A.

Interpleader (Rule 62)

A.1. Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEE E. WON
alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23851; March 26, 1976

FACTS: The WackWack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal,
alleged for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its
membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI
of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. WackWack Golf & Country Club, Inc."
and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963
by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the
president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank & Trust Company as
transfer agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said
case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its
aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201.

For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478
issued by the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is
null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and
cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to
the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact
that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan,
holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of his
refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate action to protect his rights despite the fact that
he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject matter of this litigation; and that he is made a
part so that complete relief may be accorded herein.

The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and
litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of
the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and
cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant interpleader will prosper?

HELD: NO.The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a
remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons
who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to tone or the one thing.

There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He
need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has
arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be
barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that
it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the
conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before
it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It
was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead
Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As
a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been
executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where
he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must
be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.
A.2. Eternal Gardens vs. IAC

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST

SPECIAL CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988

FACTS: Eternal Garden and Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventists (MISSION), executed a Land Development Agreement, whereby Eternal Garden
would construct at its own expense a memorial park subdivided into and sold as memorial plot
lots, on the property owned by MISSION. 40% of the proceeds be remitted monthly by Eternal
Garden to MISSION through a designated depositary trustee bank.

They also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage on said lots. All went well until
Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the land in question.Confronted with such
conflicting claims, petitioner filed a complaint for interpleader against MISSION and Maysilo
Estate. Alleging among others that petitioner was not yet the owner but a purchaser thereof, and
its willingness to pay to whoever will be declared as owner. Trial granted the interpleader.

MISSION filed a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from
petitioner.The motion was denied. An amended order was issued, still in favor of Eternal Garden.
Trial court passed a resolution reversing the judgment and ruled in favour of MISSION ordering
the judicial deposit and dismissal of the interpleader.

The Supreme Court in another case involving the same parties, ordered that Eternal Gardens to
deposit the amounts due and unpaid.

ISSUE: Whether Eternal Gardens should deposit the amounts due and unpaid.

HELD: YES.As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader,
aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is
the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice
and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation
during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled
thereto."

The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are
involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now
accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the
complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a
bank approved by the Court.

DOCTRINE: Deposit is proper in interpleader since the petitioner may not continue to benefit
from the property/funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever
will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.
A.3. Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty
A.4. Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Devt. Bank

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154470-71; September 24, 2012
x-----------------------x
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT
BANK, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BRION, J.:

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45on pure questions of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP), assailing the January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 RTC of
Makati City, dismissing (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the
"counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader
filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOC’s and the BSP’s motions for reconsideration.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of 2 sets of Central
Bank (CB) bills, with total face value of ₱ 70 million and ₱ 20 million, which were eventually
negotiated to Planters Development Bank (PDB). After different transfers/ negotiations
involving several banks/institutions, the CBs were ultimately acquired bythe Bank of Commerce
(BOC). Upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed the Officer-in-
Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department, Nuqui, of the PDB’s claim over these
CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. It requested the BSP to record its
claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of
imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer” and that, subsequent
transferees thereof were not holders in due course. Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8
of CB Circular No. 28, the existing BSP Regulation, which requires the presentation of the bond
before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP. This prompted PDB to file
with the RTC petitions for mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against BSP and BOC
reiterating that there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-
issuance of a detached assignment, particularly alleging that it merely "warehoused" the first set
of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

BOC filed its answer, praying for the dismissal of the case, alleging that PDB has no cause of
action considering that PDB is no longer the owner of the CBs. Alternatively, the BSP in its
counter-complaint/cross-claim, asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the
claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the
subject CBs, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner.

ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader suit may be initiated through the petitioner’s
answer
HELD: YES. The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the
specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable
to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-
in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section
5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-
interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to
put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s
"counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through
the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim
for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which
essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that
"payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as
a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it,
thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the
uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit,
however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of
the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or
cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule
62.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters
Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or
answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from
Planters Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with
DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of the
Central Bank bills.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly
authorized representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of
docket fees separately due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting
claimants in BangkoSentralngPilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision. SO
ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to
govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In
an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings
but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the
counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section
5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
 B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

B.1. Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Ind.

EufemiaAlmeda and RomelAlmeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc.

G.R. No. 150806; January 28, 2008

Nachura, J.:

FACTS: Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee,
represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L.
Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner
RomelAlmeda. The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave
rise to the instant case:

SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on
the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter
be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building
where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided
becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased;
provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be
reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to
the portion leased by him;

SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should

supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the basis of payment;

During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with
petitioners. In a letter, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect
Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals.

Again, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly
rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250
of the Civil Code.

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct
interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.

Petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for
failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against petitioners.

Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper.

HELD: Yes,the action for declaratory relief is proper.

It is beyond cavil that the requisites for availing a declaratory relief are present in the instant
case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution dated
November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute,
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in
such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate
relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding.
B.2. Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCR 114,
G.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Villanueva in the Philippines. They had a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer and Kimberly. But, Cipriano’s wife left for USA bringing along Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in California. Cipriano
thereafter filed with the RTC a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. The RTC granted the same.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the decision and resolution of the RTC
that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The OSG contends that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

On the other hand, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

ISSUE/S:Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

HELD: Remanded to lower court for further submission of evidence. Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code, should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted, this Court is
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent
is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the evidence in his favor.

DOCTRINE: Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory

Relief.- The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe
for judicial determination.
B.3. Malana vs. Tappa

G.R. No. 181303; September 17, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of situated in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from
Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and
occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the
latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent
materials.

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondent’s documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable
of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a
cloud upon petitioner’s title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the
RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. Before respondents could file their
answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.
Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In an Order dated
30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action
to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real
property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax
Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction in the instant case.

HELD: Yes, the dismissal of the instant case is valid. Moreover, the remedy of
declaratory relief is not proper.

Issue on jurisdiction
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties there under.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court.

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil
Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right
to repurchase.

These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00,

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Proper remedy on the instant case
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was
filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession
of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief
B.4. Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The
issue has constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional
challenge.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political
pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz: Section 8, Article VIII of the
Constitution, viz:

“Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term
of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members
first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council
and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.”

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give
equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and
the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only
one (1) representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is in the nature of an action under declaratory relief under
Rule 63?

RULING: YES, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the
nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as
essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in
the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the
very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for
declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to
the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After
all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending
two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

DOCTRINE:An action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction
of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
B.5. Sabitsanavs.Muertegui
B.6. Republic vs. Roque (In relation to southern Hemisphere case)
B.7. Dept. of Finance vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
B.8. Umali vs. JBC

REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in his capacity as Chairman of the House of

Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC, Petitioner vs.
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, chaired by THE HON. MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO, Chief Justice and Ex Officio Chairperson, Respondent
G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS: This Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of having two
representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court
enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in
the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or
interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only
one representative to the JBC. Had it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided. This Court further articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term
"Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department as no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover,
this Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that the ex officio members of the JBC
consist of representatives from the three main branches of government, to wit: the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the
executive, and a representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It can be deduced
therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was
to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government having equal
say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one
representative in the JBC would negate the principle of equality among these three branches of
the government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.

In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month
rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent
Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to December. This is now the current
practice in the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the
selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P.
Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc
deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the petitioner's votes were simply placed
in an envelope and sealed subject to any further disposition as this Court may direct in a proper
proceeding. This is the root of the present controversy that prompted the petitioner to file the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him to assail the JBC's adoption of the
rotational representation leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations

2. Whether the JBC can be compelled through mandamus to count the petitioner's votes in its En
Banc deliberations

HELD:
1. Yes. Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court of
Appeals, however, this Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency.

This Court took pains in enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this
Court, to wit: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of
first impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter; (4)
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time element presented in
this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7)
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and (8) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.

While this Court agrees with the JBC that the petitioner's preliminary remedy to question the
rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate the same, this, however,
cannot be considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is, thus, inclined to sustain the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court not only because it is the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to him but also by reason of the constitutional issues involved herein and the
urgency of the matter. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Constitution mandates that any
vacancy to the office of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court must be filled up within the
90-day period from its occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must submit the list of nominees prior to
the start of that period. As the nominations covered by the questioned December 2016 JBC En
Banc deliberations were intended for vacancies created by then Associate Justices Perez and
Brion, who respectively retired last December 14 and 29, 2016, hence, any resort to Congress
during that time would already be inadequate since the JBC list of nominees would be submitted
any moment to the Office of the President for the appointment of the next Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court. Since time is of the essence, the petitioner's direct resort to this Court is
warranted.

2. No. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant has a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
act required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
perform the act. As an extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a
ministerial one. A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial
act are mutually exclusive. Further, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct.

In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may
only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful members
and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful
representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House of
Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate
already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of the
petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that Congress
will only have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a discretionary one,
accordingly, mandamus will not lie.
 C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the COMELEC and CoA
C.1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs. Comelec
 D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
D.1.1. Ampil vs. Ombudsman

OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 192685; July 31, 2013

Ponente: Perez, J.

FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into
a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower."
wherein the latter shall provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the
cost of construction and development of the condominium building. Due to financial difficulties,
ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO. Thus, MICO and ASB executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the
development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both
ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments.

On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) were issued by
Espenesin for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in the
name of MICO and the second in the name of ASB. The second set of CCTs was issued upon the
instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO. Ampil, unsecured creditor of the ASB charged
Espenesin with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of
the Ombudsman
.
Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of probable cause for the
alleged commission of falsification. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court
affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of

probable cause may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD:The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari
proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

However, on several occasions, the court have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is
under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g)
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.

The fourth circumstance is present in this case. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had
altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed
Ampil’s complaint-affidavit. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for
Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He
heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of
records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x xx in the province or city
wherein such office is situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the
amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error.

Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated
writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His
actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona
fides mistake.
D.1.2. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her
husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent
G.R. No. 200804; January 22, 2014

FACTS: On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the
amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005.

Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor
from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and
occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005,
respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon
application of the agreed rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge
of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent
only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid
despite petitioner’s repeated demands.

In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding
their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners,
petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40
cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water
consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of
the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.

In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.

ISSUE:WON RTC is correct in denying petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 assailing the MTCC
decision in the small claims case.

HELD: YES.Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23.Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based
on the facts established by the. The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court
in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held
that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.In view of the foregoing, the Court thus
finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum. To be
sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance
of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.
This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
D.1.3. Maglalang vs. PAGCOR

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, PETITIONER VS.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND

GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), AS REPRESENTEDBY ITS INCUMBENT
CHAIRMAN EFRAIM GENUINO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 190566; December 11, 2013

FACTS: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In
December 2008, he committed an error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension
that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to
air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was
issued a memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-
day suspension was imposed. He filed MR seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for
Production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both were denied. He then filed
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is
not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for
being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse
from the CA.

ISSUE: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her.

The case falls squarely under exception “where no administrative review is provided by law”
since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an
employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized
with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of PAGCOR, not an appeal.

As there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on
record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or
deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances
and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious
resolution is in order.

DOCTRINE: An appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same
should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
D.1.4. People vs. Castaneda

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C.

CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO
N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 208290; December 11, 2013

FACTS: Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker
of Plinth Enterprise were charged with violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines when they imported into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons containing 17,160 pieces of
Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, and falsely declaring them to
contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items
(Kaspersky) having customs duties amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One
Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid.

Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,which was granted by the CTA.
Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claiming that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the
CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case.

The BOC then filed a petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CTA.

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for
the filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013
Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013.
Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when
Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA
ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the
parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May
15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari should be given due course despite its late filing.
HELD: No, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable
delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was
advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was
filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16,
2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will
also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it
to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would
deserve leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to
monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an
admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb
smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.

The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the
case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present
the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly
identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure
to file this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant
and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government
service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice.

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA
displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the
respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict
compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result
would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this
case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave
abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with indicators that
the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and
opposed the demurrer.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.

DOCTRINE: Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable
delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
D.1.5. UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Teylan
G.R. No. 110280; October 12, 1993

Romero, J.

FACTS: Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the UP College of Law, applied forSocialized
Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP).

U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). SDTrendered a decision
finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholdinginformation in his STFAP
application about the income of his mother, who isliving abroad, in support of the studies of his
brothers Antonio and Federico,which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his
studies.

As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from theUniversity and required
him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had receivedbut if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement. The Executive Committeeaffirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal appealed to
the Board of Regents(BOR). BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal forthwith filed a
motionfor reconsideration of the BOR decision.

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the BOR found Nadal guilty and imposedupon him the
penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993,non-issuance of any certificate
of good moral character during the suspensionand/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the
STFAP benefits he had receivedwith 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-
issuance of histranscript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with
theuniversity.

Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition formandamus with
preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restrainingorder against President Abueva, the
BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer forthe issuance of
an injunction and alleged that RTC judge gravely abused herdiscretion in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction thereby preventing theBOR from implementing the suspension penalty it
had imposed on Nadal.

Private respondent opposed the petition and argued that Dr. Caoili, not havingbeen authorized by
the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instantpetition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified
the petition, not being the "Board ofRegents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not
real parties ininterest who should file the same.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a respondent to a petition for certiorari may assail thelegal standing of the
petitioner when the former had specifically named the latterin a petition for mandamus
for which the injunction was issued and is assailedin the certiorari petition.
  Whether or notmandamus shall be applicable in this case.

HELD:
I. The answer is in the negative. A real party in interest is one "who stands to bebenefited or
injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of thesuit. 'Interest' within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interestin issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest inthe question involved, or a mere incidental
interest."

Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch aswhat is in
issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a studentwho violated the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline bywithholding information in
connection with his application for STFAP benefits,which information, if disclosed, would
have sufficed to disqualify him fromreceiving the financial assistance he sought. Such
dishonesty, if left unpunished,would have the effect of subverting a commendable
program into which theUniversity officials had devoted much time and expended precious
resources,from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize
thesocialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students maybenefit from
the public funds allocated to the State University.

Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in thepetition for
mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped fromquestioning their personality to
file the instant petition. Moreover, under Sec.7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11
of the University Code "all process"against the BOR shall be served on "the president or
secretary thereof'." It is inaccordance with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named
as a petitioner.Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the BOR,
hasto verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and every memberof the
BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, anaction may be
entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include anindispensable party where it appears
that the naming of the party would be buta formality. Mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases, a showing of a clearand certain right on the part of the petitioner being
required. It is of no availagainst an official or government agency whose duty requires the
exercise ofdiscretion or judgment.

II. Mandamus is not applicable since UP exercise a valid academic freedom. SC reiterated
the doctrine in Arellano vs Cui that school has an academic freedom to whom they will
accept in their institution. UP has therefore the discretion in this case that the court should
respect therefore Mandamus shall not prosper.
 D.1.6. TUASON VS RD OF CALOOCAN

ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S.

Viado, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in
her own behalf and in behalf of the other members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners
Association," petitioners-intervenors.
G.R. No. 70484; January 29, 1988

NARVASA, J.

FACTS:
I. Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers.
II. They bought a piece of land in Caloocan from Carmel Farms
III. 8 yrs thereafter, they woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were
no longer the owners of the land.
IV. Their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition
and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the
present bona fide occupants thereof."
V. A year after the declaration of martial law, Marcos ssued PD 293 with immediate effect.
VI. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel Farms, which
had earlier purchased from the Government the land.
a. The land bought by Carmel Farms was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-
called "Friar Lands").
b. Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended.
VII. Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete
payment of the price.
a. according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers
nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the
purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms,
Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said
Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government,
and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to
form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts
affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the
Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the
law and public policy.
VIII. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos:
a. Invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and
b. Declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots
IX. It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained
contradictory declarations.
a. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel
Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings
stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang
 Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said
lots.
X. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused
the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314.
XI. SC: The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos
decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a
selected group, in violation of the:
a. Constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain; and
b. Provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles;

ISSUE: W/N Certiorari under Rule 65 was proper.

HELD: YES. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify
only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed
against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the
writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while
Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the
petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of
judicial power.

The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the
parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise
of jurisdiction —which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a
cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and
interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the
members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation,
he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land
now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property
of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting
to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against
the law and public policy.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an
officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts
were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr.
Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested
in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law —the judicial
acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction.
The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the
permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.

Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power —i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the
law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce
evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He
made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding
from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and
that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the
petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to
dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect.
The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the
petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only
arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in
addition exercised it unconstitutionally.

In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for
prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the
latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without
jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws —and
had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby
affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even
if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible
relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties'
pleadings.

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio.

Separate Opinion: I concur fully in the main opinion depicting the unparalleled "despotic,
capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power" by the deposed
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as struck down by the Court's unanimous judgment in the case at
bar. These arbitrary, capricious and oppressive decrees, tailored to suit the deposed President's
every wish and whim, were the product of unrestrained power, as the deposed President took
over the entire government with the imposition of martial

DOCTRINE: Certiorari, in reality, is directed against an unlawful exercise of power. It is

proper when the doneby an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if
it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Certiorari may also be treated as a Prohibition if the averments are sufficient.
D.1.7. Province of Leyte vs. Energy Devt.Corp.

Province of Leyte versus Energy Development Corporation (EDC)

G.R. No. 203124; June 22, 2015

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: The Province of Leyte issued separate franchise tax assessments against EDC which
the latter, in turn, protested separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied all
protests, EDC appealed such denials with the RTC of Tacloban City. Notwithstanding the
pendency of the cases with the RTC, the Province of Leyte continued to issued franchise tax
assessments against EDC which prompted the latter to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction praying that the Province of Leyte be ordered to enjoin from further
assessing and collecting franchise taxes against EDC until the RTC shall have resolved the cases
with finality. In support thereof, EDC averred that it does not have a franchise, thus, the
Province of Leyte’s assessment of franchise taxes against it is contrary to law. It further claimed
that should the Province of Leyte’s action continue, EDC’s operations will cease resulting in the
losses of substantial revenues and jobs for its employees. Also, the damage that it stands to
suffer from the Province of Leyte’s acts is irreparable as there is no assurance that it will be able
to recover such losses.

The RTC initially denied the foregoing motion for preliminary injunction but on motion of EDC,
the RTC issued another order granting the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
ratiocinating that in case EDC will be held liable for the said franchise taxes, the injunction bond
would answer for the claim of the Province of Leyte whereas if EDC is compelled to pay such
taxes pending resolution of the cases with the RTC and is subsequently adjudged to be not liable
to pay the same, there is no assurance that it could recover its operational losses. This, prompted
the Province of Leyte to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.

The CA, then, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground that “there was no proper proof
of service of the Petition to the adverse party” as the registry receipts can hardly be considered as
sufficient and proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 by the Province of Leyte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the ground
that there was no sufficient proof of service of the Petition to the private respondent.

HELD: NO. The instant case was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari which is, by
nature, an original and independent action, and therefore, not considered as part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Being an original action,
there is a need for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before
it can resolve the same on the merits. Thus, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner (Province of Leyte) upon the filing of the certiorari petition. On the other hand, the
CA acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or
resolution indicating the CA's initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA's jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution indicating its initial action on
the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the
petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment to
such petition. When EDC filed its comment to the Petition for Certiorari, it voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the CA. Thus, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both
parties to the instant case.

Hence, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. Accordingly, the pertinent Resolutions of the CA
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
D.1.8. Cawad vs. Abad

GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V.

APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA,
RUBEN C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the
PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T.
ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO
T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
G.R. No. 207145; July 28, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner, Philippine Public Health Association, Inc., filed a petition for certiorari
against the Secretaries of the Department of Budget and Management& of the Department of
Health, and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, alleging that the latter group acted
with grave abuse of discretion upon the issuance of two Joint Circulars prescribing certain
requirements on the grant of benefits that are not required bythe Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers,. Among others, petitioners claim that the subject circulars are void for being an undue
exercise of legislative power by the said administrative bodies.

Through the Solicitor General, the respondents commented that the assailed circulars were issued
within the scope of their authority, and are therefore valid and binding. Moreover, the
respondents controverted that the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition are unavailing because
the assailed circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative, and not of their judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUES:

W/N the circulars are void for being an undue exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative
function.

W/N petition for certiorari is the correct remedy against an undue exercise of legislative or quasi-
legislative function.

HELD: No, the circulars are not void because theissuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of
the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their
quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is
exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the
separation of the branches of the government

In the same vein, a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy against an undue exercise of
legislative or quasi-legislative function. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be invoked
only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.

In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity
in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars.In issuing and implementing the subject
circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to
exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.

Be that as it may, for proper guidance, the Supreme Court still proceeded with the resolution of
the Circulars’ validity as to its substance whether or not the same are contrary to law.

DOCTRINE: It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare administrative issuances illegal

because petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, anderrors
committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionswithout or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition to declare administrative issuances

illegal becausethe purpose of the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court; or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction, the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, and/or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law.

PLEASE DISREGARD THIS PAGE FOR SYLLABUS PURPOSES although you may also
read it, it may help in some way.

Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is available only if: (1) it is directed
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.11

On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of
the parties.Quasi judicial functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.Ministerial
functionsare those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made, and
the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
D.2.1. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP
D.2.2. Corales vs. Republic
D.2.3. Tan vs. CA

Tan vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164966; June 8, 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: In 2002, James L. King (King) charged Roderick Lim-Go, et al. with violation B.P. 22
and Estafa involving two checks both dated June 21, 2002.Subsequently, King filed a
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit involving five additional checks. King filed a Second
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa impleading Grace Tan-Go, and herein petitioners
Rolando Tan, Elena Tan, and Lamberto Tan, as additional respondents.

King averred that in 2002, the spouses Go, together with herein petitioners Rolando Tan (father
of Grace Tan-Go), Elena Tan (mother of Grace Tan-Go), asked ₱100 Million from King
allegedly for the renovation of their movie houses in Butuan City. However, King could only
accommodate ₱40 Million, in exchange for which, Roderick Go issued several checks to King in
the amount of ₱61.28 Million, inclusive of the interest for three months.

At first, the checks issued by Go were honored by the drawee bank when presented. However,
when several of the checks he issued were about to fall due, Roderick Go requested King for a
meeting. While at the agreed meeting place, Roderick Go allegedly attacked King with a box
cutter and told him that all the checks that he issued would be dishonored and for this reason he
had to injure, kidnap and kill him. Thereafter, all the checks dated June 21, 23 and 24, 2002
issued by Roderick Go were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Despite repeated demands, no payment was made; hence, King filed a complaint for violation of
BP Blg. 22 and Estafa.

On November 11, 2002, five informations for estafa were filed against Roderick L. Go et al., and
herein petitioners, and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 5 of Cebu City.On November 18, 2002,
before any warrant of arrest could be issued, petitioners posted bail. The following day, they
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On December 17, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
They sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against
them and prayed that the same be dismissed.
On November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It found, among others, that: petitioners failed to avail themselves of
other plain, speedy and adequate remedies to challenge the public prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause; the petition failed to establish that it falls under any of the exceptions to the
general rule that the court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to
enjoin or restrain a criminal prosecution; and petitioners’ claims contesting the public
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause are matters of defense that should be threshed out during
the trial of the criminal cases and not through the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was proper.

HELD: No. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent
the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition
and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.

Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long
as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a
timely appeal. In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse
of discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal
exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act in contemplation of law.

Petitioners admitthat they received a copy of the Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002 as
early as November 13, 2002. However, from the time they received the copy of the aforesaid
Resolution to the time they were arraigned on November 19, 2002, petitioners did not take steps
to move for reconsideration, or appeal the aforesaid Resolution to the Secretary of Justice.

In fine, the arguments raised in their petition for prohibition ineluctably shows that petitioners
are principally questioning the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against
them. This is but a veiled attempt to litigate issues which should have been timely appealed to
the Secretary of Justice via a petition for review. However, petitioners, through their own fault,
failed to avail themselves of this remedy. Countless times we have ruled that the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This case is no different.

DOCTRINE: Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent
the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
D.3.1. Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay
D.3.2. Sanchez vs. Lastimosa

EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A. METEORO, Petitioners,

vs.ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,Respondent
G.R. No. 161735; September 25, 2007

FACTS: Petitioners Sanchez and Meteoro are police officers discharged from the Philippine
Constabulary. Their respective cases were dismissed on appeal and charges against them were
cleared. They then applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up
to the integration of the PC into the Philippine National Police (PNP).

NAPOLCOM issued a resolution considering as absorbed into the police force those who had
been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or criminal cases but who were later
acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and who subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement
that were not acted upon by the PNP.

NAPOLCOM issued a memo for the issuance of absorption orders by the PNP but no absorption
order was issued by the PNP. Petitioners then sought assistance of the DILG which issued a
memo.

There was no order from PNP thus, petitioners filed a case for mandamus.

ISSUE: Is mandamus a correct remedy?

HELD: No. The remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The
issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a
duty already imposed.

In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner
has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an
imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him.

The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but
to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.

the PNP Chief’s issuance of the orders for the absorption of petitioners in the police force is not
compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a performance
of a ministerial duty.

Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the
charges against them, applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until
the integration of the PC into the PNP in 1990 when R.A. No. 6975was enacted. Thus, we no
longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the Philippine
Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which istechnically an
issuance of a new appointment.

The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in which it is

vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ
of mandamus.

* NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 99-061 recalling the approval of absorption thus trial
court should have dismissed the case for being moot.

*On indispensable parties “The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.”
D.3.3. Social Justice vs. Atienza

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 156052; March 7, 2007

Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS:SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which becameeffective

on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the areadescribed therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners andoperators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist fromoperating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of theordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called"Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., PetronCorporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

However, implementation of the ordinance was repeatedly postponed. Thus,petitioners filed this
original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 prayingthat Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order theimmediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies. Petitioners contendthat respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455
(b) (2) of theLocal Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and orderthe
removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he hasallowed them to stay.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus may be issued in order to compel theenforcement of an

ordinance.

HELD:The answer is in the affirmative. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that isemployed to

compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty thatis already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The petitioner should have awell-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the
act and itmust be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to bedone.

When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is tocompel a public duty,
the people who are interested in the execution of the lawsare regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specificinterest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners
have a direct interest in theenforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned
the right ofpetitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent theduty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to thegovernance of the city." One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chiefexecutive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long asit has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He hasno
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an allegedinvalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. Itmight seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers wereto be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes andordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially beendeclared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to
thelowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
D.3.4. Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE
and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193462 | February 4, 2014 | EN BANC

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Context: There used to be a power struggle in China, one government is called Peoples’
Republic of China based in mainland China while the other is called Republic of China based in
Taiwan. The former won and consequently the International Community revoked their
recognition of the latter, the Philippines followed suit. However, the Philippines continued to
deal with Taiwan and to facilitate its dealings, Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO)
was created as such.

The MECO12 was organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under the Corporation Code.
MECO became the corporate entity "entrusted" by the Philippine government with the
responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial" relations with the people of Taiwan,
particularly in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, investment, cultural, scientific and
educational exchanges. Also, it was "authorized" by the government to perform certain "consular
and other functions" that relates to the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine
interests in Taiwan.

On 23 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Dennis Funa (petitioner) sent a letter to the COA requesting
for a "copy of the latest financial and audit report" of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his
"constitutional right to information on matters of public concern." The petitioner made the
request on the belief that the MECO, being under the "operational supervision" of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Naranjo and issued a
memorandum referring the request to COA Assistant Commissioner Espina for "further
disposition." In said memorandum, Naranjo revealed that MECO was "not among the agencies
audited. Subsequently, petitioner learned about the contents of Naranjo’s memorandum and
petitioner took it as an admission that COA had never audited and examined the accounts of the
MECO. Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petitionfor mandamus before the SC in his
capacities as "taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author.
Petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its
duty under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise
bona fide GOCC or government instrumentality. It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that the
MECO is a GOCC without an original charter or, at least, a government instrumentality, the
funds of which partake the nature of public funds.
MECOargues that a cause of action for mandamus to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty required by law only ripens once there has been a refusal by the tribunal, board or officer
concerned to perform such a duty.34The MECO claims that there was, in this case, no such
refusal either on its part or on the COA’s because the petitioner never made any demand for it to
submit to an audit by the COA or for the COA to perform such an audit, prior to filing the instant
mandamus petition.35

The COA argues that the mandamus petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of mootness
because COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan (Pulido-Tan) issued Office Order No.
2011-698directing a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan to audit certain accounts of MECO.
Further, it argued that petitioner lacks locus standi to bring the suit and the petition was filed in
violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the mandamus petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic, in light of
COA’s Office Order No. 2011-698, an order directing to audit certain accounts of MECO.
2. Whether petitioner Funa has standing to file the mandamus petition.
3. Whether petitioner Funa in filing the mandamus petitiondirectly with SC violated the Principle
of Hierarchy of Courts.

HELD:
1. No. In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA of Office Order No. 2011-698 indeed
qualifies as a supervening event that effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of
the instant mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of
the MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to
do the same.

Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing outright the petition. We believe that the
mandamus petition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing the commission of a grave
violation of the Constitution and involving paramount public interest, which need to be resolved
nonetheless:

First. The petition makes a serious allegation that the COA had been remiss in its
constitutional or legal duty to audit and examine the accounts of an otherwise auditable entity
in the MECO.

Second. There is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning the failure
of the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety or impropriety of such a refusal
is determinative of whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the
guardian of the public treasury, in which any citizen has an interest.

Third. There is also paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue regarding the legal
status of the MECO; a novelty insofar as our jurisprudence is concerned. We find that the
status of the MECO—whether it may be considered as a government agency or not—has a
direct bearing on the country’s commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing
public interest in the resolution of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive
ruling thereon, if not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, then for
the formulation of controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in
general.68 For this purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic function.

If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince, We still add another: Assuming that the
allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office Order No. 2011-698 does not
offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. In the first place,
Office Order No. 2011-698 did not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not
auditing the accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state
any determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the
COA, in fact, only appears in the memorandum70 it submitted to this Court for purposes of this
case.

Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No. 2011-698 appears to be entirely dependent
upon the judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; susceptible of being undone, with
or without reason, by her or even her successor. Hence, the case now before this Court is
dangerously capable of being repeated yet evading review.

2. Yes. The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public suits, or locus standi, are already
well-defined in our case law. Again, We cite David, which summarizes jurisprudence on this
point:

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court.Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.

We rule that the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are
with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold
that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the instant
mandamus petition.

To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on the MECO or the COA in
order to maintain the instant petition. The duty of the COA sought to be compelled by
mandamus, emanates from the Constitution and law, which explicitly require, or "demand," that
it perform the said duty. To the mind of this Court, petitioner already established his cause of
action against the COA when he alleged that the COA had neglected its duty in violation of the
Constitution and the law.

3. No. In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus petition, as
earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the
merits.76

NOTE: On the substantive issue of whether MECO is a government instrumentality or GOCC.

SC ruled it is not. Nevertheless, COA has jurisdiction to audit non-governmental entities such as
MECO because MECO
D.3.5. Cudia vs. Superintendent fo PMA
D.3.6. Villanueva vs. JBC

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW

BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE,v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833; April 07, 2015

REYES, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a
first-level court. More thana year later, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
various Regional Trial Courts.

Petitioner was not included in the list of applicants due to the JBC's long-standing policy of
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges
who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been
a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to
take recourse to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
2. Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is tenable.

HELD:
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses
two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65."As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc.,
et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., this Court explained that:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph
of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials. (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation
of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
act required.The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel
a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC
do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial
positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to
be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list
of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC. XXX
 E. Quo Warranto

E. Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno

G.R. No. 237428; 11 May 2018

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Petition for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s (respondent) appointment as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.

For a period of 20 years, from 1986 to 2006, respondent served as a member of the faculty of
UP-College of Law. Also, while being employed at the UP College of Law, from 2003 to 2006,
she was employed as legal counsel of the Republic in the PIATCO cases. After serving as a
professor in UP, she served as counsel in various government agencies. In July 2010, respondent
submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Despite its 20-year employment with UP and its employment as legal counsel in various
government agencies, records from the UP Human Resources Development Office, Central
Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment Selection and
Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only SALNs available
on record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991,
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year
government service in U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as
legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there SALN filed when she resigned from U.P.
College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of
August 16, 2010.

In August 2010, respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III as Associate Justice.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the
opening for application and required the applicants for the Chief Justice position to submit,
instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for the last two years of public service, all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in government service. The JBC
announcement further provided that "applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.

Respondent accepted several nominations from the legal and the evangelical community for the
position of Chief Justice and in support of her nomination, respondent submitted to the ORSN
her SALNs for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Respondent also executed waiver of
confidentialityof her local and foreign bank accounts.
The JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting, deliberated on the candidates for the position of Chief
Justice with incomplete documentary requirements. In particular, the JBC examined the list of
candidates and their compliance with the required submission of SALNs. The Executive Officer
informed the Council that respondent had not submitted her SALNs for period of ten (10) years,
that is, from 1986 to 2006. Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at
U.P. and that they were required to submit SALNs during those years.

There were other candidates with incomplete documentary requirements.

Hence, the ORSN, through its then Chief Atty. Pascual, inquired as to respondent's SALNs for
the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999. Respondent responded through a letter stating that
“Considering that most of my government records in the academe are more than fifteen years
old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files. In any case, the
University of the Philippines has already cleared me of all academic/administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges.”

The letter, however, was neither examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated
upon either by the JBC En Banc or the Execom. Despite respondent's submission of only 3
SALNs, respondent was listed as applicant No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she had
"COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS".

The JBC proceeded to interview the candidates, including respondent who was interviewed.
ORSN prepared list of the 20 candidates, respondent included, vis-a-vis their SALN
submissions. Opposite respondent's name was an enumeration of the SALNs she submitted
(2009, 2010 and 2011) and an excerpt from her letter that "considering that respondent's
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all those files”.

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later,
an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice.
Included in the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statement
of her SALNs. A letter was submitted by Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the
latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

Republic’s Contention

 An action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of respondent's
appointment.
 Petition is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11,
Rule 66, of the Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during
 the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the
impeachment complaint filed against her.
 Quo warranto is available as remedy even as against impeachable officers, like
respondent.
 Petition for quo warranto is different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ
of quo warranto is being sought to question the validity of her appointment, while the
impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust while in office.
 Respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the
outset, from being candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs,
respondent has not proven her integrity which is requirement under the Constitution. The
Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief
Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be
ousted via quo warranto.

Respondent’s Contention

 Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment.

 The use of the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not signify that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
through modes other than impeachment. The clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed
only by impeachment and not otherwise.
 Since petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to
conundrum because judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary
power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in
rank and is contrary to Sections and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
 Present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the
"discovery" of the disqualification. The supposed "failure" to file the required SALNs
allegedly took place for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster"
existed even before the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives
2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice

HELD:
1. Yes. SC has jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto

a. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. SC, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.

Also, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action
for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional
Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

The instant petition is case of transcendental importance. It is apparent that the instant
petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense
that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the
highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo
warranto. The Court's action on the present petition has far-reaching implications, and it
is paramount that the Court make definitive pronouncements on the issues herein
presented for the guidance of the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
Thus, the questions herein presented merit serious consideration from the Court and
should not be trifled on.

b. On the response of respondent that as she is an impeachable officer, and thus quo
warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged against her,
especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her, the Court ruled
that while both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public
official, the two proceedings materially differ. Impeachment is proceeding exercised by
the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust
reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public
officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of
public official based on predetermined rules.

Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously as these
remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

Quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is
the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to
 offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment.

An action for quo warranto may be commenced by the Solicitor General or public
prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

That usurpation of public office is treated as public wrong and carries with it public
interest in our jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the
action is for the usurpation of public office, position or franchise, it shall be commenced
by verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the
Solicitor General or public prosecutor.

The remedies available in quo warranto judgment do not include correction or reversal
of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or franchise. Judgment is limited
to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon prior exercise of
official or corporate duties.

In sum, Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and
may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper
does not prevent the State from commencing quo warranto proceeding.

c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly

elected impeachable official may be removed from office

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: xxx… may be removed from office ...”

The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove
by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. Further, that the
enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be complete statement of the causes of removal from
office.

That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to
be taken as a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may”
cannot also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it would lead
to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not
contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned, on the basis of citizenship
or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the
 grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the
functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would
result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed
from office through impeachment.

d. The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers

The fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of the impeachment
complaint does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress, no matter how noble
the respondent and the intervenors’ portray such act to be. The fact remains that the
Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the position of Chief
Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be resolved through review of
jurisprudence and pertinent laws. To abdicate from resolving legal controversy simply
because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be
to sanction the initiation of process specifically intended to be long and arduous and
compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of
public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and
case law. Evidently, this scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention
unnecessary disbursement of public funds.

Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is tribunal composed of politicians who are
indubitably versed in pragmatic decision making and cognizant of political
repercussions of acts purported to have been committed by impeachable officials. As
representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether the purported acts of
highest ranking officials of the country constitute as an offense to the citizenry.
Following this premise, the impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the
validity or constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointment, nor can their ruling be of
jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize Congress to rule on public
officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and balances as it would dilute
the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on
actions for quo warranto.

2. No.
a. Prescription does not lie against the State

The one-year limitation is NOT applicable when the petitioner is not mere private
individual pursuing private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for public
wrong and suing for public interest.

In People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullmans Palace Car Co., “It is the general rule that laches,
acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part of the officers
of the state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its character as sovereign. There
 are exceptions to this general rule, but we are unable to see that the allegations of the plea
bring the case within the principles of any such exceptions.”

The doctrine of laches, furthermore, does not apply when cause of action is brought by
the State seeking to protect the public. Quo warranto proceedings seeking ouster of public
official are governmental function. No statute of limitations is, therefore, applicable.

b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the prescriptive period

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of
an action for quo warranto. In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning
respondent's qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.

Respondent was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs covering the
period of her employment in U.P. Recall that during her application for the Chief Justice
position, the JBC required the submission of her previous SALNs. In response to the
JBC, respondent never categorically stated that she filed the required SALNs. Instead,
she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit
the said documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was
not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are
more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of "all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges

3. No
a. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to person's integrity.

The filing SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of public post. It has
Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution on the Accountability of Public Officers states:

Public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

The requirement of filing SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency

in the civil service and serves as deterrent against government officials bent on enriching
themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government official or
employee must make complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order
to avoid any issue regarding questionable accumulation of wealth. The failure to file
 truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and normally
amounts to dishonesty.

Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more
exacting when the public official concerned is member of the Judiciary.

b. Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on person's integrity

Failure to file the SALN is clearly violation of the law. The offense is penal in character
and is clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It
disregards the requirement of transparency as deterrent to graft and corruption. For these
reasons, public official who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN
cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified
from holding public office.

The requirement to file SALN is not trivial or formal requirement. Neither is it something
over which public officials can exercise discretion. It is mandated by Our Constitution
and laws. It is meant to forge transparency and accountability in the government and as
measure meant to curb corruption.

c. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the
law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, member of the Judiciary who commits such
violations cannot be deemed to be person of proven integrity

Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Her defenses do
not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada was able
to present contrary proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA,
thus rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a number of
years, as opposed to the present case where no proof of existence and filing were
presented; 2) Being on leave from government service is not equivalent to separation
from service such that she was still required to submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While
Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that she
should have obtained a certification to attest to the fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never
asked Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply
with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for the UP
HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that time; 5) That
Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of
requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the
appointment goes into her qualifications which were mistakenly believed to be present,
and that she should have been disqualified at the outset.

d. Respondent's inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in

the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirms or ratifies her compliance with the SALN
requirement.
 The invalidity of respondent's appointment springs from her lack of qualifications. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate,
nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at
the outset. It must be underscored that the JBC En Banc included respondent in the
shortlist for the position of Chief Justice without deliberating her July 23, 2012 Letter.
Without prejudice to this Court's ruling in A.M No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-
17-SC, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered respondent eligible
because it does not appear that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs was squarely
addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent
appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party
sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake.

e. Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements. Hence, Respondent failed to submit the
required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination

Further compounding respondent's woes is the established and undisputed fact that she
failed to submit the required number of SALNs in vjolation of the rules set by the JBC
itself during the process of nomination.

Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed
to submit single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This
is in obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or
whose years in government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 6713. Be that as it may, records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-
incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially
complied was respondent, who submitted only SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even
after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so.

Instead of complying, respondent offered, by way of her letter dated July 23,
2012, justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she
resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her
government service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15
years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and
administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that respondent submitted
only SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on
respondent's part to comply.
 Indubitably, respondent not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the
SALNs but there was no compliance at all. The contents of respondent's Letter dated July
23, 2012 itself betray an exercise of dishonesty and disposition to deceive in an attempt to
secure for herself the appointment as Chief Justice.

f. Respondent's failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application

Respondent is presumed to know of the importance of the filing of the SALN together with the
bank waiver. The waiver which respondent executed under oath clearly provides:
This waiver is executed on the condition that the JBC or its duly authorized representatives shall
make use of it, as well as any and all information or data obtained by virtue thereof, for the
exclusive and sole purpose of evaluating my qualifications for the position of Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Conclusively then, respondent's failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not
able to prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.

g. Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating

dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any claim of integrity
The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack of forthrightness and
dishonesty committed by respondent as government official prior to and at the time of her
application as Chief Justice. In addition to the suspicious and highly questionable circumstances
surrounding the execution of her SALNs, there were untruthful statements and dishonest acts
which were committed by the respondent which ultimately negate respondent's claim that she is
person of proven integrity

Again, while concedingly the foregoing acts as revealed during the Congressional hearings on
the impeachment are not proper subjects of the instant quo warranto petition, these acts are
nevertheless reflective and confirmatory of respondent's lack of integrity at the time of her
nomination and appointment as Chief Justice and her inability to possess such continuing
requirement of integrity.

h. Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her

nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice

Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is clear violation not only of the JBC
rules, but also of the law and the Constitution. The discordance between respondent's non-filing
and non-submission of the SALNs and her claimed integrity as person is too patent to ignore. For
lack of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC and ought to
have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the President. As the qualification of
proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as
Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not
qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of respondent in the
shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum Constitutional
qualifications.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer's entire tenure as continuing
requirement. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes candidate.

The voidance of the JBC nomination as necessary consequence of the Court's finding that
respondent is ineligible, in the first place, to be candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to
be nominated for said position follows as matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to
do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the
explanations from the JBC members and the OEO, as regards the circumstances relative to the
selection and nomination of respondent submitted to this Court in A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M.
No. 17-11-17-SC. Relatedly, the Court, in quo warrantoproceeding, maintains the power to
issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position
or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Questions:

1. What principles in remedial law have been retained by the case?

a. Concurrent jurisdiction in Quo Warranto Cases

Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto.

b. The principle of hierarchy of courts (exception: transcendental importance)

While the hierarchy of courts serves as general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs, direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified
considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than Member
of the Court. The issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
public office is matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it
obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position. It is of transcendental
importance.

c. Venue in quo warranto cases

Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto,
when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of
Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.

d. Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

 e. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance

2. What principles in remedial law have been altered?

a. The one-year limitation is not equally applicable when the petitioner is not mere private
individual pursuing private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for public
wrong and suing for public interest

Section 11, Rule 66, provides:

Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against
public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of
the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of
the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question

b. Mode of removal

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected

impeachable official may be removed from office

The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect.We have consistently held that the
term "may" is indicative of mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to
remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

c. Difference in origin and nature of impeachment and quo warranto

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the
two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in
nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or proceeding traditionally lodged in the
courts.

Impeachment is proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to

vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by
determining the public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo
warranto, involves judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
appointment of public official based on predetermined rules.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo
warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding
or exercising public office, x xx, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, x xx." In short, respondent in quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other
hand, in impeachment, conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to
the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not
legally possible to impeach or remove person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does
not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

d. The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers

Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the
Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no
argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try
impeachment cases is the Senate.

Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving
person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for disqualification, is
not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively
tried and decided by the Senate.

Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of person to occupy public position. It is direct
proceeding assailing the title to public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or
not the defendant is legally occupying public position which goes into the questions of whether
defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office.
If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants
is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other words, while impeachment
concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo
warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.
E.1. PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 131977; February 4, 1999

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. In 1988, he was appointed Customs
Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS), reclassified by the
Civil Service and categorized as "Director III, CIIS" in 1980. In 1993, petitioner was temporarily
designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City,
continuously receiving the salary and benefits of a Director III. In his place, respondent Ray
Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.

In 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs, informing him of his termination
from the Bureau, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V.
Ramos. The petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full
back wages and without loss of seniority rights, but no reply was made, prompting him to file a
petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the RTC. The case was tried and a
decision was rendered, granting the petition. Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In 1996, while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by the
President to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations,
resulting to dismissal of the appeal and rendering the decision final and executory.
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision,
which was denied on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was
now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo
warranto petition. Thus, Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with
the Court of Appeals questioning the order of the trial court, which was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution
may no longer be issued on the ground that the contested position vacated was now occupied by
a person who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.

HELD: NO. The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule
66 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some
individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege
appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot
legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. In other words, a petition
for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or
if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the
Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office,
against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against
an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may
also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position; otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the
court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to
the office.
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or
unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment
because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and
he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the
same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to
respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in
office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo
warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may
trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself.
It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether
he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the
office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by
petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not
against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial
court's decision.

DOCTRINE: A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office,
even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.
E.2. Calleja vs. Panday
E.3. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST

CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32; June 22, 2010

EN BANC.LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and
ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180443

FACTS:Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) manifested its intent to participate in the
May 2007 elections It then submitted the names of its 5 nominees:
(1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-
Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. CIBAC then filed a motion to amend the
names of its nominees, among others withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC
thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. CIBAC then submitted signed
petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje, averred that Lokin and
Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation
rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
CIBAC filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its
second nominee.

The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were
purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered
a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was
clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales opposed the motion. COMELEC failed to act on the matter.
COMELEC En Banc then declared that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat. Then resolved
E.M. No. 07-054:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the
withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as
second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona
C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the
party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be: (1). Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2.) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (3.) Armi Jane R. Borje. THUS, COMELEC en
banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC and the latter took
oath and assumed office.
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto
in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court. We do not agree. Lokin filed
a Rule 65

The COMELEC posits that Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election
protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for
certiorari in this Court.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC is correct in its position that a quo warranto may be a correct
remedy for Lokin, and not a petition for certiorari.

HELD: NO.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto,
for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list
organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for
quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek
the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by
Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a
limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
E.4. Aratea vs. COMELEC

E.5. De Castro vs. Carlos, 696 SCRA 400.

G.R. No. 194994; April 16, 2013

Ponente:SERENO, C. J.

FACTS: On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Emmanuel A. de

Castro (De Castro) as assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA). His appointment was concurred and thereafter took
his oath.
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President
(OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 2010.
OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:
2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career
Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall
remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge their
responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted
and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.

On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDAdesignated Corazon B.

Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. De Castro was then reassigned to
the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager.

Subsequently, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondentEmerson S. Carlos (Carlos) as OIC

of the Office of the AGMO. Thereafter, the name of De Castrowas stricken off the MMDA
payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.

De Castrosent a letter on demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly
payroll. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal
demand for his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter addressed to the Office of the President
on 17 December 2010.

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed
Castro as the new AGMO of the MMDA. On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.
Hence, De Castrofiled a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66
seeking to oust respondent Carlos from the position of AGMOof the MMDA.

De Castro, being a non-CESO,contends that Section 2 (3), Article IX (B) of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the security of tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues
that his appointment as AGMO is not covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not
a CES position as determined by the CESB.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro’s direct recourse to the Supreme Court was
correct and entitled to the position of AGMO, thus warrants the filing of the petition.

HELD:Petition denied.Although Section 5 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but
is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give De
Castro unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly
observed.

A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this
policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention
of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2)
further overcrowding of the Court's docket.

In this case, De Castro justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his
Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the
outright dismissal of the present Petition. De Castro likewise cites stability in the civil service
and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
De Castro's excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct
recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion
of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Even assuming that De Castro's direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be
dismissed for lack of merit.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise
a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not
well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed
by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

An AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter, it
is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level, which is equivalent to
the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29 and a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily
reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive
and managerial functions.Thus, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.
An AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the
CES. In this case, De Castro does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his
appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.

De Castro undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a
permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his
appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority."
Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the
CESB, De Castro's appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No.
945 issued on 14 June 2011.

Therefore, considering that De Castro is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term
ended on 30 June 2010, De Castro's term of office was also deemed terminated upon the
assumption of President Aquino.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that De Castro was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO

eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to
the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of
qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
E.6. Velasco vs. Belmonte
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211140; January 12, 2016

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Joseph Tan, a registered voter and resident of Marinduque, filed a petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Regina Reyesdue to material misrepresentations in her COC
i.e. (i)that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country
among other, as candidate as a Representativefor the Lone District of Marinduque.COMELEC
First Division and later on COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision to cancel Reyes’COC.
Reyes won the said election whilethe said decision of COMELEC En Bancbecame final and
executory. Despite the receipt of COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner.Hence, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco filed an
Election Protest Ad Cautelamand Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelamagainst Reyes in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The same was later on dismissed HRET
due to lack of jurisdiction. HRET’s jurisdiction begins only after Reyes is considered as a
member of House of Representatives, however, since her COC was declared cancelled by
COMELEC, her proclamation is invalid.

Despite the same, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.Velasco filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the
proclamation of Reyes. Said petition was denied while Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration of Velasco, COMELEC En Banc reversed the denial and declared null and void
the proclamation of Reyes and proclaimed Velasco as the winning candidate and was later
proclaimed for the position by the newly constituted PBOC. Velasco then sent letters to Reyes
essentially demanding that she vacate the office; to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting that he be
allowed to assume the position, and to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to delete the name of Reyes from
the Roll of Members and register his name in her place. However, his requests were not heeded.
Hence, Velasco field a Petition for Mandamus against Speaker Belmonte, Jr.; Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap; and Reyes.

On her Comment, Reyes contends that:

1. The Petition is actually one for quo warrantoand not mandamus given that it essentially
seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office;
2. The Petition is a collateral attack on a title to public office and thus must be dismissed.
3. The Court has no jurisdiction over Quo Warrantocases involving Members of the House
of Representatives as it is the HRET that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives.
4. Velasco is not the first choice of the people in the election, and a second placer cannot
take place the position even if it was proven that Reyes usurped the position.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition stating the same arguments as Reyes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is one for quo warranto?

HELD: No. A petition for quo warrantois a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed
by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.In this case, the final and
executory resolutions of COMELEC in cancelling Reyes's COC; in declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate cannot be claimed that
the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.To
be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the
final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by
administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives. The administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduqueare no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in
view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling,
now both final and executory.

DOCTRINE: A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO will not prosper if the issue is the
enforcement of one’s clear right to the claimed office which has already been held as final and
executoryand not merely a determination of the right to the claimed office.
 F. Expropriation
F.1. City of Manila vs. Serrano
F.2. National Power Corp. vs. CA
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MACAPANTON MANGONDATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 113194; March 11, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: 1978, NAPOCORtook possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is a portion
of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondatounder the
mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for
hydroelectric power purposes. NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed
and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the city’s waiver and quitclaim of any
right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance of P40.00 per square
meter.

When NAPOCOR started buildingHydroelectric Plant, Mangondato demanded compensation

from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land
and that it had already paid financial assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over
the property.Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property that
he is not privy to any agreement between NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment
made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to
Mangondato.NAPOCOR passed a resolution resolving to pay Mangondato100.00/SQM as
payment for the land of Mangondato.

Mangondato disagree with such determination and insist that the FMV of his property is higher
than 100. In his manifestation in lieu of Answer Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in
damages for the unauthorized taking and continued possession of his land from 1978 until the
filing of the Complaiant in the expropriation case; that should the lower court order the
expropriation of the subject property, that the just compensation for the land be reckoned from
the time of the filing of the expropriation case; that the expropriation case be consolidated with
the recovery of possession case; that the restraining order issued in the recovery of possession
case be maintained and a writ of preliminary injunction be at once issued against NAPOCOR;
and that NAPOCOR be ordered to deposit the value of the land as provisionally determined by
the lower court.

ISSUES:
1. At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed,
is it at the date of the taking or the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain?
2. When is There Taking of Property?

HELD: The petition of NAPOCOR is dismissed. SC affirmed the appellate court decision but
amend the legal interest from 12 % to 6 %.
 1. General rule, in determining just compensation in eminent domain the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of the complaint
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails
to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint

Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property
as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules.

The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where the Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.

Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner would be given undue
incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property
expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was the case in Caro de
Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been
an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owner’s land arising from the expropriation, as
indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was
due to increments directly caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming
an exception to Rule 67, Section 4, it has the burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and
use - not ordinary inflation and increase in land values - was the direct cause of the increase in
valuation from 1978 to 1992.

The fair market value as held by the respondent Court, is the amount of P1,000.00 per square
meter. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, as is the case here, a trial before Commissioners is indispensable to allow the
parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.Inasmuch as the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within the
recognized exceptions, which is not the situation obtaining in this petition, we see no reason to
disturb the factual findings as to valuation of the subject property. As can be gleaned from the
records, the court-and-the-parties-appointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in
evaluating the evidence submitted to them nor misappreciate the clear preponderance of
evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the respondent appellate Court is not grossly
exorbitant.

In sum, the petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general
rule in determining just compensation provided under Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary,
private respondent has convinced the court that indeed, such general rule should in fact be
observed in this case.

2. the elements of taking as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain;
 a. the expropriator must enter a private property;
b. the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
c. the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
d. the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and
e. the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property;

Clearly, this is not the intent, nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple
attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused
to exercise the power of eminent domain.

In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it entered into with the
private respondent when it passed Resolution on May 25, 1992 authorizing its president to
negotiate, inter alia, that payment shall be effected only after Agus I HE project has been placed
in operation. It was only then that petitioner’s intent to expropriate became manifest as private
respondent disagreed and, barely a month after, filed suit.

DOCTRINE/S:
 General rule,it is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint is the basis in determining just compensation in eminent domain;

Except, where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising
from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated in which
case the date it was taken shall be the basis;

 Elements of taking as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent

domain;
F.3. Republic vs. Andaya
F.4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs. DOTC

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DOTC, SEC.

LEANDRO R. MENDOZA and MIAA, respondents.
G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008

FACTS: The present case is a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein petitioner before the SC. This petition sprouted
from 2separate decisions of the SC regarding the same subject matter, which is the NAIA IPT
III.

In August 1989, the Department of Trade and Communications (DOTC) engaged the services of
Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development
up to the year 2010. Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei,
Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then
President Fidel V.Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation
of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they
formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC), which was registered, with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.

On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer
arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).

On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT
III project.

From the DOTC, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDCto the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) which on 13 february1996 by virtue of
its Board Resolution No.2 approved the NAIA IPT III.

From then on, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal for the said project.
Among the bidders was then People’s Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc. (Pair Cargo), which
on February 27, 1997 incorporated into Philippines International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
otherwise known as PIATCO.

AEDC failed to match PIATCO’s bid hence PIATCO won the bidding. This paved way to the
filing of the first case entitled Aganvs. PIATCO. AEDC filed before the RTC Pasig petitioning
for the Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction on 16 April 1997.
Meanwhile, several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality
of various agreements entered into by the Government with PIATCO (Concession
Agreements) on the ground that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of
the questioned agreements.

1st Case: Agan, Jr. vs PIATCO (Null and Void Contract)

SC held that the contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is
null and void for the absence of the requisite financial capacity of therein-respondent PIATCO.
However, since the structures of the NIAA IPT III facility are almost complete, the government
has to compensate PIATCO as builder, just compensation in order to take over the facility, in
accordance with the law and equity.

This pronouncement in Agan case gave rise to the 2nd case, which is a complaint for
expropriation.

2nd case: Republic v. Gingoyon (Complaint for Expropriation) On 21 December 2004, the
Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City RTC. The petition prayed
for issuance of a writ of possession in favor ofthe Government. The case was raffled to Branch
117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon.
Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the
possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities.

However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21
December2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in
the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that
Republic Act No. 8974, otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-
Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes"
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in
many respects.

There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No.
8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to
the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to been titled to a writ of possession, whereas
in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which
provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.

In Gingoyon, the Court ruled that Agan case could be construed as mandating the full payment
of the just compensation before the Government may be permitted to take over NAIA 3 which is
in accord with Republic Act No. 8974 and with equitable standard that allowed the government
to take possession of NAIA 3 after payment of the proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO.
ISSUE: Whether the filing by the Government of the complaint for expropriation is proper.

HELD: Yes. The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the
appropriateness of the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings.

We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to
expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns.

The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures,
adhered as they are to the soil are considered as real property. It shouldbe noted that Section 1 of
Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated
may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private
individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The
instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land
owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the
Philippines]."

Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such
goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of
the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation
may be ascertained.

PIATCO's ownership over the structures it had built in NAIA IPT III:
In Gingoyon, the court said that the 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it
mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government
of NAIA 3.

The expropriation proceedings shall be held in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974,
thus:Again in Gingoyon, the court stated that the 2004 Resolution does not particularize the
extent such payment must be effected before the take over, but it unquestionably requires at least
some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The
utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as
it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the
property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the
issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under
Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004
Resolution.

And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled in
Gingoyon that:Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of:
(1) One hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the [BIR]; and
(2) The value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7.
Since, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, the amount subject to immediate
payment should be limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
under Section 7, of the IRR. Under the present IRR, the valuations of the improvement/structure
are to be based using "the replacement cost method. In addition to the statute, the 2004
Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in
accordance with equity as well.

From the forgoing there is no way, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and
structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974
permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the
property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep.
Act No. 8974 states that" in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is
of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned,
the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered
value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]."The
"proffered value" may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the
government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which"proffered value"
should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the
proffered value.

In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount
of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The
making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken
under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still,
as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the
proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of
the proffered value, the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any
predetermined standards, although its proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review
using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No.8974.
F.5. SPOUSES ABAD vs. FIL-HOMES REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189239, 24 November 2010

Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS: Fil-Homes Realty (Fil-Homes) and Magdiwang Realty are co-owners of two (2) parcels
of lot in Paranaque City covered by separate certificates of title. They filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Spouses Leticia and Jose Ervin Abad and others(Sps. Abad) with the
MeTC Paranaque in 2003. It was alleged therein that Sps. Abad, through tolerance, had
occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate it. Sps. Abad
countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the said lots for more than thirty (30) years, and that Fil-Homes’
predecessor-in-interest (Pilipinas Development Corporation) had no title to the lots. In any
event, Sps. Abad contended that the question of ownership must first be settled before the issue
of possession may be resolved.

During the pendency of the ejectment suit, the City of Paranaque filed an expropriation
proceeding with the RTC of Paranaque involving the lots subject of the ejectment case to be used
as socialized housing project for distribution to the occupants including the Sps. Abad. Then, a
writ of possession was issued and a Certificate of Turn-Over was given to the City of Paranaque.

Thereafter (after two years), the MeTC rendered a Decision in the unlawful detainer case against
the Sps. Abad ordering them to vacate and surrender the possession of the subject lots and to pay
reasonable compensation therefor. The MeTC further held that as no payment (of just
compensation) had been made to Fil-Homes for the subject lots, they still maintain ownership
thereon. It added that Sps. Abad cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a writ of
possession (in favor of the City of Paranaque) for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.

Sps. Abad appealed the MeTC Decision to the RTC,which in turn, reversed the lower court and
dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Fil-Homes ruling that “it is not the
allegations of the Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it
is the evidence in the case” and that “when there is no ‘tolerance’ right from the start of the
possession sought to be recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper.” The RTC
further ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City of Paranaque bars the
continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been
rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the city
government, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to “disregard the final judgment and writ of
possession” due to non-payment of just compensation.Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC,
Fil-Homes filed a Petition for Review with the CA alleging that its act of allowing several years
to pass without requiring Sps. Abad to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts
to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession.

The CA rendered a Decision setting aside the decision of the RTC and reinstating the decision of
MeTC. It ruled that Sps. Abad did not present evidence to rebut the Fil-Homes’ allegation of
possession by tolerance, and considering that the Sps. Abad’s admission that they commenced
occupation of the subject property without the permission of the previous owner (Pilipinas
Development Corporation) as indicium of tolerance by Fil-Homes’ predecessor-in-interest. The
CA further ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings does
not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings.

Thus, Sps. Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.

ISSUES: WON an ejectment proceeding will be suspended or the resolution thereof be held in
abeyance during the pendency of a civil action on ownership of the subject lot.

HELD: As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended
or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
However, Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 538 essentially provides that “x x x any action for
ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such
time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the
purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the
current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for
ejectment has been instituted.” Here, Sps. Abad did not comply with any of the acts mentioned
in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension.Since the Sps. Abad failed to pay or deposit
the rents to Fil-Homes, the ejectment proceeding will not be suspended during the pendency of
the expropriation proceeding.

WON the issuance of writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding signifies the completion
of the said proceeding thereby vesting ownership of thesubject land on the beneficiary thereof.

NO. The mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer
ownership of the lots in favor of the City of Paranaque. Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of Fil-
Homes’ prior to the City of Paranaque's possession of the subject lots.Even if the lots are
eventually transferred to the City of Paranaque, it is non sequitur for Sps. Abad to claim that they
are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and
complied with before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.

DOCTRINE: Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court
of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the
issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation
proceedings.
F.6. NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Development Corp.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO
POBRE
G.R. No. 106804; August 12, 2004
CARPIO, J.

FACTS: NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent
domain. Private respondent Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land located in Tiwi,
Albay. In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision. On 18 February
1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.
Subsequently, NPC filed two expropriation case over a portion of the said property, i.e., first for
the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property and second for the 5,554 square-meter lot (1
September 1979).

On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground
that NPC had found an alternative site. The trial court granted NPC’s motion to dismiss but the
trial court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. Thereafter, trial court
issued a judgment ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant P3,448,450.00 PESOS which is the
fair market value of the subdivision of defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine
hundred sixty nine (68,969) square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September
6, 1979 and damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. NPC insists that at the time that it
moved for the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for
summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic
dismissal of its complaint. NPC relies on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the
Rules then in effect. NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it
the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre’s counterclaim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on dismissal of action as a matter of right is applicable to a
special civil action of expropriation.

HELD: No. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general
rule that the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. For as
long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present the dismissal of the complaint
rested exclusively on the plaintiff’s will. The defending party and even the courts were powerless
to prevent the dismissal. The courts could only accept and record the dismissal. A plain reading
of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not intended
to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
provided that:

SECTION 1.Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, exceptthat a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court

While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the “service of answer or summary judgment,” the Rules then
did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases. In lieu of
an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where
he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose
specified in the complaint. In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the
motion to dismiss took the place of the answer. The records show that Pobre had already filed
and served on NPC his “motion to dismiss/answer” even before NPC filed its own motion to
dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985.

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. The plaintiff’s right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been
subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17
of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to
other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.

Thus, NPC’s theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre’s
claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that
provided for the dismissal of the defendant’s claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the
expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the
claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages
occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be
made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant’s right to recover
damages either in the same or in another action. The trial court in this case reserved Pobre’s right
to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC’s own fault

F.7. Limkaichong vs. LBP