Reforming the reformers - can EC TA institution-

building in non-accession countries produce results?

CONTENTS

1. Purpose of paper

2. Some Basic Questions from a practitioner

3. The 2007 Report from the EC Court of Auditors

4. The 2008 EC Strategy

• The basic analysis
• Institutional analysis
• Tinkering with procurement
• Use of local institutions

5. The political context

6. How does one reform (in) Kleptocratic Regimes?

• Good governance?
• The toolkit?
• Getting the basics right
• What does history tell us?
• Windows of opportunity
• Sources of reform

7. Implications for Technical Assistance

8. The behavioural assumptions behind PAR interventions

Ronald G Young
February 2011
1. Purpose of paper
I have worked on EU projects for administrative restructuring in candidate and transition countries for
20 years – generally as a Team Leader - after a previous career as an innovative leader of a Regional
government. During those last 20 years, I have lived and worked in 8 countries for average periods of 2
years – and have, as a good mercenary, been contracted to 8 different companies – 3 Dutch, 2 Danish,
2 German and 1 Italian. Half of the time has been in Central Europe – the other half in Central Asia. I
am one of an army of thousands of such individual „experts” who have been attached for 18-24 months
to Cabinet Offices, Ministries and municipalities in efforts to improve their performance. Sadly, we are
never „mentioned in dispatches”.
My project experiences made me an early critic of the procurement system used by the EU – for
example the inflexibility and short duration of the projects; and the lack of interest shown by the EC in
the views of people on the ground. Some of us presented this critique to the 2006 Conference of
NISPAcee1 – which then set up a special working group to consider the issue further.
In 2007 the EC Court of Auditors looked at 32 projects in 12 countries and produced a critical
assessment of the EC’s Technical Cooperation work. In mid 2008 the EC produced a strategic response
A Backbone strategy – which is apparently now being implemented. This paper -
• sets out the critique
• considers the EC response
• explores the scope for improvement in such TA
• poses some methodological questions
• suggests a stronger role for individual consultants

2. Some Basic Questions from a practitioner

At the 2006 Conference of NISPAcee, my paper tried to explore –
• The „accidental” nature of project impact - by virtue of the very long arm of implementation
from project fiche through selection of „beneficiary”, drafting of ToR to drafting of bids (by
companies expert in this arcane skill), selection by evaluation panels of key experts and the
final interaction between experts (who had little input to the bid), beneficiaries and
stakeholders during the life of (generally short-life) projects - which have little flexibility.
• The supply-led nature of much of the technical assistance programmes – and the difficulties of
making a reality of a more demand-led strategy
• The very different set of contexts (drivers) - both within those who were admitted to the EU in
2007; in present candidate countries; and in those which now benefit from the neighbourhood
programme

An important section of the paper suggested that those of us who have got involved in these
programmes of advising governments in these countries confront a real moral and intellectual
challenge –

Box 1; The moral and intellectual challenge of ID consultancy

„After all, we are daring to advise these countries construct effective organisations; we are employed by
organisations supposed to have the expertise in how to put systems together to ensure that appropriate
intervention strategies emerge to deal with the organisational and social problems of these countries; we are
supposed to have the knowledge and skills to help develop appropriate knowledge and skills in others! But how
many of us can give positive answers to the following 5 questions? –
• Do the organisations which pay us practice what they and we preach on the ground about good
organisational principles?
• Does the knowledge and experience we have as individual consultants actually help us identify and
implement interventions which fit the context in which we are working?
• Do we have the space and skills to make that happen?
• What are the bodies which employ consultants doing to explore such questions – and to deal with the
deficiencies which I dare to suggest would be revealed?
• Do any of us have a clue about how to turn kleptocratic regimes into systems that recognise the
meaning of public service?”2

1 Network of Schools of Public Administration in countries of central and eastern Europe.

2 http://www.freewebs.com/publicadminreform/key%20papers/Critique%20of%20TA%20for%20PAR.pdf
Although, therefore, I was critical of the EC procurement system, I was also asking questions about the
capacity of the consultancy companies and individual experts – and the knowledge base which lay
behind that. And I had got so far as to map out possible actions
´So – what is to be done? There are at least four groups of actors whom I invite to take up these issues-
• The EU system – EC, Parliament and audit
• Companies
• Individual consultants

Action by the EU
The most offensive aspect of the EU system for me has been the lack of respect for learning –
• little attempt being made to capitalise on the richness and diversity of the EU project experience3
• little or no effort being made to use the vast network of individual consultants who work for the EU throughout the
world.

The EU is, of course, a vast system which has a lot on its collective mind. And is, like any other system, hardly inclined to
change a new system on the basis of a few dissonant voices from the field! The internet search I have done, however,
suggests that the time is overdue for a serious Parliamentary debate on the effectiveness of the EC development policy.
The following are some of the positions a proper debate could open up -

a. Steady as you go!

EU system of technical assistance was apparently restructured in the mid 2000s – I say apparently since, as consultants,
we were not briefed about this. RELEX adopted its new structure only 4-5 years ago. But were then overtaken by the
establishment in 2010 of the new EU Foreign Service – and all the infighting which preceded thay. Perhaps the new
systems and the new people – as they gain experience – will deal with the problems.

b. Create a learning system

The EC has an incredible range of experience in the individuals who manage and implement its programmes of technical
assistance covers. At the moment it is wasted. It might consider such tings as -
• conferences
• fellowships (to allow field experience to be refined and shared)
• intranet learning which includes the individual consultants

c. Create centres of excellence

The USA has an interesting model - the Urban Institute – whereby admin reform centres are established in each transition
country (for local government) – with a 5 year contract and an evaluation panel with proper international experts.

d. Ensure that companies are more properly screened

The present measurement of “experience and capacity” is not serious. One could suggest that the EC should carry out a
more rigorous and centralised screening of companies before they are allowed to tender – perhaps even an accreditation
system! Given the momentous consequences for companies of exclusion and inclusion, however, this would require a
serious bureaucracy which would quickly become highly contentious. The present system can be and is supported since it
meets the classic principles of “free entry to the market”. But it does require better regulation.
Another suggestion is that the complex monitoring system might be used to flag up poor contractor’s performance – and
that consistent poor ratings could lead to threat of exclusion. This, however, requires a quality of monitoring which is not
currently available. Furthermore, the monitoring system is itself the subject of competitive tendering by companies and
conflicts of interest could quickly be adduced.

e. Leave the field to bilateral work

It is easier perhaps for national agencies (such as DfiD) to assess the quality of consultants……

Action by companies
There are several things which contractors should do but which they will not in the absence of incentives or instructions.
a. screen experts – and keep them up-to-date on standards and systems
b. develop and observe a code of conduct
c. publish; this may seem a contradiction in terms – but a handful of companies do it.

Action by consultants
a. blacklist companies
b. activate and use networks´

3 One exception was when I was invited to join a European delegation E-learning group on decentralisation.
3. The 2007 Report from the EC Court of Auditors
By coincidence, a year after the NISPAcee paper, the EC Court of Auditors produced a fairly damning
report” on the effectiveness of technical assistance in the context of capacity
development”4. This involved the examination of 32 projects in 12 countries and in the more critical
environment which OECD work on capacity development seems to have created5 and was written
around 6 key questions – which gave the following summary answers

1. Does the Commission have a sound strategy for institutional capacity development, including the
use of technical assistance?
• Inadequate institutional analysis in Country Strategy Papers
• No guidance on technical assistance .

2. Are technical assistance activities within capacity development projects well designed?
• Project choice relevant but design often inadequate
• Local ownership essential but not systematically addressed by the Commission

3. Are technical assistance activities implemented efficiently?

• Long preparation phase often leads to outdated project design .

4. Problems during procurement and project start-up reduce time available for implementation
• Experts often replaced after award of contract .
• Inappropriate selection criteria for technical assistance
• Limited choice between procurement procedures
• Inefficient use of technical assistance .
• Donor coordination varies between countries .
• Implementation arrangements not yet favorable to local ownership

5. Are technical assistance activities and performance adequately monitored and evaluated?

6. Are technical assistance activities effective in terms of capacity development?

• Technical assistance contribution satisfactory but success of projects not guaranteed
• Sustainability uncertain

The Report gave 8 recommendations – 6 of which are relevant to this paper (the underlining is mine)–

Box 2; Key Recommendations of Court of Auditors’Report

Recommendation 3
Design of capacity development projects should be improved, by
• facilitating effective ownership and leadership of the national part of the process,
• better defining specific capacity development objectives and related technical assistance requirements,
• avoiding overly complex implementation structures,
• being more realistic in terms of objectives to be achieved and
• planning longer implementation periods.

Recommendation 4
The procedures governing the project preparation and start-up phase, including the procurement of
technical assistance, should be reviewed, in order to create more time for implementation, and more
flexibility should be allowed during the inception phase to adjust the project design and/or the Terms of
Reference for the technical assistance to changes in circumstances.

Recommendation 5
The evaluation criteria in technical assistance tenders should be reviewed, in order to better reflect the quality
and previous experience of the experts and the consultancy company.

Recommendation 6
More options should be considered regarding procurement possibilities to allow the best possible choice of
technical expertise, including expertise from public institutions and expertise available in the beneficiary
country or the region.

4http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/673583.PDF
5The OECD is making it more difficult to download its material so this paper from Morgan gives a good sense of the debate
http://preval.org/files/2209.pdf
Recommendation 7
In line with the Paris Declaration commitments, the Commission should increase its use of technical
assistance through coordinated programmes and apply, where possible, implementation arrangements which
encourage local ownership.

Recommendation 8
Technical assistance performance by companies and experts should be assessed systematically and
a management information system for recording, reporting and consulting this performance should be
developed.

The immediate EC responses to its critique and recommendations which were attached to the report
were defensive and incestuous – suggesting (typically for such responses) that the projects which had
been examined by the Court were part of a system which had recently been reformed.

4. The 2008 EC Strategy

4.1 Tinkering with the system
What appeared to be a more considered EC response came in July 2008 with a curiously entitled 20
pages document - A Backbone strategy. It sets out 8 „principles” and 5 „axes” – a sophistication which
began to arise alarm bells!

Box 3; The five axes6 of the Backbone strategy

1. Support strategic dialogue on Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Arrangements.
2. Improve Technical Cooperation design, management and accountability.
3. Improve procurement, contracting and other procedures related to Technical Cooperation and
Project Implementation Arrangements.
4. Enhance internal EC capacity through communication, knowledge management and training.
5. Implementation and monitoring of the Strategy.

The principles embody all the right words - flexibility, demand-led, result-orientation, harmonised,
country-owned, quality control of companies etc – but the more I looked at the paper, the more I
realised that it is basically saying that everyone just needed to try a bit harder – as is evident from the
axes shown in box 3. And the more I thought about the paper, the more I realised the superficiality of
my own 2006 analysis which had focussed on procedural aspects - rather than the issues embodied in
my later 5 questions.
Let’s face it - the Court of Auditors consists of accountants. The EC officials who drafted the response
are managers. Neither accountants nor public managers are specialists in administrative reform or
social science methodology and able to deal properly with the ends-means issue involved in such
social interventions as administrative reform. The language of the logframe has them imprisoned in
a system which believes in short causal links between activities and outcomes; if the outcomes don’t
happen, then it’s the project designers, managers or implementers to blame! It’s that simple! The
possibility of a more complex – if not chaotic – world does not occur to them. Later in this paper I
want to explore what the consequences of such a (more plausible) world view might be for Technical
Assistance.
For the moment let me just briefly note some points from the Backbone strategy.

4.2 Institutional Analysis

The EC seems particularly defensive about the suggestions that their country strategies and analyses
were inadequate. But one of the problems about institution building in non-accession countries is the
weakness of our understanding of the way power in many post-communist countries is structured.
Because countries quickly introduced elections and have open, competition between parties, the word
„democracy” is used – giving us false confidence in our ability to grasp and shape institutional
behaviour in these countries.
The imagery associated with this word powerfully influences our perception of relevant intervention
mechanisms for administrative reform.

6
details are reproduced in the Annex to this pape
Box 4; Alice in Wonderland
Azerbaijan was a seminal experience for me – when I realised that it had the inverse of the „normal”
political-civil service relationship. I was used to a system where Ministers temporararily occupy
positions of power – and civil servants were the more permanent system whose perceptions and
behaviour needed to be challenged. In countries like Azerbaijan it was (and is) the other way around –
the Ministers were the permanent feature (except for the Minister of Economic development in 2006
who was thrown into prison for being too ambitious!) and the civil servants who were there at their
whim. There was therefore no challenge. Too many western experts are taken in by the terms and
language they and others use – and assume they are dealing with systems similar to those at home.

CIS countries have been and generally remain centralised, closed and corrupt; lack the tradition of
inter-war institutions of democracy and capitalism; and the pull of EU Accession as an incentive to
reform. All of this raises fundamental questions about the appropriateness of the tools used in
Technical Assistance. This is such a major issue that it too needs a separate section (below) to deal
with.

4.3 Guidance on Technical Assistance

My 2006 paper explored the „black hole” between the drafting of the bid and the arrival on the ground
of experts who had nothing to do with either the ToR or the bid; whose knowledge of the country was
limited; and whose knowledge of administrative reform was often limited to that of one or two EU
countries. I realise now that an even more important "black hole" in the TA work is that of the drafting
and approval of the project fiche and ToR. Who does it - within what framework of assumptions?
The EC has published in recent years a series of manuals and Guidelines7 which help at least its
delegation staff understand what is involved in issues relating to „good governance”, „capacity
development” and „decentralisation”. But this still leaves untouched the adequcy of the the
assumptions and models used by the individuals who draft project terms of reference.

4.4 making procurement flexible – mission impossible?

The talk of flexibility seems too easy – and not to take proper account of the logic of the procurement
system which requires “like to be compared with like”.

4.5 Use of local institutions

The 2008 document favours „promoting the involvement of organisations other than commercial
firms (such as public institutions, universities, non-profit organisations, think tanks, etc.), and on the
other hand making more use of local and regional expertise (and more generally facilitating South-
South cooperation). Particular attention will be given to facilitating the dissemination of know-how,
the extension of learning systems, training, etc.through appropriate guidance, training and
dissemination of good practices, raise awareness ofthe existing mechanisms available for mobilising
expertise in public bodies. This includes:
- a) greater use of the negotiated procedure (already allowed by the PRAG in case of publicsector
bodies or to non-profit institutions or associations);
- b) use of grant contracts (possibly and where relevant by direct agreement) to provide TC
through non-traditional sources”.

The EC seems to suffer from an inherent schizophrenia about consultants in its work. On the one hand
it chose 2 decades ago to go for procuring private consultancies rather than building its own internal
system. But, whenever the choice presents itself (eg on Twinning; and BackBone strategy) it indulges
in the populist attack on consultants. It would be better if it did at least make a distinction between the
consultancy companies (who make the profit) and the individuals who work for them on a casual basis.

4.6 Implementation
I understand that the European Centre for development Policy Management is involved with
implementation and it would be inteersting to find out
• How have the 81 European Delegations in charge of programmes understood the issue?

7http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/governance/documents/handbook_2004.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/manuals-tools/t109_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/manuals-tools/t106_en.htm
 • How have they framed their responses? Formalistically (though action plans)? Or realistically
– through a limited number of actions?
• Do they actually have the capacity to implement all this – given that the work is being handled
by 2-3 people?
• How are the results being monitored?
• What use is actually being made of experienced people like me?

I certainly haven’t noticed any changes – the European Delegation in China actually compunded
felonies by imposing in December 2009 a unilateral requirement of an action plan from me within one
month of my arrival instead of the several months given in the ToR for the Inception report – and
stuck to this despite the lack of a counterpart appointment.

Other questions???????

5. The political context

- which emphasises how much of an unknown for western experts the cotext is which they are
supposed to be analysing.

Box 5; Features of Central Asian governance

centralised in -
• policy-making style; new policy directions are signalled in Presidential Decrees developed in secret –
with parliament and state bodies playing no real role in developing policies
• management style and systems in state bodies; where old Soviet one-man management still
prevails, with crisis-management modes evident and no managerial delegation
• the absence of conditions for the new local government system to flourish properly

closed in that -
• There is little acceptance of pluralist methods of thinking; for example about the need for
separation of power; and challenge to ideas and conventional wisdom
• Recruitment to civil service is done on the basis of (extended) family links
• Bright graduates now go either to the private or international sector (including TA)
• Elections are often fixed; It is difficult for independent-minded reformers to stand for election
• Censorship is widespread – whether formal or informal through media being owned and controlled by
government and administration figures

corrupt in that significant numbers of –

• Key government and administrative positions are bought
• public officials (are expected to) accept informal payments for special favours
• senior administrative figures have substantial and active economic interests”
• students can and do buy educational qualifications

I referred recently to the typology of the 1996 book by Linz and Stepan8 which suggested the term
„Sultanistic” for one type of post-totalitarian regime which did not, sadly, catch on. A new article on
the Russian situation9 suggests the term „neo-feudalism” for the system there.

Box 6; Neo-feudalism in Russia

The Russian system is fundamentally far more solid and durable than most Western comment allows. Its
strength emanates from a basic principle: It is much easier for subjects to solve their problems individually than
to challenge national institutions collectively. This is because what Westerners would call corruption is not a
scourge of the system but the basic principle of its normal functioning. Corruption in Russia is a form of
transactional grease in the absence of any generally accepted and legally codified alternative. Built under
Vladimir Putin, Russia’s “power vertical” provides a mechanism for the relatively simple conversion of power
into money, and vice versa. At every level of the hierarchy a certain degree of bribery and clientalist
parochialism is not only tolerated but presupposed in exchange for unconditional loyalty and a part of the take
for one’s superiors. The system is based on the economic freedom of its citizens, but cautious political restrictions

8 http://nomadron.blogspot.com/2011/02/problems-of-democratic-transition-and.html
9 http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=939
on these freedoms generate the wealth of the biggest beneficiaries. There is a cascade of floors and ceilings to the
restrictions on freedom, so it is a feudalism with more levels than the old kind. But it works fundamentally the
same way: The weak pay tribute “up”, and the strong provide protection “down.”

The Putin phenomenon reflects the fact that Russian leaders of the 1990s preferred a mediocre officer with no
noteworthy achievements to become the new President instead of, for example, experienced if imperfect men like
Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov, both of whom were quite popular at that time. The rise of Putin, who
barely progressed to the rank of lieutenant colonel in Soviet times and who later became famous only for his
corrupt businesses in the St. Petersburg city hall, became typical of personnel choices in the 2000s. Inefficient
bureaucrats by the hundreds recruited even less able people to occupy crucial positions in their ministries and
committees, content in the knowledge that such mediocrities could not compete with or displace them. As a
result, Russian governance suffers today less from a “power oligarchy” than from a dictatorship of
incompetence.
On the one hand, Russia has built a system in which the execution of state powers has become a monopolistic
business. It is controlled mainly by friends and colleagues of the system’s creator, Vladimir Putin, and faithfully
operated by the most dutiful and least talented newcomers. All big national business is associated with the
federal authorities or controlled by them; local entrepreneurs still try to bargain with regional bureaucracy. All
of the new fortunes made in the 2000s belong to Putin’s friends and people who helped him build this “negative
vertical.” Therefore, in the coming years, competition inside the elite will diminish, the quality of governance
will deteriorate further, and what is left of effective management will collapse. Yet to change these trends would
nevertheless be a totally illogical step for the political class.
At the same time, a huge social group wants to join this system, not oppose it (in contrast to the final years of the
Soviet Union). In a way, this is like wanting to join a Ponzi scheme at the bottom in hopes that one may not stay
at the bottom, and that in any event one will be better off than those left outside the scheme altogether. As the de-
professionalization of government advances (along with the “commercialization” of state services) competition
among non-professionals will grow, since these have never been in short supply. Therefore, in the future a less
internally competitive ruling elite will be able to co-opt any number of adherents.

The Russian elite has essentially “piratized” and privatized one of the world’s richest countries. It is so grateful
for this privilege that it may insist on Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 for 12 more dismal years. By
then the young liberal cohorts on whom so many Western analysts pinned their hopes for change will have
grown up. The mediocre among them will be part of the system. Most of the best of them, no doubt, will no
longer reside in Russia.

Russia seemed to be undergoing some serious reform efforts in the early 2000s10 - but it is now
revealed as donor-deep only. Granted, the EC is no longer working in Russia – but a similar analysis
could be conducted of most of the countries in the EC Neighbourhood Programme.
Transition Online have started, for example, a series giving some rare detail on the sources of finance
of political parties in central europe – here’s one useful paper on the close links between commerce
and Romanian political parties. I suspect the figures are considerable underestimates – the benefits of
political favour in Romania (and Bulgaria) are so great that I doubt whether a 40,000 euros
contribution is going to get you very much!

Box 7; Case study in anti-corruption and transparency

Government proposals to cut pensions caused serious public protests and demonstrations in Romania – and led
to the Constitutional Court ruling that this was unconstitutional – perhaps not surprising given the incredible
pensions the judges and other members of the political class enjoy.In one case an ex-judge is known to have a
monthly pension of 8,000 euros and generals (of which Romania has an extraordinary number) can expect about
5,000 euros a month. This in a country whose average monthly wage is 150 euros. And a 25% cut in public service
wages has gone through – making life even harder for teachers and others. eleven things which Vladescu won’t tell
us (in Romanian only I’m afraid) which is an attack by an esteemed Romanian financial journalaist (Soviani) on
the previous Minister of Finance for his dishonesty and hypocrisy in concealing eleven sources of income he had.
As Minister, he was on the Board of several state companies – and apparently received 96,000 euros a year for
attending their Board meetings which he forgot to declare.
The financial asset declaration forms are now compulsory – and available on the internet. I selected one file at
random from the list of officials’ forms - a 30 year-old State Secretary in the same Ministry. The only problem is
that although he has been working in the Ministry for more than a year, his form (dated 10 June 2009) tells us
that he is working in the municipality of Bucharest! However his brief CV (on the EIB website since he was
appointed in Feb 2009 to its Board) tells us that he finished the municipal job exactly one year earlier than he
completed and signed his declaration - in June 2008!
His declaration form also tells us that his net annual earnings were 50,000 rons (about 1250 euros - perhaps he

10
for example the Executive Summary “Institutional reform in Russian – moving from design to implementation in a multi-
level governance context” (World Bank June 2006) which seems to have disappeared from the website. „From Clientism to a
„client-centred orientation”; the challenge of public administration reform in Russia” by William Tomson (OECD 2007) is a
tougher analysis http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/505/1/ECO-WKP(2006)64.pdf
made a mistake and this is actually monthly?) – although he also admits to owning 25,000 sq metres of land in
Bucharest and another 25,000 sq metres of land in Calarasi). Of course he is now a State Secretary - actually
earning 9,600 euros a month! He obviously hasn’t been using his Rolex, Breitweiler and other 2 watches (which
he values in total at 14,000 euros) and does not therefore realise that it is now mid-September 2010. Rip van
Winkle rather than Midas!
Just imagine yourself in such a situation - your boss has been sacked and is being publicly pilloried for having
failed to declare external earnings. The first question of a normal person would be "Is my own declaration form in
order?" But no, people like this young State Secretary enjoy such patronage (with no experience - he became a
State Secretary at the age of 26 after an extended education!) and protection and seem so contemptuous of these
forms that he doesn't even bother to update his form which understates his income by a factor of 40! 250 euros he
says when it is actually 9,600!
His out-of-date form does, however, declare some of the additional revenues he earned as a committee member of
various state funds11.

These assets, earnings and concealments reveal systemic immorality which, in Romania’s case, seems
to be shaped and sustained by the role of its political parties which grabbed significant amounts of
property in 1990 and which now determine the career path of young characters such as this State
Secretary (nationally and internationally) and take in return a significant part of his earnings. For
more on this issue see article by Tom Gallagher.
It could be useful for civil society and the media to take more interest in these forms.

6. How does one reform (in) Kleptocratic Regimes?

6.1 Does the “Good Governance” agenda of the international community offer help?
International bodies have changed their tune about the state – even if their arrogance remains.
Physical and financial tsunamis have demonstrated the need for a smart and robust – if not strong –
state. Typically, their experts have swung from one extreme to the other. Having expected little of the
state – they now expect too much. Their anti-poverty strategies read like Soviet 10 year plans.
Merilee Grindle has been one of the few to challenge12. this latest job-creation wheeze.

Box 8; Good enough governance

“Getting good governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the public sector—from
institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political interaction, to decision-making structures
that determine priorities among public problems and allocate resources to respond to them, to organizations
that manage administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff
government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic arenas…
Not surprisingly, advocating good governance raises a host of questions about what needs to be done, when it
needs to be done, and how it needs to be done.

Recently, the idea of “good enough governance” questioned the length of the good governance agenda.This
concept suggested that not all governance deficits need to be (or can be) tackled at once and that institution and
capacity building are products of time; governance achievements can also be reversed.
Good enough governance means that interventions thought to contribute to the ends of economic and political
development need to be questioned, prioritized, and made relevant to the conditions of individual countries.
They need to be assessed in light of historical evidence, sequence, and timing, and they should be selected
carefully in terms of their contributions to particular ends such as poverty reduction and democracy.
Good enough governance directs attention to considerations of the minimal conditions of governance necessary
to allow political and economic development to occur”

6.2 The toolkit of change

The following basic mechanisms have been used to try to create in transition countries a system of
public administration which is responsive to public need –
• Judicial reform; to embed properly the principle of the rule of law13
• Budgetary reform; to ensure the integrity and transparency of public resources
• Civil service laws, structures and training institutions – to encourage professionalism and
less politicization of staff of state bodies

11 for a good picture of the impact which technical assistance in this field has had in Romania see Craciun’s 2006 paper from the

Central European University http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002856/01/craciun_f2j.pdf

12 full article at http://relooney.fatcow.com/00_New_1805.pdf
13 The book of critical essays edited by Carothers (2006) on the experience rule of law is a rare example of an

accessible critique
 • Impact assessment – to try to move the transition systems away from a legalistic approach
and force policy-makers to carry out consultations and assess the financial and other effects of
draft legislation
• Functional Review – to try to remove those functions of state bodies which are no longer
necessary or are best handled by another sector or body14.
• Institutional twinning – to help build the capacity of those state bodies whose performance is
crucial to the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire15
• Development of local government and NGOs – to try to ensure that a redistribution of power
takes place
• Anti-corruption strategies – which incorporate elements of most of the above
• Performance measurement and management eg EFQM

The problem with many of these tools – particularly the 3rd, 4th and 5th - is that their rationalistic basis
brings them into immediate conflict with local realities which subverts therefore all too easily their
good intentions even if the project had
• beneficiaries with both clout and commitment and
• experts with the relevant skills
• the necessary flexibility.

Just as simple and obvious recruitment procedures – and asking questions about the necessity of
Ministry functions - strike at the heart of a Minister’s patronage power, so do these simple and obvious
procedures for making the business of government more manageable and transparent. It is part of the
toolkit of a politician not to reveal too much – and most politicians anyway are flying by the seats of
their pants!
Too many of the tools of those involved in administrative reform are anti-political (and therefore anti-
democratic) in their “rationalism”. What many technocrats attribute to politics or parties is simply
human behaviour! Human behaviour needs to be factored into change efforts! The contrast between
the two ways of thinking is nicely caught in the following diagram –

Diagram 1; rational and political approaches to change

from Teskey (DFiD 2005)

14 a rare set of guidlines was given in 2001 by Manning et al http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/06/22/000090341_20050622142938/Rendered/P
DF/32699.pdf
15 for a rare insight into the origin of twinning see Tulmets…….
6.3 Get the basics right
A 2004 SIGMA overview of PA in the Balkans16 – written ironically precisely at the time the
procurement (rather than development) philosophy won the day in Brussels17. “Too often”, it says
“PAR strategies in the region are designed by (external) technocrats with a limited mandate. Public
Administration reforms are not sufficiently considered as political interventions which need to be
sustained by a coalition of interests which includes business, civil society and public sector workers”.

The paper then goes on to make the following very useful injunctions -
• Get the administrative basics right – before getting into the complexity of NPM-type measures
• Focus on establishing regularity
• Tackle systems - not agencies
• Develop the young; constrain the old18
• Be serious about local ownership
• Avoid having a project focus force governments into unrealistic expectations
• Address the governance system as a whole – eg parliament and admin justice

6.4 What does history tell us?

Crisis management – and financial and moral corruption – are some of the presenting features of all
centralised systems. How does one change such cultures? Where are there examples of highly
centralised societies developing systems of staff involvement in the improvement of services. Japan is
one obvious example – famous now for the way management engage staff in a continuous dialogue
about how to improve what their services and products offer the customer. But this is a relatively
recent phenomenon – brought on by the combination of the shock of Second World War defeat and
the import under General MacArthur’s regime of a little-known American management guru, Edward
Denning whose statistically based approach to “quality management” so transformed Japanese – and,
ultimately and ironically, - American industry. Before then, organisational structures had the same
features of subservience as CIS countries. Apart from such post-war scenarios, I actually don’t know of
any examples of states which have successfully come out of kleptocracy. If anything, the process seems
in the reverse direction!
This raises the conundrum – is it people who change systems? Or systems which change people?
Answers tend to run on ideological grounds - individualists tend to say the former; social democrats
the latter. And both are right! Change begins with a single step, an inspiring story, a champion. But,
unless the actions “resonate” with society, they will dismissed as mavericks, “ahead of their time”.
A significant number of people have to be discontent – and persuaded that there is an alternative. The
wider system has to be ready for change – and, in the meantime, the narrow and upward
accountabilities of the administrative system can be – and is so often – malevolent, encouraging
people to behave in perverse ways.
Formal and informal systems are a well-recognised fact of organizational life19. Whatever new formal
systems say, powerful informal systems tend to ensure the maintenance of unreformed systems –
until, that is, and unless there is a determined move to change. What do I mean by “determined
move”? -
• Ensuring, by communications, leadership and training, that people understand what the
reform is trying to achieve – and why it is needed
• Development and enforce detailed instruments
• Networking in order to mobilise support for the relevant changes
• building and empowering relevant institutions to be responsible for the reform – and help
drive it forward

Administrative reform is an intervention in a social system – or rather set of interlocking systems. Like
an organism, it will quickly be rejected or absorbed unless it can relate to elements in these larger
systems. We are these days advised always to carry out “stakeholder analyses” – to track who will be
affected by the changes and how the indifferent or potentially hostile can be brought on side or

16
17 see also Santiso (2004)
18 although I have reservations about the “ageism” of this. Young people from the region educated in Western Europe have a
shocking arrogance (perhaps because they have no local role models – perhaps because of the nature of the social science they
have been taught) which means they are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. And their instant elevation to promoted
posts on their return from Western Europe creates problems since they have no work experience.
19 In 1970, Donald Schon coined the phrase “dynamic conservatism” in Beyond the Stable State to describe the strength of these

forces in an organisation.
neutralised20. This is sound advice – and such an exercise may sometimes suggest that certain aspects
of reform should be delayed. A paper21 on the Russian experience of civil service reform is one of the
few to try to offer an explanation of how the combination of specific internal and external factors has
constrained the reform process in that particular country eg variable political leadership and support;
variable administrative leadership and capacity; political and social instability; minimal civil society;
the preponderance of old apparatchniks; cultural factors; and ‘windows of opportunity’

6.5 Building windows of opportunity

“Cultural factors” is a general term which includes the role of the extended family22 which undercuts
competitive hiring practices. And it is well known that in such societies, public positions which give
access to lucrative revenue flows are bought at huge sums of money23 Such practices hardly give
promising preconditions24 for introducing a competitive system of meritocratic recruitment to the civil
service! Civil Service Reform in CIS countries, for example, needs
• widespread acceptance that change is needed
• spurred on by an event
• some workable propositions
• an action plan
• a lead structure
• with skilled change agents

The point about such windows is that they have to be prepared for – and recognised when they arrive!!
The public administration reforms of Poland and Hungary were, arguably, as effective they were
because of the extent of preparation by reformers25 during the 1980s – in isolation from the power
structure.
The international community has had it lucky so far – EU accession was a powerful incentive to central
European governments and societies to make changes in their ways of doing things. In non-accession
countries the picture for friendly and effective state bodies is less rosy. So what does one do? Limit
oneself in countries with a context hostile to reform to funding NGOs and giving the odd scholarship?
Keep one’s powder dry and put one’s hope in the future generation?

In places where the EU incentive does not realistically exist, competition of two sorts seems to offer
some footing for PAR
• to be investment-friendly regimes; and
• to have the image of making most progress within the particular Region (particularly to attract
TA and develop the EU’s Neighbourhood mechanism in eg Caucasus).

But such competition is rather a blunt incentive compared with that of accession. Attention needs to be
paid to the details of each local context.

6.6 Sources of reform?

Laws, regulations and other policy tools will work if there are enough people who want them to
succeed. And such people do exist. They can be found in –

Box 9; where refomers can be found

• Parliaments – even in tame and fixed parliaments, there are individual respected MPs
impatient for reform
• Street-level bureaucrats and their national Associations; many officials are frustrated
with the legal overload, lack of funding and preparation for laws. Professional associations –
which presumably the Acquis Commaunitaire has helped develop – are an important force for

20 see the useful discussion in Lovell’s paper on “Gaining Support” by which uses the dimensions of “agreement to change” and
“trust” to distinguish allies, adversaries, bedfellows, opponents and fence sitters
21 “Hard cases and improving governance; Putin and civil service reform” by Pat Grey (2004)
22 see the paper “The role of Clans in post-independence state-building in Central Asia” by Janna Khegai (2004 ECPR conference

paper available at www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions)

23 an extended article on the Uzbek system by Dmitry Pashkun of the National University of Uzbekistan quotes prices of $2

million for the position of regional governor is published in the spring 2004 issue of NISPAcee News – at www.nispa.sk
24 The “strategies and sequencing” section of the very useful World Bank website on Administrative and Civil Service reform

contains a fuller discussion of this, developing a typology with the twin axes of capability and motivation. This can be found in –
www.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice
25 See unique account written in the book by insider Regulski of the almost 20 years of preparation and change which went into

the construction of the Polish local government system (available on the LGI Budapest website).
 testing the feasibility of draft policy measures if the consultations required by impact
assessments are carried out seriously.
• Ministries of Finance; have an interest in policy coherence.
• NGOs; those which actually do represent specific social interests also have a high motivation
to solve problems
• Local Government Associations; municipalities have great potential for change. They
have legitimacy – although generally they are starved of resources. But if the councillors can
develop strong links with local people and establish good national links – eg with an effective
Association of municipalities – this can have a very positive effect.
• Audit Bodies; as government audit extends beyond the question of whether the spending of
state bodies has been legally sanctioned, it moves into the critical area of “value for money”.
This, however, takes considerable time…
• Younger generation – particularly in academia, policy shops and the media

The question is how they can become a catalytic force for change – particularly in cultures like the
Bulgarian and Romanian with such low levels of trust26. By now we should understand that it is
pointless to try to identify and work with „ individual champions of reform”who will always be
sucked into the system and disappoint. The trick is to establish coalitions…..
And what is the legitimate role in this of donors? To begin to answer such an enormous question
takes us into a wider literature than is normally read by consultants and other experts in the PAR
field – those of history, development and policy development.

7. Implications for Technical Assistance

This is the big issue – for the moment let me identify the issues which those deigning Technical
Cooperation in this field need to face.

Box 10; Some Hard truths for TA

• Technical Assistance built on projects and the project management philosophy which
enshrines that may be OK for constructing buildings but is not appropriate for assisting in the
development of public institutions
• To imagine so is to have a belief system which defies any logic. Institutions grow – and noone
in the social science understands that process
• Such criticism has been made of Technical Assistance in the development field – but has not
yet made the crossing to those who work in the (bureaucratically separate) world of
institution-building in post-communist countries
• Administrative reform has no basis in scientific truth27. The discipline of public administration
from which it springs is promiscuous in its multi-disciplinary borrowing.
• Once one accepts the world of uncertainty

8. The behavioural assumptions behind PAR interventions

All change strategies make assumptions about how people behave – whether the public, officials
or the various other stakeholders of public policies in the private and third sectors. The trouble is
that these are seldom made explicit – and subject to proper analysis28.
If we wish to change people’s behaviour, we should look at all options – and, where behaviour
patterns of non-compliants are strong, we often need to use a battery of tools. What is it that is
most likely to make target groups change their behaviour? Simple instructions? Threats?
Incentives? Explanations and understanding? Involvement in the decision-making? Moral
exhortation? Or a combination?
Many people tell us that the only effective mechanism is that of the command - whether in the form of
laws or injunctions from the boss (line 5.2 in the table). Other people would argue that rational

26 I realise the whole paper could be written around this concept - see Fujiyama book, for example.
27 See the 99 contradictory proverbs underlying it which Hood and Jackson identified in their (out of print) 1999 book
28 it took some time for the underlying assumptions of the UK modernising government programme to be made explicit

(„command and control”) and subject to critique for example in Gerry Stoker article.
arguments (eg in training sessions) or leaders make a difference – and can inspire those in the
organisation to change (points 1and 2 in the table).

Table 1; Tools in the change process29

Motivating Factor Example of instrument Particular mechanism

1. Understanding 1.1 Training Rational persuasion

1.2 Campaigns Appeal to common sense
1.3 Counting and comparing – Questioning when one’s
producing league tables organisation compares badly
2. Commitment 2.1 Leadership Legitimisation; inspiration
2.2 Consultation and cooperation Shared vision
2.3 Training Pride in behaving professionally
3. Personal Benefit 3.1 Pay increase and bonus Financial calculation
3.2 Promotion ambition
3.3 Good publicity Reputation;
3.4 Winning an award Psychological
4. Personal Cost 4.1 Named as poor performer Psychological (Shame)
4.2 Demotion Monetary
4.3 “Report cards” on Pride
organisations30
5. Obligation 5.1 Law Courts
5.2 Orders and Action plans Obedience to Managerial
authority
5.3 Family ties Social pressure
6. Peer influence 6.1 peer review Pressure from colleagues to do
6.2 bribery behave the same way as them
6.2 Quality circles
7. Social influence 7.1 Opinion surveys Feedback from public about
7.2 Public demonstrations service quality
8. inertia nudge

In the field of European Law, the threat of financial penalties is assumed to be the ultimate sanction –
but, in recent years, the European Commission has moved away from a reliance on such crude tools
and has been encouraging persuasion (social marketing) and alternative forms of conflict resolution.
And governments trying to improve the performance of state bodies have also made increasing use of
“league tables”. This involves audit bodies, for example, collecting and publishing comparative
information about the performance of individual schools and hospitals in an attempt to persuade
senior managers to address the problems of poor performance (1.3 in table). This can also act as a
market-type force - bringing the force of public opinion against the organisation (4.3 in table).

To be continued……………

29Source; this table appeared in an earlier form in the book Toward a Civil Service model for Azerbaijan in the 21st Century by R
Shabanov and R. Young (Tacis 2004, Baku)
30
“report cards” measuring citizen satisfaction with public services have become popular in many countries – both
developing and developed.
ANNEX; Excerpts from A Backbone Strategy
A set of principles will guide the future provision of EC-funded Technical Cooperation, and the design
of Project Implementation Arrangements.
These principles will apply to all TC operations (notwithstanding the management mode, including
decentralized and centralized management).
1. Focus on capacity development – TC is provided with the primary aim of supporting internal
country processes to promote capacity development at individual, organisational and countrywide
levels. Where relevant, TC can be called upon to play other roles9, such as offering advice,
providing support for the implementation and facilitation/preparation of EC cooperation.
2. Demand-led approach where TC is not provided by default – The provision of TC must
be based on the demand and requirements of the partner country. Costs and available options
should be transparent. Appropriate dialogue and support may be needed in order to enable clear
formulation of the demand for TC.
3. Adopting a results-orientation – TC design will ensure that TC inputs/activities are linked to
targeted outputs which in turn lead to sustainable development outcomes. Appropriate indicators
will be agreed on in advance to monitor the implementation of TC.
4. Country-owned and managed TC process – Country partner ownership is the key underlying
principle for the organisation of EC-funded TC. From the identification to the implementation
phase, partner countries will be actively involved in the design of PIAs and TC-supported
programmes, including the procurement of TC services and the management, review and
accounting of TC results.
5. Taking account of country and sector-specific requirements – TC support will build on
a thorough understanding of the political, socio-cultural, sectoral and institutional context.
Blueprint approaches should be avoided.
6. Working through harmonised and aligned action – TC support will be closely coordinated
with other donors and aligned to country strategies and programmes through the increased use
of pooling arrangements or other harmonised approaches, such as delegated cooperation.
7. Avoiding the use of parallel PIUs and promoting effective Project Implementation
Arrangements – The use of parallel PIUs will be avoided as far as possible in favour of effective
implementation arrangements that are fully integrated and accountable to national structures10.
8. Considering different and innovative options for the provision of Technical Cooperation –
The design of TC support will consider alternatives to the use of international long- and shortterm
consultants. These alternatives include the use of national and regional resources, twinning
arrangements and knowledge transfer beyond standard training approaches.

The implementation of the Strategy will be organised around five interlinked working axes that are
presented below and set out in the Work Plan that complements this Strategy.

1. Support strategic dialogue on Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation

Arrangements.
2. Improve Technical Cooperation design, management and accountability.
3. Improve procurement, contracting and other procedures related to Technical
Cooperation and Project Implementation Arrangements.
4. Enhance internal EC capacity through communication, knowledge management
and training.
5. Implementation and monitoring of the Strategy.

Axes 4 and 5 include horizontal activities that frame the implementation process.
The implementation of this Strategy includes:
• ‘short-term priority actions’ that have to be carried out before December 2008 and actions with
a mid to long-term time horizon. Implementation will, therefore, take a phased approach and the
Work Plan will be updated following progress with implementation;
• actions that are system-wide and need to be addressed at HQ level, and actions that need to be
addressed at country level;
• among the five axis there are various actions that are being taken in response to the
recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors’ Report on TA11.

The delegations are key players in the implementation of this Strategy. In consultation with partner
country stakeholders and other donors, delegations will develop a mapping of major TC operations
and a concise Actions Plan that will include appropriate targets for the implementation of the Strategy
at country level. The Action Plan will allow for the identification of ‘quick-wins’ that can trigger and
accompany the change process12. Through these exercises (mapping and action plans), countries
and/or programmes where major problems exist will be identified, where remedial measures and
special support may be required.
The approach adopted in this Strategy goes beyond a ‘product based’ reform focusing on the
promulgation of new rules and on the development of a set of products (such as Guidelines and
trening courses) which stakeholders are expected to use.
Rather, this reform envisages a process that requires action to be taken at many levels by different
stakeholders, including effective communication and monitoring/learning mechanisms that reach out
beyond the EC to partner country stakeholders and other donors.
The Work Plan sets out an ambitious agenda for change. It requires a special effort on the part of
all involved during the first six months, to ensure that tools are created and systems introduced. The
emphasis will then be on ‘working in a different way’, which does not imply additional workload. On the
contrary, gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of TC delivery are expected.
Nevertheless, there are risks related to country partners’ capacity to ensure active involvement
throughout the cycle of TC-supported programmes There are also risks related to internal EC
workloads, particularly where delegations are already overloaded.
To manage these risks, a clear prioritisation of actions through Action Plans at country level is
envisaged.
The development of these Action Plans will take account of the opportunities offered by the annual
programming process. These plans will also allow for the flexible implementation of the Strategy,
ensuring the feasibility of the reform process tailored to the country situation. This implementation
will be supported by HQ and regularly reviewed by means of a peer mechanism through the online
platform, and at High Level Steering committee level. Actions in the area of communication and
knowledge management will provide EC staff with broad incentives to implement the Strategy and
ensure visibility.

4.3.1 Axis 1: Support strategic dialogue on TC and PIUs

• At country level, delegations will actively encourage and support local efforts to reform TC and
will engage in high level dialogue on TC and PIUs including at sectoral level and in the context of
the annual programming process. Depending on the country context, this dialogue and related
initiatives may have a different focus, scope and intensity. Possible areas of engagement include:
- to raise awareness, communicate/disseminate the Strategy to partner countries, other donors,
project staff, and other interested stakeholders; to position the EC as a donor that is committed to
taking the reform forward at international as well as at country level;
- where the partner country is leading the process, to promote/support the development of national
policies on TC/TA; where partner countries do not yet have a clear position on TC/TA and PIUs, to
enter into dialogue with them on the issue of TC/TA and PIUs;
- to work with country partners and other donors to integrate actions supporting capacity development
in sector programmes, in particular where sector approaches are pursued (identify specific roles that
TA can play in supporting sector reform processes);
- to develop links with Public Sector Reforms and Civil Service Reforms; engage in discussions related
to public service pay, staff retention and harmonisation of donor salary ‘top up’;
- This dialogue may be developed in parallel with the discussion surrounding the country Action Plan
referred to under the Working Axis no. 5 on ‘Implementation and Monitoring of the Strategy’.
• A link will be made with the programming process to ensure that annual reviews (including the
Joint Assistance Report for EDF Countries), Mid-Term Reviews and the next round of Multi-Annual
Indicative Programmes comply with the principles of this Strategy.
• Where appropriate, delegations should take a lead role in the dialogue on demand-driven and
country-owned TC, in particular where Joint Assistance Strategies are pursued. Delegations should
also act as a driver of change on TC reform among European partner agencies. Opportunities for co-
financing of TC operations with other donors under the fast track Division of Labour initiative will be
actively pursued.
• Dialogue will also be pursued at international and HQ levels as part of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda
and the post-Accra workflow, including identifying best practices in harmonised and aligned TC,
together with a further improved monitoring system of the Paris indicators and the Accra Agenda for
Action commitments prior to the next High Level Forum in 2011. Actions will be supported in the area
of joint multi-donor training at HQ and country levels.
• Dialogue with member states will be enhanced in order to ensure implementation of the Council
Conclusion of the 27th May 2008, ‘The EU as a global partner for development: Speeding up progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’, par. 67

4.3.2 Axis 2: Improve TC design, management and accountability

• At the heart of the Strategy lies the application of Guidelines on TC and PIAs. This document will
provide guidance on: i) the design and implementation of TC-supported programmes (with particular
emphasis on how to promote partner-owned operations, clarify the purposes of TC support and focus
on results, enhance harmonisation), and ii) the design of Project Implementation Arrangements taking
into account organisational and governance parameters.
• Delegations will be at the forefront of reforms at country level to ensure that TC is provided based
on partner demands.
• Delegations will ensure that other donors are systematically informed of all TC operations in the
pipeline and, where relevant, involved in the design process.
• The EC will produce other tools (e.g. standard TOR) and revise internal practices used in the
processes of programme identification and formulation, with a view to ensuring the involvement of
partner country stakeholders, and adequately defining the role of external consultants involved in
the design process. Attention will also be devoted to linking TC and PIU reform with wider issues
of Public Sector Reform.
• The ex-ante Quality Assessment System15, that is used to screen the quality of programmes at
the identification and formulation stages, will be revised to promote structured discussion and
enhance attention with regard to the key ‘quality attributes’ of TC operations. These attributes
include: partners’ commitment and ‘real’ ownership, clear definition of results, adequate fitting
to the context, harmonisation, quality of PIAs. A quality assurance system to be applied at the
preparation stage of TC operations (e.g. TOR for TA service contracts or other relevant project
documents) will also be deployed at country level.
• To strengthen ownership, joint monitoring of progress and accountability to partner countries
will be encouraged. Where relevant, this will include the promotion of Performance Assessment
Tools.
• A ‘Tool Kit on assessing and supporting issues related to capacity development’ will be produced
and its application supported by advanced training on capacity development (see axis 4).
• Monitoring systems will also be adapted, including the external results-oriented monitoring system
managed by EuropeAid (ROM system). External evaluations of innovative and important capacity
development-oriented TC operations are foreseen.

4.3.3 Axis 3: Improve TC procurement, contracting and other procedures

A set of measures will be implemented to make procurement, contracting and other related
procedures conducive to more effective TC operations, responsive to country demands and
progressively answerable and accountable to the partners’ systems. This comprises:

a) Measures to enhance Partner Government’s ownership across the whole process of

provision of TC
• Involve more partner countries in drafting and revising ToR, the selection of experts and
approving reports.
• Simplify tools (such as the practical guide on programme estimates, the templates of tender
dossiers) to make them more users’ friendly, with a view to facilitate their use by national
implementing agencies/staff.

Each geo-directorate identify the countries/operations where centralized management still applies
for TC and, in coordination with other relevant EC services, set up mechanisms to promote the
use of decentralized management, in particular for long term TC/TA services.
• In the medium term, promote use of national systems (including procurement procedures). This
implies a more systematic assessment of Partner Government capacities and procedures and
promoting the use of assessments carried out by other donors. In case of co-financing, the
provision of TC through pool funds managed by Partner Government will be fostered.

b) A new approach to improve the quality and relevance of expertise16

• Improve the quality of ToR by preparing guidance and training staff on drafting ToR (see also
sections 2 and 4 of the Work Plan).
• Establish a database to track previous performance of experts and firms. This work will initially
trialled for Framework Contracts and then extended to other types of contracts. To this end,
the establishment of ‘Evaluation of Performance Forms’ will be made compulsory for the final
payments. The implications on data protection and accessibility aspects will be carefully examined.
• Put more emphasis on quality-related criteria in the selection and evaluation of applicants, such
as: making systematic use of phone interviews of candidates for key positions, cross-checking
previous relevant experience and performance (e.g. through the ‘Evaluation of Performance
Forms’).

c) Ensure a rapid project start up and responsiveness during implementation

• Speed up the project start up by making greater use of tendering with suspensive clauses. This
implies making amendments to the Implementing Modalities of the Financial Regulations (notably
for the Budget).
• Address the issue of unavailability of experts after signing a service contract (short or long term)
by raising awareness among EC staff of possible penalties; clarify under what conditions a contract
can be cancelled and widen the options for replacing experts.
• Allow more flexibility to update/revision of project design (such as revisions of the Logical
Framework and/or budget), with a view to reduce the time required to process/agree on
such changes.

d) Widening the nature and source of potential TC expertise

This entails on the one hand promoting the involvement of organisations other than commercial firms
(such as public institutions, universities, non-profit organisations, think tanks, etc.), and on the other
hand making more use of local and regional expertise (and more generally facilitating South-South
cooperation). Particular attention will be given to facilitating the dissemination of know-how, the
extension of learning systems, training, etc.
• Through appropriate guidance, training and dissemination of good practices, raise awareness of
the existing mechanisms available for mobilising expertise in public bodies. This includes:
- a) greater use of the negotiated procedure (already allowed by the PRAG in case of publicsector
bodies or to non-profit institutions or associations)17;
- b) use of grant contracts (possibly and where relevant by direct agreement) to provide TC
through non-traditional sources.

Develop and implement appropriate additional procurement procedures to be able to conclude

various types of agreements or contracts with public bodies. These could include institutional
twinning, PG peer consultation. In this context, the involvement of local/regional/South public
bodies will be given due attention.
• Clarify the modalities to facilitate the contracting of local/regional expertise. The promotion of
South-South cooperation also calls for broadening the notion of untying of aid to allow eligibility
between ACP and non ACP Partner Countries. More generally, joint financing from EDF and
Budget sources will be examined.

e) Enhancing donor coordination for new operations

• Promote the use of delegated cooperation and promote pool funding for TC inputs.

The implementation of actions under Axis 3 will be done through various means:
• promote better understanding of existing possibilities by issuing guidance to ensure staff is fully
aware of the current legal framework;
• specific instructions might also be required in case of new developments;
• integrate the changes promoted by the present strategy in the PRAG and subsequently in training
modules;
• regularly feed the online platform on TC with updated information on procedures (including
Frequently Asked Questions – FAQs).

4.3.4 Axis 4: Enhance internal capacity through communication,

knowledge management, training
This Strategy touches on the behaviour and practices of multiple actors. The implementation of the
Strategy will be supported by a number of communication and knowledge management activities with
a view to reaching out to EC staff, partner country stakeholders and other donors.
• The Strategy and the Guidelines will be disseminated widely, firstly within the EC system and in
a second phase, once fully ‘adopted’ internally, to external partners. Communication tools (e.g.
leaflets, power point and multi-media presentations) will be produced and widely disseminated,
while ‘ambassadors of the Strategy’ within EuropeAid and the delegations will be trained and
mobilised.
• Communication will also target other donors and in particular Member States with a view to
promote coordinated action.
• At the heart of the strategy lies an interactive platform for efficient communication and the
exchange of practices between delegations and HQ. Various actions/incentives are envisaged
to ensure that HQ and the delegations regularly feed the system with relevant good practice
material, particularly on new approaches. The platform will also support the progressive revision
of systems, tools and procedures (through updating FAQs and other facilities).
• The EC will also promote the diversification of sources of expertise and facilitate access to
additional (‘non-traditional’) TC providers in the non-profit sectors. Steps will be taken to facilitate
access and networking with centres of competence within the EU system (including EU bodies
such as Joint Research Centres, line DGs, etc.) and networks with selected academic institutions,
research centres and think tanks in the North and South.
• In the area of training, existing methodological training offered by EuropeAid will be revised to
make it consistent with and to support the implementation of the Strategy. A ‘hands-on training
kit’ for a short introductory course on TC will be developed. This introductory course will then be
delivered at HQ and country level under different funding and organisational arrangements (using
both internal and external trainers including under programme funds). This training will be open to
country partners and concerned TC providers. The participation of Finance and Contract Units
staff in Europeaid and delegations will be strongly promoted. An e-learning version of this course
will be developed in the first quarter of 2009 and made available to partner country staff and
other interested donors.
• More advanced training will be organised at HQ and country level. Priority will be given to field level
tailored sessions in response to demand by country stakeholders; the ‘sector format’, open to partner
countries and other donors, will be given priority, in particular where trening may support ongoing
sector programmes. Multi-donor training will be actively pursued. External training will be offered to
core groups of staff to build EC competency in the area of capacity development.
• Steps will be taken aimed at promoting access to additional knowledge sources, mainly in the
academic and university system. This will be linked to a broader workflow aimed at enhancing
knowledge management within EuropeAid.
• A conference will be organised in 2010 on the theme ‘Good Practices in Technical Cooperation’.

4.3.5 Axis 5: Implementation and Monitoring of the Strategy

a) Implementation of the Strategy at country level
Delegations will play a key role in the implementation of the Strategy. They will steer a country-based
process of reform together with partner countries and other donors.
• A ‘mapping exercise’ of TC operations and of parallel PIUs will be conducted by the delegations
between July 2008 and January 2009.
• On the basis of this mapping, by end of January 2009, the delegations in connection with the
partner countries will draw up a concise Action Plan to implement the Strategy and meet its
objectives.
• The Action Plan will include: i) actions to address TC practices which conflict with the
guiding principles of this Strategy; ii) measures to phase out parallel PIUs and to ensure better
accountability of all TC operations and improved Project Implementation Arrangements. The
Action Plan will frame the preparation of future TC operations to ensure compliance with the
Strategy and set ambitious targets for coordinated TC, in particular in countries/sectors relevant
to the Division of Labour fast track initiative. Within the Plans, ‘quick win’ type of actions (including
communications/training) will be identified to stimulate change on a broader scale.
• HQ will develop regional analysis of the mapping and country Action Plans sent by delegations by
end of March 2009. This exercise will help identifying good practices as well as countries and/or
programmes where ‘intensive support’ is needed. Selected material will be posted on the website
to ensure communication between country partners as well as among countries. The delegations
will report back to HQ on implementation
through the established reporting system. This reporting will feed regular progress reviews.
• HQ will mobilise internal resources in sufficient quantity and quality to fully support country
processes.
• Actions to support innovative practices will be implemented: innovative programmes will be
earmarked during the identification phase (Quality Support Group checklist), delegations will be
asked to identify ‘pilot programmes’ in their current portfolio; all pilots will receive special support
through various initiatives (e.g. tailored training, exchange of practices, etc.). The interactive
platform will present good practices and success stories.

b) Overall implementation and monitoring framework of the Strategy

The Implementation Framework for the Strategy – presented in Annex 3 – includes ‘core teams’
at different levels which will ensure that key functions are properly addressed and act as points of
contact.
• The delegations will set up a team of dedicated resource people, including staff from the Finance
and Contracts Units, to oversee the Strategy implementation. They will develop and ensure
implementation of the Action Plans, ensure communication and training activities are organised,
contribute to feed the knowledge management system. All staff in delegation will contribute to
the implementation of the Strategy throughout the five working axis, including complying with the
revised procedures (see section 3 of the Work Plan).
• Each Geographical Directorate will set up an internal team of dedicated resource people to
support the overall implementation of the Strategy. This will include reviewing country Action
Plans, active involvement in the quality assessment process of new programmes, communication
activities, internal training, identification and support of innovative practices, and feeding the
online platform.

A Coordination Team, formed by Directorate E staff and including key resource people from other
concerned units, will be closely involved in the implementation system, preparing reviews and
ensuring overall coordination.
• A High Level Steering Committee, chaired by the EuropeAid Director General, will ensure regular
review of progress and that decisions are taken with regard to possible additional initiatives or
adjustments to the Work Plan.
• The first review is scheduled for November 2008 focusing on the set of ‘short term priority
actions’ to be finalised before the end of 2008 and evaluating the overall implementation system.
Two reviews are planned for 2009 (April and November 2009).
• An external evaluation of Technical Cooperation will be launched at the end of 2009.
• An informal consultative panel will be set up to promote dialogue on innovative TC practices,
which will be open to selected partner country representatives, member states and other donors,
think tanks on aid effectiveness and individual experts on TC and capacity development issues.

4.3.6 Issues relating to Project Implementation Arrangements

across the five axes
Project Implementation Arrangements are addressed across the five working axes. Box 6 below
provides an overview of the principles to be applied and of the work to be under taken in this area,
in line with Paris and EU related targets.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/index_en.htm