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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the
animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to
UNITED STATES V. LUIS TORIBIO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to
LAW
slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal
UNITED STATES V. LUIS TORIBIO G.R. No. L-5060 slaughterhouse.
January 26, 1910
Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147
FACTS: which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be
slaughtered.
WON the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, limited only to the slaughter of large cattle at the municipal
wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse.
slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor
penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
municipal treasure. slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of
police power.
2. NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use,
within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
HELD:
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the
1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 applies tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal the community.
treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like
an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos..
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of
tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and crops. These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a police power
construction should be rejected which would tend to render
abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Finally, SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent
power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere
Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption protection of general welfare and public interest.
of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in
section 30.
YNOT v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC) DIGEST CASE - Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
YNOT v IAC G.R. NO. 74457March 20,
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
1987
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
CRUZ, J. produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity.
On January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six ISSUE:
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, WON EO 626-A constitutional.
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first
in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
RULING:
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as the
Court held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not
NO. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas trial and conviction of the accused.
bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
To sum up, then, the SC finds that the challenged measure is an
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a
plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the
offensive to the sight." comfort and convenience of the people are included within those
subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is
amenable to the police power of the State.
The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the
defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against
the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant
of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO G.R. No. L-12172; August 29, 1958
The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action. The standards of the
FACTS: ordinance are entirely lacking making it unreasonable and
oppressive, hence, not a valid ordinance. While property may be
Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not
Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
permit from the mayor. and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
HELD:
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967) It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
J. Fernando
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the
Issue:
Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not
part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being due process clause?
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would
impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement Held: No. Judgment reversed.
that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such Ratio:
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection "The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the
from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
for being vague. not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the police regulation.
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the
as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
for being arbitrary. resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity
the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
the ordinance set aside.”
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
government." courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal police power.
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however,
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order measure.
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case,
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of
be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process.
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty
challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
order of society and the general well-being.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process
means peace and order and happiness for all.
are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrase. The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
FACTS:
HELD:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No.
7744 that prohibits hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension NO.The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
houses and similar establishments from offering short-time individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which
admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates or other similarly serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
concocted terms, in the City of Manila. seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all
who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there
for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
drug use and alike. limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may
be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on
Hence, Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
REVERSED.
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
ISSUE: Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No.
237 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
HELD: therefore, null and void.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the
discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of
income derived from all sources before deducting allowable
expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to
show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the
case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners
sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have
accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income.
Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate
their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the
discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on
the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior
citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on
the amount of the discount.
NDC AGRIX V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK (PVB) - CASE DIGEST - a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private respondent.
For its part, the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially
NDC AGRIX V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK (PVB) GR No. 84132-
foreclose the mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second
33 December 10, 1990
case with the same court to stop the foreclosure. The two cases
FACTS: were consolidated
The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the
1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of trial court rendered the impugned decision. Judge Francisco Ma.
Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Guerrero annulled not only the challenged provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1),
Company. but the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that:
The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix (1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of
Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims. the principle of separation of powers;
Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section (2) The law impaired the obligation of contracts; and
4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens presently
(3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. The motion for
attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are
reconsideration of this decision having been denied, the present
hereby extinguished.”
petition was filed.
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private
The Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary
respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated
restraining order and instructed the respondents to cease and
July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in Los Baños,
desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in
Laguna.
question.
During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now
the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
estopped from contesting the validity of the decree.
companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President
Marcos. The Court, after noting that the petitioners had already filed their
claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee created by the decree, had
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the
simply dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the
meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent
Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed also invoked the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a
claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get results, it Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the
sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in police power, not being in conformity with the traditional
its favor, which had been extinguished by the decree. It was only requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on the basis of Sec. extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and
4 (1) of the decree, that the private respondent attacked the validity other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix
of the provision. At that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
the private respondent was already estopped from questioning the compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the
constitutionality of the decree. category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection
clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor
ISSUE:
controlled by the government, should have been created only by
WON Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also
payment without prejudice to PD 1717. interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise
HELD: an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and
so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on
loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights
once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law
from one person and given to another without just compensation
and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not
permitted under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the
contract between Agrix and the private respondent without
justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract
is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest
of greater number.
AGUSTIN V. EDU - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent
accidents on streets and highways, including expressways or limited
AGUSTIN V. EDU G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
FACTS: motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The
hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by
Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is
229 which requires an early warning device to be carried by users of a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna
due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non- Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD
delegation of legislative power. 207.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land ISSUE:
Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and
regulations of the said instruction. WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of
due process.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen
Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came HELD:
out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
Commission,"
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and public safety.
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts the
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
of the nation.”
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of
set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."
legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions
thru P.D. No. 207 .
Petition dismissed.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES G.R. No. 111097 July was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
20, 1994
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ
FACTS: prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this
decision was denied against petitioners.
ISSUE:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid
to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season. exercise of police power.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil HELD:
organizations of the City of Cagayan de Oro denounced such
project.
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not
contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated
de Oro City enacted two (2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
business permit and canceling existing business permit to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869
establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be
and an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the
Court stressed that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for
that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion,
the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting,
and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the
merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to
the courts of justice.
349 Phil. 434 allegedly[4] subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy
Mart)[5] for P199,710.00 per month.
[ GR No. 127073, Jan 29, 1998 ]
- The questioned Decision is a nullity because Petitioner was - The questioned Decision is a nullity because the crime
denied of her Constitutional Right to counsel. charged was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the presumption of innocence was not overcome, which is
- Facts of record showing that Petitioner was deprived of and required by Due Process.
denied her Right to Counsel. Under the circumstances of
record, the absence of counsel resulting from imposition of
suspension from the practice of law upon her retained There was no disadvantage to the Government.
counsel, constituted deprivation of or denial of the Right to
Counsel. Facts of record showing legal representation of
Petitioner Imelda Marcos was not adequate. i. PGH Foundation is part of the "Government".
ISSUES:
vi. Respondent Sandiganbayan erred in holding that rentals for 1) Was respondent court correct in denying the demurrer to
sub-leases were evidence of disadvantage when such sub-leases evidence of petitioner Dans in Criminal Case No. 17453?
were made later and negotiated by a charitable foundation
deserving of support through higher rentals. Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer should
have been resolved solely on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence; and even assuming that it could be resolved using the
Assuming arguendo alleged disadvantage, the same was not evidence for the defense, the latter must have been previously
manifest nor gross. formally offered.[13]
Petitioner Marcos did not enter into the questioned lease contracts These arguments are specious and must, therefore, be rejected.
on behalf of the Government.
Third, since the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo was given in open
court and duly recorded, the Court could not just ignore the solemn It is also alleged that "for a criminal complaint or information to
declarations therein on the technicality that the testimony had not sufficiently inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
been formally offered in evidence. x x x." accusation against him, all the essential facts constituting the
offense must be stated therein, and not mere conclusions of
In any event, even if the testimony of Cuervo were to be excluded, law."[22]
there was enough evidence proffered by the prosecution,
particularly Exhibits "B" (the lease agreement in favor of the PGHFI)
and "D" (the sublease agreement in favor of TNCC) which would Assuming that the matters which Marcos wanted to see alleged in
have more than justified the denial of the demurrer. In other words, the informations are not evidentiary in character, and that they are
notwithstanding Cuervo's testimony, these exhibits constitute solid really vague and ambiguous, other courses of action could have
been taken, such as filing a motion for a bill of particulars. This is public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross
what the Court precisely suggested in People v. Arlegui. and manifest.
3) Is Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, constitutional? Marcos claims that she was not adequately represented by counsel
at the trial due to the suspension from the practice of law of her
The validity of this provision is being assailed by petitioner Marcos
counsel of record, Atty. Antonio Coronel. It appears from the
on grounds of vagueness and superfluity. She claims that the phrase
records, however, that during the absence of Atty. Coronel and
"manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government" is
sometime thereafter, she was still represented by other lawyers,
vague for it does not set a definite standard by which the court will
including Renato Dilag, Luis Sillano, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose and
be guided, thus, leaving it open to human subjectivity.
Cristobal Fernandez, Vicente D. Millora, Juan T. David, Balbino
Diego, and the law firm of Manuel M. Lazaro and Associates. The
representation of Atty. Millora and the Fernandezes subsisted even
There is, however, nothing "vague" about the statute. The assailed
in this Court, where they were later substituted by Atty. Estelito
provision answers the basic query "What is the violation?" Anything
Mendoza. In any event, at the time Atty. Coronel and his
beyond this, the "how's" and the "why's," are evidentiary matters
replacements withdrew their respective appearances, all evidence
which the law itself cannot possibly disclose in view of the
had already been presented. It is just that Marcos opted not to
uniqueness of every case. The "disadvantage" in this instance is
present any evidence for her defense, relying, perhaps, on what she
something that still has to be addressed by the State's evidence as
perceived to be glaringly weak prosecution evidence. Or it is not
the trial progresses. It may be said that the law is intended to be
impossible or far-fetched that her refusal may have been due to her
flexible in order to allow the judge a certain latitude in determining
indifference to or open defiance of the justice system.
if the disadvantage to the government occasioned by the act of a
5) Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court? Agreements executed by the LRTA with the PGH Foundation over
the LRT property at the stations in Pasay City and Sta. Cruz (Manila)
In proclaiming his innocence, Dans relied only on his and Cuervo's
'manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government'?"
testimony. Marcos, on the other hand, presented no evidence at all,
claiming that she had been prejudged by respondent court. The
prosecution submitted documentary evidence and nothing else. The
A perusal of the prosecution's documentary evidence would readily
question that must first be answered, therefore, is: Was the State's
reveal, even from a layman's perspective, that the Government was
evidence sufficient to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
seriously prejudiced in the transactions under review.
accused, petitioners herein, committed the crimes for which they
were held accountable?
With regard to Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, the Court is
xxx xxx xxx likewise constrained to agree with the trial court that the
Government suffered a manifest and gross disadvantage with the
execution of the two lease agreements, Exhibits "B" and "C." The
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or facts in this regard are undisputed.
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby."
The monthly rental price agreed upon between the LRTA and the
It is clear that for liability to attach under the aforequoted provision,
PGHFI for the lease of the Pasay lot was P102,760.00, and for the
the public officer concerned must have entered into a contract
Sta. Cruz lot, it was P92,437.20. Barely ten days later, the very same
which is "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous" to the
properties were subleased by PGHFI to private entities for
Government. The court a quo phrased the focal issue in these
P734,000.00 (for the Pasay lot) and P199,710.00 (for the Sta. Cruz
petitions in this wise: "(A)re exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C', the Lease
lot). The difference in the lease price is too enormous to ignore, for between the petitioners was not sufficiently established by the
no market force could possibly have raised the rental cost in the State's evidence.
same site by that margin in just over a week. Even by conservative
6) Were the members of the Sandiganbayan's First Division
estimates, the properties could have originally been leased out for
biased against petitioners? Consequently, is the assailed decision
at least P500,000.00[27] more. The Government was thereby
dated September 24, 1993, valid?
deprived of at least an additional half a million pesos per month.
No costs. SO ORDERED
PEOPLE V. DELA PIEDRA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.
PEOPLE V. DELA PIEDRA G.R. No. 121777. January 24,
2001 ISSUE:
FACTS: WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and
placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal
clause.
recruitment in large scale by promising an employment abroad
Maria Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and HELD:
Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, a job to Singapore without having
NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.
previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
overseas placement of workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
and in consideration of the promised employment which did not repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
materialize. Thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
said sum. by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment
become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified
woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that
by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos. An entrapment was then constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth
planned by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may
Mendoza and successfully arrested the accused-appellant. be convicted of illegal recruitment.
Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the
Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis case,
dela Piedra. merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on
the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely,
notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable
Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy
interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified
and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section
that the accused offer them a job to Singapore.
13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
not void for vagueness. applications of the statute
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,for instance, we
vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the
such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable posting of election propaganda in any place including private
degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the
connection we cannot permit reference to the rule that legislation COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived
should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived
susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The
give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even
on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for over
purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason breadth.
can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those entrusted
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition
therewith.
of recruitment and placement that would render the same
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently constitutionally over broad.
considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or
employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant,
for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law
over broad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of over
breadth.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
him: business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
prosecutions
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
under The Revised Penal Code. any person and/or entity in connection with any government
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
separate Informations against petitioner. public office concerned;
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
denied. corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
a.) Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and One of the substantive issues is whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A.
properties. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate
the following provisions of the Constitution specifically Article VI,
b.) Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods Section 28(2) for ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita.
c.) Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or Petitioners contend:
lease of properties
1.) Delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is
2.) These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso contrary to republicanism.
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006: 2.) The law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of
control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts
a.) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four- fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of
fifth percent (2 4/5%); or the Secretary of Finance.
b.) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %)
The principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive for the
following contentions. The principle of separation of powers ordains
3.) Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 constitutionally allocated sphere.
Philippine Constitution.
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin effected.
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means what
In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States
has been delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on
ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative
the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not
which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the
intervening mind of another.
basis of the taking into effect of a law.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that
beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement she has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing
annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after. the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue despite the
manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim demand the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
for survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim
because, under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no ISSUE:
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. HELD:
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under
date of retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from
court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married
validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146. the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for
the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
denies equal protection of the law.
survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous the equal protection of the laws.
acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The
proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts
marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
prohibited period. survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we
benefits to government employees and their dependents in the do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from
event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date
government employees. the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial
distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The pension as having been contracted primarily for financial
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: convenience to avail of pension benefits.
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act
No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the
spouse who married the member immediately before the members
law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish
GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
one class from another.
solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages
contracted within three years before retirement or death of a
member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship
benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members
retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive
survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the
legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which
Congress enacted the social legislation.
MIRASOL V. DPWH G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006 DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
FACTS:
facilities (toll ways).
Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory
judgment with application for temporary restraining order and
injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the
issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda.
2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.
1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH
Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access
Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners
facilities.
presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in
traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the tollway as
much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they
wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway,
was a subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was
no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily
regulated.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
PEOPLE V. CAYAT apply equally to all members of the same class.
68 Phil. 12 (1939)
Facts:
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 (1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, (2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
vs. branches of retail business.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Issue/s: Ruling/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
generally accepted principles. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
Discussions: clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a who do not.”
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
of Agrarian Reform they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
Equal Protection – Valid Classification
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A.
6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
FACTS:
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844). R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their
own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice program because they claim to belong to a different class.
and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
(PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27
just compensation.
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by
the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners
131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
(PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the form of money and not in bonds.
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in
ISSUE:
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
clause. the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
agrarian reform program.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a
program, must be in terms of cash.
power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which
HELD: prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without
a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
conform to the following requirements: determined by an administrative body is merely
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and
the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and is even so provided by RA 6657:
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and of just compensation.
the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they 3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978) or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus
conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
Facts:
Held:
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, 3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Powers of Municipal Corporations
Held:
Facts:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government.
It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved
laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is
Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the
families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a
people.
month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit
power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution
State.
has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,
etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
Issues:
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
under the general welfare clause
insure the protection of property therein.
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare,
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
of police power in the promotion of the common good.
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may
be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating
provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243,
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not
more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the
otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
limits of police power.
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the "b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second
service for an year of the
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement "c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year
to private of the
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine effectivity of this Act.
Constabulary and have
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth
reached the age of fifty-six. year of the
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural
as the Integrated recourse of the court is to trace the
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975. source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
the same subject and to
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year
transition period provided in investigate the antecedents involved.
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
retire, compulsorily, at age members of the present
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its
while the retirement age for present members and that
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law. Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only
after the lapse of the four-year
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed
by a writ of injunction. He transition period.
declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes HELD:
all members of the present
From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the that the use of the term INP
present members of the
is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute
Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and could have just made a
that Section 39 thereof shall
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National
become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period. police (PNP) for retirement
Thus, the preliminary
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from
injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, the PC and it cannot be
among others, that it may have
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the
PC.
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
failed to define who constitutes component of the INP was
the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus, already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
effectivity of this Act, belabored on the supposed
the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such
Constabulary-Integrated a situation, courts are not
National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
which is the nucleus of the with doubtful meaning for they
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
a major service of the body. In case of doubt as to
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National police, what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
which is the civilian provision during the legislative
component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal
police, shall cease to be the interpretation to the letter of the
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
establish and constituted
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section
pursuant to this Act." 89 of R.A. 6975 is
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is
failed to define who the whether the classification is
members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform
legislature failed to to the following requirements:
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
89 specifically in favor of the
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People
vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
[1939]).
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word
“shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”,
there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the
case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts
so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably
delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for
the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the
case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari,prohibition
or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.