Public Organiz Rev (2010) 10:71–88

DOI 10.1007/s11115-009-0089-4

Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental

Policy: Changing Trends in Canada
and the United States

Ahmed Shafiqul Huque & Nathan Watton

Published online: 20 August 2009

# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract In a federal system of government, powers are shared by the national and
sub-national units in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. However,
the process of policy implementation may differ on the basis of allocation of power
and the nature of the system. Canada and the United States of America adopted
federal systems of government, and faced similar pressures for implementing
policies on environmental issues. Yet, the degree of success and outcome appear to
be different due to variations in the strength of the respective federalist systems. An
analysis of the various aspects of the federal system in the two countries reveals
noticeable differences in institutional configurations, relationship between national
and sub-national units, and variances in intra-institutional relations. All these have
contributed to a divergence in the past, but there is an emerging trend of convergence
as both the Canadian and American governments are gradually moving away from
their existing patterns of policy implementation toward a new approach involving
private-sector initiatives and self-enforcement with strong inclinations toward
voluntarization, corporatization and marketization.

Keywords Environmental policy . Federalism . Policy implementation .

Convergence and divergence

Implementing environmental policy

Concern over environmental degradation and associated costs have forced govern-
ments across the globe to search for effective policies to reduce their adverse
impacts. The industrialized nations are often blamed for causing the problem by

A. S. Huque (*)
Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada
e-mail: huqueas@mcmaster.ca

N. Watton
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
72 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

consuming a high percentage of energy, and they are also expected to take the lead
in responding to the challenge. As the world’s largest economy, the United States of
America—and Canada, as its neighbor—are both important stakeholders, and
environmental policy has emerged as a critical issue in Canadian and American
politics in recent years. However, the two countries have had differing degrees of
success in implementing environmental policies, despite experiencing similar
pressures for policy reform. It may be pertinent to explain the divergence in terms
of the notion of federalism. The pattern of distribution of power between levels of
government, nature of relationship between national and sub-national levels of
government as well as between administrative agencies contribute to different
outcomes of environmental policy. This article examines the impact of federalism
upon the methods and mechanisms involved in implementing environmental policy.
The exercise is expected to reveal a number of interesting points of difference
between Canada and the United States in this respect.
Generally, studies on federalism in Canada and the United States focus on specific
aspects such as power sharing and intergovernmental relationships without taking
into account the broader implications and relationships (For example, see Livingston
1956; Smiley 1987; Bakvis and Skogstad 2008; and Greve 1999; Walker 2000;
Nagel 2001). Not much attention has been devoted to the analysis of differences
within federal institutions in Canada and America. Instead, they concentrate on the
differences between institutions, predominately between the national and subnational
levels. However, an analysis of the many aspects of the federal systems in the two
countries is necessary for determining the impacts on environmental policy
implementation. The first section of this article reviews the different federalist
institutional configurations in the two countries to establish a ground for comparison.
The pressures for environmental policy reform are discussed to highlight the
similarities between the two countries. A comparative analysis helps determine the
differences between Canadian and American systems in terms of relationships with
the sub-national units, and their impact on policy implementation. The article also
contrasts differences in agency relations within the federalist governments. Finally,
an overview of recent trends helps to highlight the potential for future convergence.
The key argument is that federalism has had a strong influence on the differences in
environmental policy implementation between Canada and the United States.
The task of comparing countries and drawing lessons is a major challenge, due not
only to the fact that there are glaring as well as subtle differences among them, but also
due to the numerous limitations of research on public policy. With reference to the study
of health policy, Forster et al. (2005) draw attention to the incompleteness of
knowledge and the risks involved in drawing lessons based on such weak foundations.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) found that the success of implementation depends
upon ‘linkages between different organizations and departments at the local level’, and
described its lack as ‘implementation deficit’. On the other hand, Hogwood and Gunn
(1984) compiled a list of ten pre-conditions necessary for ‘perfect implementation’,
and they are unlikely to be achieved in any political system. Finally, implementation
takes on starkly different shades depending on whether it is viewed from the top or
bottom (Hanf 1993, 88–90). The implementation of environmental policies is difficult
for all these reasons, and it becomes even more challenging as the constraints of
federalism are added to the equation.
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 73

Institutional configurations

The federalist institutions in Canada and the United States are different in nature, and
it partially accounts for divergences in environmental policy implementation. In
Canada, the legal foundations for environmental policy are based on the 1867 British
North America (BNA) Act, which serves as a significant portion of the country’s
‘Constitution’. The BNA Act, unlike the American Constitution, outlines specific
authorities for both the federal and provincial governments, primarily in sections 91
and 92. Yet, like its American counterpart, the Canadian document is still relatively
general, leaving jurisdiction over several environmental concerns open to interpre-
tation. As in America, the “environment” is not explicitly stated and addressed, as it
was conceivably not an issue of major importance during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (Hessing et al. 2005, 56). Under the changed circumstances, a
heightened level of uncertainty led to increasing reliance on the courts for
interpretation and the proper allocation of authority.
In Canada, the provinces are given substantial powers, unlike their American
subnational counterparts. The BNA Act grants provinces responsibility for “property
and civil rights”, and the “management and sale of… public lands”. In addition,
Section 109 gives the provinces ownership of all “lands, mines, minerals, and
royalties” (The Constitution Act of 1867). This would clearly give Canadian
provinces significantly more authority than the American states, especially due to the
fact that over fifty percent of Canadian land is owned by the Crown (and therefore,
the provinces), while only six percent of American land is owned by state
governments (Lowry 1999, 332). Thus, the provinces have substantial jurisdictions,
which allow them to regulate environmental issues concerning important areas like
public lands and resources, forestry, and hydroelectricity (Valiante 2002, 7). This is a
distinct obstacle to the implementation of a comprehensive national Canadian
environmental policy.
The powers of the American federal government were outlined in the 1789
Constitution, and it gave the national government broad and unclear authority over
domestic policy, notably through Section 8. For example, the Interstate Commerce
Clause, “with its accompanying effects on state power, has been used both to expand
and to contract national power” (Miller 1986, p. 36) and thus regulate trade and
commerce among the states. Over time, this has helped justify federal regulation of
navigable waterways, products and resources involved in trade and commerce as
well as activities that have an impact on interstate commerce. The rules are evidently
quite nebulous, and can allow for significant federal involvement in environmental
matters, like waterways and interstate pollution or crossing of state boundaries by
hazardous materials. This has also justified federal regulation of industrial mining,
and the imposition of federal environmental regulations on mining activities, because
it is considered a significant interstate commercial activity (Adler 2001, 211).
Clearly, the American federal government can wield rather broad and sweeping
powers, due to a lack of clarity in the Constitution and the ambiguous nature of
‘interstate commerce’, allowing it to become increasingly involved in the imposition
of environmental regulations.
The American states, on the other hand, derive their primary powers from the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which proclaims that “the powers not
74 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively” (Constitution of the United States of America,
Amendment X, Section 1). Therefore, the powers of the subnational governments in
America are residual in nature, and not explicitly listed in the Constitution. This
arrangement creates uncertainty in defining the limits of federal and state authority,
although it clearly gives states reasonable authority over their resources not involved
in interstate commerce, and authority over their internal jurisdictions (Caldwell
1970, 114). Thus, although unclear, the American Constitution does give
considerable interpretive power to the federal government over environmental
concerns, although the states cannot be ignored due to their authority over internal
resources.
Federalism involves numerous acts of bargaining, negotiations, concessions and
compromises, and the incidence of conflict features prominently in many countries.
In the United States, conflicts arose as states claimed sovereignty over federalization
in the early years. By the 1930s, the spirit of co-operative federalism emerged as the
merits of collective efforts by the states in dealing with common problems appeared
to be the preferred approach. Elazar (1993, 51) noted: “Informal relationships
developed, primarily in the field, where officials of the federal government, the
states and the localities exchanged information or co-operated to solve specific
problems”. However, a wide variety of disputes were bound to arise and they pitted
“one level of government against another, one ideology against another, one political
party against another, and one issue network against another” (Gormley 1989, 173).
Within a few years, a number of scholars proposed the term ‘coercive federalism’
that blended elements of cooperation and coercion to result in an interesting
approach (see Kincaid 1990; Elazar 1993).
Since the 1970s, the federal government in the United States has tried to play an
increasingly effective role in addressing environmental issues, and enacted various
laws based on its perceived constitutional power. The new experiment of cooperative
federalism “established a framework in which the federal and state governments
would work together to protect health, the environment, and natural resources, such
as wildlife, from the adverse effects of pollution-generating and developmental
activities by both private and public entities” (Glicksman 2006, 719). Generally, they
involved ‘spillover’ issues such as environmental problems that cross state
jurisdiction lines. Some examples could be air and water pollution, protection of
endangered species, and issues related to disposal of waste, and several studies noted
that conflict did give way to cooperation (see Wright 1988). In a later study, Cho and
Wright noted that cooperation and coercion were converging (2004, 465). However,
it was natural for the states to raise concerns over the extent of authority enjoyed by
the federal government and the potential risk of trespassing on their jurisdictions. A
host of cases have been presented before the Supreme Court which attempted to
clarify selective aspects of the Constitution and their linkages to environmental
policy.
During the Reagan presidency, the arrangements underwent another shift.
Gradually, there was devolution of responsibilities for many policies from the
national to the state level, although the lack of authority made such a transition
difficult. Substantial cuts in funds and personnel adversely impacted the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, and opened up the prospects of privatization and
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 75

corporatization in this policy area. By the 1990s, states started to assume policy
initiatives that were previously a federal prerogative and more signs of “renewed
state governmental strength and creativity” were evident (O’Toole 1993, pp. 24–25).
Adler reported two cases to illustrate the powerful position of the state in this
area. In the 1982 FERC v. Mississippi case, it was ruled that the states, and not the
federal government, had the authority to regulate their internal land uses. While the
federal government had contended that those land uses may have impacted interstate
environmental conditions, the Court ruled that that interpretation was too significant
a stretch, and could justify unrestrained federal intrusion into notable state affairs.
Moreover, in the 1991 Gregory v. Ashcroft case, it was ruled that a “healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government” was necessary when
dealing with environmental concerns, and that a more decentralized system would
provide solutions which were “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society” (Adler 2001, 212–13). Evidently, the expansion of federal
roles to deal with environmental concerns has been met with some resistance from
states, which fear undue intrusion on their authorities. This is an important point in
analyzing the relations between the American federal and state governments in terms
of the implementation of environmental policy.
Therefore, the federalist institutional foundations of Canada and the United States
are different by nature, and accounts for divergences in environmental policy
implementation. The constitutions of the two countries have defined specific and
primary actors concerned with environmental policy implementation, and broadly
define the terms of interaction between national and subnational institutions.
Although considerable uncertainty exists in the interpretation of these aged
documents that were not designed to address problems related to the environment,
both establish different systems of interactions, which can clearly lead to differences
in environmental policy implementation.

Policy pressures and responses

Both Canada and the United States have faced strong pressures for environmental
policy reform and implementation. This has led to a rise in government
environmental initiatives in both countries, and citizen concern for the environment
has been inconsistent. Over the past century, recession and other economic
uncertainties often led to the relegation of environmental concerns to the back
burner, while fiscal recovery received top priority from governments. Interestingly,
citizen concern peaked when ecological crises emerged, even during periods when
the economy was relatively strong. Throughout North America, high levels of public
concern and media attention for environmental issues peaked during two key
periods: 1968–1976, and 1986–1992 (Paehlke 2000, 170). Public concern during the
second wave, for instance, was facilitated by a relatively strong economy, combined
with the occurrence of ecological disasters like Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez spill,
reports of holes in the ozone, and the gas leakage in Bhopal (Brooks and Miljan
2003, 245). There are reasons to believe that political leaders in Canada and the
United States—at both national and subnational levels—responded to satisfy the
electorate.
76 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

The Canadian federal government holds broader conceptual powers. An example of

this is its requirement to uphold “Peace, Order and Good Government” (POGG), which
has been very broadly interpreted to enable some encroachment on provincial powers. In
the Regina.v. Crown Zellerbach case, the Supreme Court ruled that under POGG, the
federal government had the responsibility to act indirectly and address environmental
concerns where the provinces were unable to do so, to ensure that those concerns did not
spread to neighboring provincial jurisdictions (Cairns 1992, 69). The Crown Zellerbach
trial specifically dealt with marine pollution, and it was ruled that provincial inability
to control such pollution required the federal branch to implement indirect measures
(standards and permits) to prevent spillover into another province’s waters (Valiante
2002, 5). Although this may appear to be somewhat similar to the Interstate
Commerce Clause in America, its application has been considerably restrained, with
action occurring on a case-by-case basis and only following judicial approval.
Consequently, federal powers have been rather limited in the area of environmental
policy, and deal primarily with surveying and information-collection and environ-
mental concerns on federal lands, which include national parks, Indian lands, and the
northern territories (Gibson 1973, 61). Harrison pointed out that intergovernmental
relations in Canada have undergone periods of both conflict and cooperation, with
clear signs of commitment emerging with the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental
Harmonization that was ratified by the federal government in 1998 (2000a, 3).
With the emergence of the doctrine of ‘new federalism’ in the 1980s, the
relationship between the states and federal government in the United States began to
change. Schoenbrod (1997) argued forcefully in favour of a stronger role of the
states in setting pollutions standards. There were substantial variations across states
in terms of the ability to maintain the commitment to environmental protection, and
placed them in four categories—progressives, strugglers, delayers and regressives.
(Lester 1986). Subsequently, some of the progressive states have taken the lead in
formulating and implementing environmental protection, often disregarding objec-
tions from the federal government.
Pressures from the first wave led to the establishment of the Department of the
Environment in Canada in 1970, along with the creation of similar provincial-level
departments, such as the Ministry of Environment in Ontario in 1971. It was long
overdue, but it also led to the injection of further complexities in intergovernmental
relationships. Along with the formal departments for managing environmental matters,
the governments also passed several pieces of environmental legislation to indicate their
willingness to act and meet the demands of voters. In the early 1970s, the Ontario
government passed bills such as the Water Resources Act, the Environmental Protection
Act, and the Environmental Assessment Act. During the second wave, more legislation
was passed, including the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights in the early 1990s, and
the federal Green Plan in 1990 (Krajnc 2000, 116–17).
These pressures had similar impacts on governments in the United States. For
example, in response to the first wave of concern, the American federal government
passed the National Environmental Policy in 1969 to outline a concrete federal
policy towards the environment, and stipulated procedures to guide federal action in
alleviating environmental concerns (Caldwell 1970, 113). In addition, in response to
public demands that the government does more to protect the environment, the
federal branch created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 to lay
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 77

down the regulations to achieve the mandated goals and monitor them (Welch et al.
2004, 368, 586).
A common result from these similar pressures was a shift from a reliance on the
courts for environmental enforcement, to a focus on ‘command-and-control’
measures. Prior to the first wave, environmental protection was primarily exerted
in both countries through legal actions by private individuals against polluters.
However, this pattern of response failed to remedy various environmental concerns
in both countries. In America, the courts recognized the individual’s right to
represent the public, which made legal action easier because individuals did not have
to prove direct harm against their person by the polluter, and could instead focus on
general harm. Yet, legal remedies were limited, due to pro-development precedents
from past decisions. In Canada, however, the courts did not recognize the
individual’s right to represent the public, and this limited legal action despite the
fact that the Canadian system offered broad legal remedies (Howlett 2000, 310).
This system was obviously incapable of dealing with growing environmental
concerns, and was hence largely discarded during the first wave. Through the first
and second waves, governments at all levels adopted command-and-control
measures, by setting standards, and imposing sanctions for breaking them (Dietz et
al. 2003: 1909).
Therefore, governments in both Canada and the United States experienced similar
pressures and had to become more involved in environmental matters. However,
increased government involvement led to actions and outcomes that precipitated
conflicts between national and subnational governments, as both attempted to
expand their respective authority over environmental policies. Such conflicts
underline the critical role of federalism and the complexity of national-subnational
relations in the implementation of environmental policy.

National-subnational relations

The nature of relationship between national and sub-national governments varies

between the two federalist countries, and this may have been a major contributing
factor to the divergence in environmental policy implementation. The legal
foundations and institutions discussed earlier have not changed along with increased
governmental attention to environmental problems and have, in fact, exacerbated the
existing chasms.
In the Canadian context, environmental governance is perceived as a “labyrinth of
complexities”, due to the crisscrossing of jurisdictional responsibilities regarding
environmental issues (Gibson 1973, 85). The unique federalist structure has given
Canada one of the most decentralized frameworks for environmental policy
implementation in the world. The constitutional stipulations have given the
provinces an edge over the centre in administering environmental policies. Hoberg
and Harrison (1994, 124) found that the federal government has adopted more of a
supportive role in addressing environmental policy, conducting scientific research,
regulating mobile emissions, encouraging a coordination of standards, and establish-
ing broad guidelines. Due to provincial supremacy over most resource matters, as
outlined earlier, the provinces are relatively free to set their own standards, provide
78 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

their own enforcement and monitoring, and adopt innovative approaches which suit
their own interests (Rabe 1999, 290). The relatively weak role of the federal
government often has it struggling over the implementation of nation-wide
environmental initiatives, thus constraining the scope of environmental reform that
can be enacted in Canada. This was evident in the development and implementation
of the Green Plan by Brian Mulroney’s government in 1990. To avoid a
jurisdictional battle with the provinces, the government’s sweeping environmental
plan was limited to indirect initiatives, like information-sharing and the funding of
scientific research, instead of tackling the real environmental concerns with
improved regulation and tougher enforcement of standards (Hoberg and Harrison
1994, 135). Therefore, the low level of federal authority over environmental issues
has stunted the development of comprehensive initiatives, and has limited federal
initiatives to the implementation of indirect, non-confrontational mechanisms.
Instead of engaging in meaningful and action-oriented attempts that could effectively
address environmental concerns, the federal government in Canada is notably
constrained, and this limits the impact of nation-wide environmental policy
implementation.
When the federal government does attempt to implement any significant
environmental policy, the strength of the provinces requires that the former engage
in collaborative negotiations. The process entails overcoming numerous obstacles.
For example, when the issue concerned is one like pollution, where there is one
jurisdiction that pollutes and another which is negatively impacted, remedy through
negotiation is exceedingly difficult. Naturally, the polluting jurisdiction will
consistently oppose encroachment on its provincial resource rights, stalling remedial
action, because the end result is usually the economic damage of one jurisdiction for
the perceived environmental benefit of another (Brooks and Miljan 2003). This
conflict between unequal benefits and burdens fuels tensions between jurisdictions,
thus limiting action on the implementation of policies.
Secondly, the negotiations can be time-consuming, and result in further
environmental degradation while agreements are being reached. A good example
of this is the federal-provincial negotiations which took place to address habitat
degradation at Prince Albert National Park in Saskatchewan. The park, which was
owned by the federal government, was surrounded by lucrative provincial timber
lands which were heavily utilized by forestry companies. The destruction of the
surrounding ecosystems had negative impacts on the park’s wildlife, which often
crossed the park’s boundaries into those areas. To address this concern, the federal
government engaged in negotiations with the province of Saskatchewan and the
forestry companies for mitigating the ecological impacts. However, these negotia-
tions, which started in 1991, spanned the entire decade. By the time the federal
government had reached an agreement, significant damage had been done to the
already compromised ecosystem (Lowry 1994, 53). Next, these negotiations often
end in compromise between the jurisdictions, often resulting in patchwork responses
which fail to address long-term concerns, and may not address the initial objectives
of the negotiations (Hessing et al. 2005, 98). For example, the federal government
negotiated with the Saskatchewan provincial government in the late 1980s for the
transfer of land to create the Grasslands National Park. While Ottawa sought to
preserve 900 square kilometers for adequately protecting the unique ecosystem, the
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 79

eventual deal was a transfer in 1992 of only 450 square kilometers, leaving
significant area unprotected and open to development (Lowry 1999, 341). Thus, the
negotiations can be highly detrimental to environmental policy implementation,
stalling necessary remedial action or even transforming proposed action plans into
projects which are insufficient in the long run.
Further, provincial governments are slow to implement environmental policies,
because they do not want to risk alienating their crucial resource extraction industries.
For many of Canada’s provinces, resource extraction industries comprise a substantial
percentage of economic investment. These resource extraction industries also put
significant pressures on the environment and it follows from their exploitive nature.
Consequently, provinces, in the end, often ignore environmental degradation, in the
sense that they do not stringently enforce environmental standards and regulations. To
do so may risk the alienation of industry, which may relocate to another province in
search of lower standards that will sustain profit margins (Parson 2000, 131). Thus,
provincial environmental policies are often soft on industry. When the federal
government attempts to implement environmental policy in the provinces, it frequently
encounters this type of provincial reluctance. For instance, Alberta strongly opposed
the initial Green Plan, which called for a carbon tax which would have affected its
fossil fuel industry (Hoberg and Harrison 1994, 124). The Alberta oil industry, which
contributes $3.7 billion annually to that province through various royalties and leases,
is clearly too lucrative for Alberta and the province is reluctant to impose any
significant sanctions on it (Timoney and Lee 2001, 399). Another example is the
reluctance of provinces to transfer lands to the federal government for the creation of
national parks, unless those lands have been thoroughly studied and determined to be
devoid of exploitable resources (Bella 1986, 199). In this way, provincial economic
interests tend to outweigh environmental interests, which can impede the implemen-
tation of environmental policy. In its attempt to implement a comprehensive policy, the
federal government often has to contend with the unique resource extraction industries
in each of the provinces.
Thus, polarized federalist national-subnational relations in Canada have impeded
the implementation of environmental policy. Weak federal powers, combined with
lengthy negotiations and industry-protecting subnational units have resulted in a
system where implementation is slow, often piecemeal in fashion and, in most cases,
do not produce the desired results.
In the United States, stronger federal powers have facilitated a more effective
system of environmental policy implementation. Indeed, the growing role of the
American federal government in environmental policymaking led the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to proclaim that government involve-
ment has become “bigger, broader, and deeper—bigger within the federal system,
broader in its program and policy concerns, and deeper in its regulatory thrusts and
preemptive proclivities”. Since the 1960s, the federal government has increased its
attention to environmental issues, emerging as the dominant institution in
environmental regulation in America. It became involved in virtually every area of
environmental policy, despite protests from the states that the federal level has
overstepped its authority (Rabe 1999, 291).
Over the 1960s and 1970s, the United States federal government enacted twenty-
five major pieces of legislation concerning a wide variety of environmental
80 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

concerns, eighteen of which trespassed on regulations previously enforced by the

states. For instance, national water pollution policy was legislated in 1961, 1965,
1966, and 1972, and the national air pollution legislation in 1963, 1965, 1967, 1970,
and 1977. Further, the federal government passed legislation on endangered species
in 1973, pesticides in 1972 and 1976, and mining in 1977 (Welborn 1988, 29).
Subsequent legislations in this area include the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (1980), Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act Amendments (1984), Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (1986),
Superfund Reauthorization (1986), Clean Water Act Reauthorization (1987), Oil
Pollution Act (1990), and the Clean Air Act (1990). The North American Free Trade
Agreement (1993) and the Healthy Forests Initiative (2003) also had impacts in the
implementation of environmental policies in the United States. By setting national
standards for the quality of the environment since the 1970s, the American federal
government assumed a dominant role by regulating the activities of the states
through direction and coercion, while the Canadian federal government opted for a
supporting role to the provinces through research and consensus-building (Harrison
2000b, 49–50). It is correct to state that environmental policy making shifted
substantially from the federal to state and local levels during the Reagan Presidency.
In their study on aggregate air quality in the United States, Fomby and Lin attribute
“the beneficial trends in the emission series” to federal legislation and not devolution
in this policy area (2006, 109–120). Unlike Canada, the federal government in
America has been actively involved in environmental policy formulation and
implementation through enhanced contacts across levels of government. Nice
observed: “National-local contacts have been stimulated by many factors, including
greater population mobility and interdependence, the Great Depression, mobilization
of local political influence, greater acceptance of cooperative federalism, and the
national; grant system” 1987, 182–83). Due to the assumption of increasing
responsibilities, the American federal government has been able to move beyond
negotiations and rhetoric, and actually implement comprehensive environmental
policies.
Unlike the system of cooperative federalism which exists in Canada, the
American system has been described as “conjoint federalism”. In this system, the
federal EPA establishes standards and conditions for implementation, and delegates
the implementation and the day-to-day program responsibilities to the states, as long
as they meet the implementation requirements defined by the EPA. In addition, it
distributes federal grants to the states to help them implement policies. If the state
does not meet its requirements, the federal government assumes responsibility for
implementation (Welborn 1988, 31). States are permitted to develop their own
implementation programs, but only as long as they are in conformity with EPA
requirements and are directly approved by the EPA, on a case-by-case basis, and this
has strained relations between the national and subnational levels, with state officials
claiming that the system hinders innovation and produces unwelcome federal
micromanagement (Kraft and Scheberle 1998, 133–34). The EPA has been criticized
on several grounds, such as, adversarial attitude toward states; sluggishness in
developing environmental standards and regulations; the backlog in the system
created by the necessity for approval of every state plan on a case-by-case basis
(Welborn 1988, 38). However, in spite of such strains in the relationship, there has
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 81

been significant progress. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) reported

that EPA efforts to improve both air and water quality nation-wide have been quite
successful. Thus, in spite of polarized national-subnational relations, the United
States has been able to successfully implement a variety of national environmental
policies, thanks to its differing federalist structure.
It is obvious that differing national-subnational orientations in Canada and the
United States have contributed to a divergence in environmental policy implemen-
tation. In the past, the Canadian system remained plagued by inter-jurisdictional
negotiations, restricted federal powers, and effective provincial resistance, while the
American federal branch held the upper hand with a relatively dominant position to
ensure the implementation of national environmental policy. These differing
relations between national and subnational institutions, and the power which they
possess to either help or hinder the policy implementation, were firmly rooted in the
founding constitutions of Canada and the United States, and they continue to
produce dissimilar results.
However, in recent years, the trend is changing in the United States. All four
categories of the sub-national units have been compelled to respond to demands
from the citizens as well the severity of environmental degradation. The states have
become more proactive in spite of resistance from the centre. The Canadian sub-
national units continue to exercise more power compared to their American
counterparts.

Agency dynamics

There are marked differences in the patterns of inter- and intra-agency relations in
Canada and the United States, and this contributes further to the divergence in
environmental policy implementation. As the notion of ‘environment’ was not
explicitly addressed in their respective constitutions, the departments created for
dealing with environmental issues in the 1970s had to be superimposed on to the
existing structure of governmental machinery. However, differing federalist political
structures in the two countries have resulted in different settings in which these new
departments operate. The consequence of adding new agencies and the challenge of
integrating them with the existing structure has an impact on environmental policy
implementation.
In Canada, the Ministry of Environment was created in 1970 as a cabinet
department. The creation of a new department entailed institution-building, in which
funds and resources are squeezed out of established departments to the new
department (Krajnc 2000, 116). In the cabinet, however, funds and resources are
considered to be sources of power, and keys to ministerial prestige within the
cabinet. Ministers use their departmental clout to increase their influence in
government, and strengthen their re-election prospects. Thus, any reshuffling of
resources would necessarily entail resistance. This was epitomized during the
implementation of the Green Plan in 1990. If the Environment Ministry was to
receive billions of dollars in new money, especially during that period of budgetary
restraint, those funds would obviously have to be rerouted from existing depart-
ments. The original plan called for $3 billion to be spent on environment policy, and
82 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

the Green Plan encountered strong resistance from other stakeholders who were
apprehensive of a cut in their funds and resources. Eventually, then Environment
Minister Lucien Bouchard had to reintroduce the plan in August of the same year
with substantial revisions, and this included a redistribution of funds to decrease the
amount which would be procured by his department. As a result, over half of the $3
billion designated in the new plan was assigned to departments other than the
Environment Ministry Hoberg and Harrison 1994, 126–27). Although it seems odd
that half of the Green Plan funds would not be going to the environment department,
it is clear that ministerial resistance was crucial to this reallocation, and obviously
displays the adversarial relations that exist between cabinet departments in Canada.
The allocation to the Ministry of the Environment still comprises only one percent
of the federal budget (Brooks and Miljan 2003). In addition, it lacks the resources
and power necessary to comprehensively deal with Canadian environmental
concerns. Because environmental concerns encompass a broad range of interrelated
issues, the resources required to confront them span several departments. Therefore,
comprehensive environmental policies require interaction and cooperation between a
variety of government departments, and should include Transport, Indian Affairs,
Finance, Industry, Natural Resources, Fisheries, or Defense, to name a few (Toner
and Conway 1996, 138). However, due to ministerial competition, this cooperation
is often hard to achieve, and environmental concerns often end up as second-rate
concerns in those departments, behind their primary missions (Brooks and Miljan
2003). Competition between departments in the Canadian administrative system can
stall environmental initiatives, and relegate environmental concerns to a much lower
level of priority, thus affecting the implementation of environmental policy.
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was constituted
by bringing together units of several federal agencies. The EPA was assigned the
responsibility of preventing degradation of the environment and repair the damage
already done in this area. Various units deal with problems of air and radiation,
enforcement and compliance assurance, environmental information and justice,
pesticides and toxic substances, water, and solid waste and emergency response.
Most of its personnel are located in program offices at the centre and a number of
regional offices and laboratories provide support. Their tasks include research and
education, environmental assessment as well as the setting and enforcement of
environmental standards. Like other attempts at reorganization, the EPA was slow at
the beginning and it took a long time to operate effectively (see Comarow 2006,
157–58). EPA had a difficult time consolidating its position in the network of
agencies in the United States, and a number of controversial issues have affected its
progress.
The EPA has had a history of being under-funded, despite an expansion in its
activities (Welborn 1988, 39). The lack of funds has been, as in the Canadian case,
related to a reluctance to transfer budgetary allocations to the new agency from
existing agencies and departments. However, the EPA is not an American cabinet
department, but rather a cabinet-ranked entity. Due to its continued relative existence
outside the established structure, the EPA has been able to work more closely with
the various interrelated cabinet departments, without threatening to challenge
ministerial power balances (Stewart 1977, 1198). This has allowed the EPA to
generate comprehensive environmental initiatives more easily.
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 83

Furthermore, the EPA was instrumental in assisting the federal government in the
United States to assume a prominent role in implementing environmental policies
and enforcing standards, although the objective did not seem to be undermining the
sub-national units. “A variety of federal environmental statutes provided that after
the delegation of primacy in enforcement to a state, the EPA could take back
responsibility for implementation and enforcement where it found the state was
systematically failing to enforce the statute” (Keleman 2004, 116). Both the Clinton
and Bush administration promised more flexibility to the states in implementing
environmental policies, and it appears that there is a division of authority in which
federal regulators play a major role in policy-making while most responsibilities for
implementation are delegated to state governments.
Thus, differences in horizontal divisions of power within the federalist structures
have contributed to a certain extent to the divergence in environmental policy
implementation. The distinct frameworks of an executive led by the President in the
United States and by the Cabinet in Canada represent centralizing and decentralizing
tendencies. While divisions within the Canadian institution help to stall policy
initiatives and considerably fragment environmental policy responsibilities, the
divisions within the American institution are less intense, facilitating a more eased
development and implementation of environmental policy. The emergence of the
sub-national units in the United States as more energetic and enthusiastic actors is a
clear sign of change in this area.

From divergence to convergence

In spite of the differences discussed above, there is an emerging trend of

convergence in environmental policy implementation styles in Canada and the
United States. The potential change is not moving in one or the other direction
detected in the two cases, but both seem to be moving towards a third system based
on ‘new public management’ ideas (Howlett 2000, 305). In both countries, there has
been a continual shift away from government regulation and monitoring in recent
years and towards a scheme of voluntary private-sector initiatives and self-
enforcement (Valiante 2002, 16). In Canada and America, the recession during the
1990s led to sweeping cuts in environmental quality enforcement and monitoring to
help balance the budgets, making the respective command-and-control systems
unfeasible (Paehlke 2000, 170). An overview of this emerging trend indicates that
both federalist countries are moving towards a system dominated by the principles of
voluntarization, corporatization and marketization. This point is elaborated below.
In the United States, the decline of the command-and-control system began under
President Ronald Reagan, who believed in the neoconservative ideology that
regarded environmental regulation as an “excessive government intervention into
business”, and thus sought to rollback the system (Brooks and Miljan 2003, 253). A
major initiative launched in the Regan era that has continued through successive
presidencies is the reduction of grant aid to American states in order to help curb
increasing budget deficits. These cuts have left the states unable to fund various
environmental initiatives, and they have been forced to drop the programs. During
the early 1990s, nearly two-thirds of the states had to reduce their environmental
84 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

program activities because they were under-funded by the federal government

(Lester 1986, 154). Consequently, American environmental regulation has increas-
ingly shifted towards the private sector. This has resulted in the marketization of
emissions permits and the creation of voluntary standards by American industry
associations, who have filled the void left by downsizing governments, in an attempt
to turn profits from environmental initiatives (Howlett 2000, 318). A good example
is the system of trading in emissions credits, which provides private economic
incentives to cut emissions, hence imposing self-regulation (Dietz et al. 2003: 1909).
In Canada, similarly, there has been a move towards private sector regulation and
the marketization of environmental standards. During the 1990s, massive cuts were
implemented by both the federal and provincial governments to help them cope with
the recession. Yet, as in America, these cuts had severe implications on the
command-and-control systems in place. In Ontario, the operating budget for the
Ministry of Environment was cut by sixty-eight percent between 1991 and 1998,
with total staff being cut by forty percent (Krajnc 2000, 112). This lack of resources
led to deep cuts to many of its programs. For example, it led to the downsizing in the
number of water quality monitoring facilitates from 700 in 1991 to 200 in 1997, with
none to be found north of the city of Barrie in 1997. Krajnc also reported that the
number of air quality monitoring stations was cut from thirty-five to twenty during
the same period, while three regional analytical labs were also closed (Krajnc 2000,
119). The decrease in monitoring and analytical capacity, as a result of
decreased budgetary allocations, led to a decline in enforcement, with the
number of environment-related fines dropping sixty-seven percent between 1995
and 1997. The important point to note here is that these cuts were experienced
at both levels of government, and not just at the provincial level. Corresponding
cuts at all levels thus left all governments—national and subnational—unable to
regulate and enforce environmental policies (Krajnc 2000, 125). As in the
American case, the collapse of command-and-control capacity in Canada was replaced
with industry-based voluntary initiatives and self-monitoring, which have been
formulated in collaboration with the governments to facilitate a more smooth transition
(Howlett 2000, 317).
Thus, signs of convergence are becoming evident in recent years. Interestingly,
the governments in the United States and Canada are not moving towards each
other’s command-and-control systems, but rather a new system of private sector
dominance—perhaps under the influence of neo liberalism—with increased
emphasis on voluntarization and marketization. This is also attributable to vigorous
movements by environmental groups and associations. Whether this move to private
sector regulation will be an improvement is yet to be seen.
It is clear that the command-and-control systems of Canada and America, mired
in federalist divisions, have had varied impacts on environmental regulation. A
privatized system would avoid much of these pitfalls, although the main challenge
will be the development of a comprehensive national approach to environmental
concerns. There is a possibility that environmental conditions could conceivably
improve under this increasingly private sector oriented system, but it must be borne
in mind that the primary motivation for industry is profit. Most likely, they will abide
by such self-imposed regulations as long as they contribute to the promotion of their
business and financial interests. While it was largely fiscal considerations that led to
Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends... 85

a decline in the public regulatory system in recent years, it must be recognized that
the primary motivation of the government is not ultimately profit, but rather the
provision of public goods. This alternate focus allows them, to a certain extent, to go into
deficits and debt in order to continue financing initiatives to enhance environmental
quality and protection. It may be rare, if not impossible, to find such a mentality in the
corporate world, and this raises further concerns regarding the long-term sustainability
of the shift toward privatization of environmental management.
The impact of federalism and the institutions within those systems on
environmental policy implementation demonstrates that these arrangements have
had a strong influence on the processes and outcomes of environmental policy
implementation and a divergent pattern between Canada and the United States. The
constitutional foundations of federalism in both countries are notably different in
nature as they empower different sets of actors. This difference in the degree of
power has resulted in differences in policy implementation. Both governments
encountered similar pressures to address environmental concerns and this required
increased government involvement in environmental policymaking. In trying to
address these pressures, conflicts arose between national and subnational units
during policy implementation. Moreover, horizontal divisions within the federalist
institutions impeded implementation in the Canadian case, while not impacting the
American policies to the same degree. Finally, both governments have started to
move away from a command-and-control system towards a more privatized system
which might help minimize the impacts of federalism in the future. Of course, a
private sector-dominated environmental regulatory system risks losing sustainability
in the long run if deficits are incurred.
After identifying environmental policies as “costly”, Dye used a public choice
perspective to examine the issue of environmental externalities and cost-benefit
analysis to shed light on the difficulties of implementation (2008, 218–226). The
issue of a common-pool resource with restricted access, lack of clearly defined
property rights, and the absence of individual responsibility for caring for the
environment make the process further complex. Another difficulty faced by
governments in addressing environmental concerns relates to the perception of
environmental quality as an “intergenerational good” (Lowry 1999, 328). Because
costs are incurred in the present, and most benefits not experienced until well into
the future, it is difficult for politicians, who operate on short-term electoral cycles, to
produce adequate environmental measures. Yet, even if they choose to implement
such measures, they may be notably constrained, depending on the type of federalist
system in which they operate. It must be admitted that there are numerous
constitutional, conceptual, analytical and organizational realities that make the task
immensely challenging. Bearing in mind the problems identified in this article, it can
be said that federalism is, indeed, a major factor to be considered in the
implementation of environmental policies and programs.
It is too early to speculate on the impact of the global crisis in capitalism and the
financial crunch. All public sector agencies are under pressure as governments
struggle to gather adequate resources to fund various programs. The range of
involvement may vary across the two countries under study, depending on the
capacity of the subnational units. Generally, the tendency is to devote primary
attention to areas that are more visible to the public. Therefore, it will not be
86 A.S. Huque, N. Watton

surprising to witness a reversal of the strategy of devolution and a more visible role
by the federal governments.
In view of pressures, challenges and contexts, the challenge of environmental
protection is assuming higher significance in Canada and the United States with the
passage of time. In addition to the local and national actors, Vig has drawn attention to
the relevance of international environmental institutions and agreements (1999: 3–5).
The importance of collaboration among sub-national, national and international cannot
be overemphasized. The relative power of the stakeholders influence the outcome, but
the deepest impact is felt at the sub-national levels. The approach in both countries is
converging, and devolution and decentralization may dominate the implementation of
environmental policies for years to come. The global economic downturn and the
crisis of capitalism will require the shaping of new policies and strategies that will
bring together a wider group of stakeholders if environmental policies are to be
meaningfully implemented.

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Ahmed Shafiqul Huque teaches in the Department of Political Science at McMaster University, Canada.
His research interests are in the areas of public management, development, and public policy.

Nathan Watton teaches at Wildwood Academy of Oakville, Canada. He holds an Honours Bachelor of
Arts, Summa Cum Laude, in Political Science from McMaster University, and a Bachelor of Education
from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. His research interests
include comparative public policy and American electoral politics.