CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (2nd BATCH)
1.) RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
[A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 28, 2001]
PARDO, J.:
FACTS: Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of
Governors, the IBP, recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the
resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
In 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D. Lim, transmitted to the
Court a Resolution addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan (hereafter, the Resolution). We quote the Resolution in full:
WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution guarantees that, [a]ll persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies,
WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
mandates that [a] lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice;
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to undertake
measures to assist in the speedy disposition of cases pending before the various
courts and tribunals;
WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has received numerous complaints
from its members about serious delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution
of motions and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the
Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 requires all Regional
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts to submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual report indicating the title of
the case, its date of filing, the date of pre-trial in civil cases and arraignment in criminal
cases, the date of initial trial, the date of last hearing and the date that the case is
submitted for decision, and to post, in a conspicuous place within its premises, a
monthly list of cases submitted for decision;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 has not been made
applicable to the Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial court, the
requirements imposed upon trial courts by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
10-94 should also be imposed upon the Sandiganbayan;
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines hereby resolves as follows:
1. To recommend to the Supreme Court that Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 10-94 be made applicable to the Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction; and
2. To recommend to the Supreme Court an inquiry into the causes of delay in the
resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases before the
Sandiganbayan for the purpose of enacting measures intended at avoiding such
delays.
The Court then required Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena to
comment on the letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases
pending decision, or with motion for reconsideration pending resolution, indicating the
dates they were deemed submitted for decision or resolution.
Complying with the order, Presiding Justice Garchitorena submitted a report
(hereafter, the compliance) admitting a number of cases submitted for decision and
motion for reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions.
Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415) cases for decision remaining
undecided long beyond the reglementary period to decide, with one case submitted
as early as May 24, 1990, and motion for reconsideration which has remained
unresolved over thirty days from submission.
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena submitted a schedule of cases
submitted for decision, the schedule indicating the number of detained prisoners, of
which there are (were) none.
The IBP submitted its reply to the compliance stating: First, that it was not in a
position to comment on the accuracy of the compliance; nonetheless, it showed that
there was much to be desired with regard to the expeditious disposition of cases,
particularly in the Sandiganbayans First Division, where cases submitted for decision
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since 1990 remained unresolved. Second, the compliance did not include pending
motions, and it is a fact that motions not resolved over a long period of time would
suspend and delay the disposition of a case. Third, since the Sandiganbayan is a trial
court, it is required to submit the same reports required of Regional Trial
Courts. Fourth, the Constitution states that, all lower collegiate courts must decide or
resolve cases or matters before it within twelve (12) months from date of submission;
however, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required to resolve and decide cases
within a reduced period of three (3) months like regional trial courts, or at the most,
six (6) months from date of submission.
The Court resolved to direct then Court Administrator Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA)
to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the cases subject
of this administrative matter, and to submit a report thereon not later than 31
December 2000.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Presiding Justice Garchitorena admitted
that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan has a backlog of cases; that one case
alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, involving 156 cases but the
same has been set for promulgation of decision on December 8, 2000, which would
reduce the backlog by at least fifty percent (50%).
The Court Administrator then submitted a memorandum to the Court stating that the
causes of delay in the disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:
(1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of several years;
(2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss, Motion to
Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc. that remain unresolved for years;
(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Supreme Court;
(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings despite the
lapse of considerable length of time; and
(5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if the ponente
is still in service.
The Court considered ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) as an administrative complaint against Presiding Justice
Garchitorena for serious delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution of
motions and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and
misconduct in office.
ISSUE/s:
(1) What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must
decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?
(2) Is Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the
Sandiganbayan?
RULING:
We resolve the issues presented in seriatim.
1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views. The first view is that
from the time a case is submitted for decision or resolution, the Sandiganbayan has
twelve (12) months to decide or resolve it. The second view is that as a court with trial
function, the Sandiganbayan has three (3) months to decide the case from the date
of submission for decision.
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission
to the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to
regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the
Court of Appeals.
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. The Sandiganbayan
was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure. However, on
March 30, 1995, Congress repealed the Sandiganbayan’s power to promulgate its
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own rules of procedure and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated
by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over particular or
specialized categories of actions. They are the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, and the Sharia Courts.
Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
In his report, the Court Administrator would distinguish between cases which the
Sandiganbayan has cognizance of in its original jurisdiction, and cases which fall
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Court Administrator posits
that since in the first class of cases, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court,
then for that classification of cases, the three (3) month reglementary period
applies. For the second class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the twelve-month
reglementary period for collegiate courts. We do not agree.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 is clear on this issue. It provides:
Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as practicable, the trial of
cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until
terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date
the case was submitted for decision.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules, thus:
Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases The judgment or final order of a division of
the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case
was submitted for decision.
Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that the three (3) month
period, not the twelve (12) month period, to decide cases applies to the
Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five (5)
divisions, functions as a trial court. The term trial is used in its broad sense, meaning,
it allows introduction of evidence by the parties in the cases before it. The
Sandiganbayan, in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the
discretion to weigh the evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as
credible and reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated.
We find that the Sandiganbayan has several cases undecided beyond the
reglementary period set by the statutes and its own rules, some as long as more than
ten (10) years ago.
According to the compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan, three hundred and
forty one (341) cases were submitted for decision but were undecided as of
September 15, 2000. A number of the cases were submitted for decision as far back
as more than ten (10) years ago.
The Sandiganbayan is a special court created in an effort to maintain honesty and
efficiency in the bureaucracy, weed out misfits and undesirables in the government
and eventually stamp out graft and corruption. We have held consistently that a delay
of three (3) years in deciding a single case is inexcusably long. We cannot accept
the excuses of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that the court was reorganized in 1997;
that the new justices had to undergo an orientation and that the Sandiganbayan
relocated to its present premises which required the packing and crating of records;
and that some boxes were still unopened.
We likewise find unacceptable Presiding Justice Garchitorenas excuse that one
case alone comprises more than fifty percent (50%) of the First Divisions backlog and
that the same has been set for promulgation on December 8, 2000. As we said, a
delay in a single case cannot be tolerated, para muestra, basta un boton. (for
an example, one button suffices). It is admitted that there are several other cases
submitted for decision as far back as ten (10) years ago that have remained
undecided by the First Division, of which Justice Garchitorena is presiding justice and
chairman. Indeed, there is even one case, which is a simple motion to withdraw the
information filed by the prosecutor. This has remained unresolved for more than
seven (7) years (since 1994). The compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan
presiding justice incriminates him. The memorandum submitted by the Court
Administrator likewise testifies to the unacceptable situation in the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, there is a disparity in the reports submitted by the
Sandiganbayan presiding justice and the OCA. We find that Presiding Justice Francis
E. Garchitorena failed to devise an efficient recording and filing system to enable him
to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition. This
is his duty on which he failed.
2. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme Court Circular No. 10-
94 applies to the Sandiganbayan.
Administrative Circular 10-94 directs all trial judges to make a physical inventory
of the cases in their dockets.
Directive
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:
(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a fine of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of his powers, functions and duties as the Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan, and from presiding over the trial of cases as a justice and
Chairman, First Division, so that he may DEVOTE himself exclusively to
DECISION WRITING, until the backlog of cases assigned to him as well as
cases not assigned to any ponente, of which he shall be deemed the ponente in
the First Division, are finally decided. There shall be no unloading of cases to
other divisions, or to the First Division inter se.
In the interim, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as the most senior
associate justice, shall TAKE OVER and exercise the powers, functions, and
duties of the office of the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, until further orders
from this Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and the associate
justices of the Sandiganbayan to decide/resolve the undecided cases
submitted for decision as of this date, within three (3) months from their
submission, and to resolve motions for new trial or reconsiderations and
petitions for review within thirty (30) days from their submission. With respect
to the backlog of cases, as hereinabove enumerated, the Sandiganbayan shall
decide/resolve all pending cases including incidents therein within six (6)
months from notice of this resolution.
(4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular 10-94, effective immediately.
(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later than December
31, 2001 internal rules to govern the allotment of cases among the divisions,
the rotation of justices among them and other matters leading to the internal
operation of the court, and thereafter to submit the said internal rules to the
Supreme Court for its approval.
This directive is immediately executory.
2.) IN RE: LETTERS OF ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA RE: G.R. NO.
178083 FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), ET
AL.
FACTS: On July 22, 2008, the Courts Third Division ruled to grant[1] the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP), finding Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) guilty of illegal
dismissal. The July 22, 2008 Decision was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago who was joined by the other four Members of the Third Division. PAL
subsequently filed its motion for reconsideration (MR) of the July 22, 2008 Decision.
The Special Third Division[5] denied the MR with finality on October 2, 2009.[6] The
Court further declared that [n]o further pleadings will be entertained.[7] The other
Members of the Special Third Division unanimously concurred with the denial of the
motion.
PAL asked for leave of court to file (a) an MR of the October 2, 2009 Resolution, and
(b) a 2nd MR of the July 22, 2008 Decision. Both rulings were anchored on the validity
of PALs retrenchment program.
In view of the retirement of the ponente, Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Courts Raffle
Committee[9] had to resolve the question of who would be the new ponente of the
case.
Under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC (Rules on Who Shall Resolve Motions for
Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the Divisions of the Court, effective April 1,
2000), if the ponente has retired, he/she shall be replaced by another Justice who
shall be chosen by raffle from among the remaining Members of the Division:
However, on November 11, 2009, the case was raffled, not to a Member of the Third
Division that issued the July 22, 2008 Decision or to a Member of the Special Third
Division that rendered the October 2, 2009 Resolution, but to Justice Presbitero
Velasco, Jr. who was then a Member of the newly-constituted regular Third Division,
in view of the express excepting qualification provided under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC
that states: [t]hese rules shall not apply to motions for reconsideration of decisions or
resolutions already denied with finality. [underscoring ours]
The new regular Third Division, through Justice Velasco, granted PALs Motion for
Leave to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 2 October
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2009 and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration of Decision dated 22 July 2008. The Courts
Third Division further required the respective parties to comment on PALs motion and
FASAPs Urgent Appeal dated November 23, 2009. This grant, which opened both
the Decision and the Resolution penned by Justice Ynares-Santiago for review,
effectively opened the whole case for review on the merits.
The Justices who participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution were the best
ones to consider the motion and to review their own rulings. This was the first major
error that transpired in the case and one that the Clerk of Court failed to see. The
case should have gone to Justice Nachura or, at the very least, to the two other
remaining Justices. The re-raffle of the FASAP case to Justice Nachura (or to Justices
Peralta and Bersamin) would have been consistent with the constitutional rule
that [c]ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon[.][16]
Justice Velasco, after acting on the FASAP case for almost one whole year, inhibited
himself from participation due to a close relationship to a party, despite his previous
action on the case. Reference to AC No. 84-2007, however, was erroneous. For one,
the IRSC was already in effect when Justice Velasco inhibited himself from
participation, and the IRSC had already superseded AC No. 84-2007. The prevailing
IRSC, though, has an almost similar rule, with the difference that the IRSC speaks of
the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge or of a Member of the Division other than the
Member-in-Charge in its rule on inhibition, and did not use the ponente as its
reference point. This seemingly trivial point carries a lot of significance, particularly in
the context of the FASAP case.
Under the rule on inhibition found in Section 3, Rule 8 of the governing IRSC (as
Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno found in her dissenting opinion), the inhibition called for
the raffle to a Member of the two other divisions of the Court. Thus, Justice Sereno
found the subsequent January 26, 2011 raffle of the case to Justice Brion to be legally
correct; however, the application of the IRSC is not as simple as Justice Sereno views
it to be.
On June 21, 2011 (after the retirement of Justice Nachura on June 13, 2011), Chief
Justice Corona issued Special Order No. 1025, again reorganizing the divisions of
the Court. Justice Brion was transferred from the Third Division to the Second
Division. Accordingly, the Third Division composed of Justice Velasco, Justice
Peralta, Justice Bersamin, Justice Jose Mendoza, and Justice Sereno (who was
included as additional Member) referred the FASAP case to the Second Division
where Justice Brion belonged, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 2 of the IRSC. [17]
The counsel for PAL, Atty. Mendoza, sent a series of letters[20] addressed to the Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court: Asking whether the Court had acted on the 2nd MR
and, if so, which division whether regular or special acted and who were the
chairperson and members. Asking for the identity of the current ponente or justice-in-
charge, and when and for what reason he or she was designated as ponente.
Requesting that copies of any Special Orders or similar issuances transferring the
case to another division, and/or designating Members of the division which resolved
its 2nd MR, in case a resolution had already been rendered by the Court and in the
event that such resolution was issued by a different division.
Acknowledging receipt of the copy of the September 7, 2011 Resolution issued by
the Second Division, notwithstanding that all prior Court Resolutions
Suggesting that if some facts subject of my inquiries are not evident from the records
of the case or are not within your knowledge, that you refer the inquiries to the
Members of the Court who appear to have participated in the issuance of the
Resolution of September 7, 2011, namely: Hon. Arturo D. Brion, Hon. Jose P. Perez,
Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta, Hon. Lucas P. Bersamin, and Hon. Jose C. Mendoza.
The Letters of Atty. Mendoza to Atty. Vidal were NOTED by the regular Second
Division. The Members of the ruling Division also met to consider the queries posed
by Atty. Mendoza. Justice Brion met with the Members of the ruling Division, rather
than with the regular Second Division, as the former were the active participants in
the September 7, 2011 Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether AM# 99-8-09-SC or AC# 84-2007 should apply
RULING: A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC indicated the general rule that the re-raffle shall be
made among the other Members of the same Division who participated in rendering
the decision or resolution and who concurred therein, which should now apply
because the ruling on the case is no longer final after the case had been opened for
review on the merits. In other words, after acceptance by the Third Division, through
Justice Velasco, of the 2nd MR, there should have been a referral to raffle because
the excepting qualification that the Clerk of Court cited no longer applied; what was
being reviewed were the merits of the case and the review should be by the same
Justices who had originally issued the original Decision and the subsequent
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Resolution, or by whoever of these Justices are still left in the Court, pursuant to the
same A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC.
On the other hand, the raffle to Justice Brion was made by applying AC No. 84-2007
that had been superseded by Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC. Even the use of this
IRSC provision, however, would not solve the problem, as its use still raised the
question of the provision that should really apply in the resolution of the MR: should it
be Section 3, Rule 8 on the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge, or Section 7, Rule 2 of
the IRSC on the inhibition of the ponente when an MR of a decision and a signed
resolution was filed.
A comparison of these two provisions shows the semantic sources of the seeming
conflict: Section 7, Rule 2 refers to a situation where the ponente has retired, is no
longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself from acting on
the case; while Section 3, Rule 8 generally refers to the inhibition of a Member-in-
Charge who does not need to be the writer of the decision or resolution under review.
Under Section 7, Rule 2, the case should have been re-raffled and assigned to
anyone of Justices Nachura, Peralta, or Bersamin, either (1) after the acceptance of
the 2nd MR (because the original rulings were no longer final); or (2) after Justice
Velascos inhibition because the same condition existed, i.e., the need for a review by
the same Justices who rendered the decision or resolution. As previously mentioned,
Justice Nachura participated in both the original Decision and the subsequent
Resolution, and all three Justices were the remaining Members who voted on the
October 2, 2009 Resolution. On the other hand, if Section 3, Rule 8 were to be solely
applied after Justice Velascos inhibition, the Clerk of Court would be correct in her
assessment and the raffle to Justice Brion, as a Member outside of Justice Velascos
Division, was correct.
These were the legal considerations that largely confronted the ruling Division in late
September 2011 when it deliberated on what to do with Atty. Mendozas letters.
To summarize all the developments that brought about the present dispute expressed
in a format that can more readily be appreciated in terms of the Court en bancsruling
to recall the September 7, 2011 ruling the FASAP case, as it developed, was attended
by special and unusual circumstances that saw:
(a) the confluence of the successive retirement of three Justices (in a Division
of five Justices) who actually participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution;
(b) the change in the governing rules from the A.M.s to the IRSC regime which
transpired during the pendency of the case;
(c) the occurrence of a series of inhibitions in the course of the case (Justices
Ruben Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Corona, Velasco, and Carpio), and the absences
of Justices Sereno and Reyes at the critical time, requiring their replacement; notably,
Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro are the four most senior
Members of the Court;
(d) the three re-organizations of the divisions, which all took place during the
pendency of the case, necessitating the transfer of the case from the Third Division,
to the First, then to the Second Division;
(e) the unusual timing of Atty. Mendozas letters, made after the ruling Division
had issued its Resolution of September 7, 2011, but before the parties received their
copies of the said Resolution; and
(f) finally, the time constraint that intervened, brought about by the parties
receipt on September 19, 2011 of the Special Divisions Resolution of September 7,
2011, and the consequent running of the period for finality computed from this latter
date; and the Resolution would have lapsed to finality after October 4, 2011, had it
not been recalled by that date.
On deeper consideration, the majority now firmly holds the view that Section 7, Rule
2 of the IRSC should have prevailed in considering the raffle and assignment of cases
after the 2nd MR was accepted, as advocated by some Members within the ruling
Division, as against the general rule on inhibition under Section 3, Rule 8. The
underlying constitutional reason, of course, is the requirement of Section 4(3), Article
VIII of the Constitution already referred to above.[28]
By reconciling the two provisions under consideration, Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC
should be read as the general rule applicable to the inhibition of a Member-in-
Charge. This general rule should, however, yield where the inhibition occurs at the
late stage of the case when a decision or signed resolution is assailed through an
MR. At that point, when the situation calls for the review of the merits of the decision
or the signed resolution made by a ponente (or writer of the assailed ruling), Section
3, Rule 8 no longer applies and must yield to Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC which
contemplates a situation when the ponente is no longer available, and calls for the
referral of the case for raffle among the remaining Members of the Division who acted
on the decision or on the signed resolution. This latter provision should rightly apply
as it gives those who intimately know the facts and merits of the case, through their
previous participation and deliberations, the chance to take a look at the decision or
resolution produced with their participation.
To reiterate, Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC is the general rule on inhibition, but it must
yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC where the obtaining situation
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is for the review on the merits of an already issued decision or resolution and
the ponente or writer is no longer available to act on the matter. On this basis,
the ponente,on the merits of the case on review, should be chosen from the remaining
participating Justices, namely, Justices Peralta and Bersamin.
In sum, the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution of the ruling Division was a
proper and legal move to make under the applicable laws and rules, and the
indisputably unusual developments and circumstances of the case.
Between Section 3, Article 8 and Section 7, Rule 2, both of the IRSC, the former is
the general provision on a Member-in-Charges inhibition, but it should yield to the
more specific Section 7, Rule 2 in a situation where the review of an issued decision
or signed resolution is called for and the ponente or writer of these rulings is no longer
available to act. Section 7, Rule 2 exactly contemplates this situation.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc.s Motion to Vacate dated October 3, 2011, but received
by this Court after a recall had been made, has thereby been rendered moot and
academic. The Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines Motion
for Reconsideration of October 17, 2011 is hereby denied; the recall of the September
7, 2011 Resolution was made by the Court on its own before the rulings finality
pursuant to the Courts power of control over its orders and resolutions. Thus, no due
process issue ever arose.
3.) BAGUIO MARKET vs. JUDGE CABATO-CORTEZ
FACTS: Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative, is a cooperative
organised under Republic Act 6938; under Article 62(6) of RA 6938, cooperatives are
exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where
such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to
enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative. In 2004, the
petitioner filed with the Clerk of Court of the Baguio City RTC a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Petitioner sought exemption from the
payment of legal fees pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141, invoking Article 62 (6) of
RA 6938. Then Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes, the Executive Judge, denied the
request for exemption, holding that under Sec. 22, Rule 141, only the “Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities” and certain suits of local government
units are exempted from the payment of legal fees. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was also denied, respondent judge this time asseverating that
petitioner’s reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees
collected under Rule 141 are not “fees payable to the Philippine Government” as they
do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund under the Court’s control.
Petitioner thru a petition for review on certiorari assailed the judge’s orders,
maintaining that the case call for nothing more than a simple application of Article
62(6) of RA 6938.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a cooperative is exempted from payment of legal fess in accordance
with Section 62(6) of RA 6938.
RULING:
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure
proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of
RA 6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives
is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2)
actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately
apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption
from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable
on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the
Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to
enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
The Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact
Judicial Rules
Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc
has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees⁠1 on the issue of legislative
exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity to reiterate our En Banc ruling
in GSIS.
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a
power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of
judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935⁠2 and the 1973 ⁠3Constitutions vested on the
Supreme Court the “power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” However, these
constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to “repeal, alter or
supplement” such rules.⁠4
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The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective
power.⁠5 This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice⁠6 that this Court’s power to promulgate judicial rules
“is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5),
Article VIII⁠7 x x x .
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be
put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on
Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from “all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.”⁠8 Reaffirming Echegaray‘s
construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice and procedure as “one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence”:
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed
or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Court’s exclusive domain.⁠9 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004
and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
4.) IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES
FACTS: On December 6, 2005, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, In re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from the Payment of Filing/Docket
Fees, on the basis of Section 13, Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter
of the National Power Corporation). It reads: The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, to DECLARE that the
National Power Corporation (NPC) is still exempt from the payment of filing fees,
appeals bond, and supersedeas bonds.
On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that:
The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6395, as amended by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request
appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in
courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal
bonds and supersedeas bonds.
RULING: NO. NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment
of legal fees.
Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this
rule. Local government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with
or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. (emphasis
supplied)
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001),
NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and controlled corporation.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11,
2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said
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case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these
rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less the Executive.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear
that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of legal
fees.
5.) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. This dilemma is
rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except
when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of
the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next
Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should
the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to compel the
submission of JBC¶s nominees to the president? This issue at hand truly is impressed
with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot of petitions were received by the
court from a mandamus to prohibitions.
The Philippine Supreme Court allowed the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to submit
to Pres. Gloria Arroyo its shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice from
which Pres. Arroyo shall choose the next Chief Justice who will succeed the
incumbent Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retiring on May 17, 2010), notwithstanding
the two-month appointment ban imposed by Article VII of the 1987 Constitution during
an election period. The basic doctrinal pronouncements of the Court in the said case
are as follows:
1. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino
and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition
against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
2. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and
Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment
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of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of
a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
3. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated
by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such
interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the
Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4. Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice
on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary
cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last
after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely distinguish
Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely
incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves
to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
5. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we
have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the
JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments
in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments
to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from
such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is
axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the
enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed
considerable light on “the law of the statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court
should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.
6. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the
establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level
backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being
recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the
JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the
intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent
from the Aytona midnight appointment.
7. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second
Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the
latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full
mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that
there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible
period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in
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which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers
of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their
deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices
under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor
referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its
effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never
intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any
of the lower courts.
8. X X X. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on
whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a
Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the
outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting
justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as
Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a
deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the
proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan
Ponce Enrile’s statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among
the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
9. The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still
address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. — In case of a vacancy in the office of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers
of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence,
until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly
qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the
office of Chief Justice.
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office
of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his
duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the office
of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after
the Court has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it amiss
to confront the matter now.
10. A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is
composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every
vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the
President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The
express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated
an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise,
they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section
12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the
next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
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11. For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not
one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of
things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only
responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in
which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the
office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief
Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than
expected.
12. The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is
preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under
the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are
popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the
leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant
of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the
Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions
absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal.
There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its
being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from
May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice
Puno be appointed by the next President.
13. Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least
three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy,
and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The
90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start
the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list
of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to
appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The
JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part,
considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the
ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only
refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in
the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC,
therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending
nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
6.) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
NATURE: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision
rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the
congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
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FACTS: The case involves extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline
in the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice.
History dictates that the Malolos Constitution1 and the 1935 Constitution2 had vested
the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the
country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation
of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the
legislative body. he fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973
Constitution,4 the appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the
scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that the appointees must have all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. In the 1987, the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a
representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only
one representative from congress.
ISSUE: Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a
representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one representative
that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true
in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of
the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Hence, the motion is denied.
7.) JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014; 733 SCRA 279
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said
vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the
Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ
Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s
integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which
characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would
defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied
and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel
the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted
with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC
proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
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The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s
self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance
of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the
objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection
against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its
own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from
the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
8.) HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, ET. AL. v. HIS EXCELLENCY
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016
FACTS: On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued
Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan,
composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the
President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations.3 A few
months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential
Decree No. 1606,4 which elevated the rank of the members of the Sandiganbayan
from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices
each.5 Republic Act No. 79756 was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it
increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who
would sit in five divisions of three members each. Republic Act No. 10660,7 recently
enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with
three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling
for applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC
submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all dated
October 26, 2015.
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice
Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V.
Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6)
Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment papers were transmitted
on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their
oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge.
Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths
of office before Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno);
while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office
before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza).
Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, D. Cruz, Pozon, and Timbang (Aguinaldo, et al.),
were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. They
assert that they possess the legal standing or locus standi to file the instant Petition
since they suffered a direct injury from President Aquino's failure to appoint any of
them as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. Petitioner IBP avers that it comes
before this Court through a taxpayer's suit, by which taxpayers may assail an alleged
illegal official action where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
deflected to an improper use, or wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Petitioner IBP also maintains that it has locus standi considering
that the present Petition involves an issue of transcendental importance to the people
as a whole, an assertion of a public right, and a subject matter of public interest.
Lastly, petitioner IBP contends that as the association of all lawyers in the country,
with the fundamental purpose of safeguarding the administration of justice, it has a
direct interest in the validity of the appointments of the members of the Judiciary.
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Petitioners base their instant Petition on the following arguments: PRESIDENT
AQUINO VIOLATED SECTION 9, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN
THAT:
(A) HE DID NOT APPOINT ANYONE FROM THE SHORTLIST SUBMITTED BY THE
JBC FOR THE VACANCY FOR POSITION OF THE 16 TH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN; AND
(B) HE APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY MUSNGI AND JUDGE ECONG AS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE VACANCY FOR THE
POSITION OF 21STASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
(C) THE APPOINTMENTS MADE WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
SHORTLISTS SUBMITTED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EACH
VACANCY, THUS AFFECTING THE ORDER OF SENIORITY OF THE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce
the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary, i.e., "to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary from the political pressure and partisan activities."
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate of the JBC, as
well as the limitation on the President's appointing power to the Judiciary, thus: Sec.
9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.
It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees recommended for
appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified
nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President,
who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners
emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and
unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the
President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the
President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the nominees
named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each,
for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th and 21st Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the
position of the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each
of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the appointment
papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino's appointments:
a. Michael Frederick L. Musngi, nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
Justice, was appointed as the 16th Associate Justice;
b. Reynaldo P. Cruz, nominated for the vacancy of the 19th Associate Justice, was
appointed as the 17th Associate Justice;
c. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, also nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
Justice, but was appointed as the 18th Associate Justice;
d. Maria Theresa V. Mendoza[-Arcega], nominated for the vacancy of the
17thAssociate Justice, but was appointed as the 19th Associate Justice;
e. Zaldy V. Trespeses, nominated for the vacancy of the 18th Associate Justice, but
was appointed as the 21st Associate Justice.
Only the appointment of Karl B. Miranda as the 20th Associate Justice is in
accordance with his nomination. Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only
choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC
for each specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in deviation of
this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Hence, petitioners pray, among other
reliefs, that the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, who belonged to the
same shortlist for the position of 21st Associate Justice, be declared null and void for
these were made in violation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 26, 2016, the JBC belatedly filed a Motion for Intervention in the
Petition at bar, or more than six months from the filing of the herein Petition on May
17, 2016 and after Chief Justice Sereno, the Chairperson of the JBC herself,
administered the oath of office of respondent Econg, whose appointment is now being
questioned for having been done in disregard of the clustering of nominees by the
JBC.
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ISSUE: Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint
only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific
vacancy.
RULING: NO. President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. He was not
limited to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for
each vacancy.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy."
The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if there is only one
vacancy to consider at a time. The power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary is beyond question, subject to the limitation that the President can only
appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.
However, the controversy in this case arose because by virtue of Republic Act No.
10660, creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three members each,
there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate Justice of said collegiate court;
and that the JBC submitted six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16 th to the
21stSandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary.47 It is a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities.48 The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-vis
the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986.
It is apparent from the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the
JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that
the President cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot
be disputed herein that respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by
the JBC and, hence, qualified to be appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is
still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by
the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President
Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from
each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of
nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint
members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified
for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position
of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the
nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective appointees.
The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20
Associate Justices divided into seven divisions, with three members each. The
numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the 20 Associate Justices is
determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or appointment
by the President.
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices
shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or,
when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among the Four
(4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, which involved the Court of Appeals, another collegiate court: For purposes
of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed
by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the
date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the
Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by
RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee,
the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when
the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order
of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This
provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246)
controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of
appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot
override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual
appointment by the President.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority
or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and
order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. By already
designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the
seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a
vital part of the President's power of appointment.
There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice should not each be assigned a specific number by the JBC. The
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions were created without any distinction as
to rank in seniority or order of preference in the collegiate court. The President
appoints his choice nominee to the post of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, but not
to a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice position with an identified rank, which is
automatically determined by the order of issuance of appointment by the President.
The appointment does not specifically pertain to the 16 th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because the Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice's ranking is temporary and changes every time a vacancy occurs in said
collegiate court. In fact, by the end of 2016, there will be two more vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.51 These vacancies will surely cause movement in
the ranking within the Sandiganbayan. At the time of his/her appointment, a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice might be ranked 16th, but because of the two
vacancies occurring in the court, the same Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may
eventually be higher ranked.
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every
vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the
President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of
the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited
to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed
from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the
same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal
basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power.
To recall, the JBC invited applications and recommendations and conducted
interviews for the "six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan." Applicants, including respondents Musngi and Econg, applied for
the vacancy for "Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Throughout the application
process before the JBC, the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice were not specifically identified and differentiated from one another for the
simple reason that there was really no legal justification to do so. The requirements
and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for
all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. If an individual is found to be qualified for
one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all the other vacancies. It was only at
the end of the process that the JBC precipitously clustered the 37 qualified nominees
into six separate shortlists for each of the six vacant positions.
There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired the power
of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory authority to
determine seniority in a collegiate court. The clustering by the JBC of the qualified
nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have
been done arbitrarily, there being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the
same. The number of nominees was not even equally distributed among the clusters.
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power
to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees
into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the
well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional
prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list
of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the
minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per
vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded
herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37
qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as
the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity.
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The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the situation wherein there
are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, to which the President shall
make appointments on the same occasion, regardless of whether the JBC carried out
combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies. The President is not
bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the
separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. As the Court
already ratiocinated herein, the requirements and qualifications, as well as the power,
duties, and responsibilities are the same for all the vacant posts in a collegiate court;
and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also
qualified for all the other vacancies. It is worthy of note that the JBC, in previous
instances of closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts, such as the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, faithfully observed the practice of submitting only a
single list of nominees for all the available vacancies, with at least three nominees for
every vacancy, from which the President made his appointments on the same
occasion. This is in keeping with the constitutional provisions on the President's
exclusive power to appoint members of the Judiciary and the mandate of the JBC to
recommend qualified nominees for appointment to the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition
for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The
Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associate
Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the
four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID.
9.) HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO vs. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III (2017)
FACTS: In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court DECLARES the
clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and
the appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
successively filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 27, 2016 and a Motion
for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29November 2016) on
February 6, 2017.
The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's pronouncement that the former's
act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was unconstitutional. What the President
did with the lists, for the purpose of this particular dispute alone as far as the JBC is
concerned, was the President's exclusive domain
The JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting
in accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 93 of
the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its
independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom to
perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with the Constitution.
According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord with
the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from political
pressure as the President has to choose only from the nominees for one particular
vacancy. Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby
completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the JBC. The JBC clarifies that it
numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of precedence, but for practical
reasons, i.e., to distinguish one list from the others and to avoid confusion. The JBC
also points out that the acts invoked against the JBC are based on practice or custom,
but "practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right." The
JBC, as a constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its
practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.
The JBC moves for the inhibition of the ponente of the assailed Decision based on
Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.4
The JBC alleges that the ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had
personal knowledge of the voting procedures and format of the short lists, which are
the subject matters of this case.
JBC then expresses its puzzlement over the ponente 's participation in the present
proceedings, espousing a position contrary to that of the JBC. The JBC pray the
DECISION dated 29 November 2016 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one
be issued granting the Motion for Intervention of the JBC.
It is likewise prayed that the ponente inhibit herself from further participating in this
case. The JBC impugns the significance accorded by the ponente to the fact that
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno),
Chief Justice Serena's act should not be taken against the JBC because, the JBC
reasons, Chief Justice Sereno only chairs the JBC, but she is not the JBC, and the
administration of the oath of office was a purely ministerial act.
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The JBC maintains that it did not exceed its authority and, in fact, it only faithfully
complied with the literal language of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution,
when it prepared six short lists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan.
The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for the
JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making short lists. It presents
different scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz., (a) There are two
different sets of applicants for the vacancies; (b) There is a change in the JBC
composition during the interval in the deliberations on the vacancies as the House of
Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex officio seat for the
Legislature; (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in
the Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because of the
location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain personalities; (d) The multiple
vacancies in newly-opened first and second level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to
be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so the JBC chooses nominees
for those particular posts with more years of service as against those near retirement.
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and possibly
unique situations, there can be no general rule against clustering. Submitting
separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for the JBC to
observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list for every vacancy, and (b) choosing
candidates of competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every such
vacancy. It did not encroach on the President's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary.
ISSUES:
1) WON the ponente should have inhibited herself from participating in the
case.
2) WON the issues raised in the previous case was improperly passed upon
by the Court.
3) WON the guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC was proper
4) WON The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice posts encroached on the President's power to determine
the seniority of the justices appointed to the said court.
HELD:
1)There is no legal or factual basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant
case. The ponente has absolutely no personal interest in this case. The ponente is
also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discussed and decided to adopt the
unprecedented method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies
for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists, one for every
vacancy. The ponente does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the
clustering method of nomination for appellate courts and even the Supreme Court.
The crucial issue in the present case pertains to the clustering of nominees and not
the nomination and qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had the
opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of nominees for
simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia
in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the ponente is duty-bound to
render an opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional implications.
Neither is there any basis for the ponente 's voluntary inhibition from the case at bar.
Other than the bare allegations of the JBC, there is no clear and convincing evidence
of the ponente 's purported bias and prejudice, sufficient to overcome the presumption
that she had rendered her assailed ponencia in the regular performance of her official
and sacred duty of dispensing justice according to law and evidence and without fear
or favor.
2)All the basic issues raised in the Petition had been thoroughly passed upon by the
Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and the JBC already expressed its
disinterest to question President Aquino's "cross-reaching" in his appointment of the
six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the JBC reproaches the Court for supposedly
hurrying the promulgation of its Decision on November 29, 2016 in anticipation of the
impending vacancies in the Supreme Court due to the retirements of Associate
Justices Perez and Brion in December 2016.
A scrutiny of the process the Petition went through before its promulgation negates
any haste on the part of the Court. Even if the Court allows the intervention of the
JBC, as it will now do in the case at bar, the arguments of the JBC on the merits of
the case fail to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 29,
2016.
3) The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC
impaired the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine
the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court
unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the
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nominees into six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and maintains that it
deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of
the JBC, however, is not without limits. It cannot impair the President's power to
appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority
of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain
the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused
by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appointing power.
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged
upon the President's appointing power in the following ways: The President's option
for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the
President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the
nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the
vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain
why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to
one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was
restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were included, even
though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies. Moreover,
by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority
or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices,
Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee. The
Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all
qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the
JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate
courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored
nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her
appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong
contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment. The six nominees actually
appointed by President Aquino as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices: Michael
Frederick L. Musngi, Reynaldo P. Cruz, Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Maria Theresa V.
Mendoza-Arcega, Karl B. Miranda, Zaldy V. Trespeses.
It would be safe to say that all the aforementioned six nominees were strong
contenders. If all six nominees were placed in the same cluster, then only one of them
would have been actually appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and the
other five could no longer be considered for the still unfilled vacancies
There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees
by the JBC. the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory.
A review of the voting patterns by the JBC Members for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice only raises more questions and
doubts than answers. It would seem, to the casual observer, that the Chief Justice
and the four regular JBC Members exercised block voting most of the time. Out of the
89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total of 3 7 qualified nominees
spread across six separate short lists. Out of the 37 qualified nominees, the Chief
Justice and the four regular JBC Members coincidentally voted for the same 28
nominees in precisely the same clusters, only varying by just one vote for the other
nine nominees.
What is difficult to comprehend is how they determined the distribution of the
nominees to the different clusters in the absence of any criteria or standard to be
observed in the clustering of nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any
of its Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case.
The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in
determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of
nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The
lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation
to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
There is technically no clustering of nominees for first and second level trial courts.
The separate short lists in such situations are technically not clustering as the
vacancies happened and were announced at different times and candidates applied
for specific vacancies, based on the inherent differences in the location and
jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of nominees to the same,
hence, justifying a separate short list for each vacant post.
While clustering of nominees was observed in the nominations for vacancies in the
Court of Appeals in 2015, it escaped scrutiny as the appointments to said vacancies
were not challenged before the Court.
While it may be true that the JBC already observed clustering in 2015, it is still
considered a relatively new practice, adopted only under Chief Justice Sereno's
Chairmanship of the JBC. The clustering then escaped scrutiny as no party
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questioned the appointments to the said vacancies. The view of the consultants was
also not solicited or requested by the JBC
The separate short lists for the current vacancies in the Supreme Court are not in
issue in this case, but has been brought up by the JBC in its Motion for
Reconsideration-in- Intervention.
4)The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice posts encroached on the President's power to determine the seniority of the
justices appointed to the said court.
It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority
or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and
order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. By already
designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the
seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a
vital part of the President's power of appointment
The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can
only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already
sets in place the mechanism to protect the appointment process from political
pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short
lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President's
power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court,
beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29,
2016 of the Court in this case on the ground that it is not a party herein.
However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this
case, by taking into consideration the issues raised
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists
for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established
practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to
appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least
three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum
requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there
should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because
the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees.
All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement
of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence,
the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity.
The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the
simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its
ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his
appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said
declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something
insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the
Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated
29 November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.
10.) MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191618 : November 23, 2010
FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,[2] Article
VII of the Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is “authorized to promulgate its
rules for the purpose,” he chafes at the creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal”
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complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Atty. Macalintal has locus standi to file the instant petition.
2. Whether the creation of PET is constitutional.
3. May the PET exercise quasi-judicial power?
RULING:
1. No. The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a
judicial inquiry:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who
has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v.
Carr:“whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
questions.” Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the
complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this
instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its
jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at
that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority
over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of
judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
2. Yes.
Section 4 (7), Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. x x x.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
We reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized
what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context
of the PET in our country cannot be denied.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with
the duty characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the
Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant
of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
“promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on
numerous occasions.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that
the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution,
and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The
adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief
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Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the
Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to
be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court.
3. No.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole,
the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET
and the Supreme Court.
11.) GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES vs, COMELEC
(GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on
the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates
HELD: NO. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has
sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the
Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be
supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds
for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures
would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the
qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her
COC.
RATIO: The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause
of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
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into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C,
§2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only
in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of
barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack
of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove
the incumbent from office.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted
for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be
set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending
beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings
relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law
is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible
for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
12.) RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7,
RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIRING RETIRING
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF
PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.
A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC October 1, 2013
Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on
the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states:
Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance
of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency,
Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential
appointees, from the Office of the President.
Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively
vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As
such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper
administrative action against them for any violation thereof.4 As an adjunct thereto, it
keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court
personnel.
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In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court must pay to acquire the
retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non- government properties they used during their tenure.
pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be
made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard
FACTS: This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal
the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA),
clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5)
which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.5 properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
Valuation
To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of
Valuation under
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President
Name of Items under COA Difference
(albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justice Purchased CFAG Memorandum (in pesos)
Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs
(in pesos)
related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.
Artemio Toyota 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary Panganiban Camry,
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance (Chief Justice) 2003 model
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement
which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government Toyota 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00
agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel as it is a Grandia,
matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision. 2002 model

Toyota 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency Camry,
of Administrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, 2001 model
Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is
declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary. Ruben T. Reyes Toyota 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50
(Associate Camry,
13.) RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED Justice) 2005 model
VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED
Toyota 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00
CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT. Grandia,
2003 model
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14,
2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Angelina S. Toyota 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00
Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office Gutierrez Grandia,
(Associate 2002 model
of the Chief Justice. These Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the Justice)
proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice

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disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this

Adolfo S. Toyota 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00
Azcuna Camry, judicial prerogative.
(Associate 2005 model
Justice) ISSUE: Whether the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is
a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority pursuant to its fiscal
Toyota 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00
autonomy.
Grandia,
2002 model
RULING: YES. In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10 provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and
Ma. Alicia 5,800.002
benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges
 The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional s own affairs.
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23,
1997 and its guidelines. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

 Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her
Memorandum, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the
COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula,
noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of
the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the
appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in
1997.
 More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy
in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,
contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization
of the Judiciary s resources, based on its own determination of what it
needs.
 The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge
of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court s policy in the
Judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts:
decisional independence and institutional independence."1
Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability to render decisions
free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and
applicable law."
Institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial
branch from the executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put,
institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a
body."rνll
The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as
exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.

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The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by
prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and ensures
their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."
Fiscal Autonomy
Any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the
Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of
government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it
must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. the Constitution
through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision
states:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated
for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and
extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law
for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed
by them during the discharge of their functions.
In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino s veto of
particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary s constitutionally
guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions
in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice
to adjust in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings
from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other
items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of
the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.rνll
The Court s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the grant
to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will,
free from any outside control or interference.
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the
Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise
of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the
Court En Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects,
the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the
Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate
courts:
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to
reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. Under
this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary s
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internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement
applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own
grants‚rνll
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges,
court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power;
they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the
Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and
dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines
the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As
the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in
consultation with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice
or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is
unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.
14.) IN RE: SAVE THE SC JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS ABOLITION OF JDF AND REDUCTION OF
FISCAL AUTONOMY.
FACTS: This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development
Fund1 and replacing it with the “Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the
proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and
Congress shall determine how the funds will be used.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
against the perceived hostility of Congress.
In the letter petition, Mijares alleges that he is “a Filipino citizen, and a concerned
taxpayer.” He filed this petition as part of his “continuing crusade to defend and uphold
the Constitution” because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the
threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration
Program case on July 1, 2014.
The grounds of his complaint.
A. That certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation
of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
B. That Congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.”
C. That Congress is exercising its power “in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’
(JDF) of the Supreme Court.”
D. With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers
that Congress should not act as “wreckers of the law” by threatening “to clip the
powers of the High Tribunal[.]” Congress committed a “blunder of monumental
proportions” when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget.
E. Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to “REVOKE/ABROGATE and
EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better
serve public interest and general welfare of the people.”
ISSUE: WON JUDICIAL REVIEW IS APPLICABLE.
HELD: (NO! The requisite of Actual controversy and legal standing is absent)
This court resolves to deny the petition.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to
certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
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personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of this petition.
A. THERE IS NO ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the
existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be “an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.”
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable
controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation of an existing
legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
In the case of Belgica vs ochoa, the Supreme court held that:
“Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law.
This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted any
and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that
defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability
are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right,
but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that
any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine
fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the
constituents that they legitimately represent.”
The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
“Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.”
Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the
proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court,
however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This
court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.
petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that will abolish the
Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within
the legislative power of Congress and is “not subject to judicial restraint[.]” A
proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on
the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may
not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for
judicial determination.36 The petition, therefore, does not present any actual
case or controversy that is ripe for this court’s determination.
B. PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL STANDING
Petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule
on legal standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
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avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so
as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in
the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.”
This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.”
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if
the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite
standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect
the judiciary.
This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues
involved are of “transcendental importance” to the public. Transcendental
importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of
Representatives:
“There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised.”
A mere invocation in the pleading is not enough for this court to set aside procedural
rules:
“Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by
this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance
must be supported by the proper allegations.”
None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by
petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.
Lastly, it must also be shown that there is a clear or imminent threat to
fundamental rights. The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing
of the proposed bill in Congress. The threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest
since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into law. There is no
transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.
15.) VILLANUEVA vs. JBC
FACTS: After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva
applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC
however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such
position because the JBC’s long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge
of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the
SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary
injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of
the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been
published because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBC’s arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional
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Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with
public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees
for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in
determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has
the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy
in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the
applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing
its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by
the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience
and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-
level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct
adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many
years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven
competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
16.) SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE RUBIA
FACTS: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before
the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. Complainant filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This
was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. Evelyn
Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report
that included not only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties
forming part of the estate of complainant's late husband.
The third case is a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real
properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against
complainant, among others. Complainant alleged that there was delay in the
publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed.
She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen
Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., met
with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this meeting, complainant
informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition
for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña to check
the status of the publication of the notice. Respondent Pecaña asked for
complainant's number so that she could inform her as soon as any development takes
place in the case. Enrique and Perlito executed affidavits to corroborate these
allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan,
Laguna. Complainant went there with Enrique. Respondent Pecaña then informed
complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had
already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael. Complainant stated
that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these
concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was
only concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which
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respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganunba? Iba pala yung kaso mo." Complainant
called respondent Pecaña who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to
talk to her. Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on
the condition that respondent Pecaña would be present as well.
On March 3, 2010 23 at around 7:00 p.m., complainant picked up respondent Pecaña
at 6750 Ayala Avenue in Makati City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort,
Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge Rubia would
arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin
Hotel.
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner
meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions.
Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with
Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. Complainant was then informed
that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of
Romelias Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised complainant, as she was under
the impression that opposing counsel and respondent Judge Rubia had no business
discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed
involvement with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-
Barias.
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in
the course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been
talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court
proceedings. The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was
actively taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to
Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant
was appalled by such suggestion and replied “Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata
kaya gawin yun." Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a
manner that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely,
Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty.
Noe Zarate. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing
of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and
despite their non-compliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed,
Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default. She also alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove ownership of the property
was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias,
who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her
late husband. Complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia's inhibition. This was
denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration
denied in an order dated November 15, 2010. On November 11, 2010, complainant
filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the Court Administrator charging
respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct
unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
incompetence, and gross misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable.
HELD: Yes. This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of
Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable for their actions.
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that
the administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper
action for her was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify the
purported error"109 in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be
held administratively liable.This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the
report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be
held administratively liable for their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating
justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a
trial court judge’s since an investigating justice personally assessed the witnesses’
credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held: Such
findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated,
and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the
circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-
examine the trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the interference
made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on
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the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record.112 (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainant’s
testimony and relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubia’s witness,
Justice Gaerlan said: While respondents were able to present a witness to
corroborate their version of the incident on all material points, complainant miserably
failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity
to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s witness, Rodel Cortez
(Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible and rang with
truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident that
transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent
any ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that
the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony
is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a
spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez’[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of
evidence, such as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary
Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular date and time
Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaña.
These evidence, when taken together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident
as narrated by Barias. Barias[’] self-serving declarations have no evidentiary value
when ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period
between the alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The
eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to
question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think
about before filing an administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is
more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an
administrative complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant
and her late husband’s estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over
the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it
would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in
the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to
tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the
reprisal that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint. Judges
and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed.
Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and
court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the
bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported.
In Heck v. Judge Santos,133 this court held that: Pursuant to the foregoing, there can
be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer
who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after
the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were
otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they
took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the
duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and
bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.134 (Emphasis
supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more
than twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period
cannot prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when
the offense was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of
complainant’s allegations. This court’s mandate to discipline members of the judiciary
and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are
disciplined based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.135 Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided
for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for
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administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be filed
after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality
the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an
administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to
ignore the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed.
The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or
disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a
period of prescription to the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge
Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent
Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office.
He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña's actions by
virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the
Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a
judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they
were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several
warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court
under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge. However, nothing in the record shows that
respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaña's
interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to
admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court
Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with
complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place.
Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground
for administrative liability.
17.) IN RE: LETTER OF JUDGE DIAZ
FACTS: In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the MeTC Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant for
judgeship in one of the vacant RTC branches in Metro Manila. In connection
therewith, he was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He
was told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 for
not hearing a motion for demolition. He claims that this lapse happened only once as
a result of oversight. He requests judicial clemency and, in particular, that he be
allowed to again be nominated to one of the vacant branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila or in any of the cities where his application is being considered.
In a subsequent letter, Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He
expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held administratively liable
in Alvarez v. Diaz. He confessed that [t]he stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter
lesson and promised to avoid the commission of the same or similar acts. He
submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this Court for whatever action the Court
may take on his plea for judicial clemency.
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted
the following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack
of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides: SEC.
5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 3. Those
who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case,
where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he
has been granted judicial clemency.
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated
for appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency
is granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has
come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary
who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a
judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself
in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his
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sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand the most
searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant
it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable.
ISSUE: WON JUDGE DIAZ’ APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY SHOULD
BE GRANTED
RULING: In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over
all courts and all personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system
or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He
humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since
the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson
and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as
proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of
further opportunities in the judiciary for him.
Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is
hereby NOTED. His request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.
18.) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on
May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief
Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon
the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules,
the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for
the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases
which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition
of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that
the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A
precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly
referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15,
Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial
positions during the period therein fixed.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived
by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.”
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual
case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC
already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included
in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will
succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules
and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to
the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe
for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of
constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the controversy will
surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from
moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the
JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records
of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of
the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely
made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should
contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise
of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following
requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act
demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is
mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty
enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
RULING (APRIL 20, 2010) ON THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED
BY PETITIONERS ON THE ABOVE DECISION OF THE SC ON MARCH 17, 2010
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being
thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of
March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose
of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela.
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The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It
simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of
imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is
reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as
precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial
courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best
evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable,
the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by
them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical
judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but
the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does
not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best
lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not
obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination,
to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-
law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of
Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the
precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or
abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in
this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently
forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en
banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their
insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article
VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on
nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the
President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons
whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however,
Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section
13, Article VII (t)o avoid any further complication,[8] such that the final version of the
second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to
the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15,
Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court
either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening
their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII
of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the
ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-
contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into
Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban
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under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of
said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so
would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional
Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that
their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in
them.[9] Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to
fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition
of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the
meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or
words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent
is in the language of the law itself.[10]

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition

contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any

unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.

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