SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, A.C. No.
7649 have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the syndicate
ALMASIS LAUBAN, and
BENJAMIN DANDA, Present:
Complainants,
-versus-
SERENO, and ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR.,
WENCESLAO PEEWEE TRINIDAD,
and ANDRESITO FORNIER, Promulgated:
Respondents. December 14, 2011
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao,
Almasis Lauban and Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers
Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier
(respondents). Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed
fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City Prosecutors
Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under
I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the imposition
of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to
complainants letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants in the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaints.
The Facts
Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City
Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in
Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal
recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante,
Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money.5 De
Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of
Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito
Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and
Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were untouchable. 6
In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De
Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents,
which they were directed to sign and file.7 The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and
supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De
Guzman.8
During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City
Prosecutors Office, complainants allegedly received several phone calls from
De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of them
continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.9 When complainants
asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued,
De Guzman allegedly replied, Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila.10
Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why
they told De Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the
criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.11 Complainants were allegedly
offered by respondents ₱200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they
refused.12 Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents
One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they
refused again.13 For this reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing
of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-
1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30
November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text message from De
Guzman, saying, Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant of
Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo. 15
In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants
submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter
of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy,18De Guzmans
Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,19 and other
relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20and prayed that the
complaint be pursued against De Guzman.
Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court 21 and
Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline, 22 denied all the
allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared that he has never
communicated with any of the complainants and has never been to
Cotabato.23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not
contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and
circumstances of the meetings and conversations with him.24 Trinidad asserted
that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded
by a certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish
Trinidads reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.25 Trinidad claims that
Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly
believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay
City.26 Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close friends
headed by Montesclaros.27
Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing
court processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment
in remote areas with fabricated addresses of defendants.28Since the defendants
addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the criminal
complaint, and thus the information is filed with the court.29 Consequently, a
warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is
served upon the defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint. 30 At
this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant in
order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint.31 To prove the
existence of this syndicate, Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a
second year law student in Cebu City, to the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to
investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian
citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion
racket.32 Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend,
Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed because the charge was
fabricated, as admitted by complainants themselves.33
Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate
included some of their members as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad
pointed out that his wife was a victim of this fabricated criminal charge of
illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of
arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidads wife was not
there.36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method
of filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to harass his
victims.37
Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court38 and Position
Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35
years as a member of the bar, he has conducted himself professionally in
accordance with the exacting standards of the legal profession.40 Fornier
denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any dealings
or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed,
either for himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or
otherwise, against complainants.41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this
case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal
complaints for illegal recruitment.42 Fornier claimed that the Go Tian Brothers
are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For coming to the
legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of
the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his
clients.44 Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently an
attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed and
thwarted their criminal designs at extortion.45 Fornier prays that the Court will
not fall prey to the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made
and continues to make a mockery of the justice system by utilizing the courts,
the Prosecutors Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration in carrying out their criminal
activities.46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to establish the
charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as
complainants affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations,
conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and
convincing evidence.47
De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-
Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which
was made the basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious. 49 According
to the Certification issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City,
complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was
subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor,
did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor
did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person. 50
In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline, 51 De
Guzman stated he is an 81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He
pointed out that there are no details regarding the allegations of grave and
serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of
documents, violation of lawyers oath and other administrative
infractions.53 De Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating
Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in I.S. No.
2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal
complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which
was masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of Clarification,55 De
Guzman claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal
complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy
of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita
Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the
preparation of the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find
his and his clients names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt
under obligation to make the Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly, De Guzman
declared that he has no familiarity with the complainants or Tesclaros
Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the
complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor
G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal
recruitment business.58
During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13
March 2009,60 none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating
Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due
notice.61
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline reads:
In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent
Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be without basis and
consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the
charges against them.
As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court
Judge, there is enough basis to hold him administratively liable.
Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is
hereby recommended.62
The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the
allegations in the complaint as well as in the attachments, that complainants
failed to substantiate their charges against respondents Trinidad and
Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of
Trinidad and Forniers supposed involvement or participation directly or
indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint.64 In addition, complainants,
on their own volition, admitted the non-participation and non-involvement of
Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss
Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these reasons,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges against
Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman
failed to deny the allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import
of the same.66 Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert the truly vicious
evidence against him:
But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for
Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D. Badoy, City
Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was
alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit
of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel
to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did not identify.
He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to
whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of
those who executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba,
Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was
filed before the Supreme Court.67
The Decision of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against Fornier and
Trinidad.68 In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty
from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the
practice of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier
is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty.
Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal
recruitment cases in order to extort money.69
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be
administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the
charges against Trinidad and Fornier.
We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with regard to De
Guzmans liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman.
Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence
Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is
presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held
that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges
against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he
is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 70
Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by convincing and satisfactory proof.71
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is
not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief
for the party on the judge trying the case.72
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then
by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that
order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalty on a member of the Bar.74
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as
a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.75 It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the
party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.77
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of
the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent.
De Guzmans Liability
The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De
Guzmans liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by
complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants
did not appear in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate
the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove
by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for
the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of
extortion.
The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First,
complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint,
which contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman,
Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court
into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was
submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal
recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a
prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this
document by complainants:
This is to certify that based on available records of the Office,
ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were
among the respondents named and charged with Violation of
Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol.
XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints
were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006
rendered by the Office.
 This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not
submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection to the
complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any
Affidavit of Complaint against any person.78(Emphasis
supplied)
To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court
into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint,
which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn
to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the
other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative
charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified
documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and
this Court.
Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part
of a syndicate headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of
fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept
in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this
Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by
complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the
documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct
against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even
attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to
identify the documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of
misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse,
the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants attached
to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of
misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having the
signature and seal of the prosecutor.
Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their
communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them
that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman
use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is
the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are
these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants
did not even bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the
Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the
allegations of De Guzmans misconduct are really doubtful.
Lastly, the supposedly vicious evidence against De Guzman, which was a
letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not
credible. This letter states:
Dear Orly,
Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I
learned much about the South and the way of life there.
It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the
meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges against us in Marawi
City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your
man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two
complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and
file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to
orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge,
especially the warrants of arrest.
Thank you and best regards.79
The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the
purported letter have material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants
did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter.
Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis
V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants
appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their
allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.
The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and
credibility into this purported letter:
Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent
failed to offer denial of the letter or explain the import of the same
differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even
with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the
undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys.80
Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that
complainants, whom respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are
consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their
criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioners
observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation
of complainants criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of
Clarification, De Guzman stated:
5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-
captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently
received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of
Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c)
Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque
A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does
not have any Daryll);
6. Undersigned counsels name and that of his clients
appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor G.
Alcarez (Montesclaros lawyer who appeared in the sala
of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the
undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman
of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica
Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason,
undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this
affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the
Investigating Prosecutor;
xxx
4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros
Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the
complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of
Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he
believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty.
Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L.
Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.81
For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by
complainants in support of their complaint against De Guzman are not
credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman.
De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or
wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations
of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge
this burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and
were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the
mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the
administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even
higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values.
Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De
Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated
charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even
if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor
of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the
Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly
dismisses the charges against De Guzman.
Trinidads and Forniers Liabilities
The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with respect to Trinidads and Forniers
liabilities:
A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments
to the Joint Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals
that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges
against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the
Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondents supposed
involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts
complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly
that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce
and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges
against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that
they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any
form of communication. The supposed telephone call the
Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the
proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office to the
Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is inconceivable that
Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons
during a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary
investigation of a criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor.
To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly
militates against the reliabiity of Complainants charges against
Respondents.
xxx
But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition
already made unmistakable Respondents non-participation or non-
involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly
filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and
Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the
filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission,
however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic
merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants
had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included
 Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In
particular, they explained that they had no communication or
dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers as to inspire belief that
the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned
finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to
ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence.82
At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated.
Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed
terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as
reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with
this Court within 15 days from notice:
c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary
sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such
as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall
be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or
other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise.
Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors
dismissing the charges against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants
filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and
Fornier.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys.
Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit.
We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr.
also for utter lack of merit.
[A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]
DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated AUG 3 2005.
A.C. No. 6580 (CBD 03-1175) (Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz vs. Atty. Remegio
D. Saladero, Jr.)
A complaint dated December 16, 2003 was filed by Atty. Miniano B. Dela
Cruz before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent of
violating the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by
filing disbarment, criminal and administrative cases against complainant
without legal and factual bases, for submitting false affidavits, for refusing his
invitation to have a "brotherly" talk as fellow lawyer to clarify the matters
between complainant and respondent's clients and for filing a prohibited
pleading.
Specifically, complainant accuses respondent of: filing, through Adoracion
Losloso, a baseless disbarment case against him supported by two false
affidavits; sending complainant a letter charging him of estafa and ignoring
complainant's reply thereto; refusing complainant's invitation to a "brotherly"
talk; filing an estafa case through falsification of public document and four
other criminal complaints against herein complainant, through Losloso, which
were eventually dismissed for being groundless; filing an HLURB case in
behalf of Losloso and Nestor Aguirre without verifying the truth of their
claims; filing a motion to dismiss the ejectment case filed by complainant
against Losloso before the barangay knowing that such is a prohibited
pleading; and helping Losloso to file motions to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig
for alleged bias.[1]cralaw
Respondent filed an answer contending that: he merely acted as counsel of the
parties who filed cases against complainant and out of the 17 cases filed by
Adoracion Losloso against complainant, respondent only handles four which
are still pending resolution; it would be premature to say that said cases were
filed only to harass complainant; there is no showing that respondent is moved
by malice or bad faith in agreeing to act as counsel of Losloso; Losloso also
alleged that it was a public attorney who was assisting her in all her cases by
preparing the various pleadings in court; and it is only because said public
attorney could not appear in court that she asked the assistance of respondent
and eventually engaged the legal services of respondent when the public
attorney died.[2]cralaw
On February 17, 2004, complainant filed a Reply to the answer reiterating his
earlier claims which respondent countered with a Rejoinder asserting the same
denials.[3]cralaw
A mandatory conference was held on April 16, 2004 and on said date, IBP
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers.[4]cralaw On June 7, 2004, she submitted her report
dated June 7, 2004, finding that:
...In the case at hand, complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence to prove that respondent has been moved by malice and
bad faith in accepting to serve as legal counsel of Mrs. Adoracion Losloso.
Moreover, records show that the cases, where respondent acted as counsel for
Mrs. Losloso have not been resolved, and therefore, it could not be
determined yet whether or not they are meritorious.[5]cralaw
She then recommended that the instant case of disbarment filed against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.[6]cralaw
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution thus:
RESOLUT
ION NO. XVI-2004-
349
CBD Case
No. 03-1175
Atty.
Miniano
B. dela
Cruz vs.
Atty.
Remegio D. Saladero,
Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks
merit, the case is hereby DISMISSED.[7]cralaw
On October 19, 2004, complainant filed before this Court a Motion for
Reconsideration on the grounds that: the report and recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Maala is not based on correct records of the case; Maala's
report and recommendation did not consider the violations of respondent
under Sec. 20 of Rule 138[8]cralaw of the Rules of Court, Canons
1,[9]cralaw 8[10]cralaw and 12,[11]cralaw and Rules 1.02, 1.03, and 1.04 of the
Code of Professional Conduct;[12]cralaw the report and recommendation did
not discuss the failure of respondent to conduct an investigation to ascertain
the veracity of the complaint for Estafa, disbarment and complaint before the
HLURB, among others; and the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
erred in approving the incomplete and defective report of Maala and should
therefore be set aside.[13]cralaw
On December 28, 2004, complainant filed a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration emphasizing the issue that respondent filed groundless cases
against him.[14]cralaw
On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a Comment stating that: complainant,
instead of filing a petition from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c), erroneously filed a motion for
reconsideration; contrary to the allegations of complainant, respondent acted
in good faith and studied the supporting documents of Losloso first before
sending complainant the demand letter; respondent was not the one who filed
the cases before the HLURB, the Prosecutors' Office and the IBP; respondent
came into the picture long after these cases have been filed; respondent agreed
to handle the said cases based on his honest assessment that there is a valid
cause of action against complainant;[15]cralaw the investigating IBP
commissioner was not biased in requiring respondent to submit his position
paper despite his failure to attend the mandatory hearing on time; respondent
agreed to the order of Maala requiring both parties to submit position papers
and it was only when the commissioner dismissed his complaint that
complainant raised the issue of bias; respondent enjoys the presumption that
he is innocent of the charges against him and complainant has failed to
convincingly prove that respondent has acted in bad faith in the manner by
which he has handled the cases pending between complainant and Losloso, et
al.; complainant himself has filed several cases against Losloso (cancellation
of contract, estafa and perjury) which have been dismissed; since these cases
were also found to be without merit, complainant, following his line of
reasoning, should also be considered as having harassed Losloso in violation
of his oath as a lawyer.[16]cralaw
First of all, we are treating herein motion for reconsideration as a petition
referred to in Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c).
After reviewing the records of this case, we find the report and
recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors, to be well-founded.
Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[17]cralaw
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing
any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[18]cralaw But his guilt cannot be presumed.[19]cralawA mere charge
or allegation of wrongdoing will not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be sufficient
evidence to support the charge.[21]cralaw
In this case, complainant accuses respondent of filing baseless charges against
him. Apart from his bare allegations, however, complainant failed to show
that respondent did in fact file baseless cases against him. As borne by the
records, the complaint, as well as the motions for reconsideration of the denial
thereof, for estafa through falsification of public document, was filed by
Adoracion Losloso;[22]cralawthe disbarment case before the IBP were filed by
Losloso, Sheila Bones-Lei and Nestor Aguirre;[23]cralawwhile the HLURB
case was filed by Losloso and Aguirre.[24]cralaw Aside from complainant's
allegations, there is no proof that respondent prodded said individuals to file
cases against herein complainant. Adoracion Losloso even executed a sworn
statement expressing that it was Atty. Ramon Vera of the Public Attorney's
Office in Pasig who helped her in filing the cases before the fiscal, the
HLURB and the IBP. She also categorically stated that herein respondent only
entered the picture after the said cases had already been filed and that he did
not have any participation in the drafting of said complaints. She also
explained that out of the 20 cases filed between her and herein complainant,
respondent only participated in four cases which are still pending
resolution.[25]cralaw
Apart from complainant's naked assertions, there is also no proof anywhere in
the records that respondent filed false affidavits to support the disbarment case
against complainant in the IBP. Neither is there any showing that respondent
filed a prohibited pleading, In any case, we cannot see how such pleading, if
ever one was filed, could be a basis for disbarment. Neither could respondent's
refusal to have a "brotherly talk over a cup of coffee" with complainant or
respondent's act of helping Losloso file a motion to inhibit a prosecutor in
Pasig for alleged bias could be a basis for disciplinary action.
What is only clear is that herein respondent sent complainant a letter dated
May 17, 2001 demanding that complainant give Losloso, et al. their
commission for the sale of a property in Antipolo based on a Memorandum of
Agreement, otherwise Losloso, et al. would be constrained to file appropriate
criminal, civil and administrative complaints against herein
complainant.[26]cralaw We cannot, based on this letter alone, say that
respondent was moved by malice or bad faith.
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, such as the case at bar, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant. This Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if the complainant establishes his case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the absence of convincing or clearly
preponderant evidence, the complaint for disbarment against respondent is
correctly dismissed[27]cralawby the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Atty. Miniano Dela
Cruz, is DENIED for lack of merit.
A.C. No. 7687 December 3, 2014
RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III and PABLO R.
CRUZ, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 7688
RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III, PETER ANDREWS GO and
PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for disbarment filed
by complainants Raul C. Lanuza (Lanuza) and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing),
docketed as A.C. No. 7687, against lawyers Frankie O. Magsalin III (Atty.
Magsalin) and Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty.
Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go) for alleged
fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both involve the same
parties, revolve around the sameset of facts, and raise exactly the same issues.
The Facts
These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant
Lanuza against Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI), which operated the Dusit
Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of respondents Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz
and Atty. Go, all from the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law
Office). Both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza appealed the NLRC decision before
the Court of Appeals (CA).
A.C. No. 7688
On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642,
favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate him with full backwages.
According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia),
received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March
28, 2007 at his law office located in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia
received by registered mail the Compliance1 and Motion for
Reconsideration,2 both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by Atty.
Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment
with a copy of the CA decision on April 10, 2007. This information caused
Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said
Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was
also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days after he received his own
copies. Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post
Office (QCCPO) for a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the
Notice of Judgment with the CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In the
October 31, 2007 Certification,3 issued by Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme),
Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the Registered Letter
No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo
Pecante (Postman Pecante)and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March
29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of Postman Pecante.
With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the
disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was
docketed as A.C. No. 7688.
A.C. No. 7688
In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita "Tess" Calucag
(Calucag), secretary of PRC Law Office, altered the true date of receipt of the
Notice of Judgment withthe CA decision when she signed and stamped on the
registry return receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the
opposing party that they received their copy of the CA decision on a later date
and not March 29, 2007. The complainants added that the alteration was very
evident on the registry return receipt which bore two (2) stamped dates of
receipt, with one stamped date "snowpaked" or covered with a liquid
correction fluid to conceal the true date written on the registry return receipt.
They inferred that Calucag concealed whatcould probably be the true date of
receipt, and that the respondents must have induced Calucag to alter the true
date of receipt because they stood to benefit from the additional thirteen (13)
days to prepare their motion for reconsideration.
In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants’ allegations and
countered that they actually received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of
the CA Decision on April 10, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt 4 (1st
return receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return receipt was
"RECEIVED APRIL 10 2007" and signed by Calucag in front and within the
full view of Postman Pecante. The respondents claimed that examining and
finding that the return receipt had been faithfully accomplished and the date
indicated therein to be true and accurate, Postman Pecante accepted the said
return receipt. As borne out by the records, the 1st return receipt pertaining to
the CA decision was duly returned to the CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty.
Magsalin filed the required Compliance. Considering that Atty. Cruz was out
of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6, 2007, based on a Bureau of
Immigration certification,5 Atty. Magsalin requested Atty. Go, a senior
associate in their law office, to review PHI’s motion for reconsideration of the
decision. Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for reconsideration and
had it filed with the CA.
Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt, respondents stated the date,
April 10, 2007, in the filed compliance and motion for reconsideration.
To oppose complainants’ assertion of Calucag’s application of "snowpake" in
the 1st return receipt allegedly to conceal the true date of receipt of the CA
decision, the respondents secured a Certification6 from the CA, which stated
the following:
This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March 23, 2007,
attached to the dorsal portion of page 209 of the rollo of the above-captioned
case, asper careful observation, reveals no "snowpaked" portion and that the
white mark that appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry
Return Receipt bearing the stamp mark of receipt ofP.R. Cruz Law Offices is
a part of the white envelope that contained the decisionof this Court which
stuck to the said Return Receipt.
A.C. No. 7687
As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA
decision, but the CA denied the motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution.
On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of
Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail
the Compliance,7 dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law
Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was
received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt8 (2nd return
receipt) sent back to the CA.
Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the
respondents, Atty. Garciarequested the QCCPO to issue a certification as to
the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law
Office. Inthe October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO, Chief of
the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114
addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly
received by Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook of Postman
Pecante.
The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the other disbarment
complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz docketed as A.C. No. 7687.
In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz
must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt of the Notice of
Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof when she signed and stamped
on the 2nd return receipt the date- July 23, 2007. They contended that Attys.
Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the additional seven (7) days derived
from the alleged altered date asthey, in fact, used the altered date in their
subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely alleged such in the
compliance filed before the CA; the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on certiorari;10 and the petition for review on
certiorari11 filed before this Court. The complainants insinuated that Atty.
Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and this Court by filing
the above-mentioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were already
time barred.
In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the allegations in the
complaint and retorted that they actually received the subject Notice of
Resolution on the date - July 23, 2007 as indicated in the 2nd return receipt
which was also duly accepted by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned
to the CA as sender. Relying on the date, July 23, 2007, as indicated in 2nd
return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of PHI, filed the compliance and the
other pleadings before the CA and this Court concerning CA-G.R. SP No.
92642. The respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd return receipt
deserved full faith and credence as it was clearly indicated by Calucag,
witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately processed by the QCCPO to be
duly returnedto the CA.
Referral to the IBP
In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the Court referred the
said administrative cases tothe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the scheduled
mandatory conference held before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective position papers.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
A.C. No. 7687
In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation,14 Commissioner Salvador
B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the administrative
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave more credence to the date
indicated in the 2nd return receipt which bore no alteration and was duly
accepted by Postman Pecante than the October 25, 2007 Certification issued
by the QCCPO. He stated that the 2nd return receipt did not contain any
alteration as to the stamping of the date - July 23, 2007, and that Postman
Pecante would not have allowed and accepted the 2nd return receipt from
Calucag if it contained an inaccurate date other than the true date of receipt.
Finally, the CBD ruled that the complainants failed to demonstrate the specific
acts constituting deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct by evidence that
was clear and free from doubt as to the act charged and as to the respondents’
motive.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt
and approve the CBD report and recommendation through its Resolution No.
XVIII-2009-176.15 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.
A.C. No. 7688
In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009, the CBD
recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave
credence to the date indicated in the 1st return receipt as the actual and true
date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the
respondents. It did not subscribe to the complainants’ theory that Calucag was
induced by the respondents to conceal the true date of receipt by applying a
liquid correction fluid in the 1st return receipt. It found the the Certification
issued by Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to explain the presence of
the white substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the CBD
report and recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The
complainants moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases denied, the
complainants filed their respective petitions for review before this Court.
ISSUE
The vital issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and
Go should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the
complaints.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688 jointly as
they essentially revolve around the same circumstances and parties.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests
on the complainant.1âwphi1 The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence
that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys
the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until
the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the
Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.18
In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be
inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts
alleged in the complaint.
Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the
Registry Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices,
decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and convincing
evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it
appear that they received the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the
dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would like to
impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as to the discrepancy
on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return
Receipts was that the respondents must have induced Calucag toalter the true
date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of extending the period to file, the
otherwise time barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this leap of
inference proffered by the complainants is merely anchored on speculation
and conjecture and not in any way supported by clear substantial evidence
required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of
the Bar.
Even if the postmaster's certifications were to merit serious consideration, the
Court cannot avoid the legal reality that the registry return card is considered
as the official CA record evidencing service by mail. This card carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have
been regularly performed. Jn this sense, it is presumed to be accurate, unless
clearly proven otherwise.
The Court finds merit in the respondents' argument that had Calucag stamped
an inaccurate date on the registry return receipts, Postman Pecante, who
witnessed and had full view of the receiving and stamping of the said registry
return receipts, would have called her attention to correct the same or would
have refused to receive them altogether for being erroneous. Here, Postman
Pecante having accepted two registry return receipts with the dates, April 10,
200719 and .July 23, 2007,20 respectively, can only mean that the said postman
considered the dates indicated therein to be correct and accurate.
While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out the proper
disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn
duties, the Court will not wield its axe against those the accusations against
whom are not indubitably proven.
Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint
for disbarment should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys. Frankie O.
Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7687; and the administrative
complaint against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S. Go and
Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7688, are hereby DISMISSED.
A.C. No. 6056, September 09, 2015
FELICISIMA MENDOZA VDA. DE ROBOSA, Complainant, v. ATTYS.
JUAN B. MENDOZA AND EUSEBIO P. NAVARRO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza) for alleged deceitful acts against his client, and Atty. Eusebio P.
Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro) for negligence in the handling of his client's
defense in the collection case filed by Atty. Mendoza.
Factual Antecedents
Eladio Mendoza (Eladio) applied for original registration of two parcels of
land (Lot Nos. 3771 and 2489) situated in Calamba, Laguna before the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) at Los
Banos, Laguna and Land Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila.1 While his
application was still pending, Eladio died leaving all his children as heirs to
his estate; among them is herein complainant Felicisima Mendoza Vda. De
Robosa (Felicisima). Eladio's children pursued the application and executed a
Special Power of Attorney2 (SPA) in favor of Felicisima. Their relative, Atty.
Mendoza, prepared and notarized the said SPA. They also engaged the
services of Atty. Mendoza as their counsel in the proceedings before the
CENRO and LMB.
On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima signed a
Contract for Service3prepared by Atty. Mendoza. The said contract stipulated
that in the event of a favorable CENRO or LMB resolution, Felicisima shall
convey to Atty. Mendoza one-fifth (1/5) of the lands subject of the application
or one-fifth (1/5) of the proceeds should the same property be sold.
The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal of Felicisima
and her siblings' application for Lot No. 2489 and the partial grant of their
application for Lot No. 3771.4 The Bureau of Lands issued an Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) covering one-third (VV) or about 8,901 square
meters of Lot No. 3771 in the names of Felicisima and her siblings.
Subsequently, Felicisima and her siblings sold the land to Greenfield
Corporation (Greenfield) and received the amount of P2,000,000.00 as down
payment.
On October 15, 1998, Atty. Mendoza, joined by his wife Filomena S.
Mendoza, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas a
Complaint5 against Felicisima and her siblings (Civil Case No. T-1080). Atty.
Mendoza claimed that except for the amount of P40,000.00, Felicisima and
her siblings refused to pay his attorney's fees equivalent to 1/5 of the proceeds
of the sale of the land as stipulated in the Contract for Service.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 Felicisima and her siblings denied the
"existence and authenticity of the x x x Contract of Service," adding that it did
not reflect the true intention of the parties as they only agreed to pay Atty.
Mendoza PI,500.00 per appearance and up to P1,500.00 for gasoline
expenses. They also asserted that, based on quantum meruit, Atty. Mendoza is
not entitled to the claimed attorney's fees because they lost in one case and he
failed to accomplish the titling of the land awarded to them, which would have
enhanced the value of the property.
Felicisima and her siblings hired the services of Atty. Navarro as their counsel
in Civil Case No. T-1080.
On March 29, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza
and against Felicisima and her siblings. The RTC ruled that Felicisima failed
to substantiate her claim that she did not enter into a contingency contract for
legal services with Atty. Mendoza, and ordered Felicisima to pay Atty.
Mendoza P1,258,000.00 (for the land sold at P7,120,800.00) representing
attorney's fees as well as the total cost of suit.7
Atty. Navarro then filed a Notice of Appeal8 on behalf of Felicisima.
However, Atty. Mendoza moved for an execution pending appeal with the
RTC. Since no opposition was filed by Felicisima and her siblings, the RTC
granted the said motion and issued a writ of execution, which resulted in the
levy and eventual transfer of Felicisima's properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-433859 and T-433860 in favor of Atty. Mendoza as
the highest bidder in the execution sale.9
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered Felicisima to file an
appellant's brief but Atty. Navarro failed to file the same within the period
granted by the CA. Consequently, the CA dismissed Felicisima's appeal for
non-compliance with Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.10
On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment before
this Court against Atty. Mendoza for allegedly deceiving her into signing the
Contract for Service by taking advantage of her illiteracy, and against Atty.
Navarro for dereliction of duty in handling her case before the CA causing her
properties to be levied and sold at public auction.11
Felicisima alleges that Atty. Mendoza made her sign a document at her house
without the presence of her siblings. Said document (Contract for Service)
was written in English which she does not understand. She claims that Atty.
Mendoza told her the document will shield her from her siblings' possible
future claims on the property because she alone is entitled to the property as
her siblings did not help her in processing the application for original
registration. She was not given a copy of the said document and she
discovered only during the trial that Atty. Mendoza anchors his claim over Vs
of proceeds from the sale of the land awarded by the CENRO and LMB on the
same document she had signed.12
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima claims that her case before the CA was
neglected despite repeated follow-ups on her part. She also points out that
Atty. Navarro abandoned her case before the RTC when the latter failed to file
an opposition to Atty. Mendoza's motion for execution pending appeal, which
resulted in the loss of her properties.13
In his Comment,14 Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been a lawyer since 1954
and retired sometime in 1983 due to partial disability. Fie went back to
practicing his profession in 1996 on a selective basis due to his disability but
completely stopped a year after. Being 82 years of age at the time of filing his
comment, Atty. Mendoza admits that he is now totally disabled, cannot walk
on his own, cannot even write and sign his name, and can only move about
with the help of his family for he has been suffering from a severe case of
"acute gouty arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in moving
virtually all his joints. He points out that he had previously handled pro
bono a concubinage case filed by Felicisima against her husband, having
yielded to her repeated pleas as she was then financially hard-up and
psychologically distraught. For the application with the CENRO and LMB, he
agreed to be paid for his legal services on a contingent basis, which contract
was subsequently found by the RTC to be valid. When it was time to collect
his attorney's fees, Felicisima and her siblings refused to pay him without any
justifiable reason and even threatened to shoot him if he continued to press for
his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with no other recourse but to avail
of the judicial process to enforce his claim.
Replying to the comment of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima maintains that she did
not understand the contents of the Contract for Service and if it was truly their
agreement (contingent basis) they would not have given money to Atty.
Mendoza amounting to P66,000.00. in fact, she points out that Atty. Mendoza
failed to recover one of the lands applied for and to have the land awarded to
them titled because he became ill. Further, she denies the allegation that she
and her siblings threatened to shoot Atty. Mendoza for how could they do it to
a lawyer who will certainly have them jailed. Besides, he never mentioned
such incident during the hearing of the case.
On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to win Felicisima's case
although he was unsuccessful. He explains that even before handling
Felicisima's case, he had been saddled by many cases involving politicians
and sympathizers, having previously served as councilor in the Municipality
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for two consecutive terms. He thus emphasized to
Felicisima that in order to "keep the case alive", he could file the Notice of
Appeal in her behalf, and instructed her to look for another lawyer who has
the time to attend to her case and that she would return to him only when she
failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro admits that since he was too
preoccupied with so many cases in the local courts, he had altogether
forgotten about Felicisima's case, not having seen her again as per their
agreement.
Atty. Navarro avers that after a long time Felicisima suddenly showed up at
his office complaining why there was no appellant's brief filed on her behalf at
the CA. He claims that Felicisima blamed her and even accused him of
conniving with Atty. Mendoza. Felicisima would not accept his explanation
and she obviously failed to understand his earlier instruction as he had filed
the Notice of Appeal precisely to give her enough time to secure the services
of a new lawyer having told her that he was quite busy with his other cases.
He therefore pleads for mercy and compassion if he had somehow committed
some lapses considering that this is the first time he was charged
administratively in his almost 39 years of law practice and that he is too
willing to take complainant's cause if not for such apparent
miscommunication between a lawyer and his client.15
On December 7, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 16
On November 6, 2006, Felicisima filed a position paper17 reiterating that Atty.
Mendoza clearly abused the trust and confidence she reposed in him,
depriving her of her material possessions by filing suit to enforce the Contract
for Service. She asserted that they could not have entered into a contract with
Atty. Mendoza for the conveyance of a portion of the land to be awarded by
the Bureau of Lands as his attorney's fees because they already agreed to pay
his fee per hearing plus transportation expenses and the sum of P40,000.00.
She contended that Atty. Mendoza should be held liable for deceit and
misrepresentation for tricking her to sign, to her detriment, a document that
she did not understand.
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima maintained that he abandoned his
responsibility to monitor and keep her updated of the status of her case before
the CA. She also alleges that Atty. Navarro made it appear to her that he had
already filed the appellant's brief when, in fact, there was no such undertaking.
She thus prayed that Atty. Navarro be held liable for negligence in the conduct
and manner of handling her case before the CA.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
After two postponements, the mandatory conference was finally held on
September 25, 2006 where all parties appeared except for Atty. Mendoza.
Upon termination of the hearing, the parties were required to file their position
papers but only Felicisima complied.
On March 6, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) submitted her Report and Recommendation 18 finding
Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima's ignorance just to
have the Contract for Service signed. She held that Atty. Mendoza violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) that a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him, as well as Rule 20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts
lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning matters of
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.19
As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that his
participation in politics affected his law practice and caused him to forget
about Felicisima's case. Having failed to file the appellant's brief as ordered by
the CA, Atty. Navarro even filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance at a very
late stage, leaving no time for Felicisima to secure the services of another
lawyer. His infraction caused the eviction of Felicisima and her children from
their residence by virtue of the writ of execution and public auction of her real
properties. The Investigating Commissioner further said that Atty. Navarro's
acts showed lack of diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the CPR and his
Lawyer's Oath.20
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both Atty. Mendoza and
Atty. Navarro be suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law. 21
On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution22 modifying the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation by lowering the period of suspension from two (2) years to
six (6) months.
Atty. Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration23 contending that the IBP
Board of Governors failed to consider that after the filing of the Notice of
Appeal, there was no more lawyer-client relationship between him and
Felicisima. Insisting that there was a miscommunication between him and
Felicisima regarding his instruction that she should engage the services of
another lawyer after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, he stressed that she
only later found it difficult to scout for a new lawyer because she was being
charged exorbitant acceptance fees. Hence, Felicisima should be held equally
negligent in not hiring the services of another lawyer despite a clear
understanding to this effect. He further cites the lack of communication
between him and Felicisima, which resulted in the late filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal that she volunteered to file a long time ago.
In her comment to Atty. Navarro's motion for reconsideration, Felicisima
reiterated that Atty. Navarro should be held liable for negligence in failing to
update her of the status of the case and admitting such oversight. She claims
that despite several demands, Atty. Navarro ignored them and made himself
scarce.24
On February 28, 2012, the IBP-CBD forwarded the case to this Court for
proper disposition pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Among the records transmitted was the Resolution dated January 15, 2012
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Navarro. 25cralawred
The Court's Ruling
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent.26 For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.27
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as
a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.28 It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.29 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
After a thorough review of the evidence and pleadings submitted by the
parties, we hold that Felicisima was able to prove her charges against Atty.
Navarro but not Atty. Mendoza.
Contract for Service with Atty. Mendoza
a contract for contingent fees

The Contract for Service dated February 20, 1993 reads:cralawlawlibrary
That the client hereby employs the Attorney as their counsel for the titling and
recovery of their two parcels of land situated at Barangay Maunong, Calamba,
Laguna, [Lot] No. 2489 with an area of approximately 21,784 Square Meters
and [L]ot No. 3771 with an area of more or less 26,703 and in consideration
of the services of the attorney, the client agrees to pay the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. For the prosecution of said proceedings (titling and recovery of the said
parcels of land and hearing at the Land Management Bureau, Manila, and at
the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office at
Los Bafios, Laguna the client will give the Attorney one fifth (1/5[)] of the
said two parcels of land or one fifth (1/5[)] of the selling price of the said
properties if sold.
Said Attorney hereby accepts said employment on said terms and conditions
and to do his best care, skill and ability, and at all times to protect the rights
and interest of said client.
2. That the expenses of the proceedings, and such others as filing fees,
expenses of publication, costs legally taxable and all others shall be for the
account of the client.30chanrobleslaw
We cannot sustain the finding of the IBP that Atty. Mendoza misled
Felicisima into signing the above contract which supposedly was intended to
protect her from the claims of her siblings who did not spend for the
application with the CENRO and LMB. Such finding was based solely on the
statements of Felicisima in her affidavit-complaint. While Felicisima made a
reference to her testimony before the RTC, she did not attach the transcript of
stenographic notes of the said testimony detailing the circumstances of her
signing the Contract for Service. Neither is the receipt by Atty. Mendoza of
the sum of P40,000.00 after Felicisima and her siblings sold the land, by itself
an indication of fraud and deceit in the execution of the Contract for Service.
Upon the other hand, Atty. Mendoza presented the RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. T-1080 dated March 29, 2000, the relevant portions of which
state:cralawlawlibrary
It is not disputed that Atty. Mendoza was paid PI,000.00 for every appearance
and he was also given P300.00 for hiring a vehicle and driver for each
scheduled hearing. He also received P40,000.00 from Felicisima Mendoza
when defendants' one-third portion of Lot No. 3771 was sold.
Atty. Mendoza filed the instant case to collect one-fifth of the sale price of
defendants' land which was sold for P7,120,800.00 or the amount of
P1,424,000.00 minus the amount of P40,000.00 he received, or the amount of
P1,384,000.00.
During her testimony, Felicisima Mendoza admitted the authenticity of the
Special Power of Attorney whereby her brothers and sisters authorized her to
secure the services of the plaintiff Juan Mendoza adding that it was in writing,
in English and was explained to her before she signed it; that on the basis of
the authority given her by her brothers and sisters she engaged the services of
Atty. Mendoza; that the signature in the document, entitled Contract of
Service, is that of her name which she signed in "his house."
On the basis of the evidence, the Court finds no ground to support Felicisima's
claim that she did not enter into any written agreement with the plaintiff, Juan
Mendoza, for the latter to render legal services and the corresponding
compensation therefor as set forth in the Contract of Service. However, the
Court finds that the amounts received by the plaintiff Juan Mendoza from
defendant Felicisima Mendoza during the course of his legal services for the
twenty hearings in the amount of P1,300.00 per hearing or a total of
P26,000.00 should also be deducted from his claim of P1,384,000.00 leaving
an unpaid balance of PI,258,000.00 due plaintiff Juan Mendoza for legal
services rendered the defendants.31chanrobleslaw
Given the above finding of the RTC that Felicisima in fact entered into a
contract for legal services with Atty. Mendoza, thus debunking her defense in
her Answer denying the existence and authenticity of the said document, it
appears that Felicisima raised the issue of voluntariness of her signing the
Contract for Service only during the hearing when she supposedly testified
that, having reached only Grade IV and trusting completely her lawyer cousin,
Atty. Mendoza who told her that the document will protect her from the
claims of her siblings, she actually signed the Contract for Service. 32 The
RTC, however, found the evidence adduced by Felicisima as insufficient to
defeat Atty. Mendoza's claim for attorney's fees. Said judgment had attained
finality and even pending appeal was already executed on motion by Atty.
Mendoza.
It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction
and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an
express contract.33 The validity of contingent fees depends, in large measure,
upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the
circumstances of the case.34 Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for
a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney
upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. 35
Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint, Felicisima failed to
establish by clear and satisfactory proof of the deception allegedly committed
by Atty. Mendoza when she agreed in writing for the latter's contingent fees.
Fraud and irregularity in the execution of their contingency fee contract
cannot be deduced from the fact alone that Atty. Mendoza filed suit to enforce
their contract.
Atty. Navarro 's Gross Negligence
With respect to Atty. Navarro, the facts on record clearly established his
failure to live up to the standards of diligence and competence of the legal
profession.
Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the responsibility of
protecting the latter's interest with warmth, zeal and utmost diligence.36 They
must constantly keep in mind that their actions or omissions would be binding
on the client.37
In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and her siblings in
Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their counsel he filed the Answer with
Counterclaim. He likewise attended the hearings of the case until the RTC
rendered an adverse judgment. However, after filing the Notice of Appeal,
nothing was heard of again from him. He did not file any opposition when
Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the
sale of Felicisima's properties at public auction and eventual eviction of
Felicisima and her children from the said premises. Worse, he failed to file an
appellant's brief despite receipt of the order from the CA directing him to do
so within the period specified therein, and to file a motion for reconsideration
when the appeal was dismissed due to non-filing of such brief. His motion for
extension of time to submit an appellant's brief was filed 93 days late and was
thus denied by the CA. Barely a week after, he filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance bearing the conformity of his clients which was granted. It is
evident from the foregoing that Atty. Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of
the status of the case so that the latter was surprised upon being served the
eviction order of the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their appeal.
Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Thus:cralawlawlibrary
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest
of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.38chanrobleslaw
Atty. Navarro's asseveration that he had instructed Felicisima to look for
another lawyer and given them the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance for
them to file in the CA, fails to convince. If it is true that he did not agree to
continue being Felicisima's counsel before the CA, he should have
immediately filed the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance himself after filing
the Notice of Appeal. Despite receipt of the order to file appellant's brief from
the CA, he did not inform Felicisima about it nor did he inquire from the latter
whether they already secured the services of a new counsel. That such
withdrawal was filed long after the expiration of the period to file appellant's
brief and the denial by the CA of the motion for extension also belatedly filed
by him, clearly indicate that he never updated Felicisima on the status of their
appeal, such information being crucial after Atty. Mendoza succeeded in
having the judgment executed pending appeal.
Atty. Navarro, in fact, admitted that he forgot about Felicisima's case due to
his political activities. Despite having received notices from the CA, he
allowed the period of filing the appellant's brief to lapse and failed to file a
motion for extension before such period expired. He did file a motion for
extension but only three months later and when such motion was denied, he
finally moved to withdraw from the case. There being no appellant's brief
filed, the CA granted Atty. Mendoza's motion to dismiss the appeal. Under the
circumstances, Atty. Navarro was grossly negligent in his duties, resulting in
great prejudice to Felicisima who lost her properties to satisfy the judgment in
favor of Atty. Mendoza.
We have held that the failure of counsel to submit the appeal brief for his
client within the reglementary period constitutes inexcusable negligence39 an
offense that entails disciplinary action.40The filing of a brief within the period
set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the court. 41The failure to
file an appellate court brief without any justifiable reason thus deserves
sanction.42
Atty. Navarro's negligent handling of Felicisima's case was exacerbated by his
failure to inform her of the status of her case. There was no mention in his
pleadings of any attempt on his part to contact Felicisima at the crucial stages
when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal and the CA sent a
directive for the filing of the appellant's brief. If indeed, he had already
instructed Felicisima to look for another lawyer, he should have apprised her
of these developments and explained to her the urgency of filing the notice of
withdrawal of appearance and entry of appearance of a new counsel she may
have already engaged.
Atty. Navarro's failure to communicate vital information to his client violated
Rule 18.04 which provides:cralawlawlibrary
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.chanrobleslaw
The lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments
of his case is crucial in maintaining the client's confidence. Indeed, the
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important
developments affecting the client's case. The lawyer should not leave the
client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests. 43
In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading before an
appellate court, this Court has imposed suspension from the practice of law
for periods ranging from three to six months, and in most serious cases, even
disbarment.44
We find the recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors to suspend Atty.
Navarro from the practice of law for six months appropriate under the
circumstances. Considering that this is his first administrative offense, such
penalty, and not disbarment as prayed for by complainant, serves the purpose
of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession. For this Court
will exercise its power to disbar only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eusebio P. Navarro,
Jr. GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective upon finality of this Decision, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more
severely. The charges against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015
NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L.
KHO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S. Sorreda (Sorreda)
against Atty. David L. Kho (Kho) for malpractice and/or gross misconduct.
The Facts
The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L. Macarilay (Macarilay),
through her then counsel Sorreda,1 filed an administrative complaint2 against
Kho before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case
No. 06-1866 (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as counsel for
Macarilay on 10 March 2007.3 On 5 December 2007, Sorreda filed with the
IBP the present complaint4against Kho, which contained exactly the same
allegations in Macarilay's complaint. Sorreda alleged that: (1) Macarilay,
through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case against Candelaria Kholoma
(Candelaria) and Imelda Kholoma (Imelda), Kho's clients, before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC); (2) Kho notarized
Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being
disqualified under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since Candelaria and
Imelda are Kho's sister-in-law and niece, respectively; (3) Kho did not furnish
Macarilay and Sorreda a copy of his comment on their motion for substitution
of arbitrator; (4) Kho did not countervail the manifestation alleging the
mendacity of Kho and his clients; (5) Kho intentionally delayed the receipt of
Macarilay's motion for time extension; (6) Kho advised Robert Kholoma
(Robert), the husband of Candelaria, to forcibly eject Macarilay's watchman in
the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed by the Kholomas in
the case for forcible entry; (8) Kho also notarized the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed by the Kholomas, which amounted to "self-
notarization," because "the one being given power is the law firm of Kho
Antonio Velasco & Payos Law Offices, of which [Kho] is the premier
partner"; (9) Kho notarized the SPA with only one of the three signatories
exhibiting her cedula; (10) Kho also notarized the petition for review filed by
Candelaria and Imelda before the Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho and his
clients deliberately failed to furnish the CIAC with a copy their appeal.
In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and Imelda's
affidavit, answer in the case for forcible entry, SPA, and petition for review.
Kho, however, alleged that he acted in good faith for he believed that the
decision in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those
convicted of the crime involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize
documents," was still the prevailing rule. Kho pleaded for liberality in the
application of the then recently enacted 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since
there was no damage caused by the notarization. He admitted that he was not
yet fully conversant with the new rules. As to the other allegations, Kho
claimed that those were unsubstantiated conclusions, conjectures and
speculations. Kho admitted his failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy of the
comment on the motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish
the CIAC with a copy of his clients' appeal. However, he alleged that no
damage was caused and he immediately furnished the copies of the pleadings
upon discovery of his inadvertence.
Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate forum
shopping and splitting a cause of action, albeit baseless and unfounded, must
be sanctioned."7 In an Order8 dated 29 January 2009, IBP Commissioner
Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (IBP Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to
consolidate the present complaint with Macarilay's complaint, because there
was already a report and recommendation by a different commissioner in
Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009, Kho filed an urgent
manifestation,9 pleading for the dismissal of the present case. Kho attached a
copy of this Court's Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third
Division of this Court resolved to close and terminate CBD Case No. 06-1866
(docketed as A.C. No. 8161), considering that no motion for reconsideration
was filed against the IBP Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit,
and no petition for review was filed before the Court.
The Ruling of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the IBP
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the present complaint against
Kho because Sorreda failed to establish his allegations by clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence. The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did
not establish how Kho's alleged violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, if proven, would damage Macarilay. In Resolution No. XX-2013-
10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, dismissing
the complaint for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. XXI-2014-22114 issued
on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of Governors likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Sorreda, since the Board found no cogent reason to
reverse its initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of those
which had already been taken into consideration.
The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment, the Court finds that the present
administrative case becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court enunciates the rule of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It
provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand, or cause of action.16 A.C. No. 8161 and the present case have
substantially identical parties, refer to the same subject matter, raise the same
issue, and claim the same relief. The present complaint is a mere duplication
of Macarilay's complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this Court
in A.C. No. 8161 is conclusive in the present case. Furthermore, Sorreda
failed to discharge the burden of proving Kho's administrative liability by
clear preponderance of evidence.
The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved.17 The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant,18 and the burden is
not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as
evidence.19 Considering the serious consequences of disbarment and
suspension, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty.20 In the present
case, Sorreda did not substantiate his allegations, and he relied on his own
assumptions and suspicions. Sorreda did not show how Kho's alleged actions
amount to malpractice or gross misconduct, which will subject Kho to
administrative sanction. Sorreda cannot shift the burden of proof to Kho by
asking him to rebut his allegations. It is axiomatic that one who alleges an act
has the onus of proving it.21 If the burden of proof is not overcome, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.22
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. David
L. Kho. Costs against complainant. SO ORDERED. Del Castillo, Mendoza
Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 9831, March 09, 2016
CHAN SHUN KUEN, Complainant, v. COMMISSIONERS LOURDES B.
COLOMA-JAVIER, GREGORIO O. BILOG III, RAUL TAGLE
AQUINO AND ATTY. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The instant disbarment case filed by Chan Shun Kuen (complainant), the
General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of Compromise Enterprises
Corporation (CEC), against Commissioners Lourdes B. Coloma-Javier,
Gregorio O. Bilog III and Raul Tagle Aquino, and Deputy Executive Clerk
Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco (respondents), all from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), is an offshoot of the labor case entitled Felisa
B. Toribio, et ah, v. Compromise Enterprises Corporation and/or Margaret
So Chan.
The said labor case for illegal dismissal, unpaid service incentive leave and
13th month pay was decided against CEC; hence, it was ordered to pay
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the sum of P5,543,807.57. 1 CEC,
however, failed to appeal the said decision, thus it became final and
executory. The complainants in the labor case moved for the execution of the
said decision, hence, a Writ of Execution was issued and was duly served.
Accordingly, the sheriff levied the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 19784 belonging to CEC.
By a Decision2 dated October 16, 2007, the labor case was resolved by the
NLRC Third Division in favor of the complainants therein. CEC filed several
motions and appeal before the NLRC but all were ruled against it.
Instead of filing an appeal with the appellate court, the complainant opted to
file a series of complaints, administrative and criminal, against one or several
of the respondents of the NLRC before different bodies. 3

Undaunted with the dismissal of all the cases he filed against the respondents,
the complainant once again came to this Court with a Verified Complaint4 for
disbarment claiming that the respondents connived with each other in writing
its Decision dated October 16, 2007 for the said labor case and alleging that
Commissioner Tito F. Genilo's (Commissioner Genilo) signature was forged
by a personnel of the Third Division, as well as the December 10, 2007 Letter
of Commissioner Genilo regarding his inhibition in the said case.
In compliance with the Court's directive,5 the respondents filed their
Comment6 asserting in the main that the complainant committed forum
shopping for having filed identical complaints in various forms, against the
same respondents before different bodies. The respondents branded the
complaint as motivated by malice and retorted that the complainant has been
using the Court and several quasi-judicial bodies as a means to overturn the
decision of the Labor Arbiter in his desperate attempt to stop the execution
proceedings on his property by maliciously and repeatedly filing baseless,
unfounded and frivolous harassment suits against them.
After examining the instant complaint, the Court resolves to dismiss it
outright.
To begin with, the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer
has committed serious professional misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment.
The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows him or her to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether it renders
him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The burden of
proof rests upon the complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes the complaint with clearly
preponderant evidence.7
Guided by the foregoing tenets, the disbarment complaint against the
respondents has no leg to stand on. The particular acts alleged by the
complainant against the respondents, which to his mind, were grounds for
disbarment, have no merit and seem too far-fetched. The respondents cannot
be disbarred merely on complainant's bare allegation that the respondents
connived with each other in writing its decisions, resolutions and orders
against his company, and that Commissioner Genilo's signature was forged by
a personnel of the NLRC Third Division. These acts particularized by the
complainant are mere allegations and he has nothing but hollow suppositions
to bolster his complaint.
Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of the respondents, there
was no evidence to show that the respondents committed the acts complained
of. No specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that
the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had
misused the rules of procedure. There was no indication whatsoever of any
connivance or manifest partiality to prejudice the complainant. Neither was
there proof that the decisions, resolution, or orders of the respondents were
attended by bad faith, malice or gross negligence. As it turned out, the charges
levelled against the respondents were imaginary and unworthy of serious
consideration because it was clear from the start that the acts particularized in
the complaint pertain to the respondents' capacity as NLRC commissioners.
Besides, the sincerity of the charge against the respondents is cynical.
Upon scrutiny of the records of this case, it would reveal that the complaint
was an ill-motivated bid to disbar the respondents, who were merely
exercising their judicial function as NLRC Commissioners. Hence, there is a
veneer of truth in the allegation of the respondents that the complaint is a
vindictive charge of the complainant meant to vex, harass, humiliate and
punish them in performing their duty, as well as to get even with them for
deciding the labor case against the complainant. The Court had already held
that "[t]o allow complainant to trifle with the Court, to make use of the
judicial process as an instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the
rule of law."8
The Court also noted that the instant complaint is a virtual duplicate of
previous administrative complaints which this Court had already dismissed in
A.C. No. 80409 and A.C. No. 8621,10 there being no prima facie case. Clearly,
all the cases filed by the complainant before the different bodies essentially
revolve around the same circumstances and parties involving the decisions,
resolutions, and orders relative to the abovementioned labor case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the case should be dismissed for utter lack
of merit. Nonetheless, the complainant's propensity in incessantly filing
baseless complaints against the respondents should be curtailed. To allow
every party who lost in a case to file multiple suits against those who did not
decide in his favor would unreasonably clog the dockets of the court with
unscrupulous cases. Considering that this has already been complainant's third
attempt to file a baseless suit against the respondents before this Court, it is
deemed proper to admonish him and sternly warn him that he shall be dealt
with more severely should he commit a similar act against a member of the
Bar.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the disbarment complaint
against Commissioners Lourdes B. Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III,
Raul Tagle Aquino, and Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco for lack of merit.
Complainant Chan Shun Kuen is hereby ADMONISHED for filing the
malicious complaint, WITH STERN WARNING that a repetition shall be
dealt with more severely as indirect contempt of the Court.
A.C. No. 8261 March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G.
CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT
T. QUILALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T.
QUILALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan
and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty.
Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a
court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the
notice ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds
in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the
complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their
affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens. 1 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed
as A.C. No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated that as the surviving children of
the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths
of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; 3 that
on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had
been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their
dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the
proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the
complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the
complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of
the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated
May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto and the
defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim. 7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the
order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty.
Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to his office; that
they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that
new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the
annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino,
Jr.8seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the annotation of the
decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the
RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants’ Motion to
Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter request dated June 30,
2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed
that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en
consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta
No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim
and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009,
and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or
supporting documents on or beforesuch scheduled hearing.10 However, the
records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite
their having paid him for his professional services, the complainants felt that
said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation of
their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court
order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and
conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by
respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting
Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be
thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the
verified complaint.11 Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August
17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had been actively involved in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation
process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the
drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been
deceived into entering the agreement in the same way that they could not
feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit
any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the
counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should
not be held responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such as
that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance
fees of ₱1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the
charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not acquainted with the other
respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter
request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he
had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the
Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the second disbarment
case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to
harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was
Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual
signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-
290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular
course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of the
Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting
any involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261
that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.’s signature that appeared below the cancelled
entries, the complainants filed another sworn disbarment complaint dated
August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of
Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725,
and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints
involved the same parties and rested on similar allegations against the
respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of
forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his
part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala’s Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are
similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage
in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to
observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the
lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions are
insufficient to establish any censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
enumerates the general duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that
said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the
same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the present or of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. 21 A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
the exercise of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that
registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to
be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such
documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity
committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect
to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May
16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to
examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what
appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-
request and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to
be in conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to
perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of duty, the
complainants were not bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the
performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of consulta with the LRA,
as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as
enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within
the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning
the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with
having conspired with each other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case
No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to cause the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty.
Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC
of its order dated May 16, 2008. The complainants’ charges are devoid of
substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish
conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances
attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy
be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in
this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of
the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no
evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records
indicated their own active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement
with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now
turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered
into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and
participated in the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their
doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule
1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.1âwphi1
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the
complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr.,
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio,
Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as
such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a
fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his
legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the
litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any
other matters subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the
engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s
legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in
the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of
professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the
client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the complainants’ calls
or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have
access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he
continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints
against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty.
Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya,
Jr.
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V.
AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
 PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang
(respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety
and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda
Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his
Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so
and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for
mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on
November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband
appeared. She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of
which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the
parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents
on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent
arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was
terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s
Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012
Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077
and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant
and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid,
plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in
connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she
entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their
discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of
the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant
paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas
Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then
visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in
sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was
attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She
referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a
case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009,
respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of
P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount,
respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses
and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the
defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the
filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also
discovered that respondent was the one who notarized the document being
questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent
merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle
complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent
with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy
and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the
complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of
contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter
extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of
urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded
the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a
favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition
but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be
paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November
2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent
the amount of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been
notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14,
2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She
went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy
of the motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to
see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by
Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents
unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the
defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of
the reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be
included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same
occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the
following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of
respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, 20 after her
friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently,
complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees.
Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been
engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the
IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted
acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the
loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest
of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in
visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as
“no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the
said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in
covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having
said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel
accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and
having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her
that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor
at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he
would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of
Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation
since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in
the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause
of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in
other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by
making reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that
respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant
also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before
she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of
the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation
of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest
Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that
the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered
as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner
copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for
estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved
with modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to
which he filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her
opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding
order for his arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion
for reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the
practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the
CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of
Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that
a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth
more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as
the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by
court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of
P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to
P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount
deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an
exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is
not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is
likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent
with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and
his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received
various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them.
Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the
client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted
amounts from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when
he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly
for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable
decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took
the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been
dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding
a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an
overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers
of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that
would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of
respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was
indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations
would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29,
2010. At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty
as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to
personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here.
Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR,
which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from
his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time,
he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of
his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was
only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned
by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private
capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the
defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the
exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00
were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the
liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not
justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money
as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of
his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent
has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay
just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession,
would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must
be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the
Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence.
This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for
his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings
and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written
consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence
to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the
case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had
rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent
admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document
being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not
question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that
the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot
brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear
admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or
the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell
short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing
fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under
question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a
collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each
other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any
of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An
attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or
violated the entire profession suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of
law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the
public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts
and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the
Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed
from complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the
Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he
or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases
have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no
material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose
against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal
since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the
quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of
evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of
evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore,
the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in
contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount
of P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from
complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent
received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the
civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge.
These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant.
While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the
benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered
to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to
his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the
personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases
filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of
gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to
pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00
and P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to
be circulated to all courts.
A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy
(respondent) for unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a
complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil
(Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y
Lim (Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta
by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201).
At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations
primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties,
namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation,
Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty
Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc. 3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in
fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate
halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in
SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s
properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the
dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings
in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a
commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606
(subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of
54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15,
1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as
President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner
of the same.10 Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said
property by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor
together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but
to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September
2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies
that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her
pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied
Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping
and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising
the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He
also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back
in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into
the picture and instituted various suits covering the same issue. 14 As such, he
sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in
CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same
arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court
to File Motion for Intervention,18praying that the investigation of the charges
against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal
profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent
guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that
Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further
consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against respondent.
As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides
that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately, the
Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that
disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently. 22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that
respondent lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar
when the latter failed to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the
subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine,
respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal
profession, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s
penalty – depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present
administrative case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already
been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion
to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in
Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged
disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his
failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as an
invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as
respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s
consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had over
the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s
determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of
the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw
that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension
of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had
fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher
entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that
[her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the
admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the
finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended
penalty.1âwphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed
some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property,
notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits
of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to
the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which
would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other
words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what
has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first
offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015
NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON
DABON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez
(Nelson) against Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon) anchored
on the ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct which transgressed
the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.
The Position of the Complainant
Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly
carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez
(Sonia), which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through
threat and intimidation.
In his Affidavit-Complaint,1 dated September 13, 2006, Nelson averred,
among others, that he married Sonia on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac;
that Sonia was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her
resignation on May 15, 2006;2 that Sonia admitted to have had an adulterous
and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006, a span of
more than five years; that he came to know of the relationship only on April
18, 2006 after receiving an anonymous text message hinting/stating about the
existence of an illicit affair between the two; and that initially, Sonia denied
the affair but eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with
Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he received from Atty.
Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent, on May 4, 2006 at
about 9:47 o'clock in the morning, which stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime soon,
although I'm in great pain, I ask for your apology and forgiveness for
everything he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong and mature
person there. D cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated.
Sana don't blame him entirely bee. he is d type that never initiate things. He is
passive and tame. He was honest with me and I hope Sonia would find d
courage to tell d truth to you. I just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us.
I just want to go on with my life and use above all these for my son's sake. I
love jun and I appeal to you n asana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I
have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at pangunawa. God
bless.3cralawlawlibrary
Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her
extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual assaults
and maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation and
embarrassment.
In her own Affidavit,4 dated September 13, 2006 and attached to the
complaint, Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship with Atty. Dabon started
sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she, bothered by
her conscience, decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued
her for years and even admitted that he fell in love with her the first time he
laid eyes on her; that on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon lured her to what
appeared to be a mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug
into her food or drink causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter,
brought her to Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested her while she
was asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the incident for fear of its
adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and her family; that
she pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had happened, but
the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her misery; that since then,
Atty. Dabon succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or
twice a week through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her
that he would tell everyone that she had been playing around with him, if she
would not yield to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in silence for
years and submitted herself to the bestial desires of Atty. Dabon, until she
even thought that she was in love with him.
Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and infidelity, she
decided to call it quits with Atty. Dabon sometime in March 2006 but he
could not let go of their relationship; that Atty. Dabon started pestering and
threatening her through phone calls and handwritten messages in vile attempts
to persuade her to continue their illicit affair; that despite their break-up, Atty.
Dabon still pursued his lustful quest by bringing her to Anito Motel, along
Quirino Avenue on March 10, 2006, but she foiled his plan when she went
ballistic prompting the respondent to drive her back to the CA; that on March
13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded for forgiveness
and reconciliation but she remained firm in her resolve to end the affair; that
she had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Heiddi Venecia
Barrozo (Atty. Barrozo) and Atty. Aileen T. Ligot (Atty. Ligot), just to
convince Atty. Dabon to alight from her car as the said incident had already
drawn the attention of several employees within the vicinity of the CA parking
lot; that Atty. Dabon used the members of his staff to relay his messages and
deliver his handwritten letters to her; that Atty. Dabon, angered by her
repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a letter which stated, among
others, that he could no longer stand her constant avoidance of him and that he
would divulge their illicit relationship to her husband; that it numbed her with
fright, so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity, and told her that
Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA; that Atty. Dabon sent a
text message to Nelson telling him of the extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy
called up Nelson and informed him that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had
confessed to her the illicit relationship; and that when she was asked by
Nelson, she initially denied the affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards,
admitted the truth and explained to him that she was merely a victim of Atty.
Dabon's threat and intimidation which led to their illicit relationship.
Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful, flagrant and shameless
conduct was in gross defiance of the customs, values and sense of morality of
the community. He prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral
acts showed his lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor
and, hence, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Nelson alleged
that he had previously filed an administrative complaint for "Gross
Immorality" against Atty. Dabon before the CA.
Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also attached to his Affidavit-
Complaint for disbarment, the Joint Affidavit5 executed by Atty. Barrozo and
Atty. Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit6 of Virginia D. Ramos (Ramos),
dated May 19, 2006; and the Affidavit7 of Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva
(Minerva), dated May 22, 2006, wherein the said affiants corroborated the
declaration of Sonia in her affidavit.
The Position of Atty. Dabon
Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming
that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for
disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his
reputation.
In his Comment,8 Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and
unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He
posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their respective
affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his
name and honor. In support of his prayer for the dismissal of the present
disbarment case, Atty. Dabon proffered the following
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, complainant Nelson had no personal knowledge of the alleged illicit
relationship between him and Sonia. He relied heavily on the sworn statement
of Sonia which was replete with inconsistencies and incredible and
preposterous claims which defied logic and common sense, thus, revealing the
fallacy of the subject complaint. He contended that it was highly improbable
for him, a married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn crazy and abandon all cares
just to satisfy his purported lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia,
"an ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with two (2) teen aged
children."9
Second, nowhere in the administrative complaint of Nelson previously filed
before the CA was there any mention of any sexual assault he allegedly
committed against Sonia or of an adulterous relationship that was maintained
through threats and intimidation. Surprisingly, such allegations were included
in the present complaint for disbarment. He also pointed out that Nelson did
not attach to his administrative complaint before the CA the September 13,
2006 Affidavit of Sonia containing grave imputations against him. Such
omissions were indicative that the serious charges against him were mere
concoctions and afterthoughts designed to attain Nelson's desire to come up
with a graver accusation against him. The filing of the complaint for
disbarment was motivated by vengeance against him as Nelson was
consummed by his suspicion that he had seduced Sonia which led to the
deterioration of their marriage. He was a victim caught in the crossfire
between the troubled couple, Nelson and Sonia.
Third, there was no truth to Sonia's allegation that he was attracted to her from
the first time he saw her much less pursued her relentlessly. He and Sonia
were just close friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would usually confide
in him her personal woes and problems especially those concerning her
husband, Nelson. It was Sonia who aggressively sought his companionship
and frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and other goodies. The said
visits were attested to by Mary Jane Tulalian and Imelda Adan in their
respective affidavits,10 both dated April 30, 2008. His friendship with Sonia
turned sour when she learned of his plan to settle for good in the Unites States
with his family. Sonia began to avoid him. He exerted efforts to make her
understand his decision, but to no avail.
Fourth, the cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the
expensive gifts she gave him belied her claim that she was sexually assaulted
and that she resisted his alleged sexual advances.
Fifth, it was unlikely that Sonia would not tell anyone the grave injustice and
abuses that she allegedly suffered in his hands or report the matter to the
police considering her length of service in the Judiciary and her familiarity on
how the criminal justice system worked.
Sixth, he denied Nelson's allegation that he confessed to his wife, Atty. Joy,
his illicit relationship with Sonia. He also denied that the alleged text
messages, quoted by Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits, were sent
by him or his wife. All were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to
immediately resign as Division Clerk of Court from the CA.
Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone
calls. It was he who was the victim of harassment from Nelson, who
orchestrated a series of events that compelled him to leave the country earlier
than scheduled for fear that an untoward incident might happen to him.
On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.11
After the parties had submitted their respective verified position papers,
Investigating Commissioner Manuel T. Chan (Investigating Commissioner
Chan) of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his
Report and Recommendation,12 dated October 2, 2008, finding that the charge
against respondent Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The
recommendatory portion of the report reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough and exhaustive review of
the facts and applicable legal provisions, recommends that respondent be
found guilty of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly, be disbarred and
dropped from the Roll of Attorneys.13cralawlawlibrary
On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the recommendation and issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, the
pertinent portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson
M. Dabon, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Atty. Dabon filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
653, but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XX-2012-550,15 dated December 14, 2012.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity,16 and the
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.17
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit18 that "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. 19
In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was
substantial evidence showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship
with Nelson's legal wife.
To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he
appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his extramarital
liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report,
Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at
the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it
was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also
observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did
not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or
intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he
squarely deny the affair itself.
In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial
coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form
of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation
as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted.20 It is
clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the
existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof,
he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and
cards21 that Sonia sent to Atty. Dabon containing personal and intimate
messages in her own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection
towards him as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also
gifts she gave him on special occasions such as signature shoes, watch and
shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him in his office either to
bring him food, fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch which
apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him. Curiously, the
foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-boosting admissions"22 of
Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a consensual relationship between him and
Sonia existed.
It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried
hard to win back Sonia because he could not let go of their relationship, even
to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas for reconciliation. In one
instance, Atty. Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to alight unless she
would talk to him. Sonia had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty.
Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him to alight from the vehicle.
Moreover, Atty. Dabon made several attempts to communicate with Sonia in
the hope of rekindling their relationship through letters and phone calls but
she remained firm in her stand to avoid him. Such incident was recounted by
Ramos and Minerva in their respective affidavits.

Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments,
he offered only denials which was self-serving and weak under the law on
evidence. Other than his general claim that Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos,
and Minerva were biased witnessess because they were former officemates of
Sonia, the respondent did not even bother to proffer his own version of the
supposed harassment incidents.
In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the
illicit relationship was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained
through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused
woman could not be expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or
pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The natural
reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid her ravisher. In
this case, however, it appeared that Sonia continually remained in the
company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for
lunch-outs and frequenting his office to bring food whenever the latter was
preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to eat. Verily,
Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected
demeanor of one who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual
abuse to the police, if such was the truth. She could have placed the
respondent behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the Court
cannot lend credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the
respondent's sexual advances because of his continuous threats of public
exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that Atty. Dabon would be in a
much more precarious situation if he would carry out such threats, as this
would exposed himself to countless criminal and administrative charges. The
Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and continuing threat
and intimidation was not established by clear preponderant evidence. The
Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely and wittingly
entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any
threat and intimidation.
Consequently, the Court quotes with approval the following observations of
Investigating Commissioner Chan on this score,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sorting out the maze of technicalities, denials and evasions of the respondent
as well as the oftentimes exaggerated language of complainant or his wife,
Sonia, and the self-exculpatory declarations of Sonia, this Commissioner
considers the following facts as established:
1. Respondent and Sonia are both married, not to each other, but to
other persons, and each is aware of this fact, or should have known
such fact at the start of their illicit relationship because they were
officemates at that time;
2. Respondent and Sonia engaged in an intimate and sexual
relationship, intermittent perhaps, for a period of about six years
starting 2000 up to 2006;
3. Respondent and Sonia, despite protestations of Sonia that
respondent assaulted her using drugs and employing threats and
blackmail to maintain the relationship, appeared to have entered
into such illicit relationship voluntarily and also appeared to have
been fueled by their deep emotional needs, if not mutual lust, as
shown by the fact that the illicit relationship lasted for six long
years;
4. Respondent and Sonia, despite the protestation of Sonia to the
contrary, were not really ready to give up the illicit relationship
even if they were fully aware of its immorality or its devastating
effect on their respective marriages and careers as shown by the
fact that both respondent and Sonia did not voluntarily confess to
their respective spouses their dark secret, but were only discovered
by complainant through other channels.23
cralawlawlibrary
For what ethical breaches then may Atty. Dabon be held liable?
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cralawlawlibrary
Morality in our liberal society today is probably a far cry from what it used to
be. Notwithstanding this permissiveness, lawyers, as keepers of public faith,
are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution. 24 Indeed, those who have
taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed
of the consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh.
It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.25 A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community.26
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other
than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics
of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable
behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of marriage
are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.27
In Advincula v. Macabata,28 the Court elucidated as to what disciplinary
sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Xxx. "When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider
that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public;
to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. Disciplinary
proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring
those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem
proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled
by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of
the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the
court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the
lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be
considered.cralawlawlibrary
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or
disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case. 29 In case of
suspension, the period would range from one year30 to indefinite suspension,
as in the case of Cordova v. Cordova,31 where the lawyer was found to have
maintained an adulterous relationship for two years and refused to support his
family. On the other hand, there is a string of cases where the Court meted out
the extreme penalty of disbarment, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Toledo v. Toledo,32 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,33 a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant
proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship
with a married woman. The Court declared that the respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the Bar.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,34 the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into
marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Dantes v. Dantes,35 disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent
lawyer who maintained illicit relationships with two different women during
the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant. The Complainant's
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently
established that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession.
In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos,36 the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he
was found to have entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was
still subsisting. The Court declared that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor
clearly showed a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the
sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place
the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court
finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon,
Jr. GUILTY of Gross Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law.
Let respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court
throughout the country with copies of this Decision.
A.C. No. 5179
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against
respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle
sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City. 3 Respondent
alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly
snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know
me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left.4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate
number of respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the
car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del
Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and
humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath
of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross
misconduct. 8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's
Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita
E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del
Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped
complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent should be
administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999
in Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort,
a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such
conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the nature and
purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be
taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct
and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of
the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the
signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte. 14 In
his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the
incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He
further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's
tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted
from his car to check the damage, complainant approached him in an
unfriendly manner. 18Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move
against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle
suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer. 20 Both parties
agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would
prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present during the incident.22
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of
attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of
slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was
caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the
English language, which was unknown to complainant.24 Respondent was
identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor. 25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might
have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the
Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao
City. 26 During the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed
complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he
assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that
he went near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's
car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any
indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification 30 dated October 27,
2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had
already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was
amicably settled by the parties.31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.32
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the
Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case
between the parties had already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason
why the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory
Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only
respondent appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case
exparte.38
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for
misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend
for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a
period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation
of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an
scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis in
the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there
was indeed a slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one
Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit
attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of
Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed
that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and
should be held administratively liable.43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
issued the Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification
Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of
Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a
scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August
14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Board of Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held
administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident
happened.48 He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of
participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is
politically motivated.49
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of
disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations. This
Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if
allegations of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be
innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption
that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath. 51 Thus, the burden of
proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is
preponderance of evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing,
or of "greater weight than the other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that
the slapping incident actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his
signed and notarized Affidavit;56complainant's Affidavit was also supported
by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present during the
incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of
respondent's plate number.58
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De
La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that
"the people's faith in the legal profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act
of slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened
complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the
political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility
and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the
appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to
respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is
protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In this
instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment
committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on
the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of
another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa
ako?"
("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse
the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating
a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of
the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public,
not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the
power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of
misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them
unworthy to remain officers of the court. 63
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They
are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a
matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to
continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers
are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the
investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are
important in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found
to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent
as attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
A.C. No. 9492
PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ, Complainants
vs.
ATTY. DAVID LIM QUECO KHO, Respondent
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This case for disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez
(Vazquez) against respondent Atty. David Lim Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his
verified Complaint1 filed with this Court on 11 July 2012, Vazquez alleges
that Atty. Kho violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood. 2" He
further claims that respondent transgressed Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.3
FACTS
Vazquez and Atty. Kho were both members of the Coalition of Associations
of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (Coalition), an accredited party-list group
that participated in the national elections of 10 May 2010. The Complaint
arose from an allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate of
Acceptance of Nomination for the Coalition. Complainant contested the truth
of the statement made under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born Filipino
citizen.4
In his Complaint, Vasquez asserted that respondent was a Chinese national.
He reasoned that when Atty. Kho was born on 29 April 1947 to a Chinese
father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim Queco), respondent’s
citizenship followed that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 1935
Constitution. Moreover, Vasquez argued that since respondent has elected
Filipino citizenship, the act presupposed that the person electing was either an
alien, of doubtful status, or a national of two countries. 5
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the Court through its First Division issued a
Resolution6 dated 26 November 2012 requiring Atty. Kho to file his comment
on the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the Notice. Alleging he
received the Court’s Resolution on 18 February 2013, he filed his
Comment7 on 27 February 2013. As to the alleged falsity of his statement,
Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his Filipina
mother was not yet married to his Chinese father, and that his parents only got
married on 8 February 1977 or some 30 years after his birth. He then averred
that according to the 1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed that of his
Filipina mother, and thus he was a natural-born Filipino citizen.8
On the matter of his electing Filipino citizenship, respondent explained that
since he was already a natural-born Filipino, his subsequent election of
Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect
on his citizenship. Having established his natural-born status, he concluded
that he had not committed any falsehood in his Certificate of Acceptance of
Nomination, and that complainant had no cause of action to have him
disbarred.9
Apart from defending his natural-born status, Atty. Kho also moved to dismiss
the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. He claimed that Vazquez had
filed three (3) cases in which the latter raised the issue of respondent's
citizenship: (1) the present disbannent case; (2) a quo warranto proceeding
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and (3) a
criminal complaint for perjury lodged with the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. Atty. Kho alleged that both the quo warranto and the perjury cases had
already been dismissed by the HRET10 and the City Prosecutor
respectively.11 Finally, he raised jurisdictional questions, arguing that the
proper remedy to attack his citizenship was not a disbarment case, but
rather quo warranto.12
In answer to respondent's Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to
Comment13 on 11 March 2013. He claimed therein that at the time of election
of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25 February 1970, the latter's
mother was already a Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to
respondent's father who was Chinese. Complainant also opposed respondent's
assertion that the latter's parents were not yet married when he was born on 29
April 1947.14 Complainant further cited respondent's Certificate of Live Birth,
which stated that the latter's parents were married at the time he was born. 15
That being so, complainant averred that at the time Atty. Kho was born, his
mother was already a Chinese national. Thus, complainant concluded that
respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective, since the
latter's parents were both Chinese at the time of his election.16 Furthermore,
complainant alleged that the marriage of respondent's parents on 8 February
1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance of legitimacy to his prior election of
Filipino citizenship. Lastly, complainant denied the forum shopping charge,
saying the three cases he had filed against respondent had different causes of
action and were based on different grounds.17
On 8 April 2013, the Court issued a Resolution referring the administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation or decision.18 At the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), the case was docketed as CBD Case No. 13-3885. Commissioner
Victor Pablo C. Trinidad (Commissioner Trinidad) was designated as
investigating commissioner. In a Notice dated 14 August 2013, he set the case
for mandatory conference/hearing oh 19 September 2013 and ordered the
parties to submit their mandatory conference briefs.19
With both parties present at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing,
Commissioner Trinidad ordered them to submit their respective position
papers within ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted
for report and recommendation.20 Only the respondent submitted a conference
brief21 and position paper.22
IBP's REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On 3 November 2013, Commissioner Trinidad promulgated his Report and
Recommendation (Report)23 finding Atty. Kho "innocent of the charges" and
recommended that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Upon
weighing the evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad
found no merit to the allegation that respondent had committed dishonesty and
deceitfulness when he indicated in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of
Nomination that he was a natural-born citizen.24
Commissioner Trinidad said that respondent Atty. Kho, as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, fell under the category of someone who was born of a
Filipino mother before 17 January 1973, and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.25 On the matter of jurisdiction,
the IBP-CBD said that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter, since the issue
was whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the relevant provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although it acknowledged that
citizenship cannot be attacked collaterally, it ruled that it had to make a
finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on that very matter. The
IBP-CBD clarified though, that its ruling was limited and "cannot strip or
sustain the respondent of his citizenship."26
Lastly, the IBP-CBD found Vazquez guilty of forum shopping since in all the
three cases he had filed, he was questioning whether or not lespondent was a
natural-born citizen. It said that the actions filed by complainant involved the
same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances, as well as
identical subject matter and issues.27
On 10 August 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-
2014-519, which adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case against Atty. Kho.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
We adopt and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss
the instant administrative case against respondent for lack of merit.
This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's oath
that he shall do no falsehood and that he shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a
violation occurred when respondent declared in his verified Certificate of
Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Although the question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack,28 the
Court acknowledges the IBP-CBD's pronouncement that it had to make a
limited finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on this issue.
We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its nullity.29 A disbarment case is definitely
not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the lack of any
ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment
case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant Administrative Complaint for violation of the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility filed against Atty.
David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED.
A.C. No. 8825, August 03, 2016
BUDENCIO DUMANLAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME M.
BLANCO, JR., Respondent.
 DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment against
respondent Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for rejecting complainant's claim over a
parcel of land based on a Spanish Title.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 79146, 1 El Mavic Investment
and Development Co., Inc. (EMIDCI) appears to be the registered owner of
the land it occupies at the corner of Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard and C. de
Dios Street in Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property).
Complainant Budencio Dumanlag sent a letter dated 9 August 2010 to
EMIDCI's President, Victoriano Chung, claiming to be an agent of the Heirs
of Don Mariano San Pedro (the Heirs of San Pedro) based on a Special Power
of Attorney dated 14 October 1999.2 Complainant asserted that the Heirs of
San Pedro, and not EMIDCI, owned the Sampaloc property, predicating such
claim on a Spanish Title, Titulo de Propriedad No. (T.P.) 4136.3 He further
stated in the letter that the Heirs of San Pedro were selling the Sampaloc
property, and that he had given EMIDCI the option to buy it.
Victoriano Chung referred the matter to EMIDCI's counsel, respondent4 Atty.
Jaime M. Blanco, Jr. (Atty. Blanco), who rejected the claim. In a letter5 dated
16 August 2010, the latter explained that the Supreme Court had declared T.P.
4136 null and void in Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban v. Court of Appeals.6 Demand was made on Dumanlag and his
principals to cease and desist from further harassing EMIDCI.
Complainant sent another letter to Mr. Chung dated 1 September 2010.7 While
acknowledging the Court's decision, the former alleged that Intestate Estate
excluded the Heirs of San Pedro from the enumeration of persons prohibited
from selling lands covered by T.P. 4136, including the Sampaloc property.
Atty. Blanco rejected complainant's claim once more through another
letter8 dated 13 September 2010. He reasoned that the Supreme Court
Decision held that the heirs were specifically prohibited from exercising any
act of ownership over the lands covered by T.P. 4136.
On 22 October 2010, complainant filed this administrative case for disbarment
against Atty. Blanco, alleging that Mr. Chung was a squatter on the Sampaloc
Property and Atty. Blanco had unjustly prevented the exercise of
complainant's rights over the same.9chanrobleslaw
In his Verified Comment,10 Atty. Blanco alleged that the Complaint was
frivolous, unfounded and retaliatory. He averred, among others, that
complainant, in his second demand letter to Mr. Chung, had attached two draft
pleadings. The first was a draft petition for certiorari against the latter; 11 the
second, a draft complaint for disbarment against Atty. Blanco.12 According to
respondent, these drafts were meant to intimidate him and Mr. Chung. True
enough, after Atty. Blanco sent his second letter to complainant, the latter
filed with the Court of Appeals the draft petition, which was later dismissed.
Complainant subsequently filed the Complaint for Disbarment.
Atty. Blanco also moved that the Court direct complainant to show cause why
the latter should not be cited for indirect contempt. Respondent stated
that Intestate Estate declared in its fallo that agents of the Heirs of San Pedro
were disallowed from exercising any act of ownership over lands covered by
T.P. 4136.
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) rendered a Report and Recommendation13 for the dismissal
of the Complaint for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the
complaint was patently frivolous, and 2) it was intended to harass respondent.
He recommended that the Court issue an order directing complainant
Dumanlag to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt.14chanrobleslaw
The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-418 adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.15chanrobleslaw
No petition for review has been filed with this Court.
RULING OF THE COURT
The Complaint must be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
A lawyer is charged with the duty to defend "the cause of his client with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion."16 Nevertheless, the Code of
Professional Responsibility circumscribes this duty with the limitation that
lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. 17 In
this case, Atty. Blanco performed this duty to his client without exceeding the
scope of his authority.
As early as 1996, this Court declared in Intestate Estate that T.P. 4136 was
null and void.18 In said case, the Heirs of San Pedro claimed ownership of a
total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares on the basis of a Spanish
title, Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated 25 April 1894. The claim
covered lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and
Quezon, and even cities in Metro Manila such as Quezon City, Caloocan City,
Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila.
This Court dubbed the theory of the petitioners therein as "the most fantastic
land claim in the history of the Philippines."19 In discarding the claim, We
relied on Presidential Decree No. 892, which abolished the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and directed all holders of
Spanish Titles to cause their lands to be registered under the Land Registration
Act within six months from date of effectivity of the law or until 16 August
1976. The Heirs of San Pedro failed to adduce a certificate of title under the
Torrens system that would show that T.P. 4136 was brought under the
operation of P.D. 892. We therefore declared that the T. P. was null and void,
and that no rights could be derived therefrom.
Given the nullity of T.P. 4136, the claim of the Heirs of San Pedro against
EMIDCI has no legal basis. On the other hand, the records reveal that the
Sampaloc property is registered in the name of EMIDCI as TCT 79146 under
the Torrens system. As such, the TCT enjoys a conclusive presumption of
validity.20chanrobleslaw
Hence, complainant had a baseless claim, which Atty. Blanco correctly
resisted. In writing the two letters rejecting complainant's claim, he merely
acted in defense of the rights of his client. In doing so, he performed his duty
to EMIDCI within the bounds of law.
Consequently, there was no misconduct to speak of on the part of Atty.
Blanco. In fact, he should even be commended as he remained steadfast, in
maintaining the cause of his client even as he was subjected to harassment. As
will be discussed below, complainant, in his second demand letter, threatened
Atty. Blanco with the filing of a disbarment case.
Complainant maliciously filed the
complaint.
As a rule, a complainant should not be penalized for the exercise of the right
to litigate.21 But the rule applies only if the right is exercised in good
faith.22 When a groundless complaint is filed in bad faith, the Court has ' to
step in and penalize the erring complainant.23chanrobleslaw
The policy of insulation from intimidation and harassment encourages lawyers
to stay their course and perform their duties without fear.24 They are better
able to function properly and ultimately contributes "to the efficient delivery
and proper administration of justice."25cralawred On the other hand, failure to
shield lawyers from baseless suits serves "only to disrupt, rather than promote,
the orderly administration of justice."26chanrobleslaw
In this case, complainant knew fully well that his complaint was totally
unfounded. We note that he acknowledged the existence of Our ruling
in Intestate Estate, in his second letter to Chung. Complainant unquestionably
knew of the nullity of the Spanish title in favor of his principals; yet, he
insisted on his unfounded claim by sending a second demand letter to Chung.
Complainant even had the audacity to state that Intestate Estate excluded the
Heirs of San Pedro from the enumeration of persons prohibited from selling
lands covered by T.P. 4136. The dispositive portion of the Decision clearly
states that the heirs, as well as the agents of the estate of San Pedro, were
enjoined from exercising any act of dominion over the lands covered by T.P.
4136. At this juncture, it is appropriate to quote the pertinent portion of
the fallo of the Decision, which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to
exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any
manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they
or any of them are in possession thereof.
Given the above considerations, the Complaint filed against respondent is
nothing but an attempt to intimidate, harass and coerce him into acceding to
the demands of complainant. This is the only logical conclusion that can be
derived from the filing of a Complaint for Disbarment that is baseless — a
fact that complainant was very much aware of.
Complainant even admitted during the mandatory conference before the
investigating commissioner that he had attached the draft of the administrative
complaint against respondent to his second letter to Mr.
Chung.27 Undoubtedly, the attachment of the draft complaint to the letter was
meant to intimidate Atty. Blanco. It was a threat should he reject the demand
of Dumanlag.
The penalty for filing a malicious complaint varies from censure to a fine as
high as P5,000.
In Lim v. Antonio,28 the Court censured the complainant who was motivated
by revenge and bad faith when he filed an unfounded complaint for
disbarment against the respondent lawyer. In Scares, Jr. v. Gonzales-
Alzate, 29 we likewise censured the complainant for filing a disbarment
complaint that was similarly motivated.
For the filing of an unfounded complaint against a clerk of court, the Court
issued a stern warning to the complainant lawyer in Dela Victoria v. Orig-
Maloloy-on.30The latter was found to have been in contempt of court and was
fined in the amount of P2,000.
The Court imposed a stiffer penalty of P5,000 on the complainant attorneys
in Prieto v. Corpuz31 and Arnado v. Suarin. Their complaints against a judge
and a court sheriff, respectively, were found to be groundless.
Considering the circumstances present in this case, complainant appears to be
devious, persistent and incorrigible, such that mere censure as penalty would
not suffice. He has trifled with the Court, using the judicial process as an
instrument to willfully pursue a nefarious scheme. The imposition of a P5,000
fine is appropriate.
Complainant Defied the Order in
Intestate Estate.
For making a demand on EMIDCI to recognize the claim of ownership of the
Heirs of San Pedro, complainant appears to have disobeyed the order of the
Court in Intestate Estate, insofar as the Court enjoined agents of the estate
from exercising any act of possession or ownership over the lands covered by
the T.P. For this reason, the Court finds it appropriate to direct the
complainant to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt
for failing to comply with the order given in that Decision. Indirect contempt
is committed when there is "[disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court."33chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to: (a) DISMISS the administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for utter lack of
merit; (b) IMPOSE a FINE of P5,000 on complainant Budencio Dumanlag
for filing a malicious complaint; and (c) DIRECT complainant to SHOW
CAUSEwhy he should not be cited for indirect contempt for failing to comply
with our final and executory Decision dated 18 December 1996, insofar as it
enjoins agents of the Estate of Mariano San Pedro from exercising acts of
possession or ownership or to otherwise dispose of any land covered by T. P.
4136.
A.C. No. 9090
TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTYS. JOHN G. REYES, ROQUE BELLO and CARMENTCITA A.
TOUS-GONZAGA, Respondents
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the Resolution2 of the Court dated 22
August 2012 finding respondent Atty. John G. Reyes guilty of "negligence of
contumacious proportions" and suspending him from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
The Facts
The present case arose out of a petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Teodoro
B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant) charging respondent Atty. John G. Reyes
(respondent) with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly handling a case
involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging untruths in
pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the following incidents:
The First Incident
(Intentional Misrepresentation and Knowingly Handling a Case
Involving Conflict of Interest)
Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
Mayor Rosi to Velarde (Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an
election protest case that was on appeal before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman,
Protestant, versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated from the
Regional Trial Comi (R TC) of Calabanga, Branch 63, Camarines Sur.
According to the petition for disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the course
of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up to the
COMELEC on certiorari. 3
While the case was being tried at the RTC level, protestant Raquel Reyes De
Guzman (De Guzman) was represented by the Sales Law Office ofNaga City,
although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated in the pleadings that
his address is in Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel. Mayor Velarde, on the
other hand, was represented by Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit (Atty. Manlagnit)
from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit prepared the pleadings in connection with
the appeal to the COMELEC but, according to complainant, unknown to Atty.
Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the COMELEC, which pleading
was apparently prepared in Cainta, Rizal but was signed by respondent whose
given address is in Quezon City. 4
Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied with former Speaker
Arnulfo Fuentebella (Speaker Fuentebella) under the Nationalist People's
Coalition (NPC) party, whereas Mayor Velarde was a member of the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party, led by Camarines Sur Governor Luis
R. Villafue1ie (Gov. Villafuerte). The Fuentebellas and the Villafue1ies are
known to be politically at odds with each other. However, De Guzman
subsequently changed her political allegiance and became affiliated with the
Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor Velarde, on the other
hand, became an ally of the Fuentebellas under the NPC. 5
According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to represent De Guzman in the
election protest case because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella.
Complainant emphasized that Atty. Bello has always represented the political
interests of the Fuentebellas. There is, therefore, no doubt that Atty. Bello is
the lawyer of the Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the sudden shifting of the
political loyalty of De Guzman and Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello suddenly
stopped appearing for De Guzman in the protest case without formally
withdrawing as her counsel.7 Mayor Velarde now had to be defended by Atty.
Bello because he is already an ally of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty. Bello
cannot actively defend Mayor Velarde because he appeared for De Guzman
before the RTC.8 Thus, complainant concluded, Atty. Bello found the
expedient of passing the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty.
Reyes, making the latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,9 in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Second Incident
(Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in Pleadings and Unethical
Conduct)
On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of the 3rd District of
Camarines Sur. Complainant also filed a COC for the same position.
Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz (Ebeta) and a certain Marita
Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective COCs for the
aforementioned position. The former is an indigent laundry woman from San
Jose, Camarines Sur, while the latter was a former casual laborer of the
municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.10 Clearly, both Ebeta and
Marita had no real intention of running for the position for which they filed
their COC, but were merely instigated to do so in order to confuse the
electorate of the district, to the disadvantage of complainant. Consequently,
complainant filed a petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates.11
In connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates, complainant filed a Memorandum with the COMELEC through
the Office of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election Supervisor(PES).
Pertinent portions of the Memorandum were quoted by the complainant in his
petition for disbarment,12 to wit:
1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified Answer of Marita signed by
respondent as counsel, whose given address is in Quezon City;
2. From the Answer, it was made to appear that Marita caused the preparation
thereof, read the allegations therein contained, and understood them. It was
also made to appear that Marita signed the verification;
3. During the hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, on 23
January 2004, respondent appeared and:
a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing on the Verified Answer is
his;
b.) officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as her counsel to prepare
the Verified Answer;
c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the Verified Answer were
supplied by Marita; and
d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City when she "signed" the
Verified Answer.
4. Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal withdrawal of her COC. She
was immediately put on the witness stand wherein she testified that:
a.) she did not know respondent;
b.) she never solicited his legal services, particularly, to file the Verified
Answer;
c.) she never supplied the allegations contained in the Answer;
d.) the signature appearing in the Answer is not her signature; and
e.) she could not have signed the verification in the Answer in Quezon City on
15 January 2004 because she was in Bicol on that date.13
The petition for disbarment also alleged that respondent admitted to Attys.
Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty. Manlagnit - complainant's counsels in the
petition for disqualification before the PES-COMELEC - that Atty. Bello
merely gave the Verified Answer to him already signed and notarize. 14
For his part, respondent narrated the following version of the events:
Anent the first incident, respondent alleged that he first met Atty. Bello
sometime in May, 2003 when the latter was introduced to him by a friend. A
few months after their meeting, Atty. Bello called him up to ask if he could
handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC since Atty. Bello had so many
cases to handle. The case would be to secure a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) with application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction from the
COMELEC.15
According to respondent, he informed Atty. Bello that he has never before
handled an election case, much less one with an application for a TRO with
Preliminary Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be difficult
at first, but he would assist respondent and things will tum out easier. Due to
the assurance given and his desire for a more comprehensive experience in
law practice, respondent agreed to accept the case. Since he made it clear from
the start that he has no knowledge or experience in election cases, he was
never part of the preparations in connection with the case. Atty. Bello simply
called him up for a meeting when the pleading was ready so that he could sign
the same. They agreed to meet somewhere in Timog, Quezon City and after
he read the pleading and sensing that there was no problem, he signed the
same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter, he attended the initial hearing of the
case, during which, the parties were required to submit their respective
Memoranda.16
Respondent claimed that up to that point, there were no indications about the
true nature of the case. However, when he was preparing the required
Memorandum, he found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the
COMELEC and the submission of the Memorandum, respondent declared that
he never knew what happened to the case as he formally withdrew therefrom
immediately upon knowing the circumstances of the case. He maintained that
he cannot be held guilty of representing conflicting interests because he never
handled any previous case involving either of the parties in the COMELEC
case. Moreover, he was not properly apprised of the facts and circumstances
relative to the case that would render him capable of intelligently deciding
whether or not to accept the case. He likewise did not receive a single centavo
as attorney's, acceptance or appearance fees in connection with the case. He
agreed to handle the same simply to accommodate Atty. Bello and to improve
his skills as a lawyer and never for monetary considerations.17
With respect to the second incident, respondent related that he was at home in
Pangasinan on 17 January 2004 when he received a call from Atty. Bello
asking him to attend a hearing in Camarines Sur. He declined the request three
times due to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello pleaded, saying that even on
Saturdays, hearings could be scheduled. Thus, even if he did not want to
attend the hearing due to its distance and because of his full calendar, he could
not refuse because he really did not schedule appointments and/or hearings on
Saturdays. All that was told him regarding the case was that a congressional
candidate was being disqualified and a lawyer is needed to defend him and his
candidacy. Respondent alleged that according to Atty. Bello, the candidate
was qualified and financially capable of funding his campaign. Nevertheless,
he clarified from Atty. Bello if the candidate is not a nuisance candidate and
Atty. Bello allegedly replied: "Qualified na qualified naman talaga eh."
Respondent added that it was not disclosed to him that the disqualification
case involved a candidate for the third congressional district of Camarines
Sur. He was simply informed that the scheduled hearing of the disqualification
case would be on 23 January 2004 in Naga City.18
Since respondent was in Pangasinan and due to the fact that the deadline for
the filing of the necessary pleading was nearing, Atty. Bello advised
respondent that he would just prepare the Answer and sign for respondent's
name in the pleading. Respondent maintained that he would not have agreed
to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it not been for the pressed urgency, trusting that
he would not get into any trouble.19
While waiting for the scheduled date of the hearing to arrive, he wondered
why he has not been furnished a copy of the pleading or given additional
instructions relative to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime, has ceased to
communicate with him and suddenly became inaccessible. He thus toyed with
the impression that he was being left out of the case for reasons he could not
then understand.20
According to respondent, he was able to get a copy of the Answer only when
he was already in Naga City and it was only then and there, while reading it,
that he realized that the case was, in reality, about a nuisance candidate and
that the client he was to appear for was, indeed, a nuisance candidate. What
was even more surprising to him was that the copy of the Answer that was
given to him was unsigned: neither by him nor by his supposed client. It was
likewise not notarized. Finding the indefensibility of his client and in order
not to make matters worse, he opted to appear and just submit the case for
resolution. To prove this point, respondent alleged that all he had with him for
the hearing were only the unsigned and unnotarized Answer, the petition to
declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, his case calendar and
nothing else. He had not in his person any evidence whatsoever in support of
the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at this point, he had no
knowledge that his supposed client "had already jumped ship." More
importantly, he did not know that her signature on the Answer was forged,
precisely because the copy of the Answer that was given to him was
unsigned.21
Before the start of the hearing, respondent started looking for his client but she
could not be found. He, nevertheless, proceeded to the hearing for it was
immaterial to him whether she was present or not as he had already planned to
simply submit the case for resolution . Unfortunately, respondent claimed, the
proceedings before the PES started as a casual conversation with the lawyers
for herein complainant and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or unwittingly." 22
Respondent admitted that, during the hearing, he acknowledged that the
signature appearing on The Answer was his. He alleged that despite his
personal aversion and objection to certain allegations in the Answer, he could
not anymore deny the signature above his printed name, even if it was only
signed for and in his behalf, because he had previously agreed, although
unwillingly, that his name be signed in the pleading. It, therefore, came as a
surprise to him that of all the questions that can be asked of him during the
trial, he was questioned about his signature. Belatedly he realized that he
should have objected to the line of questioning as he was being presented as
an unwilling witness for therein petitioner. However, without sufficient
exposure in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a scheming lawyer,
he failed to seasonably object to the line of questioning. 23
Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied complainant's allegation that he
admitted having seen Marita sign the document in his presence. According to
him, he vividly recalls his response to the then query whether or not Marita
signed the document in his presence as: "I suppose that is her signature."
Likewise, when queried fmiher on the ideal that the pleading should be signed
by Marita in his presence as her counsel, he allegedly responded: "While it is
the ideal, sometimes we lawyers, like you and I, sign documents even if the
client is not around due to our busy schedules." He pointed out to the two
lawyers of herein complainant that whether Marita signed the Answer in his
presence or not is inconsequential since he was not the notary public who
notarized the Answer. He argued that his signature pertains to the allegations
in the Answer, while the signature of his client forms part of the verification
and certification and that it is the duty of the notary public to see to it that the
person signing the pleading as a party is really the person referred to in the
verification/certification. 24
Finally, respondent declared that except for the modest appearance cum
transportation fees that he received, there was no monetary consideration for
handling the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates. He
explained that when the case was offered to him, it was in haste and under a
tenor of urgency that the only impression he got was that the client was well-
to-do and could wage a decent campaign and was really a qualified candidate.
He repeated the words of Atty. Bello: "qualified na qualifed sya." He
emphasized that all he wanted was to expand his experience an practice as a
lawyer.25
In his report and recommendation dated 17 April 2007, Investigating
Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found respondent guilty of the charges
against him and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for
one (1) month. The report, in part, reads:
It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's imagination, however, that
respondent disclaims any knowledge in the above incidents and that he was
just a "willing victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow lawyer, who,
surprisingly he did not even thought (sic) of running after and holding liable,
even after all these charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it cannot be
denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed himself to be
used by whoever should be properly held liable for these fraud and
misrepresentation.
As regards the second incident, respondent argues that he could not be held
guilty of forgery, misrepresentation, and other related offenses. x x x If at all,
respondent was forced to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the
name of accommodation. Undersigned Commissioner disagrees.
Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
agreeing to be counsel for an unknown client. x x x
Undersigned Commissioner finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action
against respondent for the various misrepresentations and later, admissions
before the COMELEC when confronted with his "supposed client", claiming
that it was Atty. Roque [sic] who merely gave him instructions and whose
requests he merely accommodated. x x x
His shortcomings when he accepted to be a counsel for an unknown client in
the COMELEC protest (first incident) is in itself, already deplorable but to
repeat the same infraction in the petition for disqualification (in the second
incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even worse
that respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance
or innocence of the whole thing, a matter that, too, is inexcusable. Clearly, it
is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own confession, he was
woefully negligent.26
On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-99 was passed by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolving to
adopt and approve the above report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. It thereafter forwarded the report to the Supreme Court as
required under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.27
On 22 August 2012, the Court issued the questioned Resolution adopting the
above-quoted findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner. The Court,
however, increased the period of suspension from the recommended one (1)
month to one (1) year. The same Resolution also resolved to:
xxxx
2. IMPLEAD Aitys. Roque Bello and Carmencita A. Rous-Gonzaga in this
administrative proceedings; and
3. REMAND the whole records of this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further investigation, report and recommendation with respect
to the charges against ATTY. ROQUE BELLO and ATTY. CARMENCITA
A. ROUS-GONZAGA.
Respondent is now before us seeking a reconsideration of the aforementioned
Resolution insofar as the penalty imposed against him is concerned.
Respondent points out that from the very start, he had been very candid as to
the factual backdrop of the present case. He never denied that he should have
evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be a counsel for an unknown
client. He does not refute, nor does he argue against, the finding of the
Commission on Bar Discipline that he was remiss in his duties as a lawyer
when he accommodated the requests of a fellow lawyer to represent an
unknown client. However, respondent argues, such negligence is not the
negligence "of contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition of the
penalty of suspension. Likewise, such negligence is not tantamount to having
knowledge of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation, for the simple reason
that he did not know the details of the election case until its hearing on 23
January 2004 in Naga City. He maintains that if such fraud and
misrepresentation really exists, his "only fault was that he allowed himself to
be duped to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of
accommodation."
Our Ruling
We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious.
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or the suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the said administrative penalties28 and the burden of proof rests
upon the complaint. 29 "Preponderance of the evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary
evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence in support of his claim that respondent "knowingly"
handled a case involving conflict of interest, "knowingly" alleged untruths in
pleadings, and that he "intentionally" committed misrepresentation and
falsification.
In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged that respondent
perpetrated acts constituting intentional misrepresentation and knowingly
handling a case involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel for
Mayor Velarde in the COMELEC case. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in
determining whether a violation of this rule is present in a given case, to wit:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that
same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.31 (Emphasis omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous lawyer-client
relationship in order for the liability to attach. Clearly, respondent cannot be
held liable under any of the three aforementioned tests because he was never a
counsel for either party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said
action. Complainant, however, would have us believe that respondent is the
"furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to justify his accusation
that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Complainant,
however, failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his allegation. The
mere fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does not -
alone - prove that they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined to give more
weight and credence to the explanation proffered by respondent: that is, he
accepted the case without being fully aware of the real facts and
circumstances surrounding it. His narration is straightforward enough to be
worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew from the case after
he realized its true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel" 32 he
filed before the COMELEC.
With respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant failed
to specify which act of respondent constituted the alleged offense. If the
alleged misrepresentation pertains to the act of respondent of signing the
pleading prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with complainant and the
same cannot be considered as misrepresentation since respondent specified in
his Comment that he read the pleading before he affixed his signature thereto.
He was, therefore, aware of the statements contained in the pleading and his
act of signing the same signifies that he agreed to the allegations therein
contained. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by complainant
refers to the allegations in the pleading filed by respondent before the
COMELEC, again, it cannot be said that there was "intentional"
misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent
and as complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein contained were
supplied by Atty. Bello, which allegations, at that time the pleading was
signed, respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed out above, as
soon as the true nature of the situation revealed itself, respondent withdrew
from the case.
Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with
the petition to declare Marita as a nuisance candidate, respondent committed
falsification and knowingly alleged untruths, not only in Marita's Verified
Answer to the disqualification case against her, but during the hearing of the
case, as well. As with the first incident, respondent maintained that he
accepted the case without being fully aware of the circumstances relative
thereto, this time because of the insistence and urgency with which Atty. Bello
made the request.
We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His candidness
about the events leading to this administrative complaint against him is
demonstrated by the following declarations he made: (1) having agreed to
have his name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he cannot now deny the
signature above his printed name; 33(2) he believed the assurances of his
fellow lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever may have
been said in confidence between them will not be revealed to anybody for
whatever reason; 34 and (3) he failed to seasonably object to the line of
questioning relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby
incriminating himself and making him an unwilling witness for the opposing
party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a
result of his lack of the traits of a scheming lawyer. 35 These straightforward
statements, coupled with the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven, 36keep us from treating
respondent's proffered explanation as an indication of mendacity. 37 This
Court is, therefore, compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply
in his favor the presumption that he acted in good faith, especially considering
the failure of complainant to present clear and convincing evidence in support
of his allegations.
Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent "knowingly" alleged untruths
in the supposed Verified Answer of Marita, he admitted that Marita's Answer
was prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise authorized to sign his
name on the pleading on his behalf. This statement was corroborated by
complainant himself when he alleged in his petition for disbarment that "Atty.
John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr.x
x x that the Answer was merely passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed
and notarized." Consequently, respondent cannot be held liable for
"knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason that the allegations in the
Answer were not supplied by him.
Neither can respondent be held guilty of falsification in connection with the
forged signature of Marita.1âwphi1 "The basic rule is that mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion
and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely
alleged that Marita's signature in the Answer "was forged either by Attorney
Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that respondent falsified or caused the
falsification of the signature because "he is the one who presented the same to
the COMELEC, hence, presumed to be the one who falsified the
same."40 Other than this presumption and bare allegation, complainant has not
adduced any proof in support thereof. As a result, this Court cannot give any
merit to his accusation.
The same is true in connection with complainant's allegation that respondent
falsely testified and made misrepresentations during the nuisance candidate
case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the lawyer of Marita,
that the allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita
was in his office when she signed the Answer's verification. Apart from his
allegations, complainant has not presented any evidence, as for instance, the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings, to prove that
respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him and to enable this
Court to properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent.
It is well to note that respondent vehemently denied having admitted seeing
Marita sign the Verification before his presence in his office in Quezon City.
He insisted that his response, when queried about Marita's signature, was that:
"I suppose that is her signature." This Court finds it unreasonable - illogical,
even - that after having admitted the blunders he committed in this case, he
would now deny this particular circumstance, unless he was in fact telling the
truth. In any case, as explained by respondent, it is of no moment whether or
not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not the notary public who
notarized the Answer. Respondent's signature in the Answer refers to the
allegations therein, whereas the signature of Marita forms part of the
Verification which states that "she has caused the preparation of the foregoing
Answer and has read the contents thereof which are true and correct of her
own personal knowledge." Respondent is, therefore, correct when he pointed
out that it is the responsibility of the notary public administering the oath to
make sure that the signature in the Verification really belongs to the person
who executed the same.
It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes [his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. x x x When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced
or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule
dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof." 41
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that respondent has no
liability at all under the circumstances. His folly, though, consists in his
negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of
and evaluating the circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree
with respondent that such negligence is not of contumacious proportions as to
warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension. This Court finds the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year earlier imposed on respondent too harsh
and not proportionate to the offense committed. "The power to disbar or
suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension
be imposed as a penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion taking into consideration
the facts surrounding each case.43
In this connection, the following circumstances should be taken into
consideration in order to mitigate respondent's responsibility: first respondent
exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss in his
duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to
handle a case without being first apprised of the details and acquainted with
the circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is his first offense,
respondent "is entitled to some measure of forbearance."44
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court dated 22 August
2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty. John G. Reyes
is REPRIMANDED for his failure to exercise the necessary prudence
required in the practice of the legal profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Carrie-Anne Shaleen Caryle Reyes Vs. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva; A.C. No. 8560;
September 6, 2016
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is the Complaint1 dated March 3, 2010 filed by
complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for sexually harassing her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job
Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was
reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision
of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During
complainant’s stint under respondent, she would notice that during office
hours, respondent would often watch ”pampagana” videos saved in his office
laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films. Complainant also
averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand
and would sometimes give it a kiss. During these instances, complainant
would remove her hands and tell him to desist. According to complainant,
respondent even offered her a cellular phone together with the necessary load
to serve as means for their private communication, but she refused the said
offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular phone and does not need
another one. 2
Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon of April 1,
2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that
respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her
officemates to accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent’s
arrival and seeing that complainant had companions, he just told complainant
and the other two (2) office staff to lock the door when they leave. 3
Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009,
respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text
message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the
office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even date, respondent asked
complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly,
respondent placed his hand on complainant’s waist area near her breast and
started caressing the latter’s torso. Complainant immediately moved away
from respondent and told him “sumosobra na ho kayo sir.” Instead of asking
for an apology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give her
P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave her a note stating “just
bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy,” referring to
complainant’s mother who was also working at CAAP. At around past 11
o’clock in the morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent
were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed
complainant’s arm, and uttered “let’s seal it with a kiss,” then attempted to
kiss complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent’s advances
with her left arm, raised her voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed “wag
naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako.” After
respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask
assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an
administrative case 4 against respondent before the CAAP Committee on
Decorum and Investigation (CODI).5
Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was
traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression. 6 Eventually,
complainant filed the instant complaint.
In his defense,7 respondent denied all of complainant’s allegations. He
maintained that as a 79-year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP
on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the acts imputed
against him, especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his
staff. In this regard, he referred to his Counter-Affidavit 8 submitted before
the CODI, wherein he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he indeed watches
“interesting shows” in his office laptop, he never invited anyone, including
complainant, to watch with him and that he would even close his laptop
whenever someone comes near him; 9 ( b) he never held and kissed
complainant’s hand because if he had done so, he would have been easily
noticed by complainant’s co-staffers; 10 (c) he did offer her a cellular phone,
but this was supposed to be an office phone which should not be used for
personal purposes, and thus, could not be given any sexual meaning; 11 (d) he
did tell complainant to wait for him in the afternoon of April 1, 2009, but only
for the purpose of having an available encoder should he need one for any
urgent matter that would arise; 12 and ( e) he would not do the acts he
allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as there were other people in the
office and that those people can attest in his favor. 13 Respondent then
pointed out that the administrative case filed against him before the CODI was
already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant was only being used
by other CAAP employees who were agitated by the reforms he helped
implement upon his assumption as CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting
Corporate Board Secretary. 14
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation 15 dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent. 16 He
found that complainant failed to substantiate her allegations against
respondent, as opposed to respondent’s defenses which are ably supported by
evidence. Citing respondent’s evidence, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that since the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary was very small, it is
implausible that a startling occurrence such as an attempted sexual
molestation would not be noticed by not only the other occupants of said
office area, but also by those occupying the office adjacent to it, i.e., the
CAAP Operations Center, which is separated only by glass panels. Further,
the Investigating Commissioner drew attention to the investigation conducted
by the CODI showing that the collective sworn statements of the witnesses
point to the eventual conclusion that none of the alleged acts of misconduct
attributed to respondent really occurred. 17
In a Resolution 18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP
Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As
such, respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and
accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
In view of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, 19 the IBP Board
referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
study, evaluation, and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP
Board.20
In the Director’s Report21 dated July 8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director
recommended that the current IBP Board adhere to the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the
evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP
Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set
aside. In this light, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated August
10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP Board’s Resolution, and accordingly,
dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The provision instructs that “[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.”23
In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR states:
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xx xx
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Good moral
character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may
be defined as “what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation,
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.” 24 Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the public;
( b) to protect the public image of lawyers; ( c) to protect prospective clients;
and ( d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 25
In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court emphasized that a lawyer’s continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition to remain a
member of the Bar, viz.:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
This proceeds from the lawyer’s bounden duty to observe the highest degree
of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity, and the legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less
than the highest degree of morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that “as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. 27
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They
may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 28
After due consideration, the Court reverses the findings and recommendations
of the IBP, and finds respondent administratively liable for violations of the
CPR, as will be explained hereunder.
To recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to complainant’s purposedly
bare and uncorroborated allegations, respondent’s evidence point to the
conclusion that none of the alleged sexual advances made by respondent
against complainant actually occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from
any administrative liability. In support of such finding, the IBP largely relied
on the following: (a) the five (5) photographs 29 respondent submitted to the
CODI to show that respondent’s office space was so small that any
commotion caused by a sexual harassment attempt would have been easily
noticed by the other occupants thereof; 30 and (b) the investigation conducted
by the CODI per the Transcript31 submitted by respondent where the
witnesses said that they did not notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2,
2009, the date when respondent’s alleged sexual advances against
complainant were committed. 32 However, the foregoing evidence, taken as a
whole, did not actually refute complainant’s allegation that at around past 11
o’clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, respondent closed the door, grabbed
complainant’s right arm, uttered the words “let’s seal it with a kiss” and
attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter’s resistance.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript shows that at around past 11
o’clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a time that complainant and
respondent were indeed left alone in the office:
Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to 11
:00 sinu-sino kayo doon?
Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma’am Carrie Anne
[complainant], si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka aka po.
Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang ang witness, ang taong naroon 9:30 to 11?
Witness 1: Yes sir.
xx xx
Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?
Witness 1: Sa loob po kami naglulunch.
Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang iba?
Witness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira nung umalis po ako. Um …
pagbalik ko po wala na po si Ma’am Caan [complainant] si Ma’am Amy
nalang po ang nandoon.
Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang at tsaka si Atty. Nieva
[respondent] ang naiwan doon sa room? Eh nasaan na yung ibang OJT pa?
Witness 1: Tatlo lang po kasi kami nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung
dalawa.
Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may nangyari na dalawa
lang ang naiwan sa kuwarto?
Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po nun.
Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon
sa kuwarto?
Witness 1: Yun lang po kasi yung natatandaan ko po sir na time na naiwan
sila eh.
xx xx
Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng pagkain nandoon si Atty.
Nieva [respondent]?
Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero
tapos na po silang magtype nun tas nag decide na maglunch na eh.
Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan?
Witness 1: Dalawa pa lang sila sir pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman
po si Ma’am Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po aka si sir Nieva
[respondent] tsaka si Ma’am Caan yung nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na
si Ma’am Caan, si sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nandoon.
Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang iba?
Witness 1: Opo. 33
The same Transcript also reveals that the CODI interviewed the occupants of
the adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which, according to the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, was only separated from complainant and
respondent’s office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary, by glass
panels. Pertinent parts of the interview read:
Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11)
hanggang alas dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]?
Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP Operations Center].
Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito
noong bandang ganung oras past eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata si Atty.
Nieva [respondent] kay Ms. Reyes (Caan) [complainant] ngayon nung
chinachansingan siya parang ganun ang dating eh “I raised up my voice also,
so that the OPCEN personnel will hear of the alann” may narinig ba kayo na
sumigaw siya?
Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun yung time na ano yung RPCC
764 so nag-cocoordinate kami …
Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764?
Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala siya so may alerfa tapos
ditressfa so intransi po kami … opo …
Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?
Witness 4: Opo lahat kami.
Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw?
Witness 5: Opo.
Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa nun?
Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami ng coordination lahat kami nasa
telepono.
Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo
maririnig?
Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-
kanya kaming may kausap sa telepono eh.
Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala kayong ginagawa,
narinig niyo ang usapan doon sa kabila.
Witness 5: Yes sir.
Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas.
Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice fang level.
Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir
may mga music sila. Eto sir yung time na kinuha … Dami nila eh … Lumabas
nakita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan nabasa sir.
Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago
mag-alas dose (12) ang pinaka latest message mo dito 02103106, 11 :06. So
between 11:06 to 12 wala kayong …
Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga kami kahit … kami lang
nandoon sa telepono.
Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo?
Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book.
xx xx
Mr. Abesamis: Ma’am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig niyo si sir
[respondent] sa kabila kung wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na kapag malakas
yung salita?
Witness 4: Opo.
Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas may possibility na
maririnig niyo yung usapan kung walang radio? Siguro if intelligible or
knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila?
Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?
Mr. Abesamis: Normal na usapan, conversation.
Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila.
Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?
Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent]
minsan naririnig namin.
Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto?
Witness 4: Ah opo.
Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?
Witness 4: Kung malakas.
Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
Witness 4: Opo.
Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man Zang kahit isang word na
malakas doon sa kanila during the time na nangyari ito?
Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming maalala …
Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy kayo sa
telephone operation.
Witness 4: Busy kami.
Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano …
Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae nga pero kala lang namin ah
…
Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi?
Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi …
Mr. Abesamis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang sinasabi mo?
Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami sa coordination nung ano eh nung time
na iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon hinahanap pa namin yung
requirement.
Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na
nag-aanuhan ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva [respondent],
wala? May narinig kayong movie na parang sounding na porno ganun?
Witness 4: Wala music lang talaga sir.
Mr. Mendoza: So music.
Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila yung door pag mainit yung
kuwarto nila.
Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon?
Witness 4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano cartolina na white.
Mr. Borja: Makakatestify lang kayo sa audio eh, kasi wala kayong
nakikita. 34
The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o’clock
in the morning of April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent were left alone
in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as complainant’s officemates were
all out on errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to hastily
conclude from the testimonies of complainant’s officemates who were
interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely,
they were not in a position to confirm or refute complainant’s allegations as
they were not physically in the office so as to make a credible testimony as to
the events that transpired therein during that time.
Neither can the testimonies of those in the CAAP Operations Center be used
to conclude that respondent did not do anything to complainant, considering
that they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with
their coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is
indeed separated from the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary only by glass
panels, they could not see what was happening there as they covered the glass
panels with white cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official
duties as well as the fact that the glass panels were covered, it is very unlikely
for them to have noticed any commotion happening in the adjacent CAAP
Office of the Board Secretary.
Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the
CODI proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that all those
interviewed in the CODI proceedings were job order and regular employees of
the CAAP. Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any unfavorable
statements against a high-ranking official of the CAAP – such as respondent
who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time – lest they earn the ire of
such official and put their career in jeopardy.
Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent
did not perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript
proves that there was indeed a period of time where complainant and
respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which
gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out his acts constituting
sexual harassment against complainant.
More importantly, records reveal that complainant’s allegations are
adequately supported by a Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation35 dated April
13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems – diagnosed as
post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression – started after
suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. Moreover,
complainant’s plight was ably supported by other CAAP employees36 as well
as a retired Brigadier General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 37
through various letters to authorities seeking justice for complainant.
Perceptibly, complainant would not seek help from such supporters, and risk
their integrity in the process, if none of her allegations were true. Besides,
there is no evidence to establish that complainant was impelled by any
improper motive against respondent or that she had reasons to fabricate her
allegations against him. Therefore, absent any competent proof to the
contrary, the Court finds that complainant’s story of the April 2, 2009 incident
was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias; and hence, worthy
of belief and credence. 38 In this regard, it should be mentioned that
respondent’s averment that complainant was only being used by other CAAP
employees to get back at him for implementing reforms within the CAAP was
plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving
assertion that deserves no weight in law.39
In addition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant’s
allegation that he would regularly watch “pampagana” movies in his office-
issued laptop. In fact, respondent readily admitted that he indeed watches
“interesting shows” while in the office, albeit insisting that he only does so by
himself, and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone
would pass by or go near his table. As confirmed in the Transcript 40 of the
investigation conducted by the CODI, these “pampagana” movies and
“interesting shows” turned out to be pornographic materials, which respondent
even asks his male staff to regularly play for him as he is not well-versed in
using computers.41
Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches
pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office
premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his
staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such audacious display of
depravity on respondent’s part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes
the reputation of the government agency he works for – the CAAP where he
was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary – but also because it
shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government
service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty.42 However, his aforesaid habit
miserably fails to showcase these standards, and instead, displays sheer
unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the government position he was
entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself and that
he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or
come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness of his actions,
within the setting of this case, remains. The legal profession – much more an
engagement in the public service – should always be held in high esteem, and
those who belong within its ranks should be unwavering exemplars of
integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such as
respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those
who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more
possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the
flesh, as respondent in this case. 43
In the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges
against respondent were assessed was preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence “means evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.”44 Generally,
under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold
applies to civil cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Emphasis
supplied)
Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon 45
cited by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that
the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings
is upon the complainant. 46 These rulings appear to conflict with other
jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial evidence is
the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers. 47
The latter standard was applied in administrative cases such as Foster v.
Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in fact, illumined that:
[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.” In administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla
but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.49
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Pena v. Paterno,50 it was held:
Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how
proved)] and 2 [(Proof beyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court
states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of
evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.51 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v.
Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it
was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence. “53 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore,
quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied
in administrative cases against lawyers.
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to
preponderance of evidence – is more in keeping with the primordial purpose
of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law
elucidates, “[ d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.”54
With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been
clarified, the Court finds that the present charges against respondent have been
adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her claims
through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion – that is, that respondent had harassed her and committed
despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine,
respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar administrative cases where the lawyer
exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging from reprimand
to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 55 the lawyer was reprimanded for
his distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his female client towards
him and kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedrena, 56 the lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for rubbing
the female complainant’s right leg with his hand, trying to insert his finger
into her firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his
crotch area, and pressing his finger against her private part. While in Guevarra
v. Eala57 and Valdez v. Dahan, 58 the Court meted the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs. Here,
respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of
pornographic materials while in the office and his acts of sexual harassment
against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance and be attached to respondent’s personal record as
attorney.
A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016
LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND FE V.
FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA,
JR. Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents
should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases
should first be duly and competently established either in criminal or civil
proceedings appropriate for that purpose.
The Case
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint lodged against
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a public document
concerning realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age m order to secure
his appointment as state prosecutor.
Antecedents
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr.,
and Fe Flores presented their adverse claim1 on the parcel of land situated in
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 7919 of the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte under the
names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L. Alipao. 2 The
Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on January 23, 2007 as Entry
No. 67251.3 On December 27, 2007, an affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, which
appeared to have been signed by them,4 was also annotated on TCT No. 7919
as Entry No. 72573.5 On March 26, 2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT
No. 7919,6 and issued two new TCTs in the name of the
respondent.7chanrobleslaw
On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores Lura,
and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis
of their assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal.8 They thereby further charged him with dishonesty for
concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as a state
prosecutor. They avered that he was disqualified for the position because he
had already been 70 years old at the time of his appointment, 9 having been
born on June 26, 1936; that they submitted as proof: (1) the residence
certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they claimed
was the respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate; 10 (2) the
deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing
that the respondent was 14 years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo
Villanueva";11 (3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Tupi, South Cotabato12showing that he was 26 years old when he got married
on December 24, 1961; and (4) the affidavits respectively executed by his
siblings, Francisca V. Flores13 and Tarcela V. Sajulan.14chanrobleslaw
The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the
complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him.15 He contended
that the complainants did not present sufficient proof showing that he had
falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that the basis for the
partition of the contested property had been the compromise agreement
entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca, the complainants'
mother;16 and that he had been born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his
birth certificate.17chanrobleslaw
IBP Report and Recommendation
After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) submitted his report and
recommendation18 finding the respondent liable for gross misconduct in
relation to the forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and recommended
his two-year suspension from the practice of law. Commissioner Fernandez
dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because
his birth certificate prevailed over the documents submitted by the
complainants.19chanrobleslaw
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-
2013-27820 adopting the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al. vs.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it 1s hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he falsified
an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of which TCT Nos. RT-8320
and 8381 in his name were issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However,
the charge of falsifying his age to qualify as DOJ Prosecutor is hereby
Dismissed for lack of merit.21 (Bold emphasis in the original)
The pat1ies respectively sought reconsideration.22 On June 6, 2015, the IBP
Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration but
granted that of the complainants, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings and resolution subject of the motion,
it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration.
RESOLVED FUTHER, to GRANT the Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration, considering Respondent's gross dishonesty by making
himself younger when he applied as Public Prosecutor in the Department of
Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278, dated March 20, 2013, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification, increasing the penalty imposed on
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) years.23 (Bold emphasis in the original)
Issue
Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross
misconduct and gross dishonesty?
Ruling of the Court
We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
considering that the charges were not competently substantiated.
I appear that he st ill met the age requirement for public prosecutors, he should
Falsification must be proved in the
appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,
not in the disbarment proceeding
The complainants support their allegations of falsification by presenting the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal itself and its annotation on TCT No. 7919; and
by denying their having signed the same. However, such proof was inadequate
to establish that the respondent had been the author of the alleged falsification
of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.
We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery must be competently
proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. 24 As such, the
allegations should first be established and determined in appropriate
proceedings,25cralawred like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such
proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a
court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is
not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply
because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or
not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court
in the dispensation of justice.26 Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether
or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the
appropriate proceeding.
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution and
authenticity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document.27 In
view of this, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the positive value of it as a
notarized document.28 It is settled that notarization converts a private
document into a public document, whereby the document becomes entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.29 The notarized document then has in its
favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the presumed regularity
of its execution, whoever alleges the contrary should present evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.30chanrobleslaw
II
The birth certificate is the best evidence
of the respondent's date of birth
The complainants have also charged the respondent with dishonesty for
having concealed his true age in order to secure his appointment as a state
prosecutor. They have presented in support of the charge the residence
certificate issued in the name of one "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr."; an extrajudicial
settlement signed by one "Isabelo Villanueva"; the certificate issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato showing that the respondent
was 26 years old when he got married in 1 961; and the affidavits of the
respondent's two siblings.
In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of birth that indicated his
birthdate as "November 29, 1943."
Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the respondent's bit1h
certificate on the ground of its having been belatedly registered at his own
instance.
The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.
Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the falsity of the affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal should first be determined in the appropriate criminal or
civil proceeding, not in this proceeding for disbarment. Consequently, we
desist from definitively ruling on the weight of the evidence presented by the
complainants.
Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to the fact of birth in
public records, and is made in the performance of duty by the local civil
registrar as a public officer.31 It is thus treated as the prima facie evidence of
the fact of one's birth, and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.32 As such, the birth certificate submitted by the
respondent was decisive on the date of his birth in the absence of clearer and
more convincing contrary evidence.
Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be
successfully assailed on the basis alone of its being belatedly entered in the
local civil registry. This is because the State expressly allows the late
registration of births not only at the instance of the father, mother, or guardian
in case the person whose birth is to be registered is under 18 years of age, but
also at the instance of the person himself when already of age.33chanrobleslaw
To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration of the
respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries made
in his birth certificate.
And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants bore the burden of proof
in this disbarment proceeding against the respondent. They must establish
their charges of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and satisfactory
proof.34 Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of finding his
culpability.35 The foregoing disquisitions on the falsification show that the
complainants did not discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did
not convincingly establish that the respondent had willfully adjusted his true
age to secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment
happened on February 22, 200636 but his late registration of his birth occurred
on July 3, 2006.37 If the intention for the late registration was to make it
have effected the late registration prior to the appointment, not several months
subsequently. In addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing him
to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan on September 20, 2003,
and to have been born on November 29, 1943.38 Under the circumstances, that
he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself to meet the age
requirement for the position of state prosecutor three years later became
plainly improbable.
III
Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers
in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices
having administrative supervision over them
The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment
or suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed in the
government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or
conduct unrelated to the discharge of his official functions,39 the investigation
should be carried out by the agency or office having administrative
supervision over him or her when the allegations of the complaint relate to the
qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the public office.
Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent
to be appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of
Justice who had administrative supervision over him under the law, 40 and not
to this Court in the guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for
disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon should focus only on the
qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in
the Bar.41chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual and legal merit.
A.C. No. 8658
FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. JOHAN A. TABUZO, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 18, 2010 filed by
Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Johan A.
Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against JS
Contractor, a recruitment agency.2 During a scheduled hearing on May 10,
2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment Adjudicator who was assigned
to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to which
Arsenio complied.
A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason
why he was made to sign blank sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily
said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating.ng
kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene
Cayetano who advised him to make a clarification regarding the signed sheets
of blank paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter again
shouted at him saying, "Bwiset! Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming
abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo further
said, "Sabihin mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa
mga mukha nila ang pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang pangalan
ko ay Atty. Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi ka bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang
kaso mo!"3
Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was dismissed.
Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of
the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. "
In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Wilfred
Pascasio ordered that an Information be filed against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo
upon finding of probable cause against him.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that
there is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never handed
any copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking the initiative in
filing the said motion to clear his name as he believed he was the person
referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless,
such motion was subsequently denied in an Order dated July 16, 2002.
Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City acquitted Atty. Tabuzo for violation of RA
No. 3019.1âwphi1
Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this Court.
In a Resolution 5 dated November 24, 2010, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)
docketed the case as CBD Case No. 11-2912,
entitled "Francis C. Arsenio v. Atty. Johan Tabuzo ".
In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the
accusations against him, claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless.
He averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public
officer or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his claim, he
attached the Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas Employment Adjudicators (OEA)
who occupied the tables immediately adjacent to him in the Recruitment
Regulations Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs attested to the effect that no
such incident or any untoward event that called for attention transpired. Atty.
Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process was violated since
he was not notified of the case against him before the Office of the
Ombudsman as he was never served nor had personally received Orders from
such Office.
The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors
In his Report and Recommendation, 8 Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Eldrid Antiquierra recommended that reprimand be imposed upon Atty.
Tabuzo. The Investigating Commissioner ruled in such wise on the basis of
the sworn affidavit of Arsenio and the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve with modification the said Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner upon finding that Atty. Tabuzo violated the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.01 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. Tabuzo from the practice
of law for three months.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. 10
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.
The Court's Ruling
After examining the records of this case, the Court resolves to dismiss the
instant disbarment complaint.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief
to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and
the courts. 11
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. 12 In the recent case of Reyes
v. Nieva, 13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary
threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.
In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD
in recommending reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of the:
(1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that there
was probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and (2)
Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made
offensive statements.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree
of proof indispensable in a disbarment case was not met.
Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated
on the fact that the allegations of Arsenio were uncontroverted; hence, the
Office of the Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true.
However, there was a seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo
when a case against him was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty.
Romeo Tabuso, when the name of herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo.
As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert Arsenio' s claims
because he never received any notice or order from the Office of the
Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was
made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty. Tabuzo failed
to file his answer. 14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals that
Arsenio was able to verify the identity of Atty. Johan Tabuzo, not as Atty.
Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was discrepancy as to the
name of herein respondent when a clarification was already made.
Nevertheless, Atty. Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against
him on the basis of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will
not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one
administratively. 16Thus, it is proper to deal with the other evidence presented
by Arsenio.
The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to
discharge the necessary burden of proof. In his Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio
merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other
evidence was presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such
Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.
Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together
with the Affidavit of Arsenio cannot be considered as substantial evidence.
For one, the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was decided on the
basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the allegations of Arsenio.
Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence was further
offeted to prove the allegations contained therein.
While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial
evidence, this Court is not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority over
Atty. Tabuzo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the
disbarment complaint against Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo.
[ AC. No. 11533, Jun 06, 2017 ]
SPS. EDWIN AND GRETA CHUA v. SACP TERESA BELINDA G. TAN-
SOLLANO +
REYES, J.:
For resolution is the administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by
complainants Greta A. Chua (Greta) and Edwin S. Chua (Spouses Chua)
against Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda G. Tan-Sollano
(SACP Tan-Sollano), Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-
Sarmiento (DCP Julianda-Sarmiento), Senior Deputy City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla (SDCP Sulla), SACP Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales (SACP
Ofrecio-Gonzales), and DCP Joselito D.R. Obejas (DCP Obejas) (collectively,
the respondents) for grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law, abuse of
power or authority, and gross misconduct.
Antecedent Facts
On October 12, 2015, Spouses Chua filed a Complaint[2] for Perjury and False
Testimony against Atty. Rudy T. Tasarra (Atty. Tasarra), Luz O. Talusan
(Talusan), Po Yi Yeung Go, Jessica W. Ang, Ricky Ang, Eden C. Uy, and
Ana Tiu, before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila docketed
as XV-07-INV-15J-05513.
Spouses Chua alleged before the OCP of Manila that Talusan deliberately and
wilfully committed perjury when she narrated in her Complaint-Affidavits
that on July 11, 2009, Spouses Chua issued 11 post-dated checks in favor of
Chain Glass Enterprises, Inc. (CGEI), with an amount of P112,521.00 each, as
payment for assorted glass and aluminum products. According to Spouses
Chua, however, the said statement is not true because the said 11 post-dated
checks were actually issued on February 23, 2009 by Greta in replacement of
their previous bounced checks. Likewise, Atty. Tasarra and the members of
the Board of Directors of CGEI were likewise impleaded therein for offering
Talusan's testimony.[3]
In a Resolution[4] dated December 28, 2015, SACP Tan-Sollano recommended
the dismissal of the charges against therein respondents for lack of probable
cause. The same was recommended for approval by DCP Julianda-Sarmiento
and SDCP Sulla.
A Motion for Reconsideration[5] was filed by Spouses Chua but the same was
denied in a Resolution[6] dated August 9, 2016 issued by SACP Ofrecio-
Gonzales and approved by DCP Obejas after finding no cogent reason to
reverse the Resolution dated December 28, 2015 of SACP Tan-Sollano.
Aggrieved with such findings, Spouses Chua instituted the instant case and
averred that the dismissal of XV-07-INV-15J-05513 was inappropriate and
highly irregular considering that the prosecution offered an "airtight
case/evidence."[7]
Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records of the present case, the Court finds that
Spouses Chua failed to attribute clear and preponderant proof to show that the
respondents committed infractions in contravention with the standards
provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have
warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions against them.
"In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving
with substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. Mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."[8]
Here, considering that Spouses Chua failed to present substantial proof to
show the prosecutors' culpability, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that
the instant administrative case was ill motivated being retaliatory in nature
and aimed at striking back at them for having participated in the dismissal of
XV-07-INV-15J-05513, either as investigating prosecutor or approving
officer. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the prosecutors involved herein have regularly performed
their official duties.
Moreover, in Maquiran v. Judge Grageda,[9] the Court held that alleged error
committed by judges in the exercise of their adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed
through judicial remedies.[10] Here, the same principle applies to prosecutors
who exercise adjudicative functions in the determination of the existence of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court.
Verily, an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where
judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an
appeal, or a petition for certiorari.[11] In the present case, as narrated by
Spouses Chua, XV-07-INV-151-05513 is still pending and active. As such,
Spouses Chua still has remedies to contest said ruling.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondents
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda G. Tan-Sollano, Deputy City
Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-Sarmiento, Senior Deputy City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Suwerte L. Ofrecio-
Gonzales, and Deputy City Prosecutor Joselito D.R. Obejas
is DISMISSED and this case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.
A.C. No. 6933
GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant
Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for the suspension from the practice of law or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for violating the
Canons of Professional Ethics in connection- with the foreclosure of
complainant's properties.
Factual Antecedents
On February 14, 1997, complainant executed a real estate mortgage
(REM)2 on his two lots in favor of Family Lending Corporation (FLC) as
security for a loan amounting to PhP 5 Million with interest at two percent
(2%) per month.
On April 29, 2002, due to complainant's default in payment, FLC, through its
President Dr. Eli Malaya (Dr. Malaya), initiated foreclosure proceedings
against the mortgaged properties.3
Complainant availed of legal remedies to stop the said foreclosure
proceedings, to wit: (1) he filed a case for damages and injunction and also
moved for the suspension of the sheriffs sale, wherein such motion for
suspension was granted but the injunctive relief was denied after hearings.
Complainant's motion for reconsideration (MR) therein was also denied; (2)
he then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(WPI) with the Court of Appeals (CA), wherein no TRO was granted due to
some deficiencies in the petition; (3) he also filed an annulment of REM with
prayer for a WPI and/or TRO before the trial court, wherein-this time a WPI
was issued to stop the auction sale.4This prompted FLC to file a petition
for certiorari before the CA, questioning the trial court's issuance of the
injunctive writ. The CA nullified the said writ, mainly on the ground of forum
shopping, which was affirmed by this Court on review.5 For these cases, FLC
engaged respondent's legal services.
The complaint alleges that during the above-cited proceedings, respondent,
without the knowledge of his client FLC, approached complainant to negotiate
the deferment of the auction sale and the possible settlement of the loan
obligation at a reduced amount without resorting to the auction sale.
Respondent allegedly represented himself as being capable of influencing the
sheriff to defer the auction sale, as well as his client FLC through Dr. Malaya
to accept the amount of PhP 7 Million to fully settle the loan obligation. For
this, the complaint alleges that on April 13, 2005, respondent demanded
payment of professional fees amounting to Php 1 Million from
complainant.6 In fact, complainant already gave the following amounts to
respondent as payment of such professional fees: (1) PhP 50,000 check dated
April 13, 2005; (2) PhP 25,000 check dated April 18, 2005; (3) PhP 75,000
check dated April 22, 2005; (4) PhP 20,000 check dated May 16, 2005; (5)
PhP 200,000 on June 30, 2005; and (6) PhP 30,000 on August 17,
2005.7 Despite such payments, the auction sale proceeded.8 Hence, the instant
complaint.
For his part, respondent denies that he was the one who approached
complainant for negotiation, the truth being that it was complainant who asked
for his help to be given more time to raise funds to pay the loan
obligation.9Respondent further avers that he communicated the said request to
his client.10 Aside from the checks dated April 13, 18, 22 and May 16, 2005,
which respondent claims to be advance payments of his attorney's fees,
respondent avers that he did not receive any other amount from the
complainant.11 All these, according to the respondent, were known to his
client.12 In fact, in a Letter dated April 22, 2005 signed by the complainant
and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, complainant expressly stated that
he will negotiate for the payment of respondent's fees as FLC's counsel.13
On July 16, 2007, this Court referred the instant administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision.14
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated June 4, 2010, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to complainant's allegations that respondent,
without the knowledge of his client, negotiated with the complainant for the
settlement of the loan obligation, and that the respondent demanded and
received professional fees in negotiating the said settlement.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, respondent's act of negotiating
with the complainant on the deferment of the auction sale and the settlement
of the loan for a substantially reduced amount was highly improper as
respondent's primary duty, being FLC's counsel, was to protect the interest of
FLC by seeing to it that the foreclosure proceedings be done successfully to
obtain the best amount possible to cover the loan obligation.16 The
Investigating Commissioner explained that if a lawyer can collect professional
fees or advanced payment thereof from the adverse party, it results to a
conflict of interest.17 From the foregoing, the respondent was found to have
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), which states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.18
The report further stated that the amounts collected by the respondent should
be considered as money received from his client; as such, he has the duty to
account for and disclose the same to his client in accordance with Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 of the said Code.19 The Investigating Commissioner found nothing
on record that showed that respondent made such accounting for or disclosure
to his client.20
Hence, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent was liable
for malpractice and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Commissioner finds
the respondent liable for malpractice and, accordingly, recommends that
respondent be meted a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR suspension from the
practice of law with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severity.21
Resolutions of the Board of Governors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On September 28, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-84,22 which states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
that Respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03, and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's MR24 was denied in the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution No.
XXI-2014-28025 dated May 3, 2014 as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration.
Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED.26
Necessarily, We now give Our final action on this case.
Issue
Should Atty. Cesa, Jr. be administratively disciplined based on the allegations
in the complaint and evidence on record?
The Court's Ruling
We are in full accord with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the
CPR.
CANON 15 - A LA WYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Based on the records, We find substantial evidence to hold the respondent
liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the said Code.1âwphi1 It must be
stressed that FLC engaged respondent's legal services to represent it in
opposing complainant's actions to forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As
can be gleaned from respondent's position paper, however, it is admitted that
respondent extended help to the complainant in negotiating with FLC for the
reduction of the loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure
proceedings.27 The case of Hornilla v. Salunat28 is instructive on the concept
of conflict of interest, viz.:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. x x x.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double[-]dealing in the performance thereof.29
Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests - that of his client,
which was to be able to foreclose and obtain the best amount they could get to
cover the loan obligation, and that of the complainant's, which was to forestall
the foreclosure and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount.
Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client should ideally be
imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public
interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.30 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.31
Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was within the knowledge of his
client will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the
CPR. Respondent presented a number of documents to support his allegation
that all the communications between him and the complainant were relayed to
his client but We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties,
especially from his client, allowing him to negotiate as such.
Respondent's admission that he received advance payments of professional
fees from the complainant made matters worse for him. As correctly found by
the Investigating Commissioner, it was highly improper for respondent to
accept professional fees from the opposing party as this creates clouds of
doubt regarding respondent's legal practice. As aptly stated by the
Investigating Commissioner, if a lawyer receives payment of professional fees
from the adverse party, it gives an impression that he is being paid for services
rendered or to be rendered in favor of such adverse party's interest, which,
needless to say, conflicts that of his client's.
Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from his client. This
holds true even if eventually such fees will be reimbursed by the adverse party
depending on the agreement of the parties. Respondent cannot justify his act
of accepting professional fees from the complainant by alleging that such was
in accordance with the arrangement between his client and the complainant as
there is no clear proof of such arrangement. The April 22, 2005 Letter32 signed
by the complainant and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the
respondent, does not, in any way, prove that there was an agreement between
complainant and FLC. Moreover, the fact that respondent was already
receiving several amounts from the complainant even before the date of the
said Letter, supposedly stating an agreement between the complainant and
FLC as regards the settlement of the loan obligation and the payment of his
professional fees, is also suspicious. Such circumstance reveals that even
before the complainant and FLC have come to such purported agreement, he
was already receiving professional fees from the complainant. Respondent's
allegations to the effect that negotiations had already been going on between
the parties through him via phone calls even before that Letter do not hold
water. To be sure, it would have been easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to
present documentary proof of such negotiation and/or arrangements but
respondent failed to do so.
At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an arrangement between
FLC and complainant that respondent's professional fees shall be paid by the
complainant, which will be later on deducted from whatever the latter will pay
FLC for the settlement of his loan obligation, respondent's act of accepting
such payments from the complainant and appropriating the same for his
professional fees is still reprehensible. The said payments from the
complainant are still considered FLC's money; as such, respondent should
have accounted the same for his client. As correctly found by the Investigating
Commissioner, there is nothing on record, aside from respondent's bare and
self-serving allegations, that would show that respondent made such
accounting or disclosure to his client. Such acts are in violation of Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 of the CPR above-cited.
In addition, this Court is baffled by the idea that complainant opted to pay
respondent's professional fees first before his loan obligation was even taken
care of, and that FLC would actually agree to this.
This Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold, at all times, the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The ethics of the legal profession
rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. Clearly, in this case,
respondent failed to uphold such ethical standard in his practice of law.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governor's Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated
September 28, 2013 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-280 dated May 3, 2014
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately upon receipt of this
Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as
a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
A.C. No. 11482
JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. DANIEL T. ALVIAR, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Jocelyn Ignacio against
respondent Atty. Daniel T. Alviar for violation of Canon 1 1 , Rule 1.012 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his alleged refusal to refund
the amount of acceptance fees; Canon 123, Rule 12.044 and Canon 185 Rule
18.036 for his alleged failure to appear in the criminal case he is handling and
to file any pleading therein.
The Facts
In March 2014, respondent was referred to complainant for purposes of
handling the case of complainant's son who was then apprehended and
detained by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Quezon
City. Respondent agreed to represent complainant's son for a stipulated
acceptance fee of PhPl00,000. Respondent further represented that he could
refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the alleged
illegal arrest made on complainant's son.7
After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were given to
respondent, the latter visited complainant's son at the PDEA detention
cell.8 There, respondent conferred with complainant's son for some 20
minutes. After which, respondent left.9
Respondent, through his secretary, secured from the Office of the Pasay City
Prosecutor plain copies of the case records. Respondent also verified twice
from the Hall of Justice if the case was already filed in court.10 It was at this
time that respondent asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of
PhP50,000. Subsequently, respondent filed his notice of appearance as
counsel for complainant's son.11
Sometime in April 2014, complainant informed respondent that her son's
arraignment was set on April 29, 2014. Respondent, however, replied that he
cannot attend said arraignment due to a previously scheduled hearing. He
committed to either find a way to attend the hearing or ask another lawyer-
friend to attend it for him.
On April 26, 2014, complainant wrote a 1etter12 to respondent informing the
latter that she had decided to seek the intercession of another lawyer owing to
the fact that respondent cannot attend her son's scheduled arraignment.
Complainant then requested that respondent retain a portion of the PhP
100,000 to fairly remunerate respondent for the preparatory legal service he
rendered. Respondent denies having received said letter.13
On the date of the arraignment, neither respondent nor his promised alternate,
appeared. When asked, respondent replied that he forgot the date of
arraignment.14
This incident prompted complainant to write another letter15 dated May 6,
2014 to respondent, requesting the latter to formally withdraw as counsel and
emphasized that respondent's withdrawal as counsel is necessary so that she
and her son can hire another lawyer to take his stead. In said letter,
complainant also reiterated her request that a portion of the PhPl00,000 be
remitted to them after respondent deducts his professional fees commensurate
to the preparatory legal service he rendered.16
When respondent failed to take heed, complainant filed on June 16, 2014, the
instant administrative complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
At the proceedings therein, respondent failed to attend the initial mandatory
conferences and to file his responsive pleading, citing as reason therefor the
persistent threats to his life allegedly caused by a former client.17 Upon finally
submitting his Answer18 , respondent denied having neglected his duties to
complainant's son.
 Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
On January 21, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable
for negligence under Rule 18.03 of the CPR and recommended a penalty of
six months suspension from the practice of law. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that while respondent performed some tasks as
lawyer for complainant's son, such do not command a fee of PhPl00,000. It
was also emphasized that respondent's failure to attend the arraignment shows
the latter's failure to handle the case with diligence.19
As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends
that respondent be meted out with the penalty of suspension for six (6) months
from the practice of law and ordered to restitute the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (Phpl00,000) Pesos to the complainant.
Respectfully Submitted.20
Resolution of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XXII-2016-17821 lowering the recommended penalty to reprimand with stem
warning, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner reducing the penalty to REPRJMAND WITH
STERN WARNING.22
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, the records of the administrative case were
transmitted by the IBP to the Court for final action. Complainant further seeks
a review23 of the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016.
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of
negligence in handling the case of complainant's son.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25,
2016 of the IBP Board of Governors, reducing the recommended penalty from
six months to reprimand with stem warning. However, on the undisputed
factual finding that respondent only performed preparatory legal services for
complainant's son, he is not entitled to the entire PhP 100,000 but only to fees
determined on the basis of quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR and that the remainder should be restituted to
complainant.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.24 Canon 1825 of the
CPR mandates that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is the lawyer's
duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court citing Santiago v.
Fojas27 expounds:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for
every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to
the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.28
We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent
failed to competently and diligently attend to the legal matter entrusted to him.
It is undisputed that respondent came to see complainant's son, his client, only
once for about 20 minutes and no more thereafter;29 it is likewise undisputed
that respondent failed to attend the scheduled arraignment despite the latter's
commitment to either find a way to attend, or send a collaborating counsel to
do so;30 that he forgot the date of arraignment is an equally dismal excuse.
Equally revealing of respondent's negligence was his nonchalant attitude
towards complainant's request for a refund of a portion of, not even the entire,
PhPl00,000. In his Answer before the IBP, respondent simply denied having
received any of the letters sent by complainant.31 Respondent's claim that it
was complainant who failed to talk to him and his admission that he "forgot
about complainant"32 reveal his rather casual and lackadaisical treatment of
the complainant and the legal matter entrusted to him.
If it were true that complainant already failed to communicate with him, the
least respondent could have done was to withdraw his appearance as counsel.
But even this measure, it appears, respondent failed to perform. His failure to
take such action speaks of his negligence.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant
disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence is consistently defined as relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 While the Court finds respondent guilty of negligence, We
cannot ascribe to him any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
nor causing undue delay and impediment to the execution of a judgment or
misusing court processes. As such, and consistent with current jurisprudence,
We find the penalty of reprimand with stem warning commensurate to his
offense.34
As regards the restitution of the acceptance fees, We find it necessary to first
distinguish between an attorney's fee and an acceptance fee as the former
depends on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered, while the
other does not.
On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and
extraordinary concept.35 In its ordinary concept, attorney's fee refers to the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. While, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the
court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for
damages.36 In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the
attorney's fee in its ordinary concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer
for mere acceptance of the case. The rationale for the fee is because once the
lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. The
opportunity cost of mere acceptance is thus indemnified by the payment of
acceptance fee. However, since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only
for lost opportunity, the same is not measured by the nature and extent of the
legal services rendered.37
In this case, respondent referred to the PhPl00,000 as his acceptance fee while
to the complainant, said amount answers for the legal services which
respondent was engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that complainant
agreed to immediately pay, as she, in fact, immediately paid the sums of
PhP20,000, PhP30,000 and PhP50,000, said amounts undoubtedly pertain to
respondent's acceptance fee which is customarily paid by the client upon the
lawyer's acceptance of the case.
Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a return of acceptance
fees in cases wherein the lawyer had been negligent in the handling of his
client's case. Thus, in Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes,38 the respondent lawyer
who failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office, returned
the PhPl 0,000 acceptance fee paid to him and was admonished to be more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. Likewise, in Voluntad-
Ramirez v. Baustista,39 the respondent lawyer was ordered to return the
PhP14,000 acceptance fee because he did nothing to advance his client's cause
during the six-month period that he was engaged as counsel.
This being the case, the next query to be had is how much of the acceptance
fee should respondent restitute.1âwphi1 In this regard, the principle
of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for
determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Quantum meruit is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without working for it.
Also, Section 24, Rule 138 should be observed in determining respondent's
compensation, thus:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion
of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be
considered in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer
should receive.40 Canon 20, Rule 20.01 provides:
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining
his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, respondent only conferred once with the complainant's son for 20
minutes, filed his entry of appearance, obtained copies of the case records and
inquired twice as to the status of the case. For his efforts and for the particular
circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a reasonable
compensation of PhP3,000. The remainder, or PhP97,000 should be returned
to the complainant.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is
ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of PhP97,000 out of the
Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.

[ AC. No. 7824, Jul 19, 2017 ]
ELIEZER F. CASTRO v. ATTY. JOHN BIGAY +
TIJAM, J.:
This is a disbarment case against respondents Atty. John Bigay, Jr. (Atty.
Bigay) and Atty. Juan Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) filed by complainants Eliezer
F. Castro (Eliezer) and Bethulia C. Casafrancisco (Bethulia).
The Facts
Originally, the complaint[1] filed directly to this Court imputed several
violations, criminal and administrative in nature, against respondents such as
perjury, estafa through falsification of public documents, obstruction of
justice, deceit, and grave misconduct, among others. The case was then
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for investigation and recommendation. Upon preliminary
conference, it was agreed upon that the issues, stipulations, and admissions
shall be limited to the pleadings filed before the said office.[2] Thus, the factual
backdrop of the case is as follows:
The complaint alleged that sometime in August 1989, Bethulia engaged Atty.
Bigay's legal services for the settlement of her late father's estate, which
includes a 411-square meter parcel of land situated in Poblacion, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. Atty. Bigay also represented Bethulia in several cases related to
the estate's settlement.[3]
The complainants, however, discovered that Atty. Bigay had vested interest in
having a share in the subject inheritance. According to the complainants, Atty.
Bigay, with the cooperation of Atty. Siapno, was able to transfer an 80 sq m
portion (subject property) of the said parcel of land to his and her wife's name
by simulating contracts of sale, to wit: (1) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
1, 2005, covering the sale of the subject property to spouses Peter and Jocelyn
Macaraeg (Spouses Macaraeg); and (2) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
October 4, 2006, covering the sale of the subject property to Atty. Bigay and
his wife. These deeds were notarized by Atty. Siapno on the said dates. [4]
The instant complaint is, thus, filed against Atty. Bigay for having an interest
in a property subject of litigation/s which he is handling and for forging and
simulating deeds to the prejudice of his client and the latter's coheirs.[5]
For his part, Atty. Bigay denied being Bethulia's counsel in 1989, averring
that he passed the bar exam only in 1992.[6] Further, he averred that the subject
estate had long been settled and the property subject of the deeds of sale had
been apportioned to Bethulia way back in 1984 through extrajudicial
partition.[7] To show Bethulia's ownership of the 411-sq m parcel of land prior
to his and his wife's acquisition of the 80 sq m portion thereof, Atty. Bigay
presented: (1) a Tax Declaration under Bethulia's name; (2) annotations
showing that Bethulia mortgaged the property to the bank in 1992 and 1996;
(3) the Deed of Sale which shows that Bethulia sold the subject property to
Macaraeg; (4) and a deed of donation which shows that Bethulia donated the
remaining 331 sq m portion of the said parcel of land in 2005. [8] These
circumstances, according to Atty. Bigay, clearly show that there was no
irregularity in his and his wife's acquisition of the said portion, contrary to
complainants' imputations.
For his part, Atty. Siapno denied having notarized the subject deeds of sale.
Specifically, Atty. Siapno averred that the said deeds are falsified, that his
signatures therein as notary public were forged, and that he has never met
Atty. Bigay, Bethulia, and Macaraeg.[9]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
Relying upon Atty. Siapno's claim that his signatures in the subject deeds
were forged and that he had never personally met Atty. Bigay, Bethulia, and
Macaraeg, the IBP-CBD was persuaded that the said deeds were falsified.
Then, by virtue of Atty. Bigay and his wife's notorious claim over the
property, the IBP-CBD theorized that the said spouses are the only persons
Interested in the property and the only beneficiary of the said simulated sales.
The IBP-CBD then proceeded to conclude that only a person who has a legal
mentality would be able to formulate such tactic to make it appear that
Spouses Bigay were buyers in good faith. In addition, the IBP-CBD cited the
principle that the person who is in possession of a forged/falsified document
and made use and benefited from the same is presumed to be the
forger/falsifier. Pinning the guilt mainly on Atty. Bigay, the IBP-CBD
recommended in its November 6, 2009 Report and Recommendation, [10] thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that respondent John L.
Bigay, Jr. be SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the active practice of law.
For respondent Juan C. Siapno, Jr., he is WARNED to be extra careful with
his notarial paraphernalia.[11]
The IBP Board of Governors Resolutions
On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XX-2013-131,[12] which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and for using a falsified Deed of Sale and benefiting (sic), Atty. John L.
Bigay, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months and Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby WARNED to be circumspect
in his notarial transaction. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Bigay's Motion for Reconsideration[13] was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-187[14] dated March 23, 2014, thus:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken
into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX- 2013-131 dated February 13,
2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.[15]
Having a final say on the matter of disciplining members of the bar, We now
resolve the instant complaint.
Issue
Should the respondents be held administratively liable based on the
allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?
Our Ruling
It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and
satisfactory proof.[16]
It is settled that considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalty on a member of the Bar.[17]Preponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[18]
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the
lawyer subsists and the complaint against him must be dismissed. [19]
The IBP-CBD found Atty. Bigay guilty of forging the subject deeds of sale
and using the same for his benefit, hence, it recommended the latter's
suspension from the practice of law for six months. Atty. Siapno, on the other
hand, was merely warned to be extra careful with his notarial paraphernalia,
the IBP-CBD relying on the latter's allegations and denial.
However, the findings and conclusions of the IBP lack factual and legal
support.
As can be gleaned from the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD
quoted hereunder, its findings were merely based on bare allegations,
assumptions, conjectures, and disputable legal presumption. Pertinent portions
of the said report and recommendation read:
Respondent John Bigay, Jr. was retained by complainant/petitioner Bethulia
Casafrancisco as legal counsel/adviser of the heirs of the late Luis M. Castro,
for possible division/settlement of their inheritance among the said nine heirs.
x x x.
Respondent Juan Siapno claimed that his signatures were falsified in [the
subject deeds]. He further claimed that he had not met personally respondent
John Bigay. Also, Bethulia Casafrancisco, Peter Macaraeg, and Jocelyn
Macaraeg did not appear before him.
On the other hand, respondent John Bigay with the use of alleged falsified
Deeds of Absolute Sale made it appear that complainant Bethulia
Casafrancisco sold portion of 80 square meters to Peter M. Macaraeg to
simulate the sale not a direct sale from Bethulia Casafrancisco to the spouses
respondent John Bigay and Glenda Lee Bigay.
Spouses Atty. John L. Bigay and Glenda Lee J. Bigay are the only two
persons appearing to have interest and benefited on the sale x x x as clearly
manifested in their Affidavit of Adverse Claim, Notice of Rights and
Ownership and photographs of the property showing that said property is
already acquired by them. x x x.
Being the interested and now the owners of the above-mentioned portion of
land, Atty. John L. Bigay and wife Glenda Lee J. Bigay are presumed to
know who really made the alleged forgery/falsification in this case. If it were
true that there was an agreement between Atty. Bigay and his client Bethulia
C. Casafrancisco as to the payment of his legal services to be taken from her
share on the properties subject of litigations, why the [sic] diversionary tactic
employed in the first Deed of Absolute Sale from Bethulia C. Casafrancisco to
the alleged fictitious spouses Peter and Jocelyn Macaraeg and the latter to
spouses Atty. John L. Bigay and Glenda Lee J. Bigay? This tactic, for sure,
was planned by one of legal mentality just to make it appear that they (Bigay)
appear to be buyers in good faith and for value.
The facts and circumstances above explained squarely fall on that leading case
of People v. Manansala were the court held that "He who is in possession of a
forged/falsified document and made use and benefited from the same
is presumed to be the forger/falsifier." x x x.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the factual backdrop of the case and available
evidence on record, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the
complainants, even if considered together with those presented by Atty.
Siapno, fell short of the required quantum of proof. Aside from bare
allegations, no evidence was presented to clearly and convincingly establish
that Atty. Bigay engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, specifically, in
forging and/or falsifying deeds of sale for his benefit and dealing with the
property of his client under litigation.
To begin with, the allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated. There is
nothing on record that would show that the contracts were simulated, much
less that the same were forged and/or falsified by Spouses Bigay. Atty. Siapno
may have corroborated complainants' claim of forgery by alleging that he did
not notarize and had never met the parties in the said deeds. We, however,
could not accept hook, line, and sinker, the unsupported and self-serving
claims and denial of Atty. Siapno. The complainants likewise did not adduce
any evidence to support their imputations against Atty. Bigay.
On the other hand, Atty. Bigay presented sufficient evidence against the
accusations of forgery and engaging in the prohibited practice of dealing with
properties under litigation. He presented the notarized deeds of extrajudicial
settlement of estate and partition executed by Bethulia and her sisters in 1984,
which shows that the 411 sq m portion of the subject parcel of land had
already been allocated to Bethulia way back in 1984 as her share in the estate.
This was affirmed by the deed of quitclaim and renunciation of rights
executed by Bethulia and her sister Minerva in the same year. A tax
declaration was then issued in the name ofBethulia over the said property.
Further, the notarized Deed of Sale of the subject properly clearly states that
the same was sold by Bethulia to Macaraeg. Although the validity of the said
deed was disputed, no sufficient proof was presented to support the claim of
forgery or irregularity in the execution of the same. That the subject property
was no longer available for disposal, as the same was already sold to
Macaraeg, is affirmed by the deed of donation executed by Bethulia in favor
of her children which covers only 331 sq m of the 411-sq m parcel of land.
Lastly, the Deed of Sale executed between Macaraeg and Spouses Bigay over
the subject property is existent albeit its validity was disputed, but then again,
no proof was presented to support the claim of invalidity.
Let it be made clear, however, that neither the IBP nor this Court has the
authority to inquire into or determine the rights of the parties, specifically the
complainants and Atty. Bigay, over the property involved herein. We also do
not attempt to make any determination as to the validity or otherwise of the
subject documents, or the regularity or otherwise of the subject sales. Our
function in this administrative case is limited to disciplining lawyers.[21] The
pronouncements that We make in this case, thus, are not determinative of any
issues of law and facts regarding the parties' legal rights over the disputed
property.
At any rate, whether or not We take into consideration such pieces of
evidence, the fact still remains that the records are barren of any proof to
support the accusations against Atty. Bigay in the instant administrative case.
Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that every
person is presumed innocent of a crime or wrongdoing. Thus, this Court has
consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he or she
is innocent of the charges against him or her until the contrary is proved, and
that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.[22]
Thus, without such required proof to overcome the presumption of innocence,
this Court will not hesitate to dismiss an administrative case against a member
of the Bar.
As to Atty. Siapno's liability, from his own admissions, it cannot be doubted
that he is guilty of dereliction of duty as a notary public. It was admitted that
the questioned deeds of sale bore the impression of his notarial seal. He,
however, maintains that he did not notarize the said documents and that his
signatures therein were forged, which, however, were not proven in this case.
He admitted that he has no sole access and control of his notarial seal as other
persons could make use of the same without his consent or knowledge.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,[23] the Court held that:
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most
common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or
instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must
be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The
notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution.
A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. [24]
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly
commissioned notary public to refrain from committing any dereliction or any
act which may serve as a cause for the revocation of his commission or the
imposition of administrative sanctions.[25]Thus, Atty. Siapno's excuse cited
above cannot absolve him from liability.
Anent the penalty, considering that this is Atty. Siapno's first infraction and
that it was not clearly proven that there was indeed an illegal transaction in
this case or that he participated therein, We find that the appropriate penalty is
reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative case against
Atty. John Bigay, Jr. is DISMISSED. On the other hand, Atty. Juan Siapno,
Jr. is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and is accordingly, meted out
the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 9919, July 19, 2017 ]
DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by complainant Eduardo R.
Alicias, Jr. against Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig (Atty. Baclig) for violation. of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and/or Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
The case stemmed from the amended complaint[2] for declaration of nullity of
void documents, recovery of ownership and possession, accounting of the
natural, industrial fruits derived from the illegal occupation of the subject
property, exercise of the right of legal redemption with damages, and
application for a writ of preliminary injuction filed by Eleuterio Lamorena,
Higinio Rene Lamorena, Oscar Lamorena and Eloisa Lamorena, duly
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Marissa L. Peña, and Marissa L. Peña,
in her own behalf (Lamorena, et. al.) against Robert R. Alicias (Robert) and
Urvillo A. Paa (Paa), and herein complainant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Vigan City. Said complaint was filed in September 2012 and Atty.
Baclig was hired by Lamorena, et. al. as their counsel.
In said amended complaint, Lamorena, et. al. questioned the occupancy of
complainant and his co-defendants of a certain parcel of land. Lamorena, et.
al. claimed that they are entitled to possession of the same, being the
surviving heirs of the lawful owners of the subject property, spouses Vicente
and Catalina Lamorena (Catalina).
Complainant and his co-defendants filed their Answer,[3] stressing, among
others, that they legally acquired the subject property by virtue of a contract of
sale from its lawful owner, Catalina, as the same is her paraphernal property.
It appears, however, that in February 2010, an amended complaint [4] for
reconveyance, annulment of deeds and quieting of title was filed by
Lamorena, et. al. against herein complainant and Urvillo Paa before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Vigan City. However, it was not
Atty. Baclig who acted as counsel in this case.
On May 14, 2013, the complainant filed an administrative case for disbarment
against Atty. Baclig before Us.
In said administrative complaint, the complainant averred that Atty. Baclig
consented to false assertions when his clients allegedly made false statements
in their amended complaint. Complainant also stated that Atty. Baclig
knowingly filed an action which was: (1) already barred by res judicata and
laches; and (2) without the jurisdiction of the RTC where such complaint was
filed. Lastly, complainant claimed that Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of
a complaint, which asserted similar relief, when a similar case was filed
before the MTCC.
In his Comment,[5] Atty. Baclig contended that the allegations in the subject
complaint contained absolutely privileged communication, which insulates
him from liability. Also, the issues as to whether or not the assertions in the
subject complaint are false statements and whether or not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are yet to be decided; hence,
the complaint against him holds no water.
Issue
Is Atty. Baclig administratively liable?

Our Ruling
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief
to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and
the courts.[6]
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.[7] In the recent case of Carrie-
Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes v. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva,[8] this Court had the
occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is
substantial evidence.
The gist of the complaint before Us is the alleged false assertions in the
amended complaint, to which Atty. Baclig has consented to. Complainant
alleged that Atty. Baclig consented to falsehood when the allegations in the
amended complaint specified, among others, that the subject property is a
hereditary property when in fact it is a paraphernal property; that the property
is unregistered property; and that it was inherited in 1952 when it was not.
However, noteworthy is the fact that such assertions are the matters in dispute
in the case before the RTC. In other words, the assertions as to the nature of
the property and the time when it was inherited also deal with the main issue
of the case. To recall, Lamorena, et. al.'s main contention is that the subject
property is a hereditary property, being the property of their parents. On the
other hand, complainant alleged that they brought the property from Catalina
and the latter had every right to sell it even without the consent of her spouse
because it is her paraphernal property. In other words, the issue in the
amended complaint is who between Lamorena, et. al. and complainant herein
has the right of possession over the subject property. Hence, Atty. Baclig
cannot be faulted for consenting to his clients' act of asserting such statements.
In this regard, We emphasize that the filing of another action concerning the
same subject matter runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of
the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue delay of a case by
misusing court processes.[13]
We reiterate that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be
punished as contempt of court.
A former member of the judiciary need not be reminded of the fact that forum
shopping wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial process and clogs the courts'
dockets.[14] As a former judge, Atty. Baclig must be mindful not only of the
tenets of the legal profession but also of the proper observance of the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the complaint meritorious and
accordingly CENSURE Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig for violating Canon 1 and
Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.

At any rate, it must be considered that Atty. Baclig's pleadings were

privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney.[9]

As regards res judicata, laches, and jurisdiction, We note that the same are not
founded on substantial evidence.

However, as to the matter of forum shopping, We find that Atty. Baclig

resorted to the same.

In forum shopping, the following requisites should concur: (a) identity of

parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[10]

In this case, it must be noted that an amended complaint was filed by

Lamorena, et. al. against herein complainant and Paa before the MTCC in
February 2010. In sum, such amended complaint sought for the nullification
of the mortgage contract and deed of sale which transferred the property to
herein complainant and his co-defendants and the declaration of Lamorena, et.
al. as the absolute owners of the subject property. Eventually, the case before
the MTCC was dismissed with prejudice in an Order[11] dated November 9,
2012.

However, on September 19, 2012, another amended complaint was filed by

Lamorena, et. al. against complainants, Robert and Paa, but this time, before
the RTC. A cursory reading of the complaint reveals that the reliefs sought
pertain to the nullification of any and all the documents in the form of a
written agreement which may be executed without the consent of
Lamorena, et. al. In esse, such complaint before the RTC prayed for similar
reliefs as those which were sought for in the complaint before the MTCC.

On this note, We rule that there was forum shopping in this case, for while the
case before the MTCC was pending, Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of
another complaint before another forum, i.e., RTC. Such cases deal with the
same parties and same reliefs. Thus, a ruling in one case would resolve the
other, and vice versa.

Moreover, regardless of the fact that Atty. Baclig did not act as counsel in the
case before the MTC, it would not exempt him from culpability. Atty. Baclig
did not categorically deny the allegations of complainant regarding the
commission of forum shopping. Moreover, it is surprising that he was able to
answer the 10 causes of action raised by complainant, except the issue on
forum shopping. Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has knowledge
of the pendency of a similar complaint before the MTC when a complaint
before the RTC was filed.[12]