Table of Contents

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Public Estates Authority vs. Jesus S. Yujuico and Augusto Y. Carpio................................. 3

Mariano De Guia and Apolonia De Guia vs. Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina, Tomasa and Pablo
De Guia ................................................................................................................................. 5
L. G. Marquez and Z. Gutierrez Lora vs. Francisco Varela and Carmen Varela .................. 7
Socorro Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals and Ester Garcia ...................................................... 9
Egdardo Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines ............. 12
Torralba v. People of the Philippines .................................................................................. 14
Salcedo – Ortañez v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................... 16
Navarro v. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................... 18
State Prosecutors vs. Muro .................................................................................................. 20
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Banal ...................................................................... 22
Recio vs. Recio .................................................................................................................... 24
Heirs of Pedro Clemena vs. Heirs of Irene Bien ................................................................. 26
Alfelor & Alfelor vs. Halasan and the Court of Appeals .................................................... 28
Bayas & Matuday vs. Sandiganbayan, the People of the Philippines and the Office of the
Special Prosecutor ............................................................................................................... 30
Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. vs. Lawrence C. Qua ................................... 32
People of the Philippines vs. Enrico Briones Badilla.......................................................... 34
Junie Malillin Y. Lopez vs. People of the Philippines ........................................................ 36
Herrera v. Alba .................................................................................................................... 39
People of the Philippines v Teehankee ............................................................................... 41
Pe Lim vs. Court of Appeals ............................................................................................... 44
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals ................................................................................................ 46
People v. Vallejo ................................................................................................................. 49
People v. Vallejo ................................................................................................................. 52
People v. Yatar .................................................................................................................... 55
In Re: The Writ Of Habeas Corpus For Reynaldo De Villa ............................................... 57
Herrera vs. Alba .................................................................................................................. 60
Agustin v. Court of Appeals ................................................................................................ 62

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People v. Vallejo ................................................................................................................. 65
People v. Calica ................................................................................................................... 68
Lejano v. People .................................................................................................................. 71
People v. Umanito ............................................................................................................... 74
Diaz v. Estate Of Rogelio G. Ong ...................................................................................... 77
Jesse U. Lucas vs. Jesus S. Lucas ....................................................................................... 80
NYK International Knitwear Corp. vs. NLRC .................................................................... 83
Philippine Banking Corporation vs. CA and Marcos .......................................................... 87
Republic of the Philippines vs. Masongsong, et al. ............................................................ 90
Sps. Dioso vs. Sps. Cardeño ................................................................................................ 95
De Vera vs. Sps. Aguilar ..................................................................................................... 99
Santos vs. CA, et al. .......................................................................................................... 104
People vs. Goce, et al. ....................................................................................................... 108
DECS vs. Del Rosario ....................................................................................................... 110
Lee vs. People ................................................................................................................... 115
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Mateo ....................................................................... 119

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 Public Estates Authority vs. Jesus S. Yujuico and Augusto Y. Carpio
G.R. No. 140486, February 6, 2001
Third Division
Vitug, J.:

DOCTRINE: The Court has the power to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. Strong compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof, can
warrant a suspension of the rules. While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets, on
the one hand, there is, on the other hand, an incomparable demand for resolving disputes
fairly and equitably.

FACTS:

Public Estates Authority (PEA) obtained ownership of various parcels of land along
Manila Bay for the purpose of constructing the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. Private
respondents claimed that the coastal road directly overlapped their property. Petitioner
denied that the Coastal Road had overlapped the property of private respondents.

After series of negotiations, the parties executed a "Deed of Exchange of Real Property"
with a sketch plan showing where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares to be
conveyed to private respondents (in 3 Lots) would be taken in exchange for private
respondents' property with a combined area of 1.7343 hectares. However, PEAdecided to
defer and hold in abeyance its implementation because the compromise agreement did not
reflect a condition required by the previous PEA Board. The new management of PEA
filed a petition for relief from the resolution of the trial court which approved the
compromise agreement on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. The petition
for relief was dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari but the petition was dismissed by the appellate court
for petitioner's failure to pay the required docket fees and for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly refuse to entertain the appeal for nonpayment of docket fees?

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RULING:

In both original and appealed cases, the court can be tasked to take cognizance over such
cases only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

At all events, while a court may refuse to entertain a suit for non-payment of docket fees,
such failure does not preclude it, however, from taking cognizance of the case as
circumstances may so warrant or when the ends of justice would be best served if the case
were to be given due course. Verily, the payment of fees is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is also an indispensable step in the perfection of an
appeal. While it is mandatory on the litigant, the court, however, is not necessarily left
without any alternative but to dismiss the appeal for non-payment of docket fees. Thus, the
failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a discretionary authority, not mandatory
charge, on the part of the court to dismiss an appeal. This discretion must, of course, be
exercised soundly, wisely and prudently, and with great deal of circumspection in
accordance with the tenets of fair play, never capriciously, and always with a view to
substance.

Similarly, the Court has had occasions to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. Strong compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof, can
warrant a suspension of the rules. While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets, on
the one hand, there is, on the other hand, an incomparable demand for resolving disputes
fairly and equitably.

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 Mariano De Guia and Apolonia De Guia vs. Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina, Tomasa and
Pablo De Guia
G.R. No. 140486, February 6, 2001
Third Division
Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE: Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be
served separately on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice
must expressly direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of
the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the
judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs filed with the court below a complaint for partition against defendants. The
Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18,
1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their
counsel. It turned out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default and
plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. Defendants filed their Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order which declared them as in default. They explained therein
that they received the Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of June 18, 1992, giving
them no chance to appear for such proceeding in the morning of that day.

ISSUE:

Should the Order declaring defendants in default be lifted?

RULING:

Yes. When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule 20 of
the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:

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 SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been
filed, the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a
conference to consider: xxx

This provision mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the parties and their
lawyers. While service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is best
that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at
counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying
the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party
either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written authority to represent the party with
power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do so may be
non-suited or declared in default.

Hence, before being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel
must be shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial conference. Moreover, if
served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client
of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice
renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality
and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or after the
pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sent
to their counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of
the pretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby notified that the above-
entitled case will be heard before this court on the 18th day of June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for
pre-trial.

Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to
a lack of notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying
them the opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.

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 L. G. Marquez and Z. Gutierrez Lora vs. Francisco Varela and Carmen Varela
G.R. No. L-4845, December 24, 1952
En Banc

Labrador, J.:

DOCTRINE: Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in the states of
the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading adopted in
substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons having an
interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as
plaintiffs". We did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure.

FACTS:

Lora was authorized by defendants Valera to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in
a parcel of land in Manila. Having met Marquez, a real estate broker, both Lora and
Marquez agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's property. They found a ready,
willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and terms, but defendants,
without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the sale and execute the necessary deed
therefor. As a consequence plaintiffs failed to receive the commission which they were
entitled to receive. The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint as to
Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against defendants.

ISSUE:

Does Marquez have a cause of action against defendants?

RULING:

Yes. The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action", but
in the law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of
action is a remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal
statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of
right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is
governed by the law of procedure.

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Marquez acted as a broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for his services.
Consequently, it is clear that there is a primary right in favor of Marquez to be paid for his
services and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendants to pay for his services.
Since defendants refuse to comply with their duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his
legal right by an action in court. The complaint in the case at bar, therefore, contains both
the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined which constitute the cause of
action in the legal sense as used in Code Pleading.

At common law, in order that two or more persons may join in an action upon a contract,
there must be community of interest between them; that is, they must be parties to the
contract and jointly interested in therein. Persons subsequently admitted to the benefit of a
contract, without the privity or assent of the promisor, cannot join in a suit on the contract.

But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure. Our original code
of civil Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the code of Civil Procedure of
California, and this in turn was based upon the Code of Civil procedure of New York
adopted in that stated in 1948. Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in
the states of the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading
adopted in substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be
joined as plaintiffs".

The rules do not require the existence of privity of contract between Marquez and the
defendants as required under the common law; all that they demand is that Marquez has a
material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in the broker's commission to
be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient
to justify the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the absence of privity of
contract between him and the defendants.

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 Socorro Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals and Ester Garcia
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
First Division

Kapunan, J.:

DOCTRINE: The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the deliberations from the Congressional Record, plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish or “Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos”.

FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of
the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic
Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The Court of Appeals (CA) declared the RTC’s
decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, hence, the
instant petition.

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ISSUE:

Does the Anti-Wiretapping Act apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties thereto?

HELD:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of
R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.

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The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the
phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
“conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill.

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 Egdardo Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986
Second Division

Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: The use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, following the principle that “penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused.”

FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. The latter then
telephoned the appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went
on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where
he was briefed about the problem. When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant
to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant
called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions and the latter agreed.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico, who earlier alerted his friend
Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money
at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

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Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification
hence the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Is an extension telephone among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line?

HELD:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph

or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use.

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 Torralba v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 153699, August 22, 2005
Second Division
Chico – Nazario, J.:

DOCTRINE: The person who actually recorded should have be presented as a witness in
order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording.
Without the requisite authentication, there is no basis for he trial court to admit the tape
recording in evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioner Torralba was charged with the crime of libel for allegedly discrediting the
honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of the late CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas in the former’s radio program. As an evidence, the prosecution presented
Segundo Lim and Atty. Manuel Hontanosas, incorporator and then president respectively,
of the The Maritime Services Incorporator(TMSI), former sponsor of Torralba’s radio
program.

Atty. Hontanosas, son of the late Judge came to know of the alleged acts of libel through a
recording of Torralba’s radio program which Segundino asked his adopted daughter Shirly
Lim to record. Torralba objected to the admissibility in evidence of the recording that the
prosecution should have presented Shirly Lim, the one who actually recorded the same, for
authentication.

ISSUE:

Is the proper authentication of the recording by Shirly Lim, the one who recorded the tape,
necessary for the recording’s admissibility in evidence?

RULING:

Yes. Without the said authentication, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible in
evidence.

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It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a
proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our
jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible
in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to
wit: 1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony; 2) a showing
that the operator of the device was competent; 3) establishment of the authenticity and
correctness of the recording; 4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not
been made; 5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording; 6)
identification of the speakers; and 7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily
made without any kind of inducement.

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to
tampering of tape recordings. Thus, the establishment of a proper foundation for the
admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were
observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering. In
the case at bar, one can easily discern that proper foundation for the admissibility of the
tape recording was not adhered to.

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 Salcedo – Ortañez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994
Second Division
Padilla J,:

DOCTRINE: Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory
under R.A. No. 4200.

FACTS: Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Despite petitioner’s
objection thereto, the trial court admitted the tapes in evidence which admission was
sustained by the CA, hence this petition

ISSUE:

Are the above – mentioned cassette tapes admissible in evidence?

RULING:

No. R.A. No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act
No. 4200 are as follows:

“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. x x x”
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 “Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.”

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.

17
 Navarro v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999
Second Division
Mendoza, J.:

DOCTRINE: A recording of a communication not private in nature is not violative of

R.A. No. 4200 and is admissible in evidence provided it is duly authenticated.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with homicide for the death of Ike Lingan. Lingan and Jalbuena,
media practitioners, went to the police station, where Navarro was on duty, to report an
incident of threats made against them. Lingan and Jalbuena were threatened by the security
guard and floor manager of the Entertainment City, an establishment showing nude
dancers, after Jalbuena was caught taking photos of the nude acts.

At the police station, Navarro threatened Jalbuena, prompting Lingan to intervene. Such
intervention led to a heated argument between Navarro and Lingan. Navarro then, using
his pistol hit Lingan on the forehead and gave the latter a fist blow causing Lingan's death.

Unknown to Navarro, the heated exchange was recorded on tape by Jalbuena, which
recording was used against Navarro.

ISSUE:

Is the recording made by Jalbuena admissible in evidnce I view of R.A. No. 4200 which
prohibits wire tapping?

RULING:

Yes. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private

communications. Since the exchange between Navarro and Lingan was no private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated
by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the

18
tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those
of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and that the speakers on the tape were Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was
thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.

19
 State Prosecutors vs. Muro
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994
En Banc

Per Curiam:

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.

FACTS:

State Prosecutors filed a complaint against Judge Muro for ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge
dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded
on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction
to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends
that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a
public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in
the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

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RULING:

Yes. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety.

But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere
newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety.
Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot
be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law which is not yet in force and hence,
still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a
fact.

21
 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Banal
G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004
Third Division

Sandoval-Gutierrezz, J.:

DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of
objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party.

FACTS:

Spouse Banal are the registered owners of an agricultural land. A portion thereof was
compulsorily acquired by Department of Agriculture (DAR) pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

The spouses rejected the valuation of Land Bank, hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
to determine the value of the land. PARAD affirmed Land Bank’s valuation.

Dissatisfied, spouses Banal filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for
Determination of Just Compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, RTC based
the same on the facts established in another case pending before it without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property, take judicial
notice of figures in a pending case before it and apply the same to another case without
hearing and consent of the parties.

HELD:

No. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending

22
in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of
objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a
certain matter.

23
 Recio vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
Third Division

Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our

jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However,
an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage
of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our
lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage
with Editha Samson.

ISSUE:

Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Australian Law on divorce.

24
RULING:

A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a
foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible in court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated
by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

25
 Heirs of Pedro Clemena vs. Heirs of Irene Bien
GR No. 155508, September 11, 2006
Second Division

Corona, J.:

DOCTRINE: Allegations made in pleadings are judicial admission and consequently

binds the party making it.

FACTS:

Irene Bien prays for compensatory damages against Pedro Clemena for depriving them of
the owner’s share from a tract of rice land in Albay. Bien legally bought the parcel of land
to the original owner’s thereof who appointed Clemena as the administrator. However, in
1939 Clemena was removed as an administrator. Despite the same, Clemena refused to
leave the property thereof.

In Clemena’s answer, he alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive
possession. His claim of ownership was based on a sale of the estate to his predecessors in
interest. When the original parties died, their respective heirs substituted them in their
actions. Clemena’s heirs argued that they should not be held liable for the damages since
they had never occupied the land whatsoever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations made by Pedro in his answer partakes the nature of a
judicial admission and must thereby bind his heirs.

RULING:

Yes, the allegations made in the answer partakes the nature of a judicial admission.

Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: An admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made.

26
An admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith
should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the opposite
party or not.

Hence, petitioner’s newly contrived assertion that they were never in possession of the
land cannot hold up against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were
bound by the admission of Pedro Clemena, their predecessor in the litigation. Without any
showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.

27
 Alfelor & Alfelor vs. Halasan and the Court of Appeals
GR No. 165987, March 31, 2006
First Division

Callejo, Sr., J.

DOCTRINE: Allegations made in the pleadings and in open court are of the nature of
judicial admissions and are conclusive and cannot be controverted by the party making the
same.

FACTS:

The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor file a complaint for
partition and among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, who are
the petitioners herein. She claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the
children of the deceased Alfelor spouses.

Josefina Halasan, thereafter, filed a motion for intervention alleging that she is the
surviving spouse of Jose and his only compulsory heir. She attached a copy of their
marriage contract in her pleading.

In the reply in intervention made by Teresita she declared that she knew of the previous
marriage of late Jose Alfelor with Josefina. She even openly testified the same in open
court. Allegedly, while she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband
had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband
and wife. As narrated, Josefina left Jose just right after the two got married.

The trial court ruled in favor of Teresita since she contracted the second marriage in good
faith, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously married.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita’s good faith is controverted by her judicial admissions made in her
pleadings and in open court.

28
RULING:

Yes, Teresita’s admissions regarding the knowledge of the first marriage warrant bad faith
since these are in the nature of judicial admissions. To the Court’s mind, this admission
constitutes a deliberate, clear and unequivocal statement; and made as it was in the course
of the judicial proceedings. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that
fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof, production of evidence are dispensed
with. Consequently, and admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the
contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by
the party or not.

29
Bayas & Matuday vs. Sandiganbayan, the People of the Philippines and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor
GR No. 143689-91, November 12, 2002
Third Division
Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE: Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not
be set aside unless for good cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to
stipulate facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused
and their counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that they may be placed at a
disadvantage during the trial.

FACTS:

Petitioners Sixto Bayas and Ernesto Matuday were charged with violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 for two counts of malversation through falsification. They were the mayor and
municipal treasurer, respectively of Kabayan, Benguet. During the pre-trial, the petitioners
together with the assistance of their counsel, Attorney Molintas, submitted Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Documents which had been duly signed by Atty. Molintas, the
petitioners and the prosecutor. In the same, the petitioners admitted that they disbursed the
amounts of P510, 000 and P50, 000 and attached therein are several exhibits.

Upon the withdrawal of Atty. Molintas, their new lawyer, Atty. Cinco, moved to withdraw
the stipulations made under the premise that the same is a violation of the constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Joint Stipulations of Facts and Documents can be withdrawn by the
parties.

RULING:

No, the same cannot be withdrawn.

30
Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a
faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and,
at the same time, help unclog court dockets. The same is highly favored by the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They
should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals
and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party
who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion,
duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of
sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the
power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the courts sound discretion
which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.

In the absence of any reason to make the stipulations inadmissible, the same is deemed
conclusive upon the party.

31
 Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. vs. Lawrence C. Qua
G.R. No. 144413, July 30, 2004
First Division

Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE: In order to constitute as judicial admission, the admission made by the

parties must be made in the same case and not in separate case as required under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Petitioners RGC and Gervel Inc. together with respondent Lawrence Qua were
stockholders of Ladtek. Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and PDCP with RGC,
Gervel and Qua as sureties. Thus, Qua pledged a share of stocks and the 3 sureties
executed agreements for contribution, indemnity and pledge of shares of stocks.

The agreement states that in case of default in the payment of Ladtek loans, the parties
would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the
creditor. Thereafter, Ladtek defaulted in the payment of its obligations. Hence, Metrobank
filed a collection suit against the sureties. During the pendency of the collection case 8364,
RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank in the amount of 7 million and Metrobank executed
waiver and quitclaim which dismisses the case against RGC and Gervel leaving Qua as
sole defendant.

Subsequently, on November 7, 1988 RGC and Gervel's counsel demanded that Qua pay
42.22 % of the total amount paid the RGC and Gervel but to no avail. Thus, the latter
furnished a notice of foreclosure of Qua's pledged shares.

In his motion to dismiss in the foreclosure, Qua alleged that the payment made by RGC
was for the entire obligations which also redounded to his benefit. Thus, his statement in
the foreclosure sale contradicts his allegation in the collection case which he stated that the

32
payment by his co-sureties was only partial. Such being the case, RGC and Gervel
contended that his statement in the foreclosure case constitute as judicial admission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statement made by Qua in his motion to dismiss in the foreclosure case
constitutes as a judicial admission warranting its conclusiveness against him (Qua).

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that while Qua's statements in collection case with his
statements in the foreclosure case in contradicting, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to
show that Qua in making those statements intended to falsely represent or conceal the
material facts since both the parties undeniably know the real facts.

The requisite of judicial admission according to the Supreme Court in this case are:

a) It must be contained in a pleading/s filed by the parties;

b) It must be during the trial either verbal or written manifest actions or

stipulations;

c) Any other stage of judicial proceeding.

The elements of judicial admission are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting
statements in collection case and in foreclosure case and not in the same case as required in
Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the
same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of
such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a
judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight. As such, since the foreclosure case is
different from the collection case, the admission therein does not constitute as judicial
admission.

33
 People of the Philippines vs. Enrico Briones Badilla
G.R. No. 218578, August 31, 2016
Third Division

Peralta, J.:

DOCTRINE: Substantial compliance under the doctrine of custody is permitted under the
law provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

FACTS:

On September 6, 2010 around 10:15 pm Police Officer Paras received a phone call from
concerned citizen informing that someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA
compound in Caloocan. Thus, Paras and his companions Ronquillo and Baldomero
responded to the call and reached the target area at around 10:25 and the saw appellant
Enrico Briones Badilla standing along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously in the act of
pulling something from his pocket. Thus, a precautionary measure was undertaken by
Paras and immediately introduced himself as police officer and held appellant's arm and
asked him to bring out his hand from his pocket. Thereafter, it turned out that the appellant
was holding a plastic sachet allegedly containing a shabu. Thus, Paras confiscated the
same, informed him of his Constitutional right, arrested him and brought him in the police
station. The seized item was subsequently turned over by Paras to Espadero who placed the
item in a much bigger plastic sachet and Espadero made a request for laboratory
examination of the seized item and drug test on the sample taken from Badilla. Police
officer Pataweg received the same and turned over it to P/Sr. Insp. Libres for laboratory
examination and the white crystalline was found positive that it is a dangerous drug and
was placed in a brown envelope.

Hence, accused appellant was charged with violation of Republic Act. No 9165. Appellant
submits the failure to mark the seized item right away is in violation of the chain custody
rule under the law since no conduct of physical inventory was made and it was not

34
photographed in the presence of the appellant or counsel, representative from the media
and Department of Justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was substantial compliance in the chain of custody of the seized item
in this case.

RULING:

Yes. It is true under the law that the apprehending officer or team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his or her representative/counsel, a
representative from media and DOJ and any elected Public Officer who shall be required
to sign and be given a copy thereof. However, it was also provided under the law that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team shall not render void such seizures of and custody.

In this case, Paras confiscated the plastic sachet from appellant, the same remained in the
possession of Paras until the seized item were brought to the office. Thereafter, Paras
marked the same with his initials and turned it over to Espadero and requested Pataweg of
Crime Laboratory Office to receive the same. Thereafter, Pataweg together with Paras
turned over the seized item to Libres (chemist) and the latter said that the white crystalline
substance is positive of containing dangerous drugs. Subsequently, Libres signed the same
and place it in an envelope and presented in court as evidence.

Hence, prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the
chain custody of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought
to the court for examination

35
 Junie Malillin Y. Lopez vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008
Second Division

Tinga, J.:

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.

FACTS:

On the strength of warrant and seizure issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a team of
5 police officers raided the house of the accused. The accused was charged for violation of
Republic Act No. 9165.

Police officer Bolanos testified that he and his men were allowed entry in the house and
shown the search warrant. He ordered Esternon and Licup (kagawad) to conduct the search
and the rest police officers positioned themselves outside. The search conducted in the
bedroom which yielded 5 empty sachet which contained a shabu residue fell from one
pillows searched by Esternon. The denim bag containing three sachets were placed behind
the door of the bedroom and two sachet were found in the pillows on the bed. Thus, they
seized the same and brought to the station for 'true inventory'. Arroyo presented and
testified that the sachet contains shabu but a certain Ofelia Garcia and not Arroyo was the
one who received the same from Esternon.

The accused appellant interposed the defense that there were several irregularities in the
seizure which violates the chain custody since petitioner was asked for some errand during
the search to buy cigarettes and Esternon conducted search alone on the bedroom.
Thereafter, after three minutes, accused return and was asked to lift the portion of
headboard and in that instant, Esternon showed him the sachet containing shabu. These
statements was corroborated by the kagawad Licup, Sheila and Norma when they testified

36
that petitioner Malillin was not in the house because he was asked for some errand and
Esternon was alone in conducting the search.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the conduct of officers in this case were
contradicted by contrary proof due to non-observance of the chain custody.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

In this case, Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets
for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed
over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. The same
is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances
under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time
they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

Moreover, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly
outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too
plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial
custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical
inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon deviated

37
from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of petitioner's
house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose
of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true
inventory could not be made in petitioner's house when in fact the apprehending team was
able to record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt
therefor.

38
 Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
First Division
Carpio J.:

DOCTRINE: DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the
DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value is 99.9% or
higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.

FACTS:

Rosendo Alba (respondent), 13 years old, represented by his mother, filed a petition for
recognition, support and damages on May 14, 1998. Rosendo Herrera (petitioner) filed his
answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of the
respondent. Also, he denied being in physical contact with Armi.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. She is a professor of cell biology and she was also head of the UP-NSRI, a
DNA analysis laboratory. Halos described the procedure and asserted that an accurate rate
of 99.99% is certain to establish paternity.

Alba opposed asserting that DNA paternity testing has not gained acceptability and such
violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA paternity test must be admitted and if such DNA testing is a violation
of the respondent’s Right against Self-Incrimination.

RULING:

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion
can be had, the DNA test result must state that there is at least a 99.9% probability that the
person is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but

39
never possibly a 100%) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted
as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the
alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result
is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo
Guidelines are not complied with.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and;
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

If the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father, then the evidence is merely corroborative.

Regarding the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the
right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence)
from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from
Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

40
 People of the Philippines v Teehankee
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
Second Division
Puno, J.:

DOCTRINE: It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by

the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification
constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or
DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect."

FACTS:

In 1991, Jussi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home in Makati. Roland
Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop
about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did
not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with
her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a car driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.,
came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from
his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino
handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are
you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired
at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you
shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him
but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire
on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and
took a step backward.

41
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. All the while, accused was pointing his gun to
and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. For a moment, the accused
turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the
upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard
another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees
and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97
days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the
shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in
Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas
shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a
box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566.

ISSUE:

Whether out of court identification applies and the positive identification of the accused by
the victim may suffice

RULING:

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did
not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in
Leino’s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records
reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for
security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park

42
by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the
identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was
cramped with people and with high security risk. Leino’s fear for his safety was not
irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and
the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.

Accused can’t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of
the shooting before he personally identified him. The records show that while Leino was
still in the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He
identified the accused as the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated
that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused or read any
report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug
shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness,
he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

43
 Pe Lim vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997
Second Division

Romero, J.:

DOCTRINE: When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his
recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment.

FACTS:

Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She worked as a
receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Blvd where she met the
petitioner. Petitioner wooed her and they soon lived together without the benefit of
marriage. In 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter and the petitioner paid the hospital
bills. He also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's
birth certificate. Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings
toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried
to support herself by accepting various jobs and with occasional help from relatives, but it
was never enough. She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was
never given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Manila for
support.

Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they were only friends
and nothing more. He also alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club and
in 1980 she even left for Japan to work as an entertainer. Petitioner now argues before the
Court that there is no clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was
actual cohabitation between him and Maribel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is the real father of Joanna Rose.

44
RULING:

Yes. The evidence on record reveals that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when
Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan
Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence
which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna
Rose. Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions
cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all.

DNA, being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded official recognition
by our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.

45
 Tijing vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001
Second Division

Quisumbing, J.:

DOCTRINE: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress.

FACTS:

Petitioners are husband and wife. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of the
private respondent Angelita Diamante. On August 1989, Angelita went to her house to
fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some
marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned and left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita
and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. She proceeded to Angelita’s house in Tondo but did not find
her there. After three days, she discovered that Angelita had moved to another place.
Notwithstanding Bienvenida and her husband’s serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas
Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in
state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that
the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas
Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return
to her the boy despite the demand to do so and insists to be her offspring. This prompted
the petitioners to file a petition for habeas corpus.

46
ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person
and is the son of petitioners?

RULING:

Yes. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children as
she underwent ligation after the birth of her second child. Second, Benjamin Lopez
declared in court that his brother, Tomas (common law husband of Angelita), was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son. Third, the Court finds it unusual that Tomas Lopez filed the birth
certificate of John Thomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four
months after the alleged birth of the child. Fourth, resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Fifth, Lourdes
Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a logbook,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. UP-NSRI DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.

47
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

48
 People v. Vallejo
GR No.144656, May 9, 2002
En Banc

Per Curiam:

DOCTRINE: When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the
crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the
victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between
the evidence sample and the reference sample.

FACTS:

Gerrico Vallejo was charged with the crime of Rape and Homicide. The victim's mother,
Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon she sent her 9-year
old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of
accused could help Daisy with her lessons.. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of
her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later,
Daisy came back with accused for a book which accused could copy to make a drawing or
a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused
went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up after an afternoon nap, she
noticed that Daisy was not yet home. Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for
Daisy the whole evening until the early morning of the following day but their search
proved fruitless. Then, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied
to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta”. The body was already in the
barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants
with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. The barangay officers fetched accused from
his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to
accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim
when she was last seen alive.

49
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that he took blood samples from
accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type.
Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused on the day the victim was
missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to the NBI by the Cavite police for the
purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups.

The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused to
belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) 13 athletic basketball shirt (2) athletic
basketball short pants; (3) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4)
"cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) "cut" dirty white small panty with
reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group "A"

Pet Byron Buan also took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused as well as buccal
swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and
Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for
examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests
on the specimens collected. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr.
Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the
victim.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. On this account, the accused was sentenced to death. The cases was
then elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Buan (NBI forensic biologist) are
conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial,

50
it can still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial
evidence gathered in this rape case. The Supreme Court also elucidated on the
admissibility of DNA evidence and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in
the Philippines.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a
crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's
body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of
DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and
the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.

In the case at bar, the forensic chemist testified that while the bloodstains taken from the
clothes of the victim, as well as the strands of hair and nail specimens did not contain
human DNA, the vaginal swabs from the victim yielded positive for the presence of
human DNA and upon further analysis, it matched the DNA profile of the defendant. The
forensic chemist further explained that the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the
victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of
hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA because of
the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that
the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their
examination.

In conclusion, the Court held that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not
counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the
guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight
and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.

51
 People v. Vallejo
GR No.144656 May 9, 2002
En Banc

Per Curiam:

DOCTRINE: The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists

between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The test may yield three possible
results: a.) exclusion, b.) inconclusive, and c.) inclusion

FACTS:

Gerrico Vallejo was charged with the crime of Rape and Homicide. The victim's mother,
Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon she sent her 9-year
old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of
accused could help Daisy with her lessons. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of
her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later,
Daisy came back with accused for a book which accused could copy to make a drawing or
a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused
went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up after an afternoon nap, she
noticed that Daisy was not yet home. Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for
Daisy the whole evening until the early morning of the following day but their search
proved fruitless. Then, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found
tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta”. The body was already
in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short
pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. The barangay officers fetched accused
from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed
to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim
when she was last seen alive.

Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that he took blood samples from
accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type.
Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused on the day the victim was

52
missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to the NBI by the Cavite police for the
purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups.

The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused to
belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) 13 athletic basketball shirt (2) athletic
basketball short pants; (3) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4)
"cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) "cut" dirty white small panty with
reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group "A"

Pet Byron Buan also took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused as well as buccal
swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and
Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for
examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests
on the specimens collected. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr.
Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the
victim.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. On this account, the accused was sentenced to death. The cases was
then elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA test has probative value

RULING:

Yes. In outlining the procedure for DNA testing, the Court recognized the reliability of the
outcome of the process and expressed confidence in the scientific method used. The Court
thus paved the way for the introduction of these kinds of evidence in future litigation. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,

53
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a
crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's
body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.

In this case, the forensic chemist explained that the bloodstains, specimens taken from the
hair and nails did not contain human DNA because the samples proved to be inadequate.
However, the vaginal swab from the victim was not contaminated and was well reserved
and was therefore able to establish that the accused raped the victim because the DNA in
her vagina matched his DNA profile.

54
 People of the Philippines vs. Joel Yatar Alias “Kawit”
G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004
En Banc
Per Curiam:

DOCTRINE: Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles, like that of DNA
Typing, could be used as long as it is relevant and reliable.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,
Kathlyn Uba were on the house of their grandmonther, Isabel Dawang. Kathlyn handed a
letter sent by her aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, accusued Joel Yatar. Thereafter, Judilyn
and her husband together with Isabel departed for their farm. While on her way home,
Judilyn saw accused descend from the ladder of the second floor of the house of Isabel and
run towards the back of the house. She noticed that appellant was pacing back and forth.

Later, she saw appellant in changed clothes and noticed that her eyes were reddish and
sharp. When Isabel arrived in her house, she called for Kathlyn but to no avail. While in
the second floor, she found the lifeless body of Kathlyn, naked, her intestines protruding
and her clothing beside her. Thus, accused Joel Yatar was taken into custody.

Based on circumstantial evidence and the matching of DNA samples of the semen found in
the victim’s body and the accused’ blood sample, the RTC found Yatar guilty of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced him to death. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the DNA testing, as well as the results thereof, be used as evidence against the
accused.

55
RULING:

Yes. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse
these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of
persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under
Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar,
the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which
was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

56
 In Re: The Writ Of Habeas Corpus For Reynaldo De Villa (Detained At The New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City), Reynaldo De Villa, June De Villa vs. The Director,
New Bilibid Prisons
G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004
En Banc
Ynares-Satiago, J.:

DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly
administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance that
requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would
be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question
of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been restrained is a
complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself
an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves
as the basis of imprisonment or detention. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

FACTS:

On February 1, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa was convicted by final judgment of Rape

committed against his niece Aileen Mendoza. Out of such crime, Aileen became pregnant
and gave birth to Leahlyn Mendoza. After having been informed DNA testing could
resolve the issue of paternity, petitioner-relator June de Villa moved to conduct DNA
testing which motion was denied by the court in a final decision. Undaunted, petitioner-
relator was still able obtained samples from Leahlyn and Reynaldo and had it tested. The
DNA test conducted showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired Leahlyn due to
the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner’s sample and
those of Leahlyn’s.

57
Three years after the promulgation of the decision, petitioner-relator June de Villa, son of
Reynaldo, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. petitioner relies
upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual
issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is
crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he
sired the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the
2001 conviction must be overturned.

ISSUE:

May the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus be used to collaterally attack
a final judgment of conviction.

RULING:

No.. Review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that
the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. First, the denial of a constitutional
right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal
basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. There is likewise no
showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.

In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any
legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the
evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and

58
sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope
of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.

59
 Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba, Minor, Represented By His Mother Armi A.
Alba, And Hon. Nimfa Cuesta-Vilches, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial
Court, Manila
G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005
First Division
Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE: As of 2002, DNA analysis has been accorded “official recognition” as

evidence by the Court.

FACTS:

Rosendo Alba (respondent), 13 years old, represented by his mother, filed a petition for
recognition, support and damages on May 14, 1998. Rosendo Herrera (petitioner) filed his
answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of the
respondent. Also, he denied being in physical contact with Armi.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. She is a professor of cell biology and she was also head of the UP-NSRI, a
DNA analysis laboratory. Halos described the procedure and asserted that an accurate rate
of 99.99% is certain to establish paternity.

Alba opposed asserting that DNA paternity testing has not gained acceptability and such
violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether DNA analysis admissible in evidence.

60
RULING:

Yes. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis
as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according “official recognition” to DNA
analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise
excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.Section 49 of Rule
130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows: The opinion
of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.”

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our
jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and
Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.

61
 Arnel L. Agustin vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
Third Division
Corona, J.

DOCTRINE: The right against self-incrimination does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. A DNA
paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite. Respondents alleged that
Arnel had entered into an intimate relationship and Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on
her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe
decided otherwise and gave birth on August 11, 2000. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.

In his answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe
had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. In May 2000, Arnel and his
entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000,
Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not

62
recognized by the putative father. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the
complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

Yes. In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., the Court stated:

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing…

In another case where the accused alleged that compulsory extraction of his blood sample
for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination,
the Court addressed the issue as follow:

The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.

63
Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional
rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being
violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to
submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does
not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

64
 The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Gerrico Vallejo
G.R. No. 144656, May 09, 2002
En Banc
Per Curiam:

DOCTRINE: When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with
the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its
weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. The
guilt of the accused is not affected even if the DNA examination provides for a negative
result due to inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination and not due to
contamination of the samples.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide for
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously having sexual intercourse with Daisy Diolola a nine-
year old child against the latter’s will and while raping the said victim, accused strangled
her to death.

Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took
blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to
determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-
appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim’s clothing were turned over to
the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite
police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups. The
results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant to
belong to Group “O”. The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic
basketball shirt, with patches “Grizzlies” in front and “SAMARTINO” at the back; (2) one
(1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small “Hello Kitty” T-shirt
with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) “cut” pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5)

65
one (1) “cut” dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the
presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group “A”.

On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the
offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA tests are credible evidence considering that the specimens were
already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.

RULING:

Yes. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence
sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how
the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-
appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken
from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA. Nonetheless, it is the inadequacy
of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had
been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the

66
vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA.
Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

67
 People of the Philippines vs. Florencio Calica
G.R. No. 139178, April 14, 2004
Second Division
Callejo, Sr., J.:

DOCTRINE: A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld

only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed against Florencio Calica, Ernesto
Calica, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe. Appended to the complaint was the sworn
statement executed by Dominga Pispis .The trial court dismissed the case for insufficiency
of evidence as the court disbelieved the testimony of Dominga. However, the provincial
fiscal, on review, reversed the resolution. According to Dominga, she recognized one of
the men who abducted her husband as the appellant, Florencio Calica, who also happened
to be her husband’s second cousin and a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force
(CHDF) of Bato. The appellant, who was wearing black pants and a long-sleeved uniform,
positioned himself in front of the door of the hut, his firearm pointed towards his husband.
He, like the other armed men, had a bonnet over his head; only the eyes, nose and mouth
were visible. The appellant’s bonnet, however, was loose. Dominga was almost face to
face with the appellant, about merely half an arm’s length away, and saw his face in the
moonlight.

The appellant denied the charge lodged against him. He testified that it would take one
three hours to get to Barangay Malabuan from Barangay Bato on foot, as the road was very
difficult and one has to pass two mountains to get there. The appellant stayed in the house

68
of Elpidio Asidre on December 22, 1986, preparing for the death anniversary of his
Asidre’s mother. The appellant had arrived at 8:00 a.m. that morning to help him butcher a
pig and a goat for the occasion until 3:00 p.m. the following day.

The trial court convicted Calica for murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the
collective testimonies of the witnesses.

RULING:

No. Proof of the crime charged and the identity of the suspect/suspects may consist of
direct evidence and/or circumstantial evidence. It is settled that in the absence of direct
proof of the commission of the crime, circumstantial evidence could be the basis of
conviction as long as the following requisites concur:

(1) There is more than one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and,
(3) The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld only if the

circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person;
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.
The Court finds the identification of the appellant as one of the abductors and killers of the
victim dubious and unconvincing. Consequently, we acquit the appellant of the crime

69
charged. It is inconceivable how Dominga could have seen the appellant’s face when only
his eyes and mouth were visible through the bonnet he wore over his head. Even if the
bonnet of the appellant was “loose,” his face could not have been exposed, unless he was
not wearing it, or it was rolled up and merely covered his head.

The People may argue that, based on the evidence of the prosecution, a strong probability
of the appellant’s guilt was established, a strong suspicion that the appellant was one of
those who abducted and killed the victim, or, at the very least that there is a strong doubt as
to the appellant’s innocence. But such quantum of evidence is not sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction. Before the appellant can be convicted, the hypothesis of
his guilt must flow materially from the facts posed and must be consistent with all of them.
The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of the crime charged.

70
 Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010
En Banc
Abad, J.:

DOCTRINE: Post-conviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition,

exculpatory test results will not necessarily free the convicted individual. If the evidence
does exclude the petitioner, the court must weigh the significance of the exclusion in
relation to all the other evidence. Convicted offenders often believe that if crime scene
evidence does not contain their DNA they will automatically be exonerated. Due process
does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to
the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the
police.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. The police arrested a
group of suspects, but the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. In 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced that it had
solved the crime and presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Artemio Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. For their part, some of the accused testified, denying
any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb's alibi
appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United
States of America. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

71
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela's cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the
safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that
they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen,
the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that
the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence
in the case. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government's failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused Webb is entitled to an acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the State's failure to produce on order of the Court either by
negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

RULING:

Webb is not entitled to outright acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage.. The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was
raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela's rapist and killer but serious questions had
been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro
had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie.
It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two
persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins. If, on
examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not

72
rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that
Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb's application for DNA testing, he allowed
the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and
the other accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as
an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the
accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending
adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime
passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused's lack of interest in having
such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Nonetheless, Webb's documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only
with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S.
when the crime took place, Alfaro's testimony will not hold together. Webb's participation
is the anchor of Alfaro's story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily
fall.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 00336 and acquitted accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo
Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

73
 People of the Philippines vs. Rufino Umanito
G.R. No. 172607, October 26, 2007 and April 16, 2009
Second Division
Tinga, J.:

DOCTRINE: DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely

effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where
biological evidence is available.

FACTS:

This case was decided by the Court 11 days after the effectivity of the New Rule on DNA
Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on October 15, 2007. It remanded the case to the
trial court for the reception of DNA Evidence. On April 16, 2009, the Court closed and
terminated the case.

The facts based on the victim are as follows:

It was around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of July 15, 1989, while the victim on her way to
her grandmother’s home, the victim was accosted by a young male. It was only later when
she learned the name of accused-appellant Umanito.

She recounted that accused-appellant waited for her by the creek, and then with a knife
pointed at her left side of the abdomen, he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding
her breasts and stomach, and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home
Economics Building inside the premises of the Daramuangan Elementary School where
accused-appellant first undressed her and himself with his right hand while he still clutched
the knife menacingly on his left hand. She recounted that she could not shout because she
was afraid.

74
She further recounted that accused-appellant laid her down on a bench, 4 meters long and
24 inches wide, set the knife down, then mounted her, inserting his penis into her vagina
and shortly thereafter, accused-appellant dressed up and threatened while poking the knife
at her neck, not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her.
Accused-appellant then left, while the victim went on to her grandmother’s house and she
noticed that it was already around 1:00 o’clock in the morning when she reached there.

In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, her mother, noticed the prominence on her
stomach. It was only then when the victim divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told
her the details of what had happened in July 1989. After hearing her story, her mother
brought her to the police station.

Appellant’s version on the stand was different. Denying the accusations, he claimed that on
15 July 1989, he was home the whole day, helping his family complete rush work on
picture frames ordered from Baguio. He did not step out of their house on the evening in
question, he added.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify her in the sum of P50,000.00. The appellate
court affirmed the challenged decision.

ISSUE:

Should the appellant be acquitted based on reasonable doubt by reason of the belated filing
of the case against him and the questionable credibility of the victim with respect to her
varying allegations?

RULING:

The case was first remanded to the trial court for the reception of DNA evidence.

75
The Court discussed that the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it
can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether the appellant is the father of the
victim’s child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained.

The Court pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not
sire the alleged victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his
acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh
heavily in the ultimate decision in this case.

Thus, the Court directed the appellant, the victim and the child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence
(the Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007.

On April 16, 2009, a special second division by the Court closed and terminated the case.
There was a complete match in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino
Umanito and the child. There is a 99.9999% Probability of Paternity that Umanito is the
biological Father of the child.

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and

overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court). The disputable
presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of
the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits A and B inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same.

The trial court ruled that based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the
National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division, Umanito is the biological father of the
child. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion to that of Umanito, and that as
testified to by the victim, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990,
nine months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.

76
Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
vs. Estate Of Rogelio G. Ong
G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Third Division
Chico-Nazario, J.:

DOCTRINE: The conduct of DNA testing is allowed despite the death of the putative
father and does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

FACTS:

Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, as represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz, filed a
complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation against
Rogelio G. Ong before the RTC. It was alleged in the complaint that Jinky and Rogelio
first met in November 1993 and later became lovers, despite the former having been
married to Hasegawa Katsuo in February 1993. They cohabitated with each other from
January 1994 to September 1998; this was the arrangement out of which Joanne was
conceived and born on February 1998.

It was also Rogelio who brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home
after delivery. He also paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided
for all of Joanne’s needs recognizing the child as his. In September 1998, however,
Rogelio abandoned the two, and stopped supporting Joanne, alleging that he was not her
father. He continued to fail and refuse to give support for the child and acknowledge her as
his daughter, hence the complaint.

The RTC declared Joanne to be Rogelio’s illegitimate Child, and awarded her support
pendent lite, until she reached majority age. It was proven that, despite being in a legal
marriage, Jinky’s husband was overseas at the time Joanne was conceived and born, and
that Rogelio’s actions of paying the hospital expenses of Joanne, and of chauffeuring Jinky

77
to and from the hospital were evidences of his admission that he was the father of the
child.

Rogelio’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence he appeal to the CA. During the
pendency of the case in the CA, however, Rogelio died; he he was subsequently
substituted by his estate. The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case for the
lower court to issue an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis
for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne. This was so given that, the court,
despite the late Rogelio’s suggestion early in the case for him and Jinky to submit
themselves for DNA and blood testing to settle the issue on paternity, the trial court did not
consider resorting to the same.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA analysis
despite the death of Rogelio?

RULING:

No. The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

The term biological sample means any organic material originating from a person’s body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died,
any of the biological samples may be available, may be used for DNA testing.

In the case of People v. Umanito, citing Tecson v. COMELEC, regarding DNA Analysis, it
was reiterated that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily

78
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to.

79
 Jesse U. Lucas vs. Jesus S. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
Second Division
Nachura, J.:

DOCTRINE: DNA Testing can only be ordered after establishing a prima facie proof of
filiation.

FACTS:

On July 2007, Jesse filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the RTC. It was alleged that his mother,
Elsie, met Jesus when she accompanied one Ate Belen to her workplace. An intimate
relationship developed between the two, and Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March
11, 1969, gave birth to Jesse. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s
certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told Jesse that his father was Jesus.

Jesus allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and Jesse for at least 2 years. It was
only when their relationship ended that Elsie refused Jesus’ offer of support, deciding to
raise Jesse on her own. All attempts of Elsie in introducing Jesus to Jesse were in vain.

The RTC eventually dismissed the case before a hearing could be had, ruling that, in the
case of Herrera v Alba, there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which the parties have to establish before one can present evidence of
paternity and filiation: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. Jesse failed to
establish a prima facie case given that there was no express allegation that Elsie had sexual
relations with Jesus, and that the later treated Jesse like a son, and that Jesse’s birth
certificate contained no signature of Jesus.

80
Upon Motion for Reconsideration by Jesse, the dismissal was set aside. Upon denial of
Jesus’ MR, he filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, who ruled in his favor. The CA
held that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action, and that DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether DNA Testing can only be ordered after establishing a prima facie proof of
filiation.

HELD:

Yes. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and, the possible sources of error, the
available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, and shall not be
misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis
serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right
if, during the hearing, the conditions under Section 4 are established.

To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. A court

81
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under the Constitutions, must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of
a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in
its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

82
 NYK International Knitwear Corp. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 146267, February 17, 2003
Second Division

Quisumbing, J.:

DOCTRINE: A "certified true copy" is such other copy furnished to a party at his instance
or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or representatives of the
issuing entity. The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor
of the issuing entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not
a mere Xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or other
initiatory pleading.

FACTS:

On February 8, 1995, petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under
the terms and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but
required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight.

At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the
work place early, as she was not feeling well due to influenza. Permission was refused but
nonetheless, Publico went home.

On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work, however, the security guard prevented her
from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on management’s order. When she inquired
why she was barred from reporting for work, she was told she was dismissed due to her
refusal to render overtime service.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng.

Before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners alleged that they verified why Publico did not report
for work on May 7, 1997 and found out that her husband did not allow her to work at
night. As night work is a must in their line of business, particularly when there are rush

83
orders, petitioners claimed that given Publico’s failure to render overtime work, they were
left with no other recourse but to fire her.

The Labor Arbiter held Publico’s dismissal to be illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.

In due time, petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil action of
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for affirming the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

The appellate court dismissed the petition outright. The Court of Appeals pointed out that
there was non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified Xerox copy of the assailed NLRC
decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof as required by the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to attach the other pleadings and documents pertinent and
material to their petition, such as the parties’ position papers, their evidence and the motion
for reconsideration in contravention of the said rule.

Petitioners duly moved for reconsideration, explaining that they had requested for a
certified true copy of the NLRCs decision but since the original NLRC decision was
printed on onionskin was not legible, the NLRC itself photocopied the resolution and
certified it afterwards. As proof of payment of petitioners request for a certified true copy
of the NLRC decision, petitioners attached a copy of the official receipts issued by the
NLRC, which described the nature of the entry as CERT. TRUE COPY. Petitioners,
likewise, appended in their motion copies of pertinent pleadings and documents not
previously attached in their petition.

The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review.

84
ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari
on purely technical grounds, i.e., that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere
photocopy of the original decision?

RULING:

Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The precursor of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which took effect
on June 1, 1996, instructs us what a certified true copy is:

1. The "certified true copy" thereof shall be such other copy furnished to a party at
his instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or
representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified.

x xx

3. The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor of
the issuing entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and
not a mere Xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or
other initiatory pleading

x xx

Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the disputed document although
stamped as certified true copy is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy,
but only a Xerox copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted
guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the

85
petition for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of Administrative Circular No. 3-96,
which provides:

5. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents required
by Paragraph (3) of Circular No. 1-88 to verify and ensure compliance with all the
requirements therefor as detailed in the preceding paragraphs. Failure to do so shall
result in the rejection of such annexes and the dismissal of the case. Subsequent
compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied
that the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party, despite due
diligence on his part, and that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons
for the court to make such other disposition as it may deem just and equitable.

We should be reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.

Petitioner's bare allegations of abandonment cannot stand the unswerving conclusion by

both quasi-judicial agencies below that private respondent was unlawfully dismissed. We
find no reason to deviate from the consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that there was no basis to find that Virginia abandoned her work.

Petition denied.

86
 Philippine Banking Corporation vs. CA and Marcos
G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004
First Division

Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any
evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the
original evidence can be had.

FACTS:

In Aug. 1989, Leonilo Marcos filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with
damages against Philippine Banking Corporation.

Marcos alleged that sometime in 1982, the Bank through Florencio Pagsaligan, one of the
officials of the Bank, persuaded him to deposit money. Marcos claimed he made a time
deposit on two occasions, one for P664K for which the Bank issued a receipt and the other
for P764K for which a letter-certification was issued by Pagsaligan.

In March 1983, Marcos wanted to withdraw his time deposits and its interests. However,
Pagsaligan convinced him to keep his time deposits intact and instead to open several
domestic letters of credit. Marcos executed three trust receipt agreements totaling P851K
and deposited the required 30% marginal deposit. He claimed that his obligation to the
Bank was only P595K representing 70% of the letters of credit.

Marcos expected the Bank to offset automatically a portion of his time deposits and the
accumulated interest with the amount covered by the three trust receipts less the 30%
marginal deposit that he had paid.

In sum, Marcos claimed that his time deposit of P1.4M has earned accumulated interest of
P1.7M so his total money is P3.1M less P595K representing the 70% balance of the
marginal deposit and/or balance of the trust agreements; and that his indebtedness was only
P851K less the 30% paid as marginal deposit or a balance of P595K, which the Bank

87
should have automatically deducted from his time deposits and accumulated interest,
leaving the Bank’s indebtedness to him at P2.5M.

Marcos accused the Bank of unjustly demanding payment for the total amount of the trust
receipt agreements without deducting the 30% marginal deposit that he had already made.
Marcos also denied that he obtained another loan from the Bank for P500K supposedly
covered by Promissory Note No. 20-979-83.

The Bank alleged that the total amount of the various time deposits of Marcos was only
P764K and not P1.4M. The Bank pointed out that Marcos executed a deed of assignment
to secure his various loan obligations. The Bank claimed that these loans are covered by
promissory notes, one of which was Promissory Note No. 20-979-83. The Bank stressed
that these obligations are separate and distinct from the trust receipt agreements.

When Marcos defaulted in the payment of Promissory Note No. 20-979-83, the Bank
debited his time deposits and applied the same to the obligation that is now considered
fully paid. The Bank insisted that the deed of assignment authorized it to apply the time
deposits in payment of Promissory Note No. 20-979-83.

The Bank claimed that Promissory Note No. 20-979-83 is supported by documentary
evidence such as Marcos’ application for this loan and the microfilm of the cashier’s check
issued for the loan.

The RTC declared the Bank in default for filing its answer five days after the 15-day
period to file the answer had lapsed. It allowed Marcos to present his evidence ex parte.

The Bank asked the RTC to set aside the order of default because it had a valid and
meritorious defense. The RTC set aside the default order and ordered the Bank to present
its evidence. It, however, denied the Bank's motion to cross examine Marcos.

The RTC decided in favor of Marcos. The CA modified the decision by reducing the
amount of actual damages and deleting the attorney’s fees awarded to Marcos.

88
ISSUE:

Was the Bank able to prove Marcos’ outstanding obligations secured by the assignment of
time deposits?

RULING:

No. The Bank failed to produce the best evidence — the original copies of the loan
application and promissory note. Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been
lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy must be disregarded, being
unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.

What the Bank presented were merely the "machine copies of the duplicate" of the loan
application and promissory note. No explanation was ever offered by the Bank for its
inability to produce the original copies of the documentary evidence. The Bank also did
not comply with the orders of the trial court to submit the originals.

The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of
fraud. If a party is in possession of evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes, which its production would expose and defeat.

The absence of the original of the documentary evidence casts suspicion on the existence
of Promissory Note No. 20-979-83 considering the Bank’s fiduciary duty to keep
efficiently a record of its transactions with its depositors.

Marcos was only able to present the receipt for the first time deposit he claimed to have
made and the letter-certification to prove the total amount of his time deposits with the
Bank. According to the letter-certification issued by Pagsaligan, the total amount of time
deposits of Marcos is P764K. Marcos is bound by the letter-certification since he was the
one who prodded Pagsaligan to issue it.

The Bank was ordered to return to Marcos P500K, the remaining principal amount of his
time deposits.

89
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Masongsong, et al.
G.R. No. 162846, September 22, 2005
Second Division

Callejo, Sr., J.:

DOCTRINE: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
recorded in a public office.

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

FACTS:

Jose Lubis Masongsong and his brother, Juanito Lubis Masongsong, filed a petition in the
RTC of Lipa City, for the declaration of nullity of Decree No. 639024 purportedly issued
in favor of Serapio Lubis on June 21, 1937 in LRC Cadastral Record No. 1296, and that
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) be ordered to issue a new
decree in favor of the petitioners.

90
The petitioners adduced in evidence a technical description of the property duly certified
and found correct by the Regional Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on August
13, 1998;tax declarations covering the property in the name of Serapio Lubis, from 1968 to
1994; a Certification from the LRA dated May 29, 1998, stating that after due verification
of the record book of cadastral lots in its custody, it was found that Decree No. 639024 was
issued on June 21, 1937 covering Lot No. 8500 of the Cadastral Survey of Lipa and
Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, based on a decision in Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No.
1296; a Certification by the Register of Deeds of Batangas stating that there was no
existing or salvaged record of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 8500 of the Lipa City
Cadastre covered by Decree No. 639024, Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296 in
the name of Serapio Lubis; and a certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Region IV, that per its records, Lot No. 8500 located in
Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, is not covered by any kind of public land
application or patent; and a certified true copy of page 88, Cadastral Decree Book,
Cadastral Decree Section, LRC, showing that Decree No. 639024 covering Lot No. 8500
based on the decision, Cadastral Case No. 79-1 was issued on June 21, 1937.

The trial court rendered a Decision granting the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred in granting the
petition for the issuance of a new decree, since the petitioners failed to adduce in evidence
a copy of the decree purportedly issued in the name of Serapio Lubis, or at least a certified
copy of the decision of the court granting the decree. It further alleged that there was no
showing in the RTC that the owners of the adjoining lots, were served with copies of the
petition, the order of the court setting the case for hearing and the notice of hearing issued
by the court.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC and dismissing the appeal of
the OSG.

ISSUE:

Is the presentation of the copy of the cadastral decree indispensable in the petition for
declaration of nullity of said decree?

91
RULING:

Yes.

The respondents, as the petitioners in the RTC, were burdened to prove the following: that
the court had rendered the decision in LRC Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296
covering Lot 8500 in favor of Serapio Lubis, and that as such, Decree No. 639024 was
issued on June 21, 1937 in favor of Serapio Lubis. The respondents were burdened to
adduce in evidence the original, or even a certified copy directing the issuance of a decree
to prove its contents. As provided for in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
secondary evidence may be adduced in such a case, viz.:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents

which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
recorded in a public office.

Furthermore, Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that:

Section 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on

92
 his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

The respondents failed to adduce evidence that the decision of the court and the decree
were in favor of Serapio Lubis, and failed to present a certified copy of the LRA decision
in LRC Case No. 24. The respondents even failed to adduce in evidence the original or
certified true copy of the courts decision in favor of Serapio Lubis. They could have
secured a copy of the decision from the court or from the LRA, but failed to do so. There is
even no showing that the court records in LRC Case No. 24 and the copy of the decision
transmitted to the Land Registration Commission (now the LRA) were missing, lost or
destroyed.

The Court also notes that the respondents failed to adduce proof that from 1937 until 1968,
Serapio Lubis, or after his death, his heirs, ever declared the property for taxation purposes
under his/their names and paid the realty taxes therefor. There is even no evidence that
Serapio, or his heirs after his death, ever took possession of the property from 1937.
Inexplicably, it was only in 1968, long after Serapio's death, that the property was declared
for taxation purposes under his name. Moreover, Jose Masongsong took possession and
cultivated the property only in 1970.

Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has no application in this case, as such
provision applies only when the owners duplicate certificate of title is lost or stolen:

SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or
theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent
by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province
or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the
entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or
other person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall

93
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate,
but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

Petition granted.

94
 Sps. Dioso vs. Sps. Cardeño
G.R. No. 150155, September 1, 2004
Second Division

Callejo, Sr., J.:

DOCTRINE: The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or unavailability of

the original document is thus warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: (1)
execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.

FACTS:

Lot 248-A, the property subject of the complaint for specific performance and/or easement
of right of way, is one of three sublots of Lot 248 located along F. Gomez St., Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Lot 248-A has a total area of 222 square meters and was originally owned by
Magno Eraña, the father of petitioner Felicisima Eraña Dioso, respondent Leonora Eraña
Cardeño and their other sisters, namely, Natividad, Julieta and Encarnacion. Upon Magno
Eraña’s death, Lot 248-A was adjudicated in favor of respondent Leonora Eraña Cardeño,
et al.

Lot 248-A was later on partitioned into two, whereby the outer portion along F. Gomez St.
became the property of the respondents, Spouses Tomas and Leonora Eraña Cardeño. The
respondents built a house thereon sometime in 1972. The interior portion of Lot 248-A
became the property of Encarnacion Eraña Javel (now deceased), one of the sisters of
respondent Leonora Cardeño and petitioner Felicisima Dioso. Subsequently, Encarnacion
sold her portion to Felicidad Legaspi who, in turn, sold the same to the petitioners, Spouses
Ramon and Felicisima Dioso.

The petitioners had also built a house of light materials on the adjacent land, Lot 248-B,
then owned by Frisco Eraña. There is an existing pathway or alley on this lot which the
petitioners use as their outlet to F. Gomez St. After they bought Encarnacion’s property,

95
the petitioners wanted to construct a new house at the interior portion of Lot 248-A. They
then demanded that they be given a right of way or an outlet to F. Gomez St., claiming that
they were entitled thereto under the Pinanumpaang Salaysay executed between respondent
Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, on May
29, 1977.

When the respondents refused to give them the right of way, the petitioners filed with the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 a complaint for specific performance and/or
easement of right of way with damages. In their answer to the complaint, the respondents
specifically denied the genuineness and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay,
alleging that it was falsified.

After due proceedings, the trial court held that the petitioners’ evidence did not support
their claim that respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel executed the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay or entered into an agreement granting the latter, the petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, a right of way. The trial court noted that the petitioners presented
only a photocopy or machine copy of the purported document, and, during the trial, failed
to lay the foundation or prepare the basis for the admission of secondary evidence to prove
the contents thereof.

Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). After evaluation
of the respective pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, the CA rendered
the Decision dated May 9, 2001 substantially affirming that of the trial court’s. Citing
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the CA opined that the best evidence of the
contents of a document is the original document itself.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed with the appellate court a motion for reconsideration/new
trial, alleging that it erred in adopting the factual findings of the court a quo. According to
the petitioners, the CA should have made its own findings of facts. The petitioners,
likewise, submitted to the appellate court Tax Declaration No. 51637 for the year 1992
covering Lot 248-A in the name of respondent Leonora Cardeño where, at the dorsal
portion thereof, the following annotation was written: Revision of T.D. No. 15976 based in
PINANUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGHAHATI – pagbabahaging labas sa hukuman

96
na may pagtalikod sa kabahagi. The petitioners alleged that this document was newly
discovered evidence, the consideration of which could alter the outcome of the case. They
also averred that the document proved the existence of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay. In
their supplement to the motion for new trial, the petitioners additionally submitted a
photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, this time certified by the Municipal Assessor of
Sta. Rosa, Laguna as having been verified with the original document kept by Encarnacion
Javel. The Municipal Assessor, likewise, certified that the Pinanumpaang Salaysay had
been presented to the Office of the Municipal Assessor in connection with the issuance of
respondent Leonora Cardeño’s Tax Declaration Nos. 51637 and 51638 covering Lot 248-
A. Also submitted by the petitioners was the affidavit of Magtanggol Yldeso, one of the
witnesses to the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, attesting to the circumstances surrounding its
execution and identifying the signatures appearing thereon.

ISSUE:

Were the petitioners able to establish the due execution of the sinumpaang salaysay?

RULING:

Yes. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof
further states that "[W]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated."

The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or unavailability of the original
document is thus warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or
existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in
court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.

97
Admittedly, in this case, the original document of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was not
presented during trial. However, the petitioners presented a photocopy thereof, as well as
testimonial evidence to prove its due execution and the loss or unavailability of the original
document. Specifically, the existence and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay
was established by Yldeso, one of the petitioners’ witnesses, who testified that he was one
of the witnesses to the execution thereof and that his signature appears thereon. Further,
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 13, 1984, executed between Encarnacion Eraña
Javel and Felicidad Eraña Legaspi, covering the former’s portion of Lot 248-A, Annex "B"
for the petitioners and admitted in evidence by the trial court, expressly mentioned the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay.

Clearly then, since there was proof of the due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay,
and that, despite earnest efforts on their part, the petitioners could not produce the original
thereof, the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said document
was justified. Furthermore, contrary to the trial court’s findings, the petitioners had
sufficiently laid down the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.

The rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the contents of the original
document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document; or (3) by the recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated. The trial court
and the CA, therefore, erred in denying the admission of a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang
Salaysay, when the same may be properly considered as secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof.

Having established the existence and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, the
respondents are obliged to grant the petitioners, as successors-in-interest of Encarnacion
Eraña Javel, a right of way in accordance with the terms thereof.

98
 De Vera vs. Sps. Aguilar
G.R. No. 83377, February 9, 1993
Second Division

Campos, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were

actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof
is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court.

FACTS:

Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and
respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the
late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned
the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of
4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4,
Meycauayan Cadastre.

The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain
Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the
property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to
them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.

On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa
Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the
present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.

On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the
basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.

99
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of
Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on
threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe
on April 28, 1959.

On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the
sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa
Bernabe.

True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However,
on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan
recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the
respondents for lack of a prima facie case.

On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M).

In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the
respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a Xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale
executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto
Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.

Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that they never sold back to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore,
respondents contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best evidence of the
alleged sale; hence, it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any
evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the
document of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the
notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present
during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by the
testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial
Assessor of Bulacan.

100
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial
court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not
been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the
Xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioners satisfactorily prove the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow
the presentation of the Xeroxed copy of the same?

RULING:

Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary
Evidence states:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original
writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of
an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case.

A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and
due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the
alleged deed of sale.

101
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the
presentation of a Xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. In establishing the
execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who
executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person
who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
the execution thereof.

Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared
Exhibit A. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein
to be those of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as
Notary Public who ratified the document. After the due execution of the document has
been established, it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may
be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document
or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a
purported Xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B,
has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce
it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the
Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or
destruction of the original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established.
Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.

Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have a
copy of the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at
Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10,
1981, Steno, Crisostomo) establish the loss or destruction of the original document in

102
question. What was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the
duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo,
representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he failed to see the
deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn.,
Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to
the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because the notary public
might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the
transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites (pp. 8-12,
tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno, Tecson), prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the
duplicate original copies of the document in question.

103
 Santos vs. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 135481, October 23, 2001
Second Division

Quisumbing, J.:

DOCTRINE: Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary

evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence
of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Proof of
the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation
for the introduction of secondary evidence.

FACTS:

In 1969, private respondent PGFI occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on
Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the invitation of the
president of the Philippine Federation of Medical Practitioners. In 1971, PGFI built a
gymnasium adjacent to said building. This was later on converted into a canteen and leased
to one Victor Jimenez. Jimenez later on vacated the space after he failed to pay rentals
therefor.

In 1989, petitioner occupied the canteen by virtue of a letter-contract executed between her
and Vicente Pulido, president of PGFI.

Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its office at the Geriatrics
Center. It agreed and planned to transfer to the canteen beside the Geriatrics Center. On
December 27, 1993, PGFI asked petitioner to vacate said space in a letter advising the
latter of the termination of the lease contract. However, petitioner refused to vacate. In the
meantime, the City Government of Manila forcibly ejected PGFI from the Geriatrics
Center on January 7, 1995. On October 11, 1995, PGFI through counsel, sent another
demand letter to petitioner asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen
space within ten days of receipt of the letter. Still, petitioner refused.

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Thereafter, PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with a prayer for the payment of
rentals in arrears for the period September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 totaling
P36,750.00. The parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether or not
petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the ground of non-payment of rentals.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on the ground that PGFI
failed to establish the existence of a lease contract between the parties. PGFI claimed that
the contract had been lost when it was forcibly ejected from the Geriatrics Center. The
contract was a letter-offer signed by petitioner and addressed to PGFI, stating petitioner's
intention to lease PGFIs canteen under certain terms and conditions. It was later on signed
by Pulido as PGFI president, indicating its conformity with the terms thereof.

To prove the existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits of its trustees and officers
and presented to the trial court an unsigned photocopy of the same. However, the trial
court refused to admit the photocopy as secondary evidence. Consequently, in a decision
dated February 26, 1997, the MeTC ruled that there is no evidence that would warrant
ejectment of petitioner from the subject premises.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MeTC. PGFI filed
a motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997 and a motion to treat said motion as a
motion for new trial on October 27, 1997, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. A
few days earlier, on October 11, 1997, PGFI found its copy of the lease contract signed by
petitioner and Pulido, as well as by its other trustees. PGFI presented said contract to the
RTC, which rejected it as forgotten evidence.

PGFI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the
RTC. According to the CA, the unsigned copy of the lease contract that was presented
before the trial court qualified as secondary evidence under Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The CA noted that PGFI was able to prove the existence and due execution of the
lease contract through the affidavits of its witnesses. Finally, the contents of the contract
itself were proven through the unsigned copy held by PGFI. There is, thus, a valid lease
contract executed between the parties, contrary to the ruling of the trial court.

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The CA ruled that petitioner's failure to abide by the terms stated in the contract,
particularly the payment of rentals, warranted her eviction from the premises.

ISSUE:

Did the respondent establish the fact of the execution of the letter-contract of lease?

RULING:

The Rules of Court provides, in case the original of the document is lost:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. -- When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (Rule 130,
Rules of Court).

Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence, there
must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original;
(2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability
of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Proof of the due execution
of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence.

In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been
established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto. The loss of
said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who attested to
the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy of the contract at the PGFI office at
the Geriatrics Center. These copies were lost in the chaos that ensued when PGFI was
forcibly evicted from its office. Without a place to immediately move to, its files and
records were left for sometime on the street where they were susceptible to theft.
Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract.

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The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of witnesses in the order
stated.

There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease contract. The
affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the
subject premises for a specified amount payable every month, and the conformity to these
terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed thereon. Thus, even dispensing with the
unsigned copy that was presented at the trial of this case, there is still evidence of the
contents of the contract in the form of testimonial evidence.

Petitioner's emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy of the contract is

misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof
but also by the testimony of witnesses. At best, the original copy of the contract that was
later found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence.

Petitioner's obligation to pay rentals did not cease with the termination of the original
agreement. When she failed to remit the required amounts after December 1993, the time
when she stopped paying, PGFI was justified in instituting ejectment proceedings against
her. Petitioner clearly violated the provisions of the lease when she stopped making
payments to PGFI. Hence, we find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
respondent appellate court.

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 People vs. Goce, et al.
G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995
Second Division

Regalado, J.:

DOCTRINE: When the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.

FACTS:

In January 1988, spouses Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin were charged with illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale. The information alleged that the
three recruited eight applicants to work abroad without having secured the required license
or authority from the Department of Labor.

A warrant of arrest was issued but not one of them was arrested. Hence, the RTC ordered
the case archived but issued a standing warrant of arrest. Eventually, in Feb. 1993, Agustin
was apprehended. The RTC reinstated the case. Agustin pleaded not guilty.

Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. They declared that Agustin
represented herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency and Sps. Goce as
owners. The complainants were promised jobs in Oman. They paid various amounts as
placement fee for which receipts were issued to them. Later, a higher sum was asked of
them, which they again paid and were issued receipts.

Several months passed but the applicants failed to leave for the promised overseas
employment. When they went to the POEA, they discovered that the agency was not duly
licensed to recruit job applicants. The applicants demanded the return of the money they
paid, but the accused gave them only partial amounts.

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Only Agustin testified for the defense. She denied any participation in the illegal
recruitment and maintained that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Sps. Goce.
She denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution.

The RTC found Agustin guilty and sentenced her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE:

Was there evidence of receipts of collections/payments from complainants to Agustin?

RULING:

Yes.

Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were lost. Hence, only Xerox
copies thereof were presented, which, under the circumstances, were admissible in
evidence.

Even assuming arguendo that the Xerox copies presented by the prosecution as secondary
evidence are not allowable in court, still, the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal
of Agustin.

The RTC was justified and correct in accepting the version of the prosecution witnesses,
their statements being positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than
the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of Agustin.

The RTC judgment was affirmed in toto.

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 DECS vs. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005
First Division

Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE: The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic

copy of the deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil
Code. The duty to produce the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are
the contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the
writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents
of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.

FACTS:

Respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the Heirs of
Santos Del Rosario filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of Possession
against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Respondents
alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters situated in
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name of
respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register of
Deeds. Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under
DECS was occupying a portion of the Property through respondents' tolerance and that of
their predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused to vacate the
premises despite their valid demands to do so.

In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPSs occupation of a portion of the Property was
with the express consent and approval of respondents father, the late Isaias Del Rosario.
DECS claimed that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion of the Property to the
Municipality of Sta. Mariafor school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional
trial court judge, prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS started
occupying the Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary educational
needs of approximately 60 children between the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the donation,

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DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter Donated Site. In fact, DECS
renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

During the pre-trial conference, DECS admitted the existence and execution of TCT No.
T-222432 (Exhibit A), Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit B), and the tax receipts in
respondents names for the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). On the other hand,
respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad's affidavit that he prepared the deed
of donation (Exhibit 1) and the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality’s name
(Exhibit 2). Since there was no dispute that the Property was registered in respondents
names, the parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting its evidence first to prove
that there was a valid donation to the Municipality.

DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Natividad, all
residents of Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The deed of donation was not presented
because of its alleged loss.DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in
the DECS Division Office in Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these
offices were purportedly lost when these offices transferred to new locations. DECS did
not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There
is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside
from the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias lifetime without
objection on his part.

Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria Del Rosario-Esteban,
daughters of the late Isaias.

The trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents' complaint for recovery of
possession.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC decision.

The appellate court denied DECS motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated 29
December 2000. Hence, this petition.

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ISSUE:

Was DECS able to satisfactorily prove by secondary evidence the fact of donation, the
existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the municipal council
Resolution accepting the donation?

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the
deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The
duty to produce the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the
contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the
writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents
of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the
exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) xxx;

(c) xxx;

(d) xxx.

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

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 SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the
original document itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot
be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a
party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can
resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion
may change this order if necessary.

Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and
due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and due execution
of the document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed. The destruction
of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown
by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, on the judgment
of the court, a sufficient examination in the place [or] places where the document or papers
of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division
Office in Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were
purportedly lost when these offices transferred to new locations. However, Judge
Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other
copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other
designated government offices.

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The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary
information regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also
mandates the notary public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him
when it is a contract. The notarial register is a record of the notary public's official acts.
Acknowledged instruments recorded in the notarial register are public documents.If the
instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the notarial
records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public
document.

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the
notary public should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have
explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also
explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the
Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for
a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these
circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to
obtain a copy of the deed of donation.

CA decision affirmed.

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 Lee vs. People
G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004
Second Division

Callejo, Sr.,J.

DOCTRINE: The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document

must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person
whose name is subscribed thereto. The admission of that party against whom the document
is offered, of the authenticity and due execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove
the existence, authenticity and due execution of such document.

FACTS:

Nuegene Marketing, Inc. (NMI) made three deliveries of empty white bags in favour of
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMCI). The purchase made by VMCI was made in three
different occasions where NMI issued charge invoices. In payment of said purchases from
NMI, VMCI issued two BPI checks in the total amount of ₱934,400.00.

NMI conducted a stockholders’ meeting and one of the items in the agenda was the
dissolution of the corporation. Thereafter, the dissolution of the corporation was approved
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, Lee, Moreno, Tan and Martin filed
a petition with the SCID praying for the annulment or nullification of the Certification of
Filing of Resolution of Voluntary Dissolution of NMI for being contrary to law.

In the meantime, the trustee wrote the petitioner, Johnson Lee, requesting him to turn over
to it the ₱1,500,150.00 he received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI.
However, he failed to do so. This prompted the complainant to file a verified complaint for
three (3) counts of estafa filed against the petitioner and Sonny Moreno with the City
Prosecutor’s Office. Appended to the complaint were photocopies of Charge Invoice Nos.
0809, 0810, and 0811, issued by NMI to VMCI.

During the trial, the original copies of Charge Invoice Nos. 0809, 0810 and 0811, and of
BPI Check Nos. 068766 and 068993 were not in the custody of the prosecution. To prove
the loss, destruction or non-availability of the original copies of the charge invoices and

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checks, as well as the authenticity and due execution thereof, the prosecution presented
Ban Hua Flores, who testified that she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner
and the clerk thereat informed her that it would be difficult to locate the checks as they
were stored in the bodega, where many other checks were kept. Flores also testified that
the signatures at the dorsal portion of the checks were those of the petitioner, the President
of NMI. According to Flores, she was able to secure microfilm copies of the checks from
Solidbank, and was sure that the copies of the checks and invoices were faithful
reproductions of the original copies thereof.

Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, declared that the records
section of VMCI, which had custody of all checks and other corporate records, was near
her office. She testified that the checks, including their other records, were lost during the
flood in 1985. She also testified on the Certification issued by Carolina Diaz, the
Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two checks. She, however, admitted that
she did not see the original copies of the checks and that she was not a signatory thereto.

On the other hand, accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the checks and
charge invoices on the ground that the best evidence were the original copies thereof. The
accused claims that the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity and due execution of
the offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission thereof as secondary evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the authenticity and due execution of the
offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission thereof as secondary evidence.

RULING:

The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss
or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which
can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a
diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the

116
proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation
of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.

The proponent is also burdened to prove the due execution or existence of the original as
provided in Rule 130, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court:

When the original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure on how the
authenticity and due execution of a private document which is offered as authentic may be
proved:

Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is

received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the

maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be.

The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document must be positive.

He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is
subscribed thereto. The admission of that party against whom the document is offered, of
the authenticity and due execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove the existence,
authenticity and due execution of such document.

In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the checks were returned to
VMCI after the same were negotiated and honored by the drawee bank. The originals of

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the charge invoices were kept by VMCI. There is also no dispute that the prosecution
offered the photocopies of the invoices in evidence to prove the contents thereof, namely
that: (a) VMCI purchased 203,500 empty bags from NMI for the total price of
₱1,500,150.00; (b) VMCI received the said goods in good order and condition; and (c)
NMI charged VMCI for the purchase price of said goods. The prosecution offered the
checks to prove the contents thereof as well as the following: (a) VMCI drew and delivered
the checks to the NMI; (b) the said checks were endorsed by the petitioner; and (c) the said
checks were deposited by the petitioner with the Solidbank which was not the official
depository of NMI. Thus, the prosecution was burdened to prove the loss, destruction or its
inability to produce in court without bad faith on its part of the original copies of the said
invoices and checks without bad faith on its part.

Moreover, it bears stressing that the counter-affidavit of the petitioner was adduced in
evidence by the prosecution precisely to prove the existence, authenticity and due
execution of the original of the said charge invoices and checks and the trial court admitted
the same for the said purpose. By his counter-affidavit, the petitioner, in effect, admitted
the allegations of the affidavit-complaint of the trustee of NMI. With the admissions of the
petitioner in his counter-affidavit, the prosecution even no longer needed to adduce
evidence aliunde to prove the existence, due execution and the authenticity of the charge
invoices and the checks. All told then, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the predicates to the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices
and checks.

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 Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Mateo
G.R. No. 148025, August 13, 2004
Third Division

Carpio Morales, J.:

DOCTRINE: The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution,

loss, contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court.

FACTS:

In April 1997, Sps. Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed before the RTC a petition for
reconstitution of the original copy, as well as the owner’s duplicate copy, of TCT No. T-
38769 issued in the name of Jose Tan.

According to Sps. Mateo, TCT No. T-38769 covers two parcels of land they acquired from
Tan by purchase in Sept. 1978. The original copy on file at the Registry of Deeds is
missing and could not be located, hence, deemed lost. Lorenzo was in possession of the
owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Due to his frequent reassignment as a former military
officer to different places, he misplaced the said title although he has a Xerox copy thereof.
Efforts to locate the owner’s duplicate copy proved futile; hence, it is now deemed lost.

Lorenzo presented documentary evidence consisting of, among others, carbon copy of the
deed of absolute sale executed by Tan in their in favor, photocopy of TCT No. T-38769
issued to Tan, and photocopy of a receipt purporting to show that NBI agent Ramon
Befetel received in March 1973 from the Register of Deeds the therein listed 93 documents
including TCT No. T-386769.

The RTC denied the petition because none of the sources enumerated under Sec. 3 of RA
26 from which TCTs shall be reconstituted has been presented by Sps. Mateo and also
because the OCT is still missing and has to be reconstituted on the basis of the sources
enumerated in Sec. 2 of RA 26.

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The CA ruled that the RTC erred in not giving weight to the photocopy of the owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. T-38769 as a secondary evidence. Hence, it declared the lost original
copy of TCT No. T-38769, as well as the lost owner’s duplicate copy thereof, as null and
void and ordered the Land Registration Authority and/or the Register of Deeds to
reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Tan.

ISSUE:

Should the alleged photocopy of the title be given evidentiary weight for the reconstitution
of the original and owner’s copy of the title?

RULING:

No.

The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost
document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of
the particular case.

By Lorenzo's own information, a year before he testified, he talked to NBI agent Ramon
Befetel, who received documents including TCT No. T-386769. Why said agent, who
admittedly was still in the NBI main office, was not presented to shed light on the
whereabouts of the TCT, no reason has been proffered.

In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost
or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos’ petition for reconstitution fails.

In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available,
the photocopy of the alleged owner’s duplicate copy thereof is partly illegible. When,
where, and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to
spare it from being also "lost" were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by
the DOJ and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and
lead the SC to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos’ evidence and propriety of a grant
of their petition for reconstitution.

The CA decision was reversed.

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