(128) PIMENTEL v.
JUDGE SALANGA (Barron) FACTS:
September 18, 1967 | Sanchez, J. | Rule 137, Revised Rules of Court
PETITIONER: Constante Pimentel
RESPONDENT: The Honorable Judge Angelino C. Salanga
SUMMARY: Atty. Pimentel, a practicing attoney, is counsel of record in several cases (i.e.
a civil case, two criminal cases, and an election case) before the sala of Judge Salanga
(CFI). Eventually, Atty. Pimentel filed an administrative case against Judge Salanga for
serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and
incompetence. This case was referred to a CA Judge for investigation, report and
recommendation. Atty. Pimental moved to have Judge Salanga disqualify himself from
sitting in the aforementioned cases assigned to his sala. However, Judge Salanga the
motion. Judge Salanga reasoned that the administrative complaint against him is no cause
for disqualification under the Rules of Court and that the transfer of the aforementioned
cases will only cause delay and additional expenses to the parties. Unwavered Atty.
Pimentsal filed this petition before the SC to challenge Judge Salnagan’s right to sit in
judgement in the said cases. Furthermore, Atty. Salanga argued that the case falls squarely
under the 2nd paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court (i.e A judge may, in
the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.) and for this reason Judge Salngan failed
to exercise his sound discretion. ISSUE: Whether Judge Salanga on the basis of Atty.
Pimetel’s contentions should disqualify himself or recuse from deciding the aforementioned
cases. (NO) The Court disagrees with Atty. Pimetel’s position. Rule 37 enumerates the
disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify
himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily
inhibiting himself in the absence of any challenge by either party (or for other grounds not
provided in the said rule). Voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical
grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is
empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition. Furthermore, the exercise of
sound discretion — mentioned in the rule — has reference exclusively to a situation
where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. This means
when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue
with the case. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced,
simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. No act or
conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume
what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him.
Since Judge Salngan is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, the SC cannot,
on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment
in the cases herein mentioned.
DOCTRINE: Rule 37 enumerates the disqualification of a judge upon being
challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has
never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself in
the absence of any challenge by either party. Voluntary inhibition, based on
good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the
judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for such
inhibition.
1. Atty. Constante Pimentel, a practicing attorney, is counsel of record in the
following cases pending before the sala of Judge Angelino Salanga (CFI of
Ilocos Sur, Branch IV):
a. Civil Cases 21-C (Festejo, et al. v. Cabildo, et al.) - a special civil action
for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of elective and appointive
municipal officials; Atty. Pimentel is counsel for principal respondent,
Acting Mayor Brigido Vilog;
b. Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5 (People of the Philippines v. Anies) - for
frustrated murder; Atty. Pimentel is the private prosecutor therein;
c. Criminal Case C-93 (People of the Philippines v. Pimentel) - for
frustrated homicide; Atty. Pimentel is defense counsel therein; and
d. Election Case 2470 (Balbin v. Abaya) - an election protest involving the
office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur; Atty. Pimentel is counsel for
protestant therein.
2. Atty. Pimentel filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court on May
12, 1967, against Judge Salanga upon averments of "serious misconduct,
inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence. In the
said complaint, it was sought that Judge Salanga be immediately suspended from
office and after due notice, removed therefrom.
3. On July 13, 1967, the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation to Justice Serrano of the CA.
4. Atty. Pimentel moved to have Judge Salanga disqualify himself from sitting
in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, and Election Code 2470.
Also, it was prayed that the records of the said cases be transferred to another sala.
5. Judge Salanga denied the foregoing motion. He reasoned that:
a. the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification
under the Rules of Court;
b. the cases sought to be transferred are now on the final stages of
termination and transfer thereof to another sala would only delay their
final disposition, make the parties suffer from further efforts and
expenses; and
c. he is sworn to administer justice in accordance with the law and the
merits of the cases to be heard and decided by him.
6. Hence, Atty. Pimentel filed this original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
before the SC, where the right of Judge Salanga to sit in judgment in the
aforementioned cases is being challenged.
7. Atty. Pimentel argues that an immediate resolution of the problem of
disqualification is a matter of profound importance, particularly on his career and
potential as a practitioner of law. His cases may fall by the accident of raffle into
the sala of Judge Salanga and he cannot resign from an accepted case every time
 it falls therein. Furthermore, he states that his clients will have the natural
hesitation to retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding
judge.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Salanga on the basis of Atty. Pimetel’s contentions should
disqualify himself or recuse from deciding the aforementioned cases. (NO)
c.
RULING: Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied.
So ordered.
RELEVANT PROVISION:
sprang the added seconf paragrapg in Section 1, Rule 137. Under the
said case, the SC said that obviously Rule 26 [now 37] enumerates the
disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he
should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been
interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself
in the absence of any challenge by either party.
Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of
voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds,
is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who
is empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition.

Rule 137, Section 1, Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject to review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
RATIO:
1. Atty. Pimentel is of the position that his case comes within the coverage of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, ROC. (i.e “A judge may, in the exercise of
his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.”)
2. Furthermore, Atty. Pimentel stresses that Judge Salanga, in the factual
environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused
to disqualify himself from acting in the cases referred to.
3. [Background/History of Provision] Before the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 came into being, the law and early jurisprudence gave no room for
judges to disqualify himself, absent any of the specific grounds fro
disqualification in the law.
a. Under this rule, to take or not to take cognizance of a case does not
depend upon the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a
given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally
disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official
duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case.
b. However, then came the case of Del Castillo v. Javelona, from which
4. The exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the rule — has reference
exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes
forward with the case. This means when a judge does not inhibit himself, and
he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137,
the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case.
5. This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved.
If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or
prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of
justice.
6. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced,
simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him.
No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore,
we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally
disqualified, will do in a case before him.
7. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is
concerned, is a matter of conscience.
8. As a general rule, a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination.
9. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind
to act in or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved.
10. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case
where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.
11. In the case at bar, the SC is persuaded to say that since respondent judge is
not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, it cannot, on certiorari or
prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the
cases herein mentioned.
 130 SANDOVAL v. CA (JA)
Aug 01, 1996 | Romero, J. | Inhibition (hot and fresh out the kitchen, mama rolling that body)
PETITIONER: JUAN C. SANDOVAL
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO L. TAN JR.
SUMMARY:
This case involves a land dispute between Sandoval and Lorenzo Tan Jr. Tan is the
registered owner of a parcel of land. He eventually found out through the register of
deeds that his land was fraudulently mortgaged by an impostor. The land was
eventually registered under Sandoval’s name. Hence, Tan filed a complaint
impleading Sandoval. He prayed for the nullification of the deed of sale, as well as a
cancellation of the TCTs in his name. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent Tan, Jr. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's findings. Sandoval
filed this petition for review claiming that the ponente of the decision in the Court of
Appeals, Justice Luis Victor should have inhibited himself from the case inasmuch
because for a time, he was the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. The
SC found no legal basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case.
He presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff's evidence and ruled on
motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable
Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was
promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice
Victor as ponente. Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the
court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he
cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own
decision as judge in the trial court. Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more
prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier
involvement in the case.
DOCTRINE:
A judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly,
to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and
promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary.
FACTS:
(Facts 1-15 aren’t really important. They just give the background of the “purchaser in
good faith” aspect of the case. Not really relevant to our topic, so enuff na summary box)
1. In the case at bar, it appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property
lawfully titled in another's name by misrepresenting himself as the latter.
2. The property subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land on which a
five-door apartment building stands. It is covered by a TCT in the name of
"Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. married to Carolina Mangampo"
3. Sometime in October 1984, private respondent Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. was notified
of the need to present his owner's copy of the TCT to the Registry of Deeds,
Quezon City in connection with an adverse claim.
4. Upon reaching the Office of the Register of Deeds, he explained that he was still
looking for his copy of the TCT.
5. In November 1984, he discovered that the adverse claim of one Godofredo
Valmeo had been annotated on his title in the Registry of Deeds.
a. A Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr., obviously an impostor, had mortgaged the
property to Valmeo on October 9, 1984 to secure a P70,000.00
obligation.
6. On December 6, 1984, the real Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. herein private respondent,
filed a complaint for cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and damages
against Bienvenido Almeda and Godofredo Valmeo before the RTC
7. Sometime in April 1985, Tan met petitioner Juan C. Sandoval who claimed to be
the new owner at the site of the property.
a. He informed the latter of the case against Bienvenido Almeda and
Godofredo Valmeo.
8. Upon further investigation, petitioner discovered that as early as September 13,
1984, someone purporting to be Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. sold the property to
Bienvenido Almeda in a Deed of Sale of Registered Land with Pacto de Retro.
a. Said person representing himself as Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr., with the marital
consent of the alleged Carolina Mangampo Tan, also executed a Waiver
in favor of Bienvenido Almeda
b. As a result, a TCT in the name of Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of Bienvenido Almeda.
c. On March 29, 1985, Bienvenido Almeda sold the subject property to
petitioner Juan C. Sandoval.
d. TCT was again cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
Sandoval.
9. Private respondent's original complaint was accordingly amended in August 1985
to implead petitioner Juan C. Sandoval and to add the following as causes of
action:
a. the nullification of the deed of sale with pacto de retro
b. the waiver and the cancellation of TCTs.
i. Private respondent alleged that petitioner had prior knowledge
of legal flaws which tainted Bienvenido Almeda's title.
10. Tan caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT
11. Sandoval countered that he was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable
consideration.
a. He bought the property through real estate brokers whom he contacted
after seeing the property advertised in the March 3, 1985 issue of the
Manila Bulletin.
b. After guarantees were given by the brokers and his lawyer's go-signal
to purchase the property, petitioner negotiated with Bienvenido Almeda.
c. The price was paid in two installments. As earlier noted, Bienvenido
Almeda executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and a new TCT
was issued in the latter's name.
12. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Tan, Jr.
13. Only Juan C. Sandoval, herein petitioner, appealed the decision.
14. CA reduced appellant's sixteen assignment of errors to two basic issues:
a. the validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed on October
9, 1984 in favor of Godofredo Valmeo and the Deed of Sale of
Registered Land with Pacto de Retro in favor of Bienvenido Almeda
 b. whether or not Juan C. Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith.
15. The CA affirmed the trial court's findings modifying only the award for damages
and attorney's fees.
a. Respondent court confirmed the invalidity of the aforementioned
documents and
b. held that the circumstances outlined by the trial court should have so
aroused petitioner's suspicion as to impel him to conduct further inquiry
into his vendor's title.
16. Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of
the Court of Appeals decision.
a. he was denied due process when the ponente of the decision in the Court
of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case
inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo
trying the case.
b. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value
who should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against
private respondent Tan, Jr.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of Appeals should
have inhibited himself from taking part in the case. NO
2. W/N petitioner Juan Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith NO (not important)
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in "Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. v. Bienvenido Almeda," (CA G.R. CV No. 33265)
is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
1. Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, Section 1 reads:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
2. The Code of Judicial Conduct spells out in Rule 3.12 the disqualifications
of a judge:
"Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matters in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or
to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows that the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition."
3. The Canons of Judicial Ethics provides us with more general guidelines:
"3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety
A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
every day life, should be beyond reproach.
xxx xxx xxx
31. A summary of judicial obligations
A judge's conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be
conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour,
and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the
patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests
to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office."
4. From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to
inhibit himself from deciding the case.
a. He presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff's
evidence and ruled on motions.
b. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the
Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge
when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted.
c. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to
Justice Victor as ponente.
5. The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the
disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his "ruling in a lower
court is the subject of review" or "in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review."
a. Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the
court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision
 therein. e. The certification appearing on the deed of sale that the property was
b. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where not tenanted was plainly untrue.
he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court.
6. Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and
circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier
involvement in the case.
7. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might
be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and
partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public
confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary.
a. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the
case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the
case below constitutes a "just or valid reason," under Section 1 of
Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.

SECOND ISSUE (not impt)

1. The Court affirms the trial and appellate courts' findings that the petitioner is
not a purchaser in good faith.

2. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property

3. Circumstances that lead to court’s conclusion:

a. There were two copies of TCT in the Register of Deeds, only one of
which could be genuine. By the time that the sale to Sandoval was
being negotiated, therefore, the two copies of TCT were already in
the files of the Register of Deeds. Sandoval was aware in fact of the
irregularity attending TCTs.

b. The deed of sale contained the erroneous address of Almeda

c. The lack of consistency in Sandoval's enumeration and recollection

of his alleged meetings with Almeda warrants disbelief in and
inspires doubt of Sandoval's claim.

d. Sandoval could have unavoidably noticed the several but varying

addresses of Almeda which were suspicious, to say the least. It was
expected of him to have thereby been alerted to the questionability
of Almeda's title on the property.
 Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation Inc v. Pizarro (Aguirre)
January 14, 2005 | Chico-Nazario, Inc. | JudCon Canon 3
PETITIONER: MAMERTO MANIQUIZ FOUNDATION, INC., as represented
by its President NORBERTO C. MANIQUIZ,
RESPONDENTS: ROGELIO PIZARRO, Presiding Judge, Quezon City RTC
SUMMARY: A Complaint for violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of
Judicial Conduct was filed by the Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc.,
represented by its President, Maniquiz against Judge Rogelio Pizarro, Presiding
Judge of RTC of Quezon City. This was due to a series of orders and the decision
made by Judge Pizarro pursuant to a petition filed by Mejia for the issuance of a
writ of possession over a parcel of land which Mejia purchased through an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Mamerto, the former owner of said lot who
defaulted in its 1 million loan obligation to Mejia, moved for dismissal on the
ground that there was a pending civil case to annul the sale. The RTC granted the
petition. Mamerto then appealed before the RTC and at the same time filed for
Certiorari before the CA. Judge Pizarro of the RTC:
1. granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
2. granted the break-open motion filed by Mejia
3. denied the notice of appeal of Pizarro; and
4. granted Mejia's motion to dismiss Mamerto's notice of appeal
Mamerto mainly contends that there existed bias, partiality and gross ignorance of
the law in connection with judge's disposition of LRC Case. ISSUE: WoN Judge
Pizarro can be held administratively liable — NO
There is no gross ignorance of the law. As a rule, any question regarding the
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession. Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance
of writ of possession is entirely out of place. The dismissal of the appeal was valid
because it was premised on the withdrawal of the appeal as confirmed by the
result of the investigation and report submitted by Justice Guerrero of the CA.
Furthermore, Judge Pizarro justified the dismissal of the appeal due to the
certiorari filed in the CA, which he considered to be some form of forum
shopping. The SC said that even if it were an error, he cannot be sanctioned in the
absence of proof that the same was rendered due to corrupt and improper motives.
There was also no substantial proof of bias and partiality, but only mere
speculation and suspicion.
DOCTRINE: A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of
judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
FACTS:
1. Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc., represented by its President, Norberto
C. Maniquiz loaned 1 million from Don Mejia secured by a mortgage over a
parcel of land and its improvements in Quezon City.
a. Mamerto defaulted so Mejia caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the property. Mejia was the highest bidder.
b. The Mamerto did not exercise its right to redeem the property, so
Mejia consolidated his ownership over the land.
2. LRC CASE: Mejia filed a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the RTC of Quezon City where Judge Pizarro presides.
3. Mamerto then moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, suspension on the
ground that it had filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of real estate
mortgage, sheriff's sale, TCT, and damages.
4. The RTC then ruled in favor of Mejia.
5. A series of motions and notices were then filed: (emphasized the impt ones)
a. Mamerto submitted a notice of appeal and a manifestation of its
proposal in an effort to settle out of court but this was DENIED.
b. Mamerto filed for a Petition for Relief from Judgment and this was
granted but the prayer for TRO was denied
c. From this Mamerto filed a notice of appeal before the RTC and
a petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA.
i. Mejia filed a motion to dismiss Mamerto's appeal on the
ground that it had already filed for certiorari w/ the CA
ii. The RTC granted Mejia’s motion to dismiss and
ordered the execution of the Writ of Possession.
d. Mamerto filed a Motion to set aside and/or defer implementation of
the Writ of Possession citing the filing of the petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals but this was denied.
e. Then Mejia filed a Motion to Break-Open, which was granted.
f. CA dismissed Mamerto's Petition for Certiorari. The motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed.
g. Mamerto then filed a motion to inhibit the judge but was denied.
6. Mamerto then filed the administrative complaint against Judge Pizarro
before this Court for bias, partiality and gross ignorance of the law in
connection with judge's disposition of LRC Case.
7. Judge Pizarro claimed that after Mejia presented his evidence in the LRC
Case, Mamerto withdrew its opposition to the petition after Mejia agreed to
give Mamerto 45 days to negotiate for the repurchase of the property.
a. Since the negotiations did not prosper, the trial court rendered its
decision granting the writ of possession as prayed for by Mejia.
b. The denial of Mamerto's notice of appeal is justified because of the
withdrawal of its opposition as stated earlier.
c. The subsequent issuance of the writ of possession to Mejia is a
ministerial duty of the court.
d. The order granting the motion of Mejia to dismiss was issued on
account of the certiorari petition filed (possibly forum shopping)
8. The case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and the issue of
WoN there was withdrawal of Mamerto's opposition to the grant of writ of
possession be referred to the Presiding Justice of the CA for raffle and to
submit his investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days.
 9. The case was raffled to Associate Justice Buenaventura Guerrero who
submitted his report and recommendation stating that "there was indeed a
withdrawal of Mamerto's opposition," as supported by evidence.
10. MAMERTO’S CONTENTIONS — the decision and the Orders in question
were all issued:
a. At a time when a civil case was still pending before another branch
of the trial court, thus, Judge Pizarro allegedly failed to observe
peer courtesy when he issued said break-open Order despite
knowledge that the result of civil case would affect the issuance of
the writ of possession.
b. Despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari before the CA
and the fact that the records of the case were already ordered
elevated to the CA.
ISSUE: WoN Judge Pizarro can be held administratively liable for bias, partiality
and gross ignorance of the law— NO
RULING: For lack of merit, the complaint against respondent Judge Rogelio M.
Pizarro, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is DISMISSED. The RTC correctly:
1. granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
2. granted the break-open
3. denied the notice of appeal of Pizarro; and
4. granted Mejia's motion to dismiss Mamerto's notice of appeal
RATIO:
First Issue: No gross ignorance of the law.
The issuance of the writ of possession and the break open order was correct despite
the pendency of the civil case.
1. We affirm the correctness of respondent's order.
2. A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the
sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real and personal
property, such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed.
a. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure such as in the case at bar is merely a
ministerial function.
b. It is a settled rule that after the consolidation of title in the buyer's
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right.
3. The pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar
the issuance of the writ of possession after title to the property has been
consolidated in the mortgagee.
a. Thus, it follows that at the expiration of the period of redemption,
the mortgagee who acquires the property at the foreclosure sale can
proceed to have the title consolidated in his name and a writ of
possession issued in his favor.
4. The judge issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot
be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
5. As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ
of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled
to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome
of said case. Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of
possession is entirely out of place.
6. According to jurisprudence, this Court has consistently held that the duty of
the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial.
a. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond.
b. No discretion is left to the trial court.
The dismissal of the Mamerto's appeal was premised on its withdrawal of its
opposition to the petition which withdrawal was confirmed by the result of the
investigation and report submitted by Justice Guerrero.
1. Per report of Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, the investigation before the
Court of Appeals yielded the information that there was in fact withdrawal
by the Mamerto of its opposition to the petition, based on:
a. The transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing
b. That Judge Pizarro on the same day dictated in open court such fact
c. Even after the Maniquiz's side received the decision, they did not
file a motion for reconsideration thereof nor appealed therefrom
within the reglementary period. Instead, per Norberto's own
admission in the investigation, they requested for another
conference of the parties for possible settlement.
2. Judge Pizarro justified the dismissal of the notice of appeal due to two
apparent conflicting remedies adopted by the Mamerto.
a. The judge must have considered the appeal and the petition for
certiorari seeking, as they did, the same remedy, to be some form
of forum shopping. We are not ready to pronounce his action as in
error. However, assuming that the same was in error, it was a
judgment error for which the respondent cannot be sanctioned in
the absence of proof that the same was rendered due to corrupt and
improper motives.
Second Issue: No bias and partiality.
1. In administrative proceedings, the Mamerto bears the onus of establishing,
by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint.
2. Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a
judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot
be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation
under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person
 and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.
3. Bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence
and without fear or favor.
4. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias
and partiality.
a. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.
5. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning
a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge.
6. A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of
judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose.
7. If a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the
proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the
Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint.
a. Divergence of opinion between a trial judge and a party's
counsel is not proof of bias and partiality.
8. All told, the absence of any evidence showing that respondent Judge acted in
bad faith, ill-will or malice reduces the charges against her into a mere
indictment. We cannot, however, give credence to charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation.
9. Beyond its bare assertions, the Court cannot find any substantiated proof of
this misdemeanor to warrant administrative sanction against the respondent.
 132 Castillo v. Juan (AGAPITO)
January 28, 1975 | FERNANDO, J. | Due Process of law requires Impartiality
PETITIONER: ROSARIO CASTILLO and SONIA VILLASANTA
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE JUDGE CELESTINO JUAN
SUMMARY:
On two separate occasions, in the secrecy of his chambers, Judge Juan informed
petitioners of the weakness of their cases (rape), the likelihood of a verdict of
acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to their
advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused
indemnify them. According to Judge Juan, this move would assure their being spared
from the embarrassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to
their future. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished
presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. The two
maidens filed a case seeking the disqualification of Judge Juan as their Judge on the
ground of bias and prejudice. Judge Juan argued that he was just prompted to act thus
from the best of motives, "as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize
justice. The Court ruled that petitioners are entitled to the remedy sought and
respondent Judge must be disqualified from further hearing the cases. The Court
opined that in every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner
and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no
less than the accused. Judges are to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion
of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. Moreover, due process of law requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge. It is in line with the above due
process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for disqualification of judge
outside of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous
connection, or his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review.
DOCTRINE:
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal,
and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial Judge.
FACTS:
1.! Petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in two rape
cases, assail the actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification
on the ground of bias and prejudice. What was done by him was in disregard
of the highly-prized ideal in adjudication, likewise a due process requirement,
that a litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."
2.! On two separate occasions on August 15 and 27, 1974, in the secrecy of his
chambers Judge Juan informed petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the
likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed
upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could
do on their behalf was to have such accused indemnify them.
3.! This move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the
embarrassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to
their future. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had
finished presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as
yet.
4.! Respondent Judge could not very well deny that he did invite them to confer
with him, but he argued that he was just prompted to act thus from the best
of motives, "as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice.
ISSUE/s:
1.! W/N Respondent Judge must be disqualified from further hearing the cases.
- YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and
respondent Judge is ordered to desist from further conducting the trial of the two
prosecutions for rape, Criminal Cases Nos. 733 and 734 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, respectively entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernesto de Villa and People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa. No costs.
RATIO:
Issue #1
1.! Yes. In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner
and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the
offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even
to give the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to
first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the
suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned
in the net of his own sympathies and predilections.
2.! It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at
a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in
law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally
important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartially. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics.
It is impressed with constitutional significance.
3.! As set forth in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz: "It is now beyond dispute that due
process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and
being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision
 arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge
who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In
the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of
law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal,
and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial Judge.""
4.! It is in line with the above due process requirement that the Rules of Court
provide for disqualification of judge outside of the instances referring to their
pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection, or his having presided
in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.
5.! In this case, even before the litigants had been fully heard, they were told that
their cases were weak. They could very well conclude then that there was a
prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did
because any monetary settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their
straitened financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted
that, according to his best lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of
sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said to be consonant with the
exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The
administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a
rejection of the plea for disqualification.
 133 Parayno vs. Meneses (JAY)
April 26, 1994 | Vitug, J. | Grounds to Inhibit
PETITIONER: RODOLFO E. PARAYNO, CLEMARTIN B. ARBOLEDA,
EDUARDO R. PEREZ, CASIMIRO C. CARANCHO, DIOSDADO T.
SAMSON, MAXIMO G. SUMERA and MARCELINO M. DELA CRUZ
RESPONDENTS: HON. ILUMINADO MENESES, Presiding Judge, Branch 49,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, LORENZO M.
MATEO, ARTURO ESTRADA, NORMA LUSTINA and PABLO MERCADO
SUMMARY: Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta,
and there was a mayoralty protest regarding his election. Initially, this was
assigned to Branch 45 Pangasinan. Parayno filed a motion for inhibition against
Judge Villanueva who was the presiding judge in Branch 45. The court granted
Parayno’s motion, and the mayoralty protest case was eventually re-raffled to
Branch 49. In Branch 49, there was also a councilors protest (election protest
against the elected city councilors), and due to the fact that only one Branch
handled both mayoralty, and councilors protest, respondent Mateo stated that there
was bias in favor of Parayno, and the councilors. Due to this, Judge Meneses
inhibited himself from proceeding with the judgment of the case. WoN Meneses
was correct in inhibiting himself? NO, he is incorrect. A judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a case,
but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid
reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality
at the judge. The court in this instance stated that Meneses failed to show any legal
or valid reason as to why he should inhibit himself. The fact that Mateo alleged
partiality is an insufficient ground for Meneses to inhibit himself.
DOCTRINE: A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself
voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical
grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some
tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge.
FACTS:
1. Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.
a. The other petitioners, are members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the municipality who, along with Parayno, are the protestees in
separate election protests now still pending with the court a quo.
2. This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders of respondent Judge
Iluminado Meneses voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election
cases and denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Meneses was correct in inhibiting himself? NO, he is incorrect.
3. The mayoralty protest, involving Parayno, was originally raffled and
assigned to Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
presided over by Judge Manuel Villanueva.
a. The councilors' protest, involving the other petitioners, was
assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court, also sitting in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses
presiding.
4. A motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner
Parayno, which the court promptly granted.
a. After the records of the case involving Parayno were forwarded to
Executive Judge Romulo Abasolo, Abasolo, directed the
assignment of the case to Branch 46 of the court but only after its
presiding Judge, Hon. Roger Domagas, agreed to hear and try the
case.
b. Claiming impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner
Parayno assailed before this Court the order of the Executive
Judge.
c. The Court issued a temporary restraining order and promptly
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
d. The appellate court set aside the Abasolo’s order, and it directed
Abasolo to instead include the case in the regular raffle for re-
assignment.
5. The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors'
protests were then pending.
a. The Committee on Revision in the mayoralty protest terminated its
work on 07 October 1993 but prior to the submission of its report,
a "Motion to Use Revision Committee Report Blank Form" was
filed by protestant Lorenzo Mateo (herein private respondent).
b. In the afternoon of 21 October 1993, while the revision of ballots
in the councilors' protest was in progress, Mateo, the Revisor for
the protestants-councilors in the Revision Committee, manifested:
i. “I would like also to make of record that the Trial
Presiding Judge of Branch 49 is the same Trial Judge of
this Electoral Protest Case U-5346, Parayno versus Mateo
(sic) and therefore the Protestant look at it that there
seems to be a certain degree of greater sympathy of the
Trial Presiding Judge to the Protestee. . . .”
6. The following day, respondent judge issued the assailed order inhibiting
himself from further hearing the two cases.
a. The motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the
judge.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
respondent Judge are SET ASIDE and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in
resolving the election protests at bar. No costs.

RATIO:

1. Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:

a. Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
2. The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a
judge, sitting in a case, will at all times be free from inclinations or
prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent judgment.
a. A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of a judge. Due process requires it.
b. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act without bias but should
even appear to so be. Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the
need for some kind of manifestation of its reality.
3. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself
voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound
or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons.
a. It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of
partiality at the judge.
4. We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained
unresolved for quite some time now. Any further delay in the disposition of
the cases, particularly election protests where public interest is heavily
involved, cannot be countenanced.
5. All told and given the circumstances, we view the call for judge's inhibition,
and his acceding thereto, in this particular instance to be bereft of legal
basis and improper.
 134 TALENS TABON v JUDGE ARCEO (VELANDRES)
July 25, 1966 | Per Curiam | Topic
PETITIONER: JOCELYN TALENS DABON
RESPONDENTS: JUDGE HERMIN ARCEO
SUMMARY: a sworn-complaint was filed by Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, (Clerk
of RTC San Fernando, Pampanga) against Judge Arceo. He was charged of gross
misconduct and immorality. The case was referred to Associate Justice Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos of the CA.
The finisng of Justice Portia: Talens Dabon stated that he used offensive words
and made harsh and negative comments. He made green jokes and stories.
Whenever he had the opportunity he would make bodily contact ("chancing") with
her and other female employees. He would kiss her and the other employees. On
Dec 6, Talens-Dabon was called by the judge and entered his office. When she
was about to leave the room, the judge handed to her a folded yellow paper
containing his handwritten poem which she found to be obscene. When she was
about to leave, she found out that the door was already locked. He then embraced
her then tried to kiss her. She then submitted a request for a transfer which the
judge eventually approved. The judge denied all the allegations.
Justice Portia recommended that the judge be dismissed from the service.
ISSUE: WoN the judge should be dismissed from service for gross misconduct
and immorality YES
RULING: The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able
to administer justice. A magistrate is judged not only by his social acts but also by
his private morals. He should not only possess proficiency in law. He should
possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright
man. Judges and justices must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then
can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system. A judge should
personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. Judge Arceo has failed to measure up to these exacting standards.
He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral
uprightness. The actuations of the judge are aggravated by the fact that
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and
power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
DOCTRINE: Judges and justices must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then
can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
FACTS:
1. a sworn-complaint was filed by Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, (Clerk of RTC San
Fernando, Pampanga) against Judge Arceo.
a. He was charged of gross misconduct and immorality.
2. The case was referred to Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos of the
CA.
a. Judge Arceo was placed under preventive suspension for the
duration of the investigation.
3. The findings of Justice Portia’s investigation (mahaba yung nangyari but
nilagay ko what happened kasi baka magask siya):
a. At the time of Talens-Dabon’s assumption to office, she was about
to get married to Atty. Dabon, a lawyer who works at the CA.
b. Judge Arceo’s wife was ailing and on dialysis and has been residing
in the US with his daughter.
c. The judge told her during their first meeting that she was going to
be detailed to his office as his assistant.
i. This situation was not welcomed by her having heard of
the judge’s reputation in the office as "bastos" and
"maniakis”.
ii. This prompted her to work for her transfer to another
branch under Judge Ala-Medina.
d. She received an executive order requiring her to report to the office.
Her work was to draft and file memos and circulars, pay telephone
bills, and other clerical duties.
e. At one time she was designated to act as branch clerk and she
observed that the judge was rude and disrespectful to the other court
personnel.
i. He talked in a loud voice and shouted at them.
ii. He used offensive words and made harsh and negative
comments.
iii. He made green jokes and stories.
iv. Whenever he had the opportunity he would make bodily
contact ("chancing") with her and other female employees.
f. When she introduced her fiance to him, the judge asked her why she
was playing with her forefinger, at the same time gesturing with his
to signify sexual intercourse.
g. Sometime in November 1995, the judge kissed her on the cheek
i. This was a fact admitted by him in his testimony.
ii. He also admitted kissing other female employees.
h. Sometime in October 1995, the Courts of San Fernando transferred
to the Greenfields Country Club due to the inundation of their
regular offces with lahar.
i. A certain Ester Galicia was allowed to house her
appliances in the staff room of RTC Branch 43.
ii. These included a VCR on which, as testified by witness
Bernardo Taruc, a VHS tape brought by the judge was
 played at his bidding.
iii. The tape contained explicit sex scenes.
1. During its showing the judge would come out of
his chamber and tease the female employees
about it.
iv. Taruc further related that at one time the judge showed to
the employees a picture which when held in some way
showed figures in coital position.
i. Senapilo-Leander, a stenographer of Branch 43 testified that the
judge wrote a love poem to her and that many times he would
suddenly dictate love letters or poems addressed to her as if courting
her
i. He kissed her several times, pointedly stared at her lower
parts when she wore tight pants and made body contacts
("chancing").
ii. When Leander's wedding was set, the judge taunted her by
saying:
1. "Ikay, ang dami ko pa namang balak sa 'yo,
kinuha pa naman kita ng bahay sa isang
subdivision, tapos sinayang mo lang, tanga ka
kasi!"
j. On Dec 6, Talens-Dabon was called by the judge and entered his
office.
i. When their conversation veered to his wife, Talens-Dabon
became uneasy and directed the judge’s attention to her
unsigned Certificate of Service.
ii. When she was about to leave the room, the judge handed
to her a folded yellow paper containing his handwritten
poem.
k. she found the poem repulsive (obscene)
i. particularly the line saying "Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita
makatalik sa ngayon at bukas pagkat di mo ibig."
ii. The lines in the poem are consistent with the claims of
Talens-Dabon about the judge’s rude manner and erratic
mood wings.
l. When she was about to leave, she found out that the door was
already locked.
i. He then embraced her then tried to kiss her.
ii. He suddenly stopped and she angrily shouted "maniac,
demonyo, bastos, napakawalanghiya ninyo".
iii. He kept muttering "I love you" and was very apologetic.
m. She then submitted a request for a transfer which the judge
eventually approved.
n. After consulting her family, she reported the matter to the police and
filed with the MTC criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness,
violation of anti sexual harassment law, and this administrative case.
o. The judge denied all the allegations.
i. He never said any vulgar jokes
ii. He cursed at some employees but said it was a joke
iii. The whole Dec 6 incident did not happen.
1. He was never attracted to her.
iv. The poem was nothing more than an intellectual creation.
1. It was exaggerated and meant only to praise and
entertain Talens Dabon.
v. During the supposed kissing incident, there was a gardener
outside and if Talens Dabon really screamed, he would
have heard it. (This witness was not presented)
p. Bernardo Taruc, the most senior employee in Branch 43, testified
against Judge Arceo.
i. He testified about Talens-Dabon’s demeanor after Arceo
tried to kiss her.
ii. He testified aobut the VHS tape.
iii. Judge Arceo stated that his testimony was false and that
Taruc was just jealous because Taruc and Leander were in
a relationship.
4. The Justice of the CA made the following conclusions:
a. there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that the judge
committed the acts complained of,
b. that Talens-Dabon and her witnesses are credible
c. that the judge’s denials can not prevail over the weight and
probative value of the affirmative assertions of complainant and her
witnesses
d. that by doing the acts complained of, respondent has tempted the
morals of not only complainant but also the other court employees
over whom he exercised power and inMuence as Executive Judge.
5. Justice Portia recommended that the judge be dismissed from the service
a. with prejudice to reappointment in any other government position
ISSUE:
1. WoN the judge should be dismissed from service for gross misconduct and
immorality YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, Judge Hermin E. Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the
service for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
RATIO:
1. The Court agrees and adopts such findings and recommendations of justice
Portia.
2. The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
 administer justice. CANONS MENTIONED:
a. It is also upon the perception and confidence of the people.
3. The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and Canon I
decency which every member of the judiciary must observe Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
a. A magistrate is judged not only by his social acts but also by his
private morals. Canon II
b. He should not only possess proficiency in law. Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
i. He should possess moral integrity for the people look up to and impartially of the judiciary.
him as a virtuous and upright man.
c. Judges and justices must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private
lives.
i. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system.
d. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration of
justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not
equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrit
4. A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his official duties
and in private life should be above suspicion.
a. COURT: Judge Arceo has failed to measure up to these exacting
standards.
b. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of
moral uprightness.
c. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the
esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
5. The judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in
the judiciary.
a. His actuations would damage the integrity of the judiciary,
fomenting distrust in the system.
6. The actuations of the judge are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being
the executive judge.
a. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out
his lustful and lascivious desires.
7. He has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to
be the embodiment of
a. Competence
b. Integrity
c. independence and to avoid impropriety
d. the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.