Thakur

The state of fear before and after the creation of the commonwealth

Hobbes gives a dark description of the state of war, where nothing seems to last. People

do not trust each other, and everyone wants to profit from each other’s property. They kill each

other for the sake of accruing more power, and also to preserve what they already have. But in

this state of nature, everything seems to be as they are, nothing is just or unjust. Nothing has any

value in the state of war because there is neither any security of life nor of any property.

Everything lasts as long as one has power to preserve them and even if they are able to preserve

their profit, they are not sure to enjoy them for long because they have no sense of security of

life. Moreover, everyone is equally disposed with natural abilities to get rid of the other.

Therefore, there is hardly any progress of human civilization in the state of war. We seem

perpetually stuck in the state of nature like every other animal. Thus, out of our necessity and

desire to protect ourselves and our profits, Hobbes thinks we go into a social contract of the

commonwealth. By this act alone, we separate ourselves from our original state of war to make

human life possible, free from perpetual fear of each other into perpetual fear of the sovereign

who governs over us to protect and defend us at all times. But the question that has been

bothering me is whether we get rid of the state of fear that we had in the state of nature when we

are in the commonwealth?

Hobbes argues in chapter 13 of part 2 that the nature of man is such that they are inclined

to peace - for fear of death, desire to live a commodious living and hope of obtaining it by

industry.1 The natural desire in humans to self-preserve from the perpetual fear of death

becomes a common goal for everyone in the state of nature. Moreover, this desire allows them a

possibility to hope for a better commodious life- free from constant fear of inability to enjoy as

long as one wishes. Thus, it also seems that out of our laziness to be ever prepared to safeguard
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Oxford World’s Classics

1
 Thakur

our profits and inabilities to enjoy our profits properly, we go into the social contract that allows

us these opportunities. Moreover, the desire of ease and sensual delight (chapter 11 of part 2)

disposes humans to obey a common power who takes care of their protection which they wilfully

abandon i.e. the hope of achieving protection from their own industry. But at the same time, he

also says, that it is in our human nature to stir up trouble and sedition for our ambitions and

needs. Ambitious people continue the causes of war, also the state of war, because troubles help

them to achieve their goal. They desire military honour through war, and they constantly change

the dynamics of this war game to continue the war so that they will be valued and honoured with

respect in the society as military man. Thus, he suggests that in the commonwealth there are at

least two kinds of men - those who are inclined to peace and those who are inclined to war, each

for their own benefits. It is hard to tell which one is better, i.e. to live a subjugated life to enjoy

ease and sensual delight or to value military honour and live every day in the state of war. On

how we value things, Hobbes says everyone represents objects in their own way, each also

measuring each thing by comparing to themselves (chapter II, part 1, thought 1) “For men

measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves;...” , thus, Hobbes makes it clear

that things in themselves do not have any value, but the value that people put into them.

Hobbes asserts that life is a constant motion, of desire, fear and sense. “For there is no

such things as perpetual tranquility of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion,

and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense.” (Chapter 6, Part

2) This simply means that we will always have desires, and we cannot remain static at all. The

commonwealth is founded on this principle, that people will have these three motions, and there

is a ground for everyone to pursue their desires. By this, it also appears that the commonwealth is

2
 Thakur

always in the state of motion due to the perpetual motion of its subjects. There cannot be a

tranquil commonwealth, it seems, if the commonwealth is to function properly. The progress of

the commonwealth is tied to the progress of our passions, and it appears that the more the

passions of the subjects are fulfilled, the better the progress of the commonwealth.

But this constant motion of desire, fear and sense, equally distributed in everyone in the
commonwealth, seems to bring about the conflict that people in the state of war experienced. In
chapter 13, part 2, Hobbes says,
From the equality of ability arises equality of hope in attaining of our ends. And therefore if any
two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only)
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.)
It seems that this equality of hope and ability in attaining our ends is still present in the

commonwealth, because our motions – desire, fear and sense – are present. But one of the

reasons that we leave the state of war for the commonwealth is to remove our mutual fear of

destroying or subduing each other. Since everyone in the commonwealth still has the equality of

these threefold motion, there must arise a conflict of interest in people. We will still fight with

each other over who is going to get the same object of desire everyone is aiming at. But this fight

appears to change its nature in the commonwealth through legal means, not through our own

personal definition of what is just and unjust. The sovereign is there to decide who is going to get

that object desired by everyone in that conflict i.e. who deserves that object justly. It would be

true to say that we become enemies of each other in both states – of war and in the

commonwealth, but the nature of interaction between enemies changes. In the former, it seems

that if one is powerful enough, he can either destroy or subdue the weaker, while in the

commonwealth it seems that we become more civil and go through legal means to solve our

matters of conflict, rather than destroying each other right away. Even though the person who is

more powerful and wishes to get the object that the weak person is also aiming at, it is plausible

3
 Thakur

that the powerful will get that object. This acquiring of object, albeit different from the state of

war, still seems very similar. In the state of war, people who do not have enough power would

hardly go and harm the powerful person because of their fear of total loss of profit, while in the

commonwealth, it seems that the powerful people have more power at their helm than the

weaker, and they can use all of their power to influence the acquiring of that object. The desire to

acquire the object by taking it away from others seem to be more powerful in powerful people,

while the desire to accrue more profits without conflicts or preserve whatever profit they have

seems to be more important for weak people. Whatever the intention of different natured people

be, the quality of exchange in the commonwealth have changed i.e. that people no longer take

immediate actions for fear of their life and loss of profit. Thus, it can be said that by virtue of

being in a commonwealth, we seem to have suspended or prolonged our state of nature through a

sovereign whom we all fear equally.

The state of nature seems to be suspended or prolonged in the commonwealth because the

fear that gripped us when we were in the state of nature still seems to be present in some way.

There is a fear of the sovereign taking away whatever property we have at anytime he wishes,

except our life of which we have the right to refuse. But this seems to be the case with everyone

in the commonwealth, everyone fears him in the same way. He is the common fear, a constant

fear that everyone knows about. Although this kind of certainty is not found in the state of

nature, there will be people who will no longer fear the sovereign, either because the sovereign is

standing in their ambitious plans or stopping them from achieving the profit illegally. Despite the

nature of fear (Hobbes’s defines fear as an aversion with an opinion of hurt from the object), it

seems that there will be some people who will no longer fear the sovereign. As it was explained

4
 Thakur

earlier, people put value into things by comparing to themselves i.e. their desires and ambitions.

Since people of all kinds live in the commonwealth, everyone cannot fear the terrorising power

of the sovereign in the same way. In chapter 14 of part 2, Hobbes says, “There must be some

coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of

some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant…” This

deterrence of fear seems to be based on the proportionality of profit to be gained by the breach of

the contract. It seems that for people who have a lot to lose are more fearful of breaking the

covenant than the one who has none. However, human nature is such that for some people

whatever property they have, they may not value them in the same way as others do. Thus, they

might feel they have nothing to lose, and the deterrence of fear that the sovereign will want to

have on such people will be less, unless the sovereign decides to kill people of such kind. But as

we said, the commonwealth is founded for everyone based on the motions of life, nonetheless, it

appears that some desires cannot be entertained in the commonwealth by virtue of their nature to

destroy the commonwealth itself. Thus, for people who are not in fear of the sovereign for his

coercive power, they are in constant state of war with people and consequently with the

sovereign.

Even though the commonwealth gives us a manufactured or fabricated state of stability, it

has more potential to achieve for humans than the state of nature. In the state of war, as it has

already been said, there is no certainty. People are perpetually fearful of each other destroying or

stealing each other’s profit without being accountable to anyone. There is no just and unjust act

in the state of nature, but as we go into the commonwealth, the sovereign gives us laws that

decide whether something is just or unjust. This suspended state of nature is based on equity

(Hobbes Introduction), not on our ability to kill each other. This equity allows for people to

5
 Thakur

desire and accrue more and more, out of the three fold motion present in everyone. The

commonwealth also seems to give an opportunity to everyone to follow their desires as much as

possible without fear of losing the fruits of their labours. The general level of certainty to enjoy

the fruits of our labours allows an opportunity for the entire commonwealth to build a better

lifestyle that was impossible to achieve in the state of nature. Hence, it appears that despite the

coercive and fearful nature of the sovereign, his fear seems to be of a good quality, like parental

fear. In the commonwealth, the perpetual imperceptible fear in the state of nature is taken out of

the equation and the fear of the sovereign is put in place for the sake of entire people. Thus,

based on his fear, we seem to live a quality life, while he protects and defends us from each

other’s state of nature by suspending that nature using his terrorising power and also from other

sovereign states. The fear of the sovereign is predictable i.e. the fears are palpable. At least,

everyone knows that if they do something wrong, they will be punished in such and such way

fitting their crimes. Thus, there is no unreasonable or unjust fear from the sovereign which rarely

happens to be the case in the state of nature where each man is against every other man.

By the act of our social contract to form a commonwealth for ourselves, with a sovereign

who is there to protect and defend us from going back to the state of war, we get rid of our

perpetual fear of solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short life of man. (chapter 13, part 2)

Nevertheless, we also seem to have invited for ourselves a lot of problems - especially those who

make people less fit to obey the sovereign. (chapter 2 of part 1) “if this superstitious fear of

spirits were taken away,.....by which crafty ambitious persons abuse simple people, me would be

much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.” There are people who desire to abuse or

control people for their own benefits. Since fear, both rational and irrational, is a motion that

moves us towards acting for our own immediate benefits, we will do whatever it takes to do what

6
 Thakur

looks best for us. Our nature is also such that we are ignorant of most causes in nature, and thus

we start believing in others just because they may be right. Fear plays on our desire of no harm,

thus, by ambitious and crafty people, it appears we could be turned against the sovereign - the

commonwealth that was instituted in the first place for our own benefit. The power of the

sovereign mainly seems to come out of obedience, not out of total fear, thus if people do not

obey the sovereign, he no longer seems to have any power. Hence, it is our own ruin, if we

participate in disobeying the sovereign because of some crafty and ambitious people who are

trying to gain honour or some profit for themselves by forcing people to leave the suspended

state of war to full-fledged state of war.

Therefore, the state of war - the sword that destroys the commonwealth - always seems to

stand right there in the commonwealth, waiting for the commonwealth to fail by its own devices

- the threefold motion of desire, fear and sense - on which the commonwealth runs. Since one

fear triumphs the other in order to preserve our life and profit, while there will be some people

who out of their ambitions ruin the commonwealth and its benefit to people to gain honour by

trying to perpetuate their idea of glory and honour in society. Although Hobbes says that this

desire to gain glory in itself is not bad, it has the capacity to ruin what is good for a lot of people.

Thus, in their process of achieving their ambition, they may craft the minds of people in such a

way that people may stop following the sovereign and his laws of the commonwealth, by which

act his power loosens, and turns us back to the state of war.