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*An early draft of this articlewas presentedat the annual meetingof the Southern
PoliticalScienceAssociationin Atlanta, November2-5, 1994. I thank KathleenBratton,
George Rabinowitz,Stuart Macdonald,Timothy McKeown,Michael Munger,Wendy
Rahn, Marco Steenbergen,and the anonymousreviewersof Polity for their criticism,
advice, and encouragement.
I. Altruism Research
Since Auguste Comte introduced the term in the nineteenth century, the
word "altruism" has been used to refer to a wide range of motives and
behavior. In SystWmede Politique Positive, Comte argued against the
view that humans are exclusively self-interested. He viewed the motiva-
tion to help others as an important check on self-interest, and coined the
term altruism to refer to this motivation.1I This concern with the well-
12. David Kennet, "Altruism and Economic Behavior, I," American Journal of Eco-
nomics and Sociology, 39 (April 1980): 183-98, p. 184.
13. David Ribar and Mark Wilhelm, "Charitable Contributions to International Relief
and Development," National Tax Journal, 48 (June 1995): 229-44.
14. Kennet, "Altruism and Economic Behavior," p. 187.
15. Daniel Batson, Jim Fultz, and Patricia Schonrade, "Distress and Empathy: Two
Qualitatively Different Vicarious Emotions with Different Motivational Consequences,"
Journal of Personality, 55 (March 1987): 19-39.
16. Shalom Schwartz, "Elictation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behavior,"
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15 (August 1970): 283-93.
17. See Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The Altruistic Personality (New York: The Free
Press, 1988), p. 6.
18. Kristen Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
25. Readers wishing to evaluate the appropriateness of the survey instrument used in this
analysis will find the questions in the appendix.
26. The case of Kitty Genovese is often cited as an inspiration for studies in this field.
Genovese was assaulted and murdered in Queens, New York. Thirty-eight neighbors wit-
nessed her assault and murder; not one of them intervened to help or even to call the police.
and recipients are required to spend it in this way. Finally, the threat of a
sudden cutoff of aid is used to exert political pressure on poorer
nations. 27
One can question the extension of this line of argument to voluntary
donations by individuals. Private aid is usually targeted at poor popula-
tions rather than third world governments. Unlike official aid, private
aid is subject to far fewer conditions and is very rarely cut off for polit-
ical reasons. However, one could argue that private aid causes improved
economic conditions in the third world which lead to increased imports
or reduced immigration, and thus improve the donor's well-being.
Material self-interest is a potential, though unlikely, explanation for
donations to overseas relief.
30. Norman Frolich, "Self Interest or Altruism, What Difference?," Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, 18 (March 1974): 55-73.
31. Jeffrey Obler, "Generosity, Duty, and the Welfare State," Polity, 85 (Spring 1986):
408-30, 409.
32. Hochman and Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," p. 543.
44. See Daniel Batson et al., "Distress and Empathy"; and Daniel Batson, TheAltruism
Question: Towards a Social Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1987).
45. Eisenberg, Altruistic Emotion, p. 102.
46. Batson, The Altruism Question.
47. Batson, The Altruism Question, p. 218.
48. Monroe, The Heart of Altruism, pp. 54, 168, 190.
49. See Bibb Latine and John Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He
Help? (New York: Meridith Corp., 1970); and Dennis Hurley and Ben P. Allen, "The
Effect of the Number of People Present in a Nonemergency Situation," The Journal of
Social Psychology, 92 (February 1974): 27-29.
50. Leonard Bickman, "The Effect of Another Bystander's Ability to Help on By-
stander Intervention in an Emergency," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7
(May 1971): 367-79, p. 368.
51. This is simulated experimentally by introducing a person dressed as security or
medical personnel into the helping scenario. Their presence dampens helping behavior.
Bibb Latine and Stephen Nida, "Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping,"
Psychological Bulletin, 89 (March 1981): 308-24, p. 318.
Hypothesis I: Self-Interest
The emphasis on self-interested motivations in the bulk of the economic
literature makes it imprudent to exclude a priori the possibility that
donations to non-governmental organizations are prompted by donors'
perceptions that aid is in their own self-interest. A reduction in third-
world poverty could increase first-world exports to the recipient country,
reduce pressures for immigration to the donor's country, and provide
first-world control over necessary resources located in the third world.
The measure of self-interest was based upon the response to the question
"Is it in our self interest to aid [the third world]?" A respondent's belief
that aid is in her self-interest was assumed to depend on any or all of four
factors: perceived trade with the third world, dependence upon the third
world for raw materials, possible economic competition from the third
world, and perceived impact of third world conditions upon the respon-
dent's nation. A control for information about the third world was also
included.
56. Respondents from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are included in the
analysis. Data were taken from Jacques Rene Rabier, Helene Riffault, and Ronald Ingle-
hart, Eurobarometer 20: Aid to Developing Nations, October 1983 [Machine Readable
Data File] 1st ICPSR ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research). Data from 1983 are used because the questions necessary for this analysis
were not included in more recent Eurobarometer surveys.
assistance are likely to feel that their collective obligation is being met by
the donations of others. Economic models imply that the alleviation of
third-world poverty is a public good. Potential donors who derive
benefits from the donations of others are less likely to donate themselves.
Both of these accounts suggest that an individual's giving should be
inversely related to the perceived giving of other individuals or organiza-
tions. Two variables were included to tap the respondent's perceptions of
others' generosity: the number of aid sources (EEC, UN, business, the
respondent's government, etc.) mentioned by the respondent, and the
number of private organizations the respondent identified as working to
aid the third world. While a negative effect of these variables is predicted
by the collective action hypothesis, this effect could be attenuated if the
public goods nature of giving is offset by the provision of selective
incentives.
Control Variables:
Religiosity, Ideology, Education, and Information
Variablesto control for effects of ideology, religiosity,and education
wereincludedin the analysis.Some past literaturesuggestsa relationship
between these characteristicsand donations. Researchinto rescuersof
Jewsin Nazi-occupiedEuropehas generallyfound that rescuerscamefor
a wide varietyof social backgrounds.57 However, Ribarand Wilhelm58
find a positive relationshipbetween both educationalattainmentand
"liberalism"(in the Americansenseof the term)and donationsto chari-
ties. More surprisingly,they also find a negative relationshipbetween
churchattendanceand giving. While these variableswill be includedin
the analysis as controls, there are reasons to expect them to have a
somewhatdifferentimpactin the presentanalysis.The meaningof ideol-
ogy certainlyvariesgreatlyfrom Europeto the U.S. The impactof religi-
osity may vary accordingto differencesin the type of NGOs in the three
nations studied.Whilemany Americanand BritishNGOs are secularor
nonsectarian,much Frenchand GermanNGO aid is channeledthrough
57. See Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The Altruistic Personality; and Monroe, The
Heart of Altruism.
58. Ribarand Wilhelm,"CharitableContributionsto OverseasDevelopment."
events in the third world has a significant positive effect in two nations,
and a moderate positive effect in the remaining nation. A similar pattern
is found for information levels. Perceived dependence on the third world
for raw materials has a trivial and insignificant effect in all three nations.
The most surprising result from this analysis is the disparate effect of the
perception that the third world is beginning to compete with the devel-
oped world. In France and Germany, this variable has the expected nega-
tive effect, presumably indicating the conflict of interest arising out of
competition. In the UK, perceived competition is related to increased
willingness to view aid in the self-interest of donors. An admittedly ad
hoc explanation of this effect is that increased competition could indicate
that aid is successful in improving the economic condition of the third
world.
The social psychological literature asserts that feelings of empathy are
distinct from feelings of guilt arising from a failure to live up to personal
Moral Obligation. The regression results (Table II) support the hypothe-
sis that feelings of moral obligation to aid the third world depend on
Concernfor the Third World. Concern for the problemsof the third
world was expected to depend upon personal contact with the third
world, perceivedsimilarity(reflectedin culturalties to the thirdworld),
and exposureto the plightof the thirdworldthroughhigherinformation
levels. The regressionpredictingthis motivationis presentedin TableIII.
Personal contact and information did have the large positive effects
expected,with informationplayinga particularlylargerole in Germany.
Perceivedculturalties had a very modest and insignificantimpact. This
suggests that empathy arises more readily from familiaritythan from
similarity.Some of the causalattributionsabout thirdworldpovertydid
have significant effects, although these effects were smaller than the
effects of personalcontact or information.Religiosityagain had a posi-
tive impactin Franceand the UK, though not in Germany;ideologywas
insignificantexceptin the UK wheretherewas a weaklink betweenleft-
ism and concern.
The parallelregressionsof the measuresof moral obligationand con-
cernfor the thirdworldsupportthis viewthat thesearetwo distinctmoti-
vations.Whileconcernand moralobligationdo sharea numberof deter-
minants,the patternsamong these predictorsare quite different.Beliefs
about the causes of third world poverty play a more importantrole in
predictinga sense of moral obligationwhile personalcontact and infor-
mationweigh more heavilyon concernfor the plightof the thirdworld.
Determinantsof Giving
Motivations:HypothesesI, II, and III. The regressionpredictingre-
portedgivingto overseascharitiesallows us to determinethe impactand
importanceof each of these three motivations under discussion (see
TablesIV and V). The dependentvariablefor this analysiswas dichoto-
mous: respondentseither did or did not donate. This type of data
requiresthe use of logistic regressioninsteadof ordinaryleast squares.
The interpretationof logistic regressioncoefficients is not straightfor-
ward since the parametersindicatethe impact each of the independent
variableshas on an underlyingprobabilityfunction, ratherthan directly
UNITED
FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
aBased on the hypothetical case where all other variables are set to their mean values.
61. John Aldrich and Forrest Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984).
62. An account of experimental work relating concerns with "fairness" to free riding
behavior, see Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone
Else?" On the limitations of rational choice as a normative paradigm see Michael
McIntyre, "Altruism, Collective Action, and Rationality: The Case of Le Chambon,"
Polity, 27 (Summer 1995): 537-57.
tive effect on donations in all three nations, an effect that was particular-
ly strong in the UK. This effect is all the more striking since a control for
the impact of information about the third world has already been
included in the model.
Costs: Hypothesis VI. The measure of the costs of donations had a sig-
nificant effect on reported giving in the UK and in Germany. Admittedly,
this variable was far from an exact measure of cost. The amount of
giving may vary widely across respondents, and the present operation-
alization tapped the income elasticity of charity as much as it did direct
costs. However, the cost of donating does appear to have deterred giving
in some cases.
VI. Conclusion
Both the social psychologicaland economic literaturessuggest useful
hypotheses about the determinantsof monetarycontributions.Moral
obligation and concern were powerful and consistent motivations of
donations. Somewhatunexpectedly,perceivedself-interestalso played
an importantrole in motivating donations. The findings account for
variationin the strengthof these motivationsas well. Notions of deserv-
ingnessand responsibilityare systematicallyassociatedwith feelings of
moral obligationwhileconcernfor otherstendsto dependmore on feel-
ings of solidarityand directcontacts. Informationand an awarenessof
tradelinks with the thirdworld were importantcausesof the belief that
aid is in the self-interestof the developedworld. If altruisticbehaviorcan
be motivatedby a combinationof perceivedself-interestand moral or
empatheticconcerns, then any simple dichotomous categorizationof
behavioras either "egoistic" or "altruistic"may distortthe complexity
and varietyof human motivations.
The analysis here also shows that other-interestedaction involves
rationalselectionof efficient meansto attaingoals. The perceivedeffec-
tivenessof aid in general,or of privateaid in particular,stronglyinflu-
encesan individual'spropensityto donateor supportaid. Onemustcon-
cludethat manyrespondentstake a consequentialistview of theirobliga-
tion to aid the thirdworld. This findingjustifies the emphasis,found in
many aid appeals, on the use of donated funds to make demonstrable
improvementsin the lives of recipients.
Finally, the interactionof individualsdepartsmarkedlyfrom tradi-
tional models. Actors in a theoreticalworld of complete information
may attempt to predictone another'sbehavior and exploit it through
such responses as free riding. In our uncertainworld, the actions of
othersseem to serveas cues to guide behaviorratherthan be regardedas
strategiesto be counteracted.Socialpsychologicaltheoriesof the "diffu-
sion of responsibility"portray individualsas calculatingeconomizers
minimizing effort spent helping others. Instead, individuals may
economizeon attentionand cognitiveenergy,reactingto a situationby
emulatingthe responsesof others. This suggeststhe need to reevaluate
theoriesof the strategicinteractionsbetweenindividuals.In the absence
of perfect information,a standard"rationalchoice" account of indi-
vidual behaviorthat ignoresthe social constructionof individual'scog-
nitive environmentis at best incomplete.
These findingssuggestthat organizationswhich solicit and distribute
overseasaid shouldemploycognitiveas well as emotionalappeals.Infor-
mation and beliefs about the causes of the needs of others are strongly
relatedto concernand moral obligation, and in turn to increaseddona-
tions and support for aid. The idea that donors also benefit from aid
deserves greater stress. Aid appeals that focus only on guilt or flattery,
and not on education about the causes of poverty or the benefits of aid,
are ignoring important factors that increase our willingness to aid those
in need.
DependentVariable
ReportedDonations:
Q.236 Have you, duringthe last coupleof years,givenhelp to an organization
concernedwith the Third World by giving money or help in another
way?
1. Yes 2. Noa
Motivations
MoralObligation:
Q.219 We have a moralduty to help them. b
Self Interest:
Q.221 It is in our own interestto help them. b
Concern:
Q.177 How muchhaveyou thoughtaboutthe problemsof poorcountriessuch
as those in Africa, South America, Asia, before? Have you thought
about them a lot, quite a lot, a little, or almostnever. (Responseswere
recodedto rangefrom 0= almostneverto 4 = quite a lot.)
Personal Contact:
Q.227 Besides what you have been able to read in the newspapers or see on
television, what personal experience have you had of Third World coun-
tries? (Respondents were scored 1 point for each form of personal con-
tact mentioned.)
Information Level:
Q.178 Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio, or on
T.V. anything about Third World countries?
1. Yes 2. Noa
Contextual Variables
Number of NGOs Helping:
Q.239 Here is a list of organizations whose aim is to provide help for Third
World countries. Which among these have you heard about? (Respon-
dent was scored 1 point for each organization known.)
Number of Aid Sources:
Q.231 As far as you know, do the Third World countries receive help ...
-from (your country government)
-from the European Community
-from interational organizations like the United Nations
-via business and industrial investments
-from voluntary organizations
(Respondents were scored 1 point for each source named.)
Relative Efficacy of Private Aid:
Q.233 Of these five [aid sources listed in Q.231 above], which one do you think
gives the most useful help to these countries?
Futility of Aid:
Q.222 No matter what is done to help them they will never succeed in escaping
from a situation of poverty. b
IncomeQuartile:
Q.272b Respondent'sfamilyincome,recodedinto quartiles.1= lowestquartile,
4= highestquartile.d
Religiosity:
Q.258 Independentlyof whetheryou go to churchor not, would you say you
are ...
1. A religiousperson
2. Not a religiousperson
3. A convincedatheiste
Ideology:
Q.255 In politicalmatters,people talk of "the left" and "the right." How
wouldyou place your viewson this scale? 1 = left, 10= right.
Education:
Q.261 How old wereyou whenyou finishedyour full-timeeducation?