FHWA, 2009 Table 3-4).

Geosynthetic Reinforcement

MSE reinforcement types are generally classified as either extensible (geosynthetic)

or inextensible (metallic). This report focuses on observed distress of GMSE walls, more

specifically, geogrid reinforced walls. Geotextile, glass-fiber composites, ultra-high-modulus

polymers, geocells, and other geocomposites are also excluded because they are not widely

used in transportation projects. According to FHWA (2008), geosynthetic reinforcements

are often a very economical alternative to metallic reinforcements, especially under certain

environmental conditions, and allow for a wider variety of wall facings. The geosynthetic

reinforcement cost is approximately 15% to 20% of the total cost of the MSE wall;

therefore, some conservatism in design (strength and spacing) is not excessively expensive

(FHWA, 2008).

Despite the wide use of geosynthetic as soil reinforcement, there are unknowns with

respect to long term performance. Specifically, with respect to time and temperature

dependent creep under sustained loading leading to excessive deformations. Additional

14
research is also recommended by FHWA (2008) to evaluate the strain incompatibility

between the relatively stiff facing and the extensible geosynthetic reinforcement under

seismic loading.

Selection of geosynthetic reinforcements depend on the durability and the long-

term geosynthetic-soil stress transfer (FHWA, 2008). Each geosynthetic is different in its

resistance to ageing and chemical attack due to varying polymer types, quality, additives,

and product geometry (FHWA, 2009). FHWA (2008) estimates there are more than 600

different geosynthetic products available in North America. This variety presents a

significant challenge for engineers to design and develop specifications for the considerable

range of physical and mechanical properties. The challenges have likely lead to the

conservative approach of determining long-term nominal design strengths of geosynthetic

reinforcements. By using recommended reduction factors presented in FHWA (2009), it is

common to use a long-term nominal tensile strength (Tal) 50% to 97% lower than the

ultimate tensile strength (Tult), as determined from a wide width strip test per American

Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D4595.

Selection of the Tal is determined from reducing the Tult by all possible strength time

dependent losses (FHWA, 2009). Reduction factors used to represent the strength loss over

the design life of a GMSE wall is shown in Figure 2-2. The figure shows that there are

immediate losses at the time of installation and additional losses over the design life of the

reinforcement. Reduction factors include installation damage (RFID), creep (RFCR), and

durability (RFD). FHWA (2009) recommends that Tal values for specific products be

15
determined from extensive field and/or laboratory testing conducted by agency or an

independent third party.

Figure 2-2. Long-term geosynthetic reinforcement strength concepts (FHWA, 2009,

Figure 3-6).

In addition, to account for uncertainties in long-term reinforcement strength and

potential local overstresses, a LRFD Strength I limit state resistance factor of 0.90 is applied

when calculating soil reinforcement resistance under static loading FHWA (2009). This is a

higher resistance factor, allowing for more reinforcement strength benefit, than those

recommended for steel reinforcements. The reasoning behind this is that confinement is

not considered in developing Tal, observations indicate lower stress levels in reinforcements

than used in design, and that strain of the reinforced fill is considerably less than the

rupture strain of the geosynthetic reinforcement leading to visible deformations rather than

sudden collapse.

The most common reinforcement used in GMSE walls for transportation facilities are

geogrids; however, geotextiles have gained some traction with extensive use in temporary

structures and, more recently, as Geosynthetic Reinforced Soil (GRS) technology for the

16
application Integrated Bridge Systems. Geogrids are favorable because they are marketed

as a complete supplied package readily available from nationwide commercial suppliers.

The most common geogrids for GSME walls include high density polyethylene geogrid

(HDPE) and polyethylene terephthalate (PET). HDPE is considered to be a stiff geogrid,

manufactured from drawing a perforated polymer sheet. PET geogrids are referred to as

flexible geogrids that are formed from weaving polymer strands. Both geogrids can be

manufactured as uniaxial (stronger in one direction) or biaxial (comparable strengths in two

directions); however, for efficiency uniaxial geogrids are typically used exclusively in GMSE

walls.

In addition to reinforcements, subsurface drainage and separation geosynthetics

(mainly geotextiles) in accordance with AASHTO Specification M288 are used extensively in

construction of GMSE walls.

Design Methods

The earth pressure design methodology generally revolves around evaluating the

stability of potential failure mechanisms. Common failure mechanisms evaluated include

limiting eccentricity, sliding, bearing, pullout and tensile resistance of the reinforcement,

facing elements, and global stability. Failure mechanisms can be grouped into internal and

external stability and evaluated by using established analytical methods based on either

ASD or more recently LRFD platforms. LRFD become the required specification in federally

funded transportation projects as of October 2010 following a transition period as stated in

the FHWA (2000) policy memorandum. LRFD is defined by AASHTO (2014) as a “reliability-

based design methodology in which force effects caused by factored loads are not

17
permitted to exceed the factored resistance components.” LRFD methodology can be

summarized as factored resistance must be equal to or exceed factored loads as defined by

AASHTO Equation (1.3.2.1-1):

ΣηiγiQi ≤ φRn= Rr AASHTO Eq. (1.3.2.1-1)

where:
ηi = Load Modifier (a factor related to ductility, redundancy, and operational
classification)
γi = Load factor
φ = Resistance factor
Qi = Nominal force effect
Rn = Nominal resistance
Rr = Factored resistance = φRn

MSE walls designed in the context of LRFD must satisfy the strength limit state,

services limit state, and extreme event limit state as defined by AASHTO. A limit state is a

condition beyond which a structural component ceases to satisfy the provisions for which it

is designed (FHWA, 2007). The strength limit state considers the stability of each structural

element to relevant load combinations, whereas, service limit state provides restrictions on

stress and deformation. Extreme event limit state of MSE walls ensures the overall,

external, and internal stability requirements are meet during seismic loading or vehicular

collision. Relevant load combinations for MSE walls include permanent and transient loads.

Both, maximum and minimum load factors for permanent loads are evaluated to determine

the critical combination.

External Stability of GMSE Walls

External stability of GMSE walls for transportation facilities is typically the

responsibility of the owner agency or representative. The agency is proposing the need for

the structure at a specific location; therefore, the agency determines feasibility with respect

18
to site conditions, structure selection, and anticipated loading. Site characterization

typically includes topography surveys, field reconnaissance, subsurface exploration, and

laboratory testing to determine subsurface conditions and soil/rock parameters for use in

design. Structure selection includes such things as aesthetics, performance, environmental

constraints, constructability, and cost. Loads that may be specific to a site include

surcharges, traffic loads, hydrostatic pressures, seismic loads, etc.

External stability is evaluated assuming the reinforced zone acts like a rigid body

similar to other gravity structures. Failure mechanisms evaluated consist of sliding, limiting

eccentricity (overturning), bearing resistance (including settlement), and global stability as

shown in Figure 2-3. This evaluation determines the size of the rigid body with respect to

adequacy of the foundation soils. Greater reinforcement lengths and embedment beyond

the minimums outlined in AASHTO (2014) may be required. In some cases, foundation

improvements such as deep foundations or soil treatments may be required to support the

structure. Evaluating the external stability will be iterative with internal stability

calculations to access compound stability and as assumptions become known, such as

facing type, backfill materials, reinforcement type, final loading, and possibly geometry

requirements from internal stability calculations.

19
Figure 2-3. Potential External Failure Mechanisms for an MSE Wall (FHWA, 2009).

Internal Stability of GMSE Walls

In transportation projects, the GMSE wall system manufacturer/supplier is typically

responsible for internal stability design. The advantage is that the wall system supplier is

intimately familiar with the wall system components and designs are optimized for the

specific component properties. According to NCHRP 290 (1987), the internal failure

mechanisms are reinforcement pullout and rupture. The design parameters that need to be

considered include backfill parameters, reinforcement properties (modulus, stiffness, and

tensile strength), soil to reinforcement interaction parameters (soil density, reinforcement

spacing, normal pressure, soil and reinforcement friction, etc.), reinforcement geometry,

and construction parameters (compaction stress and reinforcement orientation) (NCHRP

290, 1987). Additionally, wall components must be designed, including facing elements,

reinforcements, and reinforcement connections accounting for lateral and vertical

20
deformations. In some cases, agencies may pre-approve MSE wall systems for better

efficiency of reviews.

The original MSE design method was developed for inextensible reinforcements, and

came to be known as the Coherent Gravity Method. According to WSDOT (2001), this

method assumes that the MSE wall behaves as a rigid body and an overturning moment is

transmitted through the reinforced soil mass. The method was refined by several MSE-

specific research studies to include a bilinear envelope of maximum reinforcement tension

and a variable state of stress. This method assumes that the failure plane does not actually

develop, the active wedge does not displace, and the inextensibility of the steel

reinforcements prevents structure deformation (Anderson, Gladstone, and Withiam, 2010).

The Tieback Wedge Method and Structure Stiffness Methods were developed and

verified using laboratory and full scale wall testing. Although different in approach with

respect to how the lateral earth pressure is calculated; both methods assume the failure

plane develops along the Rankine failure surface for extensible reinforcements (WSDOT,

2001). The Rankine failure surface is defined by a straight line oriented at an angle of

45+φ/2 from the horizontal and passing through the toe of the wall.

ASHTO and FHWA have adapted the Simplified Method developed and presented in

WSDOT (2001) for internal stability design. The Simplified Method was intended to unify

and simplify the design methods above with respect to how vertical stresses are calculated

and how reinforcement stiffness is considered in design (WSDOT, 2001). The Simplified

Method assumes the wall is flexible and does not consider the overturning moment for

internal vertical stress calculations (WSDOT, 2001). To allow for various reinforcement

21
types, a ratio of earth pressure coefficient with the reinforced zone to active earth pressure

coefficient (Kr/Ka) approach is used as shown in Figure 2-4. The value of Kr is used to

determine the maximum reinforcement tension assuming Ka is calculated per the Rankine

or Coulomb equations. Stability with respect to pullout failure is achieved when the

factored effective length of the reinforcement in the resisting zone is greater than or equal

to the factored tensile load at each reinforcement layer (FHWA, 2009).

Figure 2-4. Determination of Kr/Ka for the simplified Method (WSDOT, 2001).

22
Construction Inspection

Construction inspection of MSE walls is similar to any other earthwork; it must verify

proper site preparation, correct installation of components (leveling pads, facing systems,

reinforcements, drainage networks, etc.), and placement and compaction of backfill soil

(NCHRP 290, 1987). Quality Control (QC) in accordance with design specification is typically

the responsibility of the contractor while Quality Assurance (QA) is the responsibility of the

owner agency or representative. According to NCHRP 290 (1987), site preparation

construction inspection is necessary to verify agreement between actual and specified base

elevations, conformance of encountered soils with parameters considered in design, the

absence of hard or soft foundation soils, and verify adequate drainage. Wall components

need to be evaluated for conformance with the construction drawings, have been properly

transported and stored, free of visible damage, and are properly installed (NCHRP 290,

1987). Backfill type, placement, and compaction must be within limits and tolerances

identified in the specifications.

23
 CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF GMSE WALLS

Introduction

In this Chapter, various publications relating to poor MSE wall performance were

reviewed to identify types of wall distress and possible causes of failure. Publications

concerning MSE walls with both extensible and inextensible reinforcements, as well as,

performance of public and private projects were reviewed. The literature review is

intended to develop an understanding of the most common problems, important

considerations, and underlying risks associated with GMSE walls used in transportation

facilities. Some of these causes of failures including budget constraints, team

communication, water infiltration, poor backfill, lack of inspection, degradation, etc.

The literature review in support of this thesis has been broken out into four

categories: Compilation Studies, Individual Case Studies, Geosynthetics in MSE walls, and

MSE Wall General Reports. Compilation Studies include work that evaluates many sites of

MSE walls or draws conclusions from a statistical evaluation of MSE wall failures. Individual

Case Studies discusses one site or particular failure and presents details of the MSE wall in

regard to design, construction, or failure mechanism. Geosynthetics in MSE walls include

work that focuses specifically on the behavior and/or performance of extensible

reinforcements in MSE walls. MSE Wall General Reports include all other reports

concerning various aspects of MSE performance with respect to planning, design,

construction, maintenance, or repair. This section also summarizes the findings of the

literature review in a general observations section.

24
 Literature Review of Compilation Studies

Compilation Studies include work that evaluates multiple MSE walls or draws

conclusions from a statistical evaluation to identify trends, developments, or

improvements. These studies tend to be more academic in nature and supplement or

enforce guidance document recommendations and conclusions with respect to MSE wall

performance. The following documents were reviewed and are summarized below:

• “Applying Lessons Learned in the Past 20 Years of MSE Wall Design &

Construction” Harpstead, Schmidt, and Christopher (2010).

• “A Perspective on Mechanically Stabilities Earth Walls Pushing the Limits or

Pulling Us Down” Bachus and Griffin (2011).

• “An Assessment of the Factors that Contribute to the Poor Performance of

Geosynthetic-Reinforced Earth Retaining Walls” Valentine (2013).

• “Look Out Below!!! Potential Pitfalls and Suggested Improvements in Design and

Construction of MSE Walls” DiFiore and Strohman (2013).

• “Forensic Studies of Geosynthetic Reinforced Structure Failures”

Wu and Chou (2013).

• “Evaluation of Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) Walls for Bridge Ends in

Kentucky; What Next?” Sun and Graves (2013).

• “A data base, statistics and recommendations regarding 171 failed geosynthetic

reinforced mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls” Koerner and

Koerner (2013).

25
 • “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation for MSE Walls – Perspectives from an EPC/EPCM

Contractor” Clemente, Lamonte, Davie, and Lewis (2016).

Geotechnical Engineers should Design MSE Walls and Prepare Plans and Specifications

Harpstead, et al. (2010) report, MSE structures are a useful technology for

constructing cost effective and easily built retaining walls. However, the MSE design is

conservative, which does not necessarily lead to advancement in MSE wall technology. The

authors’ state that MSE walls are not often treated with the same diligence as other

engineered structures for the geotechnical investigation. Because MSE wall design is based

on soil-structure interaction, a geotechnical engineer should design MSE walls and prepare

plans and specifications, given their understanding of the soil-structure interaction.

Significant issues have arisen due to lack of communication between the various

engineers and contractors leading to poor execution of MSE wall design, construction, and

ultimately performance. Harpstead, et al. (2010) cite that 26 known failures were reported

in 35,000 walls; however, the authors are aware of many failures go unreported, especially

where litigation is involved.

MSE wall designs contain elements of both structural and geotechnical engineering.

The structural component of the wall facing, connections, and structural frames for

obstruction avoidance need to be designed and reviewed by a structural engineer.

Geotechnical design elements include soil-structure interaction. The authors believe that a

geotechnical engineer should assume responsibility for designing MSE walls based on their

understanding of the soil-structure interaction. Thus, the geotechnical engineer should also

26
be responsible for preparation of the plans and specifications with collaboration of both, a

qualified structural and civil engineer, either directly, or as a minimum, in a review capacity.

From review of cited wall failures, Harpstead, et al. (2010) identifies the critical wall

components as drainage systems and quality of the reinforced fill. The authors suggest that

the majority of failures result from either the designer or the contractor not understating

the importance of each of these wall elements and the requirement that each element

perform as expected.

Additionally, proper QA/QC should be completed during construction of the MSE

wall. The authors suggest that full time inspection is warranted as opposed to occasionally

checking backfill compaction. Proper QA/QC requires meticulous attention to design and

construction details including assessing existing condition and verifying the soil strength

parameters in addition to verifying all construction requirements.

Disregarding Lessons Learned

In “A Perspective on Mechanically Stabilities Earth Walls Pushing the Limits or Pulling

Us Down”, Bachus and Griffin (2011) warns engineers designing MSE walls to heed warnings

learned from previous failed projects. With the recent upsurge of MSE wall construction,

the limits of design have been pushed; many of which are innovative in terms of wall height

or creative applications, others have been pushed to limits of failure. The authors note the

continued failures of MSE structures from similar failure mechanisms, thus signaling the

same mistakes.

The use of MSE walls are an innovative, yet simple, method for reinforced soil

slopes. However, the rate of failure has increased. Bachus and Griffin (2011) report that

27
these failures are often due to previously recognized issues. The goal of this article is to not

only identify common design issues, but heighten the awareness of a robust design and

diligent construction to reduce the likelihood of future failures.

Bachus and Griffin (2011) initially presented MSE designs that were cutting edge and

were successfully designed and constructed (i.e., “the good”), then identified other MSE

walls that had adverse impacts to the structure of the wall (i.e., “the bad”), and finally

identified MSE walls that did not meet structural or aesthetic requirements (i.e., “the ugly”).

Figure 2-5 provides an example of neglecting to consider adverse impacts of foundation soil

settlement in design.

Figure 2-5. Photo of Failure of a 45 foot GMSE Wall (from Bachus and Griffin 2011, Figure 2).

The authors identify that similar issues lead to repeated occurrences of MSE wall

failures. The authors cite a 2009, Koerner and Koerner study of private project GMSE walls

that 65% of wall failures were attributable to the design; 33% to the contractor; and 2% to

facing failure. The same study suggested that technical factors leading to failures were fine

28
grained soil backfill, poor compaction, and/or the influence of water. The majority of

failures were reported to have occurred within two years of construction. None of the wall

failures observed was attributable to the geosynthetic reinforcements.

Bachus and Griffin (2011) ask, “With all of this prior knowledge and experience, are

their explanations as to why we still continue to have problems?” Possible explanations

include: inexperience, poor understanding, and forgetting design details and principles;

wishful thinking (i.e., use of probably acceptable materials and design criteria); and market

pressure. The authors note that a design of a small (less than 6 feet high) wall cannot be

scaled to a mid-size (12 to 40 feet high) or large (40 to approximately 140 feet high). In

particular, design components should not be overlooked or underestimated includes

drainage, facing strength, and compaction.

Bachus and Griffin (2011) make five specific recommendations that should be

implemented and considered standard for MSE wall designs, as follows:

1) The wall designer should assume responsibility for the engineered system.

2) Drainage design must be a component of the design (either freely draining or

include drain lines).

3) Qualified quality assurance oversight shall be performed during construction to

ensure that the design is followed.

4) Laboratory testing should be performed on soil and soil/geosynthetic interface

materials to determine actual strength and creep characteristics.

5) Consider long-term maintenance requirements during the design.

29
Geosynthetic-Reinforced Earth Retaining Walls Poor Performance

Valentine (2013) discusses contributions to poor performance in GMSE walls in “An

Assessment of the Factors that Contribute to the Poor Performance of Geosynthetic-

Reinforced Earth Retaining Walls”. Valentine (2013) investigated 45 geosynthetic-reinforced

soil structures with poor performance (e.g., deemed unusable or failure). The evaluation

included both completely failed GMSE walls and ones that have not completely failed, but

have degraded beyond its useful life. Valentine (2013) states that GMSE walls have gained

popularity because of their economic and aesthetic values; however, the performance is

unsatisfactory with failure rates up to 5% and literature evaluating failed GMSE walls is

sparse.

Difficulties in forensic evaluations of GMSE walls arise from the inaccessibility of the

MSE structure simply because it is buried, unidentified or uncertain failure factors,

disagreement among professionals evaluating the failure, and professional reputations are

at stake. Additionally, oftentimes failures are involved in legal claims that restrict the

information available.

Valentine (2013) notes that most failed GMSE walls are a result of multiple factors

and are rarely attributed to a single cause. Factors identified in GMSE wall failure can

include flawed engineering design, poor construction or inspections during construction,

inclement weather or other natural conditions (e.g., sink hole), leaking utility line, poor soil

conditions, and internal or external drainage.

This paper specifically reviewed four projects with failed GMSE walls. The first GMSE

wall failure was attributed to the contractor not following the reinforced soil type or

30
reinforcement wall coverage ratios identified in design and the inspector not identifying this

discrepancy, with failure initiating with a malfunctioning water pipe. The second GMSE wall

failure was attributed to other construction at the toe of the wall for landscaping that both

undercut and saturated the wall toe. The third GMSE wall failure was attributed to poor

design with an inadequate storm sewer size and incorrect shear strengths selected that

contributed to the development of the global failure plane. The fourth GMSE wall failure

was attributed to internal drainage measures in the design to account for perched water

behind the wall crest and softening of the clay that was typical for the area.

In conclusion, Valentine (2013) assessment of 45 failed GMSE walls identifies the

most common factors leading to failure. The primary factors for failure are a presence of

water and incorrect soil type used. Recommendations made to owners in future GMSE walls

are to require minimum experience for the designer and contractor and require a thorough

inspection.

Frequent contributions to MSE wall Failures

DiFiore and Strohman (2013) discuss frequent contributors to MSE failures and

common pitfalls in design and construction of MSE walls. MSE walls are typically more cost

effective than conventional reinforced-concrete retaining walls. The walls are generally

aesthetically pleasing, and contractors can install them with little specialized construction

skills or equipment.

Common contributors to failed MSE walls include use of marginal soils, inadequate

water management, poor coordination, and insufficient quality assurance/quality control.

Using poor quality material, such as clay or silts, can lead to issues with compaction,

31
settlement, water retention, long-term stability, soil migration, and freeze-thaw potential.

When MSE walls are designed without consideration of hydrostatic or seepage pressures,

performance or stability of the wall can be compromised. Common contributors include

ineffective wall drainage; unknown water sources identified during or after construction;

and incidences with the potential for leaking water utility pipelines (e.g., irrigation lines

used for vegetative growth on top of walls). Project coordination is an important process

for a successful MSE structure to identify the various members’ roles and responsibility,

such as the liability for site specific property evaluations (e.g., settlement, bearing capacity,

and global stability) that can go unperformed. QA/QC is a fundamental step in ensuring that

the as-built MSE structure is constructed pursuant to the design plans and specifications.

DiFiore and Strohman (2013) present the following suggested improvements based

on their experience:

• Hold a pre-design meeting, a pre-construction meeting, and regular site-

construction meetings.

• Provide wall drainage details in accordance with FHWA and NCMA design

recommendations and MSE wall manufacturer’s design guidelines.

• Verify MSE wall stability and performance checks have been performed and

reviewed.

• Verify that the contractor is trained and qualified to construct MSE structures.

• Perform QA/QC tests and inspections.

• Encourage open communications.

32
Geosynthetic Reinforced Structure Failures Forensic Studies

Wu and Chou (2013) present a compilation of lessons learned from failed MSE walls

that can be used for future successes. Nineteen cases of MSE failures of highway-related

infrastructures in mountainous areas were carefully examined and quantitatively studied.

The results indicate that rainfall is the primary natural cause of failure and incorrect

engineering practices are the cause of MSE malfunction. Human-caused failures arise from

inadequate project planning and site exploration, poor quality construction, lack of essential

training for slope stability analysis. The results of this study intended to be used to improve

engineering practices to ensure a more reliable MSE structure.

Wu and Chou (2013) have observed that most MSE structures have performed well,

leading to the conclusion that the design of them may be conservative. However, poor

performance has been observed more recently. Failure studies are necessary to identify

common mistakes to improve the safety of MSE structure failure.

Wu and Chou (2013) intended to use descriptive statistics to interpret failure

information to communicate specific results to practicing engineers. However, because

each of the 19 structures evaluated were designed and constructed for site-specific

condition, each had its own cause of failure, making the evaluation difficult to determine a

concise cause of failure. The generic causes of failure of MSE structures for technical errors

are provided in Table 3-1.

33
 Table 3-1. Generic Causes and Observed Technical Errors of MSE Failure
(Wu and Chou 2013, Table 3).
Generic cause Observed technical errors
Project planning Lack of clear scope of the project
and site exploration Conflicting client expectations
Improper site planning for overall application
Inadequate scope or extent of site explorations
Misuse or misinterpret site-related information
Neglect the effects of unfavorable geological, hydrological, Ecological, and
environmental, conditions
Analysis Conceptual errors
Misuse of analysis tools
Misuse or misinterpret parameters
Calculation errors
Failure to identify all loads and load combinations
Lack of redundancy
Design Misuse or neglect of the importance of surface and subsurface drainage system
Detailing deficiencies
Specification deficiencies
Failure to consider surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance
Material Misuse of geogrid materials
Improper fill material
Construction Improper sequencing
Improper methods or timing of construction
Insufficient compaction or poor construction quality assurance and quality control
Inappropriate site preparation
Service and Structural alterations
maintenance Neglecting routine cleanup of the drainage system
Operation beyond the scope of the design
Changes in structural use
Inadequate surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance
Unexpected construction disturbance adjacent to the site

The trigger of failure was determined to be intense rainfall in 17 of the 19 cases. Wu

and Chou (2013) concluded that rainfall initiates instability by saturating soils and

decreasing effective stress. An earthquake was the trigger of failure in the remaining two

cases studied. An important note made was that MSE structures were found to exhibit

better dynamic performance as compared to conventional concrete walls during an

earthquake, substantiating that MSE designs lead to higher dynamic flexibility and ductility.

Although the triggers of failure were rainfall and earthquakes, the cause of failure

were generally attributed to inadequate project planning and site exploration and poor

34
construction quality assurance. In 10 of the 19 cases, the failure was highly likely from

improper project planning and site exploration resulting in failures from differential

settlement or bearing instability from encountering an unexpected soft stratum, deep-

seated slope instability, or upward seepage pressure. Other issues derived from poor

project planning included misinterpretation of strength parameters of the soil and

insufficient boring information. Other technical errors arose from lack of clear project scope

and insufficient communication.

The materials used as backfill is another primary cause of failure. Most designs

specify granular soils for backfill, low-quality soils (e.g., silt, clay, crushed shale) are often

used for economic reasons. This article cited a 2010, Koerner and Koerner study of 82

reinforced structure failures, where 76% used silt and clay as backfill soils. The safety of an

MSE structure is highly dependent on the availability of qualified fill material.

The frequency of failure because of improper analysis or design was 37%. These

types of MSE structure failures may be due to the lack of experience, negligence, lack of

education, incompetence, or the inability to communicate. Wu and Chou (2013) state the

most common technical errors were from the misinterpretation of soil conditions and

incorrect selection of soil strength parameters. Additionally, “evidence indicates that the

MSE failures have been the result of a lack of essential training in traditional slope stability

analysis, rather than from any deficiency in the expertise of MSE professionals”.

Poor construction quality assurance is as high as 44%. Improvements of quality

assurance are mandatory to ensure the safety of MSE structures and independent

surveillance should be occurring to ensure correct compaction.

35
Nationwide Survey on MSE Wall Abutment Status

Sun and Graves (2013) summarize a nationwide survey and inspection/rating results

for 56 MSE wall abutments in Kentucky. Survey invitations were sent to 49 states and 5

Canadian provinces with 39 states and 2 provinces responding. Survey questions were

focused specifically on MSE abutments and considered type, geometry, reinforcement,

backfill, foundation, failures, and inspection. Relevant findings include 12 of 33

state/province responses (36%) report MSE abutment failures, with up to 10 failures

reported in one state. Over half of these state/provinces reporting failures (7 out of 12)

identified failure type as “Settlement/washout of backfill material.” Interesting findings

include that the vast majority of state/provinces limit the maximum height of MSE wall

abutments to 40 feet, as compared to the 50 foot height allowed by FHWA (2009). Also,

only 24 states/provinces (73% of responses) had guidelines for building MSE abutments,

three state/provinces had a formalized maintenance rating system, and only two

states/provinces had maintenance inspector’s guidelines.

Extensive GMSE Wall Failure Review

Koerner and Koerner (2013) performed an extensive review on 171 failed GMSE

walls and created a database, statistics, and recommendations based on their investigation.

The data base includes 44 cases of excessive deformation and 127 cases of collapse of at

least part of the wall.

The main statistical findings are as follows:

1) 96% were private (as opposed to public) financed walls

2) 78% were located in North America

36
 3) 71% were masonry block faced

4) 65% were 4-12 m high

5) 91% were geogrid reinforced; the other 9% were geotextile reinforced

6) 86% failed in less than four years after their construction

7) 61% used silt and/or clay backfill in the reinforced soil zone

8) 72% had poor-to-moderate compaction

9) 98% were caused by improper design or construction (incidentally,

none (0%) were caused by geosynthetic manufacturing failures)

10) 60% were caused by internal or external water (the remaining 40%

were caused by internal or external soil related issues)

Koerner and Koerner (2013) also presented critical issues associated with failure, as

follows:

• fine grained silt and clay soils used for the reinforced zone backfill,

• poor placement and compaction of these same fine grained backfill

soils,

• drainage systems and utilities being located within the reinforced soil

zone,

• non-existing water control either behind, beneath or above the

reinforced soil zone, and

• improperly determined and/or assessed design details.

37
 In this article, Koerner and Koerner (2013) discuss the large number of MSE

structure failures that include excessive deformation and actual collapse. Inadequate or

improper design (e.g., lack of drainage procedure and placement) and/or construction (e.g.,

use of poor soil materials and inadequate placement and compaction) are the primary

causes of failure. Prime failure mechanisms evaluated with the number and % of cases

observed is shown in Figure 3-1. The authors noted that were no cases of failure observed

to have been due to poor geotextile or geogrid products.

Figure 3-1. Basic Failure Mechanisms (Koerner and Koerner 2013, Figure 5).

Coordination between the EPC/EPCM Contractor and MSE Engineer

In Clemente et al., (2016), the interaction between the MSE Engineer and the

engineering, procurement and construction/construction management (EPC/EPCM) was

written about from the EPC/EPCM viewpoint. Several parties are engaged in the

38
procurement, design and construction of MSE walls, often under a design-build contract

under an EPC/EPCM performance. This interaction, or lack of interaction, contributes to the

success or failure of an MSE structure.

The authors developed an MSE wall survey to evaluate the performance of MSE

walls that were completed by 20 geoprofessionals. The survey results indicate that MSE

walls are generally well designed and constructed. However, the responses indicate a large

variation in the design and construction management practices. From these responses, the

authors recommended the following best practices for a successful MSE design:

• Ensure technical specialists are involved in every aspect of procurement, design,

and construction.

• Perform adequate and thorough planning with a clear division of responsibilities.

• Use project specific specifications.

• Incorporate internal and external drainage provisions.

• Ensure that the design is followed through construction with adequate oversight

by qualified personnel.

Literature Review of Individual Case Studies

Individual Case Studies discusses details of specific MSE wall performance in regard

to design, construction, or failure mechanism. The following documents were reviewed and

are summarized below:

• “A Tale of Two Walls: Case Histories of Failed MSE Walls” (Scarborough, 2005).

• “Case History of Two MSE Walls on Steep Slopes” (Boyle and Perkins, 2007).

39
 • “Heeding Nature’s Call: Replacing MSE Wall with a Bridge” (Haramy, Anderson,

and Alzamora, 2010).

• “Lessons Learned from Settlement of Three Highway Embankment MSE Walls”

(Dodson, 2010).

• “A Case History of MSE Wall Failure: Finite Element Modeling and Evaluation”

(Kim, Bhowmik, and Willmer, 2010).

• “Effects of Backfill Soil on Excessive Movement of MSE Wall” (M. Hossain, Kibria,

Khan, J. Hossain, and Taufiq, 2012).

Clayey Poorly Draining Soils – Adequate Plans and Design Case Study

Scarborough (2005) discusses two segmental block MSE wall failures (i.e., “Wall A”

and “Wall B”) using geogrid reinforcement within a clayey soil backfill in eastern Tennessee.

One wall failed (Wall A) and the other (Wall B) experienced large deformation, but remains

in service. Scarborough notes that MSE wall behavior is strongly dependent on the soil and

rock characteristics used in their construction and that a knowledge of the interaction of the

natural earthen materials having variable characteristics with the manufactured

components of an MSE wall is a critical component of a successful wall design. This paper

states that, “Factors contributing to the observed failures include not only the technical, but

also professional issues”.

Wall A failed, reportedly due to poor drainage leading to a hydrostatic pressure

buildup behind the wall facing as seen in Figure 3-2. Additional factors included issues

during construction (e.g., poor compaction of fill, wall height extending higher than

designed, and use of clay backfill). The author indicated that the designer of the wall may

40
have not understood that earth pressures for cohesive soils (e.g., clay) are not well

predicted by conventional theories and that alternative use of equivalent fluid pressures

may be useful when poorly draining soils are used for retaining walls.

Figure 3-2. Photo of Failure of Wall A (Scarborough 2005, Figure 1).

Wall B experienced large deformation. During the forensic evaluation of the wall

failure, poorly consolidated backfill soils were originally thought to be the cause of failure.

However, through 35 compaction tests performed from soil within the retained fill, the

engineers determined that both the reinforced and retained fill were well compacted.

Ultimately, the cause of failure was due to the lack of a global stability analysis being

performed, which should have identified the type of soil to be used as backfill. Additionally,

while internal, external, and facing stability may have been adequate as-designed,

consideration of global stability would have likely added more geogrid reinforcement into

the design of the MSE wall.

This paper reports that MSE wall designers may neglect important design

considerations, possibly due to economic constraints, lack of design experience or

41
understanding of regional materials, ability to shift liability, or lack of control during

construction. Scarborough (2005) noted that because of the high rates of problems

experienced, a municipality in Tennessee temporarily placed a moratorium on all MSE Walls

this ban was then lifted, but the municipality now requires an independent third party

technical review of the design prior to approval.

Scarborough (2005) concludes this paper with, “The failures of these two retaining

walls brings attention to the professional issues of what constitutes adequate plans and

design for an MSE wall, as well as to the technical issues associated with the use of

clayey/poorly draining soils”.

MSE Wall Success - Good Communication Case Study

In 2005, the Beartooth Highway on the Montana-Wyoming boarder had high

snowmelt concurrently with a heavy rainstorm that lead to debris flows and severe damage

of the roadway (Boyle and Perkins, 2007). Because this road is critical to the local tourism

industry, the State of Montana and the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT)

expedited design and construction of the road reconstruction, which included two large

MSE Walls under a Design-Build Contract. Indeed, the design-build team was selected

within a month of the damaged roadway incident.

Due to the depth of debris chutes and steep topography, the team decided to

construct MSE walls at two locations where erosion was observed to up to 12 meters below

the downslope shoulder of the roadway. This technically difficult project in a remote

location was fully completed in four months because of the successful design and good

communication between the design engineers and construction crew.

42
 Through co-locating the MDT and the design-build team members in an office during

design and on site during construction, the team was better able to communicate the

design for successful implantation. Because the designers had a thorough understanding of

readily available materials, the MSE walls were designed to be readily modified so that wall

elements and the design could be modified to the field conditions in a short timeframe.

Additional construction constraints came from limited laydown and work areas, and

variable excavation and backslope conditions. To address these potential concerns, the

designers opted for one type of high-strength geogrid reinforcement. Although, some cost

savings would have been incurred by identifying the lowest acceptable material, the overall

cost savings was greater because of the simplification during design, construction, and

oversight.

Additionally, the MSE wall plans were purposefully dynamic to be modified based on

field excavations, cut slope stability, and foundation conditions. As noted in Boyle and

Perkins (2007), “Decisions on minimum reinforcement lengths, the need to excavate and

replace native materials in the gully at Site 6, and to use a micropile-supported concrete

slab below the Site 7 MSE wall were not made until the excavations were completed and

the foundation conditions exposed.”

The technically complex Beartooth Mountain roadway was reconstructed on an

expatiated schedule following severe damage during storm events because of experienced

design teams performed a quality design, anticipated and planned for field variances, and

interacted consistently with the team throughout construction.

43
Under-Designed Drainage Structure – Surface Water Flow Case Study

Haramy, et al. (2010) presents the collapse and proposed repair alternatives for an

approximately 60-foot segment of MSE wall along the General Hitchcock Highway in the

Catalina Mountains near Tucson, Arizona. Prior to wall construction, at least one emergency

repair for roadway damage and embankment failure resulting from debris flows was known

at this location. In addition, the area experienced a large forest fire shortly after wall

construction in 2003 and large amounts of sediment debris were observed during

precipitation events. The wall failed during a series of monsoon storms between July 27th

and 31st, 2006. The failed segment of the 20-foot high MSE wall at MP 9.8 was constructed

using the welded wire MSE-system manufactured by Hilfiker. The reinforcement lengths

were designed to be 70% of the wall height and spaced 24 inches vertically. A 36-inch

corrugated metal pipe culvert (CMP) to capture inboard drainage and an 18-inch outboard

drop inlet were installed within this wall segment. The vertical CMP was tied into the 36-

inch CMP at the bottom of the wall, approximately 24-inches from the face.

44
 Severe runoff and sedimentation plugged the culverts at the failure location

resulting in overtopping of the roadway ditches and curbs as shown in Figure 3-3. It was

believed that overtopping surface water flowed through the facing rock to the base of the

wall below the embedded compacted fill that was intended to provide adequate bearing

capacity. Because the water could not easily flow out and down the slope, the authors

believe the water turned and flowed parallel to the roadway to the low point in the wall.

Water built up in the facing column below grade until it either caused failure of the

compacted fill in front of the wall or it overtopped causing failure by erosion. Either way,

the foundation of the facing rock was lost or it was assumed the facing rock emptied out the

bottom of the wall leaving the wall fill exposed to sloughing and erosion.

Following the failure, hydraulic engineers determined a larger drainage structure

Figure 3-3. Surface water overtopping MSE Wall (Top) and Failed MSE wall (Bottom),
(Haramy, et al., 2010).

45
with a minimum opening width of 12 feet and height of 4 feet is required to provide

adequate capacity and debris/sediment passage. This is significantly larger than the

originally installed 36-inch culvert. Considering emergency repair constraints, such as site

geometry, environmental restrictions, and construction schedule, the selected drainage

structure alternative was a bridge to span the entire 60-foot failure location. In addition,

the design features were implemented including (1) paved conveyance ditches to improve

the collection of surface water runoff and debris, (2) curb was removed from the top of the

wall to allow for sheet flow, (3) the toe embedment material above the bottom of the wall

was replaced with riprap to protect the base and foundation of the wall from future erosion

and prevent hydrostatic pressure built-up in the wall facing.

Inadequate Design Assumptions and Submittal Review – Settlement and Consolidation

Case Study

Dodson (2010) provided lessons learned from settlement and vertical deformation

observed in three highway embankment MSE walls constructed in 2004 on a rural highway

in northern California. Three to six inched of settlement was observed in the outbound

roadway lane less than six months after construction following a rain-on-snow event. Also,

severe longitudinal cracking with voids up to 2 meters deep was observed near the

centerline of the roadway. Bulging of the facing baskets were also observed during

construction but was considered a construction and quality control issue and repairs were

immediately made by the MSE wall supplier. Photos of wall distress are presented in Figure

3-4. The bulging baskets were likely the first indication that some kind of vertical settlement

46
in the wall fill was occurring post-construction. Despite repeated repairs, the settlement

continued and the road had to be closed to public traffic after the second winter season.

The 25- to 33-foot-tall MSE walls consisted of wire-face MSE walls with metal

reinforcements; however, non-select on-site material was identified as suitable for

reinforced zone backfill to provide significant cost-savings with relatively low risk to the

overall performance of the walls. Non-select wall backfill was explored during the 30%

design because the nearest borrow pit was approximately 45 miles away. Without the cost

savings from using on-site material, the scope of the project was in jeopardy of being

reduced to stay within the allotted construction budget.

Initially, the risks of using the non-select materials appeared low in design because

the on-site material contained less than 35% fines and were generally non-plastic. Design

recommendations from preliminary external stability calculations include minimum

reinforcement lengths at 70% of the wall height but required special consideration for

adequate drainage, soil reinforcement interaction, and higher corrosion potential. The use

of non-select material was reconsidered at the 95% design phase when settlement was

estimated at 4 inches. Mistakenly, the recommendation to change the MSE wall backfill

was not implemented and the project went to bid allowing a backfill with fines contents up

to 45%.

47
 Figure 3-4. Vertical Settlement (Top Left), Severe Longitudinal Cracking (Top
Right), and Bulging Baskets (Bottom) (Dodson, 2010).

Distress locations were correlated to surface drainage features that lead the

construction and engineering staff to believe that piping of the MSE wall backfill was a

major contributor to distress. Repairs consisted of a cutoff wall, paved ditches,

48
underdrains, geomembranes, increased curb heights, and sealing around guardrail posts.

The author concludes that three main lessons were learned from this case study, (1) that

the estimated repair costs far exceed the estimated cost of importing backfill materials

despite the appearance of using on-site materials to be low risk, (2) long term behavior

between a rigid temporary shoring system and the flexible MSE Wall system needs to be

considered, and (3) prevention of surface water infiltration into the MSE wall system would

have prevented piping of the backfill material.

Incorrect Evaluation of Settlement– Differential Settlement Case Study

Kim, et al. (2010) evaluated an MSE wall failure of an 11.5 meter high wall comprised

of reinforced concrete facing panels with steel reinforced strips. Some of the facing panels

were installed over previously installed and abandoned concrete caissons extending to

competent bedrock. The reinforced steel strips were observed to have sheared near the

wall facing connection resulting in collapse of the facing panels at ten caisson locations.

The site is located in Georgia within a piedmont geologic setting where a large

variation of soil conditions is typical. The subsurface soil is comprised of a layer of fill

underlain by residual soils, weathered bedrock, and parent bedrock. The fill and residual

soils ranged in thickness from 1 to 12.5 meters and consist of loose to medium dense clayey

sand to firm sandy clay. In addition, the MSE wall was constructed in two phases. Some

drilled caisson foundations were installed prior to the MSE wall construction; when the

building orientation was realigned, the MSE wall was realigned to match the new building

design. As a result of the mid-construction modification, a portion of the MSE wall rested on

previously placed caissons.

49
 This forensic evaluation included finite element modelling and evaluated the failure

mechanism. Additionally, parametric analysis was performed for the present and final

loading conditions to provide corrective measures from a future failure of this MSE wall.

Modeling results, neglecting the caissons, accurately predicted a settlement range (150 to

610 millimeter [mm]) similar to the observed settlements (between 135 to 520 mm and 15

to 665 mm for the apron fill and the wall panels, respectively); indicating that if no caissons

were present below the wall, the MSE wall would not have failed.

It was concluded that the MSE wall facing panels placed over the caissons

experienced significant differential settlement compared to the reinforced fill zone, causing

excessive tensile stress and ultimate failure of the facing panel connection. The wall soil

backfill and reinforced strips had settled due to the consolidation of the underlying

compressible soils and the compression of the wall backfill under its own weight. The facing

panels placed over the caissons did not undergo deformation leading to a differential

settlement condition as shown in Figure 3-5.

Figure 3-5. MSE Wall and Caisson Configuration and Sloped Reinforcing
Strip Detail (Kim, et al., 2010, Figure 3).
50
 Kim, et al. (2010) noted that MSE walls are flexible structures and can withstand

significant differential settlement as long as the wall panels and reinforced strips can settle

together. However, excessive differential settlement between the wall panel and the

reinforced strips can cause a significant increase in tensile stresses and may result in wall

failure. The paper summarized, when significant differential settlement is anticipated, a

detailed evaluation of deformation of the wall should be performed during design.

Inadequate Reinforcement Length – Excessive Displacement Case Study

Hossain, et al. (2012) presents an MSE wall that has been observed to have bulging

wall facings and deformations up to 450 mm in Texas. This paper presents the site and

laboratory investigation testing program, as well as finite-element modeling conducted in

PLASIX to evaluate the potential cause of the MSE wall movement.

Hossain, et al. (2012) notes the construction of an MSE wall does not require special

craftsmanship and skill. Nonetheless, important factors to evaluate prior to construction

include site-specific material specification, construction quality control, and a performance

monitoring plan.

The MSE wall discussed underwent a comprehensive evaluation that included soil

test borings. Grain size analysis indicated backfill material was between 28.9 and 30.7%,

moisture content ranged from 7.9 and 18.9%, Atterberg limits indicate plasticity indices

between 5.8 and 10.2, and soil resistivity was determined to be low. In this MSE wall

instance, the backfill soil did not satisfy either FHWA or the Texas Department of

Transportation (TxDOT) requirements (TxDOT, 2014). The presence of perched water zones

51
behind the wall suggest the possible intrusion of water into the high fine content backfill

producing pressure causing the MSE to shift.

Another major cause of the MSE wall to shift noted was inadequate reinforcement

length, which was constructed at 30% of the wall height. The as-built reinforcement length

covers the active zone, but does not cover the length needed for the resisting zone. Figure

3-6 illustrates the total and vertical displacement predicted using the PLAXIS model, which

corresponds to the actual measurements of wall movement identified in the field. The

model also indicated that the movement would be rotational, that also matches field

conditions and that inadequate reinforcement length in the upper portion of the MSE wall

could have caused excessive movement.

Figure 3-6. Model Predicted Total Displacement (291 mm)

(from Hossain, et al. [2012], Figure 10).

In summary, Hossain, et al. (2012) notes that excessive movement of the MSE wall

may be a result of a high percentage of fines in the backfill soil not meeting FHWA

requirements, pressure due to poor drainage derived from the fine backfill material, and

inadequate reinforcement length.

52
 Literature Review of Geosynthetics in MSE Walls

Geosynthetics in MSE walls subject include works that focus specifically on the

behavior and/or performance of extensible reinforcements in MSE walls. This section

includes research conducted on both GMSE walls and GRS. The following documents were

reviewed and are summarized below:

• “Geosynthetic Reinforced Multitiered Walls” (Leshchinsky and Han, 2004).

• “Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil Walls and Slopes: US Perspective” (Christopher,

Leshchinsky, and Stulgis, 2005).

• “GRS – A New Era in Reinforced Soil Technology” (Barrett and Ruckman, 2007).

• “Experimental and Analytical Investigation of Geogrid MSE Walls” (Reddy and

Navarrete, 2008).

• “Adoption and implementation of GRS design concepts – A Consultant’s

Perspective” (VanBuskirk, 2010)

• “Need for and Justification of Quality Management Systems for Successful

Geosynthetic Performance Need for and Justification of Quality Management

Systems for Successful Geosynthetic Performance” (Koerner and Koerner, 2012).

• “Load-Carrying Capacity and Required Reinforcement Strength of Closely Spaced

Soil-Geosynthetic Composites” (Wu and Pham, 2013).

Use of Multitiered Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil Walls

Leshchinsky and Han’s (2004) “Geosynthetic Reinforced Multitiered Walls” presents

design considerations for the use of multitiered MSE walls where high retaining walls are

required. Considering the fact that tensile stress in the reinforcement increases rapidly with

53
height, multitiered MSE walls are built with an offset between shorter tiered walls to reduce

the tensile stress in the lower tiers. Tiered walls are seen as an alternative to closer spacing

reinforcement, which increases cost. The authors recognize that rational design

methodology for various configurations of multitier MSE walls is lacking; both AASHTO and

NCMA rely on an empirical approach derived without theoretical or experimental basis.

Also, current design guidelines are limited to two-tiered walls with zero batter when walls

with more than five tiers have been successfully and economically constructed. The

purpose of this study was to evaluate multitiered wall stability by quantifying the effects of

offset distance, fill quality, foundation soil, reinforcement length and stiffness, water,

surcharge, and number of tiers.

Leshchinsky and Han’s (2004) article presents the theory that if results of multiple

parametric studies performed independently produces similar results, then an acceptable

level of confidence in the results can be assumed. The authors performed parametric

studies assessing tensile strength as a function of reinforcement length and stiffness, offset

distance, the fill and foundation strength, water, surcharge, and number of tiers, which may

be used in multitiered wall analysis. The values of each parameter were investigated by

changing its value from the baseline case while keeping other parameters unchanged.

The modelling provided the results shown below. Many of which are intuitive and

support the mode of thought for construction of GMSE walls:

• As offset distance increases, the required reinforcement strength decreases.

Additionally, the required strength of three-tiered walls is greater than two-

tiered walls. When offset is large, each tier performs independently.

54
• Low-quality fill requires higher reinforcement strength. The offset distance

for tiered walls to function independently is larger when the low-quality fill is

used, thus leading to the recommendation that an increase in the number of

tiers results in a significant increase of the required reinforcement strength.

• There was no significant effect of reinforcement length in two-tiered walls;

however becomes more apparent in three-tiered walls. The longer

reinforcement required less strength, presumably because shorter

reinforcement incurred pull-out failure and did not contribute to compound

stability.

• There was negligible difference evaluating the effect of reinforcement

stiffness and reinforcement type. Therefore, wall systems comprised of

either metal or geosynthetic can be evaluated using limit equilibrium

analysis.

• The quality of foundation soil type is a dominant factor for wall stability.

Decreasing the quality of foundation soil leads to the need for increased

reinforcement length and strength. The authors noted that poor agreement

between FLAC and limit equilibrium in this case suggests further

investigation.

• Water present in the wall structure impacts wall stability. A sudden

drawdown may decrease stability, thus requiring stronger and longer

reinforcement.

55
 Leshchinsky and Han (2004) presents a preliminary approach to multitiered GMSE

walls design, yet recognize further development is required. The study yielded that

properly conducted limit equilibrium analysis can reliably provide reinforcement layout,

strength, and connection capacity for MSE walls with complex boundary conditions as

compared to continuum mechanics-based analysis.

Success of Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil

In the Christopher, Leshchinsky, and Stulgis (2005) article, “Geosynthetic-Reinforced

Soil Walls and Slopes: US Perspective”, the authors present the cost advantages and

successful performance of GRS walls. This paper reviews three different design

methodologies with respect to their ease of use and accuracy of results.

At the time this article was written, design of GRS walls in the US followed three

guideline documents (AASHTO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges – 17th Edition,

2002; AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications – 2nd Editions with 2002 Interim Revisions,

1998/2002; and FHWA Mechanically Stabilized Earth Wall and Reinforced Soil Slope Design

& Construction Guidelines, 2001).

The three design approaches presented in Christopher, Leshchinsky, and Stulgis

(2005) include lateral earth pressure analysis, limit equilibrium analysis and continuum

mechanics-based analysis. Lateral earth pressure analysis assumes a coherent mass for the

reinforced soil to evaluate the external stability and produces a conservative design with

respect to reinforcement strength of MSE structures on firm foundations and reinforced fills

with no positive pore pressures. Limit equilibrium analysis uses stabilizing forces

contributed by equally-mobilized reinforcement layers that require computer programs in

56
design. The continuum mechanics-based analysis is rigorous and requires a thorough

characterization of the design elements, and if selected incorrectly may lead to conservative

results. This method is applicable for research and forensic tool, and is becoming more

accepted in design if performed by a trained analysis.

Christopher, Leshchinsky, and Stulgis (2005) predict that with the adoption of LRFD

design platform, public sector design methods in the US will shift from the Bishop Method

moment equilibrium method to the more rigorous Spencer Method limit equilibrium

method. Another ongoing design development in the US identified by the authors is the

need to calibrate design models from high quality granular fill to allow for the use of

marginal soils with higher fines content. The authors credit NCMA and Highway Innovative

Technology Center contributions in the advancement of GRS systems in the United States.

Use of GRS Structures for Retaining Walls

Barrett and Ruckman (2007) present the case of using GRS structures instead of MSE

Structures. MSE walls use widely spaced inclusions as “quasi-tiebacks” with heavy and stiff

facings, such as concrete blocks or panels, to stabilize the backfill, while GRS use closely

spaced geosynthetic reinforcements with minimal facing material. The authors note that

GRS is superior to MSE in resisting static and dynamic loads, as proven by the presented

negative-batter walls case studies. Additionally, the authors suggest deficiencies of the

current guidelines for design and construction of MSE structures include:

To some degree, our national guidelines are unconservative, and lead to or allow
high-failure-rate MSE walls built with dirt, widely spaced, expensive reinforcement,
huge expensive blocks, unnecessary embedment, impossible creep reduction factors,
impossible overturning calculations, odd connections and hinge heights, and
needless gravel behind facing blocks and counterproductive concrete pads under
facing blocks. Problem is, simply stated, those guidelines are inherently wrong. They

57
 allow walls that cannot tolerate high seismic forces, walls that poorly tolerate
construction errors, wall designs that cannot be extended to true truncated bases,
and that should not be used as bridge piers, rockfall barriers, negative batter and
GRS arches.

According to Barrett and Ruckman (2007), GRS structures are a superior system to

MSE structures. GRS walls have been used in complex wall structures and have withstood

strong earthquakes when they have been constructed with granular backfill soil and closely

spaced reinforcements. The authors encourage engineers to gain a deeper understanding

of GRS construction and believe the use of GRS is encumbered by current AASHTO, NCMA,

and FHWA guidelines, which are artifacts from traditional tie-back theory. The main

component of a successful GRS is to have a closely spaced reinforcement, which confine the

granular particles, preventing dilation.

Comparison of Modeling Methods for Geogrid Reinforced MSE Walls

Small-scale testing of an MSE wall reinforced with geogrids was evaluated by Reddy

and Navarrete (2008). The testing was then compared to numerical modeling and full-scale

MSE wall prototype testing. The eventual purpose of the research was to provide rational

methods to determine appropriate factors for use in LRFD design of MSE walls.

Two types of geogrids (HDPE and polyethylene terephthalate [PET]) were tested. A

full-scale MSE prototype was tested measuring movements, reinforcement strains, and

settlement, with one half of the wall using each type of geogrid. The authors determined

that the results of the pilot-study suggested similar results for both types of geogrid and

that strains encountered in the geogrids were very small, even at loads exceeding working

conditions.

58
 The pilot-scale testing was then compared to both modeling and full-scale MSE wall

prototype testing. Large differences were observed in results of the small-scale testing to

each of the modeling and the full-scale MSE wall prototype testing. These discrepancies

were attributed to the material property discrepancies and geogrid distortion for modeling

and lack of gravity for full scale wall behavior.

Reddy and Navarrete (2008) concluded that while small-scale testing may be useful

for preliminary results, computer modeling and/or prototype testing are necessary to

accurately evaluate MSE wall behavior.

Comparison between GMSE and GRS Design Theories

VanBuskirk’s (2010) “Adoption and implementation of GRS design concepts – A

Consultant’s Perspective” presents the fundamental differences between MSE and GRS

design concepts. The author acknowledges that GRS designed wall are a robust and proven

technology, but are not currently covered by any widely accepted guideline or standard.

Fundamental engineering differences explored include compaction induced stresses,

geotextile soil interaction, reinforcement spacing vs. aggregate size, stresses and strains in

reinforcement, creep behavior, and QA/QC.

VanBuskirk (2010) identifies the fundamental difference between stabilized earth of

MSE walls and the composite behavior of GRS. MSE walls require the reinforcement to be

secured to the facing, typically though proprietary design systems, to resist the soil between

reinforcement elements. The influence from the reinforcement on internal shearing of the

soil mass is ignored. GRS infers that with sufficiently tight spacing, the soil and

reinforcement act as a composite, maintaining the confining stress in the soil. The author

59
points out the facing of GRS walls act more as a façade and only needs to confine the soil

and resist construction-induced loads. Basic differences between MSE and GRS design

concepts are shown in Figure 3-7.

Figure 3-7. Basic Difference between a) MSE and b) GRS Wall Designs (VanBuskirk
2010, Figure 1)

VanBuskirk (2010) presents that reinforcing spacing plays a much more significant

role in internal stability than reinforcement strength or coverage. Thus, external stability

governs walls with tight reinforcement spacing as compared to internal or compound

failures that govern MSE wall designs. The result, GRS walls designed as a composite

requires significantly reduced reinforcement lengths as compared to MSE. Other potential

advantages of closely spaced reinforcement include suppression of soil dilation, reduction

60
or elimination of creep in reinforcements, reduced stresses in reinforcements, simplified

designs, and advantageous QA/QC procedures.

VanBuskirk (2010) concludes that it would be more appropriate to develop a

separate GRS design standard to avoid confusion with the potentially un-conservative and

complicated MSE design methods. The author believes that by following sound engineering

principles, it is possible to calculate reinforcement requirements as a function of

reinforcement spacing and that the adoption of composite behavior of GRS will lead to a

significant cost savings.

Quality Management for Successful GMSE Walls

In Koerner and Koerner (2012) Geotechnical Society Institute (GSI) White Pater #26

titled, “Need for and Justification of Quality Management Systems for Successful

Geosynthetic Performance”, the authors present three groups of geosynthetic field failures

and the necessity of implementing quality management.

The first failure type is derived from holes created in geomembranes during

construction that reduce strength and increase fluid flow. The second GMSE failure type is

failed geotextile filters due to poor placement in the field including lack of contact of placed

geotextile material and glued/blocked geotextile. The third failure type is GMSE wall

failures. However, from the 141 failures evaluated, geosynthetic reinforcement failure was

not considered to be a leading cause of failure.

The authors present the elements of a quality management system and its necessity

in engineering, and goes on to present the quality management specific to geosynthetics

and geosynthetic systems. At the time of the white paper publication, there are 230

61
Geosynthetic Accreditation Institute (GAI)-Laboratory Accreditation Program (LAP) test

methods available for accreditation. These GAI-LAP tests are available for geosynthetic

materials. Additionally, GSI has two inspector certification programs available that focus on

the QA/QC of field inspection of waste containment geosynthetics and compacted clay

liners and the other is focused on GMSE wall, berm and slope field inspection. There are

also two programs offered through the International Association of Geosynthetic Installers

for certified welding and approved installation contractors.

Implementation of a robust QA/QC program in the field for construction of GMSE

structures can both identify design modifications or observe and correct field construction

practices. The authors conclude that not only is the field QA/QC program imperative, but

also a preparation of and following a QA document identifies potential field issues before

they become a problem.

Design Criteria for Closely Spaced GMSE Walls

In Wu and Pham’s (2013) article, “Load-Carrying Capacity and Required

Reinforcement Strength of Closely Spaced Soil-Geosynthetic Composites”, the authors

present that the role of reinforcement spacing is much more significant than reinforcement

strength. In previous studies, these two parameters are considered to have an equal role on

performance. The authors identify that closely spaced (≤0.3 m) reinforcement significantly

enhances the beneficial effects of geosynthetic inclusion, which is referred to as GRS.

GRS walls are similar to GMSE walls in geometry; however, GRS walls use closely

spaced geosynthetic reinforcement to improve the behavior of the soil mass, while a GMSE

wall relies on the reinforcements as tiebacks to resist failure. Current design equations do

62
not properly account for relative roles of reinforcement spacing and strength in a GRS mass.

Wu and Pham (2013) present an analytical model for accurately predicting the load-carrying

capacity and required reinforcement strength of a GRS mass, where failure is assumed to be

controlled by rupture of the reinforcement.

Literature Review of MSE Wall General Reports

MSE Wall General Reports include all other reports concerning various aspects of

MSE performance with respect to planning, design, construction, maintenance, or repair.

These reports may not be specific to adverse performance of MSE walls, but provided

valuable insight as to some of the challenges with using MSE walls in transportation

facilities. The following documents were reviewed and are summarized below:

• “Stochastic Modeling of Redundancy in MSE Walls” (Zevgolis and

Bourdeau, 2008).

• “Design and Procurement Challenges for MSE Structures: Options going

forward” (Simac and Fitzpatrick, 2010).

• “The Geotechnical Engineer’s Role in Design/Construction of MSE Retaining

Walls” (Smith and Janacek, 2011).

• “Evaluation of LRFD Resistance Factors and Risk for MSE Walls” (Wasman,

McVay, Bloomquist, Harrison, and Lai, 2011).

• “Teaching Retaining Wall Design with Case Histories” (Sharma, 2011).

• “Sustainability Assessment of Two Alternative Earth-Retaining Structures”

(Giri and Reddy, 2015).

63
 • “State of the Practice of MSE Wall Design for Highway Structures” (Anderson,

Gladstone, and Sankey, 2012).

Reliability of MSE Internal Stability Modelling

Zevgolis and Bourdeau (2008) used stochastic modeling to assess the reliability of

MSE wall’s internal stability based on the theory that MSE walls are inherently redundant

(e.g., if a reinforcement element fails, the remaining elements of the wall assumes

additional responsibilities from the failed piece in terms of loads). The modeling method

presented evaluates both the reliability of an element (e.g., layer of reinforcement) and the

reliability of a layer given another layer has already failed, which has been omitted from

previous MSE structure modeling efforts.

This paper also includes Zevgolis and Bourdeau (2008) modeling case example of a

six meter MSE wall supporting a bridge abutment. Assuming the top layer of reinforcement

to be the most critical, probabilities of failure corresponding to different states of failure

were reported in a transition probability matrix. The model results indicated that

probabilities of failure propagation exist for three different states of failure, with pullout

mechanism being the highest risk of failure.

Assuming that the modeling with respect to internal stability, accounting for the

redundant nature of loads that is inherent of this type of structure by propagating loads

from one state of failure to another, using transition probabilities.

Owner Controlled Aspects

In Simac and Fitzpatrick (2010), the authors address how owners (e.g., private,

commercial, or government) can best contract the work to facilitate successful MSE

64
structures. This paper states that owner controlled aspects of the project influence both

cost and performance and include the following:

• Contracting options;

• Integration/coordination with various site/civil, geotechnical and the MSE

designers;

• Compatibility with geotechnical site investigation, testing, analysis and

recommendations to MSE design methods, procedures, and guidelines; and

• Responsibility/liability for global stability.

The contracting mechanism the owner selects is the first step towards overall

success of the project. Rationally, the owner’s contracting selection criteria is strongly

influenced by cost. However, a more advantageous cost may be associated with the most

aggressive contractor supplied design and design assumptions, which inherently lead to a

higher risk. To minimize these risks, an owner should define requirements and conditions

(i.e., design must meet AASHTO or NCMA structure design standards).

The second step the owner can take to establish a successful project is to coordinate

activities, responsibilities, and communication between the design professionals. As Simac

and Fitzpatrick (2010) state,

This coordination role is difficult because integration of the MSE system into the
overall site design requires effective communication between three overlapping
engineering disciplines, i.e., the site (civil) engineer, geotechnical engineer and MSE
designer. The critical coordination is between MSE designer and geotechnical
engineer, who need to work together, but clearly understand their division of
responsibilities to achieve a successful project and outcome for the public.
Understanding each professional’s responsibilities should clarify the owner’s
coordination role for each contracting method.

65
 The third step the owner can do to establish a successful project is to enable the

MSE designer to be included in the geotechnical investigations to ensure adequate data is

collected to design the MSE structure. Investigation data collected include geologic and

hydrogeologic conditions in the MSE construction area. Compatibility of the geotechnical

site investigation, testing, analysis leads to successful recommendations in the MSE design.

The final step discussed in Simac and Fitzpatrick (2010) that the owner can perform

to ensure a successful MSE Wall design is to reduce confusion over the responsibility of the

global stability. The issue with global stability has been a major problem among failed MSE

walls on who is responsible, the site (civil) engineer, geotechnical engineer, and/or MSE

designer. This confusion can be reduced through the owner’s identification of responsibility,

which is dependent on the type of contract selected (e.g., a design-build contract is best

coupled with the global stability responsibility resting on the MSE designer, while a design-

bid-build contract may be best coupled with this responsibility resting on the geotechnical

engineer.

In summary, the paper by Simac and Fitzpatrick (2010) was written to guide owners

to improve the likelihood of good performance of MSE structures. The authors emphasize

contracting mechanisms, good communication, integration of the MSE engineer with the

geotechnical investigations, and identifying responsibility of global stability. The authors

also state that, “At this stage of the market maturation process, the authors conclude that

owner-provided designs appear to be the best way to improve both cost and quality of the

finished product and should receive strong consideration”.

66
Collaboration and Systematic Approach to Design and Construction

In response to unsatisfactory performance of certain MSE walls, Smith and Janacek

(2011) reviewed the design and construction practices used in these walls. The specific

focus of this paper was to address the role of the geotechnical engineer in the design and

construction of MSE walls. The authors state that because of the nature of MSE wall design

(i.e., small, specialized firms that use proprietary design and construction procedures and

techniques); industry-wide understanding of design and implementation is limited.

Smith and Janacek (2011) state that based on several forensic assessments, a lack of

involvement from the geotechnical engineer from design through construction contributes

to poor retaining wall performance. Additionally, poor performance of MSE walls is

attributed to lack of communication between responsible parties, undefined roles of

responsibility of MSE wall structures, use of generalized site conditions used in designs

rather than site-specific soil conditions, among other issues.

Additionally, this paper discusses the importance of geotechnical data and design

into the project plans. Shear strength parameters, bearing layers, foundation improvements

and retained zone improvements must be clearly detailed in the typical cross sections,

detailed cross sections, and the wall plan and profile sheets.

Another important step in the design process is to have a joint review and resolution

of the final plans between the geotechnical engineer and the MSE wall engineer. The goal of

this review is to identify potential conflicts that may adversely affect construction issues

and long-term performance of the wall. This review should consider items that may

adversely impact the MSE wall’s stability including, but not limited to: utilities, construction

67
sequencing, grades within the influence zone, backfill volumes, drainage, undrained areas,

consistency between plans, and incorporation of design aspects that may have been

updated during design improvements in draft plans.

Smith and Janacek (2011) also discuss the importance of the geotechnical engineer’s

role during construction. Construction oversight should include a pre-construction meeting,

material testing, and construction observations. These components assist in the proper

implementation of the project plans.

In summary, Smith and Janacek (2011) reports that the geotechnical engineer must

take a proactive and substantial role in the design and construction of MSE walls for an

improved performance. The geotechnical engineer should also be responsible for the

external stability design, while the wall system fabricator or engineer under contract to the

contactor should be responsible for the internal stability design.

Risk of Failure Probability

Wasman, et al. (2011) presents a risk assessment that designers can use to select an

acceptable risk, in terms of lives or cost, and address or adjust the design associated with a

specific component of a design. Current AASHTO LRFD codes are intended to be a reliability-

based approach but values were derived from ASD Factors of Safety and not on variability of

soil design parameters (friction angle, unit weight, cohesion, etc.) The study investigates the

influence of soil property variability with respect to bearing and sliding stability, and

includes a risk assessment of two typical MSE overpass scenarios.

This risk assessment uses a probabilistic approach to determine the probability of

failure in terms of consequence and allows designers and owners to identify where the risk

68
is present and where to focus on bolstering the design. The analysis consisted of modeling

soil unit weight and friction angle as lognormal with established mean and coefficient of

variation values (e.g., economic consequence value).

The risk analysis process presented in Wasman, et al. (2011) was used on two typical

overpass MSE wall sections. The results identified the highest risk was bearing capacity

when the foundation soil were characterized with low friction angle for both sites. In

summary, Wasman, et al. (2011) notes that during the design stage, designers can use this

risk assessment to evaluate the probability of failure and select acceptable risk in terms of

dollars or lives.

Teaching Retaining Wall Design

Sharma’s (2011) paper presents implementation of wall failure case histories within

a class setting while teaching undergraduate civil engineering students. The presented

project allows the students to determine probably cause of failure, design a new wall using

a concrete cantilever approach, suggest alternatives using MSE or SRW designs, and identify

problems due to time and cost constraints. Sharma (2011) states students have benefited

from evaluating a case history to gain a greater understanding of lateral earth pressures for

geotechnical wall designs.

Sustainability Assessment of Cantilever Retaining Wall vs. MSE Wall

Giri and Reddy (2015) present the life-cycle study of two alternate earth-retaining

structures (cantilever retaining wall and MSE wall) based on environmental, economic, and

social impacts. The environmental impact considers material acquisition, construction,

maintenance, and demolition efforts. Economic impact considers direct costs incurred from

69
materials, transportation, and labor during construction. Social impacts are not well

quantified, but consider items such as employment, health and safety, aesthetics, cultural

aspects, and quality of life.

The modelled designs for both the cantilever and MSE walls use similar parameters

(geometry, backfill soils, etc.) and assume a safe and reliable equivalent technical design.

This study concluded that the MSE wall is more sustainable than a cantilever retaining wall

over the life cycle. It was observed that not only was the MSE wall more sustainable overall,

it was more sustainable for each of the three categories analyzed (environmental,

economic, and social) with the most noticeable variance being the environmental impacts

of respiratory inorganics and fossil fuels associated with concrete and steel production.

MSE State-of-the Practice Internal Design Review

Anderson, Gladstone, and Sankey (2012) presents the difficulty of providing a

reliable MSE wall design because design methods have become more abundant, more

diverse, and more complex in nature. This paper was written to provide the state-of-the

practice, basic principles of MSE wall designs, and present reasons why a different design

method should be used for each reinforcement material. The authors recognize that MSE

wall designers must fully understand reinforcement behavior and use the appropriate

design method to obtain the structural performance and service life required.

The paper presents the various design methods used (coherent gravity, simplified,

etc.) and explained that one must understand reinforcement properties and behavior

between inextensible and extensible reinforcements. The authors also point out that

designers are confronted with differences between FHWA and AASHTO guidance,

70
transitions between U.S. customary units and metric units, as well as a change from ASD to

LRFD design platforms.

This evaluation suggests that the Coherent Gravity Method should be used for MSE

wall designs with inextensible reinforcements (e.g., steel) and the Simplified Method should

be used for extensible reinforcements (e.g., geosynthetic). The paper also recommends

solely using AASHTO specifications for MSE wall design, and suggests that FHWA courses

should teach material consistent with AASHTO specification to minimize confusion and

complexity.

General Remarks Based on Literature Review

Compilation studies reviewed are valuable to confirm the seriousness of issues

affecting GMSE wall performance. These reports provide insight into repetitive technical

factors such as backfill selection and the influence of water. Many of the compilation

studies also develop conclusions considering intangible factors such as contacting methods,

communication, and experience on GMSE wall performance. Literature review of the use of

geosynthetics in MSE walls and various relevant MSE wall general reports provided valuable

insight into considerations for GMSE wall selection, design, construction and possible

deformations.

Of the case studies evaluated, the authors generally tended to focus on the physical

parameters (subsurface conditions, fines content of fills, groundwater, etc.) that lead to the

wall failure with little discussion of design conditions, except for acknowledging that a more

detailed evaluation would have been warranted. Not a single case history documented

71
restrictions placed on the design effort, such as budget, time constraints, access, etc. Nor

were there any mention of coordination with owners, partners, sub-contractors, etc.

As in the case of Haramy, et al. (2010), the amount of debris during runoff events

was mis-evaluated that lead to plugging of the 36-inch culvert that is now constructed as a

bridge. However, no mention was made as to the effort exerted to evaluate

drainage/debris conditions during design or the coordination between hydraulic and

geotechnical engineers. In the case of Dodson (2010), it was acknowledged in hindsight that

select backfill should have been used, differential settlements evaluated, and surface water

controlled; however, the paper failed to include design constraints as lessons learned. The

paper only alluded to the pressures to produce a project within initial scope is what lead to

the improper selection of backfill or that other constraints and/or a systemic design

mentality lead to the improper evaluation of surface water flows, inadequate quality

assurance lead to mistakes in the plans, and/or improper evaluation and early detection of

construction concerns could have prevented wall distress.

In the case history by Hossain, et al. (2012), the authors were quick to investigate

and point out high fines content backfill and areas of heightened soil moisture as the

leading causes of excessive deformation, as see in the article title “Effects of Backfill Soil on

Excessive Movement of MSE Wall.” Only secondarily did the authors acknowledge that the

reinforcement length of about 30% of the wall height or the storm sewer obstruction

contributed to deformation. Additionally, the backfill is generally within reasonable limits

proposed by NCMA (2010) and others. Although the article provides precise details of

investigation methods into physical wall parameters, no attempt was made to explain the

72
origin or reason for the shortened reinforcement lengths. Because the case study was a

double sided embankment with sufficient space available and no mention was made as to

the determination of this reinforcement length during the investigation, leads to an

assumption that this was the design reinforcement length, and ultimately the leading cause

of failure.

Several case studies did identify inadequacies in the design, plans, and specifications

as contributing factors to adverse performance. Scarborough (2005) noted that designers

may neglect important design considerations, possibly due to economic constraints, lack of

design experience or understanding of regional materials, ability to shift liability, or lack of

control during construction. In the case study presented by Scarborough (2005), the high

rates of problems experience caused a municipality in east Tennessee to require an

independent third party technical review of the design prior to approval. In the case of Kim

et al. (2010), it was recognized that a detail evaluation of deformation modes and stresses

should have been performed in design; however, the author did not reveal why such a

significant change was made during construction or the level of design effort that was

proposed to make such change.

Lastly, there appears to be a lack in effort to document deformation and wall

failures, wall failures are plentiful but there very few case study reports. This is not likely

due to a lack of concern or evaluation, but more likely budgetary constraints, time

constraints, or legal concerns. Contingency or emergency funds used to address wall

failures are typically in short supply and shared with other threats on our transportation

systems. The traveling public’s expectation of open roadways leads to an urgency that

73
limits the time required to adequately investigate and evaluate failures, with the majority of

the effort focused on repair alternatives. The concern over public scrutiny or risk of

possible legal action also discourages practitioners from willingly presenting poor

performance or providing a critical review.

74
 CHAPTER IV

Discussion and Recommendations

The literature review undertaken in this study has revealed seemingly countless

combinations of causes of adverse MSE wall performance. Considerations identified by

these reviews include observations such as geometry and wall layout, over simplified

design, obstructions, seismicity, wall embedment, surface/subsurface drainage, backfill

material, compaction, geotextile filters, leveling pads, durability of facing, contract type,

design team communication, contractor experience, etc. In order to isolate the primary

cause of adverse performance, these design and construction considerations are discussed

systematically in the following sections.

The bulk of the authors blame poor design practices or construction QA/QC as seen

by the repetitive conclusions pointing to poor reinforced zone backfill placement (high fines,

poor compaction, etc.) and ineffective drainage (surface drainage, erosion, inundation,

etc.). However, in each instance there are underlying tones of poor communication that

possibly surpass technical considerations. For example, NCHRP 24-22 (2013) propose a

seemingly equal relationship between fines content, pore pressure, and design and

construction QA/QC as shown in Figure 4-1.

75
 Figure 4-1. Relationship among Fines, Water in the Reinforced Fill Zone and Design and
Construction QC/QA (NCHRP, 2013).

Design Considerations

Design considerations identified can be grouped into technical and intangible

factors. Technical considerations include design methods, site characterization, and wall

component selection (backfill selection, facing type, etc.). Intangible factors include

contracting methods, communication, experience, etc. The following sections focus on the

primary influences with respect to adverse wall performance identified from the literature

review.

Design Methods

Although FHWA-mandated a transition from ASD to LRFD between 2000 and 2010,

some DOTs are still working through the backlog of projects initiated before the transition.

To complicate things further, designers have had to shift from U.S. customary units to

metric units and then back to U.S. units. Taken together, these transitions require engineers

76
to toggle between two design platforms (ASD, LRFD), two sets of units (U.S., metric), and

multiple MSE design methods (TxDOT, 2014).

Anderson, et al. (2012) presents the argument that confusion resulting from various

design methods, changes in design platforms, and inconsistent guidance has led to a

difficulty of providing reliable MSE wall designs. This argument primarily revolves around

conflicting internal stability methods (e.g., Coherent Gravity Method vs. Simplified Method).

Although changes in guidance increase the difficulty of design, no case study of adverse

performance reviewed identified internal stability design calculations, following AASHTO

guidance, to be a leading cause of failure. To the contrary, several studies suggest that MSE

wall design is conservative with Harpstead, et al. (2010) identifying this as a hindrance to

the advancement in MSE wall technology and contributes to a lack in attentiveness during

design.

Unlike internal stability design methods, incorrect external stability evaluation

appears to be a significant contributing factor to poor performance or wall failure. In the

case history by Scarborough (2005), inadequate lengths of geogrid reinforcement, resulting

from overlooking the global stability analysis, was concluded as the ultimate cause of

failure. In the case history presented by Kim, et al. (2010), incorrect evaluation of

differential settlement of a known foundation condition led to excessive tensile stress and

ultimate failure of the facing panel connection.

Although internal stability is essential to arriving at an appropriate MSE wall design,

it appears that correct evaluation of external stability is more critical with respect to

performance. The relative unknowns of site conditions and limitations of numerical

77
modeling likely contribute to incorrect evaluation of bearing resistance, settlement,

hydrostatic conditions, and slope stability.

Site Characterization

Through nineteen cases of MSE failures of highway-related infrastructures in

mountainous areas, Wu and Chou (2013) identified inadequate project planning and site

exploration as a major contributor in 10 of the 19 cases. Poor site characterization failures

consisted of differential settlement or bearing instability from unexpected soft stratum,

unidentified slope instability, and upward seepage pressure. Wu and Chou (2013) state that

the most common technical errors were from the misinterpretation of soil conditions and

incorrect selection of soil strength parameters derived from insufficient boring information.

Because MSE walls are considered flexible with a perception that the design is

conservative, geotechnical engineers have taken a lackadaisical approach to investigating

site conditions for MSE walls. FHWA (2009) recommends that a minimum investigation

consist of subsurface borings located every 100 feet along the front of the structure and

every 150 feet along the back. However, it is common that an MSE wall be designed from a

single subsurface boring where truck access permits. In an urban environment or steep

terrain, this means the boring may not even be located within the proposed wall mass.

Wall Component Selection

Primary wall components specified in design include facing type, reinforcement,

reinforcement zone backfill, and drainage system. The facing type, connections, and

reinforcement alone were not identified as being significant contributors to wall failures.

The Koerner and Koerner (2013) study of 171 failed MSE walls noted that, “there are no

78
cases involving inadequate or improper manufactured geotextile or geogrid products”

(p.27). These components are well understood with respect to strength, can be tested, and

not excessively expensive allowing for an acceptable level of conservatism in design (FHWA,

2008). Reinforced zone backfill and adequate drainage systems were repetitively identified

as the primary technical factors leading to adverse performance.

Loosening the restrictions on select fills for MSE walls has been greatly debated,

especially with respect to the amount of fines content (% passing the No. 200 sieve). The

intent is to significantly reduce costs and/or environmental impacts by using lower-quality

fills or reusing on-site native soils. NCMA (2010), NCHRP (2013), and Samtani and Nowatzki

(2016) suggest that MSE walls for transportation facilities can be successfully constructed

using established design methods with fines content in the range of 25% to 50%. The

caveats of these suggestions being appropriate fill material selection, material design

parameters, compaction control, and effective drainage

Wall failures identified in the literature review as resulting from low quality backfill

did not sufficiently identify if materials used were within specification. Either way, until

overall MSE wall performance improves, high fines content (>15%) and/or plastic (plasticity

index [PI]>6) soils should be used with caution and only when favorable conditions exist.

Surface and subsurface water contribute to poor performance and must be

accounted for in design. Haramy, et al. (2010) presented a case history where and

undersized culvert lead to overtopping and ultimately a significant wall failure and Dodson

(2010) concluded that surface water infiltration contributed to wall deformation. DiFiore

and Strohman (2013) identify that walls designed without consideration of hydrostatic or

79
seepage pressure can adversely affect performance or stability of the wall. Identified

conditions included ineffective wall drainage (clogging, pipping, etc.), unknown water

sources identified during or after construction, and incidences with the potential for leaking

water utility pipelines including irrigation line.

GMSE wall design concepts consider the geosynthetic to act as a tieback to resist

failure. This approach does not take full advantage of the benefits observed when the soil-

geosynthetic act as a composite, as in the case of closely spaced (<12 inches) reinforcement

or GRS. Wu and Pham’s (2013) conclude that reinforcement spacing is much more

significant than reinforcement strength. Barrett and Ruckman (2007) note that GRS is

superior to MSE in resisting static and dynamic loads, as proven by the presented negative-

batter walls case studies and observations after a seismic event. GRS research suggests

simplified design, shorter reinforcement lengths, lower costs, and improved strength and

stiffness performance over GMSE.

Due to perceptions of increased costs, it appears that engineers have been reluctant

to call for closer spaced reinforcement. Leshchinsky and Han’s (2004) choose to evaluate

the effects of offset distance and number of tiers in order to avoid costs associated with

closer reinforcement spacing in tall walls. Barrett and Ruckman (2007) believe the use of

GRS is encumbered by current AASHTO, NCMA, and FHWA guidelines, which the authors

believe are artifacts from traditional, tie-back theory. Wu and Pham’s (2013) recognize that

current design equations do not properly account for relative roles of reinforcement

spacing and strength in a GRS mass and have proposed an analytical model for predicting

ultimate load carrying capacity.

80
 Considering the high rates of failure observed, the cost savings are not worth the

potential risk and GRS walls should be considered whenever GMSE is proposed, especially

when boundary conditions are complex or not fully investigated. Additionally, it appears

that the adaption of GRS specific design guidance would actually offset the increased costs

of closer reinforcement spacing or lead to additional cost savings. Many of the GMSE wall

failures reviewed may have been avoided had they been designed and constructed as GRS

walls.

Communication and Experience

Although individual case studies tend to focus on technical factors such as soil type,

soil compaction, and influence of water; compilation studies and general reports presented

above extensively address intangible factors such as market pressure, inexperience, well

defined roles and responsibilities, and poor communication leading to poor understanding

as the origin of poor wall performance. As Bachus and Griffin (2011, pp 437) points out “in

an attempt to make the client happy, get the job, or to get a lower price, there may be an

unconscious impact to overlook some aspects of design.” This includes shifting certain

aspects of the design to someone else where critical steps could easily be forgotten (e.g.,

adding notes to the plans indicating external stability is to be performed by others).

In the case history of Boyle and Perkins (2007), the success of a highly complex

project was attributed to good communication through co-locating of an experienced

design team, simplified designs, anticipation for field variances, and consistent interaction

with the team throughout construction. Simac and Fitzpatrick (2010), states that in order to

establish a successful project, the owner must coordinate activities, responsibilities, and

81
communication between the design professionals. This includes integration of the MSE wall

engineer with the geotechnical investigations, compatibility of design, construction, and

field conditions, and establishing responsibility/liability for global stability. The bright side is

that significantly lower risk of poor performance can be achieved with minimal commitment

of resources by the owner.

Construction

MSE walls have long been publicized as simple, rapid, and require no special skills for

construction. To navigate the multitude of wall systems, owner agencies commonly require

a contractor furnished design (within some requirements set by the owner) in the form of a

submittal process where contractor “shop drawings” are incorporated into the contract and

used to build the structure. Construction considerations are typically discussed in terms of

QC, which is the contractors work, and QA, which is the owner’s responsibility to enforce

the contract, specifications, and plans.

QC/QA must verify proper site preparation, correct installation of components

(leveling pads, facing systems, reinforcements, drainage networks, etc.), and placement and

compaction of backfill soil. According to NCHRP 290 (1987), site preparation QC/QA is

necessary to verify agreement between actual and specified base elevations, conformance

of encountered soils with parameters considered in design, the absence of hard or soft

foundation soils, and verify adequate drainage. Wall components need to be evaluated for

conformance with the construction drawings, have been properly transported and stored,

free of visible damage, and are properly installed (NCHRP 290, 1987). Backfill type,

82
placement, and compaction must be within limits and tolerances identified in the

specifications.

The following sections discuss common or suspected deficiencies in the submittal

process, QC, and QA that contribute to adverse wall performance identified from the

literature review.

Submittals

The submittal required by owner agencies typically includes some description of

contractor experience, material certifications, shop drawings, and supplemental special

provisions. The submittal review is intended to verify that the contactor is properly trained

and qualified to construct MSE walls, proposed materials meet specifications, stability and

performance checks are complete and accurate, and design assumptions are appropriate

for site conditions based on site characterization and external stability design conducted by

the owner’s geotechnical engineer. Discussions on the process of submittal reviews were

strangely absent during the literature review, but nonetheless important as the overlap

from the design phase to construction.

Because years may have passed between original design and construction, or

availability of staff, the reviewer may not have been involved in the original design. Couple

this with minimal review time periods, typically less than two weeks, as dictated in the

special provisions, leaves little time for the reviewer to develop a thorough understanding

of proposed materials, verify the proposed design, and evaluate contractor experience.

Bachus and Griffin (2011) termed this “wishful thinking” that materials are probably

acceptable and concepts generally adapted. In addition, owners commonly disregard the

83
importance and fail to budget for geotechnical engineers to conduct these reviews and

relay on QA construction staff with little to no knowledge of the original intent or design

assumptions.

The limited time frame and lack of allocated resources discourages team interaction,

and even more surprisingly has resulted in a careless or uninformed submittal reviews. The

case history provided by Dodson (2010) illustrated a mistake in the project plans that

allowed up to 45% fines in the backfill; the mistake was missed again during the submittal

review signifying a lack in continuity from the design phase to construction.

Quality Control and Quality Assurance (QC/QA)

Again, the perception that MSE walls are simple, rapid, and require no special skills

has lead contractor and owners to not require full time QC/QA, trained staff, or pay

attention to details outside of checking compaction. However, as Barrett and Ruckman

(2007) point out, it appears that MSE walls “poorly tolerate construction errors”. Harpstead,

et al. (2010) summarized the need for QC/QA as follows:

The major lesson learned with regard to construction is the need for both the
contractor’s quality control (QC) and the owner’s quality assurance (QA) in the field.
Often the design and construction team confuse the roles and in many projects the
authors find one or both activities being excluded from the construction process. The
disconnect between the project design professionals and the wall engineer can also
lead to the misunderstanding of QA and QC of key components of the MSE wall
design, specifically soil strength parameter (p. 482).

The importance of QA/QC in both the design, as well as the field, cannot be

underestimated. During design, competent designers shall perform the modeling needed of

GMSE structures and preparation of the drawings and specifications. Additionally, the

84
design shall be reviewed for details of calculation and assumptions used and an overview

review of practicality of design and constructability of design.

Time and time again, professional papers (Boyle and Perkin, 2007; Koerner and

Koerner, 2012; Valentine, 2013) contribute poor GMSE wall performance with not verifying

design assumptions (foundation materials, subsurface drainage, etc.) and construction not

following the design parameters, typically with use of poor quality backfill and

inappropriate geosynthetic protection, layout, connection, and spacing. Construction

QA/QC plan and properly trained inspectors is imperative to successful performance of the

GMSE wall.

Discussion on Risk

Because designs with very low probability of failure are very costly, a practical level

of risk should be determined. But with an extensive list of causes of failures, how is the

engineer able to communicate the probability of adverse performance? The following

discussion identifies the risk associated with each GMSE wall parameter so that the reader

can better communicate design and construction considerations associated with GMSE wall

performance.

Design Risks that Effect Performance

Risks evaluated in design consist primarily of choosing appropriate design strength

parameters, long-term aesthetics, and defining the design life of the GMSE wall. The

challenge with evaluating these risks is that they relate back to tolerable deformation,

which is different for each wall component and not always easily determined (e.g., soil

shear strength). Therefore, strength parameters should consider the consequence of failure

85
which is a project specific consideration relying heavily on experience of the designer, not a

theoretical approach. Based on the high failure rates observed for GMSE walls, optimistic

strength values do not appear to be worth the economic savings.

During the design process, assumptions need to be made concerning the aesthetics

and estimating the design life from inevitable deterioration. Although guidance documents

provide some estimate of design life by following limits of specific components (e.g., backfill

electrochemical property limits), actual data on specific wall system durability is

nonexistent, requiring the engineer to forecast resiliency with limited technical knowledge.

Based on the wall system or materials selected, maintenance protocols may need to be

implemented to assure the assumed design life is realized. This will require a commitment

from the owner agency of qualified personnel and budget. This commitment should be

communicated and obtained during the wall selection process.

Construction Risks that Effect Performance

Potential constructability problems should be identified during design and

continually evaluated and monitored throughout construction. Some of these problems

relate to selection or availability of materials, adequate construction space, appropriate

traffic control, site conditions, weather, equipment, and experience of contractors and

inspectors. Underperformance of an individual wall component may lead to combined

deformations resulting in serious problems. Performance risks associate with poor

constructability primarily include increased deformations and poor drainage. For example,

the use of fine grain soils during wet weather may lead to poor compaction control,

resulting in increased vertical and horizontal deformations, generating adverse site grades

86
causing drainage issues, leading to further deformations that overstress the facing

connections resulting in costly repairs. To alleviate constructability risks, the owner agency

must commit qualified personnel and budget to train or vet contractors and inspectors

capable of executing the plans and specifications.

87
 CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

GMSE walls are used frequently in transportation infrastructure as a standard earth

retaining structure because of their relatively simple construction and low cost; however,

the serviceability failure rates of GMSE walls are up to 10%. Consistent with the low cost of

GMSE wall construction, geotechnical design of GMSE walls tend to have a small budget and

may not be adequate to fully characterize the earth conditions (e.g., soil type, drainage,

etc.). Additionally, the evaluations of GMSE failures are rarely evaluated through forensic

studies. When evaluated, the common cause for failure attributes improper construction as

the root cause of the failure.

This thesis discusses the importance of performing an appropriate level of effort in

the design stage for GMSE walls that will reduce the percentage of future failures.

Understanding the best use of wall components and correctly identifying the design criteria

will limit failure. A significant cost savings can be made by bolstering design and reducing

the GMSE wall serviceability failures or even collapses.

The use of GMSE walls is a beneficial retaining structure because of their ease of

construction and cost effectiveness. Because of the high rates of failure, the cost savings are

not worth the potential risk from inadequate designs; as such there have even been

moratoriums on building any MSE Walls (Scarborough, 2005). This thesis presents an

argument that many of the issues observed in failed GMSE Walls can be alleviated through

proper design.

88
 The primary lessons learned include:

• Communication: The owner must take responsibility to establish a successful

project, coordinate activities, responsibilities, and communication between the

design professionals. This includes integration of the GMSE wall engineer with the

geotechnical investigations, compatibility of design, construction, and field

conditions.

• Site Characterization: The owner is proposing to build the structure in the specified

location and it is the owner's responsibility to investigate the feasibility of the

proposed improvement, including the adequacy of the foundation soils to support

the proposed structure. (Anderson, et al., 2012). Frequent technical errors from the

misinterpretation of soil conditions and incorrect selection of soil strength

parameters were derived from insufficient boring information. Geoprofessionals

must take a more proactive role in evaluating site conditions as a whole, including

maintaining responsibility for external design and taking a larger role in

surface/external drainage provisions. The relative unknowns of site conditions and

limitations of numerical modeling likely contribute to incorrect evaluation of bearing

resistance, settlement, hydrostatic conditions, and slope stability.

• Geosynthetic Reinforcement: GMSE wall design concepts consider the geosynthetic

to act as a tieback. This approach does not take full advantage of the benefits

observed when the soil-geosynthetic act as a composite, as in the case of closely

spaced (<12 inches) reinforcement or GRS. GRS research suggests improved

strength and stiffness performance over GMSE. Many of the GMSE wall failures

89
 reviewed may have been avoided had they been designed and constructed as GRS

walls.

• Wall Backfill: Reinforced zone backfill and adequate drainage systems were

repetitively identified as the primary technical factors leading to adverse

performance. Until overall GMSE wall performance improves, high fines content

(>15%) and/or plastic (PI>6) soils should be used with caution and only when

favorable conditions exist.

• Submittals: Submittal reviews are an important overlap from the design phase to

construction. Minimal review time periods leaves little time for the reviewer to

develop a thorough understanding of proposed materials, verify the proposed

design, and evaluate contractor experience. In addition, owners commonly disregard

the importance and fail to budget for geotechnical engineers to conduct these

reviews and relay on QA construction staff with little to no knowledge of the original

intent or design assumptions. The limited time frame and lack of allocated resources

discourages team interaction, and even more surprisingly has resulted in a careless

or uninformed submittal reviews.

• QA/QC: The owner agency must commit qualified personnel and budget to train or

vet contractors and inspectors capable of executing the plans and specifications.

Implement a consistent and clear line-of-communication between the design

engineer through construction to ensure design assumptions are consistent with

actual conditions and the design is being correctly followed and adequate field

testing is being performed.

90
 In summary, GMSE walls are a valuable resource to provide a cost effective means

for grade separation needs and should continue to be used with proper design and

construction. Although backfill and drainage management may dominate GMSE wall failures

in the private sector, insufficient site characterization and/or the lack of coordinated

activities between the design professionals are leading causes of GMSE wall failures in

transportation facilities. The good news is that thorough risk based discussions of the level

of effort required; significantly lower risk of poor performance can be achieved with

minimal commitment of resources by the owner.

91
 REFERENCES

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) (2002).

Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges , 17th Edition. American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

AASHTO (1998/2002). LRFD Bridge Construction Specifications, 2rd Edition with 2002
Interim Revisions. American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials, Washington, DC.

AASHTO (2014). AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, 7th Edition with 2016 Interims.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington,
DC.

Anderson, P.L., R.A. Gladstone, and J.L. Withiam (2010). Coherent Gravity: The Correct
Design Method for Steel-Reinforced MSE Walls, Proceedings of ER2010 Earth
Retention Conference 3, ASCE, Bellevue, Washington.

Anderson, P.L., Gladstone, R.A., and Sankey, J.E. (2012), State of the Practice of MSE Wall
Design for Highway Structures, Geotechnical Engineering State of the Art and
Practice: Keynote Lectures from GeoCongress 2012, 443-463.

Bachus, R. C. and L. M. Griffin (2011). A Perspective on Mechanically Stabilities Earth Walls

Pushing the Limits or Pulling Us Down. 2010 Earth Retention Conference (ER2010).

Barrett, R. K. and A. C. Ruckman (2007). GRS – A New Era in Reinforced Soil Technology.
Geo-Denver 2007: New Peaks in Geotechnics. Geosynthetics in Reinforcement and
Hydraulic Applications.

Boyle and Perkins (2007). Case History of Two Mechanically Stabilized Earth Walls on Steep
Slopes. Geo-Denver 2007: New Peaks in Geotechnics. ASCE.

Christopher, Leshchinsky, and Stulgis (2005). Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil Walls and Slopes:
US Perspective. ASCE 2005. GSP 141 International Perspectives on Soil
Reinforcement Applications.

Clemente, J. L. M., K. A. Lamonte, J. R. Davie, and M. R. Lewis (2016). Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation for MSE Walls – Perspectives from an EPC/EPCM Contractor.
Geosynthetical and Structural Engineering Congress. ASCE. 2016.

DiFiore, S. J. and B. P. Strohman (2013). Look Out Below!!! Potential Pitfalls and Suggested
Improvements in Design and Construction of MSE Walls. Forensic Engineering 2012.
ASCE 2013.

Dodson, M. (2010). Lessons Learned from Settlement of Three Highway Embankment MSE
Walls. 2010 Earth Retention Conference. ER2010.

92
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (2000). Memorandum Load and Resistance Factor
Design (LRFD), David H. Densmore, Director of Bridge Technology, Federal Highway
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. June 28, 2000

FHWA (2001). Mechanically Stabilized Earth Walls and Reinforced Soil Slopes, Design and
Construction Guidelines, Report No. FHWA-NHI-00-043, Authors: Elias, V,
Christopher, B.R. and Berg, R.R., Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Washington, DC.

FHWA (2007). LRFD for Highway Bridge Substructures and Earth Retaining Structures –
Reference Manual. Report No. FHWA-NHI-05-094, Federal Highway Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.

FHWA (2008). Geosynthetic Design and Construction Guidelines, Report No. FHWA
NHI-07-092, Authors: Holtz, R. D., Christopher, B. R., and Berg, R. R., Federal
Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.

FHWA (2009). Design and Construction of Mechanically Stabilized Earth Walls and
Reinforced Soil Slopes, Report No. FHWA NHI-09-083, Authors: Berg, R. R.,
Christopher, B. R. and Samtani, N. C., Federal Highway Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.

FHWA (2009a). Corrosion/Degradation of Soil Reinforcements for Mechanically Stabilized

Earth Walls and Reinforced Soil Slopes, FHWA NHI-09-087, Authors, Elias, V.,
Fishman, K. L., Christopher, B. R. and Berg, R. R., Federal Highway Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.

Giri, R. K. and K. R. Reddy (2015). Sustainability Assessment of Two Alternative Earth-

Retaining Structures. International Foundations Congress and Equipment Expo,
ASCE. 2015.

Haramy, K., S. A. Anderson, and D. E. Alzamora. (2010). Heeding Nature’s Call: Replacing
MSE Wall with a Bridge. ASCE 2010 Earth Retention Conference (ER2010).

Harpstead, D. L., J. M. Schmidt, and B. R. Christopher (2010). Applying Lessons Learned in

the Past 20 Years of MSE Wall Design & Construction. ASCE. 2010 Earth Retention
Conference (ER2010).

Hossain, M. S., G., Kibria, M. S. Khan, J. Hossain, and T. Taufiq. (2012). Effects of Backfill Soil
on Excessive Movement of MSE Wall. Journal of Performance of Constructed
Facilities. ASCE. November/December 2012.

Kim, D., S.K. Bhowmik, and J.L. Willmer (2010). A Case History of MSE Wall Failure: Finite
Element Modeling and Evaluation. GeoFlorida 2010: Advances in Analysis, Modeling
& Design. ASCE.

93
Koerner, R. M. and G. R. Koerner (2012). Need for and Justification of Quality Management
Systems for Successful Geosynthetic Performance. GSI White Paper #26.
Geosynthetic Institute. October 2012.

Koerner, R. M. and G. R. Koerner (2013). A data base, statistics and recommendations

regarding 171 failed geosynthetic reinforced mechanically stabilized earth (MSE)
walls. Geotextiles and Geomembranes 40 (2013) 20-27.

Leshchinsky, D. and J. Han (2004). Geosynthetic Reinforced Multitiered Walls. Journal of

Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering. ASCE. December 2004.

NCHRP 290 (1987). "National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 290,
Reinforcement of Earth Slopes and Embankments," Transportation Research Board,
Washington, D.C.

NCHRP 24-22 (2013). Selecting Backfill Materials for MSE Walls, Final Report for National
Cooperative Highway Research Project 24-22. Authors: Marr, W. A. and. Stulgis, R.
P., Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC, 353
pp.

NCMA (2010). Design Manual for Segmental Retaining Walls, 3rd Edition, National Concrete
Masonry Association, Herndon, Virginia.

NCMA (2016). Segmental Retaining Walls Best Practices Guide, National Concrete Masonry
Association, Herndon, Virginia.

Reddy, D. V. and F. Navarrete (2008). Experimental and Analytical Investigation of Geogrid

MSE Walls. ASCE, from Research to Practice in Geotechnical Engineering Congress.
2008.

Samtani, N.C. and E.A. Nowatzki, 2016. Draft. Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) Wall Fills,
A Framework for Use of Locally Available Sustainable Recourses (LASR). Central
Federal Lands Highway Division, Federal Highway Administration, Lakewood, CO.

Scarborough, J. A. (2005). A Tale of Two Walls: Case Histories of Failed MSE Walls.
Proceedings of Sessions of the Geo-Frontiers 2005 Congress, ASCE. 2005.

Sharma, S. (2011). Teaching Retaining Wall Design with Case Histories. Proceedings of
Sessions of the Geo-Frontiers 2011 Congress, ASCE. 2011.

Simac, M. R. and B. J. Fizpatrick (2010). Design and Procurement Challenges for MSE
Structures: Options going forward. ASCE 2010 Earth Retention Conference (ER2010).

Smith, D. L. and N. W. Janacek (2011). The Geotechnical Engineer’s Role in

Design/Construction of MSE Retaining Walls. Geo-Frontiers ASCE. 2011.

94
Sun and Graves (2013). Evaluation of Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) Walls for Bridge
Ends in Kentucky; What Next? Kentucky Transportation Cabinet in cooperation with
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. Report
Number KTC-13-11/SP443-12-1F. July 2013.

Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) (2014). Design Parameters and Methodology

for Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) Walls. Texas Department of Transportation
Research and Technology Implementation Office in cooperation with the Texas
Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration. Report
Number FHWA/TX-14/0-6716-1. October 2014

Valentine (2013). An Assessment of the Factors that Contribute to the Poor Performance of
Geosynthetic-Reinforced Earth Retaining Wall. Proc., Design and Practice of
Geosynthetic-Reinforced Soil Structures, H. Ling, et al., DEStech, Lancaster, PA, 318-
327.

VanBuskirk, C. (2010). “Adoption and implementation of GRS design concepts – A

Consultant’s Perspective,” 19th Vancouver Geotechnical Society Symposium,
Geosynthetic Reinforced Walls, Slopes, and Earthworks, May 2010.

Wasman S., M. McVay, D. Bloomquist, M. Harrison, and P. Lai (2011). Evaluation of LRFD
Resistance Factors and Risk for MSE Walls. GeoRisk, ASCE.

Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) (2001). Development of the

Simplified Method for Internal Stability Design of Mechanically Stabilized Earth
Walls. Authors: Allen, T., Christopher, B., Elias, V., DeMaggio, J., Report Number WA-
RD 513.1, Washington State Department of Transportation in cooperation with the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, July 2001.

Wu, J. Y. and N. N. Chou (2013). Forensic Studies of Geosynthetic Reinforced Structure

Failures. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities. ASCE.
September/October.

Wu, J. T. H. and T. Q. Pham (2013). Load-Carrying Capacity and Required Reinforcement

Strength of Closely Spaced Soil-Geosynthetic Composites. Journal of Geotechnical
and Geoenvironmental Engineering. ASCE. September.

Zevgolis, I. E. and P. L. Bourdeau (2008). Stochastic Modeling of Redundancy in MSE Walls.

GeoCongress . ASCE.

95