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About the editors
Dr Francisco Dominguez is Senio r Lectu rer in Latin Ame rican
Stud ies, Middlesex Un ivers ity. His publications include:
'The Latin Ame ricanization of the po lit ics of emancipation',
in G. Lieves ley and S. Ludlam (eds), Reclaiming Latin Amer-
ica: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy (2009); 'Vio-
lence, the left and the creation of Un Nuevo Chile ', in W.
Fowle r and P. Lambert (eds), Political Violence and Identity
in Latin America (2008); 'The rise of the private secto r in
Cuba', in A. I. Gray and A. Ka pcia (eds), The Changing Dy-
namic of Cuban Civil Society (2008); and Mercosur: Between
Integration and Democracy (2003).
Dr Geraldine Lievesley is a sen io r lectu re r an d teaches Latin
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American an d Cuban Politics at Manchester Metropolitan
Unive rs ity. Among her recent publications are: Reclaiming
Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy
(2009, with Steve Ludlam); fn the Hands of Women: Para-
digms of Citizenship (2006 1 with Susan Buckingham); and
The Cuban Revolution: Past, Present and Future Perspectives
(2004).
Dr Steve Ludlam is a sen io r lecture r and teaches Cuban and
Latin Ame rican Po litics at the Un ivers ity of Sheffield. His re-
cent pu blications include 'Cu ba at 50 - what a bout the
worke rs?', Bulletin of Latin American Research (2009); Re-
claiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democ-
racy (2009, with Ge rald ine Lieves ley); and Labour, the State,
Social Movements and the Challenge of Neo-liberal
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Globalisation (2007, wit h Andrew Gamble, And rew J. Taylo r
and Stephen Wood).
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RIGHT-WING POLITICS IN THE NEW

LATIN AMERICA
reaction and revolt

edited by Francisco Dominguez, Geraldine Lievesley

and Steve Ludlam

•
Zed Books
LONDON I N EW YORK
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Right-wing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Set in OurType Arnhem and Fut ura Bold by Ewan Smith,
Re110/t was first published in 2011 by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cyn- London
thia St reet, London N1 9JF, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Av- Index: ed .emery@thefreeun ivers ity.net
enue, New Yo rk, NY 10010, USA Cove r des igned by Rogue Four Des ign

www.zedbooks.co.uk All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced, stored in a retrieva l system or transmitted in
Ed itoria l copyright © Francisco Dominguez, Gera ldine
any form or by any means, e lectronic, mechanica l, photo-
Lieves ley and Steve Ludlam 201 1
copying or otherwise, without the prior permiss ion of Zed
Copyright in this coll ection © Zed Books 2011
Books Ltd.

The rights of Francisco Dominguez, Ge rald ine Lieves ley

A cata logue reco rd for this book is availab le from the
and Steve Ludlam to be identified as the ed itors of this
British Lib ra ry
work have been asserted by them in accordance with the
Lib rary of Congress Cataloging in Pub lication Data ava il able
Copyright, Des igns and Patents Act, 1988.
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Contents think tanks and 12olitical intervention in contem12orary Latin
America
Acknowledgements GERA LD I NE LI EVES LEY
Abbreviations
TWO I The right in office
Introduction: reaction and revo lt
GERA LD I NE LI EVES LEY AND STEVE LUDLAM 4 PAN Para Todos: elections , democracx and the right in
contem12orary Mexico
ONE I The continental righ! ALEXANDER DAWSON

1 The South American right after 'the end of history~

5 Colombia as the linchP-in of US hegemony in Latin Amer-
GUY B U RTON .
1ca
DIANA RABY
2 The United States of America and the Latin American rigb.!
GRACE LI VINGSTONE
6 A right for a ll seasons? Right-wing_12olitics in contem-

3 Unearth ing the real subversives: the US statei....cight-wing 12orary Peru

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FRANC ISCO D U RAND .!l Undermining the new dawn: -2.P-P-Osition to LugQ. in
Parag.!:!.2Y.
TH REE I The right in OP-Rosition PETER LAMBERT

g The new Argentine_rigb.! and the Cristina Fe rnandez

z Venezuela's OP-f20sition: desP-erately seeking to overthrow
administration
Chavez ,

LEONARDO DIAZ ECH EN IQU E, JAVIER OZOLLO AND ERNESTO

FRANC ISCO DOM I NGUEZ
V I VA RES

8 Mu lt ilatera l lines of confl ict in contemP-orary Bo livia J3 T he Chilean right in the Concertaci6n era.i...19,90-20 10
ANDREAS TSOLA l( I S PAT RICIO SILVA

Conclusion: the challenge from the rigb.!

9 Right-w ing Of2f20sition as counter-revo lution: the Cuban
GERA LD I NE LI EVES LEY AND STEVE LUDLAM
case
STEVE LUD LAM About the contributors
10 Right-wing_Rolitics in contemP-orary Brazil Bibl iog@P-.hY.
MARCOS COSTA LI MA Index
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Acknowledgements hope that it may ma ke a t iny contrib ution to ending the
continent's period ic history of vio lent oppress ion.
We t han k Ken Barlow at Zed Books for his su pport and pa-
tience. We also thank the UK Society fo r Latin America Francisco Dominguez, Geraldine Lie11esley and Ste11e Lud-
St ud ies fo r facilitating d iscuss ion of some of the chapters. lam
Special t hanks are due to Guy Burton for checking Por-
tuguese spellings and to Jose Camean for t rans lating mate-
rial used in the chapte r on Braz il. We a re deep ly indebted to
many friends, co ll eagu es an d students in the UK and in the
Americas fo r educating and inspiring us. As eve r, we thank
our friends and fami lies fo r their suppo rt and forbea rance.
We dedicate this book to the tens of thousands of Latin
Americans who have been mu rde red by right-wing fo rces,
and are still being mu rde red today, above all in Co lom bia,
fo r their commit ment to democracy and equa lity, in the
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Abbreviations for the Peoples of Our
America
ACyS Acuerdo Cfvico y Social,
AP Acci6n Popular, Popu lar
Social and Civic Agreement
Action (Peru)
(Argenti na)
APC Ali anza para Camb io,
AD Acci6n Democratica,
Alli ance fo r Change
Democratic Act ion
(Pa raguay)
(Venezue la)
APRA Ali anza Popular
AFL-CIO American Federation of
Revo luciona ria Americana )
Labo r and Congress of
American Po pular
Indust rial O rgan izat ions
Revo lut ionary Alliance
ALBA Ali anza Bolivariana pa ra los
(Peru)
Pueb los de Nuestra
APS Asociaci6n de Productores
America, Bolivarian Alliance

de Soja, Association of Soya
Producers (Pa raguay)
ARENA Acc;ao Naciona lista
Renovadora, Nationa l
Renewal Party (Brazil)
ARENA Ali anza Repub licana
Naciona lista, Nationa li st
Republican Alliance (El
Salvado r)
ARP Asociaci6n Rura l del
Paraguay, Paraguayan Rura l
Association
AUC Autodefensas Un idas de
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Colombia, United
Self-Defence Units of
Colombia
BCB Banco Central de Bolivia,
Bolivian Centra l Bank
CANF Cuban American National
Foundation (US)
CCPSC Comite Civico Pro-Santa
Cruz, Civic Comm ittee of
Santa Cruz (Bo livia)
CEPRA Coo rd inadora Ejecutiva para
la Reforma Agraria,
Executive Coordi nating

Comm ittee for Agrarian
Refo rm (Pa raguay)
CIA Central Inte lligence Agency
(US)
CN E Consejo Nacional Electo ral,
National Electora l Council
(Venezue la)
COPEi Comite de Organizaci6n
Po lrtica Electora l
lndependiente - Pa rt ido
Social Cristiano de
Venezuela, Committee of
Independent Po litica l and
Electo ral O rgan ization -
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Social Christian Party of
Venezuela (Venezuela)
CTV Confederaci6n de
Trabajadores de Venezuela,
Confederation of
Venezuelan Worke rs
DEA Drug Enfo rcement Agency
(US)
ELN Ejercito de Li beraci6n
Naciona l, National
Libe ration Army (Colombia)
FARC Fuerzas Armadas
Revo luciona rias
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Colom bianas, Revo lutiona ry IDB Inte r-American
Armed Forces of Colombia Deve lopment Bank

FBI Federal Bu reau of IF E Institute Federa l Electo ral,

Investigation (US) Federal Electora l Institute

FOi fore ign direct investment (Mexico)

FEDECAMARAS Federaci6n de Camaras y IMF Inte rnational Monetary Fund

Asociaciones de Comercio y IR I Inte rnational Republican

Producci6n de Venezuela,
Venezuelan Federation of
Cham be rs of Comme rce
FRED EMO Frente Democratico,
Democratic Front (Peru)
GDP gross domestic product
Institute (US)
Movimiento Revoluciona rio
M-19
M-19, 19 Ap ril Revo lutionary
Movement (Co lomb ia)
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo,
Movement towards
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Socialism (Bo livia) organization

MAS Muerte a Secuestrado res, OAS Organization of American

Death to Kidnappe rs States
(Colombia) O PE C Organization of the
MDI mu lt il atera l deve lopment Petro leum Exporting
institution Countries

ML Movimiento Libertad, PAN Partido Acci6n Naciona l,

Libe rty Movement (Pe ru) National Action Pa rty

NAFTA North Ame rican Free Trade (Mexico)

Agreement PDT Partido Democratico

NED National Endowment for Traba lhista, Democratic

Democracy (US) Labou r Party (Braz il)

NGO non -govern menta l PDVSA Petr61eos de Venezuela,

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Venezuelan Oi l Party of the Brazilian

PEMEX Petr61eos Mexicanos, Democratic Movement

Mexican Oi l PODEMOS Peder Democratico Social,

PFL Partido da Frente Libera l, Social Democratic Power

Libe ral Front Party (Brazi l) (Bolivia)

Partido Justiciali sta, Justice PPC Partido Popu la r Cristiano,

PJ
Party (Argentina) Popular Ch ristian Party
(Peru)
PLRA Partido Libera l Radica l
Autentico, Authorita rian PRO Partido Democratico de la

Radica l Libe ral Party Revo luci6n, Party of t he

(Pa raguay) Democratic Revolution

(Mexico)
PMDB Partido do Movimento
Democratico Bras il eiro, PR I Partido Revolucionario
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In stitucional, Revo lut ionary TNC t ransnationa l co rporation
Institutiona l Party (Mexico) Union Cfvica Rad ica l,
UCR
PSDB Partido da Social Radical Civic Un ion
Democracia Brasi lei ra, (Argenti na)
Social Democrat ic Party of UD I Union Democrata
Braz il (Brazi l) lndependiente, Independent
PT Partido dos Traba lhadores, Democratic Un ion (Chi le)
Workers' Party (Brazil) UN Unidad Nacional, Nat ional
RCTV Radio Caracas Televis ion Unity (Peru)
Internacional (Venezue la) UNACE Union Nacional de
RN Renovacion Nacional, Ciudadanos Et icos, National
National Renovation (Chi le, Union of Eth ica l Cit izens
Peru) (Pa raguay)
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UNASU R Un ion de Naciones
Su rame ricanas , Union of
Sout h American Nations

USAID Un it ed States Agency fo r

Inte rnational D evelo p ment

YPFB Yaci m ient os Petro l1fe ros

Fisca les Bolivianos , Bol ivian
State Petrol Rese rves
(Bol iv ia)

Introduction: reaction and revolt
GERA LDINE LI EVESLEY AND STEVE LUDLAM
The challenge from t he left
In resea rch ing an d writing Reclaiming Latin America
(Lieveslex and Ludlam 2009~) 1 which investigated the rise
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of the left-lean ing or ' pink tide ' governments in the early
twenty-first century and the ir ach ievements, we an d ou r co l-
leagues realized how important it was to eva luate the nature
and strength of right-wing op pos ition and of the forces sup-
port ing it, and how they have gone about res isting the ' pink
tide'. As we po inted out in that study, qu ite apart from any-
th ing else, some of the 'pinlk tide' presidencies relied on
narrow majorit ies - or even, in the case of Nicaragua, on a
mino rity of the po pular vote (2009a: 3=5)- The ma in dy-
nam ic beh ind the 'pink t ide' was t he intens ity of popu la r
mo bil ization across the region aga inst the politica l and
socio-econom ic po licies know n co ll ect ively as the 'Wash -
ington Consensus' (li beral-democratic pol itics go ing hand
in hand with neo li bera l econom ics). These policies we re

strongly endo rsed by the US and gave succour to right-wing
fo rces in the form of governments, po litical parties, think
tanks, corporations, re ligious institutions an d the media, a ll
of which overwhelmingly and enthusiastica lly emb raced ne-
o li beralism. As many countries moved from mi lita ry to civil-
ian ru le afte r 1980, the Wash ington Consensus provided
the ideologica l ba ll ast an d justification for attem pts to
esta blish elitist and exclusive governments that aimed to
block movements for redistributory and socia lly just re-
fo rms. Governments emba rked upon mass ive econom ic re-
struct uring and the privatization of natura l resources, sell-
ing off the nationa l patrimony (includ ing pu blic se rvices
and utilities) to domestic and internationa l ca pital, and
open ing up previously protected sectors (notab ly
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cu lt ure) to competit ion from t he industria lized producers
of North America.
The socia l consequences were mass ively deb ilitating for
the mass of peo ple, who res pon ded over time with demon-
strations that event ually coa lesced into a repu diation of ne-
o li beralism an d the na rrow po lit ical regimes it sponso red.
Aspects of t he neo li bera l programmes directly triggered re-
vo lts that led to left-wing electoral victories: for example
aga inst the im pact of tax increases driven by minima li st fis-
ca l po licy, as in the Caracazo riots in Venezuela; against the
consequences of severe and non-d iscretiona ry fi xed ex-
change-rate regimes, as in Argent ina; or against the privati-
zation of pub lic util ities, as in Bolivia's 'water wars'. In the
fi na l two decades of the twentieth century, the widespread

popu lar association of poverty and exp loitation with neo li b-
e ralism left the right - both its populist forces and the mo re
traditiona l party-based forces - with its core policy appeal
in ru ins and with no o bvious alternative political economy
to offe r. An d wh ile the endorsement by much of the right in
Latin America of the so-called 'third wave' of democra-
tizat ion was evidently im portant, its narrow concept ion of
democracy as a set of constitut iona l and legislative pro-
cesses brought it increasingly into confl ict with a mass
electorate, much of wh ich was ex pecting its materia l pover-
ty to be redressed th rough a broa de r conception of the pur-
pose of democracy, and much of which was expecting to
partici pate in a democratic cu lture that was far more inclu-
sive an d
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partici patory t han was envisaged by the right (Lieveslex
19.9.9.; for extens ive survey mate rial see UN DeveloP-ment
Programme 20061-) - Hence, wh ile the impact of neolib-
e ralism explained many po pular revo lts, including some
that clea rly resu lted in left-wing election victories, others
we re revo lts aga inst aspects of the li mitations of really-
existin g democracy, aga inst corruption, aga inst ru li ng-class
inte rference with constitutions an d cou rts, aga inst electora l
fraud , for in d igenous rights, an d so on (for a graph ic ove r-
view, see Inter-American DeveloP-ment Bank 2006: 113-14).
So even if (as surveys found) over ha lf of t he electorate of
Latin Ame rica was prepa red to opt for authoritarian gove rn-
ment if it so lved its econom ic prob lems (UN DeveloP-ment
Programme 20061-: 80), the re was no obvious incentive to

look for an authorita rian alternative on the right! And, given
the context of a wo rldwide dep ression from 2008 that was
so clea rly linked to the ma rket fundamenta li sm of the ne-
o li be ral o rd er, why, apart from disenchantment with the
pe rfo rmance of the left in office, wou ld the popu la r vote
move to the right?
Elements of right-w ing adva ntage
Against that background, what does emerge in this boo k
is a set of elements that can sustain the powe r of right-wing
politics, and to wh ich we ret urn in our concluding chapter.
The int rinsic, historically con ditioned variety of nationa l
right-wing politics in Latin America, an d the cont rasting
con dition of the right being in government in some states
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and in o ppos it ion in most, has not incli ned us in this book
to attem pt a themat ically organized compa rative study. The
book is stru ctured around ch1apters on continental themes
- an overview, studies of US hard and soft powe r in the re-
gion - and on st udies of states whe re the right is in office,
and of states where it is in oppos ition (in one case in exile).
This stru cture is out li ned furt her below. Neverthe less there
are some co re themes that e1merge from these st udies and
that a re worth drawing attent ion to in this introduction. We
will return to them in our conclus ions.
A fi rst an d critica l question is how far and how dee ply
has the Latin American right become democratic? By the
time you have finis hed rea ding this book, you may well con -
clude that the answer is 'not very fa r an d not very dee ply'.

There is an underlying hypocrisy at the hea rt of the Wash -
ington Consensus: if a choice had to be made between
democracy and sta bility, the latter would undoubted ly win.
Lip service is paid to democratic governance, but on ly in so
far as that provides the environment in wh ich US security
concerns are pu rsued. Stabi lity and security a re un derstood
as the necessary cond itions fo r the US, its Latin American
allies and the mu lti nationa ls and internationa l institutions
(such as the International Moneta ry Fund - IMF - and the
World Bank) to do business, accrue profits and prevent the
introduction of radica l socia l programmes. In its efforts to
undermine and subvert contempo rary left-leaning govern-
ments, the Latin American right has mas ked its intentions
behi nd such words as 'freedom ' and 'democracy', but in
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practice has gone in for medi a demon ization, street vio-
lence, mu rder, sedition and - in extremis - milita ry coups
(Livingstone 2009.). That fina l recourse of right-wing forces
was used in 2002 (unsuccessfu lly) in Venezuela, in 2009
(successfu lly) in Hondu ras and in 20 10 (unsuccessfully) in
Ecuado r; and there have been rumou rs of impen di ng mili-
tary intervention in a number of othe r countries, includi ng
Paraguay and Bo livia. Clearly many right-wing fo rces wea r
their democratic clothes very loose ly. Indeed , the right iden -
tifies with democracy on ly when it su its its economic and
ideologica l purposes. As one scho la rly st udy recently con -
cluded: 'Latin America's armed forces have not stepped en -
tirely out of politics. They ste p ped aside. In most count ries
they retained the option of decid ing whether, when, an d

how to return' (Smith 2005: 106).
Second ly, the right retains formidab le resources that en-
able it to exercise po litica l powe r even when out of office.
The support of key nationa l econom ic sectors - the co re of
the ru li ng class - is an immeasu rable force, whether exe r-
cised di rectly in cap ita li st 'strikes' in Venezuela from 2002
and in Argentina in 2008; in a rmed sub-nationa l brea kaway
movements, as in Bo livia in 2008; or ind irectly, by con-
stra ining policy cho ices through threats of d isinvestment.
The su pranat iona l powe rs of US-based internationa l finan-
cia l institutions, of course, continue to exe rcise constant
influence over nationa l po li cymakers. The politica l power of
the news and current affa irs med ia in Latin Ame rica is, no-
toriously, overwhelmingly at the service of right-wing
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politics. The support of ot her mem be rs of the ru ling-class
e lites em bed ded in t he judicia ry and other institutions of
the state has been another crucial instrument for obst ruct-
ing left -wing presidencies, as ill ust rated in this boo k, for
examp le, in the cases of Argent ina and Pa raguay. And , while
neo li bera li sm may have changed the form of private profi-
tee ring from the co rru pt cont rol of public contracts and re-
sources to the di rect sa le of public services, enterprises and
natura l resources, st ructures of informa l right-wing powe r
pe rsist in netwo rks of cliente li sm, patronage an d corrup-
tion. These netwo rks in some areas sustain a mass electoral
machine fo r the right, as in Brazil . But, t hird ly, right-wing
politics also retains a broad mass a ppea l based in dee p-
rooted conse rvative social att itudes, not least in areas such

as power in the fam ily, state policy on contraception, a bor-
tion an d gay rights, an d gene rally t he processes of socia l-
ization based a round fam ily, Church and educat ion an d cul-
tural discourses s haped by the old exp lanat ions of defer-
ence, false consciousness and fear of modern ity. An d in
this respect the right enjoys a great dea l of su ppo rt in its
cam paigns from re ligious centres of power, not on ly those
of t rad it ional Catholicism, but increasingly also those of
we ll -resourced Evangelica l Protestantism. Having lost the
abi lity it enjoyed d uring the Co ld War to pose as the na-
tiona l defen der against subversion, an d now damaged by
its neolibe ral internationa li sm, to what extent t he right is
capa ble of wra pping itse lf in the flag and occu pying the na-
tiona list high ground is a question of vital importance.
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Fourth ly, t he right enjoys the su ppo rt of su pranat ional
politica l fo rces, notab ly the mach ine ry of wou ld-be full -
spectru m dominance by the US - not just in milita ry an d
security s phe res, but also in t he deployment of soft powe r
through US-fu nded non-gove rnmental organ izations
(NGOs) that directly fund right-wing politica l groupings
throughout the conti nent. Fift hly, just as it suffered in elec-
tora l terms from t he e rrors it made wh il e in government, so
the right can profit from the mistakes of others in govern-
ment. The behaviou r of the left in office, es pecia lly if it
d isap points its co re s upporters as it reaches across the
politica l cent re for votes, can empower right-wing o ppo-
nents.
The structure of the book

This book, as was noted a bove, is not a compa rative text
in politica l science or a theoretica l intervention. No r have
we sought to rep resent just one ideologica l approach, since
that would have been a thankless and intell ectua lly con-
stra ined task. The country case stud ies demonst rate that
particular and distinctive historica l and cultural t ra its must
be taken into conside ration in assessing the right's influ -
ence and its ab ility to sha pe the region's po litics. The first
chapters be low, though, address the continental and in-
te rnational context in which the right ope rates. In his chap-
te r, Guy Bu rton provides a typology of the right in govern -
ment and oppos it ion, identifying a power spect rum ranging
from politica l dom inance (Colombia) , to an inab ility to gov-
ern but an abi lity to exe rcise ind irect influence (Peru), to a
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provocative but ult imately non -hegemonic status
(Venezuela and Bo livia). Even in countries where its polit-
ica l influence is li mited, it is able to block the legislative
prog rammes of left-leaning governments and so impede
their gene ral strategies. Central to Burton's argument is the
question of whethe r the right is committed to democracy
on ly so long as its inte rests are not in dange r, and whether
it will revert to its pre-democratic t rad it ions if it judges that
the political climate has become threatening. In terms of in-
te rnational context, Grace Livingstone gives a histo rica l ac-
count of US po licy towa rds Latin America, stress ing the
continu ity of Washington's o bjectives and its continued
identification of the right - in and out of government - as
being the best vehicle by wh ich to furthe r them. Gera ldine

Lieves ley then considers the role of right-wing US th ink
tan ks in formu lating those policy objectives and in pro-
viding financia l and ideologica l support to those right-wing
parties and instit utions in Latin America that pursue the
aims of the 'New American Century'.
The cha pte rs by Alexan de r Dawson, Diana Raby an d
Francisco Duran d exam ine the right in power in Mexico,
Colomb ia and Peru, respective ly. Dawson focuses on the
2006 pres idential elections in Mexico. Des pite the incum -
bent right-wing pres ident's policy fai lures in areas such as
immigration, ins urgency and t he e radication of d rug traf-
fick ing, the can didate of the left was una ble to win, partly as
a res ult of his own errors, but also because of t he pervasive
institutiona l powe rs enjoyed by the executive branch of
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government. Dawson also d raws attention to the genera l
d isi ll usionment among Mexicans and thei r lack of confi-
dence in all po liticians - cha racteristics not conducive to
the po lit ical transformation t hat a left-wing victory wou ld
sym bo lize. In common with other chapte rs, he also hi gh-
lights the reso lute res istance of the right to what it regards
as the mora l de predation of 'modern' issues, such as fem i-
nism an d gay rights. In her st udy of Co lomb ia, Diana Ra by
identifies it as a client state chosen by the US to act as a
bulwa rk aga inst the spread of progressive politics. The
country's re pressive atmos phe re inh ibits no rma l political
activity and offers scant opportunities fo r left-wing and pop-
ula r organization. Its va unted 'democratic security' has cre-
ated a state that is neithe r democratic no r secu re. Francisco

Du rand port rays a Peruvian right that is fragmented by pe r-
sona li st politics but that neverthe less manages to exercise
cons iderab le ind irect po lit ica l influence. The sou rce of thi s
lies in its sup port networks within bus iness, reli gious and
med ia circles, and its strong inte rnational connections. De-
spite this, the right has been unable to expand its support
base and reach out to the m idd le and popu lar classes , and
that is why it has not been a ble to win pres ident ial elec-
tions.
The right in oppos ition occup ies the attention of the rest
of the book. Francisco Dom inguez offers a chil li ng cata-
logue of the Venezue lan right's attem pts to unde rmine the
government of Hugo Chavez since his election in 1998.
These have included econom ic sabotage, parliamentary
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obstruction, a med ia wa r, strikes, boycotts, an a bo rt ive
coup an d assassination pl ots. Whi le undertaking these tac-
tics, the right has cons istently denounced the government
as authoritarian and un democratic! In his cha pter, An dreas
Tso lakis charts the secess ionist activities of the Bolivian
right, fuelled by its des ire to contro l the count ry's hyd ro-
carbon resou rces, as well as to prevent the creation of a
'plurinational' state based on repudiation of racism by the
government of Pres ident Evo Mo rales. Tso lakis also con -
trasts t he differen t app roaches ado pted by the US on t he
one hand, and by the European governments an d mu lt i-
late ral development institutions on the other. Whi le the for-
mer has pu rsued an exp licitly anti-Mora les po licy, the latter
have deve loped a far more so phisticated position, aimed at

locking Bolivia into the structures of glo bal cap ita li st pro-
d uction.
Steve Lud lam's chapte r on the anti-Castro right living in
exile in the US ch ronicles the history of that right's terrorist
activit ies against the Cu ban gove rnment and demonstrates
the politica l influence it has exerted over Wash ington's
Cuba po licy - a po licy that is devoted to promoting 'demo-
cratic trans it ion' on the island and that reveals the violent
instincts still close to the hea rt of US foreign policy. Ma rcos
Costa Li ma ana lyses the ina bility of the Brazilian right to
const itute a critica l mass capable of governing, but also de-
scribes how it was ab le to li mit the speed and depth of
Pres ident Lu la's Wo rkers' Pa rty reform project after 2002.
He also specu lates on whether the government of Lula's
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successor, elected in 2010, will be a ble to fo rge ahead with
that programme now that the right-wing pa rties have lost
their congress ional advantage. In his study of Pa raguay,
Peter Lambert assesses the politica l and persona l weak-
nesses of left-lean ing President Fernan do Lugo as he faced
a prolonged assau lt aimed at desta biliz ing his government,
an attack that came from entrenched and conservative
structures of power characte rized by cliente li sm and co r-
rupt practices and fuelled by incen diary media.
In t heir account of the relationsh ip between the right an d
the government of Cristina Fernandez de Ki rchner in Ar-
gentina, Leonardo Diaz Echeni que, Javier Ozollo and
Ernesto Vivares describe a clash between two distinct mod-
els of econom ic development: one profoundly neo libe ral
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and fue ll ed by the needs of large agribus iness, and the compromise and consensus.
othe r state-led and comm itted to social redistribution. Dur- We hope that the chapters of t his book will enlighten its
ing the writing of t his book, Ch il e moved from having a left- readers, and especially ass ist those with an active interest in
lean ing government to a right-wing one led by Sebastian the role of the right in Latin America.
Pinera. Patricio Si lva, who tracks the recent history and
recovery of the right during the democratization process,
suggests that there will not be a huge po litical rupture,
given that the Concertaci6n coa lition of Christian
Democrats an d Socialists that had been in power for the
previous twenty yea rs had pu rsued neo li bera l po li cies, al-
beit wit h programmes of poverty all eviation. In Ch ile, t he
poli cy differences between left- leaning and right-wing pa r-
ties have appeared to be of degree, and all - bar the extreme
right - seem to have agreed to pursue a po litics based on
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o NE !The continental right

1 / The South American right after 'the end of
history'
GUY BURTON
The out look for the right in South America in the ea rly
1990s was optimist ic.~ The Sand inistas' 1990 election de-
feat had left Cuba the last sociali st country in the hem i-
sp here. Democracy was in vogue, followi ng the end of mili-
tary rule an d more competitive elections. The region ap-
peared to be on t he econom ic road to recovery, fo ll owing a
traumatic decade of structural adjustment. At t his t ime,
Fukuyama presented his 'end of history' thesis: societies
we re now ente ring a period in which democracy and the
market would become the dom inant form of po litical and
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econom ic organ ization (Fukuxama 79.91)-
Nearly two decades later, the 'end of history' claim rings
ho llow in re lation to South Ame rica. Since the mid-2ooos,
it has become almost commonp lace to talk of a leftward
sh ift across t he region, from Brazil an d Chi le to Venezuela
and Bo livia. Indeed, this has captu red much scho larly and
medi a attention (see Ellner 2004; Harnecker 2005; Panizza
2005; Petras 2005; Castaneda 2006; Castaneda and
Morales 2008; Barrett, Chavez and Rodrfguez-Garavite
2008; Lieveslex and Ludlam 2009.e)- By contrast, the liter-
ature t hat has focused on the right in the region has been
relative ly spa rse (Chalmers, Cam12ello de Souza and Boron
19.91.; Middlebrook 2000a; 20006). Furthermore, such
material has la rgely focused on the right during the 1980s

and 1990s, not on the period since 2000.
Th e imp ress ion the right gives in South America is one of
'winners' in the 1990s and 'losers' in the 2000s. But to
what extent is that an accu rate picture? If the left did indeed
become the main po lit ical actor to watch in the cu rrent
decade, how has the right reacted an d res ponded to such
deve lopments, if at all? Such questions a re deep ly im por-
tant, given scho larly observation that the inclus ion of
conse rvative forces, whether as politica l parties o r social
groups, is vital if democracy is to be sustained aga inst the
risk of military inte rvention (Gibson....1.9,92,; Midd lebrook
2000a; 20006). To add ress these questions, this cha pte r is
struct ured as fo ll ows: fi rst a definition of the South Amer-
ican right is provi ded; the role of t he right in the po lit ica l
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and econom ic changes of t he 1980s an d 1990s is d is-
cussed; and then t he right's app roach d uring the leftward
sh ift of the 2000s is ana lysed .
Defining the right
The right can be understood in three ma in ways: ideolog-
ica lly, socio logica lly an d organ izationa lly. Its contro l of
power (both econom ic and politica l) depends on its a bility
to exert sufficient influence, which may be ach ieved through
fo rmal or info rma l means, an d may be conducted in a di-
rect or indi rect fashion .
Ideo logica lly, the left- right d istinction may be under-
stood with regard to t he val ues that underpin each pole. Al-
though some Lati n Americanists argue that the right cannot

be defined in ideologica l te rms (Middlebrook 2000a; Gib-
son 19,9~), No rberto Bobbie's distinction between a left
that is committed to eq uality and a right that is committed
to inequa lity seems applica ble (Bobbie 19,9.§.). Indeed, the
historical trajectory of the right in the region since inde pen-
dence demonstrates th is: it has pursued the interests of the
elite over those of othe rs, ensuring an im balance in terms
of social, political an d economic cap ita l.
Sociologically, the interests associated with the left and
right can be understood thro ugh their component con-
stituencies, that is, the su bordinate an d dominant classes,
res pectively. The dominant class (or groups), on the right,
is an elite that has the greatest materia l wea lth, control of
production and access to mechanisms of coe rcion. The
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subo rd inate class, on the left, consists of those witho ut
these things. The existence of these ' haves' an d 'have-nots'
has meant two groups that a re stru ctura lly determ ined to
struggle against each other (Mil iband 19Q£; 19~9.), with the
right seek ing to maintain the status quo - and hence the
uneq ual relationship between it and the left - wh ile the left
seeks to reduce differences, through red istrib ut ion. The dis-
tinction between these two classes may seem too neat an d
may overloo k t ransfe rs of al legiance between them: for
example, high-level bu reaucrats who support redist ribution;
the poor who vote for the righ t; and socia l mob ility from the
subo rd inate to the dominant class. However, the total num-
bers who move between the two classes and the ir inte rests
are few in numbe r, ma king the distinction between the two

both pers istent an d re levant.
O rgan izationa lly, the right is interna lly diverse. It can be
sepa rated into diffe rent actors that provide the social sup-
port for government, including specific interest groups,
movements and politica l parties. Acknowledging these or-
gan izationa l factors is important, s ince it recognizes both
intra-elite diffe rences an d preferences, and also the im por-
tance of build ing coa litions among socia l an d political
groups in ord e r to aggregate their deman ds. Furthermo re,
whi le different acto rs within the right may make common
cause with each other, for exam ple, conservative pa rt ies
and business organ izations, they must also seek allies from
among the poor an d margina lized within the la rge r subo r-
d inate class. That the right is successfu l in this rega rd may
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be attrib uted both to its control of material and med ia re-
sources an d to the more heterogeneous nat ure of the left,
which ena bles the dom inant class to play off one section
aga inst another, especially through its powe rs of patronage
and clientelism.
The rise of representative democracy and markets in South
America
That the right has been skilful in exp loiting its relative so-
cia l, economic and politica l powe r over the left since inde-
pendence is evident from the continent's recent history.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the ma in politica l form in
South Ame rica was eithe r m ilitary or was democratically
'thin'. In the wake of the Cu ban revo lution of 1959, many in

the dom inant class , includ ing bus inessmen , indust riali sts,
conse rvative politicians, reactiona ry sectors of the Church
and t he armed forces, became increas ingly conce rned at t he
social ist threat, o pting fo r mo re repress ive regimes while
demob ilizing and dividing the su bo rd inate class by cont rol-
ling and channelli ng pol itica l activity. Across the sout hern
ha lf of t he continent, coa litions of a rmed forces and civi lian
politicians coope rated to seize powe r in milita ry coups in
Argentina, Braz il, Bo livi a and Ch ile. Meanwhil e, in the
no rth , period ic elections continued in Colom bia, Mexico
and Venezue la, but led either to continued single-pa rty rule
as in Mexi co o r to an alte rnat ion with in the el ite as in
Colomb ia and Venezuela.
For much of this pe riod, both regime types pu rsued a
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similar econom ic model of impo rt substitute industri-
al ization (ISi), a state-led fo rm of capitalist development
that employed large state firms and protection ist ba rriers.
Howeve r, the process was dependent on both the con-
tinued receipt of private loans and sufficien t revenue to
repay them. Ri sing input cost s during the 1970s made loan
repaymen ts more diffi cult, and after 1982 resu lted in suc-
cess ive Latin American countries defaulting. The crisis
underm ined IS i and obl iged gove rnments to undertake
structural ad just ment programmes that removed protec-
tion ism, to li bera lize their econom ies and to privatize state
indust ries. At the same time, gove rnments began to cu t
back on pub lic spend ing, includ ing on red ist ributive mea-
sures. Greater auste rity com bined with the emergence of

new social ident it ies, issues and movements such as t hose
that add ressed post-mate rial ist concerns li ke environ -
menta li sm and fem inism an d with pub lic rejection includ -
ing by some sections of the dom inant class of the human
rights abuses of rep ress ive regimes.
In response to social and politica l pressure, the regimes
undertoo k changes in t his direction during the 1980s an d
1990s. Howeve r, like the econom ic measu res that preceded
it, t he move towa rds representat ive democracy was led
'from above' rathe r t han by the grassroots (Kingstone 2001 ;
O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rueschmey_g_r, Ste12hens and
Stevens 19.9l.)- The resu lt of this right-directed pol itica l and
econom ic change was a limited fo rm of democracy, wh e re
politica l and civil rights were resto red, where the re was
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minima l change in social and econom ic cond itions, where
welfare spend ing continued to fa ll , and whe re job insecurity
and vulne rab ility rose th roug hout t he region (Petras 19.9.9.;
Colburn 2004; Richards 2001 ; Grugel 19.9.9.; Oxhorn 2003).
The South American right and t he post-20 0 0 turn to the left
The po litica l and econom ic changes of the 1980s and
1990s fa iled to meet the expectations of wider society.
Consequently, econom ic insecurity and po litica l d isaf-
fect ion prompted an electo ral leftward sh ift across the
continent du ring the 2000s. The right, it now seemed, was
in ret reat, es pecially fo ll owing victories fo r the left or centre-
left in Venezuela, Brazil, Ch ile, Pe ru, Bo livia and Ecuado r
(Lievesley and Ludlam 2009.2.: 4). But resu lts in Mexico an d

Colomb ia, whe re the right was re-elected, s howed that it
was fa r from dead.
Th at t he left's ga ins were on ly modest was a pparent in its
inabi lity to offer an alternative to the preva iling economic
model and to respond sufficiently to the demands of its
electorates (Boron 2008: 246- 7). The right has not on ly
maintained econom ic powe r, but it continues to have s ig-
nificant polit ical powe r despite the rise of the 'pink tide'.
But how the right has achieved t his has varied, be ing influ -
enced by the rise of democracy and the impact made by t he
left across the continent. The right has had to change over
the past decade and a ha lf, and has consequently ach ieved
varying degrees of influence over the politica l process and
economic system. Th is has included influence th rough
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d irect means (by having its own o rgan izations and re p-
resentatives in powe r, as in Colombia and Mexico) and
ind irect means (by participating within a governing coa li-
tion, as in Brazi l) . Other groups of the right may exercise
influence informa lly, by provid ing the framework fo r a gov-
ernment's programme and object ives, regardless of
whether they a re in powe r (as in the case of Peru) or out of
power (for examp le in Argentina and Chi le until 2010). In
some cases, though, the right does appea r to be in flux. It
may be a rgued that, wh il e t he right has lost political power
in Venezuela, Bolivia and Paraguay, it still retains econom ic
importance, even if it is mo re often organized as social
movements than as po lit ica l parties (though this is less
true of Pa raguay) .

and to agitate more in civi l society (Heredia 19.91)- Th eir ac-
tivism co incided with increasingly com petitive elections
during the 1980s and 1990s, wh ich the PAN cap ita lized
upon by attracting wider social support.
By cont rast, in Co lombia the two t rad it ional parties were
dominant until the 1990s, ma inly because they acted as
'mach ines' to co ll ect votes in retu rn for t heir politicians di s-
pens ing selective benefits to t heir supporters. Alt hough this
led to the ir support becoming de po lit icized and frag-
mented, the re was little incentive to refo rm the system,
since it wo rked to the parties' advantage (Dugas 2000).
Their fate was sea led in 2002, when Uribe was elected on a
platform to address t he issues that neither the Conse r-
vatives no r the Li bera ls had been ab le to reso lve, by
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restoring pub lic o rder an d ending t he guerrill a confl ict.
Uribe's support consisted of newly formed po litical parties,
includ ing some d issident Libe ral politicians. Like the PA N
in Mex ico, his electo ral support included vote rs drawn from
across society and from d iffe rent classes, including those
who identified themselves as independents and others from
within the econom ic an d soc ial elite (Gutierrez 2007.). De-
spite the Constit utional Court's decis ion to ba r Uribe from
standing for a t hi rd presi den t ial term, the gene ral process
has continued , with the rea lignment of Co lomb ian po lit ics
around personalities rathe r th an programmatic pa rt ies. This
was evident in the 2010 pres ident ial and legislative elec-
tions. In Ap ril 2010 , Uribe's party gained the most votes
and seats in the legis lat ure, followed by its Conservative

party sup porters. In June, Uribe's defence minister, Juan
Manuel Santos, won the pres idential election wit h 69 per
cent of the vote. Santos's victory was soon felt wit hin the
oppos it ion: the majority of the congressiona l Liberal party
decla red its support for the president-elect, exposing its
wea kened and divided natu re (Silva 2010 ).
Whil e the Mexican and Co lomb ian right differ in institu -
tiona l and organ izationa l terms, t here is much overlapp ing
regarding policy. Economica lly, bot h are committed to a
greate r ro le for the private sector. Because of Uribe's 'out-
sider' status in Colom bia, he reli ed on a number of minis-
te rs who were appointed for t heir techn ica l and profes-
siona l background, and this led to an over-rep resentation in
government of t he private secto r and of its interests
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(Gutierrez 2007.). Uri be's policies are likely to be pursued
by his successor, even if the style differs: whereas Uribe
reve ll ed in his polarizing sta1nce, Juan Manuel Santos has
adopted a more concili ato ry tone, ca lli ng for a coa lit ion of
nationa l un ity (Shifter 2010). In Mex ico, t he PAN gove rn-
ment's econom ic li bera li sm is a continuation of the struc-
tu ral adjustment programmes undertaken by PRI adminis-
trations since the 1980s. Socia lly, the right faces sim ilar
cha ll enges and diffi cu lties, es pecia lly in relat ion to pub lic
security and drug crime. Moreover, gove rnments in both
countries have to dea l with the influence of extra-lega l ac-
tors with in their po litica l syst ems: param ilitaries in Co lom -
bia and organized crime syn d icates in Mexico. But whereas
Uribe and his successo r have adopted a militaristic

approach, includ ing greater engagement with the US over
d rug-enfo rcement operations and agreeing the expans ion of
American milita ry bases in the count ry, PAN presidents
have ma intained a less certain response and have sought to
keep d irect US involvement at arm's length.
The right with influence on government: Brazil and Peru
The right need not take straightforward control of the
state fo r it to ensu re t hat its interests are maintained . Th is
can be done rathe r mo re informally, in one of two d ifferent
ways: d irectly or ind irectly. The case of Braz il demonst rates
the d irect way, through the right's entry into a coa lition be-
tween its politica l parties/ interest groups and the gove rning
parties of the left. Peru, meanwh ile, ill ust rates a more
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ind irect a pproach , by which rep resentatives of the right
sha pe pub lic discou rse or provide personnel to participate
within the executive. Initia lly, the right's econom ic priorities
in the two countries were d ivergent, t hough they eventua lly
ended up heading in t he same li bera l d irection.
In Brazil, the right has enjoyed cons istent access to
power, as is clear from the defence of socia l conservatism
and the ro le of the private sector since the mi litary pe riod
1964- 85. Since 1985, all governments, including of the cen -
tre-left, have included politicians and parties associated
with t he free-ma rket right, such as the Partido da Frente Lib-
eral (PF L, Libera l Front Pa rty, known as Democrats since
2007) in the Cardoso government or the Partido Li bera l
(Libera l Party) and its associates in the Lula adm inistration

(Baiocch i and Checa 2008). For the right, inclusion in gov-
ernment offsets its relative organ izationa l weakness, and
counteracts the leftward shift of t he centre of polit ica l grav-
ity in Brazi l. For the centre-left, the inclus ion in government
of conservatives, with thei r views on law and order, abo r-
tion, fam ily and pu blic mora lity, is seen as a price worth
paying fo r access to the ir clientelistic li nks. Wh ile weak at
the nationa l level, conservat ive parties have pockets of re-
gional support among the we ll -educated and better-off in
the more developed part s of the country, and among poo r-
er, less-educated voters in t he sma lle r count ies of Brazil
(Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power 2000a: 165).
In Peru, t he dominant class has ta ken a more informa l
route to power. Wh il e this reflects the relat ive weakness of
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the party system and of politica l parties, it also shows the
mo re extensive use of methods ava ilab le to the right . In-
deed , during the 1980s, New Right intellectua ls advocated
democracy and an end to corruption, whi le dom inant-class
inte rests gained expression in the eme rgence of vigil ante
groups in upper-class neighbou rhoods and suppo rt for the
business confede ration agai nst the first Alan Ga rcia adm i-
nistration 's attempted bank nationa lizat ion (Durand 19_91;
Conaghan 2000).
Economica lly, too, t he Brazilian and Peruvian cases
demonstrate differences. Wh ile t he right in both countries
now agrees on the need for mo re markets and fo r a leadi ng
role for the private secto r, t heir starti ng po ints in the 1980s
we re noticeab ly different. In the first years fo ll owing the

return of democracy in 1985, much of Braz il 's right retained
a prefe rence for state-led forms of deve lopment. Only at the
end of that decade did it begin to adopt a more pro-market,
modernization discourse (Mainwaring, Meneguello and
Power 2000a; CamP-ello de Souza 19.91)- But its actual
implementation was to be effective ly delayed unti l the Ca r-
doso presidency of the mid-1990s, fo ll owing the departure
of President Fe rnando Co ll er de Mello and the subsequent
inte rregnum. By contrast, in Peru the impact of the right's
pro-market discourse was apparent when democracy was
reinstated in 1980. The intellectua ls' New Right discourse
and opposition to bank nationalization demonstrated the
dominant class's commitment to economic policy change.
The right's abi lity to di rect po licy in a neo li bera l direction
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was shown by the ease with wh ich it abandoned its de-
feated pres idential candidate, Mario Va rgas Llosa, in favour
of Alberto Fuj imori in 1990. Its economic influence over
government was further ill ustrated by the adoption of its
policies by Fujimori, then by the Toledo and second Garcfa
administrations in the 2000s, wh ich appo inted pro-
business technocrats to key m inisteria l pos it ions, and con-
centrated on gene rating econom ic growth t hrough neo li b-
eral means.
The right as 'loyal opposition': Ch ile, Urugu ay and Argent ina
The previous sections have dealt with the right in power,
whethe r d irectly (Mexico and Colombia) or ind irectly (B raz il
and Peru). But the right's interests can also be susta ined

when in politica l oppos it ion. The cases of Argentina, Ch il e
until 2010, and Uruguay ill ustrate how dominant-class
inte rests can be mainta ined without controlling the state,
through the left 's acceptance of st ructures previously im -
posed by t he right. That the right is successful in this re-
ga rd owes much to t he rep ress ive legacy of the milita ry
regimes in each country, even if democracy is the on ly op-
tion in all three cases. The effect of t he left's self-restraint
has been to fash ion a right that has constituted a ' loyal
oppos it ion'.
That loya l op pos1t1on owes much to the acce ptance of
the political and econom ic model by t he centre-left govern -
ments in the three cases. The reasons fo r this may va ry: the
model was willingly adopted in Ch ile, wh ile in Uruguay and
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Argentina acceptance owed much to the const raints faced
by leftist actors. In Chile, du ring the two decades that it was
in government, the centre-l eft Concertaci6n alliance ma in-
ta ined t he va rious econom ic, social an d political structu res
left by the military regime. Thi s inclu ded some of the ear-
liest structural ad justment p rogrammes on the continent,
which had foll owed the recommendations of t he mone-
tarist-in-s pired 'Ch icago boys'. However, t he process of
economic libera lization in t he 1980s had been una ble to de-
velo p in a vacuum: increasingly, auste rity led to social re-
sent ment and deman ds for po litica l refo rm, an d this culm i-
nated in rejection of Pinochet 's continuation in power in a
1988 referendum.
By contrast, in Uruguay and Argentina t he dom inant

inte rests of the right we re assured less by gove rnment ac-
tion t han by the adm inistrations ' ina bility to imp lement
change. In Uruguay, for exam ple, although both the trad i-
tiona l centre-right Co lora do (Coloured) and Blanco (Wh ite)
pa rties introduced a series of neolibe ral econom ic reforms
after 1985, these we re never implemented to the same de-
gree or extent as in Ch il e. One of the ma in reasons fo r this
was the constitutiona l provi s ion t hat allowed ce rta in mea-
sures to be st ruck down by civi l society-generated
ple biscites - fo r examp le the 1992 referen dum vote aga inst
the privatization of all state-owned ente rprises (Chavez
2008). Desp ite th is op pos ition and the event ual victo ry of
the centre-left Frente Am plio (Broad Front) coa lition in
2004, the right cou ld be assu red t hat the 'pink tide' wou ld
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not wi pe out its econom ic measu res: internal diffe rences
with in the Frente Amp lio, and its focus on social welfa re
and human rights, meant that it adopted a mo re pragmatic
and ideologica lly mode rate st ance t han its supporters fur-
ther on the left would have liked (Panizza 2008).
In Argentina a centre-left p resident, the Peron ist Nestor
Kirchne r, had come to poweri in the wa ke of t he 200 1- 02
financ ial cris is. Alt hough he sent out an ea rly s igna l that he
would reject IM F con d it iona lity an d wou ld focus on greate r
redist ribut ion , he was unable to cha ll enge the structu ral
powe r of the right. On the one hand , the right benefited
econom ical ly through the government's reliance on eco-
nom ic growth to navigate ou t of the cris is. Instead of state
control, it was dom inant-class inte rests in the commod ity
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secto r that took advantage, t hrough an export boom fue ll ed But whi le t he right may form a 'loya l oppos it ion' in all
by the peso's deva luation. But whereas the previous benefi- three cases, it differs in its organ ization. In Ch il e and
cia ries had been large landowners who produced beef and Uruguay, both po litical pa rt ies and the pa rty system a re
wheat, it was now la rge landowners who produced soya mo re conso lidated than in Argentina. This ensures that
beans (Richardson 2009,; Wolff 2007.; Bo ris and Malche r voter choice fo r the left and the right is more discernib le in
2005). On the othe r hand, Kirchne r was unab le to wea ken the former two than in the latter. That Ch ile and Uruguay on
the right's politica l influence by the mid -point of his fi rst the one s ide and Argentina on the othe r have such d iffe r-
te rm. Socially, the suppo rt he had from those sectors that ences owes much to the ir respective ex periences in the
had suffe red in 2001- 02 became progressively weake r. years prio r to the military regimes that preceded the cu rrent
Politica lly, his efforts to bui ld a 't ransversa l' coalition be- democracies (Angell 197.2,; Chavez 2008; Altman 2008).
tween the left wit hin an d outside the Peron ist Partido Justi- In Ch il e, a centre-left governing coa lition was const ructed
cia li sta (PJ, Justice Party) flounde red following oppos ition between t he Christian Democrats and the now mode rate
from within (Boris and Malcher 2005; Levitsky and Muri llo Socialists, whi le the right was d ivided between the more so-
2008). cia lly conservative Pinochet supporters in the Union
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Dem6crata lndepen diente (UD I, Independent Democratic d iscrimination an d the use of collective ba rga ining with
Union) an d the mo re Pinochet-sceptic ma rket reformers in trade un ions (Funk 2010). Meanwh ile in Uruguay the post-
the Renovaci6n Nacional (RN, National Renovation) 1985 system ensu red that t he left and centre-left Frente Am -
(6,ogell and Po llack 2000). These two parties' support is plio and Nuevo Es pacio (New Space) were joined by the
sustained on seve ral levels: by an electora l system that traditiona l centre-right Colo rado and Blanco parties. Li ke
ove r-represents the right; by the a ppea l of the RN's comm it- the cent re-right Ch ilean pa rties, the Co lorados and Blancos
ment to econom ic lib era lization among the better-off; and rely on a cross-class coa lition of the urban middle class an d
by the deve lopment of patron- client relations between the poo r, the support of the latter ach ieved th rough clienteli stic
UDI and poo rer urban ne ighbou rhoods. The success of this netwo rks (Altman 2008; Panizza 2008).
coa lit ion was felt in January 2010 with the election of the By cont rast, in Argentina party politics has been largely
RN's Se bastian Pinera as Chile's fi rst centre-right pres ident dominated by the Peron ist PJ since the 1980s. The on ly
since democracy's return and its emp loyment of Con - cha ll engers to its position, the midd le-class Union Cfvica
certaci6n -e ra rheto ric and practices, includ ing the use of Radica l (UCR, Radica l Civic Union) and the centre-right
subs idies an d benefits to the poor, rejection of Union de l Centro Democratico (Un ion of t he Democratic

Cent re) saw the ir support d rain away - in the case of the
fo rmer after the 2001- 02 financial cris is; in the case of the
latte r fo ll owing its leaders' and cad res' dese rt ion to the PJ in
the wa ke of Carlos Menem's pres idential election victory in
1989 (Boron 2000). The fact that the PJ is dominant reflects
the incorporation of different political streams s ince the
time of Juan Peron, and also its main aim of balancing the
competing demands of left an d right through the use of
co rporatist organ izations for business an d labou r - al-
though the forme r's concerns have tended to t riumph ove r
the latte r's. That the PJ comb ines both the left an d right
within it ill ustrates why Kirchner had such diffi cu lty in
bui lding a leftist coa lit ion during his pres idency.
The 'problematic' right in opposition: Paraguay, Venezuela,
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Bolivia and Ecuador
Wh il e Argentina, Chi le and Uruguay present exam ples of
a ' loya l' right, the same cannot be said of the right in Bo-
livia, Ecuado r, Venezue la and Paraguay. In these count ries,
the right has lost political (if not econom ic) power to the
left over the past deca de. The lack of organized politica l
power has a rgua bly made it easier for the left in the fi rst
three countries to pu rsu e constitut ional reform in order to
'refound' the state. The first to do so was Venezue la in
1998- 99, followed by Bolivia and Ecuador in the last
decade. The effect of t hese measures has been to exac-
e rbate tensions between left an d right, includin g uncertainty
ove r whether the latter rema ins committed to the changing
struct ure of power in each.

That the Venezuelan , Bolivian and Ecuado rian left has
reached this crit ical moment, wh ile Paraguay has not, is due
to the social and politica l changes in each country since the
1990s. While all four countries were subjected to structura l
ad justment and economic li bera lization in the 1980s and
1990s, this occu rred aga inst a backdrop of steadily decli n-
ing political parties, especially of the right, and of the grow-
ing strength of socia l movements. But whereas Bolivian and
Ecuado rian parties have not played much of a role s ince the
1980s, it is the decli ne of the Venezue lan parties and party
system that is the most s ignificant. From t he 1950s until
1998 two parties, Acci6n Democratica (A D, Democratic Ac-
tion) and Pa rtido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (CO PE i,
mo re fully the Comite de Organizaci6n Po l1tica Electora l
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lndepend iente - Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela o r
the Committee of Independent Po litica l and Electora l Or-
gan ization - Social Ch ristian Pa rty of Venezue la) , domi -
nated pres idential elections. They we re always pragmatic
rathe r than ideo logical, and tlhis reflected t heir factiona l na-
tu re and patron- client linkages with va rious interest
groups, both ins ide and outs ide the state (CoP-P-edg~
2000). The ir privileged posit ion endured so long as they
we re able to buy sup port thro ugh thei r use of oi l revenue.
The decli ne in oi l prices and t he need fo r greater state effi-
ciency and economic diversity co incided with government
libera lization measu res, wh ich un leas hed social protest and
politica l instab ility, including seve ral coup attempts du ring
the 1990s. In 1998 the politica l outs ider, Hugo Chavez, was

elected. Though he d rew support from across society, it
was not until the mid-2ooos th at he began to institu-
tiona lize it by building a po litica l party.
In Bolivia and Ecuador, politica l parties (and especially
those on the right) had become largely redundant by the
late 1990s. In stead much of the po litica l pressu re was ex-
erted by social movements, and thi s saw success ive presi-
dents resigning befo re the end of the ir terms. In Bo livia, the
most vis ible social movements of the period were asso-
ciated with the left, includ ing groups opposed to water pri-
vatization, the ind igenous communities and the cocalero
(coca producers) trade union , from wh ich Evo Mora les
emerged as a leader and eventua lly successfu l pres idential
candidate in 2005 for the left-wing Movimiento al
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Socialismo (MAS, Movement towa rds Sociali sm) party.
Meanwhile in Ecuador ind igenous identity played less of a
role in th e emergence of the left, with the progress ive de-
te rioration of po litica l stab ility in the late 1990s and 2000s
due to various manoeuvrings across the left and right, in -
cluding between different social movements, the mi lita ry
and po liticians (Ph il iP- and Pan izza 2011 ).
By contrast, in Paraguay the right remains a dominant
politica l force through the Colo rado pa rty and sections of
the Libe ral party which joined Lugo in his election coa lit ion.
Indeed, Pa raguay demonstrates t he most consolidated of
the four po litical and party systems: unti l 2008 the Co l-
o rado pa rty enjoyed a monopo ly on politica l power th rough
both a persona list dictatorship under Genera l Stroessner

unti l 1989, and the use of corru ption and patronage s ince
(Lambert 2000). The large Colo rado parli amenta ry pres-
ence in Pa raguay effectively ended the prospects of any con-
stitut iona l reform and deepening of democracy in that
country. In the absence of any strong social movements
and thei r support, the Lugo government has been unable to
pus h through its programme, including t he use of ta rgeted
social poli cies, agrarian, jud icial and tax refo rms (see Lam-
bert below).
Given the const ra ints he has faced in Paraguay, Lugo has
been unab le to pu rsue the same kind of constitutiona l re-
fo rm that has sought to cha ll enge t he right in Venezue la,
Bolivia and Ecuado r. But even in those count ries there have
been differences: whereas the left gove rnments in Bo livia
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and Ecuador were ab le to dominate the reform process, and
include important references to communitarian just ice and
ind igenous rights, in Venezuela Chavez's 1999 constitut ion
was more modest, includ ing a refe rence to the right to pri-
vate prope rty. Desp ite the defeat of the traditiona l parties,
they still reta ined s ignificant su pport in the early yea rs of
the Chavez presidency (Sanchez 2008; Hedgecoe 2008;
Crabtree 2009-9.).
The ro le t hat constitutiona l reform plays in wide r st ruc-
tu ral change has not gone unnoticed by the right in each of
these countries. Among the most visib le of these elements
of reform are efforts by the leftist pres idents to weaken the
material wealth of the dom inant class and the ir cliente li stic
links through the state app ropriation of revenues and the

redist ribution of these. But wh il e this resu lted in nationa l
confl ict in Venezuela, in Bolivia and Ecuador it exposed re-
gional and ethnic divisions in society. In Venezuela the
Chavez government rep laced the managers of the state oil
company wit h its own su ppo rte rs and built up a pa rallel
we lfare system through the misiones (missions, socia l
provision programmes). These changes prompted an esca-
lation in confrontation between Chavez and the right after
200 1, which encouraged the pres ident to ado pt ru le by de-
cree and his right-wing opponents to exp lore avenues both
constitutional (fo r exam pl e, the 2002- 03 general strike and
the 2004 recall election) and extra-constitutional (such as
the 2002 coup attempt). Furthermore, it was over consti-
tutiona l reform, when he presented his second package in a
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referendum in 2007, that Chavez suffered his first signif-
icant defeat in a national vote.
In Bo livia, t he Mo rales government sought greater red is-
tri bution of tax revenues, wh ich led to op position from the
wea lt hier, pro-market criollo (of Span ish descent) commu-
nities in the eastern lowlands. Already agitated by greater in-
d igenous rights within the constitutiona l reform, t hey re-
sented their declining politica l representation and the grow-
ing dom inance of a non -white, anti-ma rket left in govern -
ment. The absence of st rong nationa l parties on the right
meant that this opposition coa lesced into conservative
autonomy movements, wh ich demanded greate r regiona l
representation for the eastenn de pa rtments of Santa Cruz,
Tarija, Beni and Pando (Eaton 2006 , 2009,; Crabtree

2009.§.). Their agitation was felt through growing su ppo rt
fo r a cou p in August 2008, and rejection in those provinces
of the proposed new constitution, which was passed in a
January 2009 referendum by 61 per cent to 39 per cent.
Simi lar regional pressures and d ifferences have also
emerged in Ecuador between demands for greater auton-
omy by the increas ingly wea lthy bus iness sector in the port
city of Guayaqu il, which accounts for 26 per cent of GDP
and 40.5 per cent of tax reven ues, an d the preference of the
left ist gove rnment in Quito to red istri bute state resources
to the poo rer, ne ighbouring high land commun it ies. Like
Chavez and Mo rales, Pres ident Rafael Correa has face d
o pen revo lt. In Janua ry 2010, he announced details of an al-
leged right-wing cou p plot that, he asserted, was backed by
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the US gove rnment an d right-wing US grou ps. In Se p-
tember of that year, an attempted cou p fa il ed. During the
figh ting, Co rrea was seized by re bel police, only to be res-
cued by loyal troo ps.
Conclusion
The end of the Cold War led to much d iscussion a bout
an 'end of history', as socialist ideology withered away and
libera l democratic forms of gove rnment and market
economies re placed state-directed econom ies and re pres-
sive regimes in South America. A decade late r, the ta lk was
not of the success of the ma rket and libe ral democracy, but
rathe r of their fa il ure. Moreover, whe reas in the 1980s and
1990s the right was viewed as the great beneficiary of t he

changes, by the mid -2ooos the talk was of the left and what
it woul d do to deal with the situation.
The answer, it seemed, depended on what the s ituation
was. In the mo re conso lidated an d socially sta ble democ-
racies such as Chi le, Brazil an d Uruguay, centre-left govern-
ments sought ad just ments at the ma rgin through targeted
social spending, but avoided any actions that might un de r-
mine t he right's power. By contrast, in places like
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, where politics was in fl ux,
the result was mo re confrontationa l and contributed to
greate r social an d po lit ical pola rization between left an d
right.
These different developments put pressu re on the right.
Just as the left had to change in t he 1980s an d 1990s, so
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the right is ta king stock of a d ecade of rule by the left. Most
notable in this res pect is the growing ro le of the state in so-
cia l (if not economic) policy. Few candidates of the right
propose scrap ping the targeted, cond itional cash transfe rs
pa id to the poo r in retu rn fo r t hem sending the ir ch ild ren to
schoo l, for exam ple. That they do not see any need to drop
such programmes reflects t he modesty of the changes in
Brazi l, Chi le and Uruguay. Mo re cha ll enging for the left
must be how to ensure the iright's participation in - o r at
least non -dis ruption of - change. Argentina provides an
example of such efforts runn ing into the ground; in
Venezuela, Bo livia, Ecuado r and Paraguay they remain both
o pen and uncertain.
Indeed, the main cha ll enge ove r the coming decade may
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be not for the right, but rathe r fo r the left in how best to en - a source of conce rn, especially in re lation to possib le or ac-
gage the dom inant class. Although t he right has lost po lit- tua l coups, as ill ustrated by right-wing reactions across
ica l power in some cases, it continues to hold material South America to the coup in Honduras in 2009.
wea lt h - and t his can be used against its opponents. There-
fo re, so long as the left does not cha ll enge dominant-class
inte rests, t he right can be relied upon to support t he polit-
ica l system. This re inforces the concern fe lt at the begin-
ning of the 1990s: to what extent is t he right a democratic
acto r? On the one hand , its associations with conservative
social groups, such as the Church, its support for t rad i-
tiona l fam ily structu res and its rejection of abortion and
alte rnative sexua lities place it d iamet rica lly opposite the
growing li be ralizat ion in South Ame rican societ ies. On the
othe r hand , its cond it iona l suppo rt fo r democracy must be
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The United States of America and the Latin
2 / is never sourced, and the historian who has combed the ar-
American right ch ives most thorough ly finds no written evidence. He notes
that the printed phrase pre-dates Somoza's presi dency and
GRACE LIVINGSTONE
concludes: ' It seems quite pllaus ible that one of t he most
recurrent quotations of inter-American historiography origi-
'Somoza's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch.' The
oft-quoted remark attributed to President Frankli n D. Roo- nated with Somoza rathe r t han with Roosevelt. The lan-

sevelt high lights an enduring featu re of US foreign policy: guage, certain ly, was much mo re Somoza's style, an d the

when choosing allies, it is not t he form of government that notion conveyed wou ld have served him well ' (Crawlex

most concerns US policymakers, but whether those govern- 2007_;_]_53). The revis ionism, howeve r, need not go too far:
Somoza may have hyped his 'friendship' with FDR, but t he
ments suppo rt the econom ic and st rategic interests of the
United States. The Nicaraguan dictator Anastas io Somoza United States did fund and arm the Somoza dynasty. When

was, of course, just one of a number of Latin American Somoza came to Washington in 1939, Roosevelt persona lly

d ictators that Washington has backed. met him at t he rai lway station with fu ll mi lita ry honours,

But did President Rooseve lt actua ll y say it? The quotat ion and he spent a night at the Wlhite House.

The rema rk has endured because it neatly sums up the
practice of US policy in Latin America for almost two cen -
tu ries. There a re plenty of ot her sou rced (a lthough less
pithy) quotations that revea l a sim il a r tolerance of d ictators.
FDR's milita ry attache for Central Ame rica, Co lonel Joseph
Pate, wrote in 1939:
As long as the present dictators of Central Ame rica do
not swing in their aims an d am bitions and policies in the
direction of European total ita rian ism, they undoubted ly
re present the best, most secure, and most efficient sys-
tem of government these sma ll re publi cs can have at
thei r present state of politica l infancy. (cited in Crawlex
2007~54)
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The influential State Depa rtment adviser George Kennan
mused in t he early 1950s: ' It is better to have a strong
regime in powe r than a libe ral one if it is indulgent and re-
laxed an d penetrated by communists' (Livingstone 2009.;,
is). Rona ld Reagan's adviser, Jeane Kirkpat rick, tortuous ly
made t he d istinction betwee n totalitarian (pro-Soviet) an d
authorita rian (p ro-western) regimes, providing the most
brazen intellectua l defence of the 'our-son-of-a-bitch' argu-
ment anyone coul d wish to read :
Only inte ll ect ual fash ion ... [prevents] intelli gent men of
good will from perce iving the facts that t rad it iona l autho r-
itarian gove rnments are less re pressive than revo lu-
tionary autocracies, that th ey a re more susceptible of lib -
era lization , and that t hey a re more compatib le with US

inte rests . (Kirk12atrick 1982: 4.9., em ph asis in the origina l)
Mo re recently, Geo rge W. Bush s howed that secu ring a
pro-U S regime was more important t han defend ing demo-
cratic procedure, when his adm inistration openly we lcomed
the 2002 co up against the elected pres ident of Venezue la.
US interests in Latin America have remained fai rly con -
stant over the past century an d a ha lf: the promotion of sta-
ble ca pitalist gove rnments, whethe r el ected or not. US
co rporations want access to ma rkets, commodities an d
sometimes cheap la bour, wh il e t he US state needs to se-
cu re key strategic assets such as oil . It also seeks li ke-
minded governments that will su pport t he US diplomat-
ica lly and that will coo perate m ilitari ly, idea lly allowing US
fo rces to use ports and airst rips and to construct radar and
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inte lligence systems across t he hemis phe re, enab li ng the
US to ma intain its reach as both the regiona l hegemon ic
power an d a global superpowe r.
Historica lly, right-wing governments have best suited US
inte rests - if, by right-wing, we mean pro-bus iness; in
favou r of private property rights an d law and o rde r; and
susp icious of trade un ion activity. Wash ington has always
regarded with deep suspicion any attempts to redist ribute
wea lt h or mob ilize the poo r, and keep ing reformists an d
revolutionaries out of office has been a pe rsistent theme -
one might say obsession - of US policy s ince the t urn of
the twentieth century. Right-w ing pa rt ies and the military
have therefore been the beneficia ries of US fun ds, tra ining
and inte lli gence to ha lt the advance of the left. Exce pt in a

very few cases, it wou ld not be accurate to say that the Unit-
ed States has determined who governs in Latin America;
but it has acted as an obstacle to reform, by supporting t he
parties and institutions most li kely to prevent radica l redis-
tri bution or upheava l. Conservatives in Lat in Ame rica and
the United States may also share certain social and reli-
gious va lues: anti-abortion, ant i-homosexuality, a woman's
place is in t he home, the fam ily as the bed rock of society.
Howeve r, these va lues have not been t he prima ry reason for
fo rging internationa l alli ances. It is also worth noting that,
although for the past two decades the US has been pro-
mot ing neo li bera l, free-market capitalism, in the past Wash-
ington was wi lli ng to work wit h protect ion ist, intervention ist
governments, such as the Southern Cone military regimes
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of the 1960s and 1970s, so long as US co rpo rations were
allowed to sli p under ta riff walls and into the protected ma r-
kets. If the Latin American right moves back towa rds a more
deve lopmentalist attitude, the US cou ld tolerate this as long
as its corporations we re given access. In short, it seeks gov-
ernments that a re not just pro-business, but pro-US-
busi -ness.
New challenges to US hegemon ic strategy
This is especia lly importa nt today, as US hegemony has
neve r been so contested. Within Lati n America, the left-
wing Ali anza Boliva riana para los Pue blos de Nuest ra
America (AL BA, Bolivarian Alli ance for the Peop les of Our
America) is the most eye-catching cha llenge to US

dom inance, but just as impo rtant (and poss ibly mo re
en during) is t he creation of new regiona l bod ies: Un ion de
Naciones Su rame ricanas (U NASUR, Un ion of South Amer-
ican Nations) for South Ame rica (2008) and the Commu-
nity of Latin Ame rican and Ca ribbean States (2010 ), which
excludes the United States and Canada, but includes Cuba.
These new bod ies rival the O rgan ization of American States
(OAS) , which, s ince its creation in 1948, has all owed t he US
to set the agenda fo r hem ispheric affa irs and , at its worst,
has been little more t han a too l of US inte rests. Pe rhaps
even mo re wo rryi ng for Wash ington is the dive rsificat ion of
the region 's econom ies and t he growi ng d iplomatic and
econom ic li nks to As ia, Russ ia, Euro pe and Th ird Wo rld
countries. Gove rnments of all po litica l pe rsuas ions have
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ove rcome any ideologica l avers ions to seek invest ment
from Ch ina , and Ch inese penetration of Lat in America is
now one of the US 's top security conce rns. US econom ic
influence in the Southe rn Cone, in pa rticu la r, has been se-
vere ly e roded: the Un ited States is no longe r t he la rgest in-
vesto r in Ch ile and Argentina. Trade shows the same pic-
tu re: Brazil, Chil e and Argentina sell less than 15 pe r cent of
their expo rts to the Un ited States; the markets of As ia, Eu-
rope and Latin America a re just as impo rtant for t hese
countries. Under Pres ident Lu iz Inacio Lu la da Silva, Brazil
became a lead ing playe r in bu il ding alli ances of develop ing
countries, such as those of Brazil , Russia, Ind ia and Ch ina
(BRIC) ; Ind ia, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) ; and t he G-20,
which a re ch ipping away at the US's dom inant pos it ion in

the United Nations and othe r inte rnational forums. Brazi l is
now a major chal lenge r to become the hegemon ic power of
South America. The challenges to US hegemony were out-
lined by Genera l Douglas Frase r, head of the US Southe rn
Command, the US military command res pons ible fo r all of
Latin America south of Mexico, when he testified to Con -
.
gress 1n 20 10:
The US can no longer take for granted that our way of life
is t he sole ideology of choice in this region. We must
now act ive ly compete to ensure ou r message is accu -
rately t ransmitted and rece ived by the a pp ropriate audi -
ence. Popu li sm, socialism and democracy are all now
preva lent ideas within the region. Money, t rade, and
other interaction from expanding players like China,
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Russia and Iran exist in Lat in America and the Caribbean.
We are also beginning to see a renewed polarization in
the region. All of t hese facto rs comb ine to form a com-
petit ive ma rketp lace of ideas, within wh ich non-
traditiona l acto rs have become very adept at operating.
(US Southern Command 2010: 13)
In th is sh ifting landscape, the United States has a num-
ber of st rategic aims: to mai nta in its m ilita ry hegemony in
the region , pursue cond it ions favou rable to US corpo-
rations, and bu ild an alliance of countries ideo logically and
d iplomatica lly opposed to the ALBA. Stemming the Chinese
tide and maintaining the influence of the OAS and othe r
US-dom inated regiona l bodies are other key aims. Right-
wing gove rnments are crucial! to the Pentagon because the

US does not own any mi lita ry bases in Latin America, and is
reliant on fr iend ly governments to lend or lease it fac ilities.
Sma ll , econom ically ins ign ificant states can play a vital ro le
in hosting US forces, for examp le Hondu ras, Aruba, Cu-
rac;ao and El Salvado r. Pro-market governments are also
important to US corpo rations, which have two ma in strate-
gies in the region: first, inco rporating Mexico and Central
America into the US production process. Secondly, by
using cheap la bour in maquiladoras (assem bly plants in ex-
port zones), US manufacture rs can compete with Ch inese
imports in the US domestic market. In South Ame rica, the
United States has given up, for the moment, its pu rsuit of a
Free Trade Area of the Ame ricas, but is seeking access to
markets and commodities on a state-by-state basis. Th is,
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incidentally, gives it greate r leverage, because in each bil at-
eral t rade negotiation the US is by fa r the stronger partner.
For now, the global financ ial cris is has also tempe red the
aggress ive expans ion of US compan ies into Latin American
services, such as banking, te lecoms and basic utilit ies,
such as wate r, that was so evident in the 1990s and early
2000s, and wh ich in tu rn provoked the wave of left-wing
movements opposed to privatization and the sale of natura l
resou rces to foreign corporations.
O bama, Venezuela and H onduras
Like all US presidents, Barack Obama will strive to ma in-
ta in the US's pre-eminent position in the wo rld, to secure
the state's access to vita l commod ities such as o il , and to

favour pro-US market-based states. US fore ign po licy is
shaped by a number of agencies: the State Department, the
White House, the Pentagon and inte lli gence agencies, Con-
gress and, ind irectly, corporations, the media and thi nk
tanks. But with in these parameters, Obama does have room
to carve out a different fore ign po licy from that of George
W. Bush - one th at places a greater emphasis on mu lt il at-
eralism, respect for human rights and negotiation. Never-
theless, to date, Barack Obama has allowed the Pentagon
and right-wi ng repub licans to dominate his fore ign po licy in
Latin America. Thi s is most clear in his response to the
Honduran coup. Obama cou ld have ta ken tougher action
aga inst the coup regime, which wou ld have enhanced his
standing in the eyes of moderate Latin America and
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argua bly furthered US long-term interests.
Although Obama might have been expected to ta ke a less
aggressive stance towards Venezuela an d the other ALBA
countries, his po li cies are unchanged from those pursued
in the second ha lf of the George W. Bush administration,
when the State Department, un der the pragmatic leadership
of dip lomat Tom Shannon, eschewed overt confrontation in
favour of quiet funding of opposition groups and subtle
propaganda against Venezue la and its partners. This is be-
cause all branches of the US government regard the ALBA
countries (Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
Dom inica, Saint Vincent and the Grenad ines, Antigua and
Barbuda) as incompatib le with US interests, as this inte l-
ligence report makes clear:

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has established him-
self as one of the US's fo remost inte rnationa l det ractors
... [Chavez] is li kely to continue to sup port li keminded
politica l all ies and movements in neighboring countries
and seek to underm ine moderate, pro-US governments ...
He and his allies a re like ly to oppose nea rly every US pol-
icy init iative in the region, including the expansion of free
trade, counter drug and counterterrorism cooperation,
milita ry t ra ining, and secu rity initiatives, and even US
ass istance programs. (US Senate 2010a: 30-1 )
Chavez's anti-US rhetoric, his li nks with Russia, Iran and
Ch ina, and his promotion of new inter-Ame rican bodies
co rrode US hegemony in the region, whi le the national-
ization of Venezuelan companies cuts out US investors .
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Most crit ica ll y, there is growing conce rn about the security
of US oil supp lies. Some US ana lysts suggest that
Venezue la cou ld switch sup pl ies to Ch ina as ea rly as 2012.
This rings ala rm be ll s within t he secu rity services and indi-
cates that the confl ict with Chavez will become sharper in
coming years (Ellis 2009: 110).
When left-wing Pres ident Manue l Ze laya was flown out of
the country in his pyjamas by the Hondu ran air force in
June 2009, Obama had the opportun ity to make history by
taking firm action to reverse the coup d'etat. The Un ited
States wields enormous powe r over the sma ll Hondu ran
economy: it buys two-thirds of Honduran exports, and is by
far the largest fore ign investor. O bama condemned Zelaya's
expu ls ion and cut off some aid , but he refused to define it

as a 'mi litary coup', wh ich, un der US law, wou ld have
fo rced his administ ration to cut all economic, military an d
d iplomatic ties. The US am bassado r was not withd rawn
and, crucially, Honduras was not suspended from t he Cen-
tral American Free Trade Area. The Obama administ ration
encouraged talks led by Costa Rica to d iscuss Zelaya's re-
tu rn, but the Hondu ran elite rema ined int rans igent. As the
months dragged on, right-wing Repu blicans led by Senator
Jim DeMint began to open ly support the coup, and black-
mai led O bama by refus ing to approve his nominations for
d iplomatic posts in Lat in America un less his gove rnment
agreed to recognize the resu lts of fresh Honduran elec-
tions, rega rdless of whether Zelaya was re instated. Right-
winge r Porfi rio 'Pepe' Lo bo won the high ly controve rsia l
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presi dential elections in Decembe r 20 10 , wh il e opponents
of the cou p continued to suffer a rbit rary detentions, torture
and sexua l vio lat ions, according to the Inte r-American
Commiss ion on Human Right s.
Obama was not prepa red to expend po litical ca pital in
Wash ington on reversing the Hon duran coup, but this
stance seve rely ta rnished his image in Latin America. On ly
Colomb ia, Peru, Panama an d Costa Rica recognized the
elections: an ind ication of how fragil e the right-wing al-
liance is in Lati n Ame rica. All other majo r countries ob-
jected, includ ing Brazil, wh ich seized the mo ral ground
from Obama by giving Zelaya sanctua ry in its em bassy in
Teguciga lpa; and impo rtantly Mex ico, whose right-wing
presi dent, Fe li pe Ca lderon, exp ressed concern a bout the

con du ct and legitimacy of the poll .
Although it al ienated many governments in Latin Amer-
ica, the outcome su ited US interests: an ALBA government
topp led; a pro-business pres ident more pliant to US inte r-
ests install ed; and the protection of one of the US's most
im portant mi lita ry bases in Latin America. For right-wing
Repu blicans, s upporti ng the coup made pe rfect sense. Otto
Reich, a cont roversial figu re who held high-ranking posts in
George W. Bush's adm inistration an d was a key player in
the Iran- Contra affair under Reagan, spell s out how neo-
conse rvatives viewed the stakes in Hon du ras and how they
see the battle ahead in Latin America:
The ma in threat to the peace, freedom, prosperity and
security of the US and the hemis phere does not come
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from mil ita ry cou ps, but from a form of cree ping totali-
tarian ism se lf-described as 21st Century Sociali sm and al -
lied with some of the most vi rulent forms of tyranny and
anti-weste rn ideology in the wo rld . Today in Latin Amer-
ica, democracy is being un de rmined by a new gang of
autocrats who, counseled by the oldest dictator in his-
to ry, ga in power thro ugh elections and then d ismantle
democracy from within . Fo ll owing Fide l Castro's d irec-
tion, that has alrea dy ha ppened in Venezue la and Bo livia;
is hap pen ing in Nicaragua and Ecuador; almost ha p-
pened in Honduras, and cou ld hap pen in any other na-
tion that fa ll s into the grasp of something called ALBA, o r
the Bo livarian Alte rnative for the Americas ... In spite of
its alliances with Russia, China, Bela rus, Iran, Syria,

magnate Gustavo Cisne ros, whose Venevis i6n offices were
the meeting place fo r the cou p leaders on the afte rnoon of
the coup.
The IRI receives grants from the United States Agency fo r
International Deve lopment (USAI D) and from the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), as we ll as from corpo-
rations such as Chevron and Halli burton. The IRI chai rman
is t he 2009 presidentia l candidate john McCain. It was Mc-
Cain's fo rmer legis lative counsel, john Timmons, who in-
vited a delegation of Honduran coup su pporters to Wash-
ington a month afte r Zelaya's ousting 'to clarify any mis-
understand ings a bout Honduras's constitutional process
and ... the preservation of the country's democratic insti-
tutions' (cited in O'Shaughnessx 2009.2.)- The US
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ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Lo rens, had previously
been on the US National Secu rity Council du ring t he
George W. Bush adm inistrat ion at the time of t he anti-
Chavez coup, along with Otto Re ich and Elliot Ab rams, an -
othe r veteran of the Iran- Contra affair. Lo rens had been in
regu la r touch with the oppos ition and was well awa re of its
plans. He had warned Zelaya of one coup plot, but fai led to
te ll him about the conspiracy that topp led him. His state-
ments after the coup we re o paque and ambiguous.
The last piece of the puzz le was john Negroponte, an -
othe r notorious neoconservative who, as ambassador to
Honduras during the Reagan yea rs, had defended the
repress ive Hondu ran military. He visited the country a yea r
before the coup, meeting both Roberto Micheletti, who

magnate Gustavo Cisne ros, whose Venevis i6n offices were
the meeting place fo r the cou p leaders on the afte rnoon of
the coup.
The IRI receives grants from the United States Agency fo r
International Deve lopment (USAI D) and from the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), as we ll as from corpo-
rations such as Chevron and Halli burton. The IRI chai rman
is t he 2009 presidentia l candidate john McCain. It was Mc-
Cain's fo rmer legis lative counsel, john Timmons, who in-
vited a delegation of Honduran coup su pporters to Wash-
ington a month afte r Zelaya's ousting 'to clarify any mis-
understand ings a bout Honduras's constitutional process
and ... the preservation of the country's democratic insti-
tutions' (cited in O'Shaughnessx 2009.2.)- The US
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ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Lo rens, had previously
been on the US National Secu rity Council du ring t he
George W. Bush adm inistrat ion at the time of t he anti-
Chavez coup, along with Otto Re ich and Elliot Ab rams, an -
othe r veteran of the Iran- Contra affair. Lo rens had been in
regu la r touch with the oppos ition and was well awa re of its
plans. He had warned Zelaya of one coup plot, but fai led to
te ll him about the conspiracy that topp led him. His state-
ments after the coup we re o paque and ambiguous.
The last piece of the puzz le was john Negroponte, an -
othe r notorious neoconservative who, as ambassador to
Honduras during the Reagan yea rs, had defended the
repress ive Hondu ran military. He visited the country a yea r
before the coup, meeting both Roberto Micheletti, who

became presi dent of the interim coup regime, an d the lead -
e r of the Sup reme Court, anothe r key figure in the coup.
Negroponte expressed concern that Zelaya planned to open
up the Soto Cano airbase to comme rcia l flig hts. Soto Cano
is one of the most im portant US bases in Latin Ame rica: the
500 t roo ps of Jo int Task Force Bravo a re based there, as a re
600 civilian cont ractors. The t hreat to the security an d se-
crecy of US o perations on th is military base was one reason
why neoconservatives were sympathetic to the cou p.
Whether or not US conservatives he lped to plan it, they
we re voca l in their support fo r it once it ha d hap pened.
These ha rd-li ners want to roll back the tide of left-wing gov-
e rnments and t urn back the clock to the days when coups
we re common practice. Hond uras was the wea kest li nk in
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the chain.
Confl ict over US m ilitary bases
Since US fo rces left the Pa nama Cana l Zone in 1999, the
United States has been re liant on fr iend ly governments to
len d or lease it milita ry fac ilit ies (see Figure 2.1) . This has
become increasingly d ifficu lt as left-wing gove rnments have
come to power in Latin America. The Pentagon signed ten -
year leases in 1999 fo r t he use of airbases in Aruba, Cu -
rac;ao, Ecuador and El Salvador. The left-wing presi dent of
Ecuado r, Rafael Co rrea, refu sed to extend the lease on
Manta when it exp ired in 2009 and US forces have now left.
The lease on Comalapa base in El Salvador was exten ded
fo r a fu rt her five years just before left-winger Mau ricio
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Funes was inaugurated as pres ident, so he was not given
the opportunity to expel US t roops; but the Pentagon will be
concerned that the long-term fu ture of its Salvadoran base
is in doubt. As we have seen, US officia ls had expressed
fears about President Zelaya's plans to open up Soto Cano
base. Down south, in Paraguay, in 2006, the US ambas-
sador inaugu rated a base com plete with state-of-the-a rt
radar systems funded entirely with US money, but there is
no agreement fo r US forces to use this fac ility, and Pres-
ident Fernando Lugo is un li kely to sign any such dea l.
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operations support at the US Army South base in Apiay,
The extent of the US 's officia l military presence, illus- Co lomb ia, is Richa rd Armit age (the neoconservative for-
trated in Figure 2 .1, is obscured by the use of US private mer deputy secretary of state) ; Richa rd Kerr (former
milita ry contracto rs. Accord ing to a declass ified re port, de puty director of the CIA); and Lt Gen. Minihan (the for-
ha lf of all US military aid to Colom bia in 2006 was
mer di rector of the Defense Inte lligence Agency).
awarded through private contractors (US DeP-artment of
State 2003) . These included: DynCorp, Lockheed-Ma rt in,
In other ways, too, progress ive governments are loos-
ARIN(, King Aerospace, ITT, Oakley Networks, ManTech,
en ing the historically tight a lli ance with t he US milita ry.
North rop Grumman , Te lford Aviation , PAE Government
Latin Ame rican elites once gave US Green Be rets free rein in
Se rvices, Omn itempus, CAC I, Tate, CC E and Chenega.
their mounta ins and rainforests , and schooled their own
ITT operates Colomb ia's milita ry radar s ites , includ ing
office rs in US academ ies. But today, Argentina, Venezuela,
San Andres, Riohacha , Marandua, San Jose del Guavia re,
Bolivia and Uruguay have withdrawn from the School of the
Tres Esqu inas and Bogota. Many of these compan ies em -
Americas, the noto rious ins titution which boasts eleven
ploy former mi litary or inte lli gence pe rsonnel. On the
Latin American dictators among its graduates. Ecuado r and
board of ManTech, fo r example, which provides base

Nica ragua are likely to withdraw the ir so ldiers, and Costa
Rica, which has no army, has pull ed out its po lice cadets.
The School of the Americas used to be based in the Pan a-
ma Cana l Zone, but has now moved to Fo rt Benning, Geor-
gia and has a new, anodyne name: Western Hem isp here
Institute fo r Security Coope ration.
US mi lita ry hegemony is fray ing in Latin America, and it
relies heavi ly on right-wing administ rations to ma intain its
abi lity to o perate in the region. As the Southern Com-
mand 's ten-year st rategy makes clear, one of its ma in goa ls
is to: 'Wo rk through po litico-military and d iplomatic chan -
ne ls to en hance U.S. military freedom of movement
throughout t he Western Hem isp here' (US Southern Com-
mand 2008: 11 ). It is in this context that the Obama
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administ ration signed a deal with Co lomb ia in 2009, all ow-
ing US fo rces to use seven named Co lomb ian bases. The
State Depa rtment said the deal related on ly to security mat-
te rs within Co lomb ia, but neigh bouring countries fea red its
real purpose was to cement US mi lita ry power in the region .
The publication of a US Ai r Fo rce budget justification, sent
to Congress earlie r that year, suggested that thei r susp i-
cions were justified. The air force as ked Congress for $46
mi llion to expand one of t he Co lomb ian bases, Pa lanquero,
and it stated, ' Pa lanquero provides an oppo rtunity for con-
ducting full spectrum ope rations throughout South America
.. .' (emphasis added). 'Full spectrum ope rations' is Pen-
tagon jargon fo r dom inati ng the battle space on land, at
sea, in the air and in space. It can include nuclear weapons.

The document contin ued:
Development of this CSL [base] provides a uni que op por-
tunity for full spectrum ope rations in a crit ical sub region
of ou r hem isp here where security an d stab ility is under
constant threat from narcotics fun ded terro rist insur-
gencies, anti-US governments, endemic poverty and recu r-
ring natural disaste rs. (US Congress 2009: 217.., empha-
s is added)
The offend ing paragraphs we re rap id ly deleted, but it
showed that Pentagon planne rs had cons ide red the strate-
gic va lue of the Co lom bian bases fo r the ir regiona l and
globa l ope rations. This analys is was confi rmed by a nothe r
US Ai r Force think-pa per, 'G loba l En Route Strategy', which
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showed how the Pa lanq ue ro a irbase slots into a wo rldwide
netwo rk of 'en-route' ai rbases, giving US aircraft ra pid
'glo bal access' to areas of strategic interest. A base at Palan -
que ro, it stated, wou ld give t he US Ai r Force t he capacity to
'cover the entire continent, w it h the exception of the Cape
Horn region' (US DeP-artment of Defense 2009: 22).
The deal with Colom bia allows US forces to use two
naval bases at Ca rtagena and Malaga, which give US forces
strategic access to the Pacific and Atlantic; two a rmy bases
at Larand ia an d Tolema ida; an d three airbases at Ap iay,
Malam bo and Pa lanquero. Of t hese, Palan quero is t he most
im portant. It wi ll have the capacity for la rge transport ai r-
craft , such as C17s, to land. These aircraft can ca rry tanks,
helicopte rs or large num be rs of troops, and have been used

in Afghan istan an d Iraq. US forces, however, a re not lim ited
to these bases. The US may use as many military bases or
faci lit ies as it likes, with the perm iss ion of the Co lom bian
government. US fo rces have ha d an info rma l, irregu la r pres-
ence on many Co lom bian bases for some years, includ ing
Tres Esquinas in the south - a part of the count ry dom i-
nated by the FARC - and at Arauca on t he Venezuelan bo r-
de r. The remit for US forces is extremely wide: the bases
can be used ' in o rder to address common threats to peace,
stabi lity, freedom, and democracy'. The agreement does
contain a noninte rvention clause, but Latin American gov-
ernments do not t hink the wording is watertight . Brazil and
Argentina, for examp le, issued a st rongly wo rded statement,
saying that the bases were ' incompatible with the principles
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of res pect for the sove reignty and the te rritorial integrity of
states within the region' (Argentine Ministrx of Fo reign
Relations 2009.). Most of the text of the agreement focuses
on which taxes the US will be exempt from. It wi ll not have
to pay road tolls, overfl ight o r land ing fees, harbour fees,
ent ry o r departure fees o r im po rt taxes. It does not need li-
cences to construct satellite commun ication systems, and
US veh icles and planes cannot be inspected by Colom bian
fo rces. US personnel wi ll be immune from criminal prose-
cut ion (assuming t hat clause is ratified by the Co lomb ian
authorities). These threats to Co lom bia's own sovere ignty
have caused some unease within t he country. A broad-
based coa lition, which includes the country's la rgest t rade
union federations, has been estab li shed to oppose the

bases dea l. Co lomb ia's Constitutiona l Court has ordered a
review of the agreement, saying it could vio late the consti-
tution .
In add ition to leas ing agreements in Latin America, the
United States also uses a num ber of airst rips and airports
on an informa l, ad hoc bas is for refue lli ng and minor re-
pa irs. These a re known as ' li lypads' and, again, the Pen-
tagon relies on li ke-minded gove rnments fo r access. US
Southern Command occasiona lly uses Tocumen airpo rt in
Panama for refue lli ng and US counter-drugs forces use a
num ber of sites in Peru. The US Coast Guard (but not the
mi lita ry) has used Liberia in Costa Rica. To enhance its
mi lita ry reach across the region, the US reactivated the
Fou rth Fleet of the US Navy in 2008, des pite protests from
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Brazi l. The Fourth Fleet pat ro ls the waters of Latin Ame rica
and the Ca rib bean. Su rveying t he region from the ai r a re the
Southern Command's AWACS rada r planes.
The Un ited States now regards Colom bia as the 'h ub' of
its mi litary operations in Lat in America, and it seeks like-
minded right-wing gove rnments that will allow its fo rces to
rema in. With in Co lom bia, the Pentagon has pursued fo r
mo re than a decade a hawkish po licy of encouraging the
most hard -li ne sections of the Colom bian elite to go for all -
out victo ry aga inst left-wing guerrill as, however elus ive t hat
victory may be and however much mo re bloodshed it caus-
es.
ALBA and US subversion

Most ALBA states fa ll within the US's sphere of influ-
ence. Cent ra l America and the Ca rib bean a re, of course, the
United States' t rad it ional 'backyard', but many of the An-
dean members, such as Venezue la, Ecuador (and Co lom -
bia) , have also typica lly relied heavily on trade and invest-
ment from the United States. All the mainland ALBA coun-
tries were once firm mi lita ry allies of the United States. US
poli cymakers may view with a certa in res igned acceptance
the econom ic and d iplomatic diversifi cation of the South-
ern Cone, but they thin k there is st ill all to play for in the
ALBA region. They do not regard the left-wing regimes in
the ALBA countries as permanent, but as unstable and sus-
cept ib le to pressure. Fo r this reason, the United States is
heavily funding oppos ition grou ps, right-wing NGOs and
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business organizations in all the AL BA states. Fa r from fa ll -
ing under the Obama adm inistration, US fund ing for
democracy promotion in Venezuela has actua lly risen, com-
pared with the last two yea rs of the Bush administration.
The $5 mi ll ion USAI D funding all ocated for Venezuela in
2009 was channelled entirely through the innocuous-
sound ing Economic Social Fund - a s pecial fund for direct-
ing money 'to countries based on considerations of specia l
economic, po litical or security needs and US interests'. The
on ly other countries where o ppos ition groups receive all
their USA ID grants through this account are Cuba, No rth
Korea and Cyprus. The NED, w hich was found by the US In-
spector Genera l to have funded groups 'actively involved' in
the anti-Chavez coup, gives generous sums to opposition

groups in Venezue la (US De12artment of State 2002: 3).
Bo livia, as one of the poorest count ries in the region, re-
ceives one of the la rgest USA ID grants. Much of this aid
goes to genu ine poverty-re lief programmes, albeit chan -
ne ll ed through US-vetted NGOs that promote private ente r-
prise. But some USAID funds in Bolivia have been used fo r
ove rt ly politica l purposes, as shown by documents ob-
ta ined through a freedom of info rmation request by jou r-
na li st Jeremy Bigwood. 'Sensitive, but unclassified ' USAID
proposals for 2007 included plans to s pend money on
' Public Di plomacy Programs' to 'counter attacks on the US
Government (including USAI D) from sen io r levels of the
Government of Bo livia, including President Mo rales and
key m iniste rs'. USAI D also proposed to 'bui ld and
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consolidate a network of graduates who advocate fo r the
US [Government] in key areas ' and fund provincia l govern-
ments in t he various sub-nationa l departments, some of
which have spea rheaded the oppos ition to Pres ident
Mo rales (USAID 2007.; 2008). As for NE D fund ing in 2008,
it is notable that by fa r the la rgest grant, $300,000, was
given to the IRI, wh ich played such a controve rsia l ro le in
the Venezue lan cou p. Right-wing groups in Ecuador and
Nica ragua also receive generous fund ing from USA ID and
NED.
The right in most ALBA countries remains a fo rm idab le
fo rce, backed by economic elites and large private med ia
outlets. In some countries it controls regiona l or loca l gov-
ernments. The Un ited States is cu ltivating the right and

centre-right oppos ition to un de rm ine the ALBA govern-
ments and pave the way for t heir re placement with mo re
amenable administrations. In one country - Cu ba - O ba-
ma 's po licy is ma rked ly diffe rent from that of George W.
Bush, although fundamenta lly it is a d iffe rence of tactics.
Both s hare the goa l of en d ing one-pa rty rule in Cuba, but
Obama cautiously began to test the theo ry, long advocated
by some Democrats, that engaging with Cuba was mo re
likely to bring down the regime than were isolation po licies.
Obama lifted Bush's restrictions on t ravel and rem ittances,
making it poss ible for Cub an Americans to vis it and send
money to relatives. He all owed US mo bile phone operato rs
to provide services to the is lan d to improve commun i-
cations, an d started mid-level gove rnment ta lks with the
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Cubans. The Bush adm inistration a ppointed a 'trans it ion
coordinator' an d wrote a huge ly am bitious pl an for restru c-
tu ring Cuba afte r the fall of communism. O bama froze $40
mi llion that Bus h had all ocated for democracy promotion in
Cuba, to examine where exactly the money was be ing spent.
The death of hunge r st riker O rlando Za pata Tamayo in Fe b-
ruary 20 10 prompted O bama to ma ke his ha rshest criticism
to date of Cu ba and, whi le he welcomed the Cu ban govern -
ment's su bseq uent re lease of all the US-supported d issi -
dents jai led on treason changes in 2003, he continued to
insist t hat the em bargo would not be lifted .
There is no question that Cu ba lacks the basic freedoms
of a libe ral democracy, not least mu lt iparty elections. The
question for Latin Americans is whether the United States

has the right to interfe re in internal Cuban affa irs to create a
regime more to its liking. All the othe r ALBA gove rnments
are free ly elected. Leaving aside the US med ia, wh ich often
gross ly d istort events in these countries, US officials regu-
larly crit icize democratic fai li ngs in the ALBA countries. In
some cases, the criticisms a re va lid - Dan iel Ortega's dub i-
ous sup pression of an oppos ition party, for example, or
Chavez's media restrictions, interfe rence in the jud iciary
and prosecutions of politica l opponents. In other cases, the
claims a re unsubstantiated - such as the cha rges leve ll ed at
Venezue la of harbouring te rrorists or drug t raffickers - and
can be seen as a diplomatic and propaganda attempt to dis-
credit t hese governments. In all cases, the re is a certa in
hypocrisy in the way the US portrays events in countries
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that a re its allies, rather than its enemies. The State Depa rt-
ment and the White House h igh light human rights fa il ings
in Venez uela, but downp lay abuses in Co lomb ia, even
though all independent bodies, such as the Un ited Nations,
say human rights vio lations a re far worse in the latter.
Colombia, Mexico and the 'war on drugs'
If the US is pursuin g regim1e chan ge through civi l society
acto rs in Venezue la and Bo livia, it is the Pentagon that is
most clearly driving policy in Co lomb ia. The US mi lita ry has
long been concerned a bout C,olom bia: in 2000, the head of
the Southern Command described it as t he most th reatened
nation in the region. Plan Co lombia, a counter-drugs strat-
egy, but one with a clear counterinsurgency aim, was

launched that same year. Afte r 11 September 2001, Pres-
ident Geo rge W. Bush removed any pretence that the US
was not invo lved in the war aga inst left-wing gue rrill as and
lifted restrictions on mi litary aid, so it was no longe r li mited
to counter-na rcotics but cou ld also be used to combat 'ter-
rorists'. Th is was a move t hat t he Pentagon had long
thought necessa ry but which, before t he attacks on the
Twin Towe rs, had been politica lly untena ble. Pres ident
Obama has not s imp ly continued Geo rge W. Bush's po li cy,
but has intens ified it, disregarding many Democrats ' con-
cerns about human rights to s ign t he above-mentioned deal
allowing the US to use seven military bases in Co lomb ia.
There is strong evidence that these bases a re not on ly in-
tended to support security policy wit hin Co lomb ia, but are
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also to mainta in the US mi lita ry's reach throughout Latin
America. The victory of right-wing continuity cand idate j uan
Manuel Santos in the 20 10 pres ident ial election, after an
unexpected ly close race with t he Green Party, was a reli ef to
US mi litary planne rs, although a Co lomb ian Sup reme Court
ruling that Uribe had short-circuited his legis lat ure when
signing the bases dea l he ld up its imp lementation in 2010.
Mexico has always had a special place in US- Latin Amer-
ican re lations, and now that the two countries are part of
the Nort h Ame rican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), their
fo rtunes a re even more entwined. Mexico is an integral pa rt
of t he US production process, alt hough not all US busi-
nesses and landowners are reconci led to NAFTA. Broadly
speaking, free t rade has be nefited la rge corporations and

landowners on both s ides of the border, at the expense of
sma ll firms, peasants and the organ ized working class (a
high proportion of those emp loyed in the maquiladoras are
young women who are banned by emp loyers from joining
trade unions). Cheap maquiladora labour is vita l to US
corporations seeking to drive down production costs and
compete with China. Many Mexican businesses have also
profited as export trade has soared. Large US corporations
want a right-wing government in Mexico to ensure that this
economic mode l continues. But Mexico is current ly suf-
fer ing a crisis of violence. In part, this stems from a change
in the structu re of the drugs trade, as Mexican t raffickers
have taken over the sa le and distribution from Co lombian
cartels. In part, too, just as in Co lombia, the economic
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model exacerbates the vio lence, as large numbers of land-
less, unemployed young men join armed d rugs gangs. One
of the injustices of NAFTA is that, wh ile it has thrown many
Mexicans off the land or out of work, they are forbidden
from seeking emp loyment or a better life over the borde r.
The US response to the vio lence has been to pour in la rge
amounts of US mi litary aid, and Mex ico has now overtaken
Colombia as the largest recipient of US mi litary aid in Latin
America. One consequence is t hat the Mexican police and
army, which for most of the twentieth century were wa ry of
co ll aborating with the US mil itary, are working more closely
with their US counterpa rts than ever befo re. But even right-
wing governments in Mexico share this historic wa riness of
the Un ited States, whose highhandedness can still cause

resentment. Business-friend ly pres ident Vicente Fox, for
example, was insu lted when the Bush adm inistration de-
cided to buil d a wall along the border without even con -
sulting t he Mexican government. Fo r this reason, all Mex-
ican gove rnments try to mainta in a certain level of inde pen -
dence in foreign po licy; they have often refused to back the
US's Cu ba policy, an d President Felipe Ca lderon 's attitu de
to the Hon duran cou p is anothe r recent exam pl e.
Prospect s of sympathetic relations in th e Southern Cone
and Brazil
The victo ry of right-winger Sebastian Pine ra in Ch il e's
presidential elections of 2010 was an important politica l
boost to Wash ington. Pinera will be an ideological al ly,
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sup porting the pro paganda offens ive aga inst ALBA an d
helping to shore up US d iplomatic influence in the region.
He has already echoed US criticisms of Chavez, s poken of
the continued importance of the OAS, and may even defend
the US mi lita ry presence in Co lom bia. A glance at Ch il e's
trading part ners, howeve r, shows that US econom ic influ -
ence has greatly receded in Ch ile. The country may have
signed a free trade dea l wit h the US, but it has sim il a r
agreements wit h Europe, Ch ina an d other As ian count ries.
Ch ile has been the regiona l leader in developing links with
Ch ina and , with we ll -equi pped ports on the Pacific, will ben-
efit if other Latin American count ries t rade more with As ia
(a lthough Ecuador is rapi dly t rying to upgrade its ma in po rt
to gain a sim il ar advantage) . US com panies ope rating in

Ch ile will face com petition and will not necessa rily reap
benefits from having a right-wing gove rnment in powe r; in
any case, the centre-left Concertaci6n gove rnments imp le-
mented broad ly neo li bera l po licies, wit h poverty-reduction
plans as a me re palliative. Pinera will be im po rtant, diplo-
matica lly, for the Un ited States, but wil l his government be
able to negotiate from a pos it ion of relative independence?
Argentina, which has had the loosest econom ic t ies to the
US, is in a simi lar position.
Th ere is no doubt that Jose Serra of the Partido da Social
Democracia Bras ileira (Social Democratic Pa rty of Brazil ),
the mo re right-wing can didate, wo uld have been the US's
preferred victo r in Brazil's 2010 elections. As president,
Luiz Inacio Lula da Si lva had irked Wash ington by leading
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o ppos it ion to the coup in Honduras, criticizing US military
expans ion in Colomb ia and refus ing to condemn Chavez.
His Pa rtido dos Traba lhado res (Worke rs' Pa rty) successor,
Pres ident Dilma Vana Rousseff, will not be changing
Brazi l's fo reign po licy. The shee r size of Lu la's Brazil gave
we ight, muscle and gravitas to the new left in Latin America,
and it was the real driving force behind regional integration.
Pe rha ps for this reason the US has t ried to strengt hen the
right in Brazil: recent freedom of information requests show
that USA ID funded efforts to promote politica l refo rms that
would stop party fragmentation, a problem that besets the
right fa r mo re than the left (Davila 2008). Nevertheless
Serra, an economist who studied at Co rnell and Princeton,
would not have fundamentally changed Brazil 's

autonomous fore ign policy, which the country pursued
even under the mi lita ry regimes of the 1960s and 1970s.
Serra could have ended dia logue with Iran's Pres ident
Ahmad inejad and might have d istanced Brazil from
Venezue la, but he wou ld have been wary of joining a US-led
anti-Chavez camp. He might not have been such a stan-
da rd-bear- for Thi rd Wo rld count ries as Lu la had been, but
he would have continued to work with India, Russia, China
and other developi ng count ries internationally. As health
ministe r in the Cardoso adm inistration, Serra had stood up
to the United States when it tried to stop Brazil manufac-
tu ring generic (non -patented) anti-AlDS d rugs . Not on ly do
Brazi l and t he United States com pete to be the dom inant
geopolitica l vo ice in South America, but they a re also d irect
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economic competitors, man11..1fact uring many of the same
products, and th is gives rise to regu la r s pats over t rade.
Conclusion
US hegemony in Latin Ame rica, once a dura ble certa inty,
is waning. The rise of the left is pa rt of the explanation, and
the US wi ll continue to promote market-friend ly, pro-US
parties in the region - and pa rt icu la rly in the ALBA bloc -
not least to sustain its ca pac ity to operate mi lita rily across
the region. But the econom ic strength of the emerging
countries (B raz il , Ch ina, Ind ia), the diversification of the
South American econom ies, the growing li nks between
Latin Ame rica and As ia, Africa and Euro pe, and the inter-
regiona l integration are all long-te rm cha ll enges to US
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dominance t hat a re un li kely to be reversed. The US will see k
fr ien ds and all ies in Latin Ame rica. That is uncont roversia l.
The question is whet he r it uses subterfuge and coe rcion, or
negotiation and com prom ise.
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3 / Unearthing the real subversives: the US
state, right-wing think tanks and political inter-
vention in contemporary Latin America
GERALD INE LI EVESLEY
Wash ington 's efforts to subvert the 'pink tide' - both gov-
ernments and popular movements - are the latest phase in
a long histo ry of intervention in Latin American affai rs. The
US state's po licy pos itions have been informed by right-
wing think tanks, which receive substantial federa l financia l
support and wh ich, th rough the ir membership of institu -
tiona l networks, have been responsible for interna-
tiona lizing the US 's ideo logical ambitions. Du ring t he days
of the George W. Bush adm inistration, these cent red upon
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neo li bera li sm, nationa l security and the 'War on Terror '.
The influence of conservative pseudo-inte ll ectua l lobbying
is not a new phenomenon. One can t race its li neage back
through the Co ld War, with the creation of such institutions
as Freedom House (1941) , whose aim it was to supp ly the
inte ll ectual bu ll ets in the wa r against communism. Th is was
never, of course, just a war of words, but was put into prac-
tice in the US mano duro (strong hand) policy of supporting
d ictatorships and death squads under the aegis of the
School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Geo rgia, whe re the
Latin American mil itary were taught counterinsurgency
techniques; in Operation Condor, wh ich was set up in 1975
by Latin American governments, in co ll aboration with
Wash ington, to hunt down and assass inate left-wing

politicians and activists; and through t he endo rsement of
counte r-revolutionary insurgency, such as the Nicaraguan
Contras. In the 1990s, Wash ington ado pted a mo re ' refined'
approach towa rds facilitating the s pread of 'mi lita rized' o r
'guardian' democracies, by wh ich governments handed
ove r non -military tasks invo lving domestic security and
inte lligence to the mi lita ry, in such areas as dru g traffi cking,
insu rgency, immigration and counteracti ng anti-
privatization movements (McSherrx..19,9~)-
The N ew American Century
In 1992, a d raft ' Defense Plann ing Gu idance' produced
whi le Dick Cheney was secretary of defence and written by,
among othe rs, Paul Wo lfowitz and I. Lewis Li bby (both
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stalwarts of the th ink tanks, pa rticularly the Nationa l
Endowment for Democracy (N ED), and late r Bush gove rn-
ment a ppointees) was lea ked to the press, caus ing the
White House to issue a hasty repud iation, although Cheney
agreed to its pub lic release the foll owing yea r. It can be
seen as the precu rso r of the Bush doct rine, as it prioritized
national security, economic neolibera li sm and untram-
mell ed access to resources for US corporations, and iden -
tified 'new threats' originating from poverty, inequa lity and
co rruption. The document made it clea r t hat the wa r against
guerri ll as, traficantes (d rug traffickers), social act ivists and
te rrorists was going to be mi lita rized and that popular
movements and governments critica l of Wash ington's poli-
cies wou ld be targeted. It was also exp licit in its contention

th at popular op position to neoliberal privatization of nat-
ural resources, such as water and gas, was unacceptab le,
since it slowed down the acquis it ion of such resou rces by
transnational ca pital. As Spron k an d Webber have argued:
'when social movements and the state negotiate over nat-
ural gas, they are effectively struggli ng over the fu ture t ra-
jectory of t he state' (~P-ronk and Webber 2007.: 2 ) . In 1991,
Bolivia became one of the first count ries to accept condi -
tiona l aid and debt relief under George H. W. Bush's Enter-
prise for the Americas Init iative, which, in its desire to en -
courage t rade, private investment and st ructura l ad just-
ment, was an early vers ion of the free-t rade area strategy.
Imp licit in this was the unde rstanding that governments
would act swiftly and savage ly against sectors of the
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popu lation that repud iated th is economic model.
The broader ideo logica l picture, particu la rly wit h respect
to US national security, was enca psu lated in the vision of
the 'New American Centu ry'. The Project for the New Amer-
ican Century was esta blished in 1997 'to ral ly suppo rt for
American globa l leaders hip' and was arguab ly the most
influential advocate of neoconservatism until its dem ise in
2006. As with all the think tan ks, it brought together a
broad coalition of right-wing t hinkers: veterans such as El-
liott Abrams and No rman Po dh oretz; a younger gene ration
of ind ividua ls like Wo lfowitz; bus iness leaders; academics
such as Francis Fukuyama, aut hor of the triumpha li st 'end
of history' thes is; and po liticians includ ing Dona ld Rums-
fe ld, later George W. Bush''s secretary of defence, and

Cheney. The germ of its inception was an article pu blished
in Foreign Affairs in 1996. Written by William Kristol an d
Robert Kagan (later co-founders of the Project) an d entitled
'Towa rd s a Neo-Reagan ite Fore ign Policy', it called for a
willingness to use force un il atera lly an d pre-emptively; the
creation of a benevo lent globa l hegemony; a recogn it ion
that interna l enem ies ex isted - 'an indifferent America an d a
confused America'; and a 'fo reign policy of mi lita ry sup re-
macy and mora l confidence' (.Right Web 2008). As Geo rge
W. Bush's vice-presi dent, Dick Cheney clearly took on
boa rd the Project's 2000 'Rebui ld ing Ame rica's Defenses'
repo rt, written by Kristol, Wolfowitz, Kagan, Li bby and
Stephen Cambone, wh ich a rgued that there were no neces-
sary li mits on US powe r in the wo rld. It can be contended
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that Cheney used his po lit ical position in the Bush White
House to institutionalize attitudes and strategies long in the
making. Certainly the 'War on Te rro r' facilitated the consol-
idation of the Project fo r the New Ame rican Century's
o bjectives at the very heart of government. It can be a rgued
that while Bush was the figurehead for this wa r, Cheney was
its a rchitect. US hegemony wou ld recogn ize no bounds an d
would res pect no lega l conventions. Speaking on the te le-
v1s1on programme Meet the Press shortly afte r the 11 Sep-
tember 200 1 attacks, Cheney declared: 'We have to work the
da rk side ... A lot of what needs to be done ... will have to be
done qu ietly ... us ing resou rces and methods that are avai l-
able to ou r inte lligence agencies' (Goodman 2008:...2_).
Guantanamo, Abu Gh raib, ren dition, water boa rd ing, the
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use of 'b lack states' (prisone rs transferred to countries between external an d internal threats no longer existed. One
whose gove rnments had no com punction about torturing example was US suppo rt for Co lomb ia's incurs ion into
them) - al l would be emp loyed in pursu it of th is sh ining fu - Ecuado r in Ma rch 2008 in pursu it of guerrillas from the
tu re (Bromwich 2009: 10). Fuerzas Armadas Revo luciona rias Co lomb ianas (FA RC,
Following 11 September, the US was in no mood to brook Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co lomb ia); Washington
oppos it ion to its conso lidation of globa l dominance, to be saw this as self-defence. In sim il ar fashion, in Ju ly 2008 t he
accomp li shed by military means and by the formation of US decided to resu rrect its navy's Fou rth Fleet and redep loy
coa lit ions of its allies (such as the 2003 Coa lition of the it to patro l the Caribbean an d Latin American coastline (for
Willing, which included El Salvador, Hondu ras, Nica ragua the fi rst time since 1950). Thus revival of Co ld War military
and the Dom inican Repub lic, although most Latin and Cen- containment was also reflected in the existence of US mili-
tral American states demurred) . Wash ington believed it had tary bases in El Salvador, Curac;ao, Aruba and Ecuador (al-
the right to intervene in any count ry that challenged its au- though the lease on t he Man ta base in Ecuador was not re-
tho rity, that the a rgument of national sove reignty could not newed after its expiry in 2009) and t he announcement of
be used aga inst such interventions, and that the distinction seven bases in Colombia in October 2009 (see above). It

was also evident in US Southe rn Command's decis ion that
it would ma ke its own judgement concern ing 'ungoverned
spaces' that threatened US interests, rather than seeking the
ad judication of eithe r the O rgan ization of American States
(OAS) or the UN (Tokatlion 2008: 8 ).
When Latin America's left-lean ing governments ap-
pea red, there was intense US activity to destabi lize them,
exemp lified by the approva l given to the 2002 coup in
Venezue la. In 2006, then Secretary of State Condo leezza
Rice suggested that the OAS mon itor the internal po litics of
mem be r nations to ensure that they were adhe ring to 'the
norms of democratic procedure'; if they we re not, they
shou ld be subject to what she te rmed 'transformational
d iplomacy' - that is, t he rest ructuring of the ir inte rna l
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institutions (Grandin 2007.: 22). The OAS rejected what was
seen as a crude effort to iso lat e Venezuela. Ironica lly, US at-
tempts to retain its hegemon ic position with regard to ot her
American states has led to growing assertiveness on the
part of many of t hose states and a greater sense of regional
identity and cohes ion.
Ginden an d Weld identify two forms of US interven -
tionism. One is 'hard power' - that is, good old -fas hioned
mi lita ry presence or its threat. The George W. Bus h adm i-
nistration was not ave rse to us ing t his, but it also 'ex-
pan ded key civi l an d po litical mecha nisms ("soft power") in
o rder to safeguard US inte rests wo rldwide' (Ginden and
Weld 2007_;_]_). Often hard arnd soft powe r worked hand in
hand. When Rona ld Reagan launched the NED in 1983, its

brief was to inte rvene on behalf of democracy whereve r it
was under th reat. Implicit in this was the notion that the
on ly acceptab le fo rm of democracy was one em bedded in
free-ma rket econom ics. Promoting such democracy has be-
come a mu lt ibill ion -do ll a rindust ry, with huge injections of
federa l money into institutions that a re not open to public
scrutiny or accounta bility. Much of t he activity of the think
tan ks is ostensib ly pub lic and legit imate, but some is
covert, particularly in terms of links to param ilitary organi-
zations. They essay d ifferent leve ls of penetration, whethe r
by encouraging subve rs ion aga inst elected governments
(for exam pl e, the ongo ing rebell ion of the Media Luna -
Half Moon - departments against Evo Mo rales' govern-
ment in Bo livia); wo rking to sup port US-oriented secu rity
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netwo rks (such as the Nationa l Academy fo r Pu blic Secu-
rity, founded in San Salvador in 2005); su pporting the use
of anti-te rrorist legis lation arnd strong-arm tactics aga inst
popu la r movements; or provid ing ammun ition in the cul-
tu re wa rs ove r abortion or ind igenous citizenshi p rights.
Washington has used its wa rs on drugs and te rrorism, as
we ll as its homeland security and imm igration agenda, 'to
institutiona lize a mi lita rism in the region that risks return-
ing us to the not so far off days of "d irty wa rs'" (Mxcha lejk.2,
However, this latest form of impe rial over-reach
2009.;_i).
has been met with increasingly stiff resistance from both
Latin American governments and peop les. Among a series
of re buffs that Wash ington expe rienced were the 2005 re-
pudiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (the 'jewe l

in t he crown' of Bus h's Latin America po licy), the expu lsion
of multinational companies and US am bassado rs, popu la r
protests aga inst privatization of resources, and the creation
of alternative institutiona l netwo rks, such as the Alianza
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuest ra Ame rica (A LBA,
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peop les of Ou r America) and its
Banco de l Sur (an ALBA alternative to t he Wo rld Bank),
which repu diate the ideological underp innings of the Wash -
ington Consensus and ca ll for sustainab le, equitable deve l-
opment. Furthermore, Brazil and Venezue la have spear-
headed an init iative to create a South American Defence
Council, from wh ich the US would be excluded, and the re-
gion has enjoyed growing econom ic and politica l li nks with
both China an d Russ ia, which wou ld have been unth inkable
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in t he past. Additionally, the Cancun Summ it in Mex ico in
Feb rua ry 2010 comm itted countries to the creation of a
Community of Latin Ame rican and Cari bbean States, wh ich
would include Cuba but exclude the US and Canada.
In the face of growing regiona l res istance, the US is no
longer in a position to dominate Latin America; but that is
not to say that Washington does not continue to try.
Colomb ia was the testing grou nd fo r Washington 's national
security state strategy, which comb ines eas ily with its com -
mit ment to protect oi l an d trade interests. There has been
intens ive lobbying by the major oi l compan ies to secure
their investments in Co lomb ia and safeguard futu re explo-
ration of oil reserves. In 2007, Chi qu ita Brands Interna-
tional was forced by the US justice De partment to pay a $25

mi llion fine for giving $1 mi llion to t he right-wing parami l-
itary Autodefensas Uni das de Co lomb ia (United Self-
Defence Un its of Co lombia) (Mxchalejko 2009,;,_j_). It was
rumou red t hat the secretary of homeland security, Michael
Che rtoff, knew of th is deal but did nothing to prevent it -
not the fi rst time that the actions of one branch of gove rn-
ment were at odds with those of another. In 2005, the then
Guatema lan president, Osca r Berge r, as ked fo r t he creation
of a Plan Guatemala along the li nes of the Co lom bian
model. The resu lt has been, acco rding to Amnesty Interna-
tiona l, a count ry full of 'clandesti ne groups', includ ing pri-
vate secu rity firms, crimina l gangs and retired an d sti ll serv-
ing military, which defen d elite and business inte rests
aga inst anti-globalization activists. In this sense, the 'Wa r
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on Terror ' (as the previous wa r on 'communist subve r-
sion ') has an elastic defi nition. As with t he Weapons of
Mass Dest ruction fa rrago in Iraq, the US is not adve rse to
exercises in imagination. The George W. Bush adm inis-
tration was adamant that Hamas and Hezbo ll ah were active
in the Tri-Bo rde r Area (where !Brazil, Argenti na and Paraguay
meet) and were forming links with both gue rrill as and drug
cartels, although it was unab le to provi de any co rroborating
info rmation.
Preaching counter-revolution: the role of the th ink tan ks
The wo rld of neoconservative think tanks is a la byrint hine
netwo rk of connected organ izations, with the same ind i-
vidua ls featuring in seve ral of them. People know each

othe r and they know people in government who share t heir
ideologica l vis ions and ce rta int ies. Some think tanks a re
very high profile, othe rs mo re circumspect. It is often very
d ifficu lt to trace a li ne of responsib ility for a particu la r ac-
tion, fund ing process or set of relat ionsh ips. Since its very
pub lic suppo rt for the fa iled Venezuelan cou p, the NED has
taken to outsourcing some of its activities to lesse r-known
o rgan izations, such as the Canadian Foundation for the
Americas, which t hen dis burse fun ds to anti-Chavez
groups, whi le other institutions - including fo rmer Spanis h
Prime Ministe r Jose Marra Azna r's Fundaci6n para el Anali -
sis y los Estu dios Sociales (FAES, Foundation for Ana lys is
and Social St ud ies) - promote the po licy o bjectives of t he
US Heritage Foundation . In an Ap ril 2007 He ritage Lecture
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entitled ' Lat in America: an Agen da for Liberty', Azna r de-
clared that FAES's major o bjective was to 'd ramatica lly de-
feat the project of 21st-century socialism' an d he identified
'the altermundialistas' (lite rally 'other worldists' - that is, ac-
tivists associated with the World Social Fo rum), ind igenous
movements and popu li sm as the new 'enem ies of the
West'. Latin America was faced with two roads lead ing in
oppos ite directions, and it h1ad to make a decision: 'One
leads to ... democracy, respect fo r indiv idua l rights and free-
doms ... This is the road t ravelled by successful count ries'
and is t he way 'to att ract investment ... and reduce pove rty';
the other road follows 'outdat ed ideas that created suffering
and misery in the twentieth centu ry' (Aznar 2007_;_3).
Let me sh ine a li ght on one majo r think tan k. The NED

has been described as 'the principal entity that promotes
the econom ic an d strategic interests of the US across the
globe as part of counte rinsurgency operations ' (Golingfil
201oa:_.1). To accom plish this, it pursues a mixture of
strategies. With res pect to gove rnments that are seen as
enem ies (Cu ba under the Cast ros, Nica ragua un de r the
Sand inistas, Venezue la under Hugo Chavez, Bolivia under
Evo Mora les, Hait i un de r jean-Bertrand Aristide), it wo rks
to promote 'democratic transitions' through politica l
desta bilization, media mis information, the fu nding of
o ppos it ion pa rties an d electora l man ipu lation. Mi ll ions of
dollars are spent on these activities, and even the most
ostensi bly ' lega l' - the aim of 'democracy promotion' - can
become high ly provocative. In May 2009, the Cente r for the
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Dissem ination of Econom ic Knowledge for Freedom
(founded in the ea rly 1990s in Venez uela with fun d ing from
the NED an d USAID) hosted an internationa l conference on
' Freedom and Democracy' in Ca racas. Prominent spea ke rs
such as Mario Vargas Llosa (nove li st an d losing pres i-
dentia l conten de r in Peru in 1990), Jorge Q uiroga (the ex-
Bolivian president defeated by Evo Mo rales in 2005) , Jorge
Castaneda (the e rstwh il e Mexican foreign minister) and
Francisco Flores (a former conse rvative pres ident of El Sal-
vador) joined membe rs of the Venez uelan oppos it ion in an
o pen debate a bout how to oust Chavez from power. Imag-
ine how such a gathe ring of peo ple plotting aga inst the
incumbent president wo uld have been rece ived in Wash -
ington, DC! USA ID estab li shed an Offi ce of Transition

Initiatives (OTI) in La Paz in 2004, a s imilar unit having
been created in Ca racas in 2002. The purpose of OTls in
Latin Ame rica and elsewhe re in the world has been to func -
tion as 'ra pid res ponse teams to police crises in countries
strategica lly important to US inte rests' (Golinger 2009a: 2).
The Bolivian OTI has provi ded tra ining worksho ps for polit-
ica l parties and has promoted the separatist projects that
led to t he regiona l referendums in the Media Luna depart-
ments of Beni, Pando, Tarija an d Santa Cruz - referendums
that were cha racterized by racism and a des ire to expro-
priate the count ry's gas and water reserves (see Tsolakis
below) .
In countries whe re po pular movements press for social
justice and mob ilize against neo liberal rest ructuring and
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privatization, the NE D attempts to s ho re up 'weak democ-
racies' - that is, it seeks to defend elite control (thus, in Bo-
livia, it rega rds indigenous activism as threaten ing the sta-
tus quo). It also seeks to strengt hen the grip on power of
governments (such as those of Colom bia, Peru and Mex-
ico) which ali gn t hemselves with US interests. In these pu r-
suits, the NED and its siste r organizations frequen tly ci r-
cumvent bot h the laws of the count ries in wh ich they o per-
ate and inte rnationa l law. The NED is 90 per cent funded by
federa l government, des pite the fact t hat it is a nongovern -
menta l organization. It li aises closely with the o rgans of the
US government, particularly tlhe White House, the State De-
partment, the CIA and the Pentagon, and receives bipa rt isan
sup port from Congress. It e nj oys a close relationsh ip wit h
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USA ID, which is all ocated bill ions of dollars to d isburse, di- the ideo logical penetration of civi l society (see Ludlam
rectly o r indi rectly, to 'ostensib ly private US organ izations below) . The N ED's po litical agenda is orchestrated by its
... wh ich are in rea lity closely tied to t he po licyma king estab- four core institutes: the Inte rnational Re publican Instit ute
lishment an d aligned with US foreign po licy'. The NED then (IRI), the Nat iona l Democrat ic Institute, the Center for In -
d istributes funds to a wi de spectrum of groups, includ ing te rnationa l Private Enterprise and the American Center for
politica l parties, trades un ions, bus iness, the media, profes- International Labo r Solidarity. Thei r pe rsonnel come from a
siona l o rgan izations and academ ics who a re port rayed as variety of backgrounds, includ ing t ransnationa l co rpo-
'in dependent an d non-pa rt isan but in rea lity ... become inte- rations, inte lligence an d ex-military networks, labour unions
gral agents of the t ransnationa l agenda' (Robinson 2007_; and private consu ltancy fi rms.
35) . In essence, this is the un iversalization of the Track 2 Loo king a little mo re closely at just one of these bodies,
(' peo ple to peop le') agenda ta rgeted at Cuba s ince the the involvement of t he IRI in t he a bortive 2002 coup in
passing of the Cuban Democracy Act (the Torricelli Act) Venezuela an d t he successfu l 2004 coup in Haiti is well
and t he Cuban Liberty and Democratic So lidarity Act known. In April 2002, the then IRI pres ident, George Fo l-
(Helms- Burton) in 1992 and 1996, respectively - that is, som, cele brated helpi ng 'Venezuelans forge a new

democratic future'. The NE D was furious with thi s pu blic
sup port for what was very soon a failed coup; it wanted US
invo lvement to be covert rathe r than trium pha li st. The IRI
was forme d in 1983 (and initia lly cha ired by John McCa in,
the Repub lican senator from Arizona) as pa rt of the Rea-
gan ite mandate to promote democracy. Th is remit led it to
sup port the Nicaraguan Contras, as well as death squads
and mi lita ry dictators hips. In effect, it constituted a 'lega l'
way of continu ing CIA operations, wh ich had become in-
creas ingly constrained by congressiona l scruti ny. The IRI
has also sought to influence the outcome of many elections
with the rem it of promoting 'good governance'. Thus, both
it and USA ID funded think tanks and pressu re groups in the
run -up to the November 2009 elections in Honduras.
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Under the guise of 'leade rsh ip tra ining', it su pported or-
gan izations such as the Archbi sho pric of Teguciga lpa, the
Honduran Private Enterp rise Council, the Confede ration of
Honduran Worke rs, the Chambe r of Commerce, the As-
sociation of Private Med ia an d the student group Gener-
ation XChange. Togethe r these forme d the Union C1vica
Democratica de Hondu ras (Democratic Civic Un ion of
Honduras) wh ich pu blicly backed the 2009 coup aga inst
Pres ident Manuel Zelaya. Susan Zelaya -Fenner, assistant
prog ramme officer at the IRI, speaking just befo re the cou p,
descri bed Hondu ras as a 'troub led state' racked by ram pant
co rruption, crime an d drug trafficking, wh ich was 'be ing
purposefully destabi lized fro m within ... Coups a re thought
to be so three deca des ago unti l now' (Golinger 20096: 2 ) .

She was virtually ca lli ng for a pre-emptive strike by the
right. The US government was awa re of cou p- monge ring.
Ass istant Secreta ry of State Thomas Shannon was sent to
Teguciga lpa the week before to try to broke r a deal to pre-
vent a coup, but the question remains: if Wash ington was
so anxio us to avoid vio lence, why had it contin ued to send
in USAI D an d IRI money, wh ich was help ing to fue l the
plotting?
The ideological o rigins of the NED itself can be located
in that st range netherworld where ext reme left can eas ily be-
come ext reme right. A num be r of its fo undin g members, in-
clud ing Ca rl Gershman, moved from Trotskyism to neocon -
servatism in the 1970s. Foll owing a s plit in the American
Socialist Party in 1972, Ge rshman and ot hers formed the
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Social Democrats/USA, a hawk ish foreign po licy lobby
which exercised cons ide rable influence ove r the AF L-CIO
labour confederations and t he Rep ublican Party. It en -
dorsed 'soft side' ope rations w ithin t rades unions and polit-
ica l pa rt ies (to oust rad ical left elements) and encouraged
conse rvative pu blishing houses. Given that secret CIA fund-
ing of political and cultu ral organizations had been proh ib-
ited by Congress, it and s imi lar groups we re ta king on that
role. The NED has wo rked in close conjunction with a num -
ber of organizations, includ ing Freedom House, wh ich was
foun ded by Wendell Willk ie an d Eleanor Roosevelt to s up-
port US invo lvement in Wo rldl Wa r II, before evo lving into a
lead ing anti-comm unist and now anti-ls lamist lob by. In t he
1980s, it channelled NED funds to the right-wing Alian za

Rep ub li cana Nacionalista (ARENA, Nationa list Republican
Alli ance) in El Salvador during that country's civil wa r and
to the Nicaraguan Cont ras. Other part ners have been the
Committee on the Present Danger, a Co ld Wa r group re-
vived in 2004 to engage wit h t he 'War on Terror', and the
Project for Democracy in Cent ra l America. This last organ i-
zation rece ived cove rt sup port from the Nationa l Security
Council's unofficial (and illega l) Project Democracy, ope r-
ated by Olive r Nort h an d Elliott Abrams d uring the Iran-
Contra scandal, as well as official USA ID money (Right Web
2007.) .Bush 's vice-pres ident, Dick Cheney, had a close as-
sociation wit h t he NED du ring his t ime as chief executive of
Hall ib urton between 1995 and 2000. He commiss ioned the
think tank to con duct resea rch into the effectiveness of
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emp loying private sub-contracto rs to figh t in wars; the find-
ings wou ld be put to good use during t he conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq , where co rporat ions such as Hal-
liburton we re emp loyed in th e privatization of state protec-
tion operations. A NED s pi n-off, Defense of Democracies,
was created in 2008 to use the media to press ure the
Democrat-led House of Representat ives into passing con -
trovers ial eavesd ropping legis lation .
In her boo k based on resea rch from documents released
under the US Freedom of Info rmation Act, Co li nger chron-
icled the N ED's interventions in recent Venezuelan politics
in terms of its su ppo rt fo r the Ap ri l 2002 cou p, the manage-
ment lockout an d oil st rike of late 2002 and early 2003, the
2007 med ia campa ign around t he withdrawa l of a

broadcasting licence from RCTV (Radio Ca racas Te levision
Internaciona l), and the 2004 and 2007 refe rendums. The
Sumate organization orchestrated the 2004 campaign.
When the lega l system attempted to bring it to court for re-
ceiving foreign - i.e. NED and USAID - funding to manip-
ulate a domest ic po litica l process, a state prosecuto r was
assassinated (Colinger 2007.).
Since the passage of the Helms- Burton legislation in
1996 (which st rengthened t he Cuban blockade) and t he cre-
ation of the US's Commiss ion fo r Assistance to a Free
Cuba in 2003 (which invested mass ive federa l fund ing in
plans to support d issident groups inside Cuba and to re-
bui ld t he is land's social and econom ic structures in pa rt-
ne rsh ip wit h multinationa l corporat ions once the Castros
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depart government), USA ID has spent millions of do ll ars
on support for a 'trans ition to democracy'. Much of this
expend iture has been mismanaged, acco rd ing to a Novem-
ber 2006 re port by the US Government Accountab ility Of-
fice, wh ich criticized USAI D fo r a lack of overs ight. It also
suggested that a great dea l of t he money had rema ined
within Cuban em igre circles i n Florida, whi le the cas h that
had been distributed to Cuban diss idents by the US Inter-
ests Section in Havana had been wasted on pe rsona l items
such as cloth ing and food (US Government Accountabilitx
Office 2006). The cont radiction between the need for a fed-
eral agency to show pub lic accountab ility and its partic-
ipation in corrupt and partisan practices was high lighted by
the a rrest on 4 December 2009 of an American citizen, Alan
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Gross, at Jose Ma rt i Internationa l Airport in Havana on a 'human ita rian miss ion'. In the wa ke of the Gross Affair, the
cha rge of espionage. Gross, who had arrived on a tourist Obama ad ministration fro ze USAI D funding, wh ile the
visa, worked for Develo pment Alte rnat ives Inc., wh ich, in House Committee on Fore ig1n Affai rs began to investigate
2008, had won a government contract that was part of t he the Cuban programme (Collins 20106; Landau 2010).
USA ID programme for Cu ba. He had previo usly been Gross was sentenced to fift een years' imprisonment in
linked to the 2002 co up in Venez uela, as well as to covert 2011 .

activit ies in Iraq an d Afghanistan, an d the re was speculation

Mult iple forms of intervention
that his organ ization was a CIA front (Collins 2010a). Ce r-
ta inly the Jewish gro up that he claimed to be su pporting There was s peculation that the Ba rack Obama adm inis-
through the distribut ion of la pto ps an d ce ll phones (wh ich tration, which took office in January 2009, might initiate a
he must have picked up from the US Inte rests Sect ion in sea change in te rms of the US state 's relationsh ip to both
Havana) denied all knowledge of him . Neve rtheless, in July the th ink tanks and Latin America. During the election cam-
2010, Secretary of State Hill a ry Cli nton cal led on Ame rican
pa ign , O bama released a somewhat am biguous policy
Jews to rally behin d Gross, who had been on a framework, 'A New Partnershi p for the Americas'. As

presi de nt, he prom ised to pursue po litical freedom and
democracy, includ ing freedom from fear and freedom from
want; but he also ta lked of extend ing the Me rida In itiative
(see below) to all of Latin America. The Inter-Ame rican Dia-
logue (a th ink tan k that numbe rs many forme r conservative
government officia ls among its Latin American members)
lob bied both presidential cand idates to com plete George
W. Bus h's policy agen da, and O bama ce rta inly comm itted
himself to Bush's Co lomb ian strategy. Although Obama en -
dorsed the ro le of the NED during the pres idential cam-
pa ign, the State Depa rtment's comment on the Venezuelan
referendum of 15 February 2009 was that this was an 'inter-
na l matte r' and that the re shou ld be no medd ling from out-
si de. It is, of course, im possib le to verify whether the NED
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was invo lved in su ppo rt ing the opposition (as it always had
been in the past), but the new adm inistration, indeed any
new adm inistration, m ight fin d it very d ifficu lt to re in in the
subterranean activities of it and other th ink tanks, given that
their a rch itecture of power is so embedded in the US po lit-
ica l system. It quickly became a pparent that t he O bama
administ ration was preoccupied with other areas of domes-
tic and fo reign policymaking, and that a sh ift in a pproach
towards Latin America was go ing to be put on the back
burner. Campa ign commitments and statements - includ -
ing recognition that the US had fa il ed in a number of areas,
such as drug cont rol and anti-arms trafficking; that there
shou ld be 'di rect diplomacy' with Cuba; that his adm inis-
tration wou ld rely on regiona l co ll aboration and a retu rn to

a Good Neighbour st rategy; and that t here might be a
renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NA FTA) - we re put to one si de. As a consequence, many
of the programmes and st rategies promoted during the
George W. Bush era (and often originating from the thin k
tanks) have continued. The impression that many Latin
Americans wi ll ga in from th is is that US po licy remains im -
pe rialistic and very much on the side of the right, t he m ili-
tary, the politica l and the bus iness elites.
El ements of this po licy cons istency include the ma inte-
nance and poss ib le deepening of Plan Colom bia (see Liv-
ingstone above, and Ra by be low) and rep lication of the
model in the Me rida Initiative (often refe rred to as Plan
Mexico). The creation of a Security and Prospe rity
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Partne rship was announced in March 2005 du ring a meet-
ing between Bush, Vicente Fox and the Canad ian premier,
Pau l Ma rt in, in Waco, Texas. As one of the bui ldi ng blocks
of NAFTA Plus, the Pa rtne rs hip's aim was 'to increase secu-
rity and to enhance prospe rity' (Carlsen 20086). In Ap ril
2007, Thomas Shannon, the then US assistant secretary of
state fo r western hem isphere affairs, boasted that 'we a re
re-armouring NAFTA', the implication being that US m ili-
tary power wou ld continue to be depl oyed to protect neo li b-
eralism. The Security and Prospe rity Partne rsh ip's remit
was inco rporated into the Merida Initiative in June 2008 .
This ca lled for a draconian crackdown on so-called ter-
rorism and on dissent (as re presented by Zapatistas, social
activists, women, ind igenous commun it ies and aspiring

migrants) as well as the fu rther militarization of the US-
Mexican border (Carlsen 2008a). Th is three-yea r, $1 bil lion
prog ramme (with much of the money all ocated to t he Mex-
ican military and police) suggested that nothing had been
learned from the fai lure of the mu ltib illion-dollar Plan
Colomb ia. Moreover, it fed into racist discourse north of
the border, which demonized ill egal immigrants and was to
reach its zen ith in legislation passed by the state of Arizona
in 2010 (a lthough subsequently challenged by t he judicial
system, the federa l gove rnment and the gove rnments of
Mexico, Ecuador and Argentina). It empowe red police to
check the immigrat ion status of anyone they stop ped, if
they had reasonab le susp icion that they we re in the count ry
illega lly. Crit ics a rgued that this wou ld lead to racial
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profi li ng and the ta rgeting of Hi span ics.
A sim il a r examp le of the com bination of social control
and the defence of neolibe rali sm occurred in El Salvador. In
September 2006, the right-wing ARENA government, led by
Tony Saca, int roduced anti-te rror legis lat ion based on the
US Patriot Act, which was utilized to arrest anti-p rivatization
protesters. In 2008, the US federa l budget gave $16.5 mil -
lion to fun d the Internationa l Law Enforcement Academy in
San Salvado r. This represented pa rt of a sh ift in US strat-
egy, in t hat t he secretive trai ni ng of Latin American mi lita ry
and po lice, previous ly conducted at the School of the Ame r-
icas (now eu phemistica lly kn own as t he Weste rn Hemi-
sp here Institute for Secu rity Coope ration) was being decen -
tralized. The El Salvado r facility enjoyed a la rge FB I and

Drug Enforcement Agency presence, and training pro-
grammes were run by private US security cont ractors such
as DynCorp Internationa l (Enzinna 2008: 2). Before agree-
ing to support the academy, the US insisted that its per-
sonnel shou ld be immune from charges of crimes against
humanity. This is ch illing in light of the fact that the Sa l-
vadorean Human Rights Defence Office has reported links
between the nationa l civi l po lice and death squads, with
repress ion being di rected against youth gangs as we ll as so-
cia l activists. Th is latest development shou ld not be sur-
pris ing, given Wash ington's su pport fo r brutal counterin-
surgency tactics during the civil war (during wh ich some
75,000 peo pl e we re kill ed). Following the 1992 Peace Ac-
co rds, t he Truth Comm iss ion re port of 1993 deta il ed US
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comp licity in these crimes, but the ARENA government im-
med iate ly passed an amnesty to pardon those res ponsib le
fo r human rights abuses.
One area where the US right-wing llob by and the th ink
tanks have t ried vigorously to influence government policy
in Latin America has been the fie ld of women's rights and
the contentious issues of fam ily vio lence, divorce, contra-
ception and abortion (on contraception, see Silva in this
vo lume) , and they have also organ ized to reject alternative
concepts of citizenship based on d iverse sexualities and
ethn icities. They have coord inated thei r campaigns with
conse rvative and re ligious voices from within the region.
Think tanks such as Vida Humana Internationa l (wh ich is
based in Miami) and the World Congress of Fam ilies

(located in Illino is) cam paign aga inst same-sex pa rtner-
sh ips, for premarita l ce li bacy, on the right to life and
aga inst the fem inist agenda. The World Congress sponsors
o rgan izations such as the Red Fam ilia (Fam ily Network),
which d issem inates these ideas to civil society, wh ile the
Vida Humana televis ion and rad io programmes - working
under the banner 'Defiende la Vida' ('Defend Life ') - are
broadcast t hroughout the His panic wo rld. These grou ps
adopt a m issiona ry ap proach towards saving Latin Amer-
icans from t he feminist and gay agendas, in a way remi-
niscent of t he o ld Co ld Wa r stance. However, they a ppear
unab le to stem progress towa rds equa l citizenship rights
fo r women, gays and les bians and indigenous commu-
nities. One such defeat for the right was the July 2010
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lega lization in Argentina of sa me-sex marriage and the right
fo r same-sex couples to adopt children. Right-wing politi-
cians and the Catholic Church condemned the new law -
fo r Cardinal Jorge Be rgoglio, the bil l was 'the wo rk of the
devil' (Geen 2010: 2 ) - but they we re in the minority in an
increas ingly secu la r (and , on e would like to say, more hu -
mane) society.
The exp los ion in the numb,e r of anti-immigration groups
in the US was stimulated both by a xenophobic reaction to
the open ing of the US- Mexico border, which NAFTA ap-
pea red to presage, and by the fallou t following 11 Sep-
tember 2001. The De partme1nt of Homeland Security was
created in Novembe r 2002; in March 2003 the Imm igration
and Natu ralization Se rvice was replaced by the Imm igration

and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). Its detractors
have argued that the ICE launched 'a war on imm igrants',
which intens ified after the agency's 2006 decision to begin
workplace and home raids to find and de port undocu-
mented imm igrants. It is estimated that many hund reds of
thousands have been deta ined, and many fami lies have
been bro ken up as a resu lt. Lovato has described it as the
'm ilitarization of migration po li cy' (2008: 15). Thousands of
additiona l Nationa l Guards have been posted to police the
bo rde r, and co rporations such as Ha llib urton and Boeing
have received multib illion-dollar contracts to provide rea l
and vi rtua l border walls, surveillance drones and sensors,
and migrant detention centres. This initiative - wh ich has
brought violence and death to t he bo rde rlands, territories
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already beset by the esca lat io n of the drug cartel wars - has
been closely ident ified wit h the anti-terrorism agenda. This
has all owed many fa r-right g roups to jump on the band -
wagon - such as the Miniuteman Civil Defense Corps
(armed volunteers who pat rol the bo rde r and have been
implicated in hund reds of cases of human rights viola-
tions), wh ite sup remacists, t he Ku Klux Klan , anti-Sem ites
and others. They, in t urn, belong to various networks that
also include smaller think tan ks, such as the Federation for
American Imm igration Reform, Engli sh Fi rst and Numbers
USA, which themselves are often in larger contact circles
that encompass state and federa l lobbyists, radio and te le-
vis ion pund its and t he right-wing press, as well as mo re
prominent think tanks. While the more viru lent make little

o r no attempt to mode rate their language, the mo re soph is-
ticated couch their protests in the form of rationa l argu-
ments a bout how immigration wi ll harm the economy o r
the envi ronment. Th is enab les them to have a fa r greater
impact on po licyma king processes (Larsen 2007..). It is a
constituency that would also feed into growing support fo r
the Tea Party in its attempts to divide the Repub lican pa rty
and refashion it as an anti-inte ll ectua l, homophob ic, racist
o rgan ization in the run -up to t he 2012 US presidentia l elec-
tions (Lilla 2010).
Concluding thou ghts
At the Summ it of the Americas, hel d in April 2009
Trinidad and Tobago, Ba rack O bama prom ised to bring 'an
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attitude of mutua l respect and a genu ine des ire for engage-
ment', an d sa id his ad minist ration wou ld condemn any vio-
lent overt hrow of a democratically elected government.
Howeve r, when the mi lita ry coup aga inst Pres ident Manuel
Ze laya of Honduras took place on 28 June 2009, the White
House's res ponse (as di scussed in the introduction to t his
book) was extremely di sappointing. Com plicity with the
mano duro a pproach to politics in the hem isphere had
reared its ugly head aga in. Zelaya was demonized by the US
med ia as a friend of Hugo Chavez, and thus a threat to re-
gional security. In the period between the cou p and the US-
legit imized elections in November of that year, think tanks
such as the Inter-American Dialogue, the New America
in
Foundation, the Wilson Cen te r and the Hudson Institute

attem pted to a pprop riate what one obse rver has called 'the
de bate over who owns the conce pt of democracy' (Pine
2010: 18). One of the ma in lob byists rep resenting the golpis-
tas (coup plotte rs) in Wash ington was Roge r Noriega. His
is a name well known in Latin America as the man respon -
si ble for organizing aid to t he Nicaraguan Contras in the
1980s (via USAID) and for being t he senio r staff member
off arch-conse rvative Jesse Helms on the Senate Comm ittee
on Fo reign Relations. In this capacity he helped draft the
1996 Helms- Burton legis lation, which strengthened the US
trade em ba rgo on Cu ba. He is also genera lly recognized as
the a rchitect of the 2004 coup aga inst Pres ident Aristide in
Hait i. As a visiting fe ll ow of the American Enterp rise Insti-
tute fo r Public Policy Research, he wrote an article just days
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before the Hond uran cou p, in which he s poke of the need
to act against 'wea k politica l institutions, authorita rian pop-
uli sm and the illicit d rug trade in Latin Ame rica' an d the
caudillismo (strong o r charismatic lea de rship) represented
by Chavez and his 'aco lytes' (Noriega 2009.). Among other
pro-military lob byists we re Otto Reich, one of the creators
of the Reagan Doctrine in Centra l America in the 1980s;
Diana Vi ll iers Negroponte, a Brook ings Institute ana lyst an d
wife of john D. Negroponte, who was the US ambassador
to Hon duras in the 1980s, when the count ry was used as a
launching pad for inte rvention in the Central American wars
in Nicaragua, El Salvador an1d Guatema la; and Jo rge Cas-
taneda, fo rmer Mexican fo reign m iniste r and academic
scou rge of 'twenty-first-century socialism'.

If the US wants to normalize its relat ions with Latin
America, it must stop the ill egit imate activities of organ i-
zations such as USAI D and its all ies, which see k to desta-
bi lize elected gove rnments in t he name of 'democracy',
'good gove rnance' and 'nat ional security'. It also needs to
sto p regard ing Venez uela, Bolivia and d iverse socia l move-
ments as prob lems. The influence of the rad ical right (or
the new popu li sm or whatever other la bel it goes under)
needs to be excised from fo reign policymaking. The same
anti-i ntellectual, ah istorical m indset that has mou lded
generat ions of right-wing Repub licans an d beyond - for
examp le, Barry Goldwater, the neo-Nazi fr inges, pund its
such as Rush Limbaugh, the Religious Right, Sa rah Palin
and the Tea Party - occup ies a parallel un iverse alongs ide
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the policy positions the US right and its think tanks have
taken towards Latin America. Les ley Gill makes the connec-
tion between domestic attitudes and attitudes towards Latin
America:
the same fea r and xenopho bia ... not on ly feed justifi -
cations for the loss of dom1est ic civi l li be rt ies, the depor-
tation of immigrants, the m ilitarization of the borde r, and
the 'tough on terro r' logic, but also und erg ird su ppo rt
fo r, or at least indiffe rence to, a hype r-m ilita rized foreign
policy an d the trampling of human rights ab road. (Gill,.
Grandin. Poole and Weisbrot 2009~7.)
The US needs to recogn ize that its influence over Latin
American po lit ics has waned because of the leftward t ide,
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because of the IMF's loss of econom ic control, because of
greate r regiona l assertiveness and because of civil resis-
tance to t he effects of its po li cies. Th is perception would re-
qu ire a mass ive change in mindset on the part of US po liti-
cians an d cit izens. Unfo rtunately, if we take the historica l
long view and reflect on the relationshi p between the US
and Latin America, t his may prove to be wishful thinking.
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TWO IThe right in office

4 / PAN Para Todos: elections, democracy and
the right in contemporary Mexico
2 too k severa l hits when the pub lic learned of the sweet deals
- his family members rece ived during bidd ing fo r govern-
ALEXANDE R DAWSO N
By most accounts, Vicente Fox Quesada was an ineffectual
presi dent . Alt hough ha iled as an economic whiz, during his
time in office (2000- 06) Mexico's GDP grew at a lethargic
pace, and unemployment and rura l pove rty increased. In
spite of record global oil prices, by t he en d of his adm inis-
tration Pet r61eos Mex icanos (PE M EX), the nationa l o il com-
pany, was losing money. Fox's major leg islative promises -
immigration refo rm in the US, a public accounting of Mexi -
co's Dirty Wa r, and a qu ick end to t he Chiapas rebe ll ion -
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went unfulfilled .! Mexico's Congress spent much of this
time dead locked. What is mo re, his squeaky-clean image
ment contracts (Hernandez and Quintero 2005). Towards
the end of his term , he even lost control of his own po lit ical
party, the Partido de Acci6n Naciona l (PAN, National Ac-
tion Party).
One would think, then, t hat the country would have been
ready for a change in 2006; that having just endured an
ineffectua l right-wing president, Mexicans might jo in t he
citizens of severa l other Latin American nations in rejecting
neolibera l orthodoxies and embracing some vers ion of
'twenty-fi rst-century socia li sm'. Given the wides pread

poverty and inequa lity in the country, socia l cond itions
seemed favourable. Mexicans had the ir own left-wing icon,
Andres Manuel Lo pez Obrado r, who, in the lead -up to the
2006 election, was an enormously popu lar figu re nation -
ally. Indeed, s ix months in advance of the July presidential
elections, Lo pez Obrado r had a decisive lead ove r his rivals
in the polls. And then he lost to Felipe Ca lderon Hinojosa,
who would succeed Fox as the second president ever elect-
ed from the right-wing PAN.
The lessons we choose to take from th is election te ll us
much a bout how we narrate the gene ral trajectories of left
and right in contempora ry Mexico. Today the country has
the misfortune of being both one that is deeply d ivided but
closely ba lanced electorally, and one where relatively few
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peop le have any great fai th in the po lit ical system and its
processes. Added to this, Mexico has recently been con -
fronted by a number of crises, wh ich serve to up the stakes
at every election. Its th ree dominant politica l pa rt ies have
tried to play these crises to maximum benefit, though at
least s ince the late 1990s the party that has done this most
effectively has been the PAN.
This leaves us with a series of questions. Was t he PAN
(wh ich, fo r most of its hist ory, was a sma ll , northern ,
conse rvative, Catho lic party) me rely well placed to take
advantage of recent trends, or does the ascendance of a
conse rvative po lit ical agenda signify something mo re fo r
the count ry? Is Mex ico better described as a deeply divided
country in wh ich d irty po litical t ricks sway elections, or a

place where the new right can legit imate ly claim to enjoy a
significant plurality (if not a majority) of suppo rt at the na-
tiona l level? In an era when so many countries in the region
have t rended to the left, what does it mean t hat Mexico has
gone in the op posite direction?
Democratization and the right
The Mexican right is distinct from most of its Latin Amer-
ican cousins. In the fi rst place, for most of the twentieth
century it rep resented the democratic opposition to Mexi-
co's 'Pe rfect Dictatorship ' (1929- 2000) under the Pa rtido
Revolucionario lnstitucional (PR I, the Revo lutionary Inst it u-
tiona l Pa rty). When it was founded in 1939, the PAN's early
leaders imagined the party as a human istic political
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alte rnative to the state-centred corpo ratism of the PR I. Inas-
much as the PR I s ituated itself as a secu la r pa rty, and was
linked to a long and often violent history of confl icts with
the Church, the PAN identifi ed itse lf with Catholic va lues.
Whereas the PR I insisted that , as the de facto state, it cou ld
be entrusted with the we lfa re of Mexicans, with all eviating
poverty, illness and unemp loyment, panistas (the party's
sup porters) believed that faith-based organizations were
the most appro priate mechan isms fo r curing society's ills.
Although it spent most of it s histo ry as a loyal opposition
- as a pragmatic pa rty that cooperated with the PR I to give
the ill us ion of democratic processes in the Congress, wh ile
using its lim ited pu rchase in the po lit ica l sphere to address
fair ly doctrinaire conservative issues, in the late 1970s the

PAN increas ingly became a genu ine opposition pa rty. Am id
a growing pub lic distaste fo r the co rrupt excesses of the
PR I, members of a se ries of ultra-rightist groups, such as El
Yunque (the Anvil) and the Legionna ires of Christ, increas-
ingly penetrated the PA N, pus hin g the party towa rds ultra-
right ideo logies that were intended to cu re what they be-
lieved to be the ill s of an increas ingly degene rate society.
Aga inst youth rebellion, teenage sex, growing drug use, rad-
ica l political activists, and a state beset by al legations of
widesp read graft, they favou red the strict rule of law, devout
religiosity, intolerance an d hostility to fem inism and gay
rights. Many came into politics after having pa rt icipated in a
we b of secret societies that, for the most part, o riginated on
the cam puses of Catho lic un ivers it ies during the 1950s.
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Apart from El Yun que, these included Los Tecos (a neo-
Naz i netwo rk), the Movim iento Unive rsitario de Reno-
vadora Orientaci6n (Renewa l O rientation Un ivers ity Move-
ment), the Frente Un ivers itario Anticomunista (Un ivers ity
Anti-Communist Front) and Antorcha (To rch). Their associ-
ations li nked businessmen, oppos ition po liticians, priests
and othe rs in netwo rks that were persona lly and po lit ica lly
usefu l.
The PA N expan ded further during the economic crises of
the ea rly 1980s, especia lly afte r t he PR I gove rnment nation -
alized the banks in 1982. Some joined the PAN out of a
sense of bet rayal, but the ma rket-b ased econom ic reforms
that a new gene ration of tech nocrats in the PR I pursued in
o rder to dea l with the crisis also allowed many bus inesses

to aban don the nationa l economy and the old systems of
patronage. As globa l ma rkets became increasingly impo r-
tant, some Mexican businessmen found that they cou ld re-
d uce thei r t ies to the Mexican state wit hout suffe ring severe
adve rse consequences. In turn , these businessmen increas-
ingly favou red the PAN as a party of open ma rkets and
transparent government, over what they viewed as a necrot-
ic PR I.
The new segment of the party (ca ll ed neopanistas) was
we ll represented in the largest bus inessmen's grou p in t he
country, the Confede raci6n Pat rona l de la Repub lica Mexi -
cana (Employe rs' Con federation of the Republic of Mexico).
The party that emerged from these accretions was, in t urn, a
series of fragmenta ry alliances between businessmen,
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social conservatives (including t he Comite Nacional Pro-
vida (National Pro- Life Committee), Desarrollo H umano
Integral y Acci6n Ciudada na (Comp rehensive Human
Development and Citizen Action) an d the Asociaci6n Na-
ciona l C1vica Femen ina (Nat ional Women's Civic Associ -
ation)) and shadowy figu res from the extreme right. Always
relying on a shared sense t hat Mexico's crises were the
product of a comb ination of po lit ica l, economic an d mo ral
decay, t he coa lition held together in part because it posited
a mora l alternative to the d isasters that Mexicans saw all
around them.
These netwo rks left the PAIN we ll situated to push for na-
tiona l politica l openings during the late 1980s, when the
PRI found itself un de r increasing scrutiny for its electora l

shenanigans. After clearly fraudu lent state elections in 1986
and a frau du lent pres idential election in 1988, Carlos Sali-
nas de Gortari (who claimed the pres idency with an alleged
50.4 pe r cent of the vote) decided that the regime needed to
bo lste r its democratic credentia ls. In July 1989, Sa li nas con-
ceded the gube rnatorial elections in Baja California Norte to
the PAN, the first time an oppos ition party had held an of-
fice th is high since the 1920s. He then set to work with PAN
leaders on a series of reforms to national election laws,
which helped the PAN win gubernatorial elections in
Guanajuato in 1991 , Chihuahua in 1992 and Jalisco in 1995,
along with later elections in Nuevo Leon , Queretaro and
Aguasca lientes, and Nayarit. The PAN he ld only thi rty-eight
seats in the nationa l Chamber of Deputies in 1985 (to the
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PR l's 292) , but afte r 1988 it st eadi ly gained seats in the 500-
membe r chambe r.
Not co incidentally, Salinas froze the left-wing opposition
out of this process. He likely be lieved that the most se rious
threats faced by the PR I came from the left, especia lly s ince
most critics believed that the true victo r in the 1988 presi-
dentia l election had been the leftist Cuauthemoc Cardenas
Solorzano. Salinas fought a wa r of no quarter aga inst
Cardenas's new pa rty, the Partido Democratico de la Rev-
o luci6n (PRD, Party of the De1m ocratic Revo lution). PRD ac-
tivists were systematica lly harassed, ja il ed and sometimes
kill ed. In spite of the popu larity of the PRD in parts of the
central and southern regions of Mexico, the PR I claimed
victory in every major election held in these regions during

Sa li nas 's te rm.
The PR l's hostility towa rds the emergent left was, in
some ways, unde rstandab le. The new PR D party was made
up almost entire ly of fo rmer priistas (suppo rte rs of the PRI -
Cardenas was both the son of one of the party's iconic
presi dents and a forme r PR I governo r of the state of Mi -
choacan) who cal led for a return to t he po pulist va lues the
PR I had embraced befo re the economic cris is of the ea rly
1980s. O ld-style priistas viewed them as turncoats, and the
now-dominant neol iberal wing of the PR I a bhorred their
leftist rhetoric, find ing in genera l t hat it cou ld wo rk more
easi ly with the PAN . Though they might lose some power to
the right-wing opposition, thei r larger project of neolibe ral
reform was only st rengthened by PAN victories. Still, the
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PR D kept coming. Cardenas won the first free elections
held for mayo r of the Fede ral Dist rict (Mexico City and its
environs) in 1997. In the same elections the PRD won 125
seats in t he Chamber of De pUJties, while the PAN won 121 .
With the Chiapas rebellion, the December 1994 eco-
nom ic meltdown and a series of lurid stories of corruption,
intrigue and mu rde r emanati ng from the PRI, the party
found itself haemorrhaging voters; yet it was unclear which
oppos it ion party wou ld benefit. The anti-globa lization and
social justice rhetoric of the PRD played well among the
mi llions of Mexicans who fe lt left behind by t he neoli beral
Wash ington Consensus; but by the late 7 990s the PRD was
fo rced to compete with a PRI that was return ing to its pop-
uli st roots. Panistas, by contrast, prom ised econom ic

growth based on open ma rkets and mo re investment, along
with a culturally reactiona ry, sectarian agenda based on
mo ral renovation, fam ily va lues and honesty in government
(Mendez and Luis 2008), a strategy that set them a part
from the othe r parties (.8.gxes Garcfa 2005).
These competing visions played out in the 2000 pres i-
dentia l elections, which featured Cardenas (in his third tilt
at the presidency) agai nst Francisco La bastida Ochoa of the
PR I and Vicente Fox Quesada of the PA N. Fox was, in many
ways, the most compell ing cand idate. A wealthy bus i-
nessman from Guanajuato, he joined the PAN afte r the
1982 bank nationa lizations, an d held elected office in the
Chamber of Deputies and as governo r of Gua najuato. As ide
from the matters of his d ivo rce an d his relationship with
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Marta Sahagun, whom he wou ld late r marry, he was a fam-
ily man and devout Catho lic. Nonetheless, because he
came from the fa r right, Fox was not exact ly a favourite of
traditiona l panistas, and instead of advancing his cand idacy
through t raditiona l means, he took his campa ign direct to
the Mexican people through the 'Friends of Fox', which
used a nationa l media campa ign to successfully deman d
the party's nomination . His 'friends' were, of cou rse, most-
ly ultra-right businessmen from the Bajfo, whose ascen-
dance with in the pa rty ha d been marked by the election of
Luis Felipe Bravo Mena as party leade r in 1999.
Fox ca ught both the PRI and the PRO relatively fla t-
footed. Ca rdenas (who had fin ished with only 16.59 per cent
in 1994) ma de a num ber of se rious gaffes during the

cam paign, which played into Fox's effo rts to a rgue that a
vote fo r the PR D was ult imate ly a vote fo r the PR I (de Bell
and Pansters 2001 ). Labastida, in turn, ran a campa ign that
promised many diffe rent th ings to many different commu-
nities, but faced an electorate that was deep ly fatigued of
his party and hopefu l that, for the fi rst time in seventy years,
they might elect an o ppos it ion candidate. In the end, Fox
won 45.52 per cent of the vote, an un precedented figu re for
the PA N. Labastida won 36.1 1 per cent and Ca rdenas 16.64
pe r cent. The PAN also obtained 206 seats in the Cham be r
of De puties, coming a close second to the PRI (Alarcon O l-
guin and Freidenbe r~ 2007.).
The right in power
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The PAN faced new opportu nities and cha llenges in shift-
ing from t he o ppos it ion to t he ruling party. It cou ld take on
some of the patronage roles t rad it ionally reserved for the
PRI, and use those ro les to bo lster its netwo rks. The PRl's
fam ily benefit programme, Progreso (Progress) became
PAN's Oportunidades (Opport un ities), a system of govern -
ment handouts thinly vei led as a social programme (Rocha
Menocal 2001 ). The nationa l teachers' un ion, long a bu l-
wa rk of PRI domination, shifted allegiance to the PA N.
PEM EX, the national oil company, which Fox had proposed
privatizin g, became the principal sou rce of fundin g for a
panista pres idency (P EMEX would provide upwards of 40
pe r cent of annual gove rnmernt revenue during the 2000s).
Ins ide the right, however, 2000- 06 saw consi de rab le

tu rmo il. Afte r initially nam ing a fa irly hete rogeneous cab-
inet, Fox wh ittled his advisers down to a cohort common ly
known as the Grupo Guanaj uato (Guanajuato Group) ,
drawn from the extreme right of t he party. Bravo Mena was
re-elected to run the pa rty between 2002 and 2005, furt he r
conso li dating the fa r right's hold on t he pa rty (Hernandez
Vicencio 2005). Manuel Espino too k the campa ign aga inst
the t raditiona li sts further when he took ove r the pa rty in
2005, increasingly identifying the party with a form of right-
wing po lit ics that was close ly associated with anti-statist
fo rms of sava ge ca pitali sm.
St ill , whi le the far right dom inated the party an d national
executive, traditional panistas rema ined powerful in the 128-
mem be r Senate, and ultimately preva iled against Esp ino,
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Fox and his clique in the batt le for the party's pres idential
nom ination for the 2006 elections. While the ult ra-right
pushed hard for Santiago Creel Miran da, the traditiona li sts
managed to change party ru les so that his can d idacy was
not automatic. Insisting that on ly party members (and not
the genera l pub lic) vote in the primaries, the t raditiona li sts
gave the edge to the ir cho ice fo r the nom inat ion, Feli pe de
Jesus Ca lderon Hinojosa (Hernandez Vicencio 2005).
Cal de ron's victory in t he nomination fight was testament
to the inte rna l dynamism of t he party. Un li ke the PR I or t he
PRD, whe re backroom dea ls determ ined t he nominees,
party mem bers in t he PA N actua lly chose a can didate
aga inst the wishes of the party leade rship - a can didate who
seemed more akin to the more moderate right an d who was
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clearly li nked to the t rad it ion of Catholic human ism in the in defence of the poor, and during this t ime led all potential
PAN (Ala rcon Olgufn and Fre idenberg 2007.; Ling Sanz Cer- candidates in the polls. In May 2005 he had the support of
rada 2008) . That said, Ca lderon wou ld not have an easy 43 pe r cent of potential voters in the Mitofksi po ll , while t he
path to victory in 2006 . Though the PAN continued to make potentia l PAN candidate, Santiago Creel, had the support of
inroads in severa l states, in the 2003 state elections its na- on ly 20 per cent. So threatened were t he other pa rties that
tiona l vote fe ll to 31 per cent, wh il e the PR I (in alliance with in 2005 t he PAN and PR I cooperated in an effort to have
the Green Party) won 41 per cent. The PRD also made a Lopez Obrador arrested fo r supposed abuse of power as
sma ll ga in, winn ing 18 per cent of the vote nationa lly. mayor of Mexico City. Thei r transpa rently cyn ical efforts to
Between 2003 and early 2006, many believed t he upcom- make him ineligib le to run in 2006 backfired spectacularly,
ing presidential elections wou ld be won by Andres Manuel and Lopez Obrador now became a martyr as we ll as an
Lopez Ob rad or of the PRD, a charismatic leftist who had as- advocate for t he poor.
sumed the pa rty leadership in the aftermath of the 2000 Lopez Obrador's numbe rs he ld up through early 2006.

elections. Lopez Obrador was a popu lar mayor of Mexico Poll s in January indi cated that he had t he suppo rt of 35-40
City (2000-05) , was wide ly adm ired for his public rhetoric pe r cent of the electo rate, compared to 30-35 per cent for

Calde ro n (on ly one poll had them level-pegging). In Ma rch,
with some polls still showing Lopez O brado r with a nine-
point lea d, the PAN and PR I (re presented in the election by
the old-style popu list Ro berto Madrazo Pintado, who con-
sistently ran a d istant third in the poll s) floode d the rad io
and te levision airwaves with attack ads . Noting that unem -
ployment was highe r in Mexico City than anywhe re else in
the country, one mocked Lopez O brador for ca lli ng himself
'the emp loyment pres ident'. Vicente Fox began attacking
the PR D candidate in his s peeches - a co urse of action that
was un precedented for a sitting Mexican head of state. Car-
los Sa li nas too k a s imi lar tone, calli ng Lopez O brado r a
popu list caudillo and a threat to democracy (El Universal, 12
March 2006).
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Fox's attacks in pa rt icula r stung Lopez O brador, who, at
a ra lly in Oaxaca in late Ma rch, ins isted that the president
should 'ca/late, chachalaca' ('shut up, turkey'). This utter-
ance became a defining moment of the campaign, and
sprea d vira lly through the med ia. Seizing on the image of
Lopez Obrado r as an angry demagogue, the PAN wasted no
time in remin ding voters that they did not want anothe r
Hugo Chavez or Fidel Castro runn ing the ir count ry. By the
en d of March, Mexicans we re inundated with the slogan
' Lopez Ob rador, un peli gro para Mexico' (' Lopez Obrado r,
a dange r to Mex ico') , despite these attacks being categor-
ica lly false: as mayor of Mexico City, he had governed as a
relative ly pro-bus iness mode rate.
Mexico has fai rly strict election laws, and the PRD lod ged

nume rous comp laints with the Institute Federa l Electora l
(IFE, the Federa l Electo ral Inst it ute) about the mis leading
nature of med ia commentary. In May, the IF E orde red some
of the PAN attack ads to be pu lled from the airwaves.
Around this time the Lopez O brado r campa ign also re-
leased ads intended to counte r t he PAN and PR l's 'di rty
wa r'. Still , by t his time Ob rador's num bers had fall en, and
he was po lli ng between 31 and 37 per cent, with Ca lderon at
between 35 and 41 per cent . His figures never recovered
(Sanchez Murillo and Aceves Gonza lez 2008).
On 2 July, the po ll s suggested t hat the election was too
close to ca ll . That evening t he IFE announced that it wou ld
need severa l days to amass t he fina l ta llies and decla re a
winner. Ca lderon , who believed he was winning by a
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fraction of a percentage point, elected to wait; but Lo pez
Ob rador, st ung by the campa ign and perhaps fea ring a re-
peat of 1988, declared himse lf t he winne r that very night. In
the fo llowing days, as t he IF E moved to certify t he victory
fo r Calderon, Lopez O brado r mob ilized his su pporters to
cha ll enge the vote. The cha ll enge came on seve ral leve ls.
Lopez Obrado r demanded a comp lete recount because of
alleged irregu larities at 50,000 po lli ng stations. Beyond
chall enging the count, however, he also claimed t hat the
election itse lf was inva lid bot h because of Pres ident Fox's
inte rvention and because of a series of ill egal ads com-
paring the PRD cand idate to Chavez. These lega l st rategies
we re supp lemented by a campaign of civil diso bed ience, in
which his suppo rters created 300 camps in Mexico City.

It was a risky st rategy. Po ll s taken in July by the Proyecto
de Elecciones Naciona les Compa radas (Nationa l Com par-
ative Elections Project) suggested that 50 per cent of voters
had fa it h in the election results, whi le 45 per cent dou bted
them . Sim il a rly, 40 pe r cent thought there should be an-
othe r vote, but 56 per cent did not. This suggested that a
significant numbe r of Mexicans distrusted both the process
and the results, but also ind icated that a majo rity of Mexi -
cans were satisfied with the elections - even appa rently a
significant number of Mex icans who had not voted for t he
PAN. Even many of the PR D's leade rs in the Congress op-
posed Lopez Obrado r's strategy, some evidently believing
that the s ign ificant ga ins t he PRD had made in the elections
we re a sign that the electo ral system was in fact wo rking.
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Their confidence was re inforced by the fact that the PAN
d id even bette r in voting for the Congress than it did in t he
presidential poll.
In the end the IFE d id not va lidate Lopez Ob rador's
claims, conclud ing that, whi le there had been irregularities
and illegal ads in the election, the irregularities they found
would not have changed t he election resu lts (Becerra
Chavez 2007.); and s ince the impact of the ill egal ads cou ld
not be demonstrated, the IFIE concluded that they did not
merit inva lidation of the resu lts. (It was not even entire ly
clear that the IFE had the power to annu l t he election based
on the attack ads and othe r d irty tricks.) When the election
was ratified in Septem ber, Ca lderon was decla red the win-
ne r with 15,000,284 votes (35.89 per cent). Lopez O brado r

was credited with 14,756,350 votes (35.31 per cent) and
Madrazo with 9,301,441 votes (22.3 per cent). The Chamber
of Deputies remained dead locked, with 206 seats in t he
hands of the PAN, 127 he ld by t he PR O, 106 for the PR I, and
the rest going to a co ll ection of othe r parties.
Breaking down the election
The 2006 elections once aga in revea led a country dee ply
d ivided along regiona l li nes. The PAN di d best in two re-
gions, the no rth and the cent re-west. Outside of these re-
gions Ca lderon won on ly two states, Pue bla an d Yucatan.
Lopez O brador dominated the central-south and sout heast
of the country. Outs ide of these regions the PR O coa lit ion
(with a num ber of small left pa rties in the Coa licion Por el
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Bien de Todos, Coa lition fo r the Good of All) won on ly Baja
Ca lifornia Sur, Nayarit and Zacatecas . The PRI d id not win a
single state, though it came second in many. However, it re-
mained dominant at the level of the su b-nationa l states,
cont rolling more than ha lf of the governorships in the
country after 2006.
Othe r regional trends were also notewo rthy. Wh il e the
PR O made conside rable ga ins in the south, the PR I re-
mained strong in most areas won by t he PRO. By cont rast,
the PAN com pl etely dominated Guanajuato, Ja li sco, Nuevo
Leon, Sono ra an d Tamau li pas. The PRO won 58.13 per cent
of t he votes in the Federa l District, but had almost no pres-
ence in the no rth or in the Baj10 - for instance, it won just
15.37 pe r cent of the votes in Guanajuato. Nonetheless, the

PRD vote grew across much of the count ry, wh il e the other
two pa rt ies bot h lost votes. Compared to 2000, Lopez
Ob rador's coa lit ion gained 12 per cent nat ionally, whereas
the PRI lost 12 pe r cent and the PAN lost 6 per cent. In vot-
ing for the Chamber of Deput ies, the PRD ga ined 10 per
cent, the PRI lost 16 per cent and the PAN lost 2 per cent .
Exit polls also revea led some fascinating demogra phic
tendencies. Men voted mo re for Ca lderon an d women for
Lopez Ob rador, although , as a sub-group of all women,
housewives favoured Ma drazo. Among poorly ed ucated,
rura l vote rs, t hose earning less than the minimum wage
tended to vote for Mad razo, as di d older vote rs and in dige-
nous Mexicans (naturally, there was a great dea l of overlap
in these catego ries) . Students, teachers, intellectua ls and
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the unem ployed ten ded to vote fo r Lopez Obrado r. On the
othe r han d, bus iness owne rs, employees, workers ea rning
severa l t imes the minimum wage an d urban dwell ers mo re
genera lly favoured Ca lderon. Ca lde ron drew most suppo rt
from peop le aged thi rty-five t o forty-nine, foll owed by peo-
ple aged between twenty and thirty-four. Madrazo d id best
among fifty- to sixty-fou r-year-olds, wh ile Lopez Ob rador
drew support fair ly even ly from the young (those aged nine-
teen and younge r) and from voters over fifty (Zavala
Echavarria 2008).
Opinion polls in the aftermat h of the election also re-
vealed that views on the voting process ali gned close ly wit h
voting prefe rences. PR I an d PAN supporters overwhe lm-
ingly believed that t he elections had been fair, wh il e PRD

sup porters ove rwhelmingly believed that the 2006 elections
had been stolen . These numbers rema ined cons istent we ll
into 2007, when a poll conducted by the newspaper Re-
forma in Ma rch indicated that 54 per cent of the electorate
believed the election had been legitimate, wh il e 34 pe r cent
believed it to have been frau d ulent. Break ing down these
num be rs furthe r, Alejand ro Moreno (2008) fo und that, in
the months fo ll owing the election, 40 per cent we re com-
pletely confident in the results; 30 pe r cent believed they
we re genera lly good, with on ly minor irregularities; and 27
pe r cent did not have faith in the resu lts at all . Some 75 per
cent ha d faith in the IFE's fin d ings.
It is ha rd to make perfect sense of these numbers. Win-
ne rs almost inva riab ly have fa ith in the system, and we can
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expect a certain percentage of the electorate to tell poll ste rs
that they believe in the system for reasons that are not en -
tirely t ranspa rent (nationalism, dist rust of the pollster,
conse rvatism, respect for aut hority, etc.) . It is clear, on the
othe r hand , that those who voted for Lopez Obrado r ove r-
whelm ingly questioned the legit imacy of the results. This
rem inds us that, even after more than a decade of con -
certed efforts to prod uce t ranspa rent democratic processes,
mi llions of Mex icans remained convinced that the system
was plagued by fraud.
There is still more to this claim. PRO supporters ques-
tioned both the vote itself and the nature of the campaign,
arguing that each se rved as a bas is on which the resu lts
should be annu ll ed. The second claim is somewhat more

comp lex than the first, and deserves some cons ideration .
All th ree parties rel ied on aggress ive pub lic relations cam-
pa igns leading up to the election, spen ding staggerin g
sums of money to sway vote rs. The PAN s pent 257,837,990
Mexican pesos (MXN; at the t ime the rate was a round MXN
10 to the US do ll a r) on 11,904 TV ads and 106,960 rad io
ads . Lopez O brador's coa lition spent even mo re - MXN
383,612,118 on 16,316 TV ads and 60 ,4 10 rad io announce-
ments. They we re both to pped by the PR I, wh ich s pent
MXN 444,844,809 on 10,425 TV and 59,4 14 radio ads
(Emmerich 2007.). Media critics were harshly critica l of the
ads, which were often mislea ding, simplistic and largely de-
signed to a ppea l to a li mited a rray of anxieties and hopes.
Because of the ads, Hugo Sanchez Gud ino (2008)
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suggests that Mexico is an 'esoteric democracy' - s1mu-
lated and largely contro ll ed th rough med ia images.
Lopez O brado r seems to share this sentiment. Did he
not cla im that vote rs were m isled into voting against their
inte rests through a smea r cam paign? Did he not ins ist that
Fox's utterances we re ill egal because, as president, he was
in a pos ition to sway voters undu ly? Th is makes sense if
one imagines vote rs as na·1·ve and eas ily influenced by peo-
ple in a pos it ion of authority, but it is a sorry commenta ry
on Lopez Ob rador's views of the electo rate. It is rem i-
niscent of an e ra when the PRI pos it ioned itse lf as a pate r-
na li stic authority that could protect Mexicans from a va riety
of threats, in return fo r t heir com plete loyalty. By cont rast,
in most contempora ry democracies vote rs unde rstand that

elected officials come from specific po lit ica l parties an d are
inte rested in keep ing those parties in power. Fox's parti-
sansh ip thus te ll s us something a bout t he competit iveness
of Mex ican polit ics. That it was unprecedented rea lly only
te ll s us how recent this phenomenon is.
In effect, both the suggestion that Mexico is an esote ric
democracy and the la rger sense (shared by all three pa rt ies)
that the Mexican electorate can eas ily be man ipulated may
represent a tendency on the pa rt of elite Mex icans to dis-
count the so phistication of Mexican voters. I believe, how-
ever, that an alte rnat ive reading of the im pact of the ad s on
the voter is in orde r. We must begin by acknowledging that
the images used in the PAN/PR l's d irty war aga inst Lo pez
Ob rador - Hugo Chavez, the Kalashnikov, t he constant
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replaying of 'ca/late, chachalaca' - were metonymic devices,
powerful signifiers of a series of hopes and anxieties that
are sha red by mil lions of Mex icans. Mexicans on t he left
easi ly ignored them , knowing that they were mislead ing
(and perhaps even admi ring figu res like Chavez and Cas-
tro). Fo r others, the ads reminded vote rs of the rea l danger
of politica l and social unrest that poo r and ma rgina lized
groups posed - of ongoing upris ings in Ch iapas an d Oax-
aca that might s pread to other parts of the country if left
unchecked . More fu ndamentally, the very fact that poo r vot-
e rs (who eas ily rep resented a majority of the country) had a
cand idate who openly advocated on the ir beha lf threatened
significant social transformations, shou ld Lopez Obrado r
be elected.

Also unspoken were the ways t hat race was reflected in
these sentiments. As the party of the north , the PAN is also
most clearly the party of whiteness in Mexico, of progress,
prosperity an d a foot in the modern wo rld. The PRD, by
cont rast, is mo re clea rly a party of the south, of regions that
are more heavi ly indigenous and desperately poo r. Though
the PR I won mo re of the indigenous vote, this was a func-
tion of o ld-style polit icking. The PRD's ideology is mo re
o pen ly identified with in d igenous Mexicans, but it is a ver-
sion of indigeneity that does not have much appea l among
a sign ificant segment of the urban wo rking class - voters
who a re perhaps only a few generat ions removed from their
in d igenous he ritage, but who have distinguished them -
selves from the ir ori gins, have imp roved the ir
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ci rcumstances and who opted for the PAN's vision of the
future because it was more close ly aligned with the ir asp ira-
tions.
O r perhaps rather both asp irations and fea rs. Poss ibly
the issue that, more than any othe r, pushed voters towa rd s
the PAN in 2006 was pe rso nal security, driven by both an
escalating drug war on the no rthern bo rd e r an d an epi-
dem ic of vio lent crime in cities across the count ry. It does
not seem intu it ive that the right shou ld have a better claim
to be defende rs of law and order than the left, but this ap-
pea rs to have been the case in 2006. Mexicans believed
they needed not only to fight crime, but to dramatically re-
fo rm the country's security agencies and jud iciary, both of
which were deeply tainted with corruption an d strongly

identified with decades of PRI rule. The PR D d id not have
th is ta int, but many party loya list s we re either concerned
with othe r social questions, or we re dee ply uneasy with the
milita rization of po licing and period ic abuses of civi l rights ,
bot h of which have cha racterized most effo rts to curb t he
violence. Ca lde ron , by cont rast, prom ised to ma ke the per-
sona l secu rity of Mexi cans pa ramount, even if it meant call-
ing in the army to govern the most t roubled regions . It
seems un likely that Mexicans believed that t he army wou ld
respect civil rights , but many we re wi lli ng to accept t hat
pros pect if Calderon cou Id improve the ir safety.
In the end, in spite of all the ads and other attacks, pub lic
sup port fo r Ca lde ron and Lopez Ob rador did not shift very
much from January to Ju ly 2006. Even when the PR D
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cand idate was in the lead , most po ll s showed Ca lderon
with in t he statistica l ma rgin of error, and it is just as likely
that facto rs othe r than the ads (esca lating vi olence, unrest
in Oaxaca, or some ot her factor) closed t he gap between
the cand idates. Mo reove r, given t he s ign ificant ideo logica l
d ivi s ions between the parties, it seems un like ly that many
voters sh ifted from the PRD to PAN (or vice versa) during
these months . It is more like ly t hat vote rs moved into and
out of the PR I camp, as a resu lt of a comp lex array of per-
sona l ca lculations. Poor Mexicans in particu lar had to
weigh up their fu ture under a. pro-growth , pro-trade and in-
vestment pres ident, who wou ld focus heavily on law and
o rde r, against their prospects unde r a cand idate who
prom ised to en la rge the role of t he state and move the

country away from the trajectories that had characte rized
the past thirty years. Both of these options were fraugh t
with risks, which is perhaps one reason why voters kept the
PR I re levant in these calcu lations, as a bu ffer to both the
PRD and the PAN. This ult imately reveals an electorate that
is, in some ways, mo re sophisticated than its elected offi-
cia ls.
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and its erstwhile leader. Leftists were already aban doning
the PRD in the lead-up to the election, accus ing it of being
little mo re than a vehicle for t he personal aspirations of its
leaders, an d s ince then it has fr actu red furthe r. Lopez
Ob rador is today widely mocked as a demagogue whose
max imalist desires wea kened the institutions of democracy
and marginalized his party (Palma and Balderas 2007.).

The PRD was pun ished he avily. In the Ju ly 2009 state

Conclusion: a PAN for All?
elections, when the PR I won 36.6 per cent of the vote, the

One cou ld fai rly conclude that, had a few things gone d if- PAN gained 28 per cent an d the PRD just 12 per cent. The

ferent ly, we might be ta lking today about the ascendance of PR I gained 2 mi llion voters between 2006 and 2009, taking

the Mexican left. But the facts are what they are, and since many of those voters from the PRD an d winn ing five of the

2006 the co ll apse of the PRD has been a dom inant narra- six contested governorships (two in PAN stronghol ds). The

tive. Much of the blame for that co ll a pse lies with t he party PR I is once again the largest party in the Chamber of

Deputies (t he PAN do minates the Senate). Most be lieve
that the PRI is well pos it ioned to reclaim the presidency in
2012. That said, pred icting the outcome of Mexican elec-
tions is a fool's game. Mexicans have re latively little fa ith in
their politica l parties, an d are more willi ng than electorates
in othe r parts of the region to switch party loya lties for a
variety of reasons: the PAN went from winn ing 26.69 per
cent of the overall popular vote in 1994 to 43 .43 pe r cent in
2000 an d 35.89 per cent in 2006; meanwhile the PRI po ll ed
50.18 per cent, 36.87 per cent and 22.26 per cent in those
same elections, an d t he PRD 17.06 pe r cent, 17.0 per cent
and 35.31 pe r cent (Ram irez Mercado 2007).
Feli pe Calderon has been a popu lar president, though he
has confronted a series of int racta ble pro blems. His
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mi lita ristic a pproach to dealing with the escalating drug-
related violence on Mexico's no rthern border had cost
35,000 lives by s pring 2011 . Mo re than 40 per cent of Mexi -
cans believe that the gove rnment is not winning the d rug
wa r (La Reforma, 14 April 20110) . The dee p economic crisis
that began in 2008 has likew ise damaged nationa l su ppo rt
fo r the PAN. In 2008 Ca ldero n's plans to allow some pri-
vatization of PEMEX met with enormous pu blic o ppos it ion:
70 per cent of Mexicans oppose privatizing t he company, in
spite of its prob lems.
The PAN now also faces a cha ll enge from the extreme
right. With the t raditiona l panistas once aga in in contro l of
the party, in 2007 seve ral prominent lea de rs a bandoned it
fo r the newly formed Movim iento de Participaci6n Solidaria

(Solidarity Participation Movement). The new party counts
on suppo rt from both the Union Naciona l Sinarquista (Na-
tional Synarch ist Union, a fascist group) and El Yunque,
along with thousands of supporters organ ized under the
slogan 'Vida, Fam ilia, Justicia Social' (' Life, Fam ily, Social
Justice'). It is in some ways a throwback to nineteenth-
century sociali st romanticism, t inged with twentieth-century
fasc ism. Membe rs long for a ret urn to t raditiona l co rpo rate
identities, are dee ply nationa li st and a re critical of libera l
cap ita lism, relativism and postmodernity (Uribe 2008).
Continu ing violence, crime and social crises a re likely to
swell its num bers.
If we want to understand right-wing phenomena in Latin
America today, we ought to try and understand these
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sup porters, who vote for such parties in sp ite of the fact
that these right-wing movements do not re present their
material inte rests. These vot ers constitute a values-based
right, which re lies on forms of nationa li st Catholicism that
imagine fam ily and Church as bulwarks aga inst the de pre-
dations of the mode rn world, and that endeavour to build
national so lidarity around these foundations. The Legion-
na ires of Christ - for all the recent scandal surround ing the
reve lations that its founder, Fathe r Marcial Maciel, sexually
abused a numbe r of ch ild ren and fathe red othe rs - is a
movement that is constructed on a deeply Catho lic foun-
dation of do ing good works . Syna rch ism, along with any
num ber of right-wing Catholic t raditions in Mexico, can
also be understood thus.
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Since its founding, the PAN has been integral to these vi-
sions of nationa l solidarity. This, in turn, is why the PAN
can imagine itself as the party of all Mexicans, an d not
exclusively of the privil eged business elites of the north. In
the face of a Mexican state that has so spectacularly fa iled
to meet t he needs of its citizens, and global cap ita li st forces
that take thei r labour and offer little in return, the PAN
advocates new forms of fa ith and nation based upon mu-
tua l obligation, order and mo ral gove rnment. Of course,
this does not appea l to all Mexicans, but it has helped the
PAN dominate national politics since 2000. Whet her o r not
it will trans late into an ongo ing abi lity to dominate Mexican
politics is anyone's guess.
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5 / Colombia as the linchpin of US hegemony in the poss ible exceptions of Paraguay and Hondu ras , every
Latin America othe r country has at some point undergone fundamental
regime change in which oligarch ic pa rt ies have been re-
DIANA RABY
placed by mass popu list, democratic or revolutionary par-

The right in Colombia, or the Co lomb ian ol igarchy, occu- ties and/or movements - revo lution in Mexico, Cuba and
Nica ragua; the rise of the Rad ica l Party an d later Peron ism
pies a strategic pos ition, engaging as it does in activities to
counte r democratic and popu lar movements across t he in Argentina; the emergence of socialist and commun ist

continent. The estab li shment parties, conservative and lib- parties in Chile; and so on. This exceptional po lit ica l

e ral, have conspired to monopo lize po litics in a tight ly con- longevity of the ol igarch ic system is crucial to un der-

tro ll ed two-pa rty system that has rema ined virtually un - standing Co lomb ia's reactionary role in the region.

changed since the mid-n ineteenth centu ry, and , apart from Anothe r Co lomb ian pecu liarity, close ly li nked to its

lim ited ideologica l differences rega rd ing t he Catho lic closed pa rty system, is the virtua l absence of m ilitary

Chu rch and civil liberties, are almost indistingu ishab le. regimes in the country's history. Apart from one or two

Th is pol itica l stas is is almost un ique in Latin Ame rica: with brief episodes in the nineteenth century, the only ove rt

mi lita ry d ictatorship was that of General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla from 1953 to 1957. Othe rwise, regu la r elections with a
four-yea r presidentia l term have ena bled the Co lomb ian
regime to present itself internationa lly as one of the most
stable democracies in Latin America. But close r exam i-
nation reveals that the polit ical presence of the mil itary is
all-pe rvas ive, and that t he country's democratic credentials
are li mited to high ly ci rcumscribed li be ral forma lities.
Ever s ince inde pendence, politica l d ifferences in Co lom -
bia have tended to lead to vio lence. Th is has affected all so-
cia l classes, but has always been resolved in favou r of the
dominant elites. After the fina l defeat of the Spanish, lib-
e ral- conser-t ive confl icts began, wit h civil wars in 1839- 41,
1851 , 1860- 62, 1876, 1885, 1895, 1899- 1902 (the 'War of the
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Thousand Days'), La Violencia of 1948- 58, and t he ongo ing
armed conflict from 1964 to t he present, involving Colom-
bia's gue rrilla groups, the state and right-wing param ilitary
groups.
In many ways, t he Co lom bian experience down to the
ea rly twentieth century was unexceptiona l: it was, after all ,
common across the region to have oligarchic ru le with lib-
e ral constitutiona l conventio ns, pa rt ies that bo rrowed the
European labels of 'conse rvat ive' an d ' li be ral', and frequent
armed confl ict. The country's rea l except iona lity began to
emerge in the mi d-twentieth century, when t he socio-
economic changes of incip ient urbanization an d in dustri-
alization produced rad ical upheava l an d the emergence of
new political forces in most Latin American countries: the

popu li st regimes of Va rgas in Brazi l, Peron in Argentina and
Cardenas in Mexico, fo r examp le. In Colomb ia the Liberal
government of Alfonso Lopez Puma rejo (1934- 38) at-
tempted to emba rk on a s imilar path, with lim ited measures
of la bour and ag rarian refo rm; but in the next few yea rs its
timid reforms were neutralized or reversed, giving rise to a
tense sta lemate.
It was this s ituation that led to t he meteoric rise of t he
crucial figu re in modern Colom bian po lit ics, Jorge Eliece r
Ga itan. With intense charismatic appea l and a powe rfu l
anti-oligarchic d iscourse, Gaitan was a class ic popu li st
leader: 'popu li st' not in the pejorative sense of 'oppo r-
tunist ic' or 'man ipulative', but in t he more ana lytical mean -
ing proposed by Ernesto Laclau of an 'em blematic' leader, a
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tribune of the peo ple intimately linked to a powerful mass
movement that bypassed esta blished parties and insti-
tutions (Laclau 2005; Raby, 2006: chaP-ter 7.). Ga itan thus
bot h ex pressed and fu rther ga lvan ized the mass working-
class and peasant movemen t that was demanding funda -
menta l po lit ica l change of a rad ica lly democratic natu re - a
movement that had been growing stead ily for two decades
and that was not adequate ly represented by either the Li b-
erals or the Commun ists. His assass ination on 9 Apri l 1948
precipitated the insurrection in the ca pital Bogota known as
the Bogotazo and the fratr icida l, decade-l ong conflict la-
bell ed La Violencia, in wh ich 200,000 to 300,000 peop le
we re killed, often in very sadistic fashion (Palacios 2006:
135::§).

Although , as has been demonstrated by Gaitan's daugh -
te r Gloria, targeted violence by the state and the land lords
aga inst the popu la r movement began more than two yea rs
before Ga itan's assass ination (Gaitan 19~5) 1 and desp ite
the varied and com pl ex inte rpretations ofLa Violencia, the re
can be no dou bt that the fundamenta l issue in this cata-
strophic brea kdown of the po lit ical order was a bruta l oli-
ga rchic reaction aga inst Gaitan and the popu la r gaitanista
movement. Although Gaitan wo rked through the Libera l
Party, he had ma de it crysta l clea r that his aim was to defeat
the oligarch ic forces in both the Conservative and the Li b-
e ral parties and to 't urn the Libera l Pa rty into the Peop le's
Party' (Gaitan 19~5~33Q). His movement was a direct cha l-
lenge to oligarchic domination and had evident
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revolutiona ry potential, and its vio lent su ppress ion was the
fundamenta l cause of the ongo ing inte rna l confl ict that has
plagued Colom bia eve r s ince. It was from this t ime on -
wa rds that the exclus ion of any alte rnative political move-
ment - certainly of any alternative re presenting the popular
classes - became systematic.
For the bette r part of two decades, this exclusion was
made ex plicit by the bipa rt isan regime known as t he Frente
Naciona l (National Front), from 1958 to 1974 . To put an
end to the chaos of La Violencia , and also to leave beh ind
the emba rrassment of mi lita ry dictatorsh ip, t he elite leade rs
of the Libe ral and Conservative parties agreed for sixteen
years to sha re powe r, alternatin g in the presi dency an d
sharing out the s po il s of office. Not su rpris ingly, th is cosy

arrangement had on ly li m ited success, whether in exclud ing
alte rnative forces or in putting an end to t he violence. left-
wing organizat ions such as the communists participated,
sometimes with the open comp licity of certa in estab-
lishment politicians, in factional tendencies of the Li bera l
Party, li ke the Movimiento Revolucionario Libera l (Libera l
Revo lut ionary Movement) of Alfonso Lopez Miche lsen
(Pearce 19_90: 62-3). Ot her diss idents found a home in a
surprising new formation, the Alianza Naciona l Popu lar
(ANAPO, Nationa l Popu lar Alliance), a popu list tendency
within the Conse rvative Party led by t he fo rmer d ictator,
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. But when ANAPO became too suc-
cessful, leading to Rojas Pinil la's poss ible victory in the
1970 pres ident ial election, the autho rities declared the
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official Frente Nacional cand idate Misael Pastrana to be the
victor in what Rojas's fo ll owe rs (and many others) rega rded
as a fraudulent decision (Pearce 1990: 17.0-1 ).
In t he ea rly yea rs of the Frente Nacional violent conflict
was indeed reduced, but it was never elim inated and it soon
began to increase again with the emergence of new, exp li c-
itly revo lutiona ry guerrill a organ izations - the Fuerzas Ar-
madas Revo lucionarios de Co lomb ia (FARC, Revo lutiona ry
Armed Fo rces of Co lombia) and the Eje rcito de Libe raci6n
Naciona l (ELN, Nationa l Liberation Army), both founded in
1964. Within a few years they were joined by other armed
movements, such as the Ejercito Popu lar de Libe raci6n
(Popu la r Liberat ion Army) and t he Movim iento Revolu-
ciona rio M-19 (M -19, 19 April Revo lutionary Movement),

founded in protest at the perceived electo ral fraud of 1970
and intended to promote urban insurgency.
In the 1960s and 1970s these armed movements were
part of a genera l Latin Ame rican t rend inspired by the
Cuban revolution and Th ird Wo rld insurgencies, but the
pe rsistence of some of them (ma inly the FARC and ELN) to
the present day is a pecu li arly Co lomb ian phenomenon that
can on ly be exp lained by the ongo ing regime of political
exclusion. Afte r the formal end of the Frente Nacional in
1974, the Liberal- Conservative duo poly continued on a less
fo rmal bas is, and whi le other pa rties (including the
commun ists) have been lega l for most of the time, de facto
repress ion of them by state agencies (the military and po-
lice) and by info rma l pa rami lita ries has been constant.
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Politica l exclus ion has been maintained by systematic
violence, but also by legal devices. States of siege or excep-
tion have been used re peated ly, occas iona lly at national
level but much mo re frequen t ly on a regiona l bas is, to sus-
pend constitutiona l gua rantees and impose de facto mi li-
tary ru le. Parties of the left have also been systematically
tarred with the brush of subvers ion, labelled as gue rrill a
agents on t he basis of fl imsy or often blatantly fa bricated
evidence, using paid informants, guerrilla dese rte rs o r
unsubstantiated mi lita ry int elligence. These techniques
have also been used to crim ina lize social protest, with trade
unions, peasant organizations, indigenous and other pop-
ular movements be ing ta rgeted in the same way.
The resu lt of all this has been the conso lidation of a

ingratiate himself with Wash ington, and also to obtain
state-of-the-art US arms to combat the libera l guerri ll as in
the Colombian llanos (the eastern plains region), in 1951
Gomez agreed to send a batta lion of Co lomb ian troops to
figh t alongs ide US and UN troops in Ko rea (Ortiz 2010);
Colomb ia was the only Latin American co unt ry to do so. As
a resu lt, the US s igned a Mi litary Assistance Treaty with
Colomb ia in 1952, and US advisers began to operate in the
country.
In the context of the Cuban revolution, the continued un -
rest in Colomb ia was a cause of heightened concern in
Wash ington, and in October 1959 a US Special Survey
Team of counte rinsurgency experts a rrived in the count ry
(Stokes 2005~ -29=7Q). Their recommen dations were
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reinforced in 1962 by a second miss ion, a US Army Special
Warfa re Team led by Genera l Wi lliam Ya rbo rough . It urged
that inte rnal counte rins urgency should be the Colombian
mi lita ry's prime concern, wit h US Special Forces t raining
Colomb ian military and civi lian personne l to 'execute
pa ram ilita ry, sabotage and/o r terrorist activit ies aga inst
known communist proponent s' and to permit 'clan destine
execution of plans developed by the Un ited States Govern-
ment ... rather than depend ing on t he Co lomb ians to find
their own solution' (Stokes 2005~7Q).
This strategy found swift p ract ica l app lication with Plan
Lazo from 1962 to 1965, a major military offensive against
in dependent peasant res ista nce groups in southern Tolima
and Cun dinamarca. Although the offensive succeeded in

reclaiming contro l over the territory of what had been de-
scribed as 'independent re publics' in Ma rqueta lia and
ne ighbou ring areas, it further rad ica lized the armed peas-
ants, who escaped to form the FA RC shortly afterwards.
From 1961 to 1967, tota l US mi lita ry assistance to Co lom bia
reached $160 mi llion, the la rgest amount for any Latin
American country prio r to the 1980s (Pearce...19_9Q..;._§3;
Stokes 2005;__7.3=.4).
One of the most s ign ificant aspects of US aid in th is pe-
riod was its de li berate promotion of param ilitarism as a key
component of state policy. The sinister and cyn ical termi-
nology used by the Yarbo rough re port found lega l expres-
sion in Decree 3398 of 1965, issued by Pres ident Gui ll ermo
Leon Va lencia, later confirmed by Law 48, passed by the
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Colomb ian Congress in 1968. These laws autho rized the
executive to create civil patro ls by decree and to provide
them with weapons normally restricted to the a rmed forces.
In the wo rds of Human Ri ghts Watch, they ' laid the lega l
foundation for the active involvement of civi lians in the war
from 1965 until 1989' (quoted in Stokes 2005;__7..£)- The bru-
ta l tactics of the Co lomb ian o ligarchy in La Violencia we re
thus systematized and legitim ized by impe ria l counterin-
surgency strategy.
In the turbu lent regional context from the 1960s to the
1980s, with armed insu rgenc ies and/o r mi lita ry regimes in
most countries, the Co lomb ian situation was, in some re-
spects, not so unusual. US intervention, whether in sup-
porti ng o r sponso ring mi litary coups in the Southe rn Cone

o r in participating actively in t he Cent ral American co nfl icts,
was extensive and was rationa lized by Co ld War rhetoric.
But afte r the fall of t he Be rlin Wa ll and the Soviet Union ,
and with the peaceful resolut ion of the Centra l Ame rican
confrontations, it soon became appa rent that Co lomb ia was
an anoma ly in a region increasingly characterized by peace-
ful and democratic politica l processes.
A ve ry s ignificant feat ure of this pe riod was t he repeated
fai lure of peace initiatives in Co lom bia. From the ' political
o pen ing' of t he Conservative Pres ident Beli sario Betancourt
(1982- 86), t hrough the demo bi lization of the M-19 and
othe r sma ll insu rgent groups in 1989- 91 and the talks with
the FARC an d ELN un de r Pres ide nt Andres Past rana (1 998-
2002) , all attem pts to reso lve the confl ict have fai led, or at
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least have achieved on ly very li mited resu lts. It is easy to
identify fai lures of politica l tact or goodwi ll on both sides,
but two cru cial factors have rema ined constant: the state
has refused to make su bstant ive concess ions on social and
economic issues, such as agrarian reform; and those guer-
rill a activists who have demob ilized have consistent ly been
ha rassed, threatened and, in many cases, assass inated by
pa ram ilita ries. Although some responsib ility must attach to
the insu rgent movements, the re is much to suggest that the
Colomb ian estab li shment was never serious ly inte rested in
peace. This became much clea rer under Alva ro Uribe
(2002- 10) , with his stated policy of elim inating the guer-
rill as t hrough military actiorn . Indeed , when even limited
moves towards detente (such as an acuerdo humanitario or

humanitarian agreement on prisoner exchange between the
state and the insurgents) seemed to be making progress,
Uribe repeated ly reso rted to actions that seemed delib-
e rately des igned to sabotage the progress, first accepting
and then sudden ly a bandon ing med iation by Venezuelan
Pres ident Hugo Chavez or Co lom bian Senator Piedad Co r-
doba.
Here, yet again , Co lom bian establishment int rans igence
seemed to doveta il perfectly with US pol icy. Just when
peace seemed to be breaking out with the end of the Col d
War in the early 1990s, the 'War on Drugs' acquired greater
prominence as Washington 's num ber one prio rity in Latin
America, provi ding a convenient pretext for continued inter-
vention , with Colom bia ta king pride of place in US strategy.
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There was, of course, no do ubt that ill egal narcotics pro-
d uction and trafficking had already become a serious pro b-
lem in Co lombia: it was qu ite sign ificant from the 1970s on-
wa rds and had a dramatic impact on the country's po litics
in the 1980s, with a series of targeted assassinations of
politicians and mem bers of the judiciary associated with ef-
forts to com bat the dru g mafias. Beginning in 1984 with
Minister of Justice Rodrigo La ra, the list of victims con-
tinued with a series of judges, the ed itor of El Espectador
news paper (Gu ill ermo Cano) and cu lminated with Liberal
Party presidentia l candidate Lu is Carlos Galan in August
1989. Mafia bombs extended t he terror to the general popu-
lation in Bogota an d other cities (Livingstone 2003: 82- 4.).
To impartia l obse rvers it soon became appa rent that

repress ive anti-na rcot ics policies we re counterp roductive
fo r as long as demand in t he consume r ma rkets of North
America and Europe continued to grow. But more signif-
icant for our pu rposes was evidence that mafia inte rests
had penetrated the highest ranks of the state. In the mid-
199os, Co lombia was twice 'decertified' by the US Congress
fo r non -com pliance with dru g interdiction po licy. And when
Pres ident Ernesto Sampe r suffered the humiliation of being
denied a US visa because his election campa ign had re-
ceived narcotics fund ing, the re was wi desp read sympathy
with him on the grounds that his ma in mistake had been to
get caught out; for politicians across the po lit ica l spect rum
we re bel ieved to be tainted wit h s imi lar connections.
Under Sampe r's successo r, the conservative An dres
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Pastrana Borre ro, it loo ked briefly as if there might be a
brea kthrough on the two crucial issues: the inte rna l conflict
and the na rcotics problem. In his election campaign Pas-
trana made much of his wi lli ngness to engage in dialogue,
and as presi dent-elect he arranged a dramatic pe rsona l
meeting with the legendary FARC leader Manuel Ma rulan da
in ea rly July 1998, a month before his inaugu ration. This
would lead within a few mont hs to fo rma l ta lks in a dem ili-
tarized zone, famously described by the med ia as 'the s ize
of Switzerland', and also to di scuss ions with the second-
largest insu rgent o rgan ization, the ELN. Pastrana likewise
launched an am bitious counter-na rcotics st rategy with a
strong ru ra l-development component, Plan Colombia; but
as eventually fo rma lized it was essentia lly financed and

cont rolled by the Clinton adm inistration in the US and al-
most 80 per cent of the fund ing was fo r military pu rposes.
The peace ta lks in t he demi lita rized zone of San Vicente
del Caguan wou ld drag on fo r mo re than two years, to-
gethe r wit h intermittent contacts with the ELN in Cu ba, Eu -
rope and Co lom bia itself, with no rea l progress. Plan
Colomb ia became the main pretext for continued US inter-
vention, having little disce rnible im pact on the na rcotics
trade but furthe r conso lidating a pattern of military an d po-
lice rep ress ion, human rights abuses an d environmental
damage through coca fumigation. With the 'War on Terror'
strategy of Geo rge W. Bush, the pretext for intervention and
mi lita rism wou ld become what many sus pected had all
along been the real pu rpose of Plan Colombia, name ly
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counte rinsurgency. But the most damaging effect of all has
been the contin ued rep ression and ma rginalization of the
Colomb ian poor, crim ina lized as na rcotics producers when
coca leaf or opium popp ies are thei r sole means of surviva l,
o r as su bvers ives when they try to organize in unions or so-
cia l movements to defend the ir land and their rights.
In this tragic history, it is hard to ove remphas ize the role
of the United States - a role t hat almost always encounters
the wi lli ng comp licity of the Colomb ian oligarchy. In the
words of the res pected journalist Anton io Ca ballero:
Ever since our so-ca ll ed independence, Colom bia has
been the Un ited States' wh ippin g-boy down here: since
Santan der invited them to participate in Bolivar 's Panama
Con gress [1826]; since Mariano Os pina Rodriguez

[pres ident 1857- 61] proposed that Co lom bia shou ld be
sold to become a US state; since Marco Fidel Suarez
pointed to the no rth with his Latin phrase, ' respice
polum' [foll ow the North Sta r]; since Lau reano Gomez
sent Co lomb ian t roops to fight in Korea ... since Ju lio
Cesar Turbay took the side of Great Brita in an d the Un it-
ed States in the wa r fo r the Argentinian Ma lvinas [Falk-
land] is lan ds, gaining for Co lom bia the nickname of 'the
Cain of Latin America'. (Caballero 2010: 1)
This tradition continued with Uribe's su pport for the US
wa rs in Iraq and Afghanistan, an d the decis ion to grant the
US facilities at seven milita ry bases, a decision that was de-
clared unconstitutiona l by the Co lomb ian Sup reme Cou rt in
August 2010.
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Paramilitarism an d mafia control of pol itics
The Co lomb ian oli ga rchy has always been exce ptiona lly
res istant to change an d rema rka bly astute in maintaining
control, des pite the social changes an d upheavals of the
mid-twentieth century. But the contem porary situation can -
not be understood without ana lysing a more recent and
profoundly disturbing develop ment: the penetration of the
o liga rchy by, an d its pa rtial fus ion with, a new and even
mo re ruthless bourgeo isie based on mafi a interests an d
pa ram ilita rism. As we have seen, the US Ya rbo rou gh m is-
sion in 1962 recommended m ilita ry t raining of civilian col-
labo rato rs in the counterinsurgency effort, and t his was for-
ma lized in Colom bian law from 1965 onwa rd s. In the fo l-
lowing two deca des, po pular discontent with ent renched

economic and social inequality and polit ica l immobi lity
grew stead ily and found ex pression both in ever mo re pow-
e rful social movements and in guerrilla insurgency. The
state 's rep ress ive res ponse reached its overt peak unde r
Pres ident Julio Cesar Turbay Aya la (1978- 82), who used a
state of s iege to perm it de facto mi litary ru le, with wide-
spread arbitrary arrests and to rture and la rge-sca le coun-
te rinsurgency campa igns.
Turbay's heavy-handed a pproach soon proved counte r-
productive, increas ing popu la r sympathy wit h the gue rrill as
and ea rning the armed forces inte rnat ional opprobrium for
human rights abuses. At the same time, the rise of the
drugs mafias was chan ging the social and politica l land-
sca pe in unanticipated ways. Pre-existing political an d
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jud icial co rruption was great ly intensified, wh il e both na r-
cotics production and money-laundering through agrarian
enterprises brought the mafias into confl ict with t he guer-
rill a movements. The fi rst clea r man ifestat ion of this was
Mue rte a Secuest rado res (MAS, Death to Kidna ppe rs) ,
fo rmed in 1981 in res ponse to t he M-19's a bduction of
Marta Nieves, the dau ghter of a prominent drug ba ron; it
swiftly became an inst rument of terro r in the Magda lena
Med io an d then in Antioqu ia, Ura ba an d othe r regions. The
mafia com peted wit h established elites in buying up land
and business ente rprises, but ident ified with their conser-
vative and anti-comm unist politics:
This formed the basis of the 'functiona l alliance', t he so-
ca ll ed 'dirty wa r', that emerged in the 1980s between the

drug barons, sectors of the a rmy, businessmen,
landowners and po lit ical bosses to elim inate sus pected
gue rrill as and left-wing civi lian activists ... In the ir hands,
MAS grew into one of the most powe rfu l pa ram ilita ry
grou ps, operating out of Puerto Boyaca in Magdalena
Med io. In the mid -198os the mafia began to invest huge
sums into turn ing MAS an d othe r groups into private
right-wing arm ies wh ich, when not murdering peasant
and worke r leade rs, could help to defend the d rug indus-
try. (Pearce 19,90: 155=6.)
Right-wing param ilitarism proved so effective at sup-
press ing dissent and destroying social movements, whi le
also undermining the insu rgent o rgan izations (less by open
armed conflict than by dest roying the ir social base of
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sup port), that it was mo re and more widely adopted -
sometimes offi cially, but more often cove rtly - by mi lita ry
and police commanders, poli ticians, landowners and busi -
ness inte rests of all kinds. By the 1990s it was clea r that the
main pa ram il itary organ izations we re becom ing po lit ical ac-
tors in thei r own right, a kind of Frankenste in's monste r
which threatened to escape from the control of its masters.
Befo re examining this development mo re closely, it is
necessary to ins ist that Colom bian param ilitarism was
o riginally sponso red by the st ate, and in particular the mili-
ta ry, with a strategy clea rly derived from Pentagon coun -
te rinsurgency doctrines. In the Magdalena Med io, increased
FARC activity in the late 1970s was met by the estab-
lishment of a new infant ry batta lion in Puerto Boyaca in

1982 and the 14th Brigade in Puerto Be rrio in 1983. The 14th
Brigade's commander, Gene ral Faru k Yanine Diaz, was pa r-
ticu la rly active in recruiting peasants into 'self-defence
groups' and working with MAS to ta rget guerrilla suspects.
MAS was promoted not on ly by d rug mafias but also by
traditiona l land lord s, bus iness interests and t he mi litary; in
1983, a report by the Colomb ian attorney genera l named
fifty-nine active military offi ce rs among 163 membe rs of
MAS (Stokes 2005;_7_§). Most of these offi ce rs had been
trained in the US School of the Americas (see Livingstone,
and Lieves lex, above).
Recent studies have suggested the re is a need to view the
rise of the drug mafias and the ir politica l insertion within
the context of multiple regional an d sectora l power
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struggles. Thus, for Rome ro:
The explanations wh ich identify drug t raffi cking alone as
the ma in factor in the increased violence in Co lom bia fail
to take into account t he impo rtant connections between
the a rmed conflict and dru g t raffi cking; between the
armed conflict and o rgan ized crime; between drug t raf-
fic king and legal politics; and between fo rmal po litics and
transgressive politics. (Romero 2003~34.)
In it ially t he parami litary were a counte rinsurgency instru-
ment su bordinated to the a rmed forces, the lan d lords and
the traditiona l po lit ica l class, with the drug mafias playing a
secondary role. But from the mi d-198os to the ea rly 1990s
the narcotics interests became powe rful autonomous

acto rs, and then fused with the armed 'self-defence' fo rces
of new and emerging regional econom ic groups to fo rm
ruthless paramilitary a rmies under warlo rd control, chal-
lenging the state's monopoly of force wh ile s imultaneous ly
claim ing to protect the estab lished o rd e r.
Certainly there continued to be close ties between the
pa ram ilita ry fo rces and t he state; Gea r6 id 6 Lo ings igh has
made a powe rfu l case fo r the intimate relationsh ip between
state agencies, t ransnational cap ita l and the Autodefensas
Uni das de Co lom bia (AUC, United Self-D efence Units of
Colomb ia), the ma in parami litary organization for a decade
o r so from the mid-199os onwards (6 Loing§.igh 2002).
But t he fact that the state had to re ly so much on irregular
and criminal forces had profoun d im plications fo r the
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politica l process:
The clientelist foundat ions •o f political power in Co lom bia
continued to be the sou rce of the state's ove rall gove rn-
ab ility. However, the new equi li brium im plied that the
central State, faced with the overwhelming force of the re-
giona l self-defence groups, had to delegate social control
to organizations d istinct firom its own bureaucracy and
institut ions. (Duncan 2006: 31.4)
The fu ll im plicat ions of this became a pparent d uring the
presidency of Alva ro Uribe, an upsta rt from the traditiona lly
restless region of Antioquia. Uri be was himself tainted with
na rcotics connections in his ea rly yea rs: a document from
the US Defense Intelligence Agency, declass ified in May

2004, included his name as num be r eighty-two on a 1991
list of Co lom bians wanted fo r drug trafficking (Calvo Os-
12ina 2008: 3JQ). Also, as gove rnor of Antioq uia in the mi d-
199os, Uribe actively promoted pa rami lita rism in the fo rm
of the then -legal Convivir ('to live together') Rural Vigilance
Associations; although designated by the nationa l govern-
ment as a means of recruit ing civilians to improve security
and provide intelli gence, they were almost universally con -
demned by human rights organizat ions as provid ing lega l
cover for la rceny, extortion and assassination, frequent ly
being composed of notorious crim ina l pa rami lita ries
(Contreras 2002: 130-47.). By such means, Uribe developed
an extens ive network of su ppo rt among the most reac-
tionary sectors of the mi lita ry and the land lord class.
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Having begun his political ca reer in the Li be ral Pa rty, he
carved out an autonomous position for himself within the
esta blishment, successfully prresent ing himself in 2002 as a
right-wing, populi st alte rnative to t he two main pa rt ies, with
a ha rd -li ne counte rins urgency platfo rm.
Uribe's populi sm was so s11..1ccessful that he came close r
than anyone else in fo rty years to brea king the two-party
electora l hegemony: both t he Conservative and the Li be ral
parties su ffered serious defections by pro-Uri be sectors,
and the upsta rt paisa (Antioquian) created his own electora l
vehicle, the Pa rtido Social de Unida d Nacional (Social Pa rty
of Nat ional Unity) genera lly referred to, suggestive ly, as
sim ply the Parti do de la U (' U' Party) . He also came to be
sup ported by severa l mo re new parties with mis leading o r

bizarre names, like Cambio Rad ical (Rad ical Change),
Movim iento Mira (M ira Movement), Alas Equ ipo Colomb ia
(Wings Colom bia Team) or Por el Pars que Sonamos (For
the Country of Our Dreams), essentia lly cliente li st struc-
tu res known to be li nked to paramilitary or na rcotics inter-
ests (or both). Indeed even in the most recent legis lative
elections, in Ma rch 2010, a new group ing ca ll ed the Pa rtido
de lntegraci6n Naciona l (Nationa l Integration Pa rty) elected
nine senators and eleven rep resentatives, desp ite a ppar-
ently having been created by an agreement drawn up in La
Picota gaol by fo rmer congressmen con demned for
pa ram ilita ry connections (Semana, 2 August 2010).
Uri be acqui red genuine popularity throu gh his tough
counte rinsurgency li ne, but also by promoting ca refu lly
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ta rgeted welfare programmes and consejos comunales
(commun ity council s), in wh ich he conversed with the
common peop le and atten ded to ind ivi dua l grievances. This
even led to superficial com parisons with Hugo Chavez, but
the differences we re fundamental. Uribe's community
counci ls we re not autonomou s and permanent popular or-
gan izations, as in Venez uela, but staged events tightly con -
troll ed by the presidential st aff; the we lfa re programmes
we re strictly lim ited an d there was no la rge-scale redistri-
bution of resou rces to the poor (in fact the reverse); and
power was further concentrated in the hands of a vio lent
and kle ptocratic elite, not devolved to popu la r movements.
It is by no means fanc iful to suggest that the com bination
of the terms ' Nationa l' an d 'Social' in the name of Uribe's

party was an authentic indication of its ideologica l incli-
nations, as a fascist project in the t rue sense.
Uri be was remarkably successful in ga ining the suppo rt
of western governments and the med ia, ta rring all op po-
nents wit h the brus h of 'su bvers ion' or 'terrorism ' an d pro-
claim ing the virtues of his 'democrat ic security' poli cy,
which dovetai led conven iently with George W. Bush's 'Wa r
on Te rror'. But an article by the res pected political scientist
Arlene Tickner puts matters in perspective, for she argues
that 'there was nothing "democratic" about it' (Tickner
2010) .In his second term, Uribe's problems accum ulated,
with ninety-seven mem bers of Congress - the great major-
ity of t hem uribistas - im plicated in the parapo/(tica scanda l,
that is under investigation fo r all eged li nks to the right-wing
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pa ram ilita ry; of these twenty-five have been condemned, ten
are currently on trial and the rest are un de r investigation.
They re presented 55 per cent of Uribe's sup porters in the
Senate, and his government had to re ly on suplentes (su bsti-
tutes) to keep control (~12.orrea 2010) . Anot her major scan-
dal was that of the 'fa lse pos itives', innocent people (espe-
cia lly peasan ts and young men from poor ne ighbourhoods)
kill ed in ext rajud icia l executions by the military, who wou ld
present them as guerri ll as 'kill ed in com bat' an d t herefore
'pos itives' in t he lists of enemy casualties for which they
coul d claim rewards. Fina lly, there was t he scanda l of the
chuzadas, ill ega l tele phone inte rcepts by the state security
service, which were shown to include lea ding opposition
politicians, members of the judiciary an d cu lt ura l figures.

As such evidence accumulated and po inted more and
mo re directly towa rds the pres ident himself and his imme-
d iate circle, Uribe's reaction was to accuse all and sundry -
even the justices of the Sup reme Court - of being 'soft' on
the gue rrill as, if not actua lly li nked to t hem. In t he end he
clearly over-reached himself, and his project of stand ing for
a second re-election in 2010 was rejected by the Consti-
tutiona l Cou rt, fo rcing him to ste p down and make way fo r
a mo re conventiona l estab li shment pol itician, Juan Manue l
Santos. This appea red to mark a retu rn to more legal and
constitutional norms, but it rema ins to be seen how far
Santos intends (or is ab le) to overcome the entrenched
power of the na rco-pa ram ilita ry mafia at t he highest levels
of the Co lomb ian state. The Uribe phenomenon mere ly
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marked the culmination of a long process by which a new
bourgeo isie of crim inal origin rose to claim a major sha re
in politica l power.
The process began in the late 1970s and ea rly 1980s with
the so-ca ll ed 'dodgy window' (ventanilla siniestra) of the
Banco de la Re publica, wh ich all owed fore ign cu rrency
transactions with no questions asked , and a series of tax
amnesties which fac ilitated money-laundering. In the next
few years, the most blatant attempts at politica l intervent ion
by the narcotics mafias, such as that of Pablo Escobar,
would fa il , but a mo re covert process of infi lt ration into,
and co-optation by, t he politica l parties continued without
inte rruption. Subsequently, in the wo rds of Med6fi lo Med -
ina: 'The comb ined power of the mafia and t he pa ram ilita ry

made parapo/{tica a privil eged means of ascent to the polit-
ica l leade rsh ip of society and the state.' Alt hough some of
the paramilitary a re now in gao l (with very light sentences),
they are merely the scapegoats who 'are paying the price of
domestication so that the new class as a who le can ta ke its
place in the estab li shment without constant upheavals'
(Med ina 2010: 7.). The process is neatly summed up in the
title of a new book ed ited by the Colombian politica l scien-
tist Claudia Lopez, Y refundaron la patria: litera ll y, 'they (the
narco-pa rami lita ry in co ll aboration with t he politicians) re-
founded the fathe rland' (.bQP-ez 2010).
The politica l and human cost of the Colombian model
Although forma lly very little has changed from the 1991
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const itution (wh ich on pa per is quite advanced), the
foundations of politica l powe r in Co lomb ia have thus
undergone a profound, and negative, process of restruc-
tu ring. It shou ld also be noted that the rise of t he new
mafia-parami litary class has fu rther reinforced the undemo-
cratic natu re of the Colombian system, contributing power-
fully to the marginalization of any politica l alternative by
co rruption, intimi dation an d assass ination. The most noto-
rious case was that of the Un ion Patriotica (Patriotic
Union), a polit ica l pa rty fo1rmed follow ing the demo bi-
lization of a large sector of the FARC in t he 1984- 85 peace
process; in the next few yea rs it began to ach ieve s ign ificant
success in local and congress ional elections, but over a pe-
riod of twenty years some 4,000 of its members we re

assassinated or disappea red. Othe r parties an d movements
fo rmed subsequently by various groups that laid down the ir
arms, such as t he Ali anza Democrat ica M-19 (M-19 Demo-
cratic All iance) from 1990 onwa rd s an d the Corriente de
Renovaci6n Socialista (Socialist Renewa l Cu rrent), which
left the ELN in 1991, also lost hun dreds of mem bers in this
way (Celis Mendez 2005: 208-9.) . This pattern has con -
tinued up to the present, although s ince 2004 the rather
mo re successful un ified left pa rty known as the Po lo
Democratico Alte rnat ive (PDA, Democrat ic Alte rnative
Pole) has gained sufficient nationa l and internationa l recog-
nition to give its leaders somewhat greate r security. But
provincial PDA activists continue to be attacked an d even
murde red, an d even its nationa l leaders period ically receive
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anonymous death threats .
Co lomb ia's 'democratic security' is thus neither demo-
cratic no r secure for those who ta ke se rious ly the right to
o rgan ize a rea l politica l alte rnat ive. Mo reove r, t his inse-
cu rity is by no means confined to those engaged in explic-
itly po lit ical activities. Peo ple invo lved in social movements
of any kind - t rade un ions, peasant o rgan izations, ind ige-
nous and black movements, st udent act ivists, women - are
equa lly unde r threat. The Co lom bian Comm ission of Jurists
estimates t hat between 2002 and 2008 mo re than 14 ,000
civili ans were ki ll ed or disa ppeared t hrough vio lent acts
connected with the armed confl ict. The cum ulative total of
fo rced d isap pearances is estimated at a pproximately
50,000 by the Co lom bian atto rney gene ral's office (Fisca/fa)
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- mo re than the num be r of peop le who disappeared du ring give t he count ry's elections a relative ly clean bill of health.
the Chi lean, Argentinian and Uruguayan dictatorships com - But the re a re groun ds fo r very considerab le scepticism in
bined - and an even mo re un impeachab le source, the Con - this rega rd : abstention rates a re very high , even wit h a very
sejo Nacional de la Polftica Econ6mica y Social (Nationa l incomp lete electora l registe r. Thus, in the May- June 2010

Council of Econom ic an d Social Policy) , which is directly presidential elect ions, abstention was ap proximate ly 50 pe r
answe rab le to t he president's office, recently recognized cent in the fi rst roun d an d nearly 56 per cent in the secon d
27,000 cases. As many as 2,177 civilians were kil led by the (Penaloza Dfaz 2010 ; Universal, 20 June 2010). In the
armed forces, most of them during Uribe's 'democratic March 2010 congressional elections, a bstention was almost
security'. From 2002 to 2009 1 on average 300,000 Co lom - 60 pe r cent. In many rural areas, there were repo rts of overt
bians we re forc ibly d isp laced each year, and the country is intimi dation or even outright coercion of vote rs, in some
secon d on ly to Sud an in this res pect (Tickner 2010; 1!.P-: areas by guerrillas but mo re frequently by the param ilitary.
rimny 2010). Thus, in Magdalena De part ment, the AUC's candidate won
Despite all t his, Co lomb ia is genera lly rega rd ed interna- the gove rnorsh ip unopposed in 2003 afte r all other candi-
tiona lly as a democracy, an d internationa l observers tend to dates resigned un de r threat, and even t hough more vote rs

cast blank ballots t han voted for t he winner, making a com -
plete mocke ry of the elections (.!::!.xlton 2006: 111).
Co lomb ia is frequently presented as an econom ic suc-
cess story, wit h a vigorous manufactu ring sector and di-
verse resou rce industries. Overa ll GDP growth was quite
strong in the mid -199os, but this was fo ll owed by severe
recess ion from 1999 to 2002, before a spell of renewed
growth that reached 6 per cent in 2006 (Reid 2007.: 259,.
262'-3Ql.). But in comparative perspective and in the long
te rm the country's econom ic performance has been at best
med iocre. Growth has been based on chea p labour (due in
part to the vi rtual eli mination of trade unions, Colombia ac-
counting for most of the world's assass inated labour ac-
tivists) and t he giveaway of the count ry's nat ura l resou rces.
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In social terms its reco rd is appa lli ng: in 1997 it was second
on ly to Brazil among Latin American countries in economic
inequa lity; in 1991 the richest 10 per cent of the po pulation
had fifty-two times the income of the poorest 10 per cent -
a d iffe rence t hat had increased to seventy-eight times in
2000 (Aviles 2006: 91). The concentration of landed prop-
e rty is also extreme, in la rge part because of the seizure of
huge tracts of land by t he narco-param ilitaries, who were
estimated to have taken ove r some 5 milli on hecta res be-
tween 1997 and 2003 alone. In the past thi rty years, Co lom -
bia has undergone what amounts to a massive agrarian
counte r-reform (if one can use such a te rm when very little
real ag rarian refo rm, in the se nse of distribution of land to
the peasantry, had occu rred in the fi rst place). In 1984,
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ho ld ings la rge r than 500 hecta res accounted for 32.7 pe r Uribe's pres idency Co lom bia's total military expenditure
cent of the lan d, and in 200 1 this had risen to 6 1 .2 per cent; came to app roximate ly $ 100 billion - an extrao rd ina ry
by 2004, 0.4 pe r cent of landowners possessed 61 per cent amount which, if invested in in frastru ctu re and productive
of all titled land (!::!xlton 2006: 118). enterprises, wou ld sure ly have ra ised the country to fi rst-
Although the interna l conflict has always been cons id- world status (Otero Prada 2010).
e red ' low intensity' and has been decreas ing in recent yea rs,
The Colom bian right and Lat in America
Colomb ian mi litary spending is far and away the greatest in
Latin America, at 5.47 per cent of GD P in 2008 (followed by The s ingu lar confi guration of power in Colombia and the
Ch ile with 3.5 per cent; Brazil, Venezue la, Pe ru, Uruguay and exceptiona l strength of the oli garchy ove r the past half-
Bolivia with between 1.0 an d 1.5 per cent; and the rest wit h cent ury (an d especially with its new cha racteristics of the
less than 1 per cent). As rega rd s mi lita ry man power, with last two decades) have given the country particu la r sign if-
285,000 men under arms Co lom bia was seventeenth in the icance for right-wing po litics and US policy in Latin Ame rica
world, an d in Latin Ame rica was second on ly to Braz il as a whole. In the post-Co ld Wa r context, its avai la bility as a
(wh ich has fou r times it s popu lation). In the eight years of relia ble client state, with a strategic location li nking Atlantic

and Pacific, Cent ra l and South Ame rica, is of inestimable
va lue to Wash ington. This s ignificance has on ly increased
with the rise of anti-im periali st and/o r independent-minded
governments in neighbouring count ries. Venezuela in par-
ticu la r, and with it the countries of the Alianza Bo livariana
para los Pueb los de N uestra America (Bolivarian Alli ance
fo r the Peop les of Our Ame rica), are viewed as a strategic
threat by the Pentagon and the State De partment. But the
new asse rt iveness of Brazi l and Argentina and the s pread of
leftist or autonom ist politics to severa l othe r count ries
(U ruguay, Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala) also cause the
Wash ington estab li shment concern.
Co lomb ia has thus become mo re impo rtant than eve r as
a centre for the assertion of hegemonic powe r and t he
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containment of t he ' Bo livarian' vi rus . It s role is man ifested
sometimes in exp licit threats or acts of aggress ion aga inst
its neighbou rs, as wit h the milita ry ra id on Ecuadorian terri-
tory in Ma rch 2009 or Uribe's decis ion in Ju ly 20 10 (on ly a
couple of weeks befo re leaving office) to take lega l action
aga inst Venez uela at t he O rgan ization of American States
and the Internationa l Crimi nal Court. But it is also ex-
pressed through im plied mi litary intimidation, as wit h the
2009 decis ion to grant t he US use of seven milita ry bases
with apparently hostil e intent towards Venezue la (and
potentia lly towards other neigh bours). On the d iplomatic
scene, Colomb ia has been a reli able ally of Washington in
seeki ng to push the free-trade agenda (even when it was
clearly rejected by most countries in the region, as at the

2005 Mar de l Plata summit in Argent ina) an d underm ining
o r lim iting t he scope of indepen dent regiona l init iat ives,
such as Un ion de Naciones Su rame ricanas (UNASUR,
Union of South American Nat ions). Bogota has also acted
as a centre for the ideo logica l coordination of counte r-
revo lut ionary fo rces in the region, privil eging t ies with
conservative gove rnments in Mexico, Peru and Chi le and
hosting gatherings of right-wing intell ectua ls and politi-
cians, such as Ma rio Vargas Llosa of Pe ru, Jose Marra Aznar
of Spain and Jo rge Castaneda of Mexico.
Such d ipl omatic and cultural activity cou ld be rega rded
as normal and unexcept ional; but the re are ot her and much
mo re prob lematic forms of Colombian intervent ion. The
most important is the export of param ilitarism, which may
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not be official policy, but has been well documented by
many observers. In Venezuela, the presence of Co lomb ian
param ilitaries is notorious, in particu lar in the border states
of Tach ira, Zu li a and Merida, but also in Caracas an d other
areas. There was a notorious incident in May 2004, when
some 130 Co lomb ian param il itaries were arrested just out-
si de Ca racas, ap pa rently intent on underta king armed as -
sau lts and assassinations (Calvo OsP-ina 2008: 3Q..4=5), and
Venezue lan m inisters and parrliamentarians have repeatedly
denounced the presence of Co lombian parami litaries and
their involvement in narcotics t rafficking, vio lent crime an d
politica l destabi lization. Co lom bian param ilitaries have also
been reported in Ecuador an d Bolivia, which may imp ly that
they are training loca ls in their s inister techniques.
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Mo reove r, their presence has been noted in Hon d uras inte rests across the continent, and in pa rt icu la r in Wash-
since the coup there - a logica l deve lopment, given t he ington, are unli kely to a bandon them as a tactica l option.
mi lita ry regime's need to supp ress popular res istance. The
d istu rbing imp lication is that the Co lom bian model of
mafia-parami litarism as a means of undermining popu la r
democratic movements is being promoted across Latin
America. On the pos itive s ide, moves by Presi dent Juan
Manuel Santos to no rma lize relations wit h neighbouring
countries may cont ribute to a reduction in such activities,
but so long as mafia-pa ram ilita ry networks retain their iron
grip on crucia l regions and econom ic sectors in Colomb ia
itself, the ir internationa l connections are unlikely to d isap-
pea r. Fu rthermo re, t heir proven efficacy as an instrument of
counte r-revolution means that the most conse rvative

6 / A right for all seasons? Right-wing politics in
contemporary Peru
FRANCISCO DURAND
Conservatives in Peru have proven high ly influential in na-
tiona l po lit ics since the late 1980s, des pite the fact that the ir
parties have lost five consecutive elections. In s pite of its
lim itations, the right has been effective in defining its coun-
try's po licies, an ach ievement that is qu ite d istinctive for
conse rvatives in Latin America. To date, Peru has not re-
jected neoli be ralism and no r has it shifted to the left, as d id
many countries in the wake of the electora l victories of
Hugo Chavez in Venezue la in 1998 and Luis Ignacio Lu la da
Sil va in Braz il in 2002.
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It has been argued that weak conse rvative pa rt ies may
d iminish the chances of democratic consolidation
(Midd lebrook 2000c), but the re is also a la rge r issue of
how, and unde r what circumstances, conservative forces
(traditiona lly attached to polit ica l and econom ic elites) have
managed to exercise powe r so effectively and for so long.
The issue of the re lationsh ip between the right and democ-
racy cannot be overlooked. Democracy, as politica l devel-
opments in Latin America have demonstrated, is a regime
bette r su ited to the right's historica l rivals. Popu li sts and
socialists can mo re easi ly a ppea l to the mass vote, get
elected and then reorient the t rajecto ry of the state, thus
cancelling or weakening conservative influence. The cha l-
lenge the right faces is how to adapt to democratic

con ditions. To unde rstand this dilemma, it is necessa ry to
cons ider the right's strengths as a politica l fo rce (its mate-
rial advantages an d powerfu l constituent s, and its abi lity to
bot h accommodate and achieve pos itive economic pe rfo r-
mance), as we ll as its wea knesses (interna l divisions be-
tween democratic and authorita rian factions, an inabi lity to
attract multiclass support an d vulne rabi lity to populi st an d
left-wing electora l competition). The fact that its strengths
have t hus far prevai led over its wea knesses s uggests that
Pe ruvian conse rvatism has been a ble to exercise infl uence
and contro l over t he state in ind irect ways. This chapte r as-
sesses t he evol ut ion of the Pe ru vian right since 1985 by
loo ki ng at t he inte rna l and exte rna l circumstances that
sha ped its po lit ical options, an d by ana lys ing the factors
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that enabled it to li mit the im pact of its electora l wea k-
nesses.
This study is pert inent in Iight of the fact that there has
been re lative ly little scho la rly d iscuss ion concern ing the
Pe ruvian right, and what there is needs updating. What ini-
tially att racted nationa l and internationa l attention was the
emergence of the New Right in 1987 (Lauer 19~; 12.P-ez
l9Q9). Since miss ing out on victory in the 1990 election and
fai ling to reorganize after that setback, the right, as one au-
tho r argued, became ' irrelevant' (Conaghan 2000). When
conse rvative pa rty performan1ce decli ned in the 1990s and
2000s, scho la rly inte rest also waned; academ ics were mo re
inte rested in the aut horita rianism of t he gove rnment of Al-
berto Fujimo ri (1990- 2000) and its negative impact on

democracy, as well as in the emergence of political out-
siders and independents (Roberts_.19_9.§.; Cameron_.19,97..;
Cotler and Grom12one 2000; Wexland 2001 ). As suggested
above, this cha pter ta kes a rea li st perspective, focus ing on
the ro le of powe r ho lders and the means used to achieve
their goa ls, wh il e de-emphas izing the issue of whether the
right can operate in the context of democracy in o rde r to
consolidate an idea l (or idea lized) regime type.
Peru in comparative perspective
Many Latin American count ries were deep ly affected by
the spread ing left-wing tide in the early twenty-fi rst century,
and by 2010 on ly Peru and Colombia remained attached to
conse rvative ru le (though Ch il e ret urned to it, see Silva
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below). Howeve r, des pite the s imi la rity in politica l out-
comes, the means employed to achieve conservative goals
have been quite different. In contrast to the case of Co lom -
bia, the st rategy ado pted by Pe ruvian conservatism is not
based on electoral victo ries won by strong, high ly organ ized
parties; rathe r in Peru, as in ot her count ries (such as Ar-
gentina), t he aim is ind irect or info rma l ru le. The fact that
the Peruvian right continued to exercise such power during
both Fujimo ri's aut horitarian regime and t he period of
democratization that followed may seem surprising, but is
exp Iicable. A numbe r of writers have warned of the difficu lty
of compa ring countries politica lly because of the influence
of many different varia bles. For Midd lebrook, who focuses
on conse rvative parties as the key veh icles fo r the

representation of elite interests with in democracies, part of
the prob lem is that va riations are to be expected in
ana lysing socio-po lit ica l identities and po lit ica l ro les, be-
cause those factors 'are st rongly shaped by nationa l ci r-
cumstances' (Middlebrook 2000c: 2). Zibechi goes further
in his ana lys is of conservat ive influence in Latin America in
the twenty-first century, stating that 'there has not been a
single, unitary new right in Latin America, s ince the po litica l
processes in every count ry a re ma rked ly different' (Zibechi
2008: 19.).
Yet a focus on politica l outcomes, means of influence,
and governmental and econom ic performance provides a
bas ic com parat ive foundation on wh ich to ana lyse the Pe ru-
vian case. To see how variab les wo rk, it is necessary to ta ke
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a long view of t rends in regime change. Togethe r wit h
Colom bia, Peru clea rly belongs to the catego ry of countries
where right-wing parties and conservative po licies have pre-
vai led over the long term. But Peru also seems simil a r to
Argentina, a country whe re indi rect rule is typ ica l. For
Boron, Argentina (and, by i nference, Peru) lacks strong
conse rvative parties, but elites use po liti cal accommodation
and influence over civi l society to form ruling coalitions and
to exert policy control (Boron 2000: 162). Th is would, how-
ever, on ly explain developments in the 1990s, the decade
when 'neopo puli sts' such as Ca rlos Menem and Fuj imo ri
governed (fo r the app licat io n of the concept of neopo p-
uli sm - othe rwise known as populismo de derecha, right-
wing popu li sm - to Peru, see Roberts 19,9.§. and Wexland

It would not help in understanding the subsequent
2001 ) .
decade, when politica l ci rcumstances in the two countries
we re very d iffe rent . The changes can be attributed in part to
variations in econom ic and po litica l governmental pe rfo r-
mance. Macroeconomic stabi lity is, in great part, gene rated
by governmenta l policies that emphasize fisca l conser-
vatism, st rong monetary reserves, growing private invest-
ment and low inflation, and as such are st rongly supported
by conse rvative and business interests. Yet, the social
shortcom ings of neolibe ral econom ics help ex plain why it
lacks legitimacy, s ince it offers benefits and oppo rtunities
to the elite and the midd le class, but not to the working
class and the poo r (Reinhardt and Peres 2000). After the
2002 financ ial meltdown in Argentina, the cris is triggered
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criticism of neolibe ral po licies and capita li st globalization
and Argentina moved leftwa rds, to the rad ical peronismo of
the governments of Nestor Ki rchner and Cristina Fe rnandez
de Kirchne r (peronismo is the po lit ical movement inspi red
by Juan Domingo Pe ron). In Argent ina, the economic dis-
aste r e roded neo li bera l legit imacy and placed conservatives
and menemistas (supporte rs of Menem) in a weak pos it ion,
whi le in Pe ru t he export bonanza (wh ich began at t he time
Argentina was falli ng apart) helped the right both to defend
neo li bera l po licy continu ity and to retain its influence and
continue to be part of gove rn ing coalitions. The expo rt bo-
nanza (2002- 08) , in particular, gave elite forces ample
room to manoeuvre, even if conservat ive parties did not
pe rfo rm well in elections. The outcome of t he 2006 election

was pa rt icularly s ign ificant, in that it was the first one in
which voters had to choose between pro- and anti-system
cand idates. The right suppo rted Alan Ga rcia of the Alianza
Popu la r Revo lucionaria Americana (APRA, American Pop-
ula r Revo lutionary All iance, an anti-i mpe rialist, po pulist
party when foun ded in 1924, but which has moved stead ily
rightwa rds s ince), who won a hotly contested clash with 01-
lanta Humala, the nationa list, vague ly left-wing cand idate.
The New Right emerges (and fails)
The Peruvian New Right came to li fe in 1987, during the
fi rst Ga rcia administ ration, in response to the president's
announcement that he wis hed to nat ionalize t he banking
system. This move created a rift between the gove rnment
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and t he country's business community, underm ined the at-
tractiveness of intervention ist po licies an d t rigge red a deci-
sion by uppe r- an d midd le-class groups to become in-
vo lved in electora l po lit ics. It thus brought toget her all
conse rvative forces. Ma rio Vargas Llosa, the eminent nov-
eli st (and once a man of the left), emerged as the leader of
this conse rvative revo lt; he called fo r an end to statism and
popu lism an d for t he pu rsu it of economic modernization
through ma rket refo rms, which he also believed wou ld he lp
in the fig ht against the Sendle ro Lum inoso (Shining Path)
guerrill a movement, which had launched an insu rrection in
1980. Social conservatives and neolibe ral econom ists, as
we ll as bus iness o rgan izatio ns, converged a round Vargas
Ll osa, demand ing change befo re it was too late to prevent

what they saw as a descent into econom ic and politica l
chaos, fue ll ed by the pres idential decis ion and ris ing polit-
ica l violence (Paredes and Sachs__.19_9.1, 11). Right-wing
fo rces mobilized to prevent the bank nationa lizations and
began a med ia blitz aga inst Pres ident Garcia, sens ing that
they had an opportun ity to defeat popu li sm once and for
all. The president was forced to back down over national-
ization , but continued to exace rbate the po litical cli mate
with po licies that aggravated the impact of the recess ion
and caused inflation to escalate. The el ite was not appeased
by the concession over national ization; rat her the cli mb-
down reinforced its conviction that the time was right for
action to ove rcome t he econom ic cris is and re-establish
politica l order.
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The right-wing coalition was we ll organ ized both in Pe ru
and abroad . In itially, old an d new conservatives loo ked to
Vargas Llosa and his Movim iento Li bertad (M L, Libe rty
Movement) fo r leadersh ip. ML was allied to the Frente
Democratico (FRE DEM O , Democratic Front) and to older,
mo re trad itional parties, Acc i6n Popular (AP, Popu la r Ac-
tion) and the Pa rt ido Popu la r Cristiano (PPC, Popu la r
Ch rist ian Party) . Va rgas Ll osa also received the enth us iastic
sup port of conse rvative reli gious groups, as well as of inte l-
lectua ls, neo li bera l econom ists, bus iness leaders and
upper-class profess iona ls, many of whom were new to pa rty
politics (Vargas Llosa 19,93,;,J.7..4=.Q). Vargas Llosa was joined
at the head of this coa lition by He rnando de Soto, the au-
tho r of the bestselling book, The Other Path, publ ished in

1986, in which he expounded an ant i-stat ist discourse (fo r a
systematic critique of developmental econom ics and t he
need to emb race a neolibe ral pa rad igm , see also Pa redes
and Sachs 1991). Togethe r, Va rgas Llosa and de Soto were
able to create a netwo rk of domest ic and external fo rces,
based on t heir st rong connections with ot her intellectua ls,
European conservatives, econom ists and US Repub licans,
as well as mu lt inationa l corporations, neo li beral think
tanks, the global mass med ia and mu ltilatera l organ izations
(Bromley..J.9.9Q). All these entities supported d rastic pol icy
change in Pe ru and prom ised financ ial and politica l support
once ad just ment policies we re implemented ; they also pro-
vided institutiona l and mate rial resou rces to the conse r-
vative lobby within Pe ru.
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Desp ite th is moment um and the fact t hat Vargas Llosa
won the first round of voti ng, FREDE MO fa il ed to wi n po p-
ula r su ppo rt in the May 1990 run -off election. Conservat ive
fo rces quick ly switched t heir all egiance away from Va rgas
Ll osa and to Albe rto Fujimo ri, a politica l unknown. This
proved to be a successfu l strategy: as pres ident, Fujimori,
gu ided by de Soto, forcefully implemented the conse rvative
agenda. Pe ru entered a period of econom ic and po litical
stability, and the right managed to set and ma intain a
course cons istent wit h its ideas and asp irations - desp ite
inte rna l d ivi s ions between democrat ic and aut horita rian fac-
tions, pa rt icu la rly over Fuj imori's auto-golpe on 5 Ap ril 1992
(litera lly his 'self-made coup ', when t he pres ident, with the
sup port of the army and t he secu rity se rvices, closed down

all the institutions of rep resentative government an d con-
centrated power in the executive) . It was clea r that Garcia's
d isastro us econom ic pe rformance and misguided, erratic
policies had facilitated this outcome. Although poo r voters
d id not massively support Vargas Llosa, they did em brace a
conse rvative agenda of order and progress. Fuj imo ri ra pidly
concentrated powe r and proved to be a leader capab le of
effectively add ressing the nat ion 's most press ing problems
(Du rand 19,9.§). Thus, although Vargas Llosa, the candidate
of the right, lost the election, the right actua lly won it by
switch ing its support to Fuj imori. The rea l catalyst for
change had been de Soto. Breaking from Vargas Llosa the
day after the election, he contacted Fujimo ri and orches-
trated his contact with both Washington Consensus
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institutions and international investo rs (Vargas Llosa 19.93~
17.7.-8; Bolona 19,93: 21-2). Once the new neoliberal po licy
course was set, Peruvian conservatism fo ll owed de Soto's
lead, aban doning Vargas Llosa and pledging itse lf to Fuji-
.
mon .
The gradual growth of conservative power
No matter how important the events of 1987-90 were in
te rms of stimu lating a politica l res ponse from Peruvian
conse rvatives and setting their policy goals, this progress
was only possib le beca use of a broader t rend of em pow-
erment, which had been initiated yea rs earlier. What the
1987 ' battle of the banks' did was to tilt the balance of
forces in an immed iate and decis ive fash ion. In earlie r

decades, the right had lost its influence over key insti-
tutions: the mi litary and the Catho lic Chu rch (two trad i-
tiona lly powerful actors), the educationa l system, the mass
med ia (crucia l for t he dissem ination of conse rvative va lues)
and the business community (a vita l constituent, but one
wea kened by nationa lizations un de r the military regime of
1968- 80) . But by the mid-198os, it had begun to re bui ld
these close relationsh ips. Thus t he bus iness sector was
worried by what it saw as cree ping state inte rvention in the
economy, an d was consi dering the effi cacy of emb racing
neo li bera li sm. In 1984, a new gene ration of bus iness lead-
e rs created the Confede raci6n Nacional de lnstituciones
Emp resariales Privadas (CON Fl EP, Nationa l Confederation
of Private Business), a group t hat aimed to reso lve interna l
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d ivis ions by focusing on specific issues, such as o ppo-
sition to increased taxation and t he need to establish man -
agement authority in the wo rkplace. Although many busi-
nesses were dependent on government subs idies, and al-
though there were clashes of inte rest between the domestic
market an d the export sector, al l were grad ually moving to-
wa rds an ant i-stat ist agenda and thus converging ideo log-
ica lly with t he right. Bus iness was position ing itself to ign ite
the conservative rebellion, sup port electo ral strategies
aimed at destroying populism an d emb race neolibe rali sm.
Foll owing Fujimo ri's victory, t he pres ident-elect held meet-
ings with Pe ruvian business leaders, many of whom agreed
to ta ke key cabinet posts. Business sup port proved decisive
when Fuj imori la unched the auto-golpe in 1992, when

CONF IEP was the only civil society organization to su ppo rt
him. Many prom inent bus inessmen, such as Juan Anton io
Agu irre Roca, CON Fl EP's pres id ent in 1992, an d the leading
fam ily conglomerates (Benavi des, Brescia and Romero) be-
came enthusiastic defende rs of free-market econom ics
(Durand 2003~3§7.).
The 1987 crisis also helped conse rvatives develo p links
with the media, and New Right po lit icians increas ingly ap-
pea red as pund its on te levision an d radi o programmes.
This connection strengt hened during the Fujimo ri e ra,
when many of the media developed a cosy relations hip with
the government. When Pe ru returned to holding free an d
fair elections in the 2000s, the mass med ia, now mo re
de pendent on corpo rate advertising, played a critical ro le in
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sha pi ng pub lic op inion, paving the way for can didates who
favou red the conservative agen da an d demoniz ing those
who opposed it. A s imi la r move rightwards took place with-
in the mi litary. During the gove rnment of General Ve lasco
(1968- 75) , the institution was seen by many as having sh ift-
ed to the left, but the counte rinsu rgency wa r aga inst
Sende ro Lum inoso an d the sma ll e r guerrill a grou p, the
Movim iento Revoluciona rio Tupac Ama ru (Tupac Amaru
Revo lutiona ry Movement), in the 1980s an d 1990s saw the
emergence of conse rvative officers who favoured a 'get
tough' app roach. As the guerrill as esca lated their attacks,
ever-increasing areas of the country we re placed unde r a
state of eme rgency, where extrajud icial executions, mas-
sacres an d tortu re became the no rm. The m ilita ry's

conse rvative t rajectory was fuell ed by a belief that neolibe ral
economics seemed to offer the best way out of the reces-
sion and , as both business and the military were the targets
of guerrilla attacks, it a ppea red sensib le to adopt a common
front. Thus, in 1990, CONF IEP created a secret comm ittee
to su pport the milita ry's counterinsu rgency campaign.
The Catho lic Chu rch also became an important pi ll a r of
sup port fo r the Fujimori gove rnment. Two conse rvative
Catho lic organizations, Opus Dei and Sodalitium Ch ris-
tianae Vitae, open ly sup ported both Va rgas Llosa and the
anti-bank nationa lization lobby. Founded in 1971, Sodal-
itium is an umb re ll a organization representing seven
groups. In 2001, its leader, Luis Figari , was named Con -
suitor to the Pontifical Counci l fo r Laity and , in 2005,
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auditor to the Synod of Bishops on the Eucha rist. Sodal-
itium runs elite schoo ls in Pe ru and Ch il e, and a un ivers ity
in Arequipa, Pe ru. Through t heir educationa l activities, both
religious groups were ab le to deve lop close li nks with
upper- and midd le-class fam ilies, wh ile also esta blishing
ties with Catho lic business elites. Dion isio Rome ro, a r-
gua bly the most powerfu l business leader, identified with
Opus Dei and wo rked to propagate its views on fami ly val-
ues and discipli ne in the wo rkplace (Alvarez Rodrfch 19.QQ).
Since the 1990s, a gene ration of manage ria l and profes-
siona l ind ividua ls have graduated from these elite private
schoo ls and universities and have emb raced neolibe ral eco-
nom ics and conse rvative Catho lic va lues, reconcil ing in this
way re li gious piety wit h mater ial well -being.

John Pau l ll's pastoral vis it to Peru in 1985 helped to rein-
fo rce the influence of religious conse rvatism. He did this by
pub licly condemning libe ration theology - the doctrine,
o riginating in the 1960s, wh ich argued that the Church
shou ld advocate socio-economic reform in order to pro-
mote 'the preferential option for the poor' - an d by appoint-
ing young, conse rvative bishops at the same time as the Je-
suits, the lea de rs of social progress ivism in t he 1960s and
1970s, we re experiencing interna l sp lits an d wan ing influ -
ence (Klaiber 199L495,_5u). Conservative influence was fi -
na lly consolidated when Juan Luis Ciprian i, the leader of
Opus Dei, was ap pointed bishop of Ayacucho in 1988
(Moncada 2006). Ayacucho was the region where Sendero
Lum inoso began its a rmed rebe llion in 1980, and the new
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bishop vigo rous ly defended the military's re pressive tactics
and harsh ly crit icized human rights groups that condemned
them. Cipriani was appointed a rchbishop of Lima in 1999,
and soon after became card inal of Peru, thus becoming the
first Opus Dei cardina l in the world. As of 2010, of forty
Pe ruvian bisho ps, ten came from Opus De i and two from
Soda lit ium (for Opus Dei, see Moncada 2006; information
on the num be r of bishops is from the author's inte rview
with Jeffrey Klaibe r, March 2010).
Last but not least, think ta nks an d consultancy firms be-
came the ep icent re of po licy renovation, helping to dissem -
inate market va lues and demolish popul ist and interven -
tionist ideologies. Many advisers, ministers, vice-ministers
and directors of state instit utions s ince the 1990s have

come from organ izations such as the Institute Peruano de
Econom1a 1 Libe rtad y Democracia (Pe ruvian Institute fo r the
Economy, Freedom and Democracy, founded by de Soto)
and Apoyo (Support), both of which receive gene rous sup-
port from internationa l institutions and corpo rations. This
new generation of expe rts were regarded as op inion leaders.
Using the modern media of the internet and televis ion, as
we ll as more t rad it iona l po rta ls such as rad io and the press,
they defended the new econom ic ort hodoxy and pra ised the
benefits of macroeconom ic sta bility and private invest ment,
whi le declaiming the fa il ure of populism.
Self-doubt on the right
Despite these impressive gains, severa l commentators
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noted that the New Right in pa rticular, and conservatives in
genera l, appea red uncertain of the strengt h of the ir po litical
renaissance both during the period 1987- 90 (Lauer 19~;
1.Q12ez 19~9.) and then under fujimorismo. As mentioned be-
fo re, Catherine Conaghan (2000), in her assessment of the
electora l results of t he 1990s, described it as an 'irrelevant
Right', wh il e other scholars t alked of the co ll apse of the
party system, a process affecting all parts of the ideologica l
spectrum (Planas 19_9.§.; Tanaka 19,99_; 1xnch 199_9.) . How-
ever, after Fujimori fled to Ja pan in 2000 (in an attempt -
ult imate ly unsuccessfu l - to escape a co rruption scanda l
and charges of human rights abuses) and the democratic
restoration began, t rad it iona l parties came back to life, al-
though they perhaps never quite regained their ea rlier

political we ight. Th is recovery was aided by the int roduction
of US-style elections, which focused more on candidates
than on parties and re lied mo re on polling and adve rt ising
than po lit ica l discou rse (Planas 19,96: 185).
There were two obvious const ra ints on the right's reviva l.
One was Vargas Liesa's 1990 defeat and the other was its
continu ing inab il ity to create a st rong party ca pab le of win -
ning elections. Vargas Liesa left Peru after the debacle; he
became a Span ish cit izen but rema ined a powerfu l voice in
the internationa l media, ma king his op inions known a bout
Pe ruvian current affa irs . Fujimorismo wea kened the demo-
cratic process t hroughout the 1990s, thus limiting the
right's prospects of becom ing a legit imate po lit ica l force.
Fujimori's persona li st and authorita rian style of
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government att racted enthus iastic su pport from the
Chu rch, bus iness and the military, and all defended t he
auto-golpe; but Vargas Li esa and his sma ll band of su p-
porters condemned the president as a dict ator. The right
was thus s plit in its a pp roach to Fujimori, and this deb il-
itated it. Conaghan argues that Fujimo ri had effectively
robbed the right of its politica l identity (Conaghan 2000:
i57.-8). He exploited the econom ic recove ry over which he
presided and became the da rling of the authorita rian right.
With the end of his regime, the politica l o pportunities fo r
the right a ppeared brighter, but its organizationa l weakness
ham pered its progress. This is demonstrated by look ing at
its electora l pe rfo rmance between 1990 and 2006. In 1990,
FRED EMO obtained on ly 32.6 pe r cent in the first round of

voti ng an d on ly 37.4 per cent in the run -off vote. Fujimo ri,
whose election prom ise was a vague 'Honesty, Techno logy
and Work', att racted the support of APRA and independent
voters, an d won with 62.4 pe r cent (source: Oficina Na-
ciona l de Procesos Electora les, at www.on pe.go b.pe/
index.htm l). In succeed ing elections, Fujimori created ad
hoc, neopo puli st pa rties which gained support across the
classes. In 1995, he won with 64 per cent of the vote, and in
the controve rsia l 2000 election, when the democratic right
joined forces to o ppose him, he failed to win in the first
round but obtained 74.3 per cent in the second. The demo-
cratic right and its candidate, Alejandro Toledo (who re-
ceived the su pport of Vargas Llosa, the PPC, APRA and even
the left), did not contest the final vote, a rgu ing that the
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resu lt wou ld be fra udulent (Cotler and Gromf2one 2000:
156') ·
Du ring the Fujimori decade, Renovaci6n Naciona l (RN,
National Renovation) too k up t he banne r of the right. Led
by Opus De i mem be r Rafael Rey, the pa rty supported Fuji-
mo ri until the very end. Howeve r, it fa red poorly in elec-
tions, as d id de Soto's Cap ital Popu la r (Po pular Ca pital)
which fai led to register as a pa rty to contest t he 2000 and
200 1 elections. In the wake of Fujimo ri's departu re, many
Pe ruvians were disgusted by revelations a bout the corrupt
regime pres ided over by him and by his right-hand man,
Vladim iro Montes inos, head of the Sistema de Inteli gencia
Naciona l (Nationa l Inte ll igence System) (Bowen and Hol-
ligfill 2003). Fujimori was replaced by a provis iona l

president, Va lent in Pan iagua from AP, who governed fo r
eight months unti l elections were he ld in 2001 (Cotler and
Grom12one 2000). For that election, Un idad Naciona l (UN,
National Un ity - a front formed by RN, the PPC and other
sma ll e r grou ps) chose a new presidentia l candidate. Lou r-
des Flores was a young lawye r committed to conservative
va lues and an advocate of honest government. She received
on ly 2 4 .3 per cent of the vote in the fi rst round, wh ile
APRA's Alan Garcia (who had been in ex il e s ince Fujimori's
auto-golpe), obta ined 25.77 per cent, all owing him to
prog ress into the second round. This was a remarkab le re-
su lt, given t he reputation he had acquired during his fi rst
administ ration as a corrupt and incompetent president.
To ledo, the outs ider who had taken on Fujimori in the first
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round in 2000 and who now led the Pe ru Pos ible (litera lly,
Poss ible Peru) party, became the fron trunner, obtaining
36.51 pe r cent in the first round and 53. 10 per cent in the
second. The right and part of t he left voted for To ledo to en -
sure t hat Garcia did not win. Vargas Llosa gave him his en -
dorsement, too, in orde r to reinforce the democratic wing
of conservatism.
.
Although To ledo cou ld be cons idered an economic
conse rvative, who was supported by the New Right and t he
business sector, his po lit ica l agenda was also influenced by
prog ressive and left-wing ideas. He led a mu ltiparty, mu lti-
class cha ll enge to the authoritarian right. He possessed
mass appea l because of his poor, ind igenous origins and
he cap ita lized on th is by presenting himse lf as an Inca; he

was also admired for the fact that he had succeeded thanks
to his own educationa l and work effo rts. To ledo's a ppeal
was, thus, a qua lity which hardcore, O pus Dei-believing
conse rvatives wou ld never possess. Toledo, like Fujimori,
could be placed in an intermediate category, as a political
outsider with a po puli st style but also a defender of conser-
vative econom ics. Both were leaders who attracted mass
sup port with clientelistic promises as a means of ove r-
coming the electora l li m itations of the right. As Ba rr has a r-
gued, To ledo fo ll owed a 'two-tie red policy a pp roach of d is-
tri buting benefits to the poo r whi le ma intaining a neolibera l
economic orientation' (Barr 2003: 1169.) . In the 2006 elec-
tions, Flores and UN continued to represent the conser-
vative agenda, but th is was at a time when neo li bera li sm
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and privatization policies had become the ta rgets of intense
criticism. In 2002, fo r exam ple, the peo ple of the southern
city of Arequ ipa mo bil ized against the privatization of a
loca l ene rgy company and Toledo was fo rced to stop the
bidd ing process; many sim ilar demonst rations fo ll owed. In
2006, Ga rcfa advocated ' responsi ble change' from the cen-
tre-right of politics, while newcome r Ollanta Huma la
(warm ly endorsed by Hugo Chavez - a fact that the right-
wing med ia made much of) occup ied the left of the politica l
stage. Flores received 19.98 per cent, Humala 25.7 per cent
and Garcfa 20.41 per cent. In the second round, Huma la in-
creased his support to 47.38 per cent, but Garcfa, sup-
ported by all conservative fo rces, obtained 52.64 per cent.
The right would un ite if there was a possib ility of a

nationalist, populist, pro-Chavez left-winger being elected
president.~
In sum, then, from 1990 to 2006, no conservative pa rty -
either new (ML, RN) or old (PPC, AP) or in coa lition (FRE-
DEMO, UN) won a nationa l election. Conservative parties
constituted a minority politica l fo rce, incapable of getting
mo re than 25 per cent of the vote in six consecutive presi-
dentia l elections. As a consequence, they we re compelled to
sup port the lesse r of two evils: Fuj imo ri in 1995, Toledo in
2001 and Ga rcia in 2006. The ir only option appeared to be
to play the politics of accommodation .
Final thoughts
In order to com plete this assessment of the Peruvian
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right as a political force, some critica l issues need to be ad-
d ressed. As mentioned before, Pe ru is d istinctive in the
Latin American context, in that t he politica l influence of
conse rvative fo rces is exe rcised in an indirect manner but
continues to produce positive po lit ica l outcomes. Several
inte rrelated questions come into play he re. First, how can
the disappointing electora l resu lts of conservative parties
be ex plained? Second ly, were those d isap pointing results
the consequence of particu la r conservative fai li ngs or were
they system ic? Thi rd ly, given this electo ral reco rd, how is it
that the various conservative constituencies (the Chu rch,
business, the milita ry, the media) have remained the most
influential politica l forces since 1990? Fou rth ly, what spe-
cific mechan isms of indi rect dom ination have they

emp loyed to constitute this influential lob by? Besides the
right's tactical mista kes d uring the 1990 election (poor
management of its media image; tensions between old and
new factions; Vargas Liesa's lack of po litica l experience;
and an underestimation of its popu li st and socia li st oppo-
nents), the results revea led a deepe r prob lem - one that
had affected traditiona l conservative parties before the ad-
vent of populi sm . Conservative forces in genera l, and the
New Right in particu la r, have advanced horizonta lly but not
vertica lly: that is, they have been unab le to extend their sup-
port base beyond the elite and the upper middle class. The
1990 election appeared to present a golden o pportunity for
progress. The right's political opponents were wea k and on
the defensive, and the a bility of either the popu lists or the
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socialists to ad dress Peru 's pressing problems was ques-
tioned by many. Sinesio Lopez, who ana lysed the emer-
gence of t he New Right before 1990, has a rgued that nega-
tive po pulist pe rformance enhanced conservatism's
chances to change the balance of power in its favo ur
(1.Q12ez 19~9~5~). Th is did not mean that po puli st and left-
wing influence was insign ificant. The reason Vargas Liesa
lost the election was that APRA and the left (wh ich polled
22 per cent and 13 pe r cent, respectively, in the first round
of voting) then decided to support Fuj imori in the final
round exp licitly in order to block FREDEMO.
Voting behaviour along class li nes appears to be the
main factor in exp laining th e inabi lity of conservative pa r-
ties to attract majority support. Seve ral stud ies of electo ral

behaviour in the 1990s indicated that, while right-wing pa r-
ties we re ab le to attract strong elite support, as socio-
economic status decli ned so did their appea l (Cameron
19.97~43; Durand 19,96: 105-=Q; Dietz and Dugan 1997.). Al-
though Pe ruvian conservatism experienced ideo logical
renovat ion, saw the emergence of new leade rs and pa rt ies,
recovered its influence over key institutions, enjoyed a spe-
cia l connection to de facto powe rs and cou ld count on
so lid international suppo rt, it failed to obtain broad popu lar
sup port (Lauer 1988: 134=.Q; .b.Q.P-ez 19.8,9_;_59.). What ha p-
pened to Vargas Llosa and FR ED EMO in 1990 was repeated
in succeeding elections, as voters identified conservative
cand idates with elite inte rests. In t he 2006 election, one of
the factors which prevented Flores from obtaining more
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than 20 per cent of the vote was the pe rception that she
was the candi date of t he rich, an image that Garcfa cleverly
exp loited. Thus, one important conclus ion is that the ex is-
tence of a well-esta blished class hiera rchy inh ib its conser-
vative pa rties from moving beyon d thei r co re elite con -
stituents and dim inishes thei r electora l chances. As Gibson
has noted, 'the social power of the economically privi leged
cannot be trans lated into po lit ical power democratica lly
without mu lti-class support' (1992: 21) . Mu lt iclass suppo rt,
and in particu lar popular su p port, is an essential requ ire-
ment to win elections. Latin Ame rica is a continent trad i-
tiona lly divided along class li nes, and this is express ly
manifested in the way the Peruvian party system has
evo lved. The po litical game is shaped by the fact that e lites

have more money than votes and the poor have more votes
than money. Given th is d ivide, the right's inability to trans-
fo rm discou rse into politica l action comes as no su rprise
(1212ez 19Q9: 60). Poor leadersh ip (mo re intell igent than
street sma rt) and the absence of sustained organ izational
effo rt have contributed to making this weakness more
acute. Given t hese li mitations, the right was compell ed to
accommodate itse lf to suppo rt ing 'second-best' options in
1990, 2001 and 2006.
To fu lly answer the second quest ion, it is im po rtant to
loo k at the party system du ring the 1990s and 2000s. The
right's inab ility to create a strong competitive pol itica l party
in 1990, desp ite the high expectations Va rgas Liesa's cand i-
dacy generated, shou ld come as no surp rise. All pol itica l
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parties, includ ing the t rad it iona l conservat ive ones, were
weak at this time. The pol itica l void was filled by indepen-
dents and outs ide rs, or else pa rty ins iders who saw bette r
opportunities for advancement outs ide the pa rty system
(Cameron_.19,97_;,_47..; 1-y,nch_.19,9,9,; Cotler and Grom12one
2000: 141=5 6). These new pol itica l developments also cre-
ated poss ibilities. As Middleb rook has noted in reference to
the 1990s, a weaker pa rty system gave the right 'a whole
area of maneuve r wit h potential a llies found across a range
of independent, pragmatica lly uncomm itted and ambitious
presidenciables' (Middleb rook 2000c: 281-3). Connections
with powerfu l socio-econom ic institutions at home and
ab road and Fuj imori's pos itive economic pe rfo rmance also
contributed to the right's chances of success. In t he 2000s,

traditiona l parties recovered, but they ha d to compete with
this new generation of in dependent politicians and new
party organ izations, making the political system far more
flu id.
With reference to the fina l two questions, the right has
managed to become a d riving force behind the scenes,
making Pe ru an examp le of 'conservatives ru li ng without a
party' (Boron 2000: 14_9.). In her analysis of the Fuj imori
e ra, Conaghan correctly acknowledges the impo rtance of in-
side lobbying, but does not sufficiently appreciate it
(Conaghan 2000: 25.Q). Po litica l accommodation is facil -
itated by the existence of resou rces an d networks, by t he
creation of pacts, by the co-optation of trad itional pa rties
and organ izations, and by negotiations wh ich precede the
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election of governments. The elite has the capacity to fun d
and pursue such strategies, w hereas social groups that do
not must have recou rse to other tactics, such as co llective
action. In th is manner, the Peruvian right is able to continue
to shape the po litical arena. lin 1990, de Soto's grooming of
Fujimori led to the latter's em brace of neo li bera lism an d his
acceptance by the Washington Consensus institutions
(Bolona 19_93). De Soto has continued to act in the capacity
of fac ilitator to all governments since 1990. In a simi lar
vein, Alan Garcia would not have been elected president in
2006 had he not committed himself to neolibera lism and
aligned himself with the fo rces of the right. Peru has en-
joyed economic growth and sustained private and interna-
tiona l investment s ince 1990, and the export bonanza that
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began in 2002 has consolidated the country's re putation
fo r pos it ive macroeconomic performance. Had Peru suf-
fered serious econom ic problems, t he electorate and APRA
could have moved to mo re popu li st pos it ions. At the same
time, conse rvatives and independents willing to suppo rt the
continued dominance of the neolibe ral model wou ld have
had a harder t ime defending it.
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T HR EE I The right in opposition
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7 / Venezuela 's opposition: desperately seeking and in 2005 wit h a boycott of pa rli amentary elections. An d
to overthrow Chavez although it gru dgingly accepted electoral defeat in the 2006

presi dential elections (inte rpreted by commentators with a

FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ supe rficia l understanding of the s ituation as a rejection of

Venezue la's elite has been out of pol itica l power since 1998, subversion and an acceptance of democracy), during the

and s ince then it has concent rated all its energies on seek- 2007 constitutional refe rendum it waged a cam paign of

ing to create the conditions for t he overth row of the govern- street vio lence, bi ll board and med ia scaremongering that

ment of Hugo Chavez. This elite is composed of a powerfu l was high ly rem iniscent of the events lead ing up to the over-

coa lit ion of po lit ica l parties, economic groups, sections of throw of the government of Sa lvador Allende in Ch ile in

the labour a ristocracy, bus iness bod ies, un iversity st udents, 1973. Indeed revelations in 2008 of a plot by ret ired and

state cad res from the old regime and intellectuals, and thus serving military officers to assassinate President Chavez

const itutes a formidable force. It nearly succeeded in top- signalled that a coup strategy had not been abandoned.

pli ng Chavez in Ap ril 2002; had another t ry wit h an oil lock- This was made evident by t he orgy of violence that followed
oppos it ion electoral victories in severa l key urban centres in
out in 2002- 03; again in 2004 with a reca ll referendum;

the 2008 regional elections and that ta rgeted anything
smacking of Bo livarian development (includ ing Cuban doc-
tors). The Venezuela n right's objective througho ut has not
been to defeat the government in order to govern itself, in
norma l democratic fash ion, but to destroy t he Bo livarian
Revo lut ion. In pursu it of this aim , it has relied on the pri-
vately owned med ia (which dep ict t he op position as waging
a desperate battle for liberty aga inst an increasingly author-
itarian regime) and the politica l and financ ial su pport of US
state agencies. Th is cha pter see ks to examine the reasons
that unde rli e the intensely undemocratic natu re of Venez ue-
la's op position.
The Fourth Rep ublic: a rotten regime
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The election of Hugo Chavez to the pres idency of
Venezuela in 1998 was a critica l turning point in the fate of
the d iscredited Fourth Repu blic (on the rise of Chavez, see
Gott 2006; Kozloff 2007..; !LJones 2008; Wil12ert 2007..) . The
most reca lcit rant members of t he elite, such as the ex-
president, Ca rlos Andres Perrez, and the traditiona l right-
wing parties, Acci6n Democratica (AD, Democratic Action)
and t he Comite de O rgan izaci6n Po lrt ica Electora l lndepen-
d iente (COP Ei, Comm ittee of Inde pendent Po litica l and
Electoral Organization ), opposed him from the start, but
othe rs, such as the media tycoon Gustavo Cisne ros, who
'was among those of t he cou nt ry's financia l oliga rchs who
hoped the untested officer cou ld be bent to the ir will ' (Gott
2006:....155), thought t hey cou ld co-opt him. This latte r

strategy was rapi dly abandoned on inaugu ration day when,
to genera l astonishment, Chavez alte red the wording of t he
presi dential oath, declaring: ' I swear in front of my people
that over the mo ribund const itution I wi ll push forwa rd the
democratic transfo rmations that are necessary so that the
new repub lic wi ll have an adequate magna ca rta fo r the
times.' Gott reports t hat 'his su pporters .. . erupted into
cheers [but] his op ponents gas ped. Chavez's message was
unm istakab le' (ib id.: 155) .
Chavez had decla red wa r on an oligarchy t hat was accus-
tomed to run t he affa irs of the state with ve ry little demo-
cratic accountabi lity, as though endowed with the d ivine
right to rule, and that did not expect to be questioned by the
country's darker-s kinned majority (fo r a discussion of how
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race and class have permeated Venezuela's po lit ical d is-
course, see Gottberg 2004: 115=35)- Represented by AD an d
COPE i (parties wh ich had rot ated in government s ince the
Punto Fijo Pact of 1958, wh ich fo ll owed the overthrow of
the Pe rez Jimenez d ictatorship), the oli garchy had a repu -
tation fo r economic an d po lit ica l promiscuity with few
parallels in the region. In forty years it had developed a cul-
tu re of specu lation, parasitis1m and corrupt ion, which was
bot h fue ll ed and funded by the country's oil revenues
(Coronil 19,97.). Th us, for exam ple, under the government of
Jaime Lusinch i (1984- 89) , a sma ll but very influentia l grou p
appropriated around $5 bi llion through manipu lat ion of dif-
ferent ial exchange rates (Lander 19.9~7Q). The title of a
bestsell er at the time is tell ing: the Diccionario de la

Corrupci6n en Venezuela cata logued 300 cases of graft and
co rruption by the high and mighty between 1958 and 1989,
and this was by no means the total (on co rru ption, see
Navarro 2004). Pres ident Ca rlos And res Perez (1989- 93)
was impeached for em bezzlement and m isuse of state
funds , forced to res ign an d con demned to two yea rs' house
arrest. By 1993, the Fourth Re public was clea rly mo ribund
and the legit imacy of the AD- COP Ei powe r axis was in tat-
te rs. Rafael Caldera, the frontru nner in the election caused
by Pe rez's departure, was com pelled to set up a new party
as the only way to be elected (.fh..Jones 2008). To add to t he
elite 's woes, Arist6 bulo lsturiz, a left-winger and the first
Afro-Venez uelan to be elected to t he offi ce, became mayor
of Ca racas.
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These pol itica l upheava ls with in the el ite too k place in
the wake of growi ng popu la r discontent. Venezu ela's exte r-
na l de bt rose from $1,709 million in 1980 to $35,842 million
in 1994 (Cooker 19,9,9_;_7~). In Feb ru a ry 1989, Perez had
introduced an IMF-d ictated au ste rity package (known as the
paquetazo) , which provo ked t he largest riots in t he coun-
try's history (the events became known as the Caracazo) ,
d uring which between 600 an d 3,000 peop le we re kill ed by
the mil ita ry on t he pres ident's ord e rs . Most of the deaths
too k place afte r the riots had ended, when hundreds of so l-
d ie rs, led by tan ks, raided the shanty towns around Caracas
and shot ind iscrim inately at t he population (Sonntag_J.9,9~
.Q.Q). These tactics exacerbated an ongoing radical ization
within the armed forces that woul d lead to two armed

rebe ll ions by young officers, the fi rst led by one Hugo
Chavez in 1992. The Caracazo demonstrated that the
puntofjista regime had the t ra ppings of democracy (e lec-
tions and formal const itutiona l rights), but was in rea lity
deep ly undemocratic and was not prepared to countenance
the democratic asp irations of the Venezuelan peop le
protesting against po li cies whose ma in function was to
prop up the rich and the ir fore ign pa rtners, mostly US
compan ies (for the Caracazo, see the 1992 documentary
Venezuela Febrero 27, d irected by Liliane Blaise r).
The Fourth Repub lic's d isastrous economic performance
was com pounded by high levels of inequa lity: in t he fifty
years befo re Chavez's election, income per head in
Venezue la rose by just a quarter of the ave rage rate of the
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othe r large Latin American econom ies, a s ituation that was
exacerbated by almost total neglect of the country's infra-
struct ure. Between 1990 and 1997, income per cap ita
d ropped from $5,192 to $2,858; Venezuela's human devel-
opment index decli ned from 0.821 to 0 .746; and poverty
rose from 17.65 pe r cent (9.06 per cent in extreme poverty)
to 48.33 per cent (with 27.66 pe r cent in ext reme poverty).
In 1997 t he richest 5 per cent of the popu lation ea rned 41.58
times more than the poo rest 5 per cent. In 1983, 41. 3 pe r
cent of wo rking Venezue lans were in the info rma l secto r,
whi le by 1998 the figure was 48.2 per cent; meanwh ile pub-
lic sector emp loyment decli ned from 22.67 pe r cent of tota l
emp loyment in 1983 to l 6. 33 pe r cent in l 998 (Can non
2009_;__35=:§).

If Chavez's inaugu ration s peech ha d put the fea r of God
into Venezuela's o liga rchy, once in government his actions
worried it even mo re. He swept away the o ld politica l struc-
tu res, including the pa rliament, sacked a la rge number of
judges closely associated with the ancien regime an d estab-
lished a Constituent Assem bly, whose function it was to
draft a new, Bo livarian constitut ion. Once this was ap-
proved by referendum he was a ble to initiate a thorough-
going process of t ransformation of Venezue la's economy,
politics and society. A crit ica l moment came when he
moved decisive ly to assert state contro l ove r Petr61eos de
Venezuela SA (PDVSA, Venezue lan O il ), a com pany that
had previous ly acted as a state within the state; Gott has de-
scribed this as a 'vast conglome rate d ispens ing favours and
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bribes' (2009,;,_i7Q). In fu ture, oi l revenues would be used
fo r social an d economic development with the aim of lift ing
peop le out of poverty. The elite ha d supported the cree ping
privatization of the o il industry, but this process was
sto pped in its tracks by the appointment of a new PDVSA
management; by the new constitution, wh ich made privati-
zation unconstitutional; an d by Venezuela's adoption of a
newly asse rt ive position within the O rgan ization of the
Pet roleum Exporting Count ries (OP EC) , which ensu red that
production quotas would lead to increas ing oi l prices and
thus highe r revenues. With the loss of PDVSA, the oli garchy
lost the foundation on which much of its privi lege and pa ra-
sitism had rested.
Anothe r ha rd blow fo r the right was the knowledge that

Chavez ins pired millions of Venezue lans, pa rt icu la rly the
poo r, wh ich made it very difficult to defeat him in elections.
He was also clearly not go ing to be bought. As ea rly as
1999- 2000, the elite d rew the conclusion that on ly force
could address its pred icament. This pe rception would lead
to the ' insu rrection of the bourgeo isie', the most dramatic
ep isode of wh ich was the brief oust ing of Chavez in Apri l
2002.
The insurrect ion of th e bourgeoisie
There a re uncanny para ll els between the experiences of
Venezue la under Chavez and Ch ile under All ende. Chi le's
right-wing opposition fo rmed a coalition called t he Confed-
eraci6n de la Democracia (Confede ration of Democracy)
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whi le its Venezuelan counterpart was known as the Coordi-
nado ra Democratica (Democratic Coord inating Com-
mittee). Both relied heavi ly on support from t he US and
from the domestic private media (El Mercurio and Channel
13 in Ch il e and El Universal, El Nacional and most television
channels in Venezuela). The med ia in both countries waged
sca re campa igns based on the same themes (defence of the
fam ily, private prope rty, t rad it ion, democracy, freedom and
anti-communism) and both received the po lit ical endorse-
ment of the Inte r-American Press Association (which, unde r
US leade rsh ip, represents media corpo rations in the re-
gion) in t he form of regu la r denunciat ions of gove rnment
'attacks' on the freedoms of ex pression and the press. Both
used vio lent ext ra-pa rli amentary demonstrations to create a

sense of pan ic and chaos, so as to scare the popu lation,
and both used billboard posters an d economic strikes to
d isrupt t he economy an d demo ral ize government sup-
porters. Both wh ipped up anti-commun ist sentiment,
cha rging t he government with intending to sub ject the na-
tion to the dictates of castrocomunismo and the creation of a
totalitarian d ictatorshi p. Both mob ilized women to stage
demonstrations (they were d ressed in black to symbolize a
state of mou rning for the imm inent death of democracy).
Both combined extra-pa rliamentary st ruggle with pa rt ic-
ipation in elections, and both aimed to overthrow the elect-
ed government and destroy its ideology. Both staged coups
- one successful, one uns uccessful - with the collaboration
of US agencies, which heavi ly funded all opposition
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activit ies.
Since the 1998 election, the opposition has played the
democratic game by fie lding cand idates at most elections
(regiona l, parliamenta ry and presidential), but it has not
been pre pared to acce pt the new institutional framework.
Adopting the tactics displayed by the Ch il ean right between
1970 and 1973, it has thus fa r fa iled to obtain the same re-
sults, but this does not invali date the point argued here -
that its strategic aim is the com plete eradication of chav-
ismo and eve rything associated with it, pa rticularly in te rms
of democracy and social progress. Many question the rev-
o lutionary nature of the advances achieved un de r Chavez,
and although the re are important deficiencies in the Bo li-
varian Revol ution, it must be borne in mind that Latin

American elites, in conjunction with Washington, have
ove rthrown gove rnments throughout the region for much
less serious 'offences' (we might mention Guatema la in
1954, Braz il in 1964 an d, more recently, Ho nd uras in
Thus, im perfections (o r indeed lack of revo lutiona ry depth
of the transformations effected) have never been a reason
not to ove rthrow a gove rnment. The fact rema ins, howeve r,
that the dept h of the t ransformation of Venezuelan society
and economy is, outside Cuba, the most profound in the re-
gion. The cha pter now focuses on the key politica l crises
unleashed by Venezuela's elite, so as to pinpo int the real
nature of its strategic objective vis-a-vis the Chavez gove rn-
ment. These a re the cris is lea ding to the short-lived April
2002 coup; the 2002- 03 o il lockout; the 2004
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referendum; the boycott of the 2005 pa rliamentary elec-
tions; the constitu tiona l referen d um of 2007; assassination
attem pts on t he pres ident; an d the vio lence which followe d
2009). the 2008 regional elections.
As mentioned previously, some membe rs of the oppo-
sition hoped that they cou ld co-o pt the new government.
Thus media tycoon Gustavo Cisneros suggested that one of
his re presentatives shou ld assume control of the National
Telecomm unications Comm iss ion, the state regulatory
body, wh ich wou ld have greatly aided the expansion of his
emp ire (Gott 2006: 155). Chavez refused to be ta ken pris-
oner in this way. He was dete rmined both to transform the
country without the assistance of its traditional ru le rs and
reca ll to d ismantle the who le edifice esta bli shed by the Punto Fijo

agreement. The turn ing point came in Novembe r 200 1,
when Chavez signed fo rty-nine decrees, one of which took
PDVSA out of the hands of its AD/ COPE i managers and
transfe rred it to state contro l. When the elite rea lized t he
implicat ions of the new legislation, PDVSA executives re-
acted vigo rous ly and , in league with the Fede raci6n de Ca-
ma ras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producci6n de
Venezue la (F EDECAMARAS, Venez uelan Fede ration of
Chambers of Commerce) and the co rrupt leadersh ip of the
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venez uela (CTV, Con-
federat ion of Venezue lan Workers), launched the first gen -
eral strike on 10 Decembe r 200 1 (Wil12ert 2003: 107.). The
strike sought both to prevent state control of PDVSA and to
oust Chavez. The private media whipped up
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anti-government sent iments ' on a round -the-clock bas is , a
virulence unthinkable in Euro pe or North America ' (ibid. :
102) . The new laws were wid e-ranging and cha ll enged the
privileged pos it ion of the Catho lic Chu rch, landowners,
indust riali sts, co rrupt t rade un ion ists and functionaries. By
2002, t he opposition was ca lli ng on the armed forces to
end 'the Chavez "d ictatorsh ip'" (Buxton 2009.;__Q7.).
If the elite understood t hat los ing PDVSA wou ld jeop-
ardize its surviva l as a class, Chavez knew that, without
state ownersh ip of oil revenues, the regeneration of
Venezue la was imposs ible. The PDVSA management and
the Venezue lan elite opposed his Hyd rocarbons Law, and
in th is t hey co incided with the US 's strategic interests. The
law stipu lated t hat roya lt ies pa id by private compan ies

shou ld rise from 16.6 per cent to 30 per cent, and that the
Venezue lan state shou ld contro l at least 51 per cent of new
o il production and exploration . It also sought to stop over-
production (a policy that su ited the US, in that it kept the
price low) by convincing OPEC count ries to adopt a mo re
assertive stance. Th is led to a hike in the cost of a barre l of
o il from $8.43 to $28. When Chavez then appo inted new
PDVSA directors, FED ECAMA RAS an d the CTV (themselves
both recipients of gene rous 'grants' from the Nationa l
Endowment fo r Democracy (N ED); see Lievesley~ chapte r)
champ ioned the old executives. FE DECAMARAS's pres-
ident, Ernesto Carmona, wrote in El Uni11ersal: 'The crisis in
PDVSA can be traced to the government's decis ion to cre-
ate a managing boa rd with political ends, thus shattering
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the me ritocracy in high management' (cited in Kozloff
2007.: 28). Th is 'meritocracy' had been involved in settin g
up joint ventures with private-sector contractors to pump
o il and se ll it back to PDVSA at a fixed rate, so that when oil
prices co ll a psed the ir profits increased, because PDVSA
was paying them high prices, t hus leading to huge losses to
Venezue la. Th is 'me ritocracy' also so ld PDVSA information
techno logy to a US defence cont ractor for just $1,000
(Buxton 2009: 62), while its payro ll included some 6,000
gerentes (manage rs) whose salaries amounted to $1 bill ion
annually. Since 1995, PDVSA had paid some $500 mi ll ion
pe r yea r to its foreign branches but nothing to its Venezue-
lan branch, unt il Chavez fo rced it to do so in 2001 (Britto
Garcia 2008: JlL-42). The bat tle for PDVSA was crucial for

both s ides and was inst rumental in the run-up to the Ap ril
2002 coup. In that month, the oppos ition a rrested the 'i ll e-
gitimate' res ident of the presidentia l pa lace in Miraflores
(that is Chavez) , drove his ministe rs and gove rnment
underground and abolished all the Bo livarian institutions,
includ ing the 1999 constitution, the Nationa l Assemb ly, the
National Electo ral Counci l, the ombudsman, the atto rney
genera l and the Su preme Court, and also suspended all
elections. The police were un leashed to quell any resistance
that would inevitably come from the barrios, where sup port
fo r Chavez was strongest.
The world's corporate media we lcomed the cou p. To take
just one exam ple, in the UK the Blair government's minister
respons ible for Latin American affa irs, Denis MacShane,
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wrote an a rt icle in The Times on 13 Apri l in which he com -
pared Chavez to Mussolini. So prom inent was the role of
the media in the crisis that tlhe coup has been labe ll ed the
first media coup in history. On 10 April , various Venezue lan
newspapers had openly ca ll ed fo r a coup. Thus, the front
page of El Nue110 Pafs read: 'The m ilitary have to have the ir
say'; Tai Cua/, organ of t he Movimiento al Sociali smo
(Movement towards Socialism) led by fo rmer Marxist gue r-
rill a Teodo ro Petkoff, called for 'civilian rebellion'; and El
Nacional announced that 'The fina l battle will be in Miraflo-
res', whi le also printing a statement from Primero Justicia
(Justice First), a key mem ber of the oppos it ion coal ition,
which demanded 'the immed iate res ignation of t he Pres-
ident'. On 11 April, El Uni11ersal was talk ing about 'total

confl ict'. As opposition marchers came face to face wit h
cha11istas who were cong regated a round the pres idential
pa lace to defend the gove rnment, sn ipers fi red on demon -
strators. Some t hirty peo ple, ma inly cha11ista supporters,
we re shot in the space of thirty minutes (Palacios 2002).
Whi le t he media reported that t hey had fainted from the
heat, in fact most had been shot in the hea d. When it be-
came impossib le to deny that the re had been shootings, the
med ia charged Chavez with ordering t he kil ling of innocent
civilians. Membe rs of 'civi l society', former PDVSA execu -
tives, active and retired mi lita ry officers, jou rn ali sts, broad -
casters, oppos ition politicians and even Venezuela's ca r-
d ina l all called on the armed fo rces 'to please collaborate to
reestab li sh law and o rd er so that there a re no more deaths'
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(Britto Garcfa 2008: 82). Thei r vers ion of events was reit-
e rated in Was hingto n on 12 Ap ril, when the Wh ite House
press secretary declared: 'We know that the actions encou r-
aged by the Chavez government provo ked this crisis;
Chavez supp ressed peaceful demonstrations, fi red on un -
armed peaceful protesters ... that's what took place and a
civilian t rans itiona l government has been insta ll ed' (Bartlex
and O Bria in 2003). However, CNN correspon dent Otto
Neusda lt had a d iffe rent view: 'On 10 April evening I got a
phone ca ll and I'm told: "Otto, tomorrow you ' ll get a vi deo
about Chavez, the [oppos it ion ] march will go to Miraflores,
there are go ing to be dead people, and you' ll also see 20
high ran king officers spea king against the government and
demanding his resignation '" (cited in Britto Garcfa 2008:
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49.). Thus , the plotte rs knew the chain of events in advance. by Baruta's mayo r, Capri les R.adons ki, with the excuse that
Alte rnative vers ions were absent because all pro- Vice-Pres ident Diosdado Cabell o was hiding ins ide
government med ia had been su ppressed. Chavez was fi- (Pa lacios 2002; the s iege can be seen in t he 2002 docu-
na lly arrested on 13 April, but the media reported that he menta ry Asedio a una embajada). Total media censo rship
had res igned . Otto Reich , US ass istant secretary of state for was vo luntarily imposed by the med ia owne rs themselves.
the western hemis phe re, wou ld repeat this fa bricat ion . El Universal cele brated the coup ('a step fo rward ') while Tai
Venezuela's elite was elated by Chavez's ousting. It em - Cua/ sa id 'Chao Hugo ' whil e the ir ed itorials gave the ir full
barked upon a brutal repress ion of chavista ministers , MPs , sup port to every measure taken by the Carmona govern-
gove rnors and mayo rs (Antonio Ledezma, a lead ing op po- ment. The private televis ion channels we re even mo re exu -
sition politician , a ppea red on telev is ion with an a rrest li st berant. A purge of cha vistas working in the med ia began
with 200 names); peasants we re evicted from land dist rib- with the firing of some 500 journa li sts. All of t hese events
uted to t hem under the forty-nine laws (now abo li shed); pri- too k place within fo rty-seven hou rs!
vatizat ion plans were put in place; oil sa les to Cu ba we re The coup came to an end on 13 April, when the inha b-
ha lted; and the Cu ban embassy was bes ieged by thugs led itants of the barrios mob ilized , surround ing the presidential

pa lace and many mi litary barracks, and Chavez was re-
stored t he fo ll owing day (Britto Garcfa 2008: 86-9,9.) . How-
ever, its fai lure did not deter Venezuela's elite from contin-
uing its campaign to reclaim PDVSA, to engineer the co l-
lapse of the economy an d to destab ilize the government.
Thus, in Ju ly, El Nacional ominously announced that 'the
government wi ll not last beyond December'. The med ia
ta lked regularly of a genera l strike, and in November 2002,
Luis Giust i, forme r PDVSA head and a man closely asso-
ciated with the privatization of the oi l indust ry, predicted in
El Universal that ' if PDVSA joins the stoppage, the country
will co ll apse in about a week'. Th is hype was supplemented
by the regular te levision appearances of masked soldiers
te lli ng audiences that when they acted ' nobody wi ll have
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time to do anything' (Britto Ga rcfa 2008: 131). FEDECA-
MARAS joined forces with t he CTV to organize the oi l lock-
out, wh ich began on 2 December; lasting sixty-four days, it
brought untold suffering to mi llions of poor Venezue lans
who were denied cooking fue l.
The opposition's Coord inadora Democratica received
USA ID ass istance and was also helped by Venezue la's top
pub lic re lations firms, wh ich 'produced some of the most
highly crafted anti-Chavez commercials Venezuela had ever
seen ' (Colinger 2007_;_9,5) . The cent ra l message was one of
despair in the face of imm inent catastrophe and irre-
trievab le loss of freedom in a context of regime violence
and descent into totalitarian ism. One Venezuelan com -
mented: 'Venezuelans are being subjected to a massive

Chavez-ave rsion the rapy programme, 24 hours a day, seven
days a week, mont h after mont h, ad nauseam', wh ile
no less than four te levision channe ls [not to mention
radio and newspapers] joined together 24 hou rs a day in
Decembe r 2002 and January 2003, and broadcast
propaganda announcements aga inst t he government,
dedicat ing all of their programming, without a second of
rest, to denigrate the government through yellow jour-
na li sm, to cause all classes of alarm and rumou rs to in-
voke terror. (Co li nger 2007.:,__97 1 100)
When d issident m ilita ry officers rebell ed, INTESA, the
company in cha rge of running electron ic operations in
PDVSA, promptly joined the strike and sabotaged its
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systems, thus bringing the oil industry to a halt, with devas-
tating losses. Venezue la was hard put to meet its contrac-
tua l oil obligations and was fo rced to import o il to do so.
Opposition PDVSA manage rs and emp loyees destroyed or
pa ralysed installations, oil well s and refineries, hijacked
17 1 600
Venezue lan o il tankers and convinced insu rance companies
to declare Venezue lan ports unsafe, in order to prevent fo r-
eign tan kers from un load ing o il. On 13 December 2002, t he
US State Depart ment ca lled for ea rly elections in orde r to
'end t he politica l crisis' (Col inger 2007.:,__93- 105). Even afte r
the Supreme Court ordered t he end ing of the lockout, the
private med ia continued to suppo rt it (El Nacional: 'The oi l
lockout wi ll cont inue until Chavez is out', 21 Decembe r
2002). The econom ic cost to the nation was high: $14,400

million o r 27.7 per cent of GDP (accord ing to PDVSA in
200 6) , while unem ployment, officially at 10 per cent, in-
c reased to 20 pe r cent (Weisbrot 20086: 2) . Trade un ion
leade r O rlando Castill o estimated that the o il stoppage led
to the loss of 700,000 jobs and the closu re of 10 ,000 sma ll
bus inesses (Britto Garcfa 2008: 151). In ea rly Janua ry 2003,
as the stoppage began to run out of steam, the oppos ition
staged a ma rch to the Tiuna Barracks in Ca racas, with the
de li berate aim of provoking a confrontation wit h chavistas
and t he fo rces of orde r, so as to have casualties for med ia
propaganda purposes. Mem bers of the Metropol itan Pol ice,
under the contro l of oppos ition mayo r Alfredo Pena, shot
dead seve ral peop le (Britto Garcfa 2008: 138=5i.).
The oil lockout was defeated, but t he elite did not give
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up: it now ca ll ed fo r a reca ll refe rendum . Art icle 72 of the
1999 constitution provided for the pres ident's leg iti macy to
be tested th rough a referendum , but on ly if 15 per cent of
vote rs' signatu res can be collected. Su mate, an NED-
funded NGO, undertook t he co ll ection in Novem ber and
Decembe r 200 3 (ba rely eight months afte r the end of the oil
lockou t). The co ll ection was ridd led with irregu la rities:
among those s ign ing were dead peop le, mino rs, fo reigne rs,
names that did not match identity ca rd num bers, and many
evidently signed by the same hand . Deducting these irregu-
larit ies from the tota l gathe red left the oppos ition wit h
insufficient num be rs. Faced with this setback, the oppo-
sition, supported by the Cat ho lic Church and the med ia,
launched a vio lent campa ign to intimidate d irecto rs of the

Consejo Nacional Electoral (CN E, Nationa l Electoral Coun -
ci l) by pub lish ing the ir photographs and te lephone num-
bers, and to question the ir institution 's im partia lity and pro-
bity, in order to force the CN E to agree to the referendum .
The Coordinadora also staged street marches t hat ended in
clas hes, an d even t ried to break the security perimeter of
the G-15 summit tak ing place in downtown Ca racas. Ap-
pea ls for the milita ry 'to act' resurfaced (Britto Garc(a 2008:
173). Howeve r, in Ma rch 2004, Colin Powell, in a speech to
the US Congress, recognized both the CN E decis ion (to re-
ject 800,000 s ignatures and to accept 1.9 million as va lid)
and the ap peals process, saying that Chavez was the
democratically elected pres ident of all Venez uelans. The un -
rest came to an immediate end (Britto Garcia 2008: 19Q).
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This setback - and the fact t hat it had exposed its elec-
tora l wea kness - led the op position to ado pt new tactics. In
May 2004, Venez uelan secu rity forces a rrested 130 Co lom -
bian pa rami lita ries, wearing Venezue lan a rmy un ifo rms, at
the Dakta ri hacienda, near Caracas, the property of Cuban-
Venezue lan Roberto Alonso, an individua l with strong con-
nections to Colombia and to anti -Cast ro Cubans in Miami
and a lead ing light in t he Coordinadora (Ministerio del
Pode r Popular para la Comunicaci6n y la lnformaci6n
2004). The pa ram ilita ries were be ing t ra ined by Venezuelan
army office rs. The then gove rnor of Miranda (whe re Dakta ri
is located) , Hen rique Mendoza, had already announced that
there wou ld be surprises and actions 'about wh ich we can -
not comment because we could jeopa rdize them ' (Britto

Garcia 2008: 200). Chavez announced that the plan had
been to attack both Mi raflo res and mi lita ry barracks, and
that the wea ring of military uniforms had sought to suggest
this was an army up ris ing. When the gove rnment asked the
private media to broa dcast this informat ion to the pub lic,
they refused and instead waged a cam paign to minimize the
plot and distort its pu rpose. On 10 May, Tai Cua/ talked of
'man ipulation', and , desp ite the evidence, the Daily Journal
said that 'Chavez alleges coup plot', and a BBC World Se r-
vice head li ne noted 'two pa rami lita ries assass inated ', emp-
tying the event of its subve rs ive natu re. On 16 May, Globo-
vis i6n quoted op position leade r, Felipe Mujica, who de-
scribed the plot as 'the com ic strip that the government
mounted with the paramilitaries'. The oppos it ion parties
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also alleged a government plot. US Ambassado r Shapiro
too k a full week to comment, despite an appea l from
Venezuela's vice-p res ident. The Chu rch was totally s ilent
(Britto Garcia 2008: 203=-4).
With the paramilitary plot fo il ed, the opposition tu rned
its attention to the reca ll refe ren d um. It launched a two-
pronged attack by questioning the impartial ity of both the
electora l system and the CN E, hinting heavi ly that fraud was
about to be comm itted by the gove rnment. It also circu lated
the rumou r that the country was on the verge of civi l wa r.
Thus, RCTV an d ot her private media showed a comme rcia l
that de picted 'a Revo lutionary Manua l to ro b elections'
(Britto Garcia 2008: 215) . The cha rges of electoral fraud
(befo re t he election actually too k place) were strident and

repetit ive. The Coo rdinadora - which was still in receipt of
NED and USAI D sup port - based its campaign on 'an alter-
native plan for a trans it ional post-Chavez government' that
was widely believed to have been drafted by officials from
the Bush adm inistration (Colinger 2007.: 110-11, llf!.=15)-
This campaign continued to be accompanied by a ppea ls for
violence. In Ju ly, Carlos Andres Pe rez, now exi led in Miami,
sent the fol lowing message: 'Referendum to get Chavez
out? Vio lence will all ow us to get rid of him. It's the only
way we have. Method? Chavez must d ie like a dog' (cited in
El Nacional, 15 July 2004). Some sections of the opposition
advocated t he suspension of democracy for three yea rs, the
abo lition of the Supreme Court and a d rastic restructu ring
of the armed forces.
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On poll ing day, Chavez won with a handsome 59 pe r
cent, while t he opposition polled 41 pe r cent - figu res con-
firmed by both the Ca rte r Center and the Organization of
American States (OAS). Op position po liticians saturated
the airwaves with denunciations of a 'gigantic fraud', and
on 25 August were still rejecting t he resu lt: 'The people
voted SI, the internationa l commun ity voted NO' (Britto
Garcia 2008: 258). Calls to take to the st reets 'to defend the
victory of the peo ple' were made by all Coordinadora lead -
ers, but not a single fo rma l complaint of fraud was lodged
with the CN E, the OAS, the Ca rte r Cente r or any other body.
When the US recognized the resu lt of the referendum, one
newspaper ed itorialized that 'Bush has abandoned us' (El
Nuevo Pa(s, 19 August 2004).

The oppos1t 1on was now uncomforta bly awa re that it
would contest the 2 Decem be r 2005 National Assem bly
elections defeated and in disa rray. Its response was to con -
tinue to question the pro bity of the who le process: 'The
CN E is discred ited to con duct any election ' (El Uni11ersal, 26
September 2004). Thus, it failed to engage in regional elec-
tions held on 31 Octobe r 2005, prefe rring to concentrate its
fire on the digital finger print mach ines de ployed by the CN E
as pa rt of the comp ute rization of elections. As a result,
cha11istas won the governorsh ips of twenty out of twenty-two
states , and 229 of 355 mayo ralties (Britto Garcfa 2008: 27.9.).
Prospects for the Nationa l Assembly d id not look at all
prom is ing fo r the oppos ition, and th us it decided to boy-
cott the election process. The op pos ition a rgued ,
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inco rrectly, that t here we re softwa re irregularit ies in the
electron ic voting mach ines, an d that the digital finger print
machines threatened voter confidential ity an d should be
with drawn. It expected that its objections wou ld be re buffed
by the government, giving it a good excuse to pull out of
the election . It was , therefore, su rprised when the com-
plaints we re acce pted . Nevertheless, the op pos ition de-
cided to continue with its withd rawal. Acco rd ing to the New
York Times, the real reason was that 'gove rnment candi-
dates would crush them in the elect ion ' (Forero 2005). This
was an obse rvation confirmed by offi cial EU obse rvers
(Degutis 2005). With the op position abstaining, cha11ista
cand idates won all 167 National Assem bly seats on 2
December. The Coo rd inado ra, having su ffered a stream of

setbacks s ince 1998, s plit into fact ions. Reflecting on th is
political meltdown, the Venezue lan elite realized that it
would be better to participate in the com ing 2006 presi -
dentia l elections t han to maintain its policy of abstention,
even if this meant confronting a mass ively strengthened
Chavez.
Chavez rece ived 63 per cent of the vote in 2006, thus re-
sound ing ly defeating Manuel Rosa les, the oppos ition
cand idate, who was fo rced to concede defeat. Th is was the
first t ime that an oppos it ion politician had recognized a
cha11ista victory. Turnout was 75 per cent, a histo ric high
(Hurtado 2010: 91). Time magazine, perhaps unwittingly,
inte rpreted Rosa les's acceptance of defeat as a pause in the
quest to ove rth row Chavez: 'Rosa les' brief concession
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speech suggested t he oppos ition may have reso lved to ac-
cept that Chavez won 't be ousted any time soon ' (Gould
2006). Neverthe less, despite grudging acceptance of the re-
sult, any conclus ion that th e opposition had fina lly em -
braced democracy would soon be d ispe ll ed. In the run-u p
to the constitutional reform refe rendum of December 2007,
ca ll ed by the pres ident to reform the 1999 constitution in a
radica l direction , Venezue la's elite emba rked on a semi-
insu rrectionary strategy aimed at destabi lizing the govern -
ment. It began hoarding food and other dai ly essentia ls (in -
clud ing milk, rice, toothpaste, bread and meat), and , in a
move that was high ly remin iscent of the tactics used by the
Ch ilean right against All ende, students and thugs became
invo lved in 'violent st reet clashes; ta rgeting pro-C havez

students, po lice an d the Nationa l Guard; smash ing win-
dows; turn ing over and setting ca rs alight; starting other
fires; burn ing tires; throwing rocks and bottles; engaging in
a shootout at Caracas' Central University' (Lendman 2008).
Thus, the right's seeming acceptance of the democratic
rules of the game was easi ly su bstituted by tactics aimed at
causing chaos through a nationa l wave of unrest and con -
frontation. A US Congress report recogn ized the sign if-
icance of the stu dents' actions: 'with their abi lity to mob i-
lize demonstrators, students eme rged as perha ps the most
prominent an d vis ible op ponents of the constitutiona l re-
fo rm effort and some observe rs believe that the reform
would not have been defeated had it not been for the stu -
dents' (Sullivan 2009,;_]7.). Inexperience, inefficiency and
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co rruption among some chavista offi cials no doubt contrib-
uted to the sense of unce rta in1ty felt by broad sections of the
midd le class and the poor. This was relentlessly explo ited
by the opposition's propaganda mach ine. Howeve r, the
o ppos it ion was mostly responsi ble fo r the at mosphere of
crisis and vio lence. Besides mo bilizing students, it per-
suaded individ ua l sho ppe rs t o hoa rd foods tuffs in o ppo-
sition to price contro ls. The Church helped by condemning
const itutional refo rm as morally wrong, wh ile the private
med ia waged their customa ry incendiary cam paign, de pict-
ing the proposal as a letha l threat to freedom, human
rights, the fam ily, Ch ristian va lues and such like (Sullivan
2009_;_i7.). An anonymous two-page s pread in Ultimas Noti-
cias claimed: ' If you are a Mother, YOU LOS E! Beca use you

will lose your house, you r family and your ch ildren (chil-
dren will belong to the state)' (Young 2008; an d see Lud-
lam below) . It also put the fear of God into readers, a rgu ing
they wou ld lose thei r religious freedoms, thei r jobs, their
businesses; that peasants woul d lose their land and st u-
dents thei r right to decide what to study; that the armed
fo rces wou ld be rep laced by mi lit ias; and that the Venezue-
lan cu rrency, t he bolfva r, wou ld be deva lued (Fox 2007.).
The media also pred icted that Chavez would become pres-
ident for life an d, as in Ch il e in 1970- 73 and Nicaragua in
the 1980s, Venezuela wou ld be subject to a process of
'Cubanization'. These scare stories were rep licated by the
world's med ia, wh ich de picted a government un leashing
wanton rep ress ion aga inst a rebellious civil society (Young
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2008).
The constitutiona l referen dum was defeated, by the
sma ll est of margins, t hus becoming the first oppos it ion
electora l victory against an othe rwise unbeata ble Chavez.
An ana lysis of the resu lts shows that, wh il e the oppos ition
vote barely increased, the chaivista vote went down: 3 m illion
peop le who had voted for Chavez in the 2006 pres idential
election did not vote in the constitutiona l referendum of
2007. That is, the oppos it ion d id not win the referendum;
the government lost it. With the oppos ition emboldened,
sections of it began to hatch a plot to assassinate the pres-
ident either by blowing up the president ial plane or the Mi-
raflores Palace in Se ptember 2008. Earlie r, in January 2008,
thi rty-seven Colom bian para m ilita ries had been arrested in

the state of Zu lia, on the bo rder with Co lomb ia, and found
to have all sorts of weapons, includ ing anti-tan k m issi le
launchers. It was clea r that sections of the o ppos it ion did
not be lieve they could win the November regional elections.
This proved to be the case, although the oppos ition's
mun icipal representation was enhanced by victories in key
urban areas, notab ly Ca racas, Ma raca ibo, Miranda, San
Cristo bal and La Asuncion - t hat is, in the largest cities and
in the most econom ica lly developed states of the count ry.
This contest was immediately fo ll owed by an orgy of wan -
ton vio lence an d dest ruction, ca rried out by opposition
thugs who went on the ram page, destroying faci lities
(buildings, com pute rs, veh icles, ambulances and so on)
and attacking everything associated with t he Bo livarian
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m1ss1ons (schoo ls, health centres, educationa l esta b-
lishments, community centres for the third age, and espe-
cia lly Cuban doctors) . In Ca racas itself, newly elected
Mayor Anton io Ledezma a rbit ra rily sacked about 6 ,000 City
Hall workers for being associated with the socia l missions.
Simi lar sack ings took place in other loca l autho rities whe re
the op position won, affecting thousands more workers . The
world's co rporate med ia barely re po rted these ugly events.
It is well to remember that, in all these battles, not only did
the oppos it ion have an abundance of resources (funding
from t he US and private Venezuelan sou rces, the support of
the nationa l and inte rnat iona l media, and control over large
chunks of t he economy, including the banking and com-
mercial sectors) which faci litated its a bility to sabotage any

policy init iative, but it also had cont rol over important insti-
tutions of the state appa ratus, such as gove rno rsh ips and
mun icipal ities and , crucially, substantial po lice fo rces (as
we saw above, the Metropo litan Pol ice was the decis ive
mechan ism utilized du ring t he sho rt-lived cou p aga inst
Pres iden t Chavez in Ap ril 2002, while regiona l police forces
we re complicit in the rioting and street battles un leashed by
the oppos ition). It could also count on the ass istance of the
large num ber of Co lomb ian pa ram ilita ries operating in the
bo rde r a reas and , accord ing to some reports, in Venezue-
la's ma in cit ies, particu la rly Ca racas (VTV 2009.) .
On 16 Janua ry 2009, key oppos ition figu res met sec retly
with US State Depa rtment officials in Puerto Rico, weeks
before t he Obama inaugu ration. On their retu rn to
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Venezue la, they prepared to contest the 15 February refer-
endum ca ll ed to pass judgement on the gove rnment's pro-
posal to lift te rm lim its on all elected officials, includ ing t he
pres ident . Two days before the vote, Chavez went on te le-
vi s ion to announce that a cou p involving retired a rmy offi -
cers had been fo il ed (PressTV 2009.). The elite obvious ly
feared that it would lose the refe rendum - a view confi rmed
when the government received 54 pe r cent, to the oppos i-
tion 's 45 pe r cent (Consejo Naciona l Electoral 2009.). The
oppos it ion was also active in mob ilizations in the state of
Zu lia aga inst the gove rnment 's plan to take contro l of the
nation 's ports. In tactics rem iniscent of the Bol ivian elite
(see Tsolakis be low), the governo r Manue l Rosa les led ca ll s
fo r a refe rendum on whet her Zul ia shou ld separate from

Venezuela. Given that Zulia borders Co lomb ia, this initia-
tive raised deep concerns in Ca racas. The Zulia sepa ratist
movement is pa rt of the US's promotion of NED-fun ded
'regiona l autonom ies' in Latin Ame rica.
Conclusions
The Venezuelan elite's repudiation of democratic practice
began with the overthrow of Pe rez Jimenez and its acces-
sion to polit ical power in 1958 fo ll owing the Punto Fijo Pact.
Since the election of Hugo Chavez to the presidency, it has
exp lored all poss ible aven ues to ove rth row him an d his
government. There is irrefutable evidence that its methods
have invo lved the t raditiona l cou p d'etat, bringing about the
economy's co ll a pse, ousting through referendums,
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assassination, and vigorous attempts to d iscredit t he legit-
imacy of electora l resu lts favou rab le to the gove rnment as a
prelude to its overthrow. Venezuela's elite is a highly inte-
grated political and econom ic class, whose privi leges, sta-
tus, standing and wea lth depend on its control over the
levers of po lit ical power an d, crucially, the executive branch
of the state. Its dislodgement from national politica l power
since 1998 and its loss of control over the co lossa l wea lth
emanating from the country's oil industry have threatened
its very existence as a class. What com poun d s its predica-
ment is the Chavez government's dete rmination to red is-
tri bute this wealth among mil lions of hithe rto socially, polit-
ica lly and econom ically exclu ded Venez uelans, thus cre-
ating a nationa l consensus, in which the elite's previous

privileges a re not on ly quest ioned but rejected by a growing
body of po litically awa re cit izens.
Furthermo re, whatever its shortcom ings - and it has a
few - the Bo livarian Revo lution is a process involving the
mass ive t ransfo rmation of the lives of mi llions of indi -
vi dua ls; without such mass su pport, the gove rnment cou ld
not have survived the sustained attack of a powe rful elite,
which enjoys the active comp licity of the US. The Bo livarian
Revo lut ion's aim of build ing twenty-fi rst-century sociali sm,
howeve r foggy some of its tenets may be, is substantially
mo re than an abst ract as piration. It invo lves t he restruc-
tu ring of the economy, including the d istrib ution of mil-
lions of hecta res of lan d and the nat iona lization of the com-
mand ing he ights of the economy (e lect ricity, steel,
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transpo rt), which has led to a dramatic reduction in the
power of mu lt inationa l capital (particu la rly of finance cap-
ital an d it s mu ltilatera l bod ies, the IMF and the Wo rld
Ban k). Although the Venez uelan economy rema ins funda -
menta lly cap ita li st, the logic of neo li bera li sm is being chal-
lenged. The Venezuelan state is being stead ily t ransfo rmed,
and many of its permanent institutions no longer protect
the interests of the ru ling class in a way they used to a
decade ago . The objectives of Venez uela's elite an d its class
inte rests a re fun damenta lly incompatible with the Bo livarian
project - not because the latte r is undemocrat ic, but be-
cause its logic points to the eli mination of all the elite's
privileges. Fina lly, although Venezue la's elite has been d is-
lodged from nationa l pol itica l power and has been greatly
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wea kened by the democratic encroachments of the Bo li-
varian Revo lution, it ma intains powerful politica l an d eco-
nom ic levers, wh ich it has de ployed effectively to prevent
the develo pment of the Boliva rian Revo lution. Rather than
its se lf-p resentation as a group of be league red democrats
res isting the autho ritarian thrusts of chavista populism, the
Venezuelan right is more realistically to be viewed as a
movement intent on the overth row of a democratica lly
elected gove rnment. To achieve this aim, it has been ready
to use any means.
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8 / Multilateral lines of conflict in contemporary res istance by the Bo livian elites, both within and beyond the
Bolivia state (Eaton 2007.). Business o rgan izations, regional civic
committees and conservative politica l pa rties entrenched in
ANDR EAS TSO LAK IS
the Media Luna (Half Moon) depa rtments of Santa Cruz,
The election of Evo Mora les in December 2005 signa ll ed Tarija, Beni and Pan do in the so uth and east of the co untry

the concl usion of a long cris is that ha d defined, fo r a quar- have spea rheaded resistance to Mo rales-sponso red re-

te r of a century, the interrelated develo pmental cycles of fo rms. Furthe rmo re, bastions of the o ppos it ion in the state

politica l and econom ic li be ralization in Bolivia. Bo livia's - the Senate, the prefectures, some mun ici pal adm inis-

society and state are undergoing si gnificant transfor- trations and, less blatantly, the Banco Cent ra l de Bolivia

mations - stim ulated by the Mo rales adm inistration's rena- (BCB, Bolivian Cent ra l Bank) - have also res isted social an d

tiona lization of the hydrocarbon, telecomm unications and institutiona l change. Incessa nt struggles beyon d, but also
within the state, have regu la rly threatened to overwhelm the
mining sectors, land reform and the struggle for a new con -
stitutiona l order (Dunkerlex 2007.). These transformations, Mo rales government (Tsola kis 2008).

howeve r, have generated systematic and sometimes vicio us These domestic deve lopments must be pl aced within

wo rldwide and macro-regiona l processes of change. The
election of Evo Mo rales has fo rmed pa rt of a hem is phe ric
rejection of neol ibera li sm and US imperiali sm . It has there-
fo re significantly changed re lationsh ips between the Boli-
vian state, the US and mu lt ilate ral deve lopment institutions
(M Dis). Th is chapter ad dresses the fo ll owing questions:
how have the US government, the mu ltilatera l dono r
commun ity and t ransnational capital reacted to Mora les '
election an d his reform project? How, in turn, has the
Mo rales government managed its relationsh ip with transna-
tiona l elite forces? How have alte rnative mac ro-regiona li st
projects such as t he Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueb los de
Nuestra America (AL BA, Boliva rian Alli ance for the Peo ples
of Our Ame rica) transformed Bo livia's fo reign relations?
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Despite its su bstantial s hift of milita ry and financ ial capa-
bilit ies towards the Mid die East, and desp ite its professed
neutra lity towa rds democratica lly elected gove rnments
sha pi ng a ' pink t ide' aga inst imperial ism , the Geo rge W.
Bush administ ration perpetuated the Co ld War st rategy of
antagon izing popu list/ left-wing gove rnments in its histor-
ica l backyard (Rob inson 19,9.:§.). I a rgue that a distinction
must be made between the destab ilizing tactics of the US
and engagement with the Morales adm inistration by the
rest of the donor commun ity. The latter has been far mo re
effective in facil itating the Bolivian state's protection of pri-
vate property and fiscal and moneta ry discipline. The
process of the inte rnationa lization of the Bo livian state,
begun in 1985, continues and has shaped Mora les ' reforms.

Howeve r, t his clashes with Bolivia's members hip of ALBA
alongside the Venezuelan , Cuban, Nicaraguan and Ecuado-
rian governments, among othe rs. Concurrent inte rnal and
externa l institu tiona l strugg les are thus placing t he Bo livian
state on new, unpredictab le developmenta l paths.
Evo Morales and the Movim iento al Socialismo (MAS,
Movement towa rds Sociali sm) have demonstrated the
capacity to build a hegemonic movement, despite the pro-
tracted resistance of Bolivia's elites. Thus, the Bolivian elec-
torate ratified the new constitu tion by referendum in Jan-
uary 2009 1 and the MAS won the elections of December
2009 by a lands lide, retu rn ing Mora les to the pres idency
and securing mo re than two-thirds contro l of both houses
of re presentatives (Corte Nacional Electora l 2009.).
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Howeve r, its effective containment of t he destab ilizing ac-
tions of business elites has not freed t he Mo rales gove rn-
ment from the underlying class and inter-ethn ic cont ra-
d ictions, in part because it relies on transnationa l produc-
tion netwo rks and the suppo rt of global governance insti-
tutions to susta in its hegemo ny.
Contextualizing contem porary changes in Bolivia's foreign
relations
The Bolivian state has undergone fa r- reaching t ransfo r-
mations since the 1985 hyperinflationary cris is, wh ich laid
bare the insoluble contradictions of state capitalism , and
hera lded a wave of li bera lization under the Paz Estenssoro
(1985-89), Paz Zamora (1989-93) 1 Sanchez de Lozada

(1993- 98; 2002- 03) and Banze r/Quiroga (1998- 2002)
administ rations. A radica l programme of social restruc-
tu ring was enginee red by the staff of MDis, in co ll a bo ration
with a sma ll transnational fact ion of Bolivian businessmen
and technocrats. The latte r were cons idered mode l students
of the Wash ington Consensus, not me rely for thei r ortho-
dox approach to economic management but also for their
creative implementation and elaboration of orthodox
macroeconom ic policies (Tsolakis 2010).
Neo li bera l restructuring sought to reconfigure cap ita l-
labour relations, in orde r to susta in globa l ca pital accumu -
lation. Rest ruct uring involved the privatization of accumu -
lation, the creation of a consensual cap ita li st order and t he
libera lization of the state. Restructuring was underpinned
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by a process involving the internationalization of the state,
which itself stimu lated mu lt il atera lism - defined as 'mecha-
nisms for a rriving at gene ral pol icy consensus' through
'coo peration and dealing co ll ectively with confl ict' (Cox
19_92: 27.). I define inte rnatio nalization broad ly as the inte-
gration of the state into a g lobal organizationa l or gove r-
nance comp lex, built through inte rgovernmental collab-
o ration, enjoying supranationa l aut hority an d tending to
'privilege the investor as dom inant politica l su bject' (Gill
2000: 3).
Restructuring created its antithes is in the resistance,
which has cha ll enged the t ransnational bloc both within
and beyon d the Bo livian state. Attempts to depoliticize the
state were systematica lly unde rmined by its re-politicization

by domestical ly oriented elites and la bour fo rces
(Conaghan and Malloy_.19,95). Some policies were im ple-
mented successfu lly, whi le othe rs remained in limbo or
we re roll ed back; some institutions were transformed or
eli m inated , others remained bastions of continuity. Post-
1985 restructuring may be unde rstood as an elite attempt,
with the active support of MDis, to graft mode rn ca pita li sm
and li beralism on to a corru pt, nepotistic and statist social
o rgan ism. Fo r the imp lementation of libe ral reforms, Boli-
vian elements of the transnational bloc were pa rt of, and
we re dependent on, cliente li stic social networks, and th is
exp lains their fa il ure to legitim ize the high social costs of
world market integration.
The transnationa l bloc failed to generate neo libera l
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hegemony because restructUJring im pi nged on customa ry
elite practices, and because the policies cond itioning pri- '
vate-sec-tor development not only fa iled to increase per
cap ita GDP but also accentuated the concentration of Bo-
livia's social su rplus in t ransnational cap ita l (World Bank
2000). Social polarization and insuffi cient growth, com -
pounded by the wo rldwide econom ic crisis of the late
1990s, the re pression of cocaleros (coca farmers) in the
Cha pa re region by param ilitary fo rces, and the re-
composition of la bour a round indigenist movements in the
highlands cond it ioned the form of suba lte rn resistance that
emerged and event ually overwhelmed elite forces (.!:::!y,lton
and Thomson 2007.).
The fa ilu re of restructuring was symbo lized by the

lands lide election of Evo Mo rales. Mora les prom ised to
deconstruct the entire po litica l and economic edifice
pa infu lly constructed since 1985, by refound ing Bolivia
through the renationa lization of its st rategic jewels (gas,
mining, te lecommunications); by sponsoring the election
of a Constituent Assembly; by ridd ing the state of its cor-
rupt and inefficient ru li ng elites; by promoting trad itional
coca production; and by redistributing Bolivia's social sur-
plus to suba ltern forces. Mora les prom ised a dua l decolo-
nization , by cha ll enging external nee-co lon ialism and by
ending the interna l colonia li sm pe rpetuated by criollo elites
(wh ite, of Spanish descent) through the defence of ind ige-
nous sovereignties (Webber 2008).
The interconnections between interna l and externa l forms
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of 'co lon iali sm ' identified ought to be emphasized. In this
chapter I focus primaril y on the latter. I contend that we
must break down the apparent unity of the agents of such
co lon ialism, as there are substantial differences between
the strategies and policies elabo rated and imp lemented by
the US State Department, the transnational corporations
(TN Cs) and the MDis towa rds the Mora les government.
Howeve r, before analysing mu lti latera l lines of conflict, a
short exposition of the contempo rary domestic ba lance of
social forces is requ ired.
The M AS, t he 'plebeian mass' and the conservative oppo-
sition
The MAS emerged in the late 1990s, just as Bolivia was
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undergo ing accelerating social change that t ransfo rmed a The principa l ach ievement of the MAS has been to har-
self-conscious ly working-class movement into a hete ro- ness t hese various lines of res istance and become the ove r-
geneous and mu ltiple 'plebeian mass' (Garcfa Linera, arching organizational fo rce opposing neo li bera l restruc-
Gutierrez, Prada and Ta12 ia 2000). This compe ll ed the trade tu ring, interna l co lonia lism and indigenous exclusion
union confederations to share centre stage with a pl ethora (Movimiento al Socialismo 2008). The MAS leaders hip has
of sma ll er associations, giving a mu ltifaceted and flu id ach ieved the seemingly imposs ible feat of channelling na-
fo rm to suba ltern resistance and consequently to criollo tiona list, class-b ased and ind igen ist discou rses into a dis-
domination itse lf The organ izationa l core of the MAS, the cu rs ive who le cent red on two fun damenta l issues rem i-
union of cocaleros from Chapare, many of them relocated niscent of the National Revolution of 1952: agrarian refo rm
miners who retained thei r organizational capacity (Cra btree and the renationa lization of privat ized corpo rations (Do
2005)is only one element in an a rray of organizations. The Alto and Stefanoni 2008). However, just as the MAS was
MAS won the elections when the li nes of conflict had mu lti- generat ing this hegemonic movement, the conservat ive
plied into innumerab le loca l, secto ral an d nationa l/ethnic oppos it ion, batte red in the 2005 genera l elections but en-
struggles, and had become potentia lly unmanagea ble. trenched in the Senate, in five out of nine prefectures, and
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undergo ing accelerating social change that t ransfo rmed a The principa l ach ievement of the MAS has been to har-
self-conscious ly working-class movement into a hete ro- ness t hese various lines of res istance and become the ove r-
geneous and mu ltiple 'plebeian mass' (Garcfa Linera, arching organizational fo rce opposing neo li bera l restruc-
Gutierrez, Prada and Ta12 ia 2000). This compe ll ed the trade tu ring, interna l co lonia lism and indigenous exclusion
union confederations to share centre stage with a pl ethora (Movimiento al Socialismo 2008). The MAS leaders hip has
of sma ll er associations, giving a mu ltifaceted and flu id ach ieved the seemingly imposs ible feat of channelling na-
fo rm to suba ltern resistance and consequently to criollo tiona list, class-b ased and ind igen ist discou rses into a dis-
domination itse lf The organ izationa l core of the MAS, the cu rs ive who le cent red on two fun damenta l issues rem i-
union of cocaleros from Chapare, many of them relocated niscent of the National Revolution of 1952: agrarian refo rm
miners who retained thei r organizational capacity (Cra btree and the renationa lization of privat ized corpo rations (Do
2005)is only one element in an a rray of organizations. The Alto and Stefanoni 2008). However, just as the MAS was
MAS won the elections when the li nes of conflict had mu lti- generat ing this hegemonic movement, the conservat ive
plied into innumerab le loca l, secto ral an d nationa l/ethnic oppos it ion, batte red in the 2005 genera l elections but en-
struggles, and had become potentia lly unmanagea ble. trenched in the Senate, in five out of nine prefectures, and

in key mun icipalities, includ ing Cocha bamba, Santa Cruz
and Tarija, began to coa lesce into a li bera l, bus iness-
oriented politica l front .
Bo livian criollo elites are not immune from internal strug-
gles; t ransnationa l and domestic elite blocs have been his-
torically s plit between the Altiplano (Western high lands),
the va ll eys, and the Oriente (Eastern lowlands) (Grebe
19~3). A sign ificant section of Cruceno (Santa Cruz) elites
has been demand ing sove reignty for its region since the
1950s. The o bjective of t he Com ite Civico Pro-Santa Cruz
(CCPSC, Civic Committee of Santa Cruz) was to defend the
(successfu l) app ropriation of 11 pe r cent of oil export rev-
enues. This generated s ignificant income fo r the depart-
menta l administ rat ion and fed into t he regiona l bloc's
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sepa ratist sentiments, as its influence over the nationa l gov-
ernment, politica l parties and bus iness confede rations
grew. The CC PSC leadership has not bothered to hide its
white supremacism: its close re lationsh ip wit h the fasc ist
Falange Sociali sta Bo liviana (Bolivian Sociali st Fa lange) is
we ll documented (Dieterich 2006).
Ove rshadowing these regiona l elite riva lries, the election
of Morales has arguab ly un ified the class interests of
domestica lly oriented and t ransnat ional bus iness groups,
and the caste/ racia l conscioUJsness of Paceno (La Paz) and
Cruceno elites. Conve rgence aga inst a broader enemy fos -
te red thei r coalescence a rou nd civil and state institutions
such as the Poder Democrati co Social (PODEMOS, Social
Democratic Powe r) and Un idad Nacional (National Unity)

political parties, the Senate, the prefect ures, the CC PSC an d
business o rgan izations. Indeed , a Nationa l Democratic
Council was formed as an op position bloc, made up of five
provincial governo rs, business associations, conservative
civic grou ps and PO DE MOS legis lators. The strategic nu -
cleus has, however, become the CCPSC, wh ich is linked to
conse rvative po litical parties and bus iness o rgan izations
grouped in the Camara de lndustria y Come rcio (CAI NCO,
Council of Industry and Comme rce) and the Camara
Agropecuaria de O riente (Eastern Council of Land and Cat-
tle) , among other organizations (Eaton 2007.). These busi -
ness federat ions constitute a flexib le framework for the
union of fo reign TNCs (prima rily in hydrocarbons and
bank ing) and domestic export-led agribusiness, and
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constitute a formidable anti-MAS platfo rm. The CAINCO
and CCPSC have also enginee red a st rategy of di rect di plo-
matic visits by business leade rs to the Eu ropean Comm is-
sion, the US government, Brazil and Argentina, to muster
sup port for the protection of private prope rty and to ex-
pound the autonomist demands of the Media Luna (inter-
view with European Comm iss ion official, 30 Ma rch 2007).~
The CCPSC does not merely resist the MAS through for-
ma l channels and an autonom ist discou rse, but has also
emp loyed terrorist tactics th rough its youth organ ization,
the Un ion Juven il Crucenista (U JC, Santa Cruz Youth
Union). Since 2003, the UJC has intim idated indigenous
immigrants and particularly MAS sup porters, and has kid-
napped and beaten Cuban doctors who are provid ing

med ical services to low-income patients in Santa Cruz. On
10 September 2008, it ra ided state-owned agencies in the
city, includ ing the televis ion station, the te lecommu-
nications corporation Entel, and the tax-co ll ection agency.
Described by the media as 'iso lated' acts by 'uncontrolled'
youth, these actions were designed to provoke a coercive
government response and thereby gene rate internationa l
and domestic support fo r the CC PSC (Council on Hemi-
.§.P-heric Affairs 2008).
The concurrent upheava ls in the Altiplano and the en -
trenchment of criollo elites in the Media Luna increased the
centrifuga l tendencies of the nation. The criollo bloc galva-
nized a s ignificant section of the urban popu lation in the
Media Luna in 2007 and 2008 by emphas izing the racia l
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d istinction between cambas ('natives' of the lowlands) and
kollas (indigenous peoples from the high lands), denounc-
ing the invasion of thei r territo ry by t he latte r and propos ing
inte rna l migration controls . Criollo secess ionist amb it ions
have been undermined by Aymara and Quechua imm i-
gration from the Altiplano since the 1970s. Those latter
commun ities' sup port for the MAS, at least in ru ral areas
and in the extens ive shanty towns surrounding Santa Cruz,
stems from Mo rales' refo rm programme, includ ing rena-
tiona lizations, land reform and an increase in the legal m in-
imum wage to 577 bolivianos (BOB) ($77) . The gove rnment
has also introduced the un iversal Renta Dignidad (d ignified
pens ion), involving a month ly payment of BOB 200 ($26),
financed by gas profits and costi ng $260 mi llion annua lly.

It has implemented the Bono Madre-Nino (the Mother-Chi ld
Voucher): free hea lthcare to pregnant women and BOB
1,800 ($234) over two yea rs for the ch il d. Th is is expected
to cost $ 100 mi ll ion per yea r, and has secured World Bank
financ ing. Finally, it has created the Bono Juancito Pinto,
which allocates BOB 200 to each prima ry schoolch ild to
encou rage attendance. These reforms have been instru-
menta l in restraining labour demands and secu ring the
electora l suppo rt of the poor.
US interference
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Mo rales (Crabtree 2008; 2009.!2,). Before the Constituent
Assem bly opened, the oppos ition had been demanding the
capitalia plena (fu ll capital) - the transfe r of the executive
and legislative branches of the state from La Paz to the
nineteenth-century capital, Sucre. The object was to sh ift
the administ rative cent re of g ravity away from La Paz and
undercut Ayma ra influence. It wou ld also add prefectu ral
support to the Media Luna and create difficu lties for the
MAS, which cont rolled the prefecture of Sucre. The strategy
ga lvan ized the Civic Committee of Sucre, wh ich duly initi-
ated a debate in the Constitutional Assemb ly, which con -

The domestic opposition was defused by the recall refer- vened in Sucre. The MAS de legates' rejection of its demand

endums in August 2008, the January 2009 ratifica tion of incensed the comm ittee, wh uch organized violent protests

the new constitution and the December 2009 re-election of in the city, leading to fou r deaths and hundreds of injuries

in August 2007. This fo rced the Constitutiona l Assembly's
suspens ion for one month in Septembe r. As violence was
spira lli ng out of control, in November 2007, Mora les an-
nounced a reca ll referendum - on the pres ident, vice-
president and all prefects - to be held in August 2008. The
outcome - an endo rsement of the Mo rales government -
bo lste red the MAS and its commitment to constitutiona l re-
fo rm.
Domestic struggles do not occur in an internationa l vac-
uum, but must be directly re lated to US policy in t he region.
The US government financed the re pression of coca fa rm-
e rs and backed repress ive Bo livian governments in the late
1990s and early 2000s. As a consequence, it can be blamed
fo r the persistence of poverty and inequality in Bolivia.
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Popu la r anger prope ll ed Mora les on to the nationa l an d in-
te rnational politica l stages, and led his adm inistration to
in d iscriminately - an d perh a ps inap prop riately - li nk ne-
o li be ral restructuring to US dom inance over the IMF, the
Wo rld Ban k an d the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB). Since Mo rales' election, the US gove rnment has
maintained a relative ly low public profi le, wh ich obse rvers
have interpreted as a 'wait and see' ap proach (Gamarra
2007~3). Em pirica l evidence nonethe less demonst rates that
the US State Depart ment has sought to covertly underm ine
the Mo rales adm inistration . On 1 Septem ber 2008, Mo rales
expe ll ed Phi lip Goldberg, the US am bassa dor, fo r see king
to consp ire against democracy an d destab ilize t he country.
This prom pted Venez uela's Hugo Chavez to follow su it in

so lida rity, and the US to declare the Bolivian envoy in
Wash ington, DC persona non grata. Morales later expell ed
Ambassador Gold berg's successor and the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (D EA). The Bush ad ministration responded
with a series of aggressive actions, furthe r souring rela-
tions. In Septembe r 2008, it placed Bolivia on a counter-
narcot ics blacklist, and later suspended t he country from
the An dean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, the
preferential t rade agreement through wh ich, between 2002
and 2007, the US became Bo livia's second-largest trad ing
partne r in the region, for fa iling 'to coo perate with t he Un it-
ed States on important efforts to figh t d rug t raffick ing'
(Council on HemisP-heric Affairs 2009.). How did US
ambassadors an d t he DEA conspire against democracy in
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Bolivia?
A st ring of gaffes by US em bassy staff that revealed the
covert activit ies of the United States Agency for Inte rna-
tiona l Development (USAI D) led Evo Mo rales to decla re, in
August 2007: ' I cannot unde rstand how some am bassado rs
dedicate themse lves to po litics, and not d iplomacy, in our
country ... That is not called coope ration. That is called con-
spiracy' (Dangl 2008a). In j uly an d again in Novem ber
2007, at least three Peace Co rps volunteers and a Fulbright
resea rche r were asked by US embassy staff to provide infor-
mation on the identity, whereabouts and resi dence of
Venezue lans and Cubans they met in Bolivia (Democracy_
Now! 2008). Am bassado r Go ldberg held secret meetings
with the prefect of Santa Cruz, Ruben Costa, and t he

leaders hip of the CCPSC, directly prior to a wave of oppo-
sition -sanc-tioned vio lence in August and September 2008
fo ll owing the recall referendum. The takeover of factories,
roadb locks, the sabotage of gas pipe li nes and the unpro-
vo ked killi ng of th irty ind igenous fa rmers by ind ividua ls
whom the gove rnment described as 'h it men' emp loyed by
the oppos ition, justified Mora les' decision to declare mar-
tial law in the northeastern department of Pando. The meet-
ings between Goldberg an d t he CCPSC leadership sug-
gested that these te rrorist activit ies had at least received the
US ambassador's blessing, if not the US embassy's finan -
cia l and organizational support (Council on Hemisi:2heric
Affairs 2009,).
After the 2002 pres idential election, when Mora les came
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second, the MAS was identified by the US gove rnment as
Bolivia's most powerful anti-systemic force. A declassified
2002 memo exp lained that a 'USAI D po litical party reform
project aims at implementi ng an existi ng Bo livian law that
would .. . ove r the long run, he lp bui ld moderate, pro-
democracy politica l pa rt ies that can serve as a counter-
we ight to the radica l MAS or its successors' (Dang! 20086).
Thereafter, the Bus h administ ration provided d irect finan-
cia l support and strategic advice to conservative parties and
associations. In 2004, USAI D esta blished a special Office
of Transition Init iatives (OTI) in Bo livia wh ich, in its own
words, ' intervenes rapid ly and undertakes qu ick-impact
inte rvent ions through sho rt-term grants that cata lyze broad -
er change' (We isbrot 2008a). Since 2006, th is 'su ppo rt for

democracy' has taken the form of strategies promoting
administrative and fisca l decent ra lization, in order to con-
so lidate state institutions t hat challenge the central govern-
ment. The OTI t ransferred at least $4.5 mi llion to founda -
tions and NGOs used by the o ppos it ion and wh ite sepa-
ratist organizations, and to the fou r autonomist prefects of
the Media Luna. Juan Ramon Qu intana, minister of the
presi dency, ca lcu lated that, of the $134 million of USAID
financ ial assistance provided in Bolivia in 2007, $89 million
was spent on such activities (BolP.ress 2007.). Th is fund ing
was spent undermining the legit imacy of the government
through med ia campa igns soiling Mora les' image and
introducing issues such as the capitalia plena, de partmental
autonomy and t he Venezue lan 'conspiracy', seeking to
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ga lvan ize pa rochia l 'po pular' movements and foster insta-
bi lity, an d supporting the main opposition bodies, PODE-
MOS, the civic committees and departmenta l prefects
(Center for Economic and Policx Research 2008). The US-
based National Endowment for Democracy, active in the
coup d'etat aga inst Venezue lan President Hugo Chavez in
2002, has also organized wo rksho ps and pane ls to pro-
mote decentra lization and polarization in Bolivia. The US
ambassador's pe rsona l role i1n the 1990s in the transitions
in Croatia and Bosnia (where regiona li st discourses ac-
qu ired more politica l we ight) and the active participation in
the workshops of criollos of Croatian descent and of Cata lan
resea rche rs fue ll ed accusations of attempts to Balkan ize
Bolivia (Chossudovskx 2008). Add it iona ll y, s ince the

1980s, bot h USA ID and the DEA have funne ll ed assistance
funds and provided tra ining and weapons to special po lice
units, pu rported ly to figh t narco-trafficki ng. However, in
light of its spying and subve rsive activities, it may be in-
fer red that the US government has actua lly been t rying to
d ivide and destab ilize the coercive apparatus of the Bolivian
state (Weisbrot 2008a).
The MAS has dea lt with these provocations in a number
of ways. It s igned a Comp lementary Accord to the Basic
Technica l Coope ration Agreement on Defence between the
Repub li c of Bo livia and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezue la - a mut ual defence agreement, wh ich promises
the support of the Venezuelan mil ita ry in the case of an
invasion or a civil war (Council on HemisP-heric Affairs
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2006). Add it ionally, many Venezuelans and Cubans a re
underta king humanitarian work in Bo livia. These include
2,000 Cuban doctors, who provide free services in rural
areas, in particu lar in the Santa Cruz region, the bastion of
criollo oppos ition to land reform. It is poss ible that some of
these activities a re not strictly human ita rian, but are de-
signed to provide military and st rategic support to t he gov-
ernment in the Oriente. Acco rd ing to sources close to the
president, at least fi fty Venezuelan econom ic and mi litary
advisers were active in the pres ident ial palace and key min-
ist ries (persona l interview, summe r 2007). Bolivia also
began an ambitious military procu rement programme,
using Venezuelan loans of at least $50 million. Securing the
support of the army has been the corne rstone of the

government's struggle aga inst the destabi lizing activities of
the op position and the US government. Until now, the army
has obeyed Morales' orde rs. It took ove r the facilities of pri-
vate hyd rocarbons corpo rations upon the announcement of
their nationa lization in May 2006; it deployed in mining
areas to restore order in the face of violent skirm ishes be-
tween mining coo peratives and state-employed mine rs in
Feb rua ry 2007; and it implemented the government's state
of siege in Pando in September 2008.
TNCs, th e donor com mu nity and the ALBA: multilateral
lines of confl ict
By contrast, European policymake rs and the staff of
MDis have exhi bited a more subtle response and have
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worked towards sta bilizing Bolivia. There ap pears to be
reluctance on the pa rt of the donor commun ity to endo rse
the fragmen tation of Bo livia. Instead of antagonizing the
new, democratica ll y elected government, they have engaged
with it, wa iving more than ha lf of Bo livia's foreign debt
(from $4.942 bi llion in 2005 to $2.142 bi llion two years
late r), including the entire stock of debt outstand ing to the
World Bank, the IMF and the IDB (Gamarra 2007~43). The
European Comm ission has increased its annua l grants to
the Bo livian Treasury and NG Os s ince the m id-1990s.
Whi le ostensi bly respecting the wi ll of the peo pl e, MDis
have rest ricted their ro le to lock ing Bo livia into the structu re
of global capitalist production, by securing the gove rn-
ment's commit ment to fisca l and monetary stabi lity, free

trade an d the defence of private prope rty, as we ll as fight ing
aga inst the exprop riation of the assets of TNCs and pro-
moting pu blic- private partne rsh ips between private and
state-owned m 1n1ng and hyd roca rbons co rporations
(International Monetary. Fund 2009.) . Depoliticized state
agencies, chief among them the BCB, have cont inued
monetarist economic management and price cont rol po li-
cies. Indeed, Article 327 of the new constitution ens hrines
the depoliticization of t he BCB (Asamblea Constituxente de
Bolivia 2007.). The inte rnational exchange system remains
free of rest rictions on cu rrent payments and t ransfers, an d
no sign ificant contro ls on capital flows have been imposed
(International Monetary, Fund 2009.). Interestingly, a pill a r
of the MAS's programme has become macroeconom ic
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stabi lity, in sta rk cont rast to its more radical electoral
rhetoric (Movimiento al Socialismo 2008). The ghost of hy-
pe rinflation and the de bt cris is of the early 1980s continues
to haunt the government, which is 'fu lly aware of the need
to maintain macroeconomic stabi lity' and 'to continue with
fisca l consolidation efforts ' (International Monetary. Fund
2009_;_3). Far from delin king from the multilate ral institu -
tiona l comp lex it inhe rited, the Mora les government coo p-
e rates with MDis and t he European Comm ission, in part to
un de rcut US dom inance (inte rviews with officials of the
European Comm iss ion in Bolivia, May- December 2007).
The MAS's economic programme may be sa id to have
deepened t he stru ctural pres e nce of ca pital in the Bolivian
economy. Its macroeconomic programme recalls Bo livia's

pre-1985 state cap italism mode l, but it is now couched in
new rhetoric calling fo r the invention of a vague transition
to social ism in the form of 'An dean -Amazon ian cap italism'.
This wou ld be founded upon large private and pu blic
co rporat ions; a primitive cap ita li sm cent red on fami ly and
kinshi p networks based on artisan and small commerce;
and a communitarian econom ic organization shaped by
autonomous te rritorial sove reignties. The cornerstone of
this form of capita l accumu lation would rema in, as in the
1930s, 1950s and late 1960s, the nationa lization of strategic
resou rces. Vice-President Garc(a Line ra boasted in 2007:
'the Bo livian state has thus increased its control of the GDP
by 6- 7 per cent, to 19 pe r cent today. Ou r objective is to
reach 30 per cent' (Do Alto and Stefanoni 2008: 99,). It is
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thus no surp rise that the IMF (2007.; 2009.) lau ded t he
MAS leadership's fig ht aga inst corruption an d waste in
state institutions and the increased efficiency of tax-
co ll ecting agencies, whi le noting pers istent pat ronage .
Spea king on Bolivia's nationa l! day in 2007, Mora les empha-
sized that internationa l financ ial institutions are no longer
imposing conditions for econom ic an d state restructuring,
because Bolivia is a lready aclhieving responsib le fiscal and
monetary po licies. The co re tenets of neo liberalism -
monetary and fisca l discipli ne an d free t rade - rema in intact
(International Monetary, Fund 2007.; 2009.). This does not
preclude an im provement in the conditions of wo rkers, but
on ly so long as te rms of trade rema in pos itive. Low eco-
nom ic growth between 1985 and 2005 bare ly matched

popu lation growth, signifying the stagnation of rea l wages.
The princi pal historical constraints on accumu lation in Bo-
livia have been deteriorating terms of t rade, corruption and
lega l insecu rity, and above all social instab ility (World Bank
2005). Returns on investment outs ide the hydrocarbon and
ban king sectors have historica lly been hinde red by tense
Bolivian labou r relations. Low levels of fore ign d irect invest-
ment (FD I) and domestic cap ita l formation as a propo rtion
of GDP were characteristic of the entire 1985- 2005 era, and
this reflected low bus iness confidence.
What does this te ll us a bout the relationshi p between the
Mo rales adm inistration and t ransnat ional capital? First, that
the Mo rales government d id not cause low business confi-
dence, nor d id it exacerbate already highly vo latile social
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relations. Secondly, that t he th reat of capital flig ht and eco-
nom ic co ll apse - brandished by right-wing newspapers and
European leaders in May 2006 in the face of nationa lizat ion
- rema ins low, cons idering the quas i-exclus ive dependence
of growth on hyd rocarbons and mining, and the unp rece-
dented globa l upsu rge in demand for oi l, gas, mine rals and
metals - an upsu rge that has on ly been pa rtially ha lted by
the globa l financia l cris is. Even without significant private
domestic cap ita l fo rmation - a situat ion preva lent before
Mo rales' election and not caused by the MAS government -
GDP growth has been mo re robust (4.5 per cent in 2007;
6.1 pe r cent in 2008; 3.4 per cent in 2009) 1 as the value of
exports quadrup led to $6.5 billion between 2004 and 2008,
generat ing an unprecedented pos it ive t rade ba lance, at the

same time as co rporate taxation was increasing sign if-
icantly. Nationa lization does have international re per-
cussions, as it affects the interest of TN Cs cont rolli ng the
strategic hydrocarbons, telecommun ications and electricity
secto rs. The nationa lization of ext ractive industries by
Sup reme Decree was regarded as an exercise in redis-
tri butive just ice aga inst abusive ex plo itation by TNCs.
Res istance by US and Eu ropean governments to the na-
tiona lization of oil and gas was lukewa rm, in part because
of the awa reness that privatization contracts signed in 1996
had gross ly underestimated natura l gas reserves. And TNCs
have already mu ltiplied the returns on thei r invest ments
whi le continu ing to infringe workers' rights and cause la rge-
sca le environmenta l damage. Most importantly,
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nationa lizat ion does not constitute a full-on ex propriation
of fo reign property - a d istinction Mo rales emphasized. The
Bolivian administ ration imp lemented a Venezue lan -style na-
tiona lization, by which those TNCs that operate gas fields
and t ransfe r ownersh ip of the gas produced to the
Yacimientos Pet rolfferos Fisca les Bo livianos (YPFB, Boli-
vian State Pet ro l Rese rves) must pay 82 per cent of t heir
profits to t he state, instead of 50 per cent before nationa l-
ization and 18 per cent befo re the 2004 gas referendum
(Gray, 2007.). For Jo rge Alvarado, president of the YPF B,
'The days of supe rprofits are over. But even at 18 per cent of
the value of gas being produced, the fore ign companies will
enjoy 20- 25 pe r cent profits' (Lewis 2006). Moreover, the
government took a controlling sta ke in fou r TN Cs ope rating

in the e nergy sector, and on 1 May 2008 announced t he
renationa lization of t he telecommun ications company Entel
(owned by Italy-based Stet) - a move that antagon ized both
the European Commission an d the Italian government. In
2007, the gove rnment withdrew from the World Bank's In-
te rnational Cent re for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
evad ing arb itration in favo ur of Stet (Internationa l Institute
for Sustainable Develo12ment 2007.). The t iming of these
waves of nationalization demonstrated an asse rt ion of gov-
ernment powe r and a commitment to reform in the face of
o ppos it ion forces.
Despite threats of cap ita l flight and lega l challenges, all
TNCs investing in t he hydroca rbons secto r rema ined in Bo-
livia and acce pted the new contractua l terms, an impo rtant
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politica l victory for Mo rales. FOi increased consistently, to
$1.302 billion in 2008 - back to the record levels of the
years of cap italization and p rivatization ($1.026 bi llion in
1998) (Instituto Nacional de Estadfsticas 2009,). Although
FOi was s ignificantly lowe r in 2009 (on ly $322 mi ll ion by
the end of the second quarter) , it rema ined re latively high
by Bo livian standards. TNCs appea red to have understood
that the legit imacy of the new Bolivian adm inistration wou ld
enhance the social sta bility necessary fo r profitab le invest-
ment. Most im po rtantly, booming Chinese an d Indian de-
mand has rende red such ventures high ly profitab le. Indeed,
with o il prices we ll above $70 a barrel (affecting the price of
gas, too), lega l conflicts between the MAS and the oppo-
sition (with accompanying roadblocks an d regiona l
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protests) did not affect TNC invest ment plans an d have Bolivian production re lations in the futu re remains to be
bare ly impinged on output in the ene rgy industry seen, but it is boun d to undermine the trans ient hegemony
(International Monetary Fund 2009). TNCs have also been ach ieved by the MAS. Bolivia's limited integration into glob-
lining up to invest in the m ining secto r, with contracts fo r al cap ita l markets has pa rtia lly insu lated it from the globa l
future investments worth $2.9 bi ll ion. Th is was high ly tu rmo il. This was demonst rated by the fact that GDP
important for a nationa l economy valued at $ 18 billion in growth fe ll to 3 pe r cent in 2009, yet Bo livia did not enter
2009. Crucially, the current revival of mining production in recess ion. Sharp, if tempora ry, declines in commod ity
Oruro and Potosi (with regiona l growth rates of aroun d 18 prices for its main ex ports began to have a negative impact
per cent and 24 per cent, res pectively, in 2008), plus the on FDI and fisca l revenue, although exports ma intained
potentia l exploitation of globally s ignificant deposits of adequate leve ls through 2009 and the country ach ieved a
lithium in the Salar of Uyun i, may aid in rebalancing t he trade surplus, and Bolivia nar rowly avoided deflation for the
economic re lationsh ip between Altiplano and Media Luna year, with a 0.29 per cent inflation rate at year end (Banco
(.6gencia Bolivaniana de lnformaci6n 2009.) . Centra l de Bolivia 2010). The IMF expected growth to re-
The extent to which the globa l economic crisis will affect bound in 20 10 , accom panied by moderate inflation, though

it suggested that any cu rrent account deficit wou ld reduce
the government's margins of manoeuvre in its amb it ious
social programmes and mean that the gove rnment, in orde r
to contro l inflation and sustain GDP growth, cou ld be disci-
pli ned into imp lementing wage rest ra int and improving the
investment climate (Internationa l Monetary Fund 2009~4.) .
ALBA
The continued integration of the Bo livian state into globa l
governance networks contrad icts the alternative macro-
regiona l project it has bu ilt in collaboration with Venezue la,
Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador and others. The ALBA, the alte r-
native to George W. Bush 's proposed Free Trade Area of
the Americas, is founded on a creative app roach to regiona l
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integration that aims to disso lve the cash nexus bind ing the
world market, through the creation of alternative, de-
monetarized and expand ing circuits of internationa l ex-
change, based on solidarity and welfare provis ion - the ex-
change of oi l for med ical services is the conventiona l exam -
ple (Harris and Azzi 2006). Howeve r, three fundamental
constraints have unde rmined this project. First, ALBA's ex-
changes of services are quantitat ively too lim ited to remove
the pressu re of monetary discipli ne - t hey are just drops of
wate r in a sea of ma rket relations. Second ly, the othe r re-
gionalist Chavez- Mora les init iative, ALBA's Banco del Sur
investment bank, which seeks to provide an alternative to
IMF lending, underm ines the ALBA by incorpo rating a no-
toriously conse rvative gove1rnment (Co lomb ia) and by

offe ring m icrocredit to sma ll ent repreneu rs. This latte r fac-
tor is a st riking examp le of the expans ion of capital an d
cap ita list class formation (p rim itive accum ulation) into
rura l a reas (Chu 2005), including ind igenous comm unities,
which unde rmines the commun ita rian product ion purport-
ed ly defended by the MAS. The Banco del Su r's ca pital of
$8 bi llion is tiny by compa rison with that of conventiona l
deve lopment institutions, and its politica l impact is li kely to
be minimal. Third ly, and most im portantly, the Bolivarian
bloc intersects with a mu lt il evel regiona l and globa l gove r-
nance comp lex wh ich dwa rfs it and its potentia l. Bolivia re-
mains linked to glo bal institutions, notab ly the United Na-
tions, the IMF and the World Bank, along with regiona l
institutions s uch as Mercosur and the Andean Commun ity,
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and t his lega lly const ra ins Bo livian state po licy. Further-
mo re, most Latin American governments have refused to
join ALBA, prefe rring the consolidation of Me rcos ur and
continenta l ene rgy integration (the const ruction of a pipe-
line from Venezuela to Argent ina being an example).
It is worth remem bering that, especial ly s ince the late
1970s, Bol ivia's most fundamenta l econom ic constra ints
have been generated by Argentinian, Brazilian and Ch ilean
im periali sm rathe r than US dom inance. Unti l the mid-
199os, 40 pe r cent of fore ign exchange rese rves depended
on gas exports that were di rected exclus ively to Argentina.
Foll owing the construction of a gas pipeline to Brazi l in
1997- 98 us ing a $130 mil lion Wo rld Bank loan, Braz il be-
came Bolivia's largest trade part ner and Pet rob ras (the

state-owned Brazi lian com pany) one of its principal sources
of FDI. Commod ity exports (agricu ltural products and gas)
are primarily ta rgeted at Bo livia's di rect neigh bours, notably
Argentina and Braz il. The latte r's interests lie in susta ining a
chea p, steady sup ply ext racted from t he Bo livian gas fie lds
by Petrob ras . Bolivia antagon ized Braz il in 2006, when it
demanded a substantial increase in oil prices; it t hen forced
Pet rob ras to sell Bo livia's two biggest refineries to the YPF B
in 2007. In gee-economic terms, Brazil and Argentina a re
far more relevant than Venezuela and Cuba, or indeed Ch il e
(the historic enemy) - a rea lity that is bo rne out by the in-
creas ing cooperation between Bo livia and Me rcosu r.
The principa l imped iment to Bolivia's economic deve l-
opment rema ins its re lationsh ip wit h its direct neighbours.
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Mo rales' nationa li st logic of emancipation confronts neigh-
bours wit h highe r leve ls of development an d hence fa r
greate r economic, institutional and mi litary power. Cra btree
.(2006). right ly em phas izes the tens ions generated by a na-
tiona listic social model infringing t he econom ic interests of
bo rde ring nationa l elites. In this context, the suppo rt of
Chavez has been important in securing regional acqu i-
escence to Bolivia's refo rms - in particu la r nationa lization -
and mu lt il ate ral su pport aga in st the secess ionist amb itions
of the Media Luna. It is also difficu lt fo r governments in
Brazi l and Argentina, t hemselves struggli ng against US im-
pe rialism (a lbeit in a reformist manner) , to justify their own
societies' unequa l relationshi p with Bo livia.
Latin American regionalization is t herefore bolstered by

the part1c1pation of the Bo livian government in Chavez's
Bolivarian fede ration, and by t he official acqu iescence of
Argentinian and Brazi lian administ rations (Sader 2005). An
unprecedented movement towards inter-state cooperation
and peacefu l conflict reso lution among new Latin Ame rican
elites may sustain the format ion of a macro-regiona l bloc
with enhanced power in the globa l a pprop riation of social
surplus, recasting the existing internationa lization of the
Bolivian state.
Conclusions
The internationa lization of the Bolivian state has been
d istorted by new, regional lines of gove rnance and by the
penetration of suba ltern social forces into state institutions.
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In turn, these new and un predictab le institutiona l re lations
have stimu lated US attempts to inte rfere in the refo rm
process. The MAS has suffered from protracted res istance
to the implementation of its sho rt-term po licy objectives by
elites entrenched in va rious state institutions (prefectu res,
the Senate and minority groups in the Constituent Assem-
bly) and civil o rgan izations (regiona l civic committees and
business associat ions). The destab ilizing tactics emp loyed
by the opposition have received systemat ic technical and
fi nancial suppo rt from the US government, wh ich has ta ken
the dangerous path of fue ll ing racist movements and di s-
courses t hat promote civil wa r. The MAS leaders hip has
faced important t hreats to its survival, yet it has rema ined in
government and mainta ined its authority. Th is resi lience

has been fostered prima rily by unp recedented favoura ble
te rms of trade, and by im plementing popu lar socia l re-
fo rms, includ ing a new constitution, land refo rm, national-
izations a la Chavez, a un iversal pension scheme, and in-
creases in the lega l minimum wage. However these reforms
have, in part, been made possib le by the generosity of the
donor community. I have argued that its continued co ll a b-
o ration with MDis has safegua rded the Mo rales govern-
ment against the subversive activities of the US em bassy
and bus iness elites in Santa Cruz. Mo rales' willi ngness to
sustain fisca l and monetary d iscipline, free t rade an d joint
ventures between state-owned and privately run com panies
in d uced MDis to gradua lly reduce Bo livia's exte rna l de bt
burden, wh ich in turn has released the fisca l resou rces
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required for the social investments cu rrently galvanizing
mass su pport for the government. The institutiona l inte r-
locking of M Dis with key cent ra l government minist ries - in
particular the finance, comme rce and plann ing ministries,
the BCB an d depo lit icized regulatory agencies - has per-
sisted and has provided a much needed buffe r aga inst US-
promoted su bvers ion (International Monetarx Fund 2007.;
2009.). Th is t rajecto ry is like ly to continue and intens ify with
an ongo ing wo rldwide econom ic cris is, wh ich has bo lste red
the politica l weight of the IM F and the World Ban k and
which is leading Latin American governments (includ ing
the Bolivian) to adopt a mo re conciliatory tone towards the
'inst ruments of the Emp ire'. Indeed, supranational 'legal
pad locks' have effective ly neutralized the revo lutiona ry

changes des ired by some membe rs of the Mora les govern-
ment.
Although the financ ial, techn ical and d iplomatic support
provided by the Venezue lan gove rnment has inte rfered with
the smooth function ing of co ll aborative practices with
MDis, Bolivia's alli ance with Caracas has offe red relative
protection from US encroachment and va luab le sup po rt in
its claims aga inst its neigh bours. It has also sustained
macro-regional integration and stabi lity. Ne ighbouring gov-
ernments - in particu lar Venezu ela - and MDis have helped
to unde rcut the a rticu lation of a right-wing autonom ist
project in the Media Luna. Their overt o ppos it ion to any
fo rm of secess ion ism in Bolivia's lowlands has t hus neu-
tralized the destabi lizing tactics em ployed by the US. There
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we re hopes that the O bama administration wou ld inau-
gu rate a new partne rsh ip with Bo livia, and the conciliato ry
words of Assistant Secreta ry of State fo r Weste rn Hem i-
sphere Affairs Thomas Shanrnon du ring a vis it to Bo livia in
May 2009 helped to bolste r this belief; but bilatera l negoti-
ations fai led to result in a s ingle concrete agreement on any
of the issues divid ing the two governments. These included
the reinstatement of the DEA, the extrad it ion of Gonza lo
Sanchez de Lozada (the former Bolivian president accused
of genoci de against the in digenous nations) and the contin-
uation of US technica l and financ ial support for conser-
vative movements and po lit ical parties (Council on Hemi-
§,F2heric Affairs 2009.).
Multilate ral lines of conflict, created by gee-econom ic

sh ifts and t ransnationa l po lit ica l alli ances, are cu rrently in
flux. It is a matte r for conjecture whethe r the Morales gov-
ernment will be ab le to foste r a sustainable form of Andean
cap ita lism in an unpredicta ble econom ic and inte rnationa l
environment defi ned by eco logica l degradation , US over-
stretch, European stagnat ion, unstab le Chinese an d In d ian
growth an d the socia l experiments engen de red by the ' pin k
tide' in Latin America. We can, however, expect t hat the pro-
gress ive policies im plemented by the MAS will continue to
generate protracted res istance from conservative elites and
will remain conditioned by the vagaries of world ma rket
prices and the goodwill of MDis. Fu rthermore, knowledge
of leaps forward, stagnation and ret reats in neigh bouring
countries wi ll affect expectations and action in Bo livia (and
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vice versa), reflecting the t ransnationa l interconnections be-
tween domestic contexts. The politica l prospects fo r
conse rvative forces in Bo livia ap pear d ire. To use Gram-
scian termino logy, t he ratificat ion of the new constitution
closed a cycle of wars both 'of pos ition' and 'of movement'.
The firm contro l of both houses of congress by the MAS
fo ll owing the 2009 elections, buttressed by the indub ita ble
popu la rity of Mora les on t he one hand an d by unprece-
dented cap ita l accumu lation on the othe r, tem porarily sta bi-
lized the political scene and crysta llized a (t rans ient) hege-
mon ic order organ ized by the MAS. The right is divided,
subdued by the MAS's electora l victories (incl uding unex-
pectedly hi gh levels of sup port in Bo livia's lowlands, con -
si dered bastions of conservatism) , by the a ppa rent success
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of Mo rales' nationalization and we lfa re measu res, and by
the delegitimization of neo li bera l d iscourse in the wake of
the global econom ic cris is. Its activities are currently con-
fined to a protracted defence of property rights (pa rt icu larly
of land reso urces) , to med ia attacks on the government and
to a slow and pain fu l polit ical reo rgan ization invo lving the
rearticulation of liberal ideas. However the econom ic rever-
berations of a possib le 'doub le-dip' glo bal recess ion and
emerging protests li nked to the government's inadequate or
sluggish invest ments in ce rta in loca lit ies may help to accel-
e rate the eventual reconstitution of Bolivia's conservative
fo rces (Hatheway 2010) .
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9 / Right-wing opposition as counter-revolution: the electora l left, in the face of such reaction. The mere fact
the Cuban case that Cu ba has successfu lly resisted decades of vio lent right-
wing opposition justifies its inclus ion in this book. In this
STEVE LUDLAM
chapter, the term 'right wing' is preferred to conse rvative.

Neither the left in Latin America nor its suppo rte rs else- Right-wing Cu ban exiles had hoped that by now the te rm

where need history lessons about the reactions of wh ich the 'conservative ' would have come to apply to irreconcilab le

right is capab le when ruling-class interests a re th reatened, Stalinists in a post-communist Cuba, in the same way as it

especially when, as has frequen tly been the case, the right has been app lied to the remnants of Soviet-b loc commun ist

has the active pa rtnersh ip of, o r acts directly as the agent parties. Here, though, 'right wing' refers to Cuban politica l

fo r, the US government. The 2002 coup in Venezuela, the fo rces seek ing ' regime change': the re placement of Cuba 's
constitutional 'socialist state of worke rs' with a ca pitalist
' Pando Massacre' in Bolivia in 2008, the 2009 coup in
Honduras and t he attempted coup in Ecuador in 20 10 are state and mu lt ipa rty li bera l democracy. It would , of cou rse,
be foolish to imagine that social conservatism has d isap-
but the most recent and extreme examp les (at the time of
pea red on the is land: any regu la r vis itor can observe it in
writing) of the continu ing vu lnera bility of the left, especiall y

deep-rooted attitudes to re li gion, race and gen de r, in every-
day conversation about the music played on buses, t he
behaviour of yo ung peop le, and gay sto rylines in the Cuban
TV soap opera.
Politica lly, though, Cu ba's right has been exce ptiona l in
severa l ways. First, and most obvious ly, Cu ba has not held
mu ltipa rty elections s ince 1948. None was held in the wa ke
of the 1959 revolution, an d s ince its constitutional refer-
en dum of 1976 Cuba has had a no-pa rty electora l system
within a one-party state, in which the Commun ist Pa rty en -
joys the status of 'the highest lea ding force of society and
of the state' (,RgP-ublic of Cuba 19.9L5)- With socia l owne r-
sh ip of the economy and most media, right-wing politics
cannot ta ke the forms fami lia r in libera l-democratic states.
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Secondly, in t he context of US hostility and US-based te r-
rorist attacks, right-wing oppos it ion inside Cu ba is t reated
by the state as counter-revo lut iona ry. Since the defeat of the
last co unte r-revolutionary guerrill as in the Escam bray
mountains in the 1960s, the re has been no serious right-
wing presence inside Cuba. And although some interna l
d issidents distance themselves from US inte rvention, the
commit ment of US 'Cu ba trans it ion' funds to op positional
civil society activity ma kes right-wing activism inside Cuba
easy to classify as me rcenary and treasonous. So Cuban
right-wing polit ics have been led overwhelmingly by US-
based exiles, who have fo rged a powe rful lobby to influence
a US Cu ba policy that is ch aracterized by the principa l
o bjective of 'regime change' an d restoration of ex il es'

propert ies. As a study written for the US Army Wa r Co llege
in the ea rly 1990s put it:
It wou ld be go in g too fa r to say that ou r Cuban po li cy has
been 'ma de in Miam i'. Neverthe less, Cu ban Ame rican
influence - primarily th rough the Cu ban Ame rican Na-
tional Foundation (CA N F) - has been palpa ble and has
st rengthened the hard -line incli nations already dom inant
in US foreign policy circles. This influence has been all
the mo re potent because t here is no polit ica l con-
stituency for a 'safe r' o r more flex ib le li ne on Cu ba ... The
upshot is that the Cuban American community has been
ab le to exe rcise a virtual veto over US policy. (cited in
Arboley,a 2002: 202)
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Th ird ly, US-based inte rvention against the Cuban revo-
lution gives it a wi der significance in Latin America, since
its fo rms, ranging historica lly through destab ilization and
attem pted invasion, sa botage and terrorism, to strategies
based on promoting an o ppos it iona l 'civi l society', have for
decades constituted some of the principa l US methods
aga inst t he left across the region. Th is chapter wi ll outline
the origin of Cu ba's counter-revo lutiona ry right and its
domination of the Cuban exi le community; factors unde r-
pinn ing its dom ination; and signs of cracks in the right-
wing exile monolith in the twenty-fi rst century.
Empires and dictators
Historica lly, Cu ba's right, as elsewhere in Latin America,

was associated with loya lty to the Span ish em pire and ot her
strong states (notab ly the US); with the dom inance of
landowners; with an anti-Enlightenment alli ance with t he
Catho lic hierarchy; and with murderous defence of s lavery.
In the repu blic, such po litics produced the 1912 s laughter of
the black protest party, the Independent Party of Colour,
and t he emergence of fasc ist groups under t he d ictatorshi p
of Machado, the 'tropical Mussolini' (Castro Fernandez
2008; CuP-ull and Gonzalez 2005). The practice of normal
electora l po lit ics was regu larly crushed by US occupations
and by the Machado and Batista d ictatorshi ps an d the ir
assassins (Gott 2004: ch. 4,; Thomas 2001: books 4=7.)-
Cuba's el itist governance was further de bauched by corrup-
tion and cliente li sm, by t he US mafia and by home-grown
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politica l gangsterismo (Cirules 2004: 89,...15§.; Perez 79.95~
chs 8- 10). The a bsence of a mass Cat ho lic vote under-
pinn ing a particular conservat ive pa rty may have been partly
a consequence of the un predictab le opportunism of po liti-
cians in the 'pseudo-repu blic', but it also reflected t he
Catho lic hierarchy's elitist all iances with Cuba's ru ling
class.
Post-revolutionary right-wing exile leaders were noto ri-
ously competitive as they jostled for US su pport. But they
sha red one determination: the resto ration of their pro perty
and powe r, by any means necessa ry. Norma lization of re la-
tions between the US and revolutionary Cuba has been vio-
lently opposed. Initially, exi les quickly produced hund reds
of armed groupings, inextricably li nked to the CIA's secret

'dirty war ' aga inst Cuba and featu ring hund reds of bomb-
ings and a rson attacks on Cuban ta rgets, as US and Cu ban
agencies have deta il ed (Ko rnbluh 19_9~; Elli ston 19.9.9.; Ro-
drfguez 19.9.9.; Escalante 2004; 2006). The chief executive of
the Bacardf rum com pany act ua lly bought a B-26 bomber to
attack Cu ba's oi l refineries (Ca lvo OsP-ina 2000: 19). When
preparing the 1961 Bay of Pigs invas ion, the CIA organized
armed groups inside and outside Cuba. Prom inent exil e
fam ilies sent t heir young men to jo in the invasion force,
and t he ensuing fiasco left a tenth of the invasion force
dead and over 1,100 ta ken prisoner. An inflamed right
blamed President john F. Kennedy's refusa l to comm it the
US air force to batt le.
Kennedy's agreement with the USSR to end sup port for
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invasion plans - part of t he 1962 miss il e cris is sett lement -
ended right-wing hopes of a rap id restoration of the ir rule in
Cuba. But right-wing vio lence simp ly changed fo rm. Some
joined the US Special Fo rces (H. Jones 2008: 151). Many
became freelance terro rists. Terrorist attacks on revolu-
tionary Cuba have claimed 3,478 lives and have inju red
2,099 peo ple (Rodrfguez Cruz 2005~7l)- Proportionately,
this is as if some 95,000 US cit izens had been ki ll ed by
Cuban attacks (none has) . Attacks have included chemical
and biologica l wea pons, from napa lm bombs to crop virus -
es and deadly human viruses which affected over 300,000
Cubans in 1981 and kill ed 158, including 101 ch il d ren
(Rodrfguez Cruz 2005;_i34,; Bole nder 2010: 113-21 ). In 1976,
a bomb destroyed a Cu ban airli ne r, kill ing all seventy-three

peop le on boa rd (Leon Cotayo 2006). It had been planned
by the two most prominent Cuban-American terrorists,
whose invo lvement with the US state is deta il ed by a former
US Head of Interest Section (de facto ambassado r) in
Cuba:
Many Cuban exi le terro rists got their start by wo rking
with the CIA on acts of vio lence against targets in Cuba.
But as the CIA closed its base in Miam i and de-
emphas ized such tactics, its fo rmer 'o peratives', among
them O rlando Bosch and Luis Posada Ca rril es, turned
free lance. Declass ified CIA and FBI documents leave no
doubt that Bosch and Posada we re then involved in acts
of terrorism, such as the bomb ing of a Cubana ai rliner in
1976 with the loss of 73 innocent lives ... Posada
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acknowledged to The New York Times that he was res pon -
s ib le fo r the 1997 bombings of tou rist hotels in Havana,
resu lting in the death of an Italian tourist and the wound -
ing of severa l ot her peo ple. (Smith, Harrison and Adams
2006: 1)
It wou ld thus be a mistake to imagine that the right a ban -
doned terrorist tactics in the 1960s. As expectation grew in
Miam i in the 1990s that Cu ba wou ld co ll apse, new ter-
rorism campa igns aga inst Cuban tourism and visiting fo r-
eign tourists began, in an attempt to cut off a potential eco-
nom ic life li ne. The Cuban Nat iona l Assembly reported ove r
sixty such incidents in the 1990s and into t he 2000s
(National Assembly of Cuba. 2006). As one Cuban anti-
te rrorism agent re ported, Cuba, its tourists and their ai rcraft

became ta rgets in a 'free fi re zone ' (Ludlam 2009).
Right-wing hegemony in 'Exilio City'
Wh il e un ited over Cuba po licy, the growing exile commu-
nity was ideo logica lly diverse (Garcfa 19,96: 122- 3). But pub-
lic exile po lit ics have rare ly reflected this dive rsity: 'Perhaps
the ma in characte ristic of the diverse Cuban American
commun ity in Miam i over the past fo rty yea rs has been the
domination by t he exile mino rity waging permanent wa r
aga inst Castro' (Levine 2001: 218). This domination was
ruthless ly forged to ensu re that the Cu bans in 'Exi lio City'
pe rceived themse lves as 'exiles' rather than mere 'immi-
grants' (Ortegi! --19.9Q;. _45). The first exi les were the
batistianos, officials and su pporte rs of Batista's
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dictatorshi p, dete rmined to recove r thei r powe r and prop-
e rty (Portes 2007.: 123=37.)- Yet these ultra-rightists report-
ed ly made up on ly some 5,000 of the 200,000 migrants
who entered the US before the missi le cris is, and an even
tinie r minority of the 700,000 or so who had arrived by the
mi d-199os (Levine 2001: 55). 'Exi lio City' rema ined true to
pre-revolutiona ry cubanidad (Cub anness) - socia lly reac-
tionary, preserving racism, sex ism and class d iscrimination
(Sawxer 2006: 159,; de la To rre, 2003,;_JJ7. 1 126).
Right-wing hegemony rest ed, fi rst, on economic and
politica l power: 'a mass of resources an d opportunities
avai la ble to fr iends an d a ll ies. Fe ll ow Cu bans stood fi rst in
line as recipients of this la rgesse but on ly on cond it ion that
they adhered strictly to the ideologica l outlook of the

enclave' (Portes 2007~31-2). This hegemony was enfo rced
by the 'official pulpit' of exile radio stations, leaving '[a] mil-
lion Cu bans ... blackma il ed, totally controlled, by th ree
radio stations ', acco rd ing to one exile bus inessman (cited
in de la Torre 2003;_47.=9.). Confronted by anti-Hispan ic
prejud ice, the community was mob ilized to captu re loca l
political power, as 'Cuban-American entrep reneurs contrib-
uted to the campa igns of Cuban-American politicians who,
once in office, reciprocated the favor' (Portes 2007.: 127.).
The right 'turned the city into a one-issue community in
which candidates for pos it ions ranging from schoo l boa rds
to judges are assessed by the ir politica l be liefs regard ing
Cuba' (Levine 2001: 218). The level of corruption became
legendary.
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Politica l powe r has been unde rpinned by exilio socia l and
religious ritual and commemoration, re inforced by the
Catho lic hierarchy, whose messianic anti-communism
intens ified during the Cold War, in a Cu ban Chu rch on ly
too aware of the fate of some of their colleagues in the
Span ish Civi l War (Kirk 19Q9.; Alonso Tejada 19.9.9)- When
official Catho lic proclamations welcomed the Bay of Pigs
invasion, fore ign priests we re deported from Cuba (Kirk
19Q9.;,_9A)- The Church fought the revo lutionary govern-
ment's ch il dca re programme, claim ing that Cat holic fami -
lies wou ld lose custody of brainwashed children, and its
Operation Peter Pan saw some 15,000 chi ldren rushed into
exile unaccom panied, many neve r to see their fam ilies again
(Torrei ra CresP-Q, and Buajasan Marrawi 2000). An

astonishingly s imilar right-wing media sca re was launched
in Venezuela in 2009, the sim il arities so pronounced that
the Venezuelan min ister of ed ucation broadcast footage of
the Cuban events.
Enforcing hegemony by terror
A second crucia l factor underpinn ing right-wing hege-
mony has been te rro r an d intimi dation within the US. The
right-wing cultu re of Miam i 'is the product of four decades
of seeth ing betrayal, sus picion and conspiracies ... [I t] was
out of such t hin king that the boun da ries of t he Castro Wa r
were drawn: any in d ividua l or bus iness viewed as sympa-
thetic to Havana became fair game for vigil ante justice'
(Bardach 2002:-1.13). From t he mid-1960s, the reced ing
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pros pect of early restoration of the old orde r led some to
faci litate fam ily trave l to Cuba, and even d ialogue with the
Cuban government. In the 1960s, Cuban exiles carried out
156 terrorist actions within the US and in other count ries
(Arbolexa 2002: 141). Moves unde r Ca rte r in the 1970s to
ease relations with Cuba furthe r alarmed the right (Garcia
l9.9~-1.4Q). In 1973- 76 alo ne, the FBI investigated 103
bombings an d s ix murders wi thin t he US t hat were cred ited
to Cuban exile groups. Those who promoted d ialogue
foun d their businesses bom bed (including one whose
Cuba vis its secured the release of 3,600 politica l prisoners)
and severa l were assass inated (Levine 2001: 183; de la Torre
2003.;._4,9). The pres ident of the Bay of Pigs veterans' associ -
ation was mu rdered after pub licly attack ing exil e te rrorism

(Garcfa 19_96: lf!.l_). At the tu rn of the century, the Miami
New Times listed sixty-eight terro rist acts in the city, includ-
ing s ix mu rders, commenting that 'lawless vio lence and in-
timidation have been the hallma rks of el exilio for mo re than
30 yea rs' (Mu lli n 2000).
Academics and cu ltura l indust ries were sim ilarly tar-
geted. The human rights group Americas Watch and t he
Fund for Free Ex pression found t hat 's upp ress ion of dis-
sent in Miami takes a va riety of forms, including attacks on
artistic freedom, academic freedom, the press, and human
rights activists' (Human Rights Watch 19,93). The Institute
fo r Cuban Studies, at Miami -Dade Unive rsity, was bombed
fo r ho lding unapproved conferences, and the Cu ban Mu-
seum of Arts and Cu lt ure fo r dis playing works by Cubans
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from the island. A few years later, when Cuba's 'Miam i Five'
anti-terrorism agents appea led against their conspi racy con-
victions, the US Cou rt of Appea l noted many re ports of
exile bomb ings and kill ings. It orde red a new t rial, con-
clud ing that it 'was mandated by the perfect storm created
when the surge of pervasive community sentiment, and
extens ive pu blicity both before and during t he trial, merged
with t he imprope r prosecutorial references' (US Court of
8P-P-eals 2005,;_91). In 2005, the UN Working Group on
Arb itrary Detention also noted t hat men in parami lita ry un i-
fo rms had appeared in the cou rthouse, and it declared that
the Cubans' imprisonment was 'a rbit ra ry, be ing in cont ra-
vention of a rt icle 14 of t he Inte rnationa l Covenant on Civil
and Po lit ica l Ri ghts' (United Nations 2005). The appea l

verdict was later overturned, and the Sup reme Cou rt de-
clined to consider t he case. But in 2010, defence lawyers
d iscovered t hat some of the journalists reporting the t rial
had appa rent ly been on the US government payro ll in anti-
Cuba projects, rais ing new constitutional issues about the
case (Amnesty International 2010: 7.).
Tolerated terrorism
A third factor in t he longevity of right-wing domination
has been t he protection offered by the relationship between
the Cu ban right, US government agencies and the ir clients
in Latin Ame rica. When, in 7 998, Cuba gave the FBI evi-
dence, at the latter's request, a bout te rrorist activity in
Miam i, the information was not used to a rrest terrorists,
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but to arrest Cuba's anti-te rrorism agents. Human Rights
Watch reported in the 7 990s:
The official response to the vio lence and intimidat ion in
Miami has been marked by a notable fa il ure to prosecute
crim ina l acts directed aga inst diss idents. Wh ile in the last
few yea rs there have been over a dozen bomb ings aimed
at t hose who favor a mod erate ap proach to the Cuban
gove rnme nt, the re has not been a single a rrest or prose-
cution in that time. (Human Rights Watch 19.93)
Networks of Cu ban exiles se rved right-wing Latin Amer-
ican regimes across the death-squad decades (Ding~
2004~ 128). Orlando Bosch was secu rity adviser to the
Pinochet regime in Chi le. Luis Posada Carriles ran

Venezue la's intelli gence service. Bot h Bosch and Posada
Carriles we re later jailed in Venezue la fo r masterm ind ing
the 1976 airliner bom bing. Bosch served eleven yea rs. Posa-
da Ca rril es escaped, allegedly with bribes funded by Miam i
right-wing leade rs (Calvo OsP-ina 2000: 43=.4)- He went
back on to the CIA payroll , he lping run US Co lone l Ol ive r
No rth's ' lrangate' ope ration with the Contra arm ies in
Nica ragua (National Security Arch ive 2005; 2006).
Bosch late r ente red the US and was arrested. The attor-
ney genera l opposed po litical asylum , declaring that Bosch
had been ' reso lute and unwavering in his advocacy ofter-
rorist vi olence' for th irty yea rs (cited in Bardach 2002: 202).
His release became a key demand in the 1988 congres-
siona l campa ign of Miam i-Cuban Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ,
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managed by Jeb Bush, the future governor of Florida ,
whose father, Pres ident Geo rge H. W. Bush, ove rru led the
Justice Department and released him. Having escaped from
Venezue la, Posada Carriles continued to o rgan ize terro r at-
tacks aga inst Cuba. A Cu ban1 agent, rec ruited in Miam i to
bomb Havana's Tropicana nightclub, records that Posada
Carriles gave him the C-4 exp losives fo r the bombing
(Alvarado Godox 2004~ 129=3Q). Pa rdoned fo r an at-
tempted bomb ing of Fidel Cast ro in Panama, Posada Car-
ril es re-entered the US in 2005 and was a rrested for il lega l
ent ry. The US Justice Department decla red him 'an un re-
pentant crim inal and adm itted masterm ind of te rrorist plots
and attacks on tourist s ites' (cited in Lacey 2006). Released
and welcomed in Miam i as ai hero , he was eventually tried

on imm igration-related cha rges, and acquitted in 2011.
The 1999 FBI report Terrorism in the United States 1999:
30 Years of Terrorism, a Special Retrospective Edition cata-
logued 'terrorist activity in the Un ited States 1980- 89', in-
clud ing twenty-seven acts, mostly bombings, attributed to
Cuban-American groups (Federal Bureau of Investigation
19.9.9) - Yet, in s ixty-two pages of ana lysis, there is no men -
tion of the Cuban connection. The report comp letely ne-
glects terrorist attacks launched aga inst Cuba in violation of
the Neutra lity Act. One FBI agent com plained: ' Every day we
have a Neut ra lity Act violation because people leave to do
runs on Cu ba. But no one wi ll all ow us to do ou r jo b' (cited
in Bardach 2002: 117..).
Invading the Hill
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The protect ion of te rrorists reflected a wide r Cu ban -
American mut ua lity, anchored in a formi dable exil e lo bby
based in Wash ington. The election of President Rona ld Rea-
gan and his hard-line anti-communist officials t ransformed
the Cu ban lo bby. Prompted by Reagan 's nationa l security
advisers, and fede rally fu nded by his National Endowment
fo r Democracy, the heart of the lo bby from 1981 was the
Cuban American Nationa l Fo undation. One hundred right-
wing exiled business leaders pa id a joining fee. Th rough its
Politica l Action Comm ittee, CAN F rewarded and relied on
hund reds of nationa l polliticians, d istri butin g some
$400,000 in the 1992 elections alone (Arbolexa 2002: 19.8_).
The public voice of right-wing Cuban America was now
spea king about human rights diplomacy, and pursu ing

legislative means to lock US po licy into exile st rategy.
Reagan's Democracy Project and Clinton's 'Track 2' st rat-
egy focused on the promot ion of op positiona l civil society
in Cu ba, ena bling CANF to pa rt ici pate directly in fede ral
projects. CAN F placed itse lf at the hea rt of the Reagan
White House's secret wa r in Nicaragua, and forged ties with
the South African-backed rebel fo rces figh ting the Angolan
government and its Cu ban ally. CAN F announced: 'We sup-
port Pres ident Reagan 's initiative to lend mo ral and mate rial
ass istance to freedom figh ters in Cuba, Afghanistan,
Ethio pia, Cam bod ia, Nicaragua, Ango la and other coun -
tries' (Calvo Os12 ina 2002: 43).
CANF grew strong enough to initiate po licy. In the 1990s
it mo bilized its legal expertise an d its politica l clout to drive
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through two laws that em bedded key right-wing exi le objec-
tives: the 1992 Cu ban Democracy Act (To rricelli Act) an d
the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic So lida rity (Lib-
ertad) Act (Helms- Burton Act). These tightened the em-
bargo by inte rnationa lizing it fu rther: introducing sanct ions
on count ries that provided 'ass istance' to Cu ba, banning
US mu ltinationa ls ' su bsid iaries from trading with Cuba,
prohib it ing me rchant vesse ls from entering US ports within
six months of docking in Cuba, and ma king it poss ible to
expe l from the US non-US cit izens who 't raffic in pro perty',
if their businesses with Cub a involved property nationalized
in the 1960s (Tit le Ill of Helms- Burton). Cu bans who we re
not US citizens at the time of the nationalizations were also
given retrospective rights to com pensation. The laws also

banned rem ittances, seve rely li m ited travel by US citizens
to Cuba and made human ita rian med ica l aid subject to 'on-
site' inspection by US officials of their use in Cuba. They re-
moved most of the pres ident's discretion to lift the em-
ba rgo , pass ing the authority to Congress; and they made
lifting the em bargo dependent on prio r 'regime change' in
Cuba. They also autho rized and requ ired the expend iture of
fede ral funds to build civil society ins ide Cu ba and to run
prog rammes to prepa re fo r Cuba's 'trans ition ' to a li bera l
cap ita list democracy. A measu re of the effectiveness of t he
CAN F lobby is that, in the passage of both laws, the incum-
bent pres idents rejected the legis lation, but fl ip-flo pped in
election years when their principa l o pponent sup ported the
CAN F pos ition.
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A measu re of the ruth lessness of th is Cuban right is the
extent to which its strategies rely on the supp ress ion of the
human rights of other Cubans. In the fi rst place, they have
removed the rights of Cuban Ame ricans (and US citizens in
gene ral, of cou rse) to send money or goods to he lp Cuban
fam ilies and othe rs, and to t ravel freel y to the island, and
have imposed pena lties on t hose who have defied these re-
strictions (US Government Accountability Office 2007~5.§).
In the second place, the ruthless pursu it of restoration
th rough econom ic st rangu lation has had , as intended , a
d ire impact on the mass of Cu bans. The UN Human Rights
Council itself has reco rded 'the disastrous and lasti ng eco-
nom ic and social effects ... of the em bargo imposed on the
Cuban po pulation ove r 40 yea rs ago , as well as its impacts

on civil and politica l rights' (United Nations 2008: 10-11 ).
The American Association fo r World Health, after a twelve-
month study in the 1990s, reported that 'the U.S. emba rgo
of Cuba has d ramatica lly harmed the hea lth and nutrition of
large numbe rs of ord inary Cu ban citizens ... [It] is ou r ex-
pe rt med ica l opin ion that the U.S. embargo has caused a
significant rise in suffe ring - and even deaths - in Cu ba'
(American Association for World Health 19_97.).
In the third place, right-wing policy has had a direct ad-
verse im pact on civil society activists ins ide Cuba. In the
1990s, Cuba's inte rna l op position groups we re, one US
d iplomat in Havana noted, woefu lly sma ll and disunited, in
spite of ex il e attempts to un ite them under t he umbre ll a of
the Concilio Cubano (Cuban Council ) (Moses 2000: 126).
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The right-wing st rategy made thei r position even more pre-
carious. Amnesty Inte rnational, a seve re crit ic of Cuba, has
made this point succinctly:
The embargo legis lation conta ins provisions for 'democ-
racy bu il ding' in Cuba which include the all ocation of sig-
nificant amounts of aid and support for Cu ban NGOs
and individuals oppos ing t he government ... The Cuban
autho rities port ray non -vio lent po lit ica l d iss idents and
human rights activists as foreign sympathizers sup-
porting US po licy aga inst Cuba. The emba rgo has helped
to undermine the enjoyment of key civi l and political
rights in Cuba by fuelling a cli mate in which fundamenta l
rights such as freedom of association, ex pression and
assembly are routine ly den ied. (Amnestx International

2009~)
Amnesty's perception is sha red by a forme r US head of
inte rest in Havana (Smith 2006) and by forme r Pres ident
James Carter, who, fo ll owing his own invest igations inside
Cuba, noted that d issidents
were unan imous in ... oppos ition to any elevation of
ha rsh rhetoric from the United States toward Cuba and to
any funding of the ir efforts from t he U.S. government.
Any knowledge or report of such financia l su pport wou ld
just give cred ib ility to t he long-stand ing claims of Pres-
ident Castro that they were 'pa id lackeys' of Wash ington.
(Carter 2002)
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Arguably the most effective interna l oppos ition move-
ment of recent years has been the Vare la Project, wh ich in
2002 co llected some 20,000 s ignatures on a pet it ion to the
Cuban Nationa l Assemb ly, seeking to change the law in
o rder to perm it private ente rprise and politica l pa rt ies.
Howeve r, the US-orchestrated international campa ign in
sup port imp licated activists on the island , some of whom
we re prosecuted in 2003 for receiving funds and materials
from the US (Am nestx International 2003). The st rategy of
o rgan izing oppositional groups and of staging provo-
cations to justify cou ps d'etat and externa l intervention is a
we ll -known CIA approach used in Guatema la in the 1950s,
Ch ile in the 1970s, Nicaragua in the 1980s, Venezue la in the
2002 coup and s ince, and in Bolivia since 2006. Cuba is

pe rmanent ly on alert fo r such plots, given the history of the
US's plann ing of violent pretexts to justify invasion
(National SecuritY. Arch ive 2002). One of CAN F's attempts
to form an inte rna l branch in 1991 co ll apsed when the
Cuban Democratic Coa lition 's leader emerged as a Cuban
security officia l (Arbolexa 2002: 209.). Cuban laws passed
in retaliation to the Helms- Burton provis ions were used
aga inst the dissidents a rrested in 2003, after US d iplomats
toured Cu ba organizing, fund ing an d supplying activists,
provid ing the Cuban cou rts with the evidence that in d i-
vidua ls had been co ll abo rating with US subve rsion (Pe rez
Ro~ue 2003; Elizade and Baez 2003). Th is ba leful connec-
tion is acknowledged in Amnesty's repo rt on the 2003
cases (Amnesty Internationa l 2003).
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US human rights d iplomacy has also given Cuba's right-
wing exile leadership an internationa l platform, both in
info rmal dip lomacy and in t he human rights arena. The
ea rly 1990s saw CANF wo rking alongsi de the US govern -
ment in the Geneva sessions of the Un ited Nations Com-
mission on Hu man Rights, fund ing the pa rticipation of ex-
politica l prisoners. Init ial US attempts to win a vote con -
demning Cu ba had fai led. So CAN F an d others had
launched Human Rights 88 to mobi lize at the 1988 Geneva
sess ions, coo rd inating hunger strikes in Miami and in
Cuba. CAN F established an office in Moscow, and its lead-
e rs accompanied US senators to Moscow in the early 1990s
to offe r trade dea ls in return for end ing sub sidies to Cuba
and for Russ ia to switch its vote against Cuba in Geneva

(Calvo OsF,2ina 2002: 4.9=SQ).
Helms- Burton enabled the US to drive a new ba rga in
with the Europea n Un ion : s us pend ing imp lementation of
Tit le Ill and the t hreat of having EU bus iness executives ar-
rested, in return for t he EU 'Common Pos ition ' on Cuba,
whose objective is 'to encourage a process of t rans ition to
plurali st democracy and respect fo r human rights and
fundamenta l freedoms ' (EuroF,2ean Union 19_9.§). This gave
CAN F an arena in which to figh t for tougher sanctions.
Ri ght-wing po litica l pa rt ies in the fo rme r Sovi et bloc, as well
as in states like Sweden and Spain, we re eager all ies. The
Cuban Liberty Council boasts of its meetings wit h Vaclav
Havel, Lech Wat~sa , Rona ld Reagan , Boris Yeltsin, George
H. W. Bus h, George W. Bush and Jose Ma ria Azna r. Such
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pe rsona l meetings are man ifestations of links wit h interna-
tiona l foundat ions working fo r regime change in Cuba,
such as Aznar's Fundaci6n Hispano Cubana (Span ish
Cuban Foundation) . Vaclav !Havel he lped launch the In-
te rnationa l Comm ittee for Democracy in Cu ba, which cam-
pa igns to hold governments to account for their implemen -
tation of the EU Common Pos it ion. Its el ite members in-
clude prom inent right-wi ng po liticians and many ex-
pres idents from Latin America and Eastern Eu rope. Three
times between 2002 and 20 10 , s uch lobbyi ng o perations
have he lped secure the award of t he Euro pean Pa rliament's
Sakha rov Prize to Cu ban d iss idents .
In all of this human rights activi sm, the Cuban right
stands sho ulder to shoulder with US human rights

d iplomacy, in which t he charges against Cuba are brought
in a manner that is - in the li ght of tru ly horrendous abuse
elsewhere in the Ame ricas and the world (an d, of course, in
US-occu pied Guantanamo Bay) - who lly dis proportionate.
This right-wing discou rse s imi larly rejects the equa l status
of economic and social rights in the UN Declaration of Un i-
versa l Rights - rights mostly enjoyed in far higher measure
in Cuba t han in most other states on the planet.
A furt her advantage accruing to the Cuban right from t he
activit ies of its lob bying strategy has been access to state
fund ing. This is not a new phenomenon in the exile
commun ity, but the sca le of suppo rt has grown greatly. The
US Government Accountabi lity Offi ce recorded that:
To suppo rt indepen dent civil society groups and
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ind ividua ls, State and USAI D awa rd ed 44 grants and
cooperative agreements between 1996 and 2005 to three
types of grantees: (1) democracy and human rights
NGOs focused specifica ll y on Cuba, wh ich received
about 51 pe rcent ($37.3 m illion) of the assistance; (2)
democracy and human rights NGOs with a wo rldwide or
regiona l focus, wh ich rece ived about 39 percent ($28.7
mi llion); and (3) universities, which received about 10
percent ($7.6 million). (US Government AccountabilitY.
Office 2006: 3)
One histo rian of t he Cuban right wrote t hat 'being a
d issident has become a business', and recorded the view of
one ex-politica l prisoner t hat the 1995 Cuban Council, pro-
moted by CAN F as an umbrell a group ins ide Cuba, was
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'eaten up by its membe rs' personal greed ' (Calvo and De- Cracks in the monolith
cler~ 2000:_1_43). According to one account, more than
Although the Cuban right clashed fur ious ly with the US
$200 million in US fede ral funds we re channe ll ed through
government ove r migration po licy in the mid-1 990s, histo-
CAN F leader Jose Mas Canosa after the foundat ion's cre-
rians may come to see the period as the high tide of exile
ation (Bardach 2002: lJQ). So lucrative (but co rrupt, ex-
right-wing influence. They were able to take the mora l high
treme and ineffective) has been the virtually uncontro ll ed,
ground in 1996, after the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR)
right-wing Cuban management of US government-funded
shoot-down. BTTR had init ially sea rched for Cuban rafters,
Radio and TV Marti that a Senate re port in 2010 recom-
but aft er US migration pol icy changed, it began fly ing mili-
mended it be moved out of Miami and managed by the
tarized Cessna ai rcraft illega lly into Cu ban airspace, drop-
state-run Voice of Ame rica se rvice (US Senate 20106). The
ping leaflets and threaten ing to provoke a civili an air inci-
Un ive rs ity of Miam i's Cuba t ransition stud ies programme
dent. After twenty-five Cuban warn ings to the US Federa l
was a direct creation of the CAN F's Endowment fo r Cuban
Aviation Autho rity following intrusions , two Cessnas we re
Stud ies, with matching state fund ing (Calvo OsP-ina 2002:
shot down. Within ten days, Pres ident Cli nton had s igned
3~9.) ·
off Helms- Burton, the legis lation that arguably re presents

the greatest achievement of the right-wing lob by.
But in the twenty-first cent ury the exile monolith has
begun to revea l s ignificant cracks. The re have certa inly been
mo re victories. President George W. Bus h went to 'war on
te rror' and listed Cuba as a te rror state. His appo intment to
key fo reign policy positions of hard-liners from t he 1990s
Contra teams was we lcomed. Bush de livered fa r mo re than
the frequent White House photo opportun ities. The hun-
d reds of pages of t he re ports of hi s Comm ission fo r Assis-
tance to a Free Cuba detailed plans fo r 'regime change', pri-
vatizat ion of Cuban we lfa re services and, above al l, property
restit ution, the core right-wing demand (Commission for
Ass istance to a Free Cuba 2004; 2006). As noted a bove,
Bush's d iplomats in Havana t ravell ed the island organ izing
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and supplying d issidents . The 2006 commiss ion report
ca ll ed fo r an $80 m illion 'Cu ba Fun d for a Democratic Fu-
tu re', of which $31 mi llion was ea rma rked fo r 'su ppo rt to
independent civi l society on the is land' (Comm ission for
Ass istance to a Free Cuba 2006: 20). In 2007, in the pres-
ence of fam il y mem bers of imp risoned Cu ban d issidents,
Bush announced the creation of an inte rnationa l Freedom
Fund to offer Cubans post-regime-change loans. The po licy
traffic was not all one way, however. Bush continued to sus-
pend the im plementation of Helms- Burton Title 111 (which
would have all owed the arrest of fore ign bus inessmen 't raf-
ficking' in nationa lized Cu ban prope rty). No r did he repea l
the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act, which opened the way to what became a $700 million

trade in sa les of food to Cuba.
But the rea l cha ll enge to Cu ba's right has come from
within its own community. Some of this shift is rout inely
associated wit h the changing class composition of the late r
waves of Cuban -American migrants, and with less extreme
younge r generations. The death in 1997 of CAN F leader
Jose Mas Canosa began a process of splinte ring. A mo re
moderate CAN F stance emerged, op posed bitte rly by the
new Cu ban Liberty Council. Some of the sh ift is clea rly
linked to the behaviour of the right-wing machine. Its oppo-
sition to the pope's historic vis it to Cu ba in 1998 reo pened,
in a high ly sensitive pa rt of the exilio soul, the d il emmas
about engagement (Erikson 2008: 119-20). An oversub-
scribed Catholic Chu rch-organized cru ise to Cuba to join
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the po pe's vis it was aban doned in t he face of right-wing
hostility. Soon after, the right's image was damaged by t he
case of Eli an Gon zalez, who su rvived a raft crossing from
Cuba du ring which his mother drowned. A politically
cha rged custody battle ensu ed between t he boy's fathe r in
Cuba and fam ily re latives in Miami , nois ily backed by the
exile right. When the US courts found for the father, the ex-
iles refu sed to release the boy. He was eventua lly se ized by
heavily a rmed po lice, prompt ing vio lent right-wing protests
in Miami. In the afte rmath , a mo re moderate Cu ba Study
Grou p emerged. One of its mem be rs explained that its pur-
pose was to reclaim a mo ral right fo r exi les to pa rt ici pate in
a refo rmed Cuba and to overcome 'the image of Miami as
being vengeful and anxious to get back to esta blish the old

o rder, as opposed to a new Cuba. The image of Miam i as
trying to get back to Cuba and cont rol things, an d reclaim
property and all these things' (cited in Erikson 2008: 122).
Bus h's 2004 rest riction on fam ily suppo rt, cu rta iling vis-
its to one every three yea rs and li miting t he money an d
goods t hat coul d be sent, was a victory fo r the right, but
one that revea led deep divisions in ' Exili o City', just as
right-wing op position to remittances had in the past (Garcfa
Fraudulent use of fede ral Cu ba Program fun ds
1 9,96: 761-Q) .
d id further damage. In 2008 the fede ral Gove rnment Ac-
counta bility Office re ported fraud invo lving t he USA ID
Cuba Program's two la rgest democracy aid grants - to the
Center for a Free Cu ba and the Grupo de Apoyo a la
Democracia (Democracy Support Group) (US Government
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Accountabi lity Office 2008: 15) . The US has recently t urned
to paying private cont ractors to distribute material ai d to
inte rna l d iss idents (see Lieveslex a bove).
An d, s ignificantly, more po li cy th ink tan ks in Wash -
ington, an d a report to Cong ress, have wearily pointed out
that the emba rgo has fa iled (US Senate 2009,; SteP-hens and
Dunscomb 2009). Even the CAN F ca utiously weighed in
along sim il a r lines (Cuban American National Foundation
Fidel Castro's ill ness in 2006 and his retirement as
2009.) .
president in 2008 had so litt le immed iate effect on politics
in Cuba that the long-awa ited 'bio logica l so lution' now a p-
pea red bankrupt, too. An d in the wider fore ign -po licy arena,
all the states of Latin Ame rica now op posed the embargo,
and in 2009 invited Cuba to rejoin t he O rgan izat ion of

American States. The emergence of the Bo livarian Alli ance
of the mo re radica l states in the so-ca lled 'pi nk tide' of left
Latin American pres idents has given Cuba crucial po litica l
and economic allies (Lieveslex and Ludlam 2009E.)- Boost-
ed by sa les of med ical se rvices, a bove all to Venez uela, by
2005 Cu ba had restored its GNP to the levels it had enjoyed
before the Soviet co ll a pse.
Straws began to blow in the electo ral wind. Two of the
three right-wing Repub lican Cuban Ame ricans in the House
of Representat ives in Sout h Fl orida, the Diaz-Balart broth-
ers and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, faced prom inent Cuban-
American Democrat cha llengers in 2008. All three held thei r
seats, but with margins of victo ry that fe ll by 7 pe rcentage
points on average from t he 2006 resu lts - to 16 pe rcentage
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points in two cases and 6 percentage points in the thi rd. (In
the 1990s they had enjoyed majorities of between 30 and 50
pe rcentage po ints.) A major Brook ings Institute su rvey of
opinion in the Cu ban -American community at the end of
2008 found 55 per cent opposed to cont inuing the emba rgo
- the first such majority s ince the Brook ings series began in
1991; even among sup porters of the embargo, 55 per cent
wanted t he US government to open d ialogue - that d irty
word - wit h Cuba (Brookings Institute 2008).
Conclusions
This chapter has focused overwhelmingly on t he Cuban
right in ex il e. Some of the factors identified he re as unde r-
pinn ing t he st rengt h of the Cuban right remain s ign ifican t;

othe rs have weakened. It remains immense ly well fun ded,
but its politica l an d cultural domination of 'Exilio City' has
signifi cantly weakened, and it has lost the automatic protec-
tion it once seems to have enjoyed for vio lent intim idation
of other strands of exi le po lit ical thought. Its rejection of all
compromise with the Cuban government is no longe r
sha red by most Cuban Americans, and the cu lture of te rror
in Miami has finally damaged its wider legitimacy.
It remains active internationa lly, though, and still con-
ta ins funct ioning terrorists. The international right-wing net-
works that the Cu ban right has been prom inent in for so
long remain busy. The image of Cuban totalitarian ism
meticulously d issem inated by t he US and the Cuban right
has been pa rt of the propagan da machinery that, two
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decades after the end of the Cold War, has been repackaged
in t he face of t he 'pi nk t ide' in Latin America, and notably in
Venezue la, Bolivia and Honduras. In each of these cases,
the threat of the Cu ban exam ple has been prom inent - in
the run-up to the coups in Venezue la and Honduras and in
the attempted armed secession in Bolivia. The darke r s ide
of th is network is also sti ll active. In 2010, one of the terror-
ists recruited by Posada Carrill es to pl ant bombs in Havana
hote ls in 1997 was a rrested ente ring Venezuela. Extradited
to Cu ba, he to ld television journali sts that he had been sent
to Caracas by a right-wing group in Miami to organ ize the
assassination of Hugo Chavez and to bom b oil tankers
going to Cuba. Cuba's media were quick to construct the
man's terro rist fami ly tree, in order to demonstrate the
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continu ing terrorist amb it ions of some in Miam i. anyway, on ea rly parole).
The vo ice of the Cuban right, however unrepresentative it In 2008 1 Pres ident Ba rack Obama took Florida from the
may have become, remains loud and uncomprom ising. Republicans by 2 percentage points: the firs t pres idential
Ha rd-li ne oppos ition quickly emerged to the intervention of victor s ince 1959 to win without the Cuban lobby's support.
the Catholic Church to improve the prison conditions of He had incu rred right-wing w rath by pledging to lift Bush's
politica l prisoners in Cuba, and then to secu re the release 2004 controls on fami ly vis its and remittances, and by hint-
of the diss idents imprisoned in the 2003 crackdown. When ing at new talks with Havana (a lthough he rejected a lifting
the latte r group of prisoners ca ll ed on the US government of the blockade until Cuba met the standard 'regime
to lift t he emba rgo, a longer list was quickly issued in change' cond itions). But even1if he had not lost his majority
Miam i of ex-prisoners who sup ported the embargo. When sup port in Congress in the 2010 mid-term elections, he was
the Catho lic Church's med iation secu red prisoner re leases highly un like ly to risk a 1 per cent swing in the Florida vote
to Spain, the right attacked the Church's deal because it in the battle for a second term by launching a prolonged
fo rced the prisone rs into exile (even though those who re- congressiona l battle to lift the em bargo. And in the after-
fused t he offe r of asylum in Spain we re released in Cuba math of the right-wing reviva l in the 20 10 mid-terms, two

prominent members of the hard right on Cuban po licy,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Connie Mack, took the chairs of
the House Foreign Affairs Comm ittee and the Fo reign Af-
fairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphe re, respec-
tively. So, though there had been steady progress in Wash -
ington towards a gradua l lift ing of the ban on US citizens
travelli ng freely to Cu ba, the prospects fo r this once aga in
seem d im. Many with an interest in US Cuba policy saw
open travel as initiating a wider econom ic reoccupation of
the island and its strangulation with do ll ar bill s - always the
preferred option of a s ignificant minority of US po liticians
since 1959.
So the Cuban right, its forces still concentrated in Miami ,
retains a loud and insistent vo ice in US debate, and is still
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in a strong pos ition to block legis lative change. It also
maintains its voice in inte rnational right-wing netwo rks. But
as the mono lithic re presentative of Cuban America and
gua rd ian of an unchallenged emba rgo po li cy, the right's
time appea rs to be pass ing. Its classic modell ing of the law-
less Latin American o liga rch ic tradition - a t rad ition equa ll y
at home in the southern states of the US when the ex il es ar-
rived in the 1950s - has long outlived its legit imacy. It has
fai led .
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10 / Right-wing politics in contemporary Brazil indust rializat ion and modernization. Thus the oli garchy was
able to su rvive the abo lit ion of s lavery in 1888 and to weath-
MA RCOS COSTA LI MA
er the Vargas revolution, which began in 1930. Between

Owing to Brazil's economic significance and the high es- 1930 and 1945, and again in 1950- 54, the popu list Getulio

teem in wh ich ex-president Lu iz Inacio Lu la da Si lva is held Vargas and his Partido Traba lhista Brasileiro (Brazilian

by the Latin American left, the Partido dos Traba lhadores Workers' Party) created the corporatist Estado Novo (New
(PT, Workers' Party) adm inistration that has governed State), whose objective it was to achieve state-led industri -

Brazi l since 2002 - first under Lu la and then under Di lma alization and social reform. Vargas led a coalition of t he

Roussef - has been a target fo r conservative forces with in new urban working class, seg1ments of the middle class and

the country, as well as in the region as a whole, in the US the peasant ry see king a democratic system. Opposing them

and elsewhere. The Braz ili an right has its origins in an au - we re the forces of reaction, represented by landowners and

tho ritarian, property-owning oligarchy whose power rested othe r groups closely linked to inte rnat iona l comme rce and

on slavery and wh ich was ab le to cast a long shadow over cap ita l and the US. The right-wing Uniao Democrat ica Na-

society, even as the country went through the processes of ciona l (Nationa l Democratic Un ion) led the politica l figh t

aga inst Va rgas. Having su rvived this popu li st cha ll enge
(Vargas comm itted su icide in 1954 ), the o liga rchy would
late r sup port the mil itary coup of 1964, wh ich ousted the
democratica lly elected gove rnment of Joao Gou lart and
esta blished a dictatorsh ip that lasted until 1985 an d that
transformed Brazi lian polit ica l institut ions. The politica l
pa rties which eme rged during the st ruggle for t he end of
mi lita ry ru le and fo r a transition to democracy continue to
dominate the po litica l scene today, not least the PT, which
emerged in 1980 as a hete rogeneous alliance of trade
union ists, left-wing intellectua ls, fem inists, grass roots ac-
tivists and li beration -theology Catho lics. On t he right, the
Partido da Frente Libe ral (PFL, Liberal Front Party) - known
as the Democratas (Democrats) s ince 2007 - emerged as
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the pre-eminent force. In the 2010 election, conservat ive
fo rces attem pted to en d PT control. The right des ired a gov-
ernment more closely identified with the interests of in-
te rnationa l capita l and the socio-econom ic elite, and one
that would bring to an end the PT's domestic reforms,
which aimed at improving the living conditions of the poo r
through social assistance an d investment, whi le also seek-
ing greater South- South cooperation and autonomy vis-a-
vis foreign cap ital (for a crit ica l assessment, see Branford
2009.) . This chapter will focus on the right's po litical activ-
ities and its ideas about how Brazil shou ld be inse rted into
the internationa l financ ial system, as we ll as its res istance
to the recent leftwa rd shift in Latin America's continenta l
alliances. -6

The military dictatorship and t he politics of transition
The contem porary right emerged from a process of polit-
ica l realignment during the twenty-one years of military rule.
The 1964 coup interrupted the nationa l-popu la r project of
deve lopment, includ ing land reform and contro l ove r profit
repatriations by foreign co rpo rations - initiatives th at had
been introduced by President Gou la rt - and in their place
fo rmed policies close ly in line with the needs of domestic
cap ita l and its fore ign allies. The mi litary immed iate ly
closed Congress and ru led by decree. The harshest periods
of mi litary cont rol - the administ rations of Costa e Sil va
(1967- 69) and Ga rrastazu Medici (1969- 74) - provoked
armed insu rgency by commun ist and Maoist guerrill as in
1968. The mi litary's response was to impose a 'state terror
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[wh ich] suppressed all op ponents - generally left-wingers
but also many li bera ls' (Weffort 19~4_;_9.4.). Such was the
feroci ty of the repression that all insu rgents were elim inated
by 1971. Once the left had been defeated , the regime then
pe rmitted the creation of two pro-regime politica l parties,
the Ac~ao Naciona lista Renovadora (AR ENA, National Re-
newa l Party) and the Movimento Democratico Bras il eiro
(M DB, Brazi lian Democratic Movement), which we re in-
tended to act as safety valves for societa l pressu res - that
is, as proof that the regime believed in democracy. After
1974, the governments led by gene rals Geise l and then
Figue iredo assumed less ha rd -li ne positions and emba rked
upon a s low political lib era lization, all owing the restoration
of habeas corpus and freedom of the press, as we ll as a

politica l amnesty; furthermo re, in 1982 d irect elections for
state gove rnments were permitted. This opening fac ilitated
the creation of the Partido Democratico Traba lhista (PDT,
Democratic Labou r Party) led by Leonel Brizo la (a veteran
southe rn politician and discip le of Vargas), the PT and t he
Partido Socialista Brasi leiro (Brazil ian Socialist Pa rty). It
was at this time that Lula eme rged as a trade union leader
(he represented the metalwo rkers) as labour mob ilization
intens ified. Changes were also ta king place within the two
tame officia l pa rties. ARENA was renamed the Partido So-
cia l Democratico (PDS, Social Democratic Party); it then
su ffered a schism, from which the PF L emerged. The latter
would become the dominant conservative force in contem -
pora ry po lit ics, whereas the PDS became discredited as a
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consequence of its identificat ion with a military regime de-
nounced as incompetent and co rrupt. The MDB, now called
the Partido do Movimento Democratico Bras ileiro (PM DB,
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) expe rienced a
major defect ion, resu lting in 1988 in the formation of the
Partido da Social Democracia Bras il eira (PSDB, Social
Democratic Party of Brazi l) led by Jose Serra and future
president, Fernando Henrique Ca rdoso. The oppos it ion to
the mi lita ry was thus wide-ra nging and increasingly vocal,
particularly in the 1983- 84 campa ign demand ing the elec-
tion of the president by di rect po pular vote, rather than by
the regime-dominated electora l co ll ege. Although the mili -
ta ry won that particu la r argument, the oppos it ion, led by the
PMDB and the PDT, nominated Tan credo Neves as its

pres idential can d idate in the 1985 elections, which he
subsequently won . Neves died befo re his inauguration and
was succeeded by his deputy, Jose Sarney, a po litician who ,
though close to the milita ry, led the re-democrat ization
movement. He introduced a new constitution in 1988 1
which allowed fo r the direct election of the pres ident fo r the
first t ime since 19 60. Desp ite the oppos ition's strength , the
trans ition to democracy in 1985 was ve ry much a case of
being managed 'from a bove' - that is, being ca refu lly con -
troll ed by the milita ry, particula rly un de r the lea de rsh ip of
Gene ral Golbe ry do Couto e Silva.
Although dos Santos has asserted that ' in contempo ra ry
Brazil, the archa ic, patria rcha l wo rld is pe riphe ral and in a
process of acce le rated obso lescence' (1 985: 268) , oli ga rchs
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and loca l ch iefta ins still reta in cons ide rable political powe r.
Th is is des pite the fact that the Brazilian right has suffe red a
greater degree of fragmen tation than othe r Latin American
conse rvative pa rties, the resu lt of which is that it needs to
negotiate and accommodate in o rde r to move fo rwa rd
(Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power 20006: 54) . In the
1990, 1994 and 1998 elections, conse rvative parties ac-
counted for 51.2 pe r cent, 45. 3 per cent and 42.3 per cent,
res pectively, of the total vote fo r cong ressiona l seats
(Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power 20006: 4.8,). These
electora l resu lts demonstrate how much power the PFL
(later the Democratas) and the PM DB (plus others) have
exe rcised in Congress. Thus, the PMDB rema ined the
largest party up to the 20 10 election. The sit uation was

further complicated by the fact that, as well as having to
accommodate one another, the four la rgest pa rt ies - the
PMDB, PT, PSDB and PFL - also needed to cons ider t he
partidos nanicos (tiny parties), wh ich were genera lly devoid
of ideo logical intent but were wi lli ng to be bought. Up to
2010, a government of t he left or right needed to adopt
these tactics in orde r to get legis lation through. An examp le
of the potentia lly catast roph ic po lit ical consequences of
this method of gove rning occurred in 2005- 06, when the
first Lula administ ration was almost brought down by the
mensalao (month ly all owance) scanda l, which cost the
presi dent his ch ief of staff, Jose Dirceu (essentia lly, the PT
had been bribing op position po lit icians to su pport its par-
liamentary bil ls). O bvious ly progressive reform was
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constrained by these circumst ances, as we ll as by other fac-
tors, domestic an d international. Thus, during the pe riod of
libera lization, both the PT and the PDT hoped that, if elect-
ed to government, they might be able to move in a socia list
trajectory; once in power, however, this aim was dropped
from the PT's agenda, as Lu la was com pelled to cons ider
the demands of large domestic and fore ign ca pita l and the
right-wing oligarchy. Th is would lead to a d iminution -
some would say to the disap1pearance - of the rad ical con -
tent of the PT's programme.
Despite t he retention of o liga rch ic influence, t he elite has
not been able to ho ld back t he rap id pace of change in
Brazi lian society s ince the mid -twentieth century. The urban
popu lation has risen from 31.2 pe r cent in 1940 to 67.6 pe r
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cent in 1980 and 80 per cent in 20 10, as a resu lt of rap id The right after the transition
rura l-to-urban migration, industrial ization and huge popu-
The neo li bera l mode l - so beloved of the Thatcher and
lation growth (from 70 million in 1960 to 190 mi ll ion in
Reagan governments in the UK and the US - was a pplied to
2010). Although the count ry has thus undergone a dramatic
economies across the world in the context of the debt cris is
transformation, it has not been a ble to overcome the prob-
lem wh ich Buarque de Ho landa has identified: 'Democracy and under the aegis of the IMF restructuring packages that
responded to it. It was driven by the imperatives of the
in Brazi l always was an unfo rtunate misunde rstand ing. A
Wash ington Consensus. The ideo logica l objectives of the
rura l and semi-feudal aristocracy im ported it and tried to
consensus we re rolled out by the corpo rate media as 'the
adapt it whereve r poss ible to its rights and privi leges'
end of histo ry', as if the re cou ld be no alternative to them.
(2006: 160). This contradiction between Brazil's demo-
Thus even socia l democratic pa rties - such as the Sociali sts
cratic and modern needs and t he interests of the oli ga rchy,
in France and Labour in the UK - reduced pub lic spending
as represented by the politica l right, wou ld become eve r
and moved away from inclusive social po licies. The re now
mo re a pparent as post-transition gove rnments imp le-
seemed to be little po lit ical d ifference between 'left' and
mented moneta rist structura l ad justment policies.
'right'. This phenomenon affected Brazil and the rest of

Latin America, as a broad array of left-wing parties began to
behave as parties of order, and not as parties of change.
Thus, in order to get elected in 2002, Lu la reassu red
domestic and internationa l capita l that he wou ld not under-
take structu ral reforms and wou ld not default on Brazil's
fo reign debt. Once in office, he continued Ca rdoso 's
macroeconom ic st rategy.
Sarney governed Braz il at the head of an alliance of re-
gional leaders and po litical clans. Unable to curb the mas-
sive inflation, he became increas ingly unpopu la r, as d id his
successor, Fernando Coll e r de Mello, who, having narrowly
beaten Lu la in the 1989 election (by 4 9.9 per cent of t he
vote to 44.2 pe r cent), escaped impeachment for corruption
by resigning in September 1992 (he was impeached in
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absentia in 1993). The interim1 pres ident, ltama r Franco, ap-
pointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso as his finance min-
ister. Cardoso presided over a programme of privatizat ion
and huge pub lic spend ing cuts and the introduction of a
new currency, the Rea l, in 1994. Cardoso's politica l ascen-
dancy first at the Treasury and then as presi dent (1994-
2002) was welcomed by multinationa l cap ita l, the Brazi lian
elite, the midd le classes and even significant sections of the
poo r, particu la rly because of tlhe dramat ic reduction in infla-
tion by 1997. He was a ble to defeat Lu la in two presi dentia l
elections: in 1994, he obtained 54.3 per cent (to Lu la's 27
pe r cent) and in 1998, 53.1 per cent (to 31.7 per cent) . How-
ever, t he central thrust of his policies was not to promote
autonomous deve lopment through domestic

indust rialization, but rather to restructu re the economy so
as to att ract fore ign invest ment by eliminating ta riff barrie rs
and exchange contro ls - measures that were comp lemented
by a comprehens ive policy of privatization. As a result, im -
ports cli mbed to 52.7 pe r cent in 1994 and many Brazilian
businesses closed or went into pa rtne rsh ip with foreign
compan ies; this accounted fo r 70 per cent of me rgers and
acquis it ions between 1995 and 1999. It led even the pro-
neolibera l Veja magaz ine to comment 'the history of cap i-
ta lism has rarely seen the t ransfer of control on such a
sca le in such a short period ' (Lambert 2009.). Brazil went
through a rapid process of deindustrialization, affecting
much of Sao Pau lo's automo bile industry, the PT's birth-
place (Sader 2005). Unemployment dou bled to 9 pe r cent,
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whi le the ba lance of payment s fell from a su rplus of $10.5
bi ll ion in 1994 to a deficit of $3.5 billion in 1995. It was to
rema in in the red until 2000. In short, Brazil's sove reignty
was being se rious ly compromised. To stem the haemor-
rhage, Ca rdoso borrowed heavi ly; the externa l debt rose
from $150 bi ll ion in 1994 to $250 bill ion in 2002 (Lambert
2009.) . Critics of Ca rdoso have argued that he de liberately
created the con ditions fo r t he ' recolon ization of Brazil',
which turned the country 'from a liberal raw material export-
ing country to a dynam ic industria lizing count ry and eme rg-
ing industrial power ... to a regressive stagnant fore ign
owned subs id iary of ove rseas cred it ho lders and investors
dependent on the largesse of inte rnationa l financia l insti-
tutions ' (Petras and Veltmaxer 2003;_4=5). In othe r words,

Lula in herited a financ ial cris is, which had horrendous so-
cia l conseq uences.
The pre-eminent conse rvative party, t he PFL, an d the pre-
eminent cent re-right party, the PSDB, wo rked together dur-
ing the late 1980s and the 1990s. They were inst rumental in
o btaining congress iona l app rova l of t he Plan Real, under
which the new currency was pegged to the do ll a r in an ef-
fo rt to secu re financial sta bility, as well as in secu ring the
constitutional amendment that gua ranteed Cardoso's sec-
ond term as pres ident in 1998. Fo rmer PFL governo r of Per-
nambuco, Marco Maciel, was vice-p res id ent during both
Cardoso's terms in government. Falli ng out in 2002, the
pa rties res umed co ll a boration for t he 2006 elections, when
the PF L's Jose Jorge was the vice-pres idential ru nning mate
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of the PS DB's Geral do Alckmin. Ove r the yea rs, an d desp ite
the fact that a number of the ir mem be rs had opposed the
mi lita ry dictatorsh ip, the PFL an d the PSDB grew increas-
ingly conservat ive an d eve r more closely aligned wit h
agri bus iness an d the financia l and industrial sect ors. Their
agen da centred on t he need to reshape the re lationship be-
tween the state an d the market, which they believed neces-
sitated open ing t he Brazilian economy to fo reign invest-
ment and privatizing its commanding heights, as well as
the education, health and socia l insurance sectors (unde r
the advice of the World Bank),. These were the po licies pur-
sued by the Cardoso gove rnment, which also set a bout dis-
mantling la bour legis lat ion, al lowing employers maximum
flexib ility in matters of hiring and fir ing, an d cutting social

expend itu re. The right also re pud iated agra rian reform and
measures to protect the envi ronment, which it rega rded as
creating unnecessary li mitations on economic growth. In
te rms of ethica l po licy, it op posed abortion and equal rights
fo r homosexua ls, and suppo rted the death pena lty; in fo r-
eign -po l-icy terms, it sought preferentia l re lat ions hips with
rich count ries, particularly the US. It is easy to imagine t he
Brazi lian right's displeasu re when it perceived that t he Lu la
government was go ing to im plement the exact oppos ite of
these policy preferences fo ll owing the 2002 election. De-
spite not challeng ing the neo li bera l econom ic model, the
PT int roduced extensive social provis ion programmes and
agrarian reform.
The Lula government and the Brazilian right
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One of the mainstays of the right's influence over Brazil-
ian polit ics was its traditional electora l ho ld over t he poo r-
est states of t he north and no rtheast, where conservat ive
politicians enjoyed cliente li st re lations with many vote rs.
The ep itome of this was the state of Bahia, wh ich was the
fiefdom of the PFL's Anton io Carlos Maga lhaes from 1985
until his (and other conservatives') st rongho lds began to
be cha ll enged by the PT afte r 1998. In the 1990s, the PFL
cont rolled 90 per cent of the 417 mayora lties and 75 per
cent of loca l state deputies. Today, the no rt heast is a bas -
tion of PT suppo rt and , following the 2010 elections, t he
Democratas lost most of its Congressiona l representation
there. The success of the PT and its allies was initially
based on compet ing for seats in state parli aments that

histo rically had had what Borges describes as ' low electora l
competitiveness', given the dom inance of loca l chiefs in
Amazonas, Bahia, Cea ra, Go ias, Para1ba, Ma ranhao an d To-
cantins. Of these, five had been controll ed by a s ingle party
- eit he r the PFL, the PMDB o r the PSDB - between 1982
and 1998, du ring wh ich time each party was a mem ber of a
nationa l government coa lition, and the PFL was crucia l to
Cardoso's policy of savage neo liberal rest ructuring (Borg~
2010: 169=7.li-17.7.)- The PT also made inroads into gover-
nors hip elect ions in t hese states, obtaining an average 8 per
cent in 1994, 34 per cent in 2002 (coinciding with t he PT's
nationa l electo ral thrust) and 25 per cent in the 2006 elec-
tions (Borges 2010: 17.1).
The key to unde rstanding this electoral volte-face, which
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saw the left (p rinci pally the PT) in ascendancy and the right
in massive decli ne, is the impact of the Lu la government's
social programmes, particu la rly the Bolsa Familia (Fam ily
Grant). Under this scheme, t he poorest families receive a
monthly grant for each of the ir child ren (up to a maxim um
of three) provided they are sent to school and are vacci-
nated. By 2010, it had benefit ed 52 m illion peop le - almost
ha lf of the beneficia ries of all such programmes in the re-
gion put togethe r (Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica 20106). Othe r initiatives included Fome Zero (Ze ro
Hunge r), which was desi gne d to combat urban and rura l
malnut rition; employment stimu lation; and lim ited agrarian
reform an d resettlement . The s lowness of t his final element
was crit icized by radica ls with in the PT and outs ide it by the

mi litants of the Movimento dos Traba lhadores Rura is Sem
Terra (Rura l Land less Wo rkers' Movement), whi le therefor-
m's progress t hrough Congress was blocked by lobbyists
fo r large agribusiness concerned with the export of soya,
beef, ethanol and coffee. The politica l effect of Lula's re-
fo rm agenda was to dismantle t he trad itiona l clientelistic
netwo rks that histo rically had aided right-wing po litical par-
ties (Borges 2010: 17.5).
Despite its efforts, the PT government fa iled to resolve
the huge social prob lems inhe rited from t he Ca rdoso adm i-
nistration (and , of course, from Braz il 's previous histo ry) .
Although t his is unsurprising, given the sca le of the prob-
lems, it d id offe r opportun it ies for critiques of the PT's
political t rajecto ry. By 2008, Brazi l was one of the most
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unequal countries on earth. According to the United Na-
tions Development Programme, income inequa lit ies, as
measured by the GIN I index, were as high as in very poor
African countries, such as Sie rra Leone, Swaziland, Lesotho
o r Nami bia. However, the World Ban k ranks the Brazi lian
economy as among the ten richest in the world - the coun-
try has a GDP of $1.7 trillion, similar to Ita ly (~ghin 2008:
1). The reason fo r this d ispa rity was income distrib ution. As
Beghin s hows,
1 per cent of the popu latio n - less than 2 mill ion peo ple -
have 13 per cent of all household income. This per-
centage is s im ila r to that of the poorest 50 pe r cent -
about 80 million Braz ilians ... 30.3 per cent of the popu -
lation or 54 million a re conside red poo r and, within this

gro up, 20 mi llion peo pl e o r 11 .5 pe r cent of the popu-
lation a re ran ked as extremely poor. (~gh in 2008: 1)
Leve ls of rural poverty are even more ma rked, and the liv-
ing conditions of a large proportion of the urban popu lation
are woefu lly ina dequate. UN Ha bitat drew attention to the
fact that
38.5 pe r cent of all urban househo lds were ' precarious' in
2005 [and] 31.8 per cent of househo lds in the southe rn
region and 26.7 pe r cent in the southeast region a re
inadequate [whi le t he figures rose to] 70.1 per cent in t he
nort hern region, 59.7 pe r cent in the mid-west ... and 53.5
per cent in the northeast. (UN Habitat 2010: JQ)
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However, in t he pe riod 2000- 10, Brazil was a ble to im -
prove the living conditions of an estimated 10.4 mi llion
peop le. The ma in factors behin d t his we re im proving in-
comes for poor urban househol ds; slower population
growth; slowing rura l-to-u rban migration; the development
of low-income hous ing policies t hat sub sidize const ruction
costs an d slum upgrading (UN Habitat 2010: JQ). The re-
maining housing deficit main ly affects those 'with an in-
come of less t han 3 m inimum1wages a month'. For Begh in,
Poverty in Brazil has a colou r and a locat ion: it is black,
urban and concentrated in the no rtheast region. Two-
thirds of all the poo r a re b lack, 70 per cent of the total
popu lation living in pove rty ... are city dwe ll e rs and 51 pe r
cent ... live in the no rtheast . (~ghin 2008: 2)

This is compounded by the fact that some 45 mi llion
ma le and female workers do not enjoy labou r rights, forma l
wages or minimum social protection, and that the re is a
highly regressive tax system, with the poor paying far more
as a propo rt ion of the ir wages than the rich.
The PT's critics have argued that, in o rder to get elected
in 2002, it made an historic comp romise with finance cap-
ital, both domestic and internationa l, and the consequence
of this was that it did not attempt to initiate st ructura l
socio-econom ic transformation. The resu lt was continuing
poverty and exclus ion, as detai led above (desp ite the pos i-
tive accomplishments of the Bolsa and its sister pro-
grammes), along with deepening insecu rity, rising vio lent
crime and all egations of co rruption aga inst the government
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(Sader 2005). Howeve r, from an entirely d ifferent view-
point, the Economist hai led Lu la's ach ievements:
Brazi l's circumstances and its stand ing in the world have
been transformed during Lu la's presidency ... Poverty has
fallen and economic growth has qu ickened. Brazil is
enjoying a virtuous circle: soaring Asian demand fo r ex-
ports ... is ba lanced by a booming domestic ma rket, as -
partly thanks to better social policies - some 20m new
consume rs have emerged from poverty. No wonder for-
eign bus inesses a re pi li ng in, whi le a swelli ng group of
Brazi lian mu lt inationa ls is expanding ab road. (Economist
2010a)
At the same time, it was highly critica l of the expans ion of
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the role of the state in economic management, particu la rly popu la rity, and is exp lained by his po litical style, which was
ove r Pet rob ras, t he nationa l oil company. Lula ended his to appea l direct to citizens over the heads of t he right-
te rm of office with a staggering 80 per cent app rova l rating, dominated Congress and Senate, and his efforts to build
giving the Braz ili an right little space fo r manoeuvre. Its own links with state governo rs in order to ensure imp lemen-
credib ility was particu la rly affected by t he fact that, us ing its tation of the social programmes.
pa rliamentary majo rities, it had attempted to o bstruct the
The 2010 elect ion: a resoundi ng defeat for th e right
PT's social legislation as it passed through Congress. Its
spo ili ng tactics d iscredited the entire party system. A 2009 Dilma Rousseff, Lula's preferred PT successor, began her
Sup reme Court re port on t he state of the count ry's pa rty cam paign fo r the 2010 presidentia l election amid a shower
system concluded that, in 2008, almost 90 pe r cent of of media accusat ions that she was li nked to corruption
Brazilians had no forma l party li nks; the fi gu re rose to 91.6
scanda ls, na rco-trafficking an d organ ized crime. The attacks
pe r cent in 2009 : that is, 119.7 mi ll ion peop le, in a context
reached such levels of intensity in newspapers li ke O Estado
where 2.9 m illion more peop le registered to vote. This dis-
de S. Paulo and Folha de Sao Paulo, t he magaz ine Veja and
connectedness cont rasts sha rply wit h Lula's pe rsona l TV Globo that the Sao Paulo b ranch of the journalists' t rade

un ion held a protest rally aga inst the poss ibility of a ' med ia
coup ' (see Tso lakis, above, and Dfaz Echen ique, Ozo llo and
Viva res, be low, fo r other examples of med ia interventions in
politics). At the same time, the right-wing parties attempted
to block discuss ion of any substantive matters during the
campa ign (Nogueira 2009: 2f!..i..3Q) .
No cand idate won out right in t he first round of voting,
and during the second round Rousseff and Jose Serra of the
PSDB faced each other in a number of televised debates .
The Economist argued t hat Serra's di lemma was th at 'attack-
ing Lu la's record wou ld go down bad ly, an d ... dwell ing on
his own would be little mo re successfu l, because that
would mean rem ind ing voters of his t ies to ... Fe rnando
Henrique Cardoso'. Wh ile the magazine lauded Cardoso fo r
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conquering ' Brazil's endem ic hyper-infl ation ... he is usua lly
remembered fo r high unemp loyment, a success ion of
c rises not of his making, and politica l scanda ls no wo rse
than those that have rocked the current government'. As the
jou rna l concluded, the consequence was th at ' Mr Serra was
left with almost not hing to talk about' (Economist 20106).
Se rra was norma lly described in the corpo rate media as
being a centrist or a social democrat, but in fact his views
were extreme ly right-wing. During the second round , he ac-
cused the Bo livian government of be ing 'compl icit ' in drug
trafficking; accused Venezuela of 'she lte ring' the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC, Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia) ; and castigated Lu la for
fa iling to recogn ize the Honduran regime insta lled after the

coup aga inst President Manue l Zelaya in June 2009
(Weisbrot 2010). The right's propaganda campaign
notwithstand ing, Rousseff won the second round comfort-
ably, with 56 per cent to Serra's 44 per cent. Furthermo re,
the PT and its coalition all ies won majorit ies in the Cham-
ber of Deputies (68 per cent) and the Senate (67 pe r cent)
and gained a number of state governo rs and loca l state
deputies. In Congress, the PT comman ded 311 seats out of
a total of 513, but if one adds t he seats of the broad array of
its nine coa lition partne rs, that figu re rises to 402; this
represents the la rgest majority since the trans it ion to
democracy in 1985. In the Senate, Rousseff had the su ppo rt
of fify-four out of eighty-one senators. The PT also won the
popu la r vote in s ixteen out of twenty-seven states (Folha de
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Sao Paulo 2010).
Concluding thoughts
The 2010 election resu lts were a clear indication that the
process of democratization, integra l to t he PT's policies of
social inclus ion, has substantially e roded the right's t rad i-
tiona l clienteli stic support base. It is also evident that a
majority of Braz ili an voters identify right-wing po licies with
debt, unemp loyment, growing socia l inequa lities, rising
poverty an d severe loss of sove reignty, and view the PT in a
highly positive light. Fo r this s ituation to crystall ize into a
pe rmanent political sh ift, t here wou ld need to be a dee p-
en ing of the PT's red istribu tion ist po licies, a continued
democratizatio n of society and po lity, and a renewed

affirmation of nationa l sove reignty.
It is also essentia l to s ituate Brazil with in the context of
the region's po lit ica l changes, whe re, after the resounding
fai lure of the Washington Consensus, popu lar movements
underpinned the elections of left-lean ing governments,
beginn ing with Hugo Chavez in 1998, continuing with Lu la
in Braz il in 2002 and t hen successes in Argentina, Uruguay,
Bolivia, Chi le, Ecuado r and Paraguay (see Lieveslex and
Ludlam 2009_g_). Th is t rend exp lains why the Braz ili an right
has consistently attempted to obstruct regiona l integration
by, for examp le, trying for ten years to block Venezuela's
ent ry into Mercosur (a move that was fina lly approved by
the Brazili an Senate in Decembe r 2009). Opposit ion sena-
tors had 'argued that under Chavez, Venezuela had lost its
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democratic characte r with regards to the press, cou rts and
legislatu re, disqua lifying the country from membership'
(Rabello 2009.) . Nevertheless, Brazilian capita li sts were
keen to invest in t he Venezuelan economy (Mar~uez 2010).
To conclude, the two PT governments led by Lu la em -
barked upon a deve lopment model based on the redistri-
bution of wealth. Although this d id not tack le t he structura l
roots of inequa lity or the cap ita li st nat ure of the Brazi lian
economy, it did garner huge popular support. This drasti-
ca lly reduced the political stand ing of conservat ive pol iti-
cians an d t he electora l prospects of their pa rties. The latest
fi nancial cris is, which erupted in August 2008, has demon -
strated that t he economic and po litica l practices pursued by
globa l cap ita li sm require profound changes if individuals
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are to live in a wo rld where t he frui ts of their labou r an d
wea lt h are not app ropriated by an elite, and where the vast
majority of people benefit from the wea lth they themselves
produce. With the election of Di lma Rousseff and the leg-
is lative dominance t he PT gove rnment enjoys, Brazil is in
an optimum posit ion to deepen its socio-economic reforms
and overcome t he country's oligarchic tra dition.
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Undermining the new da wn: opposition to
11 / Lugo was a strong advocate of li beration theo logy, the pro-
Lugo in Paraguay gress ive Catho lic doct rine that eme rged in the 1960s. It ar-
gued that the Church had a mo ral ob ligation to defend and
PETE R LAM BERT promote t he interests of the poo r, and advocated profound

The election of Fernando Lugo at the head of the Alianza socio-econom ic and po litical reform. Indeed , Luge's plat-
fo rm was based on a series of progress ive socia l and eco-
para Camb io (APC, All iance fo r Change) coa lition in Ap ril
2008 was a historic event in a number of ways. Fi rst, it put nom ic reforms, includ ing an un precedented land refo rm

an end to over sixty years of un inte rrupted ru le by the Co l- prog ramme, jud icial refo rm and state-sector refo rm to ad-

o rado Party, which had gove rned Paraguay since 1947. Sec- d ress rampant co rruption. These initiatives we re to be

ond, it brought about the first peaceful handover of power accompan ied, and in part financed, by tax reform, as well as

between politica l parties in the histo ry of the count ry. And by a renegotiation of the 1973 Treaty with Brazi l relating to

thi rd, it brought an ex-bishop to powe r. What was perhaps the Itaipu hydroe lectric dam. Luge's victo ry and the scope

even mo re aston ish ing in a count ry ruled by deep ly conser- of his electora l prom ises led to huge expectations and gave

vative and aut ho ritarian regimes for most of its histo ry, him significant political capit al when he took office. When

he promised a 'new dawn' for Pa raguay of justice, peace
and solidarity, many believed that he wou ld de liver it. Yet
three years later, Lugo could point to very few tangible suc-
cesses or reforms.
This chapter wi ll exam ine why Lugo was unab le to imple-
ment the most im portant elements of his electora l platfo rm
and will ana lyse the a rray of powerful and entrenched inter-
ests that stood against him , blocking his refo rm agenda
and undermining governab ility in Paraguay. Concretely, it
will first ana lyse the nature an d context of his victory and
the constraints they imposed on his programme. It wi ll then
cons ider the successes enjoyed in the first two yea rs, befo re
examining the st rategies em ployed by the oppos it ion to
block four key elements of his refo rm agen da: judicial
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reform, tax reform, anti-corru ption an d land reform, before
assess ing the role of the op position in Congress and the
med ia. What becomes clea r from this ana lys is is that op po-
sition behaviou r not on ly reflects the ent renched and
conse rvative structures of power t hat have been a legacy of
the d ictatorship, but also the very rea l li mitations of a t ran -
sition that has stagnated in a state of 'defective democracy',
cha racterized by clientelism, aut ho ritarian enclaves and in-
equa lity (Merkel 2004).
The victory in the context of the transition
The overth row of Genera l Stroessner in February 1989 by
his e rstwhi le mi lita ry ally, Genera l Andres Rodriguez, ush-
ered in a t ransition to democracy, but not a s ign ifican t

change in the structures of power in the country. Without
dou bt the trans it ion brought advances in terms of demo-
cratic procedures and institutions, includ ing elections (na-
tiona l, municipa l and regiona l), and a new constitution in
1992; yet it was essentially lim ited, conse rvative and uncon -
so lidated (Lambert 2000).
The politica l dominance of the Co lorado Party was a cen -
tral reason behind the lim itations of the trans it ion process.
The party had come to power via the bloody civil war of
1947, rap id ly t ransforming itse lf into the pillar of the infa-
mous Stroessner dictatorship (1954- 89), and then into the
initiator of, and dom inant fo rce in, Paraguay's t rans ition to
democracy. During this t ime it constructed a political sys-
tem based on vast networks of patronage and clientelism at
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the local level (as well as in the highly inefficient and po lit i-
cized state sector), on widespread corruption and on an
effective electora l machinery, all of which we re key to its
deve lopment as 'one of Latin America's most powerfu l and
best o rgan ized po litical movements ' (Sanders-19~9~_3).
These factors, far more than actua l performance, explain
how the Co lorado Party ma naged to ho ld on to power in
success ive elections in 1989, 1993, 1998 and 2003. Indeed ,
the Colorado governments until 2003 we re pa rt icu larly
inept in te rms of levels of corruption, econom ic misman -
agement and ineffectual governance. Between 1996 and
2002, Paraguay endu red a prolonged period of econom ic
stagnation, during which per ca pita income dropped by
ove r a third to just over $1,000 and poverty rose to 48 per

cent (Lambert 2000: 400), wh il e corruption, cont raband,
arms and drugs trafficking increased; indeed, in 2002
Paraguay was categorized as the most corrupt country in
Latin Ame rica, and the third most corrupt in t he world
(Trans12arencx International 2002), whi le indict ment
cha rges were brought against three forme r pres idents of the
transition period. The party itself was beset by internal fac-
tiona lism - a facto r that contributed to attem pted coups
d'etat alleged ly invo lving ex-General Lino Oviedo in 1996
and the infamous marzo paraguayo (the Paraguayan March)
of 1999, which witnessed the assass ination of the vice-
president, Lu is Maria Argana, and pitched battles invo lving
thousands of civilian pro-democracy demonstrators outs ide
Congress t hat led to the death of seven pro-democracy
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demonstrato rs and to dozens of others be ing wounded
(Abente Brun 19.9.9).
The qua lity of democracy in the Co lorado-dom inated
transition remained poor in te rms of good governance,
democratic legitimacy and active citizenship, wh ile t he
politica l and jud icia l systems were undermined by clien-
te li sm and corruption (Lambert 2007.). Furthermore, social
exclusion in the form of high levels of pove rty, inequality
and d iscrimination underm ined democratic citizensh ip,
pa rticipation and access to bas ic services (UN Devel-
QP-ment Programme 2008). As a result, Paraguayan democ-
racy might have advanced further than mere ly a semi-
authoritarian regime, but it was ce rtain ly tentative and
unconso lidated, with clear s igns of what Merke l (2004)_

te rmed a 'defective democracy', with long-term deficits in
areas of rule of law, accountabi lity and inequa lity. By the
early 2000s, democracy ap peared less threatened by the
'sudden death of military inte rvention than by the s low
death of decay' (O'Donne ll _.19,9.4), as the legitimacy of
democracy as a system was steadily eroded by poor perfor-
mance, low quality and widesp read d is illusionment.
This dange rous trend was clea rly reflected in a se ries of
pol ls by Latinoba r6metro. In 2007, for examp le, on ly 33 pe r
cent of Paraguayan res pondents supported democracy as a
system, and on ly 9 per cent were satisfied with its pe rfor-
mance. Paraguay also sco red lowest in Lati n America on al-
most all other ratings of attitudes towa rds democracy, in-
clud ing support for and trust in po liticians and politica l
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parties, and government perfo rmance and improvement to
we lfa re (Latinoba r6metro 2007.). Meanwhi le, the 2005 su r-
vey found that 69 per cent of res pondents wou ld support
authoritarianism under certa i n ci rcumstances, with almost
70 pe r cent of respondents re plying that the nature of gov-
ernment, whether autho ritarian or democratic, was less
important than performance (Latinobar6met ro 2005). Such
low leve ls of legitimacy and support for democracy raised
the poss ibi lity of the rise of social confl ict on the one hand,
and on the othe r autho ritarian po pulism, reflected in the
prolonged popularity of t he controve rsia l figu re of Lino
Oviedo.
The outcome of t he 2008 elections

Luge's electora l victo ry, with 41 per cent of the vote,
ended six decades of ' maladmin istration and pi ll age'
(O'Shaughnessy, 20096: 7.) by the Co lorado Pa rty. In the
words of the new pres ident, it was a victory by 'the little
ones', the end of 'an exclus ive Paraguay, a Pa raguay of se-
crets, a Pa raguay known for its corruption', promis ing a
'new dawn' of refo rm ism in Pa raguay (Diario Ultima Hora
2008). Howeve r, the t riumph was not as clea r cut as some
have suggested.
First, Lu go's victory did not imp ly the co ll apse of the Co l-
o rado Pa rty. Indeed, it remained the largest party in te rms
of membership, seats in the Senate (fifteen out of forty-
five), seats in the Chamber of Deputies (thirty out of
eighty), departmenta l governo rsh ips (ten out of seventeen)
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and local government (with control ove r 70 pe r cent of mu-
nicipalities). Moreover, its mechan isms and structu res of
info rmal power (clientelism, pat ronage and corruption) re-
mained large ly intact, not least in the high ly po lit icized pub-
lic-sec-tor bu reaucracy, and, via dom ination of the Sup reme
Court, in the jud iciary as a whole. Second ly, the outcome of
the 2008 elections 'did mo re to rea rrange the electora l map
than to transform it' (Abente Brun 2008: 15Q). Rathe r than a
large sh ift of votes from t he Co lorado Party to the APC,
there was a shift (of a bout 8 per cent) to the Union Na-
ciona l de Ciudadanos Eticos (UNACE, Nationa l Un ion of
Ethical Cit izens), the high ly conse rvative, populist party of
Lino Oviedo, wh ich broke away from the Colorado Party in
1998. The combined Co lorado/UNAC E vote was 53 pe r

cent, refl ecting a continued high leve l of support fo r conse r-
vative and right-wing part ies that were based on cliente listic
relations and that we re virulently opposed to Luge's re-
fo rms (Nickson 2009.).
Thi rd ly, the APC was not a so lid, ideologica ll y based
coa lit ion, but rather a ma rriage of convenience between
Lugo and the main, traditiona l oppos it ion to t he Co lorados,
the centre-right Partido Libe ral Rad ical Autentico (PLRA, Au -
tho ritarian Rad ical Libera l Party) , which was by far the
largest party in the APC coalition. Once the election had
been won, the structural weakness of t he coa lition became
increas ingly evident. Wh ile Lugo cou ld count on the su p-
port of only a handful of centre-left parties with minima l
representation in Congress, the PLRA was itse lf sharply
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d ivided between com peting, high ly pe rsona lized factions.
This was exacerbated by the deeply conservative views of
many in the PLRA, es pecia lly on issues such as land and tax
reform, which were integra l t o Luge's reform programme.
To complicate matte rs further, from the outset Luge's re la-
tions with his vice-p resident, Federico Franco of the PL RA,
we re d ifficult, lead ing Lugo to al ly himself with anti-Franco
majority factions in the PL RA, wh ile Franco increasingly
pos itioned himself as a sou rce of oppos ition. Fourthly, the
nature of Luge's reforms challl enged ent renched elite inter-
ests in Paraguay that he ld s ignificant powe r and influence in
all major parties. Sign ificant ly, the initial reform effo rts of
the previous Co lorado adm inistration of Nicanor Duarte
Frutos (2003- 08) in the crucial a reas of tax an d land refo rm

had been effectively opposed and blocked by a powerful al-
liance of interest groups with cross-pa rty rep resentation,
even though the Co lorado Party at the time held a clear
majority in Congress.
Lugo was the refore backed by a fragmented, ideo logically
d ivided coalition which lacked an abso lute majo rity in Con-
gress. This, combined wit h the weak presidentialist system
esta blished un de r t he 1992 constitution, which grants Con-
gress extensive powers, meant he would have to negotiate
sup port not on ly with sections of the politica l opposition in
Congress, but also with elements within his own coa lit ion.
Yet his victo ry gave him cons idera ble politica l cap ita l, ex-
tremely high app rova l ratings (ove r 90 per cent when he
too k power) and high expectat ions of positive change
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(Latino bar6metro 2008: 31- 2). He also had a clea r reform
prog ramme that promised su bstant ive imp rovements in the
qua lity of democracy in terms of governance, ru le of law
and fa r-reaching socio-economic refo rm. Given his lack of a
so lid suppo rt base, his po pularity and legitimacy would be
dependent on performance and on his a bility to address the
longstanding and press ing issues of poverty, inequality,
co rruption and land lessness high li ghted in his electora l
prog ramme.
S ucce sses
In t he first two yea rs of Lu ge's presidency, his govern-
ment made s ignificant ga ins in the a reas of hea lthca re,
poverty-all eviation programmes, fore ign relations and t he

negotiations over Itaipu . In hea lthcare, des pite t rad it iona l
low leve ls of service and coverage, Pa raguay had made
prog ress since the mid-199os due to a long-term coord i-
nated strategy based on the creation of social pharmacies,
loca l health councils and preventive hea lthcare. Lugo built
on this success t hroug h the introduction in the first
months of his administration of free access to medical
attention in pu blic hosp ita ls, free mate rnity ca re, free emer-
gency treat ment and free access to certain med icines, with
free denta l treat ment added in 2009. He also expanded the
highly successful prima ry hea lthcare pha rmacy project. Ini-
tial poverty-all eviation measures were based on the estab-
lishment of a system of conditiona l cash transfers, which,
modelled on the Brazil ian system of Bolsa Familia, aimed to
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provide the poorest fam ilies w it h a monthly cash subs idy of
up to $60 in retu rn for commit ments to chil d vaccination
and school attenda nce. The coverage included 13,000 fami -
lies in 2008, rising to 65,000 in 2009, with a target of
200,000 fami lies by the end of 2010 (Arce 2010).
Lugo also managed to create a st rong, pragmatic and
proactive fore ign policy, estab li sh ing trade and aid agree-
ments with a wide range of international pa rtners from
across the po litical s pect rum. Wh ile he maintained good
relations with the US, wh ich was genera lly supportive of t he
administ ration in terms of reforms to improve areas of
governance and rule of law, he also rece ived strong support
fo r his reform agenda from cent re-l eft governments in Latin
America. Meanwh il e internationa l donors and financ ial

institutions were key to important innovations in a reas such
as customs, the financial control system, the civi l service
and t he police.
Pe rha ps Luge's most sign ificant success was over the
issue of the 1973 Ita ipu Treaty with Brazil , wh ich had long
been a sou rce of contention in Paraguay. Although each
country owns an equa l (50 pe r cent) share of the energy
produced, the treaty obliges Paraguay to sell any unused
electricity at an esta blished cost price to Brazil, rathe r than
at market va lue or to third parties. In pract ice, Paraguay
uses ba rely 7 per cent of the energy output and so se ll s the
rema inder of its half sha re to Brazil. Although Pa raguay re-
ceives a 'compensation ' fee of $120 million per year, it has
long argued that this is a 'scan dalously un fair ' t reaty, by
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which Paraguay provides a subsidy on ap proximate ly 20 per
cent of Brazi lian domestic ene rgy use - put at $3 bi llion pe r
year (Nickson 2009.). Afte r re peated refusa ls by Braz il to
renegotiate con ditions until 2023, constant pressu re from
Lugo, including veiled t hreats to take the matter to the In-
te rnational Cou rt of Justice, led to an un precedented agree-
ment in Ju ly 2009. Brazil promised to tripl e 'com pensation'
royalties to Paraguay to $360 million pe r yea r, to com plete
the substation and transm iss ion line to Asuncion , to agree
to auditing and transparency, to all ow Paraguay to grad ually
begin to se ll elect ricity to Braz il (but not other count ries) at
market price, and to share management (Comisi6n de
Entes Binacionales Hidroelectricos 2009.). This was seen in
Pa raguay as a majo r victory, since the extra annua l revenue

could potentially dou ble pub lic investment from central
government and finance majo r poverty reduction and social
expend itu re programmes. However, it took until May 2011
fo r both houses of the Brazilian legis lature to a pprove the
agreement.
Blunting the key reforms
By Lu go's own admiss ion, the fi rst two years of his admi-
nistration were disappointing, la rgely because of the suc-
cessful strategies emp loyed by the oppos ition to block his
reform agenda. This can be seen in the four key policy areas
that formed the basis of his electora l programme: jud icia l
reform, anti-co rruption, tax reform and land reform.
Almost twenty yea rs after the beginning of t he t rans ition,
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the judicia ry was still wide ly rega rded as corrupt, inefficient
and una ble to combat corruption o r im pun ity o r to protect
citizens' rights (Lambert 2007.). It was also highly politi-
cized, due to a quota system established unde r the 1995
Pacto de Gobernabilidad (Governab ility Pact), under wh ich
appo intments and promotions we re decided by po lit ical ne-
gotiation between the major pa rt ies, and hence on the basis
of politica l service, allegiance and loya lty, rather than on
merit, expertise, experience or qua lification. Reform of the
Sup reme Court was seen as t he sta rting po int for any over-
hau l of the corrupt judicia l system. Faced wit h a Co lorado
majority in t he Sup reme Cou rt, Lugo requ ired a two-t hirds
majority in both chambers of Congress to push through re-
fo rm. Without the po lit ical support from Congress to

undertake a major overhaul of the system, and unab le to
convince the PL RA to abandon the quota system, Lugo was
fo rced to continue the practice of negotiation of ind ividua l
appo intments. In Janua ry 2009 he fa iled to garner enough
sup port to rep lace a ret ired Colorado member of the
Sup reme Court with his own preferred candidate, which
would have given the government a majority of five to four.
This reflected deep divisions in the ru li ng coa lition, as well
as Luge's inab ility to negotiate with the o ppos it ion. More
revea li ng of the oppos it ion to Lugo, in January 2010 the
Sala Constitucional (Constitutiona l Trib una l) voted to rein-
state two members of the Supreme Court who had been
suspended in 2003 but had not been replaced because of
repeated impasse in Congress. Although there was no
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evidence that Lugo had intervened in the decis ion, Lino
Oviedo of UNACE decla red that Lugo was 'taking the first
steps towards the estab li shment of a d ictatorshi p', fol-
lowing in the steps of Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales 'to
persona lly manage Jud icia l Power and annu l the power of
Congress ', wh il e ex-Pres iden t Nicanor Duarte termed the
decision a 'coup d'etat against Cong ress' (.f:g_ Re12.ublica
2010). The decision was su bsequently rejected by Congress
and annu ll ed by the Su preme Cou rt. Unab le to negotiate re-
fo rm in Congress o r cha ll enge the quota system im posed
by the two major parties, by 20 10 Lugo had tacitly accepted
defeat in his cam paign to overhau l the judicial system.
In te rms of increased trans parency, anti-corruption and
professiona lization, reform of the inefficient, corrupt and
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Colorado-dom inated pub lic sector (Nickson and Lambert Paraguay as a po lit ica l prize, ena bling parties to esta bli sh
2002) made initial progress in a numbe r of areas, including cliente li stic structures within the state sector. Wh il e be-
customs, t he ports administration, the telephone company tween 1947 and 2008, the Colorado Party had almost so le
and Itaipu. The Ministry of Fi nance also continued the work access to such powe r, the 2008 electora l victory al lowed
begun in 2003-05 to transform itself into an 'is land of in- the PL RA to ga in a foot ho ld in the pu blic sector for the first
teg rity' in terms of greater t rans pa rency and accounta bility time and begin to a ppo int its own po lit ical allies throughout
(Abente Brun 2008). Initiatives by the secretariat of the civi l the state bureaucracy. Aga irnst such establis hed politica l
service also made some headway in introducing stan- practice, effo rts to reform the system made s low progress .
da rd ized norms fo r merit-based appointments, promotion The key element of Luge's anti-corruption campaign was
and accountab ility. Howeve r, by 2010 the re had still been tax reform, which wou ld also provide essential fund ing fo r
no imp lementation of the progressive Pub lic Adminis- proposed social welfare and poverty-all eviation pro-
tration Law of 2001, beyond a few isolated ministries. This grammes. Paraguay is the only count ry in the region with no
was not so much a question of fi nancial resources as of system of d irect income tax; furthermore, it has the lowest
political wi ll: contro l of m inistries has long been seen in tax burden (under 12 per cent) and has no effect ive
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agricultu ral export tax, instead relying heavil y for revenue on from powe rful inte rest grou ps , such as soya exporters. Hav-
regressive, indirect taxation (chiefly VAT) . No r does it have ing reappointed the refo rmist Borda as finance ministe r,
any system of declarat ion of assets and income, which is Lugo attempted to push th rough the reform in January
seen as a contri buting factor in the growth of the informal 2009; when t his was blocked , he launched a high -profi le
secto r and corruption, includ ing money-l aun de ring, cont ra- (but uns uccessfu l) campa ign to get it through Congress in
band and narcotics trafficking. The tax reform bill , origina lly Apri l 2010, when it was post poned fo r a further three yea rs.
drawn up in 2004 by Finance Min ister Dionis io Borda, was O ppos it ion to such a key measu re reflects three factors:
modest, in that, as well as esta bli sh ing a declaration of as- first, the ab ility of lega l and ill ega l economic inte rest
sets, it woul d on ly directly affect a pproximately 10 ,000 of groups, including soya prod ucers, cattle farmers and t hose
the country's wealth iest peop le (0.3 pe r cent of t he invo lved in ill icit activities, such as contraband an d na r-
economical ly active popu lation) with a top rate of 10 per cotics, to use their cross -party influence to block a refo rm
cent (Ministerio de Hacienda 2010). However, it had twice that was clearly in the nationa l inte rest; secon d ly, the tribal
been postponed (2006 an d 2007) due to politica l oppo- nature of Paraguayan po lit ics, reflected in the number of
sition from UNAC E and the PLRA an d intense lob bying Colo rados who had sup ported refo rm wh il e in government

in 2006 and 2007, but who voted against it in opposition in
2009 an d 2010; and thirdly, a clea r opposition policy of
macroeconom ic destab ilization as part of its effo rts to
underm ine the government. The opposition was we ll aware
that fai lure to ga in congressiona l approva l for tax reform
would represent a major blow to Luge's a bility to fun d his
key reforms designed to address ineq uality, poverty an d
co rruption.
According to government figures, 38 pe r cent of
Pa raguayans (some 2.3 mi llion peop le) live in poverty, ris-
ing to 49 per cent in rural a reas; 19 pe r cent live in extreme
poverty (Direcci6n General de Estadfdisticas, Encuestas y_
Censos 2008). These figures have changed little since the
mid-1990s. Paraguay is also one of the most uneq ual
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countries in Latin America, with a GINI in dex coefficient of
0.58. Nowhere is this mo re evident than in the a rea of land
ownership, with 7 per cent of lan downe rs own ing 77 per
cent of the cu ltiva ble land (Alderete 2009.), making
Pa raguay the most unequ al country in Latin America in
te rms of d istri bution of land. The com bination of traditiona l
inequa lity, increased land concentration s ince the 7 990s
(due to the uncontro ll ed expansion of soya prod uction) and
increased land lessness (wh ich affected approximately 30
pe r cent of the rural po pulation) led to growing tens ions be-
tween landowners and landless peasant organizations
throughout the first decade of the new mill ennium. The
promise of agrarian refo rm was centra l to Luge's electora l
platform and provided him wit h a strong base of support

among Paraguay's increas ingly well organ ized peasant
movements. Howeve r, desp ite the creation of a new state
body for land reform , the Coordinadora Ejecut iva para la
Reforma Agraria (CE PRA, Executive Coordinating Com-
mittee for Agrarian Reform) , the crucial first step - the con-
ducting of a cadastra l survey to estab li sh land va lue and
ownership - had still not been carried out by the end of
2010, all eged ly due to the lack of funds to cover the cost,
estimated at $300 million. Reform efforts such as investi-
gat ing, expropriating and redistribut ing tierras malhabidas
(lands gained through corrupt practice under the d icta-
tors hip) also foundered due to the legal complexity of
ownership and oppos ition by powe rfu l groups. By 20 10,
land reform appeared to have stagnated and Lugo had
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reverted to the previous expens ive po licy of buying land at
commercial prices for red istri b ution.
The inab ility of the government to imp lement its agrarian
reform programme was the consequence not so much of a
lack of wi ll or even resources, but rather of the ex istence of
a coordinated, well resourced and powerful opposition.
Landowners' groups, especially the Asociaci6n Rura l del
Paraguay (ARP, Paraguayan Rura l Associat ion ) and the Aso-
ciaci6n de Productores de Soja (APS, Associat ion of Soya
Produce rs), comprise some of the wealthiest and most
in fluent ial elites in the count ry, and enjoy a strong lobbying
presence, with representation in all major political parties.
The APS, for examp le, represents the richest economic
group in Paraguay, looks t o Brazil for representation,

support and protection, and has proved under success ive
administrat ions to be ab le to block tax and land reform, not
on ly t hrough lobbying, but also through the threat of direct
action in the form of tractorazos (road-blocking of major
routes by t ractors). Such a tractorazo early in December
2008 sent a clear s ignal to Lugo that land reform efforts
would be met wit h significant opposition. The s low pace of
reform under Lugo led to a rise in land occupations, an in-
creas ingly militant d iscou rse among peasant organ izations
and clashes wit h armed, often Brazilian, security guards.
The deterioration in t he s ituation led Claud ia Ruser, the
controversia l hard-li ne leader of t he APS, to accuse Lugo of
alleged support for the land less movement, which she went
on to classify as a proto-guerri ll a organization, supported
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by President Chavez (Oxford Analxtica 2008). As Lu go 's
land reform project stagnated, socia l confl ict became in-
creas ingly likely.
Opposition in Congress
Opposit ion in Congress was the key element in the fa il-
ure of these fou r key reform packages. Wh ile this oppo-
sition came ma inly from the Co lorado Party and UNACE, it
also came from wit hin the PLRA, in the form of Vice-
Pres ident Federico Franco, who , in mid-2009, forma lly led
the PLRA out of the APC, although the two majority PLRA
factions rema ined in government. The oppos it ion strategy
in Congress was three-fold. First, it sought to block key
legislation pe rta ining to Lugo's refo rm agenda th rough
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alliances between the Colo rado Party, U NAC E and d iss ident undermined by attem pts in Congress to su bject both the
PLRA membe rs. This included voting to block vita l funding 2009 and 2010 budget proposa ls to huge increases in
streams (most notab ly the tax reform bill, but also initially a spending, gene rating the possib ility of an unsusta ina ble
key fo reign aid package), wh il e also vot ing aga inst a wi de deficit. In June 2009, Congress voted to furthe r postpone
range of reforms an d proposals sup ported by Lugo, ranging the tax reform bi ll , thus cutting a key revenue stream; wh il e
from refo rm of membersh ip of the Supreme Court to on the same day it also voted to increase state pensions
Venezuela's membersh ip of Mercosur. In a party system and double the sa la ries of depa rtmental governo rs and
predominantly composed of non-p rogrammatic parties, membe rs of the Nationa l El ectoral Comm iss ion, at a com-
party loyalty rather than ideologica l oppos ition was an bined cost of $ 11 8 million. Likewise, in October 2009, it
im portant contributory factor. voted to increase its own budget by 52 per cent and that of
Second ly, the oppos it ion sought to desta bilize t he gov- the jud icial system by 20 pe r cent. Such measures had the
ernment by generating a fiscal deficit an d unde rmining clear aim of un de rm ining the government by 'pris ing open
macroeconom ic stab ility. The government's init ial five-year a tailo r-ma de fisca l gap' an d suggested that the Co lorado
plan fo r 'susta ina ble growth with justice' was immediately Party was 'intent on macroeconom ic destab ili sation as part

of its plan to rega in powe r at any cost in 20 13' (Oxford Ana-
!xtica 2009.!2).
Thi rd ly, it sought to unde rmine Luge's socia l welfare and
poverty-all eviation programme in an attempt to prevent him
from establishing a politica l base among the poo r. Revea l-
ingly, at the same t ime as Congress increased spending in
June 2009, it refused funding to CE PRA, the land reform
agency, to finance new settlements for landless fa rmers.
Meanwhile, in October 2009, Congress cut the budgets of
the key institutions fo r poverty all eviation, includ ing the
Secreta rfa de Acci6n Social (Social Welfare Secretariat), and
the Secretarfa de Eme rgencia Naciona l (Nationa l Emer-
gency Secreta riat), wh il e a congress ional comm iss ion voted
to cut funds for Paraguay's internationally respected
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conditiona l cash t ransfer programme. With lim ited exec-
utive powe rs, Lugo found his room fo r manoeuvre high ly
constrained. When he ra ised the possib ility of 'po pular con -
sultations' as a means to pressure Congress to cooperate
with the government (referendums are exp ress ly perm itted
in the 1992 constit ution), Congress all eged 'creeping au -
tho ritarian ism ' and insisted he s igned a 'Democratic Pact'
to sup port rep resentative - rather than pa rt icipatory or Boli-
varian - democracy. When Lugo refused, the oppos it ion in
Congress and the med ia adroitly mani pulated his d iscourse
to accuse him of plotting to int roduce a totalitarian ,
Chavez-style 'twenty-first-cent ury socialism' to Pa raguay.
Fourth ly, throughout 2008 and 2009 rumou rs of an im-
pend ing mi litary coup in Paraguay we re rife. These we re

heightened or reflected by Lugo's rep lacement in his fi rst
fifteen month s in office of a total of forty-th ree gene rals - as
we ll as of t he heads of t he a rmy, navy and ai r force on no
fewe r than three occas ions. St rikingly, wh ile he rejected the
idea of any imm inent military uprising, he di d state that
there might be 'sma ll groups' of military pe rsonnel that
'cou ld be used by the po lit ical class' (Sm ink 2009.). Indeed ,
des pite the constant rumours, few believed that the military
would act alone, but might briefly intervene in a Honduras-
style cou p on behalf of an op position fact ion. Lugo's admi-
nistration was perhaps even more vulnerab le to a coup by
Congress, in the form of almost constant threats of im -
peachment. Indeed, by the end of 2009 Lugo faced high ly
pub licized ca ll s for impeachment from the opposition on
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four sepa rate grounds: fo r all eged corruption in t he man-
agement of lands fo r red istribution; fo r promoting the class
struggle; for all eged li nks wit h guerrilla movements; and for
fai ling to protect cit izen secur ity.
Given how close t he opposition was to the two-thirds
majority in Congress requi red to impeach Lugo, his survival
was due principally to the deep d ivis ions in the oppos ition,
and to its sepa rate strategies to gain power. Whi le Vice-
Pres ident Franco might have reli s hed the o pportunity to
take ove r the pres idency an d st rengthen his own pos ition,
and that of the PLRA, befo re the 2013 elections, this was
vi rulently opposed by factions in the Colorado Pa rty, which
had the ir eyes set on the same elections. This wou ld sug-
gest that the constant threat of impeachment was mo re a

strategy emp loyed by the o ppos it ion to desta bilize the gov-
ernment, gain concess ions from Lugo, or sim ply under-
mine his attempts to im plement his refo rm programme
(Arce 2009.).
The op position in Congress was driven not on ly by pa rty
politica l concerns, but also by a shared ideologica l oppo-
sition to many of the reforms pro posed by the government.
Although none of the three major parties in Paraguay is pro-
grammatic, all are heavily weighted towards conse rvative
and right-wing interest s, an d all benefit from the cu rrent
socio-econom ic status quo. It is this un ity, in terms of
class, econom ic and socia l interests, that is most st riking in
the case of the Paraguayan Congress. When a right-wing
PLRA senato r, Alfredo Jaeggli, stated in November 2009
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that 'we have a six-month window in which to remove Lugo
before t he social organ izations a re strengthened', he re-
vealed the cross-party fea rs among t he po litica l el ites in
Paraguay of the growth of peasant and othe r social move-
ments and of overdue socio-econom ic reforms that wou ld
threaten the stat us quo (Benegas 2010) . There is a striking
consensus among politica l e lites in Paraguay: they view
bot h refo rm and social movements as a very rea l threat to
their interests.
The media
Although the media became im portant unofficia l sou rces
of investigation into corruption, impun ity and crime during
the t ransition, t hey were fa r from objective or non-partisan.

The lack of regu lation in the 1990s led to a concent ration of
med ia control in the hands of a ve ry sma ll group of figures
with shared business and politica l inte rests, and a resu lting
integration of the print med ia with te levision and rad io out-
lets. Moreover, the print media strongly influenced the cov-
e rage and ana lysis of news for rad io, televis ion and d igita l
services. In th is sense, the press not on ly reported po lit ical
events, but had the powe r to man ipu late, lim it and set the
politica l agenda (Ortiz 2009.). In the case of Lugo, t his re-
sulted in the emergence of a powerfu l and influentia l source
of opposition.
Even before the 2008 election, there ap peared to be a
concerted campaign to associate Lugo with the radica l left,
link ing him not on ly with Hugo Chavez and Evo Mora les,
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but also with landless peasant organizations, and, by exten -
sion, with the incipient Paraguayan gue rrill a movement, the
Eje rcito Po pula r Pa raguayo (EPP, Pa raguayan Peop le's
Army) and even the Colombian Fue rzas Armadas Revolu -
ciona rias Co lomb ianas (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colom bia). From August 2008, this association between
Lugo, land less but allegedly armed peasants, Chavez and
the threat of 'twenty-first-century socia lism' constituted a
central part of the opposition campaign in t he majority of
the media. Most notably, ABC Color, Paraguay's most wide-
ly read and influential dai ly newspape r, adopted a cons is-
tently anti-gove rnment li ne in its head lines, editorials and
comment pieces. Politica l analysis invo lved emphas izing,
repeating and exaggerating the wea kness of the

government, the inexperience and ineptitude of Lugo and
the growth of socia l tens ion, instabi lity and insecurity in
o rder to create a climate of fea r and anger directed at the
president. In addition, the press gave extens ive coverage to
the oppos ition to Luge 's reform programme, presenting it
as sens ible, respons ible, led by elite consensus and acting
in the nationa l inte rest.
On the other hand , proponents of reform were presented
as irresponsib le, na"ive and dange rous (Arce 2009) - and,
in t he case of peasan t organizations, as corrupt, a threat to
law and order, and even linked to gue rri ll a groups (Ortiz
2009.) . The fact th at the press effectively set the pa ramete rs
of debate meant that Lugo increas ingly strove to portray
himself as a moderate centrist, adopti ng a more cautious
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rhetoric that led to accusations from supporters that he was
responding to opposition crit icisms of creeping socia lism
and imminent government co ll apse, rather than sufficiently
promoting his own reform programme.
The case of the EPP
A further destabilizing element in Luge's administration
was the continued activit ies of the EPP. Th is very sma ll
guerri ll a group ope rated prima rily in the poor regions of
Concepcion and San Pedro, wh ich, from the 1990s, had
seen growing conflict between an increas ingly mi litant
movement of land less peasants and an alli ance of powe rfu l
cattle ranchers and Brazilian soya bean producers. Whi le
the activities of the EPP we re sporadic and re lative ly lim ited

(Oxford Analxtica 2009~), they were explo ited by the med ia
and oppos it ion po lit icians to reflect an all eged dete rio ration
in nationa l security and publ ic o rder, becom ing a rallying
cry of anti- Lugo opposition. Days after the kidnapp ing of
cattle-rancher Fidel Zava la in October 2009, Li no Oviedo
threatened Lugo with impeachment fo r fai ling to protect cit-
izen secu rity, whi le Ma rio Abdo Benitez, vice-p res ident of
the Colo rado Party, went furt her, as d id sections of the
press, accusing t he president of having d irect links with
leaders of the EPP. Wh ile there was little evidence, the re-
peated accusations left permanent negative associations.
The t rue nature of this nascent armed group rema ins
sh rouded in mystery. Iso lated and d isowned by the left, it is
a sma ll group wit h a very li mited fie ld of action. Wh il e it is
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pe rceived by many in the ARP and t he APS, by the press and
by po liticians in the three major politica l pa rties as ev idence
of a wider subve rsive movement with links to the
Paraguayan land less movement and the Co lom bian FARC,
othe rs have raised quest ions regard ing its aims and finan -
cia l backers, and whether these are at all what t hey seem. It
is plaus ible, for example, that the EPP is financed and sup-
ported by powerful d rugs mafias that have estab li shed
themse lves in t he north and east of t he count ry and wish to
keep the area 'out of bounds' for the authorities (Oxford
Ana lxtica 2009_g_). Whatever the ir rea l identity, the issue of
the EPP was used to further underm ine the embattled presi -
dent's legitimacy. In a reaction that was indicative of the
power of the right and the media to establis h the politica l

agenda, in April 20 10 Lugo declared an ultimate ly futile thir-
ty-day state of emergency in five depart ments, in response
to the killi ng of fou r people, including a poli ceman, by the
EPP. The measu re, unprecedented in t he t rans ition, was
wide ly criticized as a dange rous overreaction by Lugo and
evidence of his susce ptib ility to the constant all egations of
his sym pathies towards the guerrillas and his ina bility to
provide security in the a reas in wh ich they ope rate.
U ndermining the new dawn
By the end of 2010, the administ ration of Lugo was wide-
ly perce ived s imp ly to have run out of steam - a perce ption
pe rhaps exacerbated by the revelation in August of that year
that Lugo was suffering from an advanced but t reatab le
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fo rm of lymphatic cancer. In the mun icipal elections of
November 2010, the Colorado Party emerged triumphant,
with over 55 per cent of the vote, winn ing 132 out of 238 mu -
nicipa lities - includ ing, narrowly, Asuncion. But it was the
unprecedented 54 pe r cent abstention rate and t he renewed
dominance of the two traditiona l parties - which together
won nearly 94 pe r cent of the vote - that most clearly re-
flected the extent of popu lar dis ill us ionment with the fa il ure
of Lugo to im plement his promised reform programme.
To some extent this was due to personal fa ili ngs. His
highly individual style of leade rsh ip and info rma lity in deci-
sion -ma k-ing led to preva rication, im provisat ion and back-
tracking on certa in issues, and made it more diffi cu lt to
esta blish a wo rking coa lit ion in Congress or to turn

widesp read su ppo rt among the poor into a clearly a rtic-
ulated politica l base of su ppo rt beyond the fractious APC.
Furthermo re, his integ rity came under scrut iny with the
emergence of three patern ity su its in the fi rst s ixteen
months of his pres idency, one of which he accepted. The
issue was not so much one of a senio r mem ber of the
Chu rch fat hering ch ild ren, but rather his refusal to recog-
nize pate rnity or to support the (impoverished and single)
mot hers and offs pring in question . Add it ional accusations
of corruption , affecting him and some of his inne r circle, as
we ll as ne potism fu rther underm ined his image as a 'clean '
and t herefo re different kind of politician (Oxford Analy,tica
2009.f).Yet, desp ite persona l inadequacies, the clea rest
cause of the fa il ure of the refo rmist programme lay with
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what Lugo characterized in Novem ber 2009 as an o rches-
trated campa ign to unde rmine his presidency and impede
his policies. This was due not , as he claimed, to ' mafia' o r-
gan izations or golpistas (coup plotters) , but to a conse r-
vative elite that was th reatened by the nature of his refo rms.
The fo rm and success of this cam paign are notab le for a
numbe r of reasons.
First, the oppos ition, ranging from members of the t rad i-
tiona l agrarian and politica l elites, mode rnizing agrarian
elites , t he soya produce rs and secto rs of the business elite,
was characterized by a complicit agreement to oppose re-
fo rms that threatened the socio-econom ic and po lit ical sta-
tus quo. In this sense, the oppos it ion showed itse lf to be
mo re united by class co ns iderations than by pa rty

allegiance. Des pite factiona li sm and cross-pa rty mist rust,
the elites from all majo r parties were ab le to unite to op-
pose reforms of the tax system, the jud iciary and land
ownership, wh ich wou ld have adversely affected the ir class
inte rests. Secondly, given the la rge body of consensus on
the need for socio-econom ic reform both with in the in-
te rnational financial and deve lopment community, and
among the Paraguayan po pulation, it would appea r that the
oppos it ion was more motivated by the desire to regain and
retain po lit ical power at almost any cost, than by any over-
riding concern for the nationa l inte rest. Th is reflects the his-
torical tendency of po lit icians in Paraguay to act st rate-
gically to further the ir own power and that of thei r pa rty (in
te rms of ca pture of the state, pu blic posts and state
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revenues and resources), rather than to act in the inte rests
of their constit uents.
Thi rd ly, the elites were a ble to adopt a mu lti -layered strat-
egy to underm ine Lugo's pop11..1 la r legitimacy. This cons isted
of constant opposition through often shifting alli ances in
Congress, which sought not on ly to block key legislation
and gove rnment initiatives but also to undermine govern-
ment fisca l ba lance. This was supported by a med ia cam-
pa ign that criticized the performance and characte r of Lugo
by portraying rumour and suppos ition as fact, most notably
by associati ng Lugo with left-wing rad icalism, 'twenty-fi rst-
cen -tury socialism ', and t he spectre of imminent socia l
breakdown. Such opposition was sup ported most forcefu lly
by the powerful rural landowne rs' associations, the APS and

the APC, wh ich also th reatened direct action in the form of
tractorazos to block legislation .
Fourth ly, the oppos it ion reflected the li m itations of an
unconso lidated and 'defective' democracy. Wh ile democ-
racy is often judged by the performance of t he adm inis-
tration in office and by its relationship with democratic
procedures and institutions, equally revealing a re the
behaviour, alliances and st rategies of the op position. In t he
case of Paraguay, the opposition acted wit hin t he consti-
tutiona l framewo rk, but it di d not act as a res pons ible
oppos it ion in a consolidated democracy. Th reats of im-
peachment, the use of rumours of im pend ing coups,
macroeconom ic destab ilization and the blocking of mod-
erate reforms even against t he clea r nationa l inte rest reflect
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a politica l class accustomed to power within a defective
rathe r than a consolidated democracy.
The nature of Luge 's proposed refo rms and t he virulence
of t he oppos it ion campa ign to desta bilize his adminis-
tration suggest that the roots of th is confl ict go deepe r.
Much of the ma instream writ ing on democratization in the
1990s stressed the impo rtance of caution and accommo-
dation in democratic transitions in terms of socio-
economic reform, em phasizing the politica l natu re of
democracy an d the need not to provoke elite reaction.
Adam Przeworsk i argued that democratization was best
served by the 'docility and pat ience' of ma rgina lized sectors
and the preservation of existi ng socio-economic relations,
includ ing the d istri bution of income and wealth (Przeworski

1986: 63), wh ile Alan Rouquie stated the need for 'con-
struct ing democracy befo re chang ing society' (Rougu ie
1986: 13.§). Othe rs, of cou rse, have a rgued of the dangers of
such a narrowly institutiona l an d procedural a pproach ,
maintaining that, in countries cha racterized by pove rty an d
the high ly unequa l distribution of wealth and resou rces, re-
fo rm is central to democratic conso lidation. Atilio Boron,
fo r example, has a rgued powerfully that s ignificant social
reform programmes to reduce inequality an d pove rty are as
necessary as elections in te rms of the stab ilization and con -
so lidation of democracy (Boron 19,95;,__].92,). The case of
Pa raguay in the 1990s, with a transition stagnating in a mire
of corruption, mismanagement, dis ill us ionment and lack of
reform, high li ghted the very rea l dange rs of a model of
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democracy limited to institut ions and proced ures . It also
demonstrated t hat, if democracy is to survive and progress,
it must be founde d on a far greate r degree of social and
economic redistribution, attainab le on ly through a pro-
gramme of socioeconom ic reforms, along the li nes of t hose
proposed by Lugo.
Lugo's reforms were more cons istent with 'mode rate so-
cia l democracy' than rad ical socialism (O'Shaughnessx
20096: 122). Yet from the outset he was confronted by a
broad o ppos it ion, com posed of entrenched econom ic,
med ia and politica l elites, wh ich, determined to defend thei r
class interests, sought to undermine the legitimacy of his
administ ration and hence his reforms. In the first three
years of t he administration, the o ppos it ion managed to
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block almost eve ry as pect of Lugo's reform programme,
blunt his ambitions and hence neutra lize and t hen under-
mine his popu la rity. As a resu lt, Lugo was unab le to de-
velo p his base of sup port, fo rm a coherent politica l move-
ment, push through his desperately needed social refo rm
agenda or sign ificant ly move Pa raguay towa rds a mo re con-
so lidated - and less defective - democracy.

12 /The new Argentine right and the Cristina
Fernandez administration
LEONARDO DfAZ ECHENIQU E, JAV IER OZOLLO AND
ERNESTO VIVARES
The process of change in Argent ina and the country's re-
gional re integration, initiated after the deep crisis of 2001,
d id not take place without a reaction from the social fo rces
that underpinned t he neo li bera l mode l conso lidated in the
1990s. In 2007, Pres ident Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
succeeded her hus band, Nestor Carlos Kirchner Osto ic
(2003-07). It was in exceptionally favourab le po lit ical, eco-
nom ic and social cond it ions that she came to powe r with
the goa ls of consolidating the ongoing reform of
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conservative and neo li bera l structu res and pu rsuing new
domestic and regiona l po li cies (Vivares, Dfaz and Ozorio
2009.). It seemed that no oppos ing force cou ld ha lt this
prog ramme of reforms. However, t he first attempt to tax the
extraord inary profits of grain ex porters, in order to insulate
domestic food prices from international trends, cu lminated
in an institutiona l and democratic cris is and re presented a
nationa l confrontation between alternative mode ls of deve l-
opment. Oppos ing the government, the leaders of Argenti-
na's four major agricu ltura l produce rs' organizations
launched a nationa l strike and mounted road blockades I
paralys ing t he country, caus ing wides pread food sho rtages
and producing a growing atmosphe re of politica l crisis that
was intensified by the media mono po lies.

Unexpected ly, the gove rnment coalition fract ured, cast-
ing doubt on the susta ina bility of the Cristina Fe rnandez
administ ration, which faced not just electora l defeat but
even a Hon duras-style coup. Sudden ly, confronting the
previous ly unbeatable admin istrat ion was a res ilient and
unified coa lition, ca pab le not only of ha lting t he reform
process, but even of restoring the conservative and neolib-
e ral order. In response to new domestic, regiona l and in-
te rnational patterns of politics an d develo pment, a new
Argentine right has emerged. It is a com plex politica l-
economic force, conso lidated through three decades of
deve lopment by powerful po lit ica l and econom ic actors in
agri bus iness, finance and the media. This new right reta ins
strong featu res from its past, but its compos it ion an d
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strategies constitute a new identity that is more aligned with
current conservative an d neolibe ral tendencies in the hem i-
sphere: wo rking within democratic settings, su pported by
med ia mono polies an d networks li nked to mult il atera l
financ ial institutions.
This cha pter ana lyses the compos it ion and behaviour of
this conservative an d neolibera l opposition in Argentina in
the light of the majo r conflicts over agrarian taxation and
ove r the 2009 reform of med ia regu lation that have conso l-
idated the right.
From world granary to soya nation
Argentina is an agri-exporter, especially of meat an d
grains. This is uniquely profitab le, thanks to the natura l

con ditions of the famo us Pampa humeda (humi d Pam pas)
and to the inse rt ion of the agrarian sector into the va lue
cha in of global agri bus iness. This sector is develo ped an d
cap ita list, with high ly concentrated and a bsentee landown -
e rship, and has been sh ift ing in recent decades towa rds
financ ial forms of control of land and production. Within
this model of accumu lation, Argentina ranks today as the
world's third-largest soya bean produce r, beh ind the US
and Brazil. The agrarian sector has historically enjoyed deci-
sive political and economic influence, an d its elites have
o pposed all project s of social transformation.
The golden age of the agricultura l sector, which made Ar-
gentina the 'wo rld granary', spanned the end of the nine-
teenth and the beginning of t he twentieth centuries, when
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the country occu pied a key ro le in the inte rnationa l division
of western la bour as a producer and exporter of food. The
dominant socia l force was an oligarchy of lan downe rs, who
consolidated their dom inatio n by exterm inating t he ind ige-
nous popu lation and promoting European imm igration.
The politica l o rde r, its institutions and civil society were
fo rged on the back of the needs of this econom ic model,
and on the basis of positivist and Da rwinist ideas. How-
ever, with modern ization in1 the twentieth century, this
model declined , erod ing the politica l powe r of the agra rian
secto r, wh ich sustained the status quo throu gh a long al -
liance with pro-fascist milita ry grou ps, intell ectua ls and the
hie rarchy of the Catholic Chu rch . The Argentine right wou ld
become the core anti-democratic fo rce during a long period

of the country's politica l and economic instab ility, enjoying
the decis ive externa l su pport of various industria lized coun -
tries.
This phenomenon, in s imilar forms, occurred throughout
the region , and t he study of the Argentin ian expe rience pro-
duced major interpretations of autho ritarian ism and polit-
ica l instabi lity in Latin America invo lving the st ruggles be-
tween agri-export and import-su bstitution -industria lization
coa lit ions (O'Donnell 197].; McGee Deutsch 19.9.9)- Yea rs
later, without the suppo rt of the US and afte r the decli ne of
the dictatorship in the wa ke of the Falklands/Ma lvinas war,
a rap id process of regiona l democratization prompted a re-
treat by the t rad it ional authorita rian and conservative
fo rces. In para ll el, the agra rian sector lost its decis ive
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economic importance. As a resu lt of fa lli ng inte rnational
food prices and sector profitab ility, the green revo lution in
agriculture ended the myth of Argentina as the granary of
the wo rld. Revenues for meat and grain (pa rt icu larly wheat)
d ropped from 30 pe r cent of national income in the 1960s
to 10 pe r cent in the 1980s (Teubal, Domfnguez and Sabati-
no 2005). The power of the agrarian sector decli ned with
the loss of the military option of se izing power, with class ic
d ivis ions between bus iness inte rests and wit h its inab ility
to build a po lit ical pa rty. In the 1980s, the secto r became a
secondary factor in a new po litical-economic comp lex, now
led by highly internationalized financia l and industrial sec-
tors.
However, in the 1990s, complex t ransformations

occu rred in t he po lit ical and economic doma ins. These
transformations were driven by an increase in demand for
food; by the use of grain for othe r products, such as bio-
fue ls; by the continued incorpo ration of techno logy; and by
the acce lerated integration of industry and agribusiness,
which strengthened internationa lized agrib us iness sectors.
The food sector in Argentina is highly integrated into wo rld
trade via globa l va lue chains, with strong vertica l integration
cont rolled by internationa l corporations such as Dreyfus,
Genera l Lagos Cargi ll , Noble, ADM, Nidera, Bunge and
Born, Ace ite ra General Deheza and Vicent1n (Bisang, Anll6
and CamP-i 2008; Economic Commission for Latin America
2009.) .
At the domestic leve l, institutiona l changes have played a
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central pa rt, with the Menem administ ration's (1989- 99)
neolibera l policies ma king the Argentine agricultural sector
one of the most de regulated in the world. This popular ma r-
ket economy sought to emulate a Thatcherite socia l al liance
between the d ifferent sectors. The Menem government's
popu li st discourse turned out to be a Trojan Ho rse for
conse rvative and neoli be ral politica l forces. At the hea rt of
these forces was the Union de l Centro Democratico (Union
of the Democratic Cent re). A conservative, neo li bera l and
anti-Peron ist party, it became the key ideologica l a lly of the
administ ration as it sought to increase ma rket confidence.
The ch ief executive of the t ransnationa l agribusiness corpo-
ration Bunge and Born was appo inted minister of economy,
and the Sociedad Rural (Ru ral Society) was given extensive

and valua ble rea l estate in t he capital city of Buenos Aires.
Reinsertion of t he country into the global order was com-
pleted with Menem 's pardoning of mem bers of the mi lita ry
res pons ible fo r gross human rights vio lations, his all iance
with the most conservatives sectors of the country and his
fo reign po licy of subordination to t he United States. These
changes ma rked t he reconfiguration of socia l forces beh ind
a market-led model of deve lopment, designed to d ismantle
the welfare state, o pen the economy, commodify la bour an d
produce a significant sh ift in the balance of power between
labour and cap ita l in favou r of the latter.
Agrarian transformation during the Menem adm inistration
During the Menem administration, the last stage in a
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long process of li bera lization and internationa lizat ion of the
agricultural sector witnessed the disso lution of regu latory
committees, changes to leasing laws, privatization of grain
si los and ports, an d the opening up of the ma rket to genet-
ica lly mod ifie d (GM) products. The objective was to pro-
mote outsou rcing and to ancho r the secto r in inte rnationa l
market s. The process strengthened the major economic
groups in the count ry, whose members became key playe rs
in the confrontation wit h the government in the conflict
ove r agricu ltura l product export taxes. With currency con-
vertibility faci litati ng outsourcing, competition po li cy before
the 2001 crisis put the secto r in a favoura ble export posi -
tion.
Within th is internationa lized sectora l mode l, it is
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poss ible to identify various levels of actors. Com panies an agribusiness sector that is high ly integrated from pro-
such as Ca rgill, Dreyfus, Bunge and Deheza a re at the fi rst duction to commercialization, but that has low leve ls of
level, as market leade rs cont rol ling 27 per cent of the export emp loyment of labou r.
market. The second leve l cons ists of large grou ps of farms, In these cond itions, the agrarian politica l reaction was
cont rolled by investment t rusts, which lease and hire in - triggered by an increase in the price of internationa l gra ins
te rmed iaries to harvest large tracts of land. Between 1997 and industrial derivatives, such as bio-fuels, which put GM
and 2002 alone, these trusts increased thei r ho ldings from soya at the centre of the agribus iness, thanks to easy har-
400,000 to 2,000,000 hectares. The third level is com - vesting, low labour costs and huge profits. In just a few
posed of internationa l actors in contro l of agro-techno logy, years, the convers ion to soya yielded exponential growth in
particularly seeds and chem icals. A strategic featu re of th is te rms of production and land usage: from 3.7 million tons
struct ure is the small landowner, who, with insufficient cap- in 1980 to 46.5 million tons in 2008; the a rea of land af-
ital to access the new va lue cha in of the agribus iness, rents fected went from 7 mi llion hecta res to 12.5 million hectares
land to larger businesses. Comp leting the structu re of the in the same period (Institute Nacional de Estadfstica y Cen-
secto r a re the oi l and mach ine ry su pply industries, creating sos 2010 ).
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TABLE 12. 1 Growth in production and price of main grains Pesca, Go bierno de Argenti na.
200 1-08><
In 2007, agribusiness, prima ry production and manufac-
Year Wheat ~laize soya tu re rs of agricultural o rigin represented 56 per cent of total
111 ill ion S/ton 111 ill ion S/to n 111illion S/ton Argentine expo rts. Today t he country is the world's lead ing
tons tons tons
producer and exporte r of soya bean oil, the second-p laced
2001 16.0 132 15.4 87 26.9 186
2002 15.3 U7 4 .7 90 30.0 203
producer and the leading exporter of sunflower oil, and the
2003 u.3 160 15.0 107 34.0 237 thi rd- placed prod ucer an d exporte r of soya bean and sun-
2004 14.6 16g 15.0 105 31.6 230
2005 16.0 158 -
"0.:,- 99 38.3 262 flower, the fou rth-p laced exporter an d prod ucer of dried
2006 12.6 178 4.4 110 40.5 2 35
2007 14.6 209 21 .8 165 47.6 299 mi lk, among othe r key products. In sho rt, Argentina stands
2oo8 16.0 500 20.4 240 46.5 :,· 90
out for its strength in the first link of t he agro-i ndustrial sec-
tor, but it is sti ll depen dent in the more advanced global
Note: .,,, Price Gu lf of Mexico (Internationa l Price Index for
va lue cha in (Antunes 2008).
Commodities).
However, this structura l configuration has brought a bout
Source: IN DEC; Secreta rfa de Agricultu ra, Ganaderfa y
significant di stortions in agra rian prod uction, such as the
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concentration and centralization of ca pital. In terms of such as gra in and livestock for domestic consumption. Ac-
property, for instance, cont rol by major landowners is still a co rd ing to some estimates, 4 million hect ares of land de-
feature. Over the last hun dred yea rs, contro l of the land has voted to livestock have been converted to soya production
rema ined in the hands of a few fam ilies, who have ex- (Reboratti 2010).
panded their lands: of the thirty-five largest landowning
Rural reaction
fam ilies in 1913, th irty still featu red as such in 2010. Mean -
whi le sma ll hol dings have declined to 25 pe r cent of the In the pres idential elections of 2007, Cristina Fernandez
total, and nearly 85,000 prope rt ies of an average 200
enjoyed the su ppo rt of the ru ral electorate linked to cereal
hectares have disa ppea red . Today, 3.8 per cent of soya pro- production. This was despite the fact that the Kirchner
d ucers produce 60 per cent of tota l production, whi le 40 ad minist ration had already increased tax on agricultural ex-
pe r cent of prod ucers produce less than 4 per cent ports by more than 10 pe r cent and there we re majo r con-
(Institute Nacional de Estadfstica y Censos 2010 ). Another flicts ove r government livestock and dai ry policies. For the
significant impact of soya conve rsion has been the im pact first time, the majo r agrarian associations had coo rd inated
on othe r agricultura l production that is vita l for the peop le,
their demands through the netwo rk known as Mesa de

Enlace (lite rally 'li nking tab le'). Small fa rmers demanded
the libe ralizat ion of t he export t rade in livestock, as well as
subs idies for the da iry industry. The gove rnment a rgued
that regulation of the ma rket was necessa ry to contain
domestic prices, wh ich have a high impact on consumpt ion
and inflation. In fact, un de r the Kirchner administ ration the
underlying prob lem of t he sector remained unreso lved: the
reinsertion of the Argentine economy and its agribusi -
nesses into the wo rld market (Antunes 2008).
On 13 March 2008, Pres ident Fe rnandez s igned Bill 125,
esta blishing a sli ding scale of ex po rt taxes on agricultu ral
products, principally soya. The aims were to uncou ple in-
te rnationa l prices from domestic, to avoid any retu rn to hy-
pe rinflation, to guarantee ava il a bility of bas ic domestic foo d
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sup plies and to li mit soya co nvers ion. The new system im-
plied an increase in tax co ll ect ion equ iva lent to o .8 per cent
of GDP - that is, between $2 billi on and $3 bi llion. Bi ll 125
came as a shock to the Mesa de En lace grou pi ng of agri -
producers, who st rongly rejected it. They called on the agri-
cu lt ure secto r to launch a natii ona l st rike against it, initiating
an escalating confl ict that wou ld polarize Argentine society
ove r this an d other as pects of development po licy. In a nut-
she ll , from this point on, t he central objectives of t he Mesa
de Enlace wou ld be to a bo li s h any kind of agricu ltura l ex-
port taxes and to mainta in the subo rd ination of domestic
agricultural production to inte rnat iona l prices, wit h the
price of food on the domestic ma rket reflecting interna-
tiona l ma rket forces (Ferrer 2010).

The confl ict lasted fou r months an d went through th ree
phases. At first, it was cent red on a debate a bout the s itu-
ation of the agricultu ral sector. Demonst rations and fai led
negotiations en ded in the res ignation of the ministe r of
economy, wh ich, howeve r, did not reso lve the conflict. In
the second phase, the government mod ified Bill 125, int ro-
d ucing concess ions for sma ll prod ucers, though these were
not accepted by the Mesa de Enlace group. An intens i-
fica tion of mo bilizations fu e ll ed confrontation in the streets
with government su pporters . In the third phase, the conflict
was generalized and became high ly polit icized. When Bi ll
125 was sent to Congress, it was defeated, as Vice-President
Julio Cobos, one of the ma in lea de rs of the governing coa li-
tion, a bandoned the presi dent.
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Rural anti-gove rnment act ivit ies assumed a va riety of
fo rms: demonstrations, obstruction of the commercial-
ization of bas ic foodstuffs and erect ion of the road blocks
that we re to become the ce nt ra l tactic of the prod ucer
groups. Previously, road bloc kades had been the principal
means of dis ru pt ion used by the piqueteros, who had
protested against the Menem government's neolibe ral po li-
cies. Un li ke Menem, t he Kirchner adm inistration adopted a
policy of no re pression and no use of po lice fo rce. Under
Menem , the rura l and industria l associations had de-
nounced road blockades as a constraint on their econom ic
rights, but now they were mounti ng such blockades. A dis-
tinctive fea ture of the protes ts of employers' associations
was the participation of sma lle r producers, members of the

Fede raci6n Agra ria Argentina (Argentine Agrarian Feder-
ation) who radica lized the confl ict with the government, de-
ploying an uncompromis ing discou rse based on the histor-
ica l role of el campo, the countrysi de, in the life of the na-
tion.
By pressure or pe rsuasion, the producer groups obtained
the support of mun icipa lities an d provinces with agra rian
electora l bases, add ing to the legitimacy of the political
forces behin d thei r demands. In an unexpected turn , these
associations also received t he su pport of op position polit-
ica l pa rties, both left- an d right-wing. Forces from the left
questioned the credibility of the gove rnment because of its
in d ustrial and labour policies and because of the lack of
struct ural reforms. Forces on the right attacked the
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'po puli st' economic intervention ism of the government, t he
confiscatory character of the taxes an d the gove rnment's
ignorance of agra rian life. However, the greatest impact on
the government came from the po litical fracture within t he
peronista Pa rti do Justicialista (Pj, Justice Pa rty), which saw
politicians li nked to neolibe ral ex-pres idents Menem and
Duha lde move into op pos it ion to the gove rnment . The
union of agrarian workers also came to su pport their em-
ployers' demands against the government. Howeve r, even
though t he oppos it ion managed to bring toget her diverse
forces, few of them woul d remain wedded to right-win g de-
mands.
The more social, political and econom ic actors joined the
new op pos ition, the more cohe rent and consistent became

the discourse identifying el campo as the axis of the oppo-
sition, whose inte rests we re the interests of the who le of
Argentine society. Historic federa li st demands for provin-
cia l autonomy, the ro le of the people of el campo in the
golden era of the wo rld 's granary, authoritarianism and be-
lief in white supremacy we re a ll mixed in a discourse whose
common components were class rage and defiance of the
democratic o rder. The discourse of the growing agrarian re-
vo lts was accompanied by hazardous reactiona ry behav-
iour, like the pa rad ing of weapons, and attempts to dis-
suade the security forces from intervening against ill ega l
activities. The confl ict became a politica l-econom ic window
on to phenomena that had remained concea led in recent
years but now found an opportun ity to reassert their lost
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authority and identity. However, times had changed, and
these sectors no longer had contro l of strategic state forces.
They cou ld, however, count on the support of the large r
med ia corporations to help them claim legit imacy fo r the ir
struggle and for thei r claims to represent democratic com-
mon sense.
Right-w ing opposition an d media corporations
The principal med ia corporations provided wide news
coverage of the conflict, in favour of the producer groups.
For four months, the conflict monopo lized all media and
news channels, which presented a particular vers ion of the
d isputes. The li mited viewpoints presented can be attrib-
uted to the shared patte rns of ownersh ip and ideo logy that

link the great med ia monopo lies and impo rtant actors of
agribus iness , particularly the powe rfu l Cla rfn Group. Th is
common outloo k saw the med ia rapidly joining battle on
the s ide of the agrarian secto r. The role of the med ia fo-
cused on bu ilding an image of el campo and its rep resen -
tatives as the 'best of the Argentine identity', with count ry
peop le po rt rayed as facing mu ltiple adve rsities but contin-
uing to get up every day to labour for 'the great ness of the
nation ' and 'the growth of ou r economy' and so on. In
tu rbu lent po lit ical waters, the large med ia monopolies un-
veiled the ir allegiance, taking the side of the most powerful
econom ic inte rests and presenting the beliefs of the Argen-
tine right as exp ress ing the inte rests of the who le society. It
constituted a Gramscian ideologica l construction, based on
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the prem ise that the peop le shou ld defend the Argenti ne
way of life aga inst the tyranny of the Kirchners .
However, th is experience is not a un iquely Argentine phe-
nomenon. Du ring the fina l qua rte r of the twentieth century,
the reg ion as a who le wit nessed the consolidation of di-
verse oligopo lies of med ia commun ication, cont rolled by
large t ransnationa l compan ies. Th is ol igo polization princi-
pa lly unfolded in the electro n ic med ia and televis ion sec-
to rs. These fo rms of bus iness had t rad itionally been charac-
te rized by the cont rol of powe rful fam ilies in the region ,
such as the Cisneros in Venezuela; Azca rraga in Mexico
(owners of Direct TV) ; Marinho, Sirotsky, Saad, Ab ravanel
and da Sflvio Santos in Brazil; Matte and Ed wa rds in Ch il e
(linked to the coup of Pinochet aga inst Salvador All ende) ;

Romay Salvo, Fontaina De-Feo and Scheck in Uruguay
(Garcfa 2009.); and the Nob le, Saguier and Vila fami lies in
Argentina.
In Argentina med ia concent ration accompan ied the pe-
riod of neo li bera l t ransfo rmation of the accumu lation
model that started with the mi litary coup in 1976 and ended
with the economic cris is of 2001. This pe riod featu red the
nationa lizat ion by the m ilita ry dictatorsh ip of Papel Prensa
(Press Paper), t he main com pany producing and su pplying
newsprint in the country, and its partial transfer to the
ownership of the t hree major newspapers: Clarfn, La Nacion
and La Razon. The po litica l meaning of this for the dicta-
tors hip was strategic: if you contro l t he production of
newsprint then you control t he voice of newspapers. Hence
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the importance of cont rol of Papel Prensa and of t he mili -
tary d ictatorship's med ia regulation legislation, wh ich li m-
ited broadcasting licences to favo ured owners.
The Graviers, a Peron ist fam ily, were the owners of Pa pe!
Prensa, whose acquis it ion by the Grupo Clarfn du ring the
d ictatorship became the subject of a heated pol itica l dis-
pute un der Cristina Fernarndez's administration (Sanz
2004; Garcfa 2010 ; Wainfeld 2010). On the one hand, the
government launched an investigation and is prosecuting
the Grupo Cla rfn, on the bas is of the a rgument that the
three newspa pers had co ll uded with t he d ictatorship in the
takeover of Pa pe! Prensa - a move that was accompan ied by
extortion and threats to the lives of Gravie r fam ily mem -
bers. On the other hand, the Grupo Cla rfn ins ists that the

acquis it ion was legitimate and t rans parent, and did not fea-
tu re any pressure, kidna p or torture of t he Gravie r fam ily by
the dictato rsh ip. Grupo Cla rfn claims that the government
is see king to gag the independent media and curta il free-
dom of speech, and makes com parisons with medi a-
licensing d isputes in Venezuela un der Presi dent Hugo
Chavez. Meanwh ile, in view of t he histo ry of Pa pe! Prensa's
acquis it ion and to avo id it being controll ed by a media
monopoly, President Cristina Fe rnandez has sent a bi ll to
Congress seeking the nationa lization of the company.
In Argentina the Grupo Clarfn, bes ides ho ld ing 267 li -
cences for med ia communication, controls most of t he
business associations li nked to t he medi a, such as the Aso-
ciaci6n de Entidades Periodfsticas de Argentina
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(Association of Journa lism Compan ies), the Asociaci6n de
Teledi fusoras Argentinas (Association of TV Channels), the
Asociaci6n de Te levision por Cable (Association of Cab le
Channels) an d the Asociaci6n de Rad ios Privadas de Ar-
gentina (Association of Private Rad io Stations) . In other
words, it can be a rgued that the Grupo Clarfn contro ls t he
institutiona l framework of med ia corpo rations in the coun-
try. To comp lete the picture of the economic-po lit ica l power
of this monopo ly, we present be low a cha rt of s ign ificant
ho ld ings of Grupo Clarfn an d private media companies
under its influence.
TAB LE 12.2 Key ho ldings of Grupo Clarin

Confronting right-wing opposition
The process that fo ll owed the political defeat of the
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administration in the Senate over agri-export taxes was
cha ract erized by a triumphan1t oppos ition coa lit ion dep loy-
ing a defiant and aggress ive discou rse aimed at the next
legislative elections, wh ich were to be he ld in June 2009.
Two oppos it ion electora l coa lit ions emerged that re pre-
sented the agrarian sector and its demands: the Acuerdo
Cfvico y Social (ACyS, Social and Civic Agreement) wh ich
gathered together such diffe rent po litical forces as the
Union Cfvica Radica l (UCR, Rad ical Civic Union) and the
Partido Socialista (Socia li st Party) ; and the Ali anza Fede ral
Pro (Pro Federal Alliance) , wh ich comb ined centre and
right-wing groups of the Pj with the Pro puesta Re publicana
(PRO, Repub lican Proposa l) under the leadership of the
'Argentine Berlusconi', Mauricio Macri, the PRO mayor of

Bue nos Aires.
In the legis lative elections of 2009, the government suf-
fered a se rious defeat, with a swing against it of over 12
cent. It lost a s ign ificant num be r of seats, mostly in the
province of Buenos Aires, whe re ex-Pres ident Ki rchner
headed the li st of deputies, together with the Buenos Aires
provincial gove rnor, Dan iel Scio li. In less than a yea r, the
electora l sup port of the pro-gove rnment coa lit ion Frente
pa ra la Victoria (Front for Victory) fel l from 60 per cent to
30 per cent, su bstantially mod ifying the correlation of polit-
ica l forces and costing the pro-gove rnment coalition con-
trol of Congress. The agrarian lo bby got eleven new
de puties into Cong ress - all business association leade rs,
who took control of t he st rategic congressiona l
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commission on ag riculture, defin ing a new po lit ical agenda
based on deregu lation of the agri-export sector and eli mi -
per nation of any fo rm of ex port tax.
Despite the advance of the agrarian secto r into the po lit-
ica l system, howeve r, the accompanying revival of the right
d id not prod uce a consolidated right-wing politica l coa li-
tion, but res ulted in pa rty fragmentation, d riven by the rise
of ind ivid ual po lit ical figures . Praised by the econom ic
esta blishment, Vice-President Julio Co bos was presented by
the med ia as a pres idential candidate, and the re was
favou rable presentation of othe r right-wing fi gures, such as
Francisco de Na rvaez, Mauricio Macri and Carlos Reute-
man, othe r potential presidentia l cand idates. This support
was lin ked to a right-wing offens ive, with active lea de rsh ip

Bue nos Aires.
In the legis lative elections of 2009, the government suf-
fered a se rious defeat, with a swing against it of over 12
cent. It lost a s ign ificant num be r of seats, mostly in the
province of Buenos Aires, whe re ex-Pres ident Ki rchner
headed the li st of deputies, together with the Buenos Aires
provincial gove rnor, Dan iel Scio li. In less than a yea r, the
electora l sup port of the pro-gove rnment coa lit ion Frente
pa ra la Victoria (Front for Victory) fel l from 60 per cent to
30 per cent, su bstantially mod ifying the correlation of polit-
ica l forces and costing the pro-gove rnment coalition con-
trol of Congress. The agrarian lo bby got eleven new
de puties into Cong ress - all business association leade rs,
who took control of t he st rategic congressiona l
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commission on ag riculture, defin ing a new po lit ical agenda
based on deregu lation of the agri-export sector and eli mi -
per nation of any fo rm of ex port tax.
Despite the advance of the agrarian secto r into the po lit-
ica l system, howeve r, the accompanying revival of the right
d id not prod uce a consolidated right-wing politica l coa li-
tion, but res ulted in pa rty fragmentation, d riven by the rise
of ind ivid ual po lit ical figures . Praised by the econom ic
esta blishment, Vice-President Julio Co bos was presented by
the med ia as a pres idential candidate, and the re was
favou rable presentation of othe r right-wing fi gures, such as
Francisco de Na rvaez, Mauricio Macri and Carlos Reute-
man, othe r potential presidentia l cand idates. This support
was lin ked to a right-wing offens ive, with active lea de rsh ip

from key med ia groups, wh ich demanded the immediate
res ignation of Cristina Fernandez and new elections.
Nonetheless, wea kened by se rious electoral defeat, but
with a long pe riod before the next presidentia l elections, the
Fernandez government decided to recapture the po litica l
initiative by continu ing with an d deepen ing reforms to the
neo li bera l order. Some of these in itiatives had sta rted by
the end of 2008. The strategic return of social security
provision from private to state contro l, the creation of a un i-
versa l chil d benefit scheme, the new med ia law and an
equa l civil marriage law all helped recover the electo ral base
of the pro-government coalition. Revers ing one of the cen-
tral neolibera l refo rms of the last stage of the Menem admi-
nistration, the socia l security reform led to open po litica l
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confrontation with the domestic an d internationa l financ ial
commun ities, wh ich severe ly criticized it, as did news-
papers such as Clarfn, La Nacion and El Cronista, wh ich
feared the loss of this profitab le source of private-sector in-
come. Howeve r, thanks to the refo rm, the gove rnment
strengthened its own st rategy fo r financing development
and reducing its de pendence on incomes gene rated by the
agri-ex po rt secto r.
In the 1990s, development through deregulation and pri-
vatization - the cornerstone •o f the neo liberal project - as-
sumed a central role for internationa l capital in the form of
fo reign d irect investment (FD I). Internationa l financia l inst i-
tutions st ressed that FDI cou ld reso lve the difficu lty of
generat ing domestic savings an d ca pital. In Argent ina,

though, FDI did not fo ll ow the ru le. And whi le FDI in the
Asian economies reached 30 per cent of GDP, in Argent ina
it remained below 20 per cent, an d most of the fo reign in-
vestment went into the refinancing of public de bt and into
mergers and acqu isitions, rathe r t han into ca pital invest-
ment and techno logy. By cont rast, between 2003 and 2008 1
with Argenti na having departed from t he internationa l finan-
cia l order by refusing to settle its internationa l debts, the
rate of investment in the count ry reached 27 per cent of
GDP, totally financed from domestic savings, in which a
strategic role was played by the new, publicly managed pen -
sion scheme (.bQP.ez San Miguel 2010). In a tactica l finan-
cia l move, pension assets equiva lent to around 10 pe r cent
of GDP we re t ransferred to the Nationa l Social Security
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Administ ration, in order to form a pub lic reserve fund that
invests at least 50 per cent of its assets in pub lic bonds an d
treasury financial instru ments (International Labour Organi-
zation 2010: 10) .
Up to 2009, the centra l critique of t he new right and of
the left-wing oppos it ion had been t he fail ure of the pop-
uli st, deve lopmentalist mode l to de liver socia l justice, pa r-
ticu larly in a country with 8.8 per cent unem ployment, wit h
40 pe r cent of wo rkers in the info rmal economy and wit h 47
pe r cent of ch il d ren aged under eighteen class ified as poor
(Institute Nacional de Estad(stica y_ Censos 2010) . The in-
te rnationa l cris is of 2008 and the agra rian confl ict deep-
ened the vu lne rabi lity of these socia l sectors. But this
o pened the doo r for a hist oric reform : the creation of

Asignaci6n Un iversa l po r Hijo para Protecci6n Social (Un i-
versa l Fam il y All owance for Social Protection), a social safe-
ty net for hundreds of thousands of margina lized chi ldren
and ado lescents. The new programme offered $47 per
month per chil d, depos ited in a savings account. The par-
ent responsib le for the ch ild can access t he cash on ly if the
ch ild has atten ded school and undergone hea lth checks
and vaccinations (in the case of children unde r five years of
age). As a conditiona l cash transfer scheme, t his Argentine
income-red istribution measure fo ll owed s imilar socia l pro-
tection schemes in Brazil and Ch ile. A centra l featu re of
these red istribut ive po licies has been the relatively sma ll
size of the social protection packages - on average be low
10 per cent of total econom ic stimu lus packages int roduced
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by the state, and, in the case of Argentina, accounting for
just 0.1 per cent of GDP. In othe r wo rds, this was an in-
come-red is-trition policy based on prudent financ ial criteria
and d id not unde rm ine the w ider popu li st strategy for fi .
nancing deve lopment (Internationa l Labour Organization
2070: 8).
A third initiative was Law 26 .522, known also as t he
Med ia Law, wh ich repea led and rep laced the legislation that
the military d ictatorship had used to privil ege its politica l al-
lies. The new law li m ited the number of med ia licences
each corporat ion cou ld ho ld, all owing new media investors
and actors to ente r a market dominated by a handful of con -
glome rates. The law ma inly targeted the majo r med ia
co rporat ions and mu ltimedia monopo lies which, over time,

would now be ob liged to sell off pa rt of the ir po rtfolios.
Opposition to the measu re was led by the majo r media
co rporations, suppo rted by the Sociedad lnte ramericana de
Prensa (Inter-Ame rican Press Association), wh ich re pre-
sents the owners of med ia compan ies. Its central a rgument
was that the gove rnment was vio lating constitutional rights
and seeking to curb freedom of speech by force, li ke
Chavez in Venezuela. Politica lly, the anti- Media Law cam-
pa ign was headed by the UCR, ACyS with Eli sa Carrio, the
right-wing Pe ronist, and the Buenos Aires city mayor,
Mauricio Macri. Howeve r, desp ite the right-wing alliance
aga inst the Med ia Law, the oppos ition was defeated in Con-
gress by the government, with the support of left-wing pa r-
ties. After th is po litical setback, the politica l and business
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oppos it ion took the matter to the courts, and following a
Sup reme Court ruling in 2010, the gove rnment decla red its
intention to implement the law from Septem ber 2011 1 al-
though further cha Ilenges can not be ruled out.
The last, but no less sign ificant, init iative was the equal
marriage rights law, wh ich ended d iscrimination based on
gender o r sexua l prefe rence: a democratic mi lestone in a
country with a long Catholic, conservative tradition. The
measure aga in d ivided the country, th is time cu ltura lly. It
provoked the most sectarian and conse rvative groups of the
Catho lic Church, with some of its exponents even demand-
ing a sort of crusade aga inst the measure. So, by mid-2010,
what the media monopolies had portrayed only two yea rs
before as a government on the verge of dis integration had

become a strong coa lit ion, which received popu la r suppo rt
fo r its reform programme.
Conclusion
Those measu res taken in response to the right-wing cam-
pa ign enabled the Cristina Fernandez administration to re-
ga in the political initiative and to resume the process of re-
fo rmin g Argentina's neolibe ral and conservative order. Eco-
nom ic stabi lity in 2009 - in clear contrast to the impact of
the internationa l cris is in other countries - undermined
negative pred ictions a bout the fu ture of the Argentine econ-
omy. By 20 10, the major media co rporations were recog-
nizing the recovery of the gove rnment's electora l pos1t1on
and t he inabi lity of the right-wing opposition to obst ruct
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reforms. The opposition coa lit ion, created to underm ine the
Fernandez gove rnment, demonstrated impo rtant weak-
nesses, not least in te rms of its capacity to fo rm an effective
government. Left-wing parties we re the fi rst to leave the
oppos it ion bloc. The right-wing pa rties divided into dif-
ferent factions, preventing the eme rgence of any clea r
strategic perspective.
The role of the politica l pa rt ies in the agrarian conflict re-
vealed the fragi lity and instabi lity of the politica l system,
when confronted by the tasks of st ructura l refo rm in the
context of deep inequa lit ies. This is demonstrated by the
d ifficu lties that dom inant secto rs have had in bu il ding a
politica l party capa ble both of reflecting the ir inte rests and
of running the state. In the past, th is has, more than once,

tu rned them against the democratic system itself when they
have perce ived a threat to the ir interests . Up unti l 1982,
conse rvative and neoli be ral fo rces elected to use military
fo rce to re-establish orde r and progress: orde r fo r the poor
and progress fo r themse lves. But after a cou ple of decades
of post-d ictators hip democracy in the region, this option is
no longer viable, given the new inte rnationa l, regiona l and
domestic contexts.
Nonetheless, as t he Argentine case demonstrates, pro-
cesses of st ructura l reform o r t ransformation tend to weak-
en the president ial po lit ica l order, because of the sca le of
institut iona l conflict (nota bly with the legislative and jud i-
cia ry powers) - conflict that reflects t he d iverse interests
and forces ope rating in the state- society comp lex. Rather
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than be ing s imply an expression of po litical insta bility, in-
stitut iona l confl ict is pa rt of st ructura l reform in any society
where socia l just ice is the major issue. The positive compo-
nent of these processes of t ransfo rmation is t hat they have
reshaped the Argentine right, so that conservat ive and ne-
o li beral sectors have adhered to the logic of institutiona l ac-
tion wit hin the democratic framework, abandon ing t he use
of subve rsive force. In that sense, the most dangerous
oppos it ion to the refo rms a ris es not in the politica l system
itself, but in its social founda tions: in t he politica l-
economic a rena, whe re concent rat ions of power can have a
greate r impact on democratic stabi lity.
This is appa rent in attempt s by powerful econom ic inter-
ests to su bvert the democratic order t hrough an

'instit utional' co up: that is by asserting the loss of the polit-
ica l legitimacy of democratic government, by using media
campaigns of destab ilization (such as in Hon d uras) and by
mobilizing external hem ispheric and regional support. This
phenomenon is not new and there is a vast academic lite r-
atu re, written from the US-based, pos itivist polit ica l science
pe rspective, that argues that the inherent weakness of presi -
dentia l systems weakens politica l ord e r, wh ich, in some
cases, might justify undemocratic institutional change (Linz
19.9Q). In this respect, a key figu re is US Assistant Secreta ry
of State fo r Western Hem isphere Affai rs Arturo Va lenzuela,
a strong advocate of neo li bera l develo pment an d an ac-
knowledged specialist in US- Latin Ame rica re lations. Be-
sides exp ress ing the US government's open support fo r the
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fraudu lent elections conducted by the coup lea de rs in Hon -
d uras in 2009, and negotiating the estab li shment of seven
US m ilita ry bases in Colomb ia, Valenzue la is the lead ing
vo ice of US conse rvative sectors proclaim ing the need for
strong US leadersh ip, given the allegedly growing instabi lity
of its democracies and t he presumed ris ks to regiona l secu-
rity (Sabatini and Ma rczak 2010).
The overlap between this US hemis phe ric app roach and
the new right's domestic st rategies constituted a wider sce-
nario of institutiona l action for the new Argentine right, al-
beit with domestic restrictions. In this sense, conservative
and neo li bera l forces are cond itioned by comp lex domestic
structures re lated to the ownersh ip of land, d istri bution of
income, the model of accumu lation an d the position of
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large, ove rseas-based mu ltinational compan ies wit hin the popu li st model. The oppos ition coa lit ion, or the new Argen-
inte rnationa l value chain. Beyond that, it is im portant to tine right, has blended old and new po litica l-econom ic
recogn ize that the Cristi na Fernandez adm inist ration was fo rces, and has developed two crucial politica l leve rs: in-
deep ly unawa re - even na'ive - of the mobilizing ca pacity of te rnationa l li nkages and t he capacity to desta bilize a gov-
the agrarian actors and of the ir potent ial to create alliances ernment by acting within the institutiona l comp lex of the
with ot her conservative and neo li bera l forces opposed to state.
reform. In a nutshell , t he adm inistration, with its powe rful
electora l pos ition, underestimated the potential seriousness
of confl ict with po litica l actors who a re numerica lly sma ll
but econom ica lly strategic.
The agrarian confl ict, which unexpect ed ly turned into an
institut iona l cris is, had its roots in Argentine society, and it
shook the po litica l system, divi ding the country between
those fo r and aga inst the reg iona li st, developmentalist and
 ]Ill
.. 1]111

13 / The Chilean right in the Concertaci6n era,
1990-2010
PATRIC IO SILVA
The vi ctory of Sebastian Pinera in the Janua ry 2010 pres i-
dential elections ma rked an end to twenty yea rs of centre-
left Conce rtaci6n (Reconciliation) gove rnment in Ch ile. It
also constituted the fi rst triumph of the Ch ilean right in a
pres idential contest for fifty-two years. In this cha pter, I ex-
plo re the pol itica l evo lution of the right afte r t he end of the
Pinochet regime in March 1990 and th roughout the two
decades of Conce rtaci6n government.
Followi ng the restoration of democracy, the Chilean right
managed to ma intain a strong influence over the electo rate
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and consol idated its pa rty structures and parl iamentary re p-
resentation. As th is study shows, howeve r, th is relative suc-
cess was not just the resu lt of its politica l appea l, but was
aided by the Pinochet legacy, pa rt icu larly some institutiona l
and electo ral regulations and the strong presence of the
armed forces in the post-1990 pe riod. The right cons istently
defended legis lation inherite,d from the autho rita rian era
'
and also sought to protect fo rmer an d serv ing mem be rs of
the armed fo rces who we re facing poss ible prosecution fo r
human rights a buses . Although right-wing parties we re un-
able to prevent changes in both these areas, t hey were ab le
to effectively obstruct them fo r a ve ry long t ime. In th is
manne r, and des pite its failu re to get into gove rnment in
those twenty yea rs, the right managed to strongly influence

the pace of the democratization process in Chile.
The Chilean right and its uneasiness w it h party politics
The Chi lean right historically foun d it d ifficu lt to accept
that it must get invo lved in party politics in orde r both to
defend its ideas and to com pete with centre and left polit-
ica l forces (Cristi and Ruiz 1992). For a long time, t he rep-
resentation of right-wing ideas and interests in Ch il e was
undertaken by powerful entrep reneurial organizations such
as t he Sociedad de Fomento Fa bril (Society of Factory Pro-
duction) and the Sociedad Nacional de Agricu ltura (Na-
tiona l Agricu ltura l Society) and by t he media, particu la rly
the influential El Mercurio newspaper (Correa Sutil 2005).
Until the mid-195os, these forma lly non-politica l channe ls
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we re effective in influencing government, parliament and
pub lic op inion. The right was awa re that the Chi lean elec-
torate di s li ked blatant right-win g ideas. Thus, durin g the
1958 pres idential election, Jorge Alessandri presented him -
self as an independent and apolitica l figure, and durin g his
pe riod in gove rnment preferred to work with figures from
the wo rld of enterprise, rather than the t rad itiona l right-wing
pa rties (Angell 19_93). Howeve r, the foundation in 1958 of
the Part ido Democrata Crist iana (PD C, Christian Demo-
cratic Party) and t he st rengthening of the left fo ll owing the
Cu ban revo lution of 1959 were s ignals that the Chi lean right
needed to mode rnize and consolidate its organizationa l
struct ures (Fleet ....19.8.5). Howeve r, this aggiornamento
(u pdating) of the right on ly took pl ace after the PDC's

land slide victory in 1964, wh ich pro pelled Edu a rd o Frei to
the presidency and the disastrous defeat s uffe red by
conse rvative and li bera l pa rt ies in the parliamenta ry elec-
tions of the fo ll owing year. Th is expe rience led to the cre-
ation of the Pa rt ido Naciona l (PN, Nationa l Party), wh ich
ama lgamated most of the ex isting right-wing parties and
movements (Valdivia 2008; Soto and Fernandez 2002) .
The PN immediately adopted a confrontationa l stance to-
wa rds t he Fre i gove rnment and its socio-eco nomic po licies,
particu larly agra rian refo rm (K.ay and Silva 19,92,,). The riva lry
between the PN and the PDC fac ilitated t he electora l tri-
umph of the Un idad Popu lar (UP, Popu la r Unity) left-wing
coa lit ion in September 1970. During the Allen de gove rn-
ment (1970- 73), the PN began to adopt a putschist
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pos ition: first cove rt ly, and then in an increas ingly overt
manne r, it enco uraged the a rmed forces to bring the UP
government down (Garret6n 19~9.). The ult ra-conse rvative
gremialista (gui ld) movement was the ma in polit ica l fo rce
o rgan izing mass o ppos it ion to the government. This o rigi-
nated in 1967 among conservative st udents at t he Catholic
Unive rs ity of Santiago, and it aimed to provide a co unte r-
we ight to PDC and UP activists. In the final days of the Al-
lende government, the gremialistas were responsib le for
huge demonstrations an d long strikes in the t ransport an d
commercial sectors, by st udernts, doct ors and other groups,
which practically para lysed the count ry (QP-i:2enheim 2007..).
Following the Septem be r 1973 coup, the mi litary gove rn-
ment officially proh ibited politica l pa rties, but lead ing PN

and gremialista politicians rap id ly occu pied positions in
ministries, embass ies and advisory committees. Jaime
Guzman, the und isputed leader of t he gremialista move-
ment, became one of the junta's main ideologues, nu r-
tu ring it with a vast body of doctrinarian ideas, such as
those reflected in the ' Decla ration of Principles' of Ma rch
1974. He was one of the key architects of the lega l and in-
stitutiona l structures of the autho ritarian regime, includ ing
the 1980 constitution (Cristi 2000). Anothe r important
source of po litical and ideo logica l sup port for the junta
came from a relatively unknown group of neo li bera l econo-
mists known as the 'Ch icago boys'. These aco lytes of Mil-
ton Friedman a rrived in Apri l 1975 and set about reordering
the economy on the basis of t he privatization of state assets
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and the int roduction of orthodox free-market principles
(Valdes 19_95; Silva 2008). Although the gremialistas initia lly
strongly resisted the ult ra-li bera l tenets defended by the
'boys', they recognized their re lative success and gradua lly
began to accept them. In t he end, gremialistas and neo lib-
erals coa lesced (Huneeus 2000). A division of labour
emerged, with the 'Chicago boys' respons ible for the eco-
nom ic and financia l reforms and the gremialistas concen-
trating on sel ling these ideas to the popular sectors, as well
as on contesting the presence of clandestine left-wing ac-
tivism in the shanty towns. To this end, they sought to take
cont rol of mun icipal gove rnments in the poorest districts
(Klein 2004). The po lit ical capital accumu lated during
those years would prove late r to be of enormous

importance for t he right as a source of electora l su pport
after 1990.
The Ch ilean economy underwent a strong recovery be-
tween 1977 and 1981 , and many vo ices abroad began to talk
about the 'Chi lean m iracle'. Th is created a climate of t ri-
umphalism among Pinochet's su ppo rte rs, who felt that his
regime was now firmly entrenched. The adoption of the
1980 constitution was an expression of t hat self-confidence.
The constitution paved the way for the holding of a
pleb iscite on 5 Octobe r 1988, in which the Chilean peop le
would say 'yes' o r ' no ' to another eight yea rs of military
rule. If the ' no' option preva il ed, general elections wou ld
take place within a year. Pinochet and his advisers confi -
dently believed that, by 1988, Ch il e would have achieved
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high levels of econom ic prospe rity, which wou ld gua rantee
a 'yes' victory. However, a severe c risis e rupted in 1981, re-
emerged and la rge-sca le protests demanded a trans ition to
democracy (Silva 2003). As in the past, t he Chilean right
only began to act when the status quo was threatened.
Thus , in Septembe r 1983, t he gremialistas decided to orga-
nize more formally and , under Guzman 's leade rsh ip, they
fo rmed the Uni6n Dem6crat a Independ iente (U DI , Inde-
pendent Democratic Union) , which rep resented the most
ferven t Pinochet loya li sts. More moderate conse rvatives
then founded Renovaci6n N aciona l (RN, Nationa l Reno-
vation) in 1987. Both organ izations participated in the 'yes '
cam paign du ring the run-up to the referendum .
The 1988 referendum un ified all the democratic

oppos it ion forces from Ch ristian Democrats to socialists
around the 'no' option. The ir victo ry sign ified the en d of the
mi lita ry regime and the sta rt of the restoration of democ-
racy. The Chilean right was shocked by the defeat and the
UDI an d RN began a fran tic search fo r a single presidential
cand idate to compete wit h the centre-left (grouped un de r
the name of the Conce rtaci6n) in the elections to be held
on 14 Decem ber 1989. The right fina lly chose He rnan Buch i
as its candi date. He was a young neo li bera l econom ist who
had become Pinochet's minister of finance in 1985 an d, as
such, was res pons ib le for the strong economic recuper-
ation in that period. He resigned from that post in April
1989 in order to cam paign, but proved unab le to turn the
politica l tide, obtaining on ly 29.4 per cent of the vote. His
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chances we re red uced by the p resence of another right-wing
contender, the bus inessman Francisco Javie r Errazu riz, who
ran a popu list cam paign an d received 15.5 per cent. Patricio
Aylwin, the Concertaci6n candi date, won the election with
55.2 pe r cent and was swo rn in as president in March 1990.
Government-opposition relations following the transition to
democracy
The Chi lean right lost an important battle in Decem be r
1989, but it was certainly not defeated . The fact that, aft er
seventeen yea rs of dictatorsh ip, it had obtained a re-
specta ble 45 pe r cent of the vote demonst rated the formi -
da ble electora l strength of the right at the time of the tran-
sition. Even more im portant, the right-wing parties did we ll

in the parli amenta ry elections that too k place s imu lta-
neously with the pres idential one. They rece ived forty-eight
seats (as compared to sixty-nine for t he Concertaci6n) in
the Chambe r of De puties and s ixteen (aga inst twenty-two)
in the Senate. The right enjoyed outright contro l of the Sen-
ate because of the existence of nine 'institutiona l senators'.
These unelected politicians - fo rmer gene rals, gove rnment
ministe rs and members of the Su preme Cou rt - had been
appo inted by Pinochet before Aylwin's inaugu ration
(Siavelis 2000). The right's pa rliamenta ry strengt h was out
of propo rt ion to the numbe r of votes it o bta ined at the
polls: before leaving powe r, the military government ha d
introduced a binomia l electo ral system, wh ich remains in
place today. This com pels political parties to fo rm la rge
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coa lit ions to compete for seat s in the Chambe r of Deputies
and the Senate. Each electora l coa lit ion needs to obtain
mo re than two-thirds of votes in a two-seat (binomial) con -
stituency in order to ta ke both seats - an almost im possib le
feat that all but guarantees t he right half the seats in con -
stituencies wit h a majority of left vote rs (Pastor 2004). Fo r
this reason, the Concertaci6n genera lly o bta ined a sim ilar
numbe r of seats in the Senat e as the right, desp ite the fact
that its cand idates us ually received 10 - 20 per cent mo re
votes than thei r compet itors. Thus one of the key aims of
the UDI and the RN s inee the transition has been to op pose
the replacement of the binomia l system with one based on
proportiona l rep resentation, a policy des ired by the Con -
certaci6n. The consequence was that, so long as the right

was ab le to mainta in its large congressiona l presence, Con-
certaci6n governments ha d to negotiate wit h the UDI and
RN in ord e r to get their legislative programmes approved.
As a result of this balance of power, the Aylwin gove rn-
ment realized that it had to maintain bot h official and infor-
ma l li nes of consu ltation with the Chilean right, if democ-
racy was to be consoli dated. Aylwin an d significant Con-
certaci6n politicians, the refo re, pu rsued what has been
te rmed a 'democracy of agreements', in orde r to secure
politica l and economic stabi lity. The UDI and RN reacted
d iffe rently to this governmental call fo r cooperation. While
RN leade r Andres All amand and most of the party's con -
gress ional rep resentatives embraced it and facili tated the
adoption of a series of impo rtant decis ions on taxation,
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social policy and economic reform, the UDI rejected most
of the Concertaci6n's programme. The UD I demonstrated
little interest in contributing to an improvement in the polit-
ica l cli mate in the country. Rather than avoiding contro-
vers ial issues and mode rating the tone of discuss ion, it fe r-
vently defended the forme r military regime and constantly
criticized the Un idad Po pular pe riod, which was identified
as the majo r sou rce of most of Ch ile's politica l and institu-
tiona l problems. The assassination of the UDi's foun de r,
Jaime Guzman , in April 1991 by a left-wing grou p only con -
tributed to its intransigent sta.nce.
The factor t hat most comp licated the relationshi p be-
tween t he Concertaci6n governments and the right was un-
doubtedly the continued invo lvement of Genera l Pinochet

in Chi lean po litics (Fuentes 2000; Ange ll 2007.). Under the
1980 constitution , he rema ined commande r-in-ch ief of the
army until 1998 and then became a senato r for life. Wh ile in
London in Octobe r 1998 he was a rrested on human rights
cha rges issued by a Spanish judge, but he managed to
avo id prosecution (with the conn ivance of the British gov-
ernment) and retu rned to Ch ile in Ma rch 2000. Pinochet re-
ma ined a cont rovers ial and d ivis ive figu re until his death in
Decembe r 200 6. His notoriety contributed to extremely
d ifficu lt re lations between gove rnment and military, which
we re also exace rbated by t he human rights issue and the
continued presence of 'autho ritarian enclaves' in the coun-
try's legal and institutiona l framework. The UD I and RN de-
fended the milita ry's reputation and o pposed Concertaci6n
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attem pts to restore democrati c civilian cont rol over it.
The Aylwi n government combined decisiveness with cau -
tion when address ing the del icate question of human rights
abuses during t he Pinochet gove rnment. Although the lat-
te r's 1978 Amnesty Law protected the milita ry from lega l
prosecution, Aylwi n created the Comm iss ion for Truth and
Reconciliation (a lso known as the Rettig Comm iss ion after
its cha irman) just a month after his inaugu ration . The com-
miss ion was tasked with conducting a full investigation into
abuses and then publ ish ing a report on its find ings. The
right argued that its rem it cont rad icted the amnesty provi-
sions and denounced its report, publ ished on 9 Feb rua ry
1991, as biased . The comm it ment of subsequent Con-
certaci6n pres idents Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos and

Michelle Bachelet to continue investigating military crimes
was met with st iff right-wing op position . Nevertheless, t he
jud iciary gradua lly began to reinterp ret t he existing amnesty
law, paving the way for the prosecution an d imprisonment
of a la rge number of fo rmer mem bers of the a rmed forces
and t he secret services.
Du ring the Concertaci6n period, the right was also very
active in the defence of what, in Chi le, a re called the temas
va/6ricos (value themes), that is ethica l and reli gious issues
such as sexuality, teenage pregnancy, abortion an d divorce
(Blafield 2002). The UDI, in particu la r, strongly opposed
government initiatives to enhance civil libe rt ies in these
areas. Thus, fo r exam ple, the UDI, the Catholic Chu rch and
othe r conse rvative groups castigated te levision adverts
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wa rning young peo pl e of the consequences of HIV/AIDS
and recommending that they use condoms. Sim il a r clashes
occu rred over the state's decis ion to introduce sex educa-
tion in schools and to provide educationa l an d psycho-
logica l su pport fo r adolescent mothers expe ll ed from
schoo l because of pregnancy. The right made use of its al-
most total control of the Chi lean mass med ia to discred it
these policies. A particu lar focus of right-wing attacks was
the Servicio Naciona l de la Mu je r (S ERNAM , Nationa l
Women 's Agency), a specialized state agency created by the
Aylwin government in January 1991 to foster gender equa lity
in Ch ile. SERNAM int roduced a se ries of programmes
which aimed both to protect and to empowe r women in the
home and at work. These included measu res intended to

prevent and pun ish domestic violence against women and
ch ild ren an d to create lega l benefits fo r single working
mothers (Franceschet 2005) . The UD I an d RN rega rd ed
SERNAM as a vehicle fo r feminist propaganda, an unnec-
essary expans ion of state inte rvention and an un des ira ble
intrusion into fam ily life (Baldez 19.9.9)- The single most
d isputed 'ethical' iss ue was divo rce. Owing to the Catho lic
Chu rch's o ppos it ion, Ch il e was the on ly western nation that
lacked a lega l framework fo r divorce . The law proposed by
the Fre i gove rnment in 1995 was on ly a pproved by the
Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and only afte r the right had
pushed through a series of mod ifica tions. It was then dis-
cussed for anothe r seven years in the Senate, during which
time the Concertaci6n was fo rced to ma ke fu rther
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concessions, befo re it became law in Ma rch 2004 . Once
aga in, the ap proach of the U DI an d RN to the divo rce law
d iffe red, in that the forme r a lmost tota lly rejected it, wh il e
the latte r's support faci litated its passage.
When Michelle Bachelet became the Concertaci6n 's
presidential candidate in May 2005, as an agnostic, single
mother of th ree and a sup porte r of gende r equality she
represented all the ideas and values conse rvative Ch il e
most hated. Its fea rs were rea lized when her government
proposed various po licies to protect women and chi ldren,
such as the right to breast-feed at wo rk, the st rengthening
of penalties for men who fa il ed to pay alimony and the
esta blishment of nationwide she lters for victims of domes-
tic violence. The most controve rs ial issue was the 2006

decision to make the morning-after pill freely ava il a ble at
pub lic hospitals and medica l centres. This measure was in-
tended to reduce t he ala rm ing rates of teenage pregnancy
and illegal abo rt ion, wh ich destroyed the hea lth and cost
the lives of countless young women. Many UDI mayo rs, in-
clud ing Pablo Za laquett, the popu list mayor of the La Flo r-
ida d istrict in Santiago, saw this as a Trojan Ho rse designed
to clear t he way for the lega lization of a bortion, and refused
to al low the pill's d istribution in a reas under thei r juris-
d iction. Bachelet was forced to s ign a supreme decree to
gua rantee the policy's implementation, but in Apri l 2008
the Constitutiona l Court ru led in favou r of a demand made
in March 2007 by thi rty-six right-wing deputies that the pill
shou ld not be avai lab le in pub lic health cent res. A
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protracted politica l and lega l battle ensued between govern-
ment and the right - a battle only finally won by the exec-
utive on 18 Janua ry 20 10 (the day afte r Sebastian Pinera's
election victo ry), when Presi,dent Bachelet enacted a new
law all owing the pill 's d istribut ion.
The way the Concertaci6n gove rnments conducted for-
eign policy also became a bone of contention fo r the right.
Ch ile was d iplomatica lly iso lated du ring the mi lita ry period
because of the abuse of human rights. It was also iso lated
from the rest of Latin America owing to Pinochet's strategy
of economic integration in North Ame rican, European and
Asian ma rkets (Munoz 19.8.Q). After 1990, Chi le sought to
reve rse this process, as well as to play a more active ro le in
regiona l and global o rgan izations (Van Klaveren 2000). It

particu larly t ried to im prove relations and reso lve confl icts
with its neigh bours, Argent ina, Pe ru an d Bolivia. Thus,
Pres idents Aylwin an d Frei expen ded great efforts to im -
prove Chi lean- Argentine relations by tackli ng border d is-
putes and promoting econom ic integration. In August
1990, Aylwi n and Carlos Menem began a review of bo rd er
issues, an d within a yea r on ly two of twenty-four remained
outstanding, an d those (in the Laguna del Des ierto region)
they put to a rbitration. The government acce pted t he arbi-
tration ve rd ict in favour of Argentina in 1994, but the right,
which had o pposed arbitration in the fi rst place, con -
demned Aylwin for giving away Ch ilean soil. It had a s imi la r
res ponse to the agreement on Argentina selling gas to
Ch ile, arguing that this would lead to energy dependency.
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When Argentina uni latera lly increased the price of gas and
there were frequent inte rrupt ions to its supp ly, vo ices on
the right demanded that Frei break off re lations with Ar-
gentina and sue it fo r compensation. Later, when Rica rd o
Lagos was criticized for not being tough enough on Ar-
gentina, he res ponded that it was crit ica lly im portant to
maintain good relations des pite diffi cu lt issues (Rodrfguez
Elizondo 2006).
Michele Bachelet's foreign po licy, an d particu larly what
we re seen as he r conciliato ry policies towards Boliva and its
leader, Evo Mora les, was also attacked by t he right.
Bache let and Mora les enjoyed an excell ent persona l rap-
port, an d the st rength of the comm unication and coo per-
ation between their count ries increased after they were both

installed in 2006. The consequence was the estab li shment
of a bilatera l agen da of th irteen po ints, in which, for the firs t
time, Chile agreed to discuss the Bo livian deman d for a re-
sumption of access to the Pacific coast (wh ich it had lost
after defeat in the Wa r of t he Pacific in 1884). This provoked
huge commotion within the Ch ilean right, which also acted
as the vo ice of the armed fo rces. Infl uentia l news papers
such as El Mercurio and La Tercera constantly warned of Evo
Mo rales' close connection to Hugo Chavez and regularly
pub lished opinion polls in wh ich Ch il eans expressed their
o ppos it ion to any agreement with Bo livia concerning access
to the sea.
Pe ru's decis ion to define the parameters of its sea bo rd e r
with Ch ile s pa rked a grave d ip lomatic cris is, especially
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when the fo rmer petitioned t he Internationa l Court of Jus-
tice at The Hague in January 2008. In contrast to the situ-
ation with Argentina and Bo livia, all Chi lean politica l forces,
includ ing the right, supported the pos it ion adopted fi rst by
Lagos and then by Bache let. However, this did not prevent
right-wing politicians from attacking what they saw as weak-
ness on the part of the gove rnment in its res ponse to state-
ments by Pe ruvian offi cials an d newspa pers. Thus, Ivan
Mo reira, UDI de puty and mem be r of t he pa rliamentary for-
eign relations comm ittee, demanded that the Bachelet gov-
ernment 'ponerse los pantalones' (' put on its trousers', i.e.
show its strength) as ru mours of Pe ruvian spying activities
spread (El Mercurio, 1 August 2009).
From Lavfn to Pinera: the struggle for t he presidency

Following its defeat in 1989, the idea of winning a presi -
dentia l election appeared a very distant aspiration for the
Ch ilean right. The fact that the Concertaci6n had demon -
strated its capacity to form competent and successful gov-
ernments, which secured both economic growth and po lit-
ica l stabi lity, made a right-wing gove rnment high ly unlikely.
The right was also still identified as having played a key ro le
in the 1973 coup and as having suppo rted the Pinochet
regime. These facts were, fo r many Chi leans, reason
enough not to vote for the right, even if they were d isillu-
sioned with the Conce rtaci6n. That the right cou ld not se-
cure an electoral majority was shown in the results of t he
first two pres idential elections: in 1989 Aylwin obtained 55.2
pe r cent of the vote, and in 1993 Frei rece ived 57.9 per cent.
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This led the right to realize that it wou ld have to distance it-
self both from the military regime and from Pinochet him -
self, if it wanted to capture the electo ral support of people
who wou ld not t rad it iona ll y have voted fo r it. However, this
created a problem: by do ing so, it might lose its t rad itiona l
constituency. The right had to wa lk a po lit ical tightrope. In
the early 1990s, RN leaders such as Andres All amand and
Sebastian Pinera cautious ly began to criticize aspects of the
recent autho ritarian past andl stressed the need to democ-
ratize and mode rnize the Chi lean right in order to focus on
the count ry's future (Allamand 1993). At the same time,
UDI and RN activists worked to augment their presence in
mun icipal government.
The onset of t he 1998 As ian financ ial crisis severe ly
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affected the Ch il ean economy and ma rked a turn ing po int subs ide after Lagos's victory of 70. 1 pe r cent to Zald1va r's
fo r the country. Fo r the first time since the return to democ- 29.9 per cent. The suppo rt that Christian Democratic party
.
racy, Ch ileans faced serious economic problems as the Fre i cad res and voters wo uld give to the Concertac1on pres 1-
government fai led in its effo rts to stimu late recovery. The dentia l candidate appea red highly suspect.
right used this to stress the need to ado pt bo lder econom ic The right's high expectatio1ns of the 1999 elections we re
measures, and presented itself as the only po lit ical force based on the s pectacu lar ascendancy in the opinion polls of
capa ble of do ing so. The crisis opened a window of op por- the UDl's Joaquin Lavin. Elected mayor of the rich Las Con-
tunity fo r the right, and for the first time it began to believe des county in Santiago province, his outstand ing adminis-
that it could win the pres idential elections schedu led for trative reco rd made him pop11..1 la r in the ca pita l and the rest
December 1999. The Conce rtaci6n's electo ral chances we re of the country. Running fo r re-election in 1996, he obta ined
further wea kened, in that it could not decide on a s ingle an astonishing 78 per cent of the vote. Th is was the first
cand idate. Primaries he ld in May 1999 between the Chris- ind ication that Lav in was able not only to reach t he right-
.
tian Democrat Andres Zaldivar and the socia li st Ricardo wing electorate, but also to ga rner t he suppo rt of vote rs
Lagos caused tensions with in the coalition, wh ich d id not who had so fa r been part of the Concertaci6n's

constituency (the so-ca ll ed voto cruzado, 'sp lit-t icket vot-
ing'). Befo re becom ing the right's pres idential can didate,
Lavin needed to win the RN's endorsement, but at the
beginn ing of 1999 it was still plann ing to have its own
cand idate, Senator Se bastian Pinera. However, Pinochet's
arrest in London fac ilitated rapp rochement between the two
parties, as they closed ran ks in his defence; in ea rl y January
1999 t hey decided to fo rmalize this unity with the fo rmation
of the Alianza por Ch ile (Alliance for Chi le) . A primary be-
tween Lavin and Pinera was scheduled for June of that yea r,
but on 9 Janua ry Pine ra withdrew fo ll owing a poo r s howing
in the o pinion poll s. Lavin became acceptable to RN lead -
e rs, who app reciated the degree of po lit ical independence
he had secured from the UD I. Lagos and his advise rs were
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slow to rea lize that the right now posed a serious cha ll enge
and that they needed to improve their cam paign tactics.
Lagos had been acting as if he were already the next pres-
ident, wh il e Conce rtaci6n politicians unde restimated Lavin,
descri bing him as a cosista, a person concerned with prac-
tica l matters who lacked a long-term vision fo r the country's
future development. The Concertaci6n also d id not app re-
ciate that many Ch ileans were fearfu l of electing a sociali st
as president (the last having been Salvador Allende) (Silva
19.9.9) ·
The 1999 pres identia l elect ion was the most closely con-
tested s ince the resto ration of democracy. Rica rdo Lagos
and Joaquin Lavin fought for every s ingle vote, and fo r the
first time s ince 1989 a second round wou ld be needed to

decide the resu lt. Though the cand idates were virtua lly
level-pegging afte r the first round (47.95 per cent to 47.51
pe r cent), at the end of the second, in Janua ry 2000, Lagos
managed to ach ieve a slight advantage (51.31 per cent to
48.69 per cent) ove r his right-wing rival. Once in office, the
Lagos government pe rfo rmed well in political and eco-
nom ic terms, as well as in the internationa l a rena. Lavin
opted to run for the politically im portant position of mayo r
of Santiago's city cent re, wh ich he easily won in Octobe r
2000. However, his attem pts to resolve the dist rict's many
social an d infrastructural prob lems were dogged by a bud -
get shortfall; this fa ilu re affected both his standing in the
city and nationally. Desp ite this setback, in 2004 he began
his campa ign for the December 2005 presidential election.
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His popularity was boosted du ring t he fina l phase of
Lagos's term because the Concertaci6n appeared uncertain
about the li kelihood of a fourth victo ry. There was vei led
criticism of Lagos, who was mo re concerned with his per-
sona l stand ing than with bo lste ring the chances of the
coa lit ion. Lav in cam paigned w ith the message that another
Concertaci6n government would mean 'mo re of the same',
whereas he wou ld bring rea l change. Howeve r, the sur-
pris ing se lection in March 2005 of Miche ll e Bachelet as the
Concertaci6n candidate dented the right's prospects. Many
Ch ileans app roved of t he id ea of a woman as president,
especially if that woman was Bachelet. She had bu ilt a
strong re putation as m iniste r of health and then of defence
in Lagos's administ ration, and was liked fo r her warm and

spontaneous persona lity. Another setback occurred when
the RN chose Sebastian Pinera as its cand idate and he re-
fused to step down in favou r of Lavfn. So the right went into
the 2005 elections divided between two candidates. In the
first round of voti ng, Pinera narrowly beat Lavfn (by 25.5 pe r
cent to 23.2 per cent), but Bachelet trounced them both
with 46 per cent; and in the second round of voting, in Jan-
uary 2006, she received 53.5 pe r cent to Pinera's 46.5 pe r
cent. Defeat notwithstanding, Pinera had fina lly succeeded
in displacing Lavfn and ending the U Di's long hegemony
ove r the Ch ilean right. Lavfn la rgely abandoned day-to-day
politics fo r academic life, although he d id se rve as a presi -
dentia l adviser on some im po rtant pove rty-alleviation init ia-
tives. This closeness to the Conce rtaci6n alienated many of
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his forme r sup porters.
Chilean politics relaxed considerab ly after the death of
Pinochet in December 2006, as a majo r source of tension
between the gove rnment and the right-wing opposition
d isap peared. This aided Pinera's promotion of himself as a
cand idate of the politica l centre: he emphasized his up-
bringing in a Christian Democratic fam ily and espoused
policy pos itions close to that party's; he also st ressed that
he had not voted fo r Pinochet in the 1988 referendum.
Pinochet's death also affected the Concertaci6n, in that it
had used him as a means of un it ing its foll owers. Now the
coa lit ion began to fall apa rt. Although Bachelet's own popu -
larity increased, her a ppea l d id not automatica lly t ransfer to
the adm inistration; wh il e many Chi leans app roved of the

way she managed the effects of the internationa l financ ial
crisis by providing increased sup port to the poor, many
also dou bted that there woul d be a fifth Concertaci6n gov-
ernment. This view strengthened as the Concertaci6n went
through a tortuous cand idate-selection process, until fina lly
choos ing Edua rdo Frei, a politician who was unable to gen -
e rate much enthusiasm even among the most pa rt isan
coa lit ion suppo rte rs. The fact that he had been pres ident al-
ready, and that his pe rformance was not rated highly, ce r-
ta inly helped Pine ra's chances of victory. The Con -
certaci6n 's ho pes were dea lt a further blow by the an-
nouncement in June 2009 by the young and media-friendly
socialist deputy Ma rco Enrfquez-Om inam i that he wou ld
run a sepa rate campa ign . The resu lt of the Decem be r
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elections marked the end of t he Conce rtaci6n e ra. Wh ile
Frei and Enrfquez-Om inam i received 29.6 pe r cent and 20. 1
pe r cent, respectively, Pinera obtained 44 pe r cent of the
vote in the first round and went on to wi n a tight victo ry
ove r Frei (51.6 per cent to 48.4 pe r cent) in the second. De-
sp ite its being such a t ight race, the re was a palpa ble sense
of d isaste r wit hin the Concertaci6n camp.
The right in power: an early assessment
Afte r its electoral trium ph, iron ically the right found it
mo re diffi cult to impose its po lit ical and econom ic agenda
from the pres idential pa lace than it had when in op pos ition .
Th is was pa rtly a consequence of the se rious ea rthqua ke
and tsunami that struck Ch i le on 27 Fe bruary 2010 , on ly

days befo re Pinera's inaugu ration. Th is catastrophic event
transformed both the political environment of the country
and the agendas of its politica l actors. Paradox ica lly, the
co lossa l task of reconstruction fo rced the new neo li bera l
government to adopt the pro-develo pmental stance that it
had always detested ideologica lly. Thus, Pinera expanded
state su pport for the thousands of citizens who had lost
homes and income, and poured money into reactivating the
country's economy and re buil d ing its infrast ructure. The
earth quake did have one pos itive consequence for the gov-
ernment, in that both the Concertaci6n and the non -
parliamentary left d id not adopt an oppos itional role. Every-
one unde rstood that this would have been inapp ro priate
(and politica lly counterproductive) given the
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ci rcumstances. In rea lity, s in ce the electora l debacle, the
Concertaci6n was fragmen ted and unab le to constitute an
effective polit ical oppos ition.
Pinera soon came under crit icism from with in his own
cam p because of his decision - which echoed that of
Alessand ri in 1958 - to form a cabinet whose mem bers
came almost exclusive ly from the business community.
Prominent leaders from the UD I and RN, such as Pablo
Lone ira and And res All aman d , we re not appointed; the UDI
was pa rt icu larly d isgruntled by the relatively mino r role it
was allotted. The government was also attacked by sup-
porters and opponents alike fo r its lack of experience
(unsu rpris ing after twenty yea rs of Concertaci6n rule) and
fo r a number of blunders it made. Pinera was fo rced to

repl ace some of his new appo intees after they were accused
of past econom ic errors or crim ina l actions by both the
Concertaci6n an d t he press. Many bus iness peo ple turned
ministe rs were also accused of having a confl ict of inte rest
between the ir pu blic an d pe rsona l roles. Al l of this under-
mined Pinera's campa ign promise to deliver efficient and
effective government and to put an end to corru ption.
Pinera himse lf freq uently expressed his admiration fo r fo r-
mer Pres ident Aylwin an d his wish to govern in a similar
fash ion. The re we re indeed sim il arities between the two
ad minist rations: both pres idents came to powe r afte r a long
pe riod in oppos it ion, and neithe r enjoyed a majority in pa r-
liament, so that they had to rely on st rikin g dea ls with the
o ppos it ion to get legislation t hrough. Pinera ca ll ed on the
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Concertaci6n to return to Aylwin's 'democracy of agree-
ments'. Some sociali st leaders rebuffed this idea; they a r-
gued that that type of coope ration had been needed in the
immediate afte rmath of the trans it ion to democracy in order
to avo id a return of autho rit arian ism, but that nowadays
Ch ile was a full democracy and requ ired a pro per o ppo-
sition.
In the early part of his government, Pinera continued
many of the domestic and fore ign policies purs ued by the
Concertaci6n governments . It is ap parent that his previous
criticism of those policies had been motivated more by
electora l cons iderations than by ideological ones. Thus, for
example, relations with Argentina and Peru rema ined t he
same, and in the case of Peru actually im proved . Howeve r,
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Pinera's decla ration in summer 2010 that Chil e wou ld not problems high li ghted by t he earthqua ke, then the Chil ean
d iscuss the issue of Bo livia's access to the sea (although it right has a rea l chance of winning t he 20 13 presidentia l
would suppo rt fu ll access to Chilean ports) is li kely to dam - elections. This may certain ly be the case if the Concertaci6n
age re lations between the two countries. The continu ity fai ls to regroup its forces and rega in the trust of the Chilean
which characte rizes much of the cu rrent gove rnment's pro- electorate.
gramme has led many commentators to descri be the Pinera
ad minist ration as the 'fift h Concertaci6n government'. This
continu ity, and the absence of a radical refo rmulation of
poli cy, might lead to a good wo rking re lationsh ip with the
Concertaci6n. Pinera clearly recognized that the eart hqua ke
put pa id to any plans he may have had to reform pu blic
poli cies and institutions an d to reo rient economic devel-
o pment. If, du ring his fou r-year te rm, he succeeds in pro-
viding adequate solutions to the most urgent social

Conclusion: the challenge from the right
GERALD INE LI EVESLEY AND STEVE LUDLAM
The chapters in this book have confi rmed a key observation
of its overview chapter (Burton above) and of previous
studies (e.g. Midd lebrook 2000a: ~-9=SQ): namely, the va ri-
ety and histo rica l specificity of right-wing po lit ics in Latin
America. This is not surprising. The po litica l and pa rty sys-
tems of Latin American states evolved at different rates and
with different characteristics, even if, from a distance, they
may appear to have often shared common cha racterist ics
such as 'st rongman ' po litics and vio lent militarization. In
recent decades, phenomena that are often t reated as und if-
ferent iated - such as the imposition of neo li bera l politica l
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economy or democratization - have, of course, affected dis-
tinct po lit ies diffe rently. The chapters above on right-wing
governments naturally revea l d ifferent compos itions of
politica l behaviour underlying electoral success, including:
US-sponsored param ilitary violence in Colombia; embed-
ded institutiona l powers in Mexico; ideo logica l st rength
reinforced by hegemonic re li gious and media forces in
Pe ru. Sim il arly, whe re the right is in oppos ition, it faces left-
wing presidencies whose po lit ica l bases have been bui lt, in
response to neolibera lism and democrat ization, from very
d ifferent po lit ical materia ls, as our previous book indicated
(Lievesley and Lud lam 2009-9;). Some, as in the case of the
Pe ronists in Argentina and the Socialist Pa rty in Ch il e,
represent the su rviva l of long-existing pa rt ies. Others have

bui lt new po lit ical parties to defeat the right, notab ly in the
case of the Partido dos Traba lhadores (Wo rkers ' Party) in
Brazil. Yet others have achieved success based on the
mobilization of mass social movements, as in Bolivia's
Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism);
o r around projects of pol itica l renewa l led by a popu la r indi-
vidua l with, at least initia lly, no mass political organization
under his/her contro l, as in Venezue la, Ecuado r and
Paraguay, led by Chavez, Correa and Lugo, respective ly.
Notwithstanding such complexities, and although this book
is not a wo rk of compa rative po lit ical science, it is possib le
to discuss some of the genera l factors that may characterize
right-wing po litics in twenty-first-century Latin America.
The most widespread conce rn about the future of
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right-wing po litics in Lati n America has been the threat of a
return to unconstitutional methods, including military or
mi lita ry-installed dictato rsh ip (Rob inson 2008: 357..). In one
we ll -rehearsed vers ion, discussed by Midd lebrook, this
prospect has been li nked to the consequences of an ab-
sence of effective right-wing pol itica l parties in democ-
ratized states (Middlebrook 20006: 286- 8). At the turn of
the century it was also argued that the inab ility of right-wing
neopopu li sm, in particular, to offer a viable alternative po lit-
ica l economy in the face of the unpopu la rity of neo li bera l
policies imp lied the ris k of a return to undemocratic politics
on the right (Cammack 2000: 157..-60). Apart from threats
to the propertied classes arising from red istributive po lit ica l
programmes, the risk is identified that the 'wars' on terror

and drugs encou rage extremely right-wing politics. Living-
stone, Dom inguez and Ra by, in thei r chapte rs a bove, pro-
vide plent ifu l evidence of this threat. Diam int has wa rned of
the wide r ris ks arising from the a bsence of a democratic
cu lt ure with in t he armed and po lice services that are the
main nationa l, multiand su b-nationa l protagon ist s in such
'wars' waged in the name of security (Diamint 2004.). In his
cha pter above, Dawson wa rns that the cris is of law an d
o rder in Mexico, associated a bove all with the militarization
of the 'war on d rugs', has been lin ked to a resu rgence of ex-
treme right-wing and fascist grou ps appea li ng to o lder
fo rms of social and po litical contro l in the face of gang-
ste rism and neolibe ral fragmen tation. At the t urn of the cen -
tu ry, t he conce rns of Midd leb rook an d of Cammack had not
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yet been bo rne out. Since then, howeve r, as chapters in t his
vo lume demonstrate in relation to the successfu l cou p in
Hondu ras (Livingstone), tlhe unsuccessful coups in
Venezue la (Dominguez) and Ecuado r, and the armed au -
tonom ism in Bolivia (Tsolakis), the will ingness of right-
wing forces to resort to d irect and mu rde rous ly violent poli -
tics has ce rta inly not been exhausted by the process of
democratization , just as one scho la rly su rvey pessimisti-
ca lly concluded (Smith 2005~344=5)- Indeed, as so often in
the twentieth century, in each of these four states where vio-
lent politica l reaction has occurred (and, in the case of
Honduras, has succeeded) this vio lent turn in right-wing
politics has been a conseq uence not of the failu re of
democratization , but of its success, insofar as it has led the

left to tu rn to electora l po lit ics, with consequentia l policy
cha ll enges to elite su premacy an d wealth.
Short of unconstitutiona l violence, right-wing po litics can
retain great influence when forma lly in op position, through
ind irect means: the domestic soft-power alternative to
domestic ha rd power. A variety of avenues for t he exercise
of soft power identified in this book will continue to be
open to t he right. The most obvious and structurally
embedded factor is the econom ic order, nationa l and in-
ternationa l, and its politica l implications, whether seen in
te rms of the emergence of a new transnationa l cap ita li st
class (Ro binson 2008: 17.1-89.), or in terms of t he ideo-
logica l const ra ints on economic policyma king (Panizza
2009: 228- 3n). The power of ca pitalists to com bine and
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obstruct a left-wing government is described in this vol-
ume, for exam pl e, in the case of agribusiness in Argent ina
(Dfaz Echen ique, Ozo ll o and Vivares above), and even
mo re dramat ically in t he case of Venezuela (Dominguez
above). The right can also mo bilize bus iness interests to
mount quas i-constitut ional cha ll enges to the left, as in
some elements of the autonomist revolt against the na-
tiona l government in Bolivia (Tsolakis above). Less violent
examp les of right-wing powe r wielded within the insti-
tutions of the state have been identified above in terms of
jud icial power in Argentina (Dfaz Echenique, Ozo ll o and Vi-
vares above) , and in Ch ile, where the Constitutiona l Cou rt
reve rsed Bachelet's contraception policy (S il va above). A
particu lar and intense exam ple of business power in Latin

America is the private med ia, add ressed here in the specific
cases of Venezue la, Argentina and Ch il e (Dominguez; Dfaz
Echen ique, Ozo ll o and Viva res; Si lva). The role of the hier-
archy of the Catholic Church in opposing progress ive sex
education has been noted (Si lva a bove), and in conce rt with
the right-wing media forms a powe rfu l ideo logical force in
nationa l politics, as outlined in the case of Peru (Durand
above), and is capa ble of ins piring right-wing extrem ism, as
in Mexico (Dawson above). As Si lva records above, the
Ch ilean right cam paigned with Church suppo rt du ring the
years of centre-left Concertaci6n governments, defend ing
temas va/6ricos (va lue t hemes) in areas like sexua lity, abo r-
tion and d ivo rce. The dep loyment of Catho li c ideo logical
influence in the case of the Nica raguan Sandinista
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government po li cy of ext reme anti-abortion ism is a striking
examp le. The lin ks between Catho lic leaders and po lit ical
parties a re not confined to the right, of cou rse, and informal
links between t he Catho lic Chu rch and Christian Democrat
parties have become more common than d irect ones; and ,
with the exce ption of Opus Dei, the to rch of Christian fun -
damentalism is sa id to have passed to the Evange lical
sects, whose pasto rs in Brazi l greatly outnum be r Catho li c
priests (llP-fndola 2009_;_].51=3). Indi rect leve rs of power
are, of course, mutually reinforcing. In this vo lume, the
combination of bus iness power, med ia power and the ex-
ploitation of elite cont rol of constitutiona l corridors of
power is particu la rly in evidence in t he case of Paraguay
(Lambert above). And, it shou ld be reca lled, the clientelist

method, despite the impact of neo li bera l privatization on
the scope for corrupt pub lic management, rema ins a pow-
erful right-wing advantage in some states with left-wing
presi dencies, notably Brazi l (Costa Li ma above). A ca pacity
fo r 'reverse cli entelism' is also noted in the literature, as a
genera l inst rument of business influence over po liticians,
the extend ing of mate ria l benefits to po liticians in retu rn for
influence over policy and appo int ments (see Seligson
2008).
Within the const ra ints of li beral democratic po litics, what
are the prospects fo r a right-wing reconquest of the territory
submerged by t he 'pi nk tide' of left presidencies? In the two
cases where the right has displaced 'p ink tide' presi dents -
Panama in 2009 and Chil e in 2010 - t here are some
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common factors. Both of the los ing centre-left cand idates
had histories that damaged t heir candidacies: Balbina del
Carmen Herrera Arauz's links with the US-deposed and dis-
graced ex-Presi dent Noriega; Concertaci6n candidate,
Christian Democrat Eduardo Fre i Ruiz-Tagle's own reco rd
in his ea rli er term as Chilean president. In the Chi lean case,
of cou rse, the constitutiona l one-term li mitation on presi-
dents bequeathed by the mi lita ry was crucia l, with President
Bache let enjoying 80 per cent sup port in the po ll s but un-
able to stand aga in for the centre-left Concertaci6n. Both
winn ing candidates, Rica rdo Ma rt ine lli and Sebastian Pinera
in Panama and Chile, res pectively, were relatively young and
supe r-rich bus iness tycoons, with strong persona l profi les
independent of the ir parties. It would be a mistake, though,

to read this as a sign that right-wing neopopu lism has re-
tu rned. Neither was elected in oppos ition to the existing
party systems. Both also were opposing pres idents who
occupied mode rate currents in the 'pink tide', and bot h
were elected under 'time for change' banners (Democratic
Change and Nationa l Renovat ion), offering bus iness expe-
rience to manage economies then fa ltering in the face of the
world crisis. And Pinera was elected on a prom ise to pre-
serve Concertaci6n socia l policies, in much the same way
as Mexico's right-wing Pa rt ido Acci6n Naciona l (PAN, Na-
tiona l Action Party) undertoo k a non-threaten ing ' re-
badging' of its riva l's social programmes (Dawson above).
Med ia-fue ll ed pe rsonalist presidentia li sm, conducted with-
in the pa rty system, is not the same as ant i-system ic
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popu li sm.
It is d ifficult to see how the neopopu li sm of the late
twentieth cent ury can be eas ily revived. Its commitment to
neo li bera li sm hangs li ke an a lbat ross around its neck, so
that, even if t he impact of the neo libe ral world recession
underm ines support for incumbent left-wing pres idents, it
is hard to see how t he popu list po litical met hod could con -
coct a d istinctive, popu la r a lternative politica l economy.
The PAN's success in Mex ico d raws on an exceptionally
long co rporatist t rad it ion that has no equ ivalent elsewhe re
in the region. The left has, overwhelmingly, not made itself
vulne rable by abandon ing the fisca l conservat ism that ne-
o li bera ls successfully championed in the past (Tuss ie and
Heidrich 2008: 62- 5). And allongside t his fisca l caution in

their we lfare policy programmes, the left-wing presidencies
have not, by and large, comb ined criticism of neo libera li sm
with crit icism of capitalism and t rade inte rnationa lism in
genera l (Grugel and Riggirozz i 2009: 222- 4 .). Furthermore,
the left, in its reviva l of nationa list politica l economy, how-
ever lim ited its rad icalism in terms of direct nationalization
of nat ura l resources, has occupied the nationa li st high
ground, and has reinfo rced its position by endorsing the
d iscourse of the new anti-imperiali st, Latin American con -
tinenta lism. Even in the a rea of historica l nationa list pre-
occupations about territorial boun daries, the left (in Bo-
livia) has been at least as successfu l as the right (in Ch ile)
in champ ioning such causes. Furthermore, the progress of
a new continentalism in institutions and alli ances - such as
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the 2004 Alianza Bo livariana para los Pueb los de Nuest ra
America (AL BA, Bolivarian All iance for the Peop les of Our
America), the 2007 Un ion de Naciones Suramericanas
(UNASU R, Un ion of South American Nations) and the
decla ration in 20 10 of a new Comm unity of Latin American
and Ca rib bean States, which wi ll include Cuba but exclude
the US and Canada - involves only a li mited degree of inte-
gration an d does not require the poo li ng of nationa l
sovereignty in t ransnationa l legis lation. This does not yet
give the right, or parts of it, the ca pacity to buil d a po pular
anti- integration ist platform of the kind attempted by some
mainst ream and many ext reme right-wing parties and
movements in the European Un ion in recent decades.
There do, nevertheless, rema in areas of popu la r appea l,
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where the right can reta in strong electoral leverage. The is- we are not in a position he re to un ravel othe r contributory
sues associated with socia l conservatism (as opposed to pe rsona l and systemic factors. And s ince 2008, 'p ink tide'
economic neoli be ralism), such as abo rt ion and gay rights, presidents have been re-elected with increased majorit ies
rema in powe rfu l too ls in the hands of right-wing po lit icians (Bo livia, Ecuador) , have had successor presidents elected
and their re ligious and med ia all ies. Furthe r, some have ar- (U ruguay, Brazi l), or have won for the fi rst ti me (El Sal-
gued that the underlying ideo logical weakness of the right, vador). What can be sa id here, though, is that, in any case
in terms of mass attitudes, is not as great as the 'pink tide' and contrary to early predictions, Latin American
resu lts would suggest, but rathe r that the left has moder- economies have recovered mo re rap id ly than those in other
ated its po litics to appea l to po pular preferences that have regions (OECD 2010: 3=5; World Bank 2011 ). The post-
not moved mass ively in a leftward d irection (Morales 2008: crisis decline in rem ittances from the US and elsewhere
37.=9.). The poss ib le genera l po lit ical benefit to the right of (Inter-American Deve lo12ment Bank 2009.) - a crucia l
the impact of the world recess ion is a critical cons ideration. source of personal and nationa l income - was also recov-
Certainly the right-wing victories in Panama and Ch ile may ering in 2010 and was expected to continue to recover in
have been related to the ea rly effect of the 2008 crisis, but 2011.

The role of the US in Latin American politics remains all-
pe rvas ive, whethe r it is funding 't rans ition' strategies in
Venezue la (and, as eve r, in Cuba) and coordinating sup port
fo r right-wing po litics in general; trying to lock nationa l eco-
nom ic policy into bilate ral trade agreements and financ ial
dea ls; or implanting US milita ry (and mi lita ry and po lice
training ca pacities) across the continent. As the chapters by
Livingstone and Lieves ley above make clea r, the US con -
tinues to dep loy massive ha rd and soft power in the region,
and does so in ways that seek to underpin right-wing po li-
tics and underm ine left-wing alternatives. It provides re-
sources that sustain netwo rks of right-wing su pport in the
mi lita ry and security forces, in inte ll ectua l and policy
commun ities, and in med ia production. Neverthe less, its
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power can no longe r be deployed with the same certainties
of success as in the past. It has been evicted from military
bases in Ecuador and Bo livia. It fai led to s ustain its flagsh ip
neolibera l Free Trade Area of the Americas project beyond
its rejection at the historic Mar del Plata pan -Ame rican
summ it of 2005. It fai led in 2008 to sustain the cam paign
of its sponso red right-wing, a rmed autonom ists in Bo livia
in the face of the defence of the Bolivian gove rnment by the
mem be r states of UNASUR. And its fa il ure to secure su p-
port for its cand idate for the secretary-generalship of the
Organization of American St ates (OAS) in 2005 was fol-
lowed, in 2009, by the unan imous OAS vote (afte r the US
withdrew) to offer membershi p to Cuba. All Latin American
states have opposed the US emba rgo on Cuba in the UN,

and have d iplomatic relations with a state that has been the
object of ha lf a century of US ' regime change' interventions.
Many states have also called for the prosecution of anti-
Cuba te rrorists enjoying sanctua ry in the US, and fo r the re-
lease of the five Cu ban anti-terrorism agents imp risoned in
the US. And a year after t he 2009 right-wing coup in Hon-
duras, the US had been ab le to persuade, of all the Latin
American states, on ly its right-wing allies Pe ru and Co lom -
bia to recogn ize the post-coup regime. It wou ld take an un -
usua l diplomatic alliance in 20 11 , between Co lom bia and
Venezue la, to secure a vote to readm it Honduras into the
Organization of American States, along with perm iss ion fo r
Ze laya to return to the country. Even its ind irect power
through the channels of foreign direct investment in Latin
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America, the mach inery that im posed t he 'Wash ington Con -
sensus', has been weakened po lit ica ll y by the (as yet small-
sca le) alte rnative of the ALBA banks and barter deals, by the
deve lopment of regiona l projects based on Brazilian fi-
nance, and by the much larger alternative of China's t rade
and investment in the continent. The Wo rld Ban k has re-
ported, indeed , that the 'C hina connection' has been a key
facto r in Latin Ame rica's rapid recove ry and growth s ince
the 2008 world crisis (World Bank 2011 ).
In te rms of the potentia l cha ll enge of t he right wing in
coming yea rs, then, many po litical factors from past
decades remain effect ive sources of powe r: a willi ngness to
act unconstitutiona lly and to dispense with democracy; the
ind irect cent res of po lit ical power among ca pitalists and the

med ia, an d the associated rese rvo irs of socia lly conse r-
vative ideas; the capacity of ru ling classes to defend the ir
inte rests within the wider institut ions of t he state; st raight-
fo rwa rd ly successfu l electoral cam paigning in spite of dam-
aged neo libe ral credentials, if not necessa rily in the form of
neopopu li sm; and, of course, the pervasive (if currently less
ove rwhelming) influence of the US in so many aspects of
Latin Ame rican societies. To a ll of this, of course, must be
added the behaviour of left-wing governments, parties and
politicians in securing political office and sustain ing them-
selves in it. A crucial question is the di lution of right-wing
med ia domination, whethe r through an expans ion of the
im pact of alternative, continental channe ls li ke ALBA's
TeleS ur, or by licens ing an d resou rcing alternative and
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commun ity media, as, for examp le, in Bolivia. In this s phe re
there is a lready a rea l battle for hegemony ta king place that
the left - whethe r it is in office o r in op position - cannot af-
fo rd to neglect. Anothe r a rea in wh ich the reformist left can
make almost uncha llenged progress in securing electoral
sup port is in the area of identity politics, the rights of
women, gays an d ethnic mino rities, where a great dea l re-
mains to be done (UN Deve lo12ment Programme 200fr!.).
This is an area in wh ich the left historica lly has not always
been progress ive (Lieves lex 2009_;_ 26- 34). Yet, however
sh rill the opposit ion of socia l conservatives, it is an area
that does not d irectly cha ll enge the existence of ca pita li st
power, but on ly t he way in which it is exercised. The capac-
ity of the left, as well as of the right, to defend itself at the

continenta l leve l has been demonstrated in the conta inment
of Bo livian right-wing autonom ist revolt, in the reaction to
the Colom bian 'anti-terrorist' bomb ing of Ecuado rian terri-
tory in 2008, and, at least to an extent, in the attempt fi rst to
reinstate Man uel Zelaya to the Honduran pres idency and
then to iso late the post-coup regime. In another aspect of
its new continentali sm, the left's foundation of ALBA on the
bas is of respect for national sovereignty, rathe r than treaty-
bound constitutiona l fede ration, as in the European Un ion,
removes a potentia l ta rget of right-wing politica l attack.
In ou r ea rlier work on the left in Latin America, we, like
othe rs, noted the re lative ly modest social democratic and
o rthodox programmes of most of the 'pink tide' states in
economic and social po licy (Lieveslex and Ludlam 2009~
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220-9_; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009: 220-3Q). In conven -
tiona l electo ral terms, this can be port rayed as a wo rkab le
accommodation to ideologically cent rist and even right-
wing vote rs for t he purpose of assembling a majority vote
(Morales 2008: 37.=9.). The degree of de pendence of some
left-wing presidentia l programmes on raw materia l exports
could ce rta inly create vu lnerab ility in the event of world
prices falling, alt hough this vu lnera bility will be offset if
state-init iated economic diversification proceeds with suffi-
cient speed. But such concerns also ra ise the broade r, and
indeed historical, question of whethe r, to sustain thei r
potentia l even for rigo rous reformism , left-wing govern -
ments in a capitalist society need to avo id 'conservative
poss ibi lism' and proceed relent less ly in a sociali st di rection

on the assumption that t his is the best defence aga inst a
ruling class that wi ll eventua lly move more or less vio lently
aga inst such a gove rnment (Boron 2008: 261-l.::SA) · The his-
tory of the cou p in Ch ile an d the de bates on the left a bout
the lessons of that historic defeat, a bout the neut rality of
the cap ita li st state an d the comm itment of its rule rs to
democracy and about whether radica li sm is a defence
aga inst, o r a guarantee of, a ruling-class revo lt against an
elected left-wing gove rnment have become more, not less,
relevant to the fate of the 'p ink tide' in the twenty-first cen -
tu ry.
There is always the poss ibi lity of right-wing parties s im-
ply prom is ing to susta in left-wing socia l policies, as in the
2010 election in Chi le. Beyond considerations a bout
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economic and social policy, though, severa l 'pin k tide' gov-
e rnments, nota bly Venez uela, Bolivia and Ecuador, have re-
fo rmed thei r constitutions to em bed forms of popu la r par-
tici pation an d ad ministration1, includ ing ethnic rights, that
can in future defend social gains in t he face of right-wing
government attempts to reverse progressive change.
The creation of a genuinely popular democratic cult ure
that breaks free of the electoral paterna lism of t he Euro pean
social democratic and socialist traditions cou ld provi de a
bu lwa rk against right-wing po lit ics in the twenty-first cen -
tu ry. It co uld also limit t he ris k of left-wing pres id ents
becoming isolated from thei r mass elect orates and unde r-
ta king policies that alienate the ir voters and let the right
back in. The re is little evidence that a co herent
 '
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post-neolibe ral right is emerging t hat offe rs a coherent new labour and of t he long st ruggle for equality.
balance of the fo rces of state and market, and a new polit-
ica l economy - even if, in some cases, the re is a willingness
to susta in some social programmes inherited from t he left.
But, as so much of this boo k demonstrates, in the long bat-
tle to democratize not just politica l processes but also the
d istribution of wealth and socia l power, the right is still in
possession of colossal resources. In the twenty-fi rst century
in Latin America, the ca pacity of left-wing politica l leaders at
all leve ls to sustain the ir programmes in the face of the
right's resources will determ ine whether the mass of Latin
American peop le continue to have thei r lives blighted by
poverty and exclusion, or whether they begin to enjoy not
mere ly the pe riodic right to vote, but also the fruits of their

Endnotes
1- I use the te rm 'South America' here to distingu ish the
countries stud ied in th is chapte r - the Span ishand Por-
tuguese-speak-ing countries on the continent of South
America and Mexico - from the wider Latin America region
of South America, Central America and the Spanish-
speaking is lands of the Ca ribbean. That I do so does not
mean that t he catego rizations of the right laid out in the
South Ame rican cases are not app licab le to the wider re-
gion. However, given space constraints I am ob liged to
lim it my comparative study of the right . I would like to
thank Peade r Kirby and Barry Cannon for comments on an
earlier d raft of this chapter, as well as the o rgan izers of and
participants in the 2009 Society of Latin American Stud ies
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panel, where an earl ie r ve rsion of the chapte r was pre-
sented.
i . PAN Para Todos means 'PAN fo r All ', referring to the Par-
tido de Acci6n Naciona l (Nationa l Action Party).
3. During the 1970s, the Mex ican gove rnment murdered
severa l hundred radica l activists, some of whom we re at-
tempting to foment rebell ion in the countrys ide. No one
has eve r been held accountable. The Chia pas rebe llion was
launched by the Zapatista Army of National Libe ration in
1994. It first demanded land reform and late r the implemen -
tation of a new indigenous-rights regime. Th is conflict re-
mained unresolved in mid-201 1, desp ite repeated attempts
at negotiated solutions.
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4 . In June 2011, as this boo k was in the production process,
Oll anta Huma la defeated Keiko Fuj imo ri, Alberto Fujimori's
daughter, in the second round of the pres idential elections,
by 51 per cent to 49 per cent.

5. Inte rvi ews referred to in the text were conducted with cu r-

rent or forme r high-level European Un ion officials and dele-
gates. All sources rema in anonymous .

.Q.. Th is chapte r is dedicated to my friend Gildo Ma r~al Bran -

dao (1949- 2010) , polit ica l scienti st at the Un ive rsity of Sao
Pau lo.

About the contributors
Dr Guy Burton is a research associate for the Latin America
Programme at the Ideas Centre at the Lon don School of
Economics. He is the autho r of Building Social Democracy in
Latin America (Edwin Mellen, forthcom ing); ' Brazil: Th ird
ways in the thi rd world' in Reclaiming Latin America: Exper-
iments in Radical Social Democracy (2009); 'A textbook for
the left?', Revista Enfoques Educacionales (2008); 'Bu ild ing
social democratic education ', International Journal of Con-
temporary Sociology (2008); and is co-autho r of 'PT never
aga in? Fa il ure (and success) in the PT's state government
in Esp irito Santo and the Federa l Dist rict' in Radicals in
Power: The Workers Party and Experiments in Urban Democ-
racy in Brazil (2003).
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Dr Marcos Costa Lima is Adjunct Professor at the Unive r-
sidade Federa l de Pernam buco, Brazil, whe re he is coordi -
nator of the Regiona l and Deve lopment Nuclei of Studies
and Research. He is President of the Unive rsities Forum for
Mercos ul, and a member of the Commission of the Un iver-
sity of Latin American Integration . His recent books include
Dinomica do Capitalismo P6s-Guerra Fria. Cultura tec-
nol6gica, espa90 e desenvolvimento (2008); A atualidade do
pensamento de Celso Furtado (2008); an d Regionalismos,
democracia e desenvolvimento (2007).
Dr Alexander Dawson is an associate professo r of Latin
American History at Simon Frase r University in Vancouve r,
Canada. Along with severa l articles, his publications include
Latin America since Independence: A History with Documents

(2010); First World Dreams: Mexico since 1989 (2006); an d
Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (2004). He is
working on a history of peyote, ind igeneity and the idea of
cu lture, tentative ly called How Culture Became a Right.
Dr Leonardo Dfaz Echenique is Associate Professo r in the
Depa rtment of Po litical Science and Sociology at the Un iv-
ers idad Aut6noma de Ba rcelona and coo rdinator of Pu blic
Pol icy Stud ies at the Fundaci6 Carles Pi i Sunyer. Among
his publ ications are: 'Argenti na: reform ing neolibera l ca pi-
ta li sm ' in Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical
Social Democracy (2009); and Lula (2004).
Dr Francisco Durand is Professor of Po litical Science at the
Un ive rs ity of Texas at San Anton io. He has pub lished
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severa l book chapters on the new right in Peruvian po lit ics,
and is author of, among other boo ks, El Peru fracturado: for-
malidad, informalidad y economfa delictiva (2008); La mano
invisible en el Estado (The Invisible Hand in the State)
(2006); Riqueza econ6mica y pobreza pol{tica (Economic
Wealth and Political Poverty) (2003); Organized Business,
Economic Change and Democracy in Latin America (1998) ;
and Business and Politics in Peru (1994). He has acted as a
consultant to the Inte r-American Development Ban k, the
Inter-Ame rican Center fo r Tax Adm inistration and t he US
Agency fo r Internationa l Deve lopment.
Dr Peter Lambert is a sen ior lectu re r in Lati n American Stud -
ies at t he Un ivers ity of Bath. Having wo rked between 1987
and 1991 in the fie ld of po litics and popular education in an

NGO in Pa raguay, he comp leted his PhD at the Un ivers ity
of Western England at Bristo l befo re moving to Bath.
Among his pub lications a re: ' Pa raguay' in Countries at Cross-
roads: A Sur11ey of Democratic Go11ernance (2007) ; and
'M uero con mi patria! Myth, po litical violence and the con -
struction of nationa l identity in Paraguay', in W. Fowle r and
P. Lambert (eds), Political Violence and the Construction of
National Identity in Latin America (2006).
Grace Li11ingstone is a journali st specia lizing in Latin Ame r-
ican affai rs. She was a reporter for the Guardian in
Venezue la and has also worked fo r the BBC World Service
and has written for the Obser11er, the Statesman and the
Tablet. She is the autho r of America's Backyard: The United
States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the
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War on Terror (2009) ; and Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democ-
racy and War (2003).
Ja11ier Ozollo is a professor at the National Un ivers ity of
Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina. He has also been di rector of
cu ltura l management in the government of the province of
Mendoza, Argentina. Among his publications are: Marx and
the State. The social determinants of thought of /(art Marx
(2005), an d 'Argentina: reforming neolibe ral capitalism ', in
Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social
Democracy (2009).
Dr Diana Raby is Sen ior Research Fellow at the Resea rch
Institute of Lat in American St ud ies, Unive rsity of Liverpoo l.
Her most recent book is Democracia y re110/uci6n: America

Latina y el socialismo hoy (2008) , a revised version of
Democracy and Revolution: Latin America and Socialism
Today (2006). Recent articles inclu de: 'Why Cuba is stil l
im portant', Monthly Review (2009) ; ' Latin America's left-
wa rd turn ', Global Dialogue (2008); and ' El liderazgo ca ris-
matico en los movimientos po pula res y revo lucionarios',
Cuadernos def CEND ES (2006).
Dr Patricio Silva is Professo r of Mode rn Latin Ame rican His-
tory at Leiden Unive rs ity, the Netherlands. His research fo-
cuses on democratization and the technocratization of poli -
tics in Ch ile. His publications include: ' Swimm ing aga inst
the tide? The Ch ilean social democratic model in historical
pe rspective' in Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in
Radical Social Democracy (2009); In the Name of Reason:
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Technocrats and Politics in Chile (2008) ; an d The Soldier and
the State in South America: Essays in Civil- Military Relations
(2001).
Dr Andreas Tsolakis is an Institute of Advanced Stu dy post-
docto ral fellow at the Un iversity of Warwick and an interna-
tiona l relations analyst at the Fundaci6n Secretariado Gi -
tano in Ma drid. His research interests include critica l theo-
ries of the state, globa lization an d governan ce, Latin Amer-
ican history and politics and European integration. He is
the author of The Reform of the Bolivian State: Domestic Poli-
tics in the Context of Globalizat ion (2010) and has pub lished
on state theo ry, t ransnational elite fo rmation , reforms in
Bolivia sponsored by the Movement towards Sociali sm, the
Europe 2020 Strategy, social inclus ion policies an d the
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Roma.

Dr Ernesto Vi11ares is Lecturer in Internationa l Po litical Econ-

omy at FLACSO-U N ESCO, Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales, Qu ito, Ecuador. His resea rch focuses on
the po litical economy of South American regiona li sm, wel-
fare and financing of development. Among his pub lications
are: 'The South American sem i-perip hery: financing devel-
opment and welfare in Brazi l and Argentina', in M. Phoebe
and 0. Worth (eds), Globalisation and the Semi-Periphery
(2009); and 'Toward a re-read ing of the po litica l economy
of South America', IPEG Papers (2007).
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Index Acci6n Democratica (AD) (Venezuela), 21-2, 114
Acci6n Popu la r (AP) (Pe ru), 99
Note: The fu ll academic index from the print edition of this
Acue rd o C1vico y Social (ACyS) (Argentina), 204
book is presented here fo r the reade r's reference. The page
agrarian reform, 83, 92- 3, 128, 133- 4, 135, 139, 14 5, 185- 6
references relate to the print edit ion and therefore bear no
agrarian secto r, powe r of, 196
relation to locations on this device, but have been reta ined
agrarian transformation, in Argentina, 197- 9
to show the re lative pos it ion of t he indexed subjects within
agri bus iness, mo bilization of, 226
this book.
Agu irre Roca, Juan Antonio, 101

11 Septem ber attacks, 46 Ahmedinejad, Mahmoud, 4 2

Alckmin, Gera ldo, 170
abortion , 17, 25, 28,47, 56,170,215,216,226,228 Alessandri, Jorge, 211
Abrams, Ell iott, 33, 4 5, 52 Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueb los de Nuestra Ame rica
abstention in elections, 92 (ALBA), 28, 29, 30, 32, 48, 93, 130- 1, 139- 43, 143- 5, 228,
Acc;ao Naciona li sta Renovadora (ARENA) (Brazil) , 166, 167 230; an d US subve rsion, 38- 40
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Ali anza Democratica M-19 (Co lom bia), 91 Americas Watch grou p, 153
Ali anza Fede ral Pro (Argentina), 204 Amnesty Internationa l, 48, 157, 158
Ali anza Naciona l Popular (ANA PO) (Co lomb ia), 80 Amnesty Law (1978) (Ch il e) , 215
Ali anza pa ra Cam bio (APC) (Pa raguay) , 177, 191 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (USA),
Ali anza Popu la r Revo lucionaria Americana (A PRA) (Peru), 1 37

99, 104, 105,107, 109 Andean -Amazonian capitali s m , 140

Ali anza por Ch il e, 219 anti-globalization movement, 67
Ali anza Re publicana Naciona li sta (ARENA) (El Salvado r), Ant igua, 30
52, 55 Apoyo o rgan ization (Peru), 103
All aman d, And res, 214, 218, 222 Arcadia Foun dation, 32
Allende, Salvado r, 113,116,202,219 Argafia, Lu is Ma rra, 179
Alonso, Ro be rto, 123 Argentina, 2, 4, 7, 15, 18- 21 , 28, 35, 37, 93, 144- 5, 226; debt
Alvarado, Jo rge, 141 of, 205; new right in, 194- 209; relations with Chile, 217;
American Center fo r Internationa l Labor So lida rity, 51 soya production of, 195- 7
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Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 58 Aylwin, Patricio, 213, 214-15, 217,218,222
Arizona, cont rol of immigrants in, 55 Aznar, Jose Maria, 49, 94, 158
armed forces see mil itary
Bacardi company, 150
Arm itage, Richard, 35
Bachelet, Miche ll e, 216,217,218,220,227
Aruba, 29; airbases in , 35
Banco Central de Bolivia (BCB), 130, 139
Asignaci6n Un iversa l por Hijo pa ra Protecci6n Social (Ar-
Banco de la Repub lica (Co lomb ia), scanda l, 90
gentina), 206
Banco del Sur, 143
Asociaci6n de Productores de Soja (Paraguay), 186
Banzer, Hugo, 131
Asociaci6n Naciona l C1vica Femen ina (Mexico), 65
Barbuda, 30
Asociaci6n Rura l de l Pa raguay (ARP), 186
Batista, Fulgencio, 150
assassination, practice of, 44, 53, 83, 86, 88, 91-2, 94, 102,
Bay of Pigs invasion , 150, 152
118, 126, 128
Benitez, Mario Abdo, 190
Autodefensas Unidas de Co lomb ia (AUC), 48, 88, 92
Berger, Osca r, 48
AWACS radar planes, 38
Bergoglio, Jo rge, 57
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Betancou rt, Belisario, 83 lines of confl ict in, 130- 47, 130; US destabilization
Bianco pa rty (Uruguay), 20 USAID funding fo r, 38- 9; wate r wars in, 2
Bigwood, Jeremy, 39 Bolsa Familia (Braz il), 171, 173, 181
bio-fue ls, product ion of, 196, 197 Bono Juancito Pinto, 135- 6
Blaiser, Liliane, Venezuela Febrero 27, 11 5 Bono Madre -Nino (Bo livia), 135
Blanco party (U ruguay) , 19 Borda, Dionis io, 184
Bobbie, Norberto, 12 Bosch, Orlando, 151, 154
Boeing company, 57 Bravo Mena, Lu is Felipe, 67, 68
Bogotazo, 79 Brazil, 6, 14, 17- 18, 29, 31, 37, 41-3, 48, 93, 117, 144- 5, 227;
Bolivarian Revo lution, 113, 11 7, 11 9, 128, 129 deindustrializat ion of, 170; economic growth in, 173; in-
Bolivia, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 21 - 4, 30, 32, 35, 40, 47, 50, 229, equality in, 172; right in, 165- 76
231; access t o sea, issue of, 217, 222, 228; attempted armed Brazil, Russ ia, Ind ia and Ch ina (BRIC), 29
secess ion, 162; debt of, waiving of, 139; defence agreement breast -feeding, right t o, 216
with Venezue la, 138; foreign re lations, changes in, 131- 3; Brizo la, Leone l, 167
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Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) o rgan ization, 159- 60 Camb io Rad ica l (Colombia) , 89
Buchi, Hernan, 213 Cambone, Stephen, 46
Bunge and Born company, 196, 197 campo, el, countryside bloc (Argentina), 200- 1
Bush , George H. W., 45, 154, 158 Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 49
Bush, George W., 27, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, Cancun Summit, 48
54- 5, 85, 89, 131 , 137, 143,158, 160 Cano, Gui ll ermo, 84
Bush , Jeb, 154 capitalia plena cam paign in Bolivia, 136, 138
business interests, mo bilization of, 226 Caracazo riots (Venezuela), 2, 115
Cardenas Solo rzano, Cuauthemoc, 66- 7, 79
Caballero, Anton io, 85
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 167, 18, 169, 170, 171, 174
Cabello, Diosdado, 120
Cargi ll com pany, 197
Calde ra, Rafael, 115
Carmona, Ernesto, 119
Calde ron Hinojosa, Felipe de Jesus, 31 , 41, 64, 68- 9, 75
Carter, Jimmy, 153
Camara Agro pecuaria de Oriente (Bo livia) , 134
Carter Center, 124
Camara de lndustri a y Comercio (CAINCO) (Bo livia), 134
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cash transfe rs, 24 Che rtoff, Michae l, 48
Castaneda, Jo rge, 50, 58, 94 Chevron company, 33
Castillo, O rlando, 122 Ch iapas re bellion (Mexico) , 63, 67, 74
Castro, Fide l, 32, 49, 74, 161 Ch icago boys, 19
Catho lic Church, 4, 25, 57, 64, 65, 67, 69, 77, 78, 101 , 102, Ch icago Boys (Ch ile), 212
104, 11 8, 122, 123, 126, 14 9, 150, 152, 161, 163, 177, 191, 195, ch ild ren, benefit schemes for (Argentina) , 205, 206
207, 215,216,226 Ch ile, 7, 14, 15, 18- 21 , 28, 41- 2, 97, 125, 154, 157, 202, 226,
Center for Internationa l Private Ente rprise, 51 227, 228; borde r issues with Bolivia, 217- 18; 'Ch il ean mi r-
Center for the Dissem ination of Econom ic Knowledge, 50 acle', 212; earthquake and tsunami, 221; foreign policy of,
Cent ra l Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 51, 52, 54, 154, 157 216- 17; lessons of coup in, 231; relat ions with Argentina,
Chavez, Hugo, 6, 22, 23, 30- 1, 32, 40, 42, 58, 74, 83, 89, 96, 217; right in, 210- 23
106, 113- 29, 136, 138, 144, 186, 189, 202, 224 ; assassination Ch ina, 31 , 41, 43; t rade and invest ment in Latin America, 28,
plot against, 113, 118,126, 163 42,230
Cheney, Dick, 44- 5, 46, 52- 3 Ch iqu ita Brands Internationa l, 48
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Cuba, 150 coca farme rs in Bo livia, 132- 3, 136
Ciprian i, Juan Lu is, 103 Col d War, 4, 83
Cisneros, Gustavo, 33, 11 4, 118 Coll or de Mello, Fe rnando, 18, 169
Civic Comm ittee of Sucre (Bol ivia), 136 Colomb ia, 5, 6, 14, 15- 17, 31 , 38, 48, 54, 97, 143, 224, 230;
civil ma rriage law (Argentina), 205 and wa r on drugs, 40- 1; as li nchp in of US hegemony,
civil society, 149 78- 95; human rights a buses in, 4 0; military bases in, 36- 8;
civil wars, 78 mi lita ry spend ing in, 93; model, costs of, 91 - 3; subo rd i-
Clarin Group, 201 , 202- 4 nation to US, 81- 5
cliente li sm, 180, 226- 7; reve rse clientelism, 227 Colo rado party (Pa raguay), 22 , 178- 81, 184, 186, 188, 191
Clinton, Bill, 155, 160 Colo rado party (U ruguay) , 19, 20
Clinton, Hi ll a ry, 54 Com ite Civico Pro-Santa Cruz (CCPSC) (Bolivia), 134- 5, 137
Coalici6n Po r el Bien de Todos (Mex ico) , 71 Com ite de Organizaci6n Polftica Elect oral lndependiente
Coalition of the Willing, 4 6 (COPEi) (Venezuela), 114
Cobos, Julio, 200, 205 Com ite Naciona l Pro-vi da (Mexico), 65
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Commiss ion for Assistance to a Free Cuba, 53, 160 contraception, 56, 226; in Chi le, 216
Commiss ion for Truth and Reconci liation (Ch ile), 215 Convivir Rural Vigi lance Associations (Colom bia), 88
Committee on the Present Danger, 52 Coord inado ra Democratica (Venezuela), 116, 121, 123-4
Concertaci6n (C hile), 210-23, 227 Coord inado ra Ejecutiva para la Reforma Agra ria (C EPRA)
Conci lio Cubano, 157, 159 (Pa raguay), 185
conditiona lity of loans, 19 Cordoba, Piedad, 83
Confederaci6n de la Democracia (Ch il e) , 116 Correa, Rafae l, 24, 224
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), 11 8, Corriente de Renovaci6n Socialista (Co lom bia), 91
121 co rruption, 22, 67, 104, 105, 114, 140, 159, 177, 180, 184-5,
Confederaci6n Nacional de lnstituciones Empresariales Pri- 188,191,193; in elections, 73
vadas (Peru) (CON FIEP) , 101, 102 Costa e Si lva, Artur da (Brazi l) , 166
Confederaci6n Patrona l de la Repu blica Mexicana, 65 Costa Rica, 31, 36, 37
Consejo Naciona l Electo ral (CN E) (Venezuela), 122, 124 counte rinsurgency, 44, 56, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87
const itutions, reform of, 231 Couto e Silva, Go lbery do, 167
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Cree l Miranda, Santiago, 68 (Helms-Burton Act) (1996) (USA), 51 , 53, 58, 155- 6, 158,160
crime syndicates, 17 Cuban Liberty Council , 158, 160
criollo elites in Bo livia, 133- 5, 138 Cuban lobby in USA, 155
Cuba, 6, 11, 30, 38, 48, 49, 54, 120, 229; emba rgo against, Cuban Museum of Arts and Cu lture, attack on, 153
156, 161, 162, 163, 229; revolution in, 13, 81, 82; right-wing Cubana ai rliner, bombing of, 1151
oppos it ion in, 148- 64 see also Cuban doctors Cubanization, fea r of, 126
Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future, 160 Curacao, 29; airbases in, 35
Cuba Study Group, 161 Cyprus, 38
Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), 149, 155,
death squads, 51, 56
157, 158, 159, 160, 161; Endowment for Cuban Studies, 159
Defense of Democracies, 53
Cuban Democracy Act (1992) (Torrice ll i Act) (USA), 51, 155
Defense Planning Gu idance document, 44-5
Cuban Democratic Coalition, 157
DeM int, Jim, 31
Cuban doctors, attacks on, 11 3, 127, 135, 138
Cuban Libe rty and Democratic Solidarity democracy, 11 , 49, 50, 53, 78, 91, 92, 96, 114, 193, 208, 210,
Act
222, 225; attitudes towards, 179; creation of democratic
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cu lture, 232; cultu re of, lacking in armed forces, 225; defec- divo rce, 2151 226
tive, 178 179 192 193; esote ric, 73; promotion of, 51; rep-
1 1 1 Dominica, 30
resentative, rise of, 13- 14 Dreyfus company, 197
Democracy Project (USA), 155 Drug Enforcement Agency (D EA) (USA), 137, 138, 146
democratic t rans it ion, 192 dru g t raffi cking, 5, 17, 40, 44, 52, 58, 76, 84, 137, 138, 174,
democratization: in Mexico, 64- 8; third wave of, 2 178 1 190; control of, 54 see also Wa r on Dru gs
Depa rtment of Home land Security (USA) , 57 dru gs gangs, 41
Desarro ll o Hu mano Integra l y Acci6n Ciudadana (Mexico), Dua rte Frutos, Nicano r, 1811 183
65 DynCorp Inte rnational, 56
Development Alte rnatives Inc., 53
Eco nom ic Social Fun d, 38
Diaz, Fa ruk Yan ine, 87
Ecuado r, 14, 21- 4 30 32 36 38 39 224; ai rbases in , 35; at-
1
Dirceu, Jose, 168 1 1 1 1 1

tempted coup in, 148; Co lomb ia's incursion into, 46

di sappearances, 91
education: of the poor, 24; school attendance, 181, 206
di stri bution of wea lth, 128
Eje rcito de Liberaci6n Naciona l (ELN) (Co lom bia), 80, 83,

85
Eje rcito Popu la r de Libe raci6n (Co lomb ia), 80
Eje rcito Popu la r Pa raguayo (EPP) (Pa raguay), 190
El Salvado r, 29, 52, 55, 229; airbases in, 35
El Yunq ue group (Mexico), 65
elections, compute rization of, 124
'en d of history', 24
English First, 57
Enriquez-Om inami, Marco, 221
Entel company, 142
Enterprise for the Americas In itiative, 45
environmentalism, 14
Errazu riz, Francisco Javier, 213
Esco ba r, Pa blo, 90
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ethn ic minorities, rights of, 230, 231
European Comm iss ion, 139, 140, 142
European Union, 228; Common Position on Cuba, 158
Evange lical sects, 226
Exilio City, 151- 2, 162
extrajud icia l executions, 102
Falange Sociali sta Boliviana, 134
Falklan ds/Malvinas war, 196
fa lse positives scan dal (Colomb ia) , 89- 90
Fede raci6n Agraria Argentina, 200
Fede raci6n de Camaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Pro-
d ucci6n de Venezue la (FEDECAMARAS), 118, 121
Fede ral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Terrorism in the Unit-
ed States, 155

Fede ration for American Immigration Reform, 57
feminism, 6, 14
Fernan dez de Kirchne r, Cristina, 98, 194- 209
Figari, Lu is, 102
Figueiredo, Genera l, 166
Flo res, Francisco, 50
Flo res, Lourdes, 105, 106, 107
Folsom, Geo rge, 51
Fome Zero programme (B raz il), 172
foo d shortages, creation of, 194
fo reign direct investment (FOi), 141, 142, 205
Fox Quesada, Vicente, 41, 55, 63- 4, 63, 67, 69
Franco, Federico, 186
Franco, ltama r, 7 69, 188
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Fraser, Douglas, 29
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) , 29 1 143; fail ure of,
229; re pud iation of, 48
Freedom House, 44, 52
Frei, Edua rd o, 211 1 216,217,218, 221
Frei Ru iz-Tagle, Eduardo, 227
Frente Amp lio (U ruguay), 19, 20
Frente Democratico (FRED EMO) (Peru), 99, 100, 104, 107
Frente Nacional (Colom bia), 80
Frente para la Victoria (Argent ina) , 204
Frente Universitario Anticomun ista (Mexico), 65
Friedman , Milton , 212
Frien ds of Fox (Mexico), 67
Fuerzas Armadas Revo lucio narias Co lomb ianas (FARC),
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46 80-1 82, 83, 84 174, 189, 190; demo bilization of, 91
1 1 1 Garcia Li nera, Alvaro, 140
Fuj imo ri, Albe rto, 18, 97 98, 102 104, 105, 106 107 108;
1 1 1 1 Garrastazu Medici, Emilio, 166
auto-golpe, 100 gay issues, 6 28, 56, 148, 171 228 230
1 1 1

Fukuyama, Francis, 45; 'end of history', 11 Ge isel, Ernesto, 166

Fund for Free Expression, 153 gender issues, in Ch ile, 215-16
Fundaci6n His pano Cu ban a, 158 generic anti-A IDS drugs, 43
Fundaci6n pa ra el Analis is y los Estud ios Sociales, 49 genetically modified (GM) produce, 197
Funes, Mau ricio, 35 Gershman, Carl, 52
Gill, Lesley, 59
G-20 group, 29 Giusti, Lu is, 121
Ga itan, Glo ria, 79
Gol dberg, Phili p, 136-7
Ga itan, Jorge El iecer, 79-80
Goldwater, Barry, 59
Ga lan, Luis Carlos, 84
Gomez, Lau reano, 81-2 1 85
gangsterism 0, 7 50, 22 5 Gonza lez, Elian, 161
Garcia, Alan, 18 1 98, 99, 105 1 106, 109
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Good Neighbou r st rategy of USA, 55 Guatema la, 48, 117, 157
Goulart, Joao, 165 guerrill a movements, 79, 80- 1, 86, 166
governance, good, 51 Guzman, Jaime, 211 - 12; assassination of, 214
Graviers family, 202
Hait i, cou p in, 51, 58
Green Be rets, 35
Halli bu rton company, 33, 52- 3, 57
Green Party (Co lom bia), 40
Hamas, 49
Green Pa rty (Mexico), 69
Have l, Vaclav, 158
gremialista movement (Ch il e), 211 -1 2
Helms, Jesse, 58
Grenad ines, 30
Gross, Alan, 53 Helms-Burton Act see Cuban Li berty and Democratic So li-
da rity Act
Grupo Cla rin see Cla rin Group
Heritage Foundation (USA), 49
Grupo de Apoyo a la Democracia (USA), 161
Herrera Arau z, Belbina del Carmen, 227
Grupo Guanajuato (Mexico), 68
Hez bo ll ah, 49
Guantanamo prison, 46
HIV/AIDS, 215

hoarding of essential commod it ies, 125, 126
Hondu ras, 29, 30-1 , 32, 51- 2, 78; coup in, 25, 31, 32, 42, 52,
58, 94, 11 7, 148,162, 174,188, 194,208,225,229,231
Hondute l think tank, 32
H uma la, Ollanta, 99, 106
Human Rights 88 organization, 158
Human Rights Watch, 83, 154
Hydrocarbons Law (Venez uela), 118
identity po litics, 230
immigrants, undocumented, contro l of, 57
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (USA), 57
im port substitute in d ust rialization (ISi), 14 , 195- 6
income di strib ution, 92, 206; in Braz il , 172
Indepen dent Party of Co lour (Cuba), 149
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India, 4 3
India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) , 29
in digenous people, 56, 105, 135, 143, 146, 195; in elections,
74 ; movements of, 49, 50; rights of, 47
inflation, 131, 140, 143, 199
Institute fo r Cuban Studies, 153
Institute Peruano de Econom(a, Libertad y Democracia, 103
Inter-Ame rican Comm ission on Human Rights, 31
Inter-Ame rican Development Bank (IDB) , 136
Inter-Ame rican Dia logue, 54
Inter-Ame rican Press Associat ion, 117
International Comm ittee for Democracy in Cu ba, 158
International Cou rt of Justice, 182
International Law Enforcement Academy, 55
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), 31 19, 59, 128, 136, 139, jud icial power, 226
143, 144, 146, 169
Kagan, Robert, 45 1 46
International Repub lican Institute (IRI), 32- 3, 39, 51 , 52
Kennan, George, 27
inte rnet, use of, 103
Kennedy, John F., 150
INTESA com pany, 121
Kerr, Richard, 35
Iran, 29, 31, 42
Kirchner, Nestor, 19- 20, 98
Iran -Cont ra affair, 32, 33
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 27
Iraq, 53
Korea, 82
lst uriz, Arist6bulo, 115
Kriste l, William, 45, 46
Itaipu hydroelectric dam, 177
Ku Klux Klan, 57
Itaipu treaty, 182

La bastida Ochoa, Francisco, 67- 8

Jaeggli, Alfredo, 188
Laclau, Ernesto, 79
John Pau l 11, 102- 3
Lagos, Rica rdo, 217, 218, 219- 20
Jorge, Jose, 170
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land: distribution of, 120, 185; ownership of, 192 (concen- Liberal Party (Co lomb ia), 80, 82, 88
tration of, 92) Liberal Party (Paraguay), 22
land refo rm see agrarian refo rm libera lization, 14, 19, 25, 197,199
land less movements, 186, 190 liberation theo logy, 103
La ra, Rodrigo, 84 Limbaugh, Rush, 59
Lavin, Joaqufn, 219- 20 lob bying, 108
Ledezma, Antonio, 120, 127 Lobo, Porfirio 'Pepe', 31
left: as party of order, 169; in gove rnment, 230; mode rates Loingsigh, Gea roid 6, 88
politics, 228; vu lnerab ility of, 148 Lone ira, Pa blo, 222
left po lit ics in Latin Ame rica, 1- 2, 11, 38; post-2000, 14- 15 Lopez, Claudia, 90
left- right d istinction, 12 Lopez, Sinesio, 107
Legionnai res of Christ (Mexico), 65, 77 Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso, 80
Leon Va lencia, Gu illermo, 82 Lopez Obrador, And res Manuel, 63- 4, 69- 75
Lib by, I. Lewis, 45, 46 Lorens, Hugo, 33
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Los Tecos network (Mexico) , 6 5 ma rriage, equal rights law, in Argentina, 207
Lugo, Fe rnando, 7, 22- 3, 177- 93, 224 Marti n, Paul, 55
Lus inch i, Ja ime, 114 Marti nell i, Rica rdo, 227
Marulanda, Manue l, 84
Maciel, Marcial , 77
Mas Canosa, Jose, 159, 160
Maciel, Marco, 170
McCa in, John , 33, 51
Mack, Conn ie, 163
Med ia Law (Argenti na) , 206
Mac ri, Mau ricio, 204, 205, 207
med ia: private, 123, 210 - 11, 226 (attack ads , use of, 69 , 70,
MacShane, Den is, 11 9
71, 73- 4 1 75; censorsh ip of, 120; Cuban exile rad io stations,
Madrazo Pintado, Roberto, 69, 71, 72
152; demon ization by, 3; destab ilization campa igns of, 208;
mafia interests , 84; cont rol of po litics, 85- 90
d il ution of right-wing contro l of, 230 ; limit ing of licences,
Magalhaes, Anton io Ca rlos , 171
20 6- 7; powe r of, 4 , 189; ro le of, 116, 11 8, 11 9, 120- 1, 174 [in
ManTech company, 35
Argentina, 201-4 ; in Ch ile, 215]) ; state-owned , 148
maquiladoras, 29, 4 1 Med ina, Med6filo, 90
Mar del Plata summ it, 229

Mendoza, Henrique, 123
Menem , Ca rlos, 21 , 98, 196- 7, 200,205,217
Mercosur, 144; Venezue la's membership of, 175
Merida In itiative, 54
Mesa de Enlace netwo rk (Argentina), 199- 200
Mexico, 5, 14, 15- 17, 29, 31, 63- 77, 224, 226; and war on
d rugs, 40- 1
Miam i, Cuban exile politics in, 151- 2
Miam i Five, 153, 229
Micheletti, Roberto, 33
mi lita ry, 3, 101 , 121
mi lita ry bases of USA, 46, 85, 94, 208, 229
mi lita ry coups, 3, 13, 187- 8, 211
mi lita ry dictato rsh ip, 78, 80, 166- 8, 206, 212, 224, 225
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Minihan, Kenneth, 35
Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (USA), 57
misiones (Venezuela) rule by decree, 23
Montesinos, Vlad imi ro, 105
Mo rales, Evo, 6, 22, 23, 32, 39, 47, 50, 130- 47, 189, 217
Mo reira, Ivan, 218
Movimento Democratico Brasi lei ro (M DB) (Braz il ), 166
Movimento dos Trabalhado res Rura is Sem Te rra (Braz il ),
172
Movim iento al Socialismo (MAS) (Bolivia), 22, 131, 133- 6,
137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146- 7
Movim iento al Socialismo (Venezue la) , 119
Movim iento de Participaci6n So lidaria (Mex ico) , 76
Movim iento Libe rtad (ML) (Pe ru) , 99
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Movim iento Mira (Colombia), 89 (Bo livia), 130, 133, 134, 135, 142
Movim iento Revo lucionario Libera l (Co lomb ia) , 80 Negroponte, Diana Vill iers, 58
Movim iento Revo lucionario M-19 (Co lomb ia), 80, 83, 86 Negroponte, john, 33
Movim iento Revo lucionario Tupac Amaru (Peru), 102 neo li bera li sm, 4, 132, 140, 168, 171, 205, 208, 225, 227, 228;
Movim iento Unive rs ita rio de Renovado ra Orientaci6n repudiation of, 1- 2, 130
(Mexico), 65 neopopu li sm, right-wing, 225, 227
Mue rte a Secuest rado res (MAS), (Co lom bia), 86- 7 Neusda lt, Otto, 120
Mujica, Feli pe, 123 Neves, Tancredo, 167
New American Cent ury, 44- 9
Narvaez, Francisco de, 205
New Right (Peru), 18, 97, 99- 101, 103
National Academy for Pu blic Security (San Salvador), 47
newsprint, cont rolling production of, 202
National Democrat ic Inst it ute, 51
Nica ragua, 30, 32, 36, 39, 155, 157, 226; Contras, 44, 51, 52,
National Endowment for Democracy (N ED), 33, 45, 49, 50,
58
51, 119, 122, 124, 128, 138, 155; o rigins of, 52
Nieves, Marta, 86
nationa lizat ion, 128, 141, 145; of banks, 65; renationa lization
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No riega, Roger, 58 Organization of Petro leum Expo rting Count ries (OPEC) ,
No rth American Free Trade Agreement (NA FTA), 41, 55, 57 ll 6, ll 8
No rth, Oliver, 52, 154 Ortega, Dan iel, 40
No rth Korea, 38 Os pina Rodriguez, Mariano, 85
Nuevo Es pacio (Uruguay), 20 Oviedo, Li no, 179, 180, 183, 190
Numbers USA organization, 57
Pacto de Gobernabilidad (Paraguay) , 183
Obama, Barack, 30- 3, 38, 54, 58, 146, 163 Palan quero military base (Co lombia), 36-7
o il : access to, 27, 30; rising prices of, 142; surge in demand Pali n, Sarah, 59
fo r, 141 PAN Para Todos (Mexico), 63-77
Operation Condor, 44 Panama, 31, 227, 228
Operation Peter Pan , 152 Panama Cana l Zone, 33, 36
Opus Dei, 102, 103, 105, 226 Pando Massacre (Bolivia), 148
Organization of American States (OAS), 28, 29, 42, 47, 94, Paniagua, Va lentin, 105
124, 161,229, 230 Papel Prensa company (Argerntina) , 202
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Paraguay, 3, 4, 7, 15, 21- 4, 78, 224, 226- 7; right in, 177 Partido do Movimento Democratico Bras ileiro (PM DB) ,
param ilitaries, 17, 82- 3, 85- 90, 126, 127 167, 171
param ilitarism, Colom bian mode l of, 94 Partido do Trabalhadores (PT) (B razil), 42, 7 65- 6, 170, 171,
Partido Acci6n Nacional (PAN) (Mexico) , 15- 16, 63- 77, 175, 176, 224
227- 8; Oportun idades programme, 68 Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Argentina), 20, 21, 200
Partido da Frente Libera l (PF L) (Brazil), 17, 165, 167- 8, 170, Partido Libera l (P L) (Brazil), 17
171 Partido Libera l Radica l Autentico (PLRA) (Paraguay), 180,
Partido da Social Democracia Bras ileira (PS DB) (B razi l), 42, 183, 184, 188
170, 171 Partido Nacional (P N) (Chile), 21 1
Partido de lntegraci6n Nacional (Co lom bia), 89 Partido Po pular Cristiano (PPC) (Peru), 99, 105
Partido Democratica Cristiana (PDC) (C hile), 21 1 Partido Revolucionario lnstituciona l (PRI) (Mex ico) , 15, 64,
Partido Democratico de la Revoluci6n (PR D) (Mex ico) , 66, 16, 72; Progreso programme, 68
69- 76; co ll a pse of, 75 Partido Social Cristiano de Venezu ela (COPE i) (Venezue la),
Partido Democratico Trabhalista (PDT) (Brazil), 166- 7 22
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Partido Social de Unidad Naciona l (PSUN) (Colombia), 88 Pentagon, 50
Partido Social Democratico (Brazi l), 167 Pe rez, Carlos And res, 114- 15
Partido Sociali sta Brasileiro (PSB), 167 Perez Jimenez, Ma rcos, 128
Partido Trabha li sta Brasileiro, 165 Pe ron, Juan Dom ingo, 79, 98
partidos nanicos (B raz il), 168 peronismo, 98, 224
Pastrana, Misael, 80 Pe ru, 5, 6, 14, 15, 17- 18, 31, 224, 226; bo rder issue with
Pastrana Borrero, Andres, 83, 84 Ch ile, 217; right-wing po litics nn, 96-109
Pate, Joseph, 26 Pe ru Posib ile o rgan ization, 105
Patriot Act (USA), 55 Petkoff, Teodoro, 11 9
Paz Estenssoro, Ange l, 131 Petrob ras com pany, 144, 173
Paz Zamo ra, Jaime, 131 Petr61eos de Venezuela SA (P DVSA), 116, 118-22
peasant organizations, 82 Petr61eos Mexicanos (PEM EX), 63, 68; privatization plans
Pena, Alfredo, 122 fo r, 76
pens ion scheme (Argentina), 205-6 Pinera , Sebastian , 7, 20, 41-2, 210 , 216, 218, 219, 220-3, 227
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'pink tide', 1, 14, 19, 131, 14 6, 161 ,1 62, 227, 228,229, 231; US Por el Pars que Sonamos (Co lomb ia), 89
reaction to, 44 Posada Carri les, Luis, 151, 154- 5, 162- 3
Pinochet, Augusto, 19, 20, 202, 210 , 212, 213, 214- 15, 217, poverty, 11 6, 185,206; in Brazil, 172- 3; reduction of, 181 , 187,
218; a rrested in London , 214 , 219; death of, 220- 1 220
piqueteros, 200 Powell , Co li n, 122- 3
Plan Colomb ia, 40 , 55, 84- 5 Primero Justicia (Venezuela), 11 9
Plan Lazo (Colomb ia) , 82 privatization, 1, 2, 14 , 19, 30, 53, 68, 76, 120, 132, 141, 197,
Plan Real (B raz il), 170 205, 212; of o il , 116; oppos itio n to, 44, 45
Pode r Democratico Social (POD EMOS) , 134, 138 Project for Democracy in Central America, 52
Podho retz, No rman, 45 Propuesta Republicana (PRO} (Argentina) , 204
Polo Democratico Alte rnative (PDA) (Co lomb ia), 91 Protestantism , Evangelica l, 4
poo r people, voting fo r the right, 13 Proyecto de Elecciones Naciona les Comparadas, 70
popu li sm, 79, 88 Publ ic Dipl omacy Programe, 39
populismo de derecha , 98 Pumarejo, Alfonso Lopez, 79
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Punto Fijo pact, 114, 11 8, 128 219,220,222
Renovaci6n Nacional (RN) (Pe ru) , 105
Qu intana, Juan Ramon , 138
Renta Dignidad (Bo livia), 135
Qu iroga, Jo rge, 50, 131
Reuteman , Carlos, 205

Rad io and TV Ma rt i, 159 Rey, Rafel, 105

Radonski, Capri les, 120 Rice, Condo leezza, 47

raw mate ria ls exports, dependence on, 231 right: adaptation to democratic conditions, 96; as loyal

Reagan , Ronald , 155, 158 oppos it ion, 18- 21; defin ition of, 12-1 3; in ALBA countries,

Reagan Doctrine, 58 39; in Argentina, 194- 209; in Braz il, 165- 76; in Ch il e, 210 -
23; in Co lomb ia, 93- 5; in Cuban opposition, 148- 64; in
Red Fam ilia, 56
Reich, Otto, 32- 3, 58, 120 Mexico, 63- 77; in oppos it ion, 6 (problematic, 21- 4) ; in

Rel igious Right, 59 Paraguay, 177; in Peru, 96- 109; in powe r, 5, 15- 17, 221 - 3; in

rem ittances, decli ne in, 229 South Ame rica, 11-25; in Venezue la, 11 3- 29; specificity and

Renovaci6n Nacional (RN) (Chi le), 20, 213, 214, 215, 218, variety of, 224; typology of, 5; with influence on
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government, 17-1 8 Sahagun, Marta, 67
right-wing advantage, elements of, 2- 4 Salinas de Gortari, Ca rlos, 66, 69
road blockades, 194, 200 same-sex marriage, 56
Rodrfguez, Andres, 178 Samper, Ernesto, 84
Ro jas Pinill a, Gustavo, 78 1 80 San Salva dor, 47, 56
Romero , Dionisio, 102 Sanchez de Losada, Gon zalo, 131, 146
Rooseve lt, Fran klin D., 26 Sand inistas, 11, 226
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, 154, 162 1 163 Santander, 85
Rosa les, Manuel, 125, 127 Santiago Creel, 69
Rousseff, Dilma Vana, 42, 176 Santos, Juan Manuel, 16, 40, 90, 94
Rumsfeld , Dona ld , 45 Sa rney, Jose, 167
Ruse r, Claudia, 186 School of the Americas, 35- 6, 44 , 56, 87
Russ ia, 31 , 43 Scioli, Dan iel, 204
Secreta ria de Acci6n Social (Pa raguay), 187
Saca, Tony, 55
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Secreta ria de Emergencia Nacional (Paraguay), 187 social ownersh ip of economy, 148
Security and Prospe rity Part nership, 55 socialism, twenty-first-centu ry, 189, 192
Sende ro Luminoso (Peru), 99, 103 Socialist Pa rty (Chi le), 224
Serra, Jose, 42- 3, 174 Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Chile), 210
Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (S ERNAM) (Ch il e), 215- 16 Sociedad lnte ramericana de Prensa, 206
sex education, opposition to, 226 Sociedad Naciona l de Agricu ltura (Ch ile), 210
Shannon, Thomas, 30, 52, 55, 146 Sociedad Rura l (Argentina), 196
Shapiro, am bassado r, 123 Soda lit ium Christ ianae Vitae, 102, 103
Sil va, Lu iz Inacio da, 'Lula', 6- 7, 17, 28, 96, 165, 170; and t he soft power, 225
Brazilian right, 171- 4; electora l defeats of, 169; popu la rity of, Somoza, Anastasio, 26
1 74 Soto, Hernando de, 100, 103, 109
single-pa rty ru le, 13 South American Defence Council, 48
slavery, 149, 165 soya: genetica lly modified, 197; oil production, 198; produc-
Social Democrats/USA, 52 tion of, in Argentina, 195- 7
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state, depoliticization of, 132 Tea Pa rty, 57, 59
street fight ing, 125 te le phone inte rcepts, 90
strikes, 23, 194; ca pitalist, 3-4, 199 (in Ch ile, 211 ; in temas va/6ricos, 215, 226
Venezue la, 121- 2) te rritorial bounda ry issues, 228
St roess ner, Alfredo, 22, 178 te rror: attacks on Cuba, 150- 1; in USA (as means of enforc-
strongman politics, 224 ing hegemony, 152- 3; tole ration of, 154- 5); state terro r, in
struct ural adjustment prog rammes, 45 Brazil, 166
students, ro le of, 125 think tan ks, right-wing, 44- 59
Suarez, Ma rco Fidel, 85 Timmons, John, 33
Su mate organ ization (Venezuela), 53, 122 To ledo, Alejandro, 104, 105- 6
Summ it of the Ame ricas, 58 torture, 86, 102
Track 2 st rategy of USA, 51, 155
Tamayo, Orlan do Za pata, 39
tractorazos, 192
tax reform, 177, 184 , 186, 191
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
taxation, 173, 199, 204; amnesties, 90

(USA) , 160
t rade unions , 20, 27, 200; elim i nation of, 4 1, 92
t ransnational com pan ies , in Bo livia, 139-43
Tu rbay Aya la, Ju lio Cesa r, 85, 86
Uniao Democrat ica Naciona l (Brazil), 165
Union Civica Democratica de H ondu ras, 51 - 2
Union Cfvica Ra dica l (UCR) (Argentina) , 21, 204
Union de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASU R), 28, 94, 228,
229
Union de l Cent ro Democrat ico (UCO) (Argentina) , 21, 196
Union Democrata lndepend iente (UD I) (Chile) , 20, 212,
214, 215, 218,220,222
Union Juven il Crucefi ist a (U JC) (Bo livia) , 135
Union Naciona l de Ciudadanos Et icos
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(Paraguay) , 180, 184, 186
Union of Soviet Socia li st Repu blics (USSR) , fa ll of, 83
Union Patriotica (UP) (Co lombia, 91
Unidad Naciona l (UN) (Bolivii a) , 134
Unidad Naciona l (UN) (Peru), 105
Unidad Popu lar (UP) (Ch il e) , 211
Union Naciona l Sina rqu ist a (Mexico) , 76- 7
Unit ed Nat ions (UN), 47, 144
UN Commiss ion on H uman Right s, 158
UN Declarat ion of Human Right s, 159
UN Development Programme, 172
UN H uman Rights Council, 156
UN Wo rking G roup on A rbit ra ry Det ention , 153
Unit ed States of America (USA) , 1, 3, 124; Cuban t rans it ion
(U NACE)
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funds, 149; destabi lizing tactics of, 131; fore ign policy of, 30; US Army Special Warfa re Team, 82
funding of Cuban right, 159; fund ing of transition strategies, US Navy, Fourth Fleet, 37- 8, 46
229; hegemony of, 78- 95 (cha ll enges to, 28- 30); inte r- US- Mexico borde r, 57
ference in Bo livia, 136- 9; mi lita ry bases in Latin Ame rica,
vaccination programmes fo r children, 206
32, 37 (conflict ove r, 33- 8); policy towa rds Cuba, 6, 150;
Valenzue la, Arturo, 208
relations with Latin American right, 26- 43; relations with
Varela Project, 157
Paraguay, 182; role in Latin America, 5, 6, 44- 59, 148, 208,
Vargas, Getu lio, 165
224, 229; Special Fo rces, 150; subve rsion by, 38- 40
Vargas Llosa, Mario, 18, 50, 79, 94, 99- 10 1, 104, 107, 108;
Uribe, Alva ro, 15, 16, 40, 83, 85, 88- 90, 93
Uruguay, 18- 21, 35 auto-golpe, 104
Velasco Alva rado, Juan, 102
US Agency fo r Inte rnationa l Development (USAID), 33, 42,
Venezue la, 2, 4 5, 6, 14, 15 21-4, 30- 3, 35, 38 40 42, 48,
1 1 1 1
50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58- 9, 124, 137; Cuba Program, 161; funding
50, 53, 54, 94, 154, 157, 224, 229, 230; Colomb ian pa ram il -
fo r Bolivia, 38- 9; funding for Venezue la, 38; grants by, 38- 9;
itaries in, 94, 126, 127; cou p in, 47 51, 148 162; Fourt h
1 1
Offi ce of Transition Initiatives, 50,138
Republic, 114- 16; support fo r Bolivia, 146; US attitude to, 30
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Vida Humana Internationa l, 56 women, 28; em powe rment of, 215- 16; in powe r, 220; mob i-
vigi lante grou ps, 18 lization of, 11 7; rights of, 56,230
violence, domestic, in Chil e, 215- 16 Workers' Party (Brazil), 6
Violencia, La (Colombia), 79- 80, 82, 83 World Ban k, 3, 128, 136, 139, 142, 144, 146
Vo ice of America, 159 World Social Fo rum, 49

Washington Consensus, 1, 3, 48, 67, 100, 109, 131, 169, 175, 230
Walesa, Lech, 158 Yacimientos Petro lrferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) , 141
welfare policy programmes, 228
War of the Thousand DaysHemisphere
Western , 78- 9 for Security Cooperation, 56 Yarbo rough, Willi am , 82, 86
(Colombia) Institute
War on Drugs, 40-Wolfowitz,
1, 83- 4, 225
Paul, 44–5
Za laquett, Pab lo, 216
War on Terro r, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52, 59, 85, 89, 160, 225
Za ld ivar, And res, 219
Wash ington Consensus, 1, 3, 48, 67, 100, 109, 131, 169, 175,
Zapat ista movement, 55
230
I I" I• Zavala. Fidel. 1 qo