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G.R. No.

91649 May 14, 1991


On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, “to regulate
and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This
was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of
much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
public order, among others.

Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD
1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms
are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization.

1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that
the government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by
Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National

3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of government and the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014

This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the city of General Santos asking to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Commission on Audit (COA).which affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal.

Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to entice those
employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early
retirement package."6
This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commission’s regional director agreed that the grant
lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to
respondent Commission’s Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan
SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.26 Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early
retirement program.


Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits –
Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits
the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and
one-half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service in the City Government.9
Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the beneficiary’s years of service in the city
government. The ordinance provides that only those who have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may
apply.75 Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a
form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the employee enjoy the
remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.
Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan – other than the
GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To
ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance.71

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit decision dated January 20, 2011 and
resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as
amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition
for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative
complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and remove
local officials.

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is
not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law
allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law
gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are
of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and
purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989


Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs
of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he
was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that
he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its

Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of
the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,
with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook".
But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time
the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under
the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
SCRA 203 [2004]



Respondents also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note
that petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

Petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the
rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising
and implementing all public works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.


Whether the petitioners has legal standing to institute the suit;


The creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of an appropriation of funds to the
First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and
the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial
interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the
validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.

The party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.