Elaetic One PDF

Parmenides and the Eleatic One1
by J o n a t h a n Barnes (Oxford)
Φοβούμαι μη ούτε τα λεγόμενα
συνιώμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος
είπε πολύ πλέον λειπώμεθα
/. Introduction
Take pen and paper, and attempt to catalogue the furniture of the
universe: your enumeration, according to Melissus, will end before it
has begun. For the universe consists of one single unique item: enti-
ties are necessarily infinite in extent; but "if there were two, they
1
A draft of this paper was read several years ago to the B Club at Cambridge:
I gained greatly by the discussion there. Some of the matters I touch upon are
discussed at more length in my forthcoming book on the Presocratics. — Fragments
and testimonia are cited in the normal way by reference to Diels—Kranz, Die Frag-
mente der Vorsokratiker. The following works will be referred to by author's name
and page numbers only: —
C. B umker: "Die Einheit des parmenideischen Seienden", Jahrb. class. Philol. 32.
1886, 541-61
J. Bollack[l]: "Sur deux fragments de Parmenide", REG 70, 1957, 56-71
J. Bollack [2]: review of Untersteiner [l], Gnomon 40, 1968, 533-40
K. Bormann: Parmenides (Hamburg, 1971)
L. Campbell: The Theaetetus of Plato (Oxford, 18832)
F. M. Cornford: Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939)
H. Diels: Parmenides' Lehrgedicht (Berlin, 1897)
H. Fr nkel: "Parmenidesstudien", in his Wege und Formen fr hgriechischen Denkens
(Munich, 19683) = Furley and Allen
D. J. Furley: "Notes on Parmenides", in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. Rom
(edd.), Exegesis and Argument, Phronesis suppt.I (Assen, 1973)
D. J. Furley and R.E.Allen (edd.): Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (London.
1970-5)
W. K.C.Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1962- )
U. H lscher: Parmenides — vom Wesen des Seienden (Frankfurt-am-Main, 19(>9)
J. Jantzen: Parmenides zum Verh ltnis von Sprache und Wirklichkeit, 7xMcmala (x*
(Munich, 1976)
G. S. Kirk and J.E. Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 19S7)
J.H.M. M. Loencn: Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias (Assen. 1959)
A. A. Long: "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony", Phnmcsix 8. 1»>M.
90-107 = Furley and Allen
A. P. D. Mourelatos: The Route of Parmenides (New Haven, Conn., l l >70)
0003-9101 /79/Of> 1 1 -0001 $2.00
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2 J o n a t h a n Harnes
o HI Id not he infinite hut would have hounds against one another"

(30 li to\ el. 7J5) 2 ; thus at most one ohjcct exists.
'lixactly one thing exists1. 'Iliat is the intoxicating thesis of 'real'
monism. It is, of course, utterly distinct from its milksop homonym,
'material' monism, which maintains that everything is made of some
single matter or stuff. As a philosophico-scientific thesis it is at best
ahsurd and at worst unintelligible; yet beyond all doubt it was pro-
pounded by Melissus.
Almost to a man, scholars deny Melissus any monistic originality:
he inherited real monism, together with most of the rest of his philos-
ophy, from father Parmenides; and it was the uncouth verses of the
Way of Truth which placed το εν at the centre of Eleatic meta-
physics3. A few heterodox students have quarrelled with that ascrip-
tion, doubting the presence — or at least questioning the importance —
of The One in Parmenides' thought4; but their scruples have been
A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.): The Presocratics (Garden City, N.Y., 1974)
G. E.L.Owen: "Eleatic Questions", CQ n.s. 10, 1960, 84-102 = Furley and Allen
G. Reale: Melissa - testimonianze e frammenti (Florence, 1970)
K. Reinhardt: Parmenides (Bonn, 1916)
M. Schofield: "Did Parmenides discover Eternity?", AGPh 52, 1970, 113-35
E. Schwabl: "Parmenides", Anz. Alt. 9, 1956, 129-56
F. Solmsen: "The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined", Phronesis 16, 1971,
116-41 = Mourelatos (ed.)
M.C. Stokes: One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1971)
L.Tar n: Parmenides (Princeton, N.J., 1965)
M. Untersteiner [1]: Parmenide — testimonianze e frammenti (Florence, 1958)
M. Untersteiner [2]: Zenone — testimonianze e frammenti (Florence, 1963)
W. J. Verdenius: Parmenides (Groningen, 1942)
J.Whittaker: God, Time, Being, Symb. OsL suppt. 23 (Oslo, 1971)
J.R.Wilson: "Parmenides, B 8.4", CQ n.s. 20, 1970, 32-4
L.Woodbury: "Parmenides on Names", HSCP 63, 1958, 145-60
E. Zeller and R. Mondolfo: La filosofia del Greci, Part I vol.iii, ed. G. Reale (Flor-
ence, 1967).
2
It is clear (pace Kirk and Raven, p. 300) that Melissus means to infer uniqueness
from infinity and not vice versa (see e.g. Stokes, p. 148). In 30 B 6 "το μέγεθος
άπειρον" means "infinite in spatial extent" (see e.g. Guthrie, vol. II, p. 110 n.2;
Reale, pp. 82-6; contra: Simplicius, in Phys 109.32: G.Vlastos, review of J. E.
Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Gnomon 25, 1953, 29—35 = Furley and Allen).
3
Monism is such a familiar feature of Eleatic thought that it is rarely discussed: there
are plenty of confident ascriptions (e.g. Kirk and Raven, p. 329: the "Parmenidean
tenet . . . which Parmenides himself . .. valued most of all (was) his monism");
but few argue for the ascription or attempt to imagine what real monism means —
the best effort I know is that in H. Fr nkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy,
trans. M.Hadas and J.Willis (Oxford, 1975), pp. 349-70.
4
See esp. B umker; M. Untersteiner, "L'essere di Parmenide e ούλον ηοη έΎ", Riv.
crit. stor. filos. 10, 1955, 5—23 = Untersteiner [1], pp. XXVII—L; Untersteiner [2],
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Parmenides and the Eleatic One 3
unconvincingly expressed, and they have failed to shake the ortho-

doxy. And indeed, the orthodoxy has reason for complacency: the
history of fifth century thought is often seen to hinge on Parmenidean
monism; a luxuriant doxography is pretty well unanimous in ascribing
το εν to Parmenides5; and the thesis of real monism is apparently
both stated and argued for in the surviving fragments of Parmenides'
poem.
In this paper, I shall argue that we have in reality no reason to
make Parmenides a monist. My approach is negative and serial:
I shall simply consider one by one the texts and suppositions which
have been or might be adduced in the quest for monism, and I shall
endeavour to show that their adduction is of no avail. My aim is to
prick the hide of orthodoxy: even the most sagacious elephant may
benefit from the occasional gad-fly's sting.
//. Fifth Century Thought
'The first Milesian philosophers posited a primordial unity or One;

from that unique αρχή they generated a pluralistic world. Parmenides
argued that the initial posit was correct, the subsequent generation
impossible: in the beginning there was but one thing; and that one
pp. 215 —8 (cf. Reale, pp. 109-16). Baumker and Untersteiner concentrate upon
the doxography and 28 B 8A\ their arguments thus ignore most of the relevant
passages, and they have been largely disregarded (rejections by Schwabl, pp. 150—1;
Bollack [2]; Stokes, p. 308 n.65; further references in Zeller and Mondolfo,
pp. 198—201). — F. Solmsen ("The 'Eleatic One' in Melissus", Med. konink. ned.
ak. wet., Afd. Lett. 32.8, 1969) argues that το εν is of no great importance in
Parmenides' thought (see already Reinhardt, p. 108; cf. Solmsen, p. 120); Taran,
pp. 269—91, argues that Plato and Aristotle misrepresent the Eleatic One. Neither
scholar denies real monism to Parmenides. — Mourelatos, pp. 130—3, suggests that
Parmenides did not attack τα πολλά, and was not a "holistic monist"; but "Par-
menides argues for monism in the sense in which we speak of idealists or mate-
rialists as "monists"." Mourelatos' position is tentative, and he does not argue for
it at any length. See also B.Jones, "Parmenides' 'The Way of Truth'", 7. Hist. Phil.
5
11, 1973, 287-98.
E.g. Plato, Theaet 180 E; Soph 242 D; Aristotle, Met A4, 986b 18 = 28 A 24;
Simplicius, in Phys 115.11-7 = A 28 (quoting Theophrastus, Phys. Op. fr. 7 D,
Eudemus, fr. 43 W, Alexander); Plutarch, adv. Col. 1114 DE = A 34 \ Hippolylus,
Ref Ι.Π = A 23. — Eudemus says that Parmenides ου φαίνεται δεικνύει ν ότι fv
το δν (fr. 43 W = Simplicius, in Phys 115.16 = A 28): he means that Parmcnidcs'
argument is unsound, not that Parmenides offers no argument. - Proclus infers
from 5, 5.25, and Β #.44, that Parmenides ονκ άγνοιϊ το πλήθος τ«»ν νοηιιον
(in Parm 708.7-709.6); and he is followed by Asclepius (in Met 202.15 «>) and
Philoponus (in Phys 65.12-3); bul that is part of the wholly unlnstoncal Nco

4 J o n a t h a n Barnes
thing could never t u r n into many. Of Parmcnidcs' followers, Zeno

defended him indirectly, by attacking all forms of pluralism; and
Melissus defended him directly, by restating his main theses and argu-
ments in plain prose. Finally, the neo-Ionian revivalists, Empedocles
and Anaxagoras, hoped to evade the snares of Eleatic ontology by
denying the initial Milesian posit: assuming a primordial plurality,
they sprung Parmenides' trap and rescued the multifold world.' That
rough sketch summarizes a commonly accepted account of the devel-
opment of Presocratic philosophy6: the account turns on the monism
of Parmenides, and its plausibility provides the first and most general
reason for making Parmenides a monist.
I doubt that any general history of early Greek thought can in itself warrant the
ascription of any particular doctrine to any particular Presocratic philosopher. We can-
not, as historians, avoid weaving in our imaginations some great tapestry of Pre-
socratic thought; but our imaginings are merely fantastical if they are not grounded
in a nice observation of those few torn fragments which have escaped time's vandal-
ism. Our knowledge of Presocratic thought is meagre; our knowledge of Presocratic
chronology is nugatory. The torn fragments no longer determine a unique design: we
cannot infer an overall pattern from the surviving pieces, and then use the coherence
and symmetry of that pattern to support and vivify the inference.
In any case, the orthodox pattern I have just sketched is most implausible. First,
we cannot properly construe the real monism of Elea as a ratification of the earlier
Milesian monisms; for the two monisms are, as I have already remarked, entirely
different in their content — only the names are the same.
Seondly, the central tenet of the neo-Ionian revival was not pluralism: Empedocles
and Anaxagoras were out to vindicate change and alteration. It was Parmenides'
attack on generation and destruction, and thence on the apparent alterations in the
phenomenal world, which posed the great challenge to his successors; and that attack
is, logically speaking, quite independent of the matter of monism.
Thirdly, it is wrong to read Zeno's attacks on pluralism as an indirect defence of
monism: to argue against pluralism is not — witness Gorgias — to argue for monism;
and several of the weapons in Zeno's armoury are, notoriously, effective' against
monists and pluralists alike. A strand of the ancient doxography suggests that Zeno
was a destructive antilogician, not a conservative defender of the Eleatic establishment.
Against that suggestion we have only Plato's celebrated story at the beginning of
Parmenides\ and I sympathise with the view that there is more genial invention in that
tale than most scholars are willing to allow.7
platonic reconstruction of Parmenides' thought (see esp. Simplicius, in Phys 142.28—
144.25; cf. e.g. ibid., 136.27-31; and see the criticisms by Bδumker, pp. 541-6).
Cf. Plotinus, Enn V. 1.8.14-27.
6
The major English exponent of this account is Cornford; Stokes' book constitutes
a sustained attack upon it.
7
For a developed exposition of this view, see Solmsen; contra G. Vlastos, "Plato's
Testimony concerning Zeno of Elea", JHS 95, 1975, 136-62.

Fourthly, there is Melissus. This poor man is traditionally regarded with an affec-
tionate contempt: failing to find a publisher for his naval memoirs, he tried to eke
out his pension by producing a cadet edition of the Way of Truth. That work is
regularly snubbed: Melissus echoes his master's voice; only his errors are his own. But
that old slander is, 1 think, false to the core.8 In any case, as far as monism goes, it
need not detain us. For Melissus' excellent argument for monism is certainly not
Parmenidean; and if, as most scholars allow, Parmenides' One (if there really is such
a thing) was spatially finite, Melissus' argument could not in consistency have been
advanced by his master.9 If the argument was not pillaged from Parmenides, need we
suppose that its monistic conclusion was?
The first argument for ascribing monism to Parmenides fails: no
general consideration of the history of Presocratic thought can guar-
antee that ascription.
///. The Doxography
Doxographical reports are valuable only if their original source is

lost; and we need not attend to the numerous second-hand reports
of Parmenidean monism unless we no longer have access to the first-
hand documents on which those reports are based.
28 B 8, the long central fragment of the Way of Truth, is quoted by
Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Simplicius pre-
faces the quotation as follows: και ευ τω μη δοκώ γλισχρος, ήδέως
αν τα περί του ενός δντος έπη του Παρμενίδου μηδέ πολλά οντά
τοίσδε τοίς ύπομνήμασι παραγράψαιμι δια τε την πίστιν των υπ"
εμού λεγομένων [sc. in 142.28—144.25] και δια την σπάνιν του
Παρμενιδείου συγγράμματος (in Phys 144.25 = A 21). It is generally
assumed that Simplicius was both honest and well-informed; and that
he used, with scholarly care, the Academic library at Athens, which
will have contained a full and accurate text of Parmenides' poem. If
that is so, we still possess in fragment B 8 everything that Parmenides
wrote περί του ενός οντος; and we can scarcely suppose that a pas-
sage asserting or arguing for monism would fail to be included under
that heading. In short, if we may trust Simplicius, we possess and can
scan for ourselves all the first hand evidence on which the doxo-
graphers based their monistic interpretation of Parmenides.
8
v
See csp. Reale, pp. 253-68 (and pp. 29-30 for a list of Mclissus* detractors)
So B umker, p. 559 n.48; cf. Corntord, p. 44; Guthric. vol. II, pp 52 3 Some
hold that Parmenides' έόν is not finite (see csp. Owen, pp 95 101, also l-iankcl.
pp. 195-7; Stokes, pp. 140-1; and cf. Simplicius, in /Viy\ 14^.29 3<? .<* ΛΟ.
detailed references to the controversy in Taran, pp. 150- 60, /.cllci and Moiulollo.
pp. 238-41 ; Hermann, pp. 171-9.

Γ> Jonathan Barnes
Λ narrow inspection bears out that conclusion. The argument for monism which
the doxography constantly ascribes to Parmcnides appears first in Aristotle: παρά γαρ
to v ιό μη ov oiuVv αξιών t·(ναι. εξ ανάγκης £ν οίεται [sc. Παρμενίδης] το δν
και Λλλο oiuVv (Met Λ 5, 9K6b29 = A 24\ cf. I* 4, 1001 a32).10 it is plain that
Aristotle spun that argument from lines 36—7 of R #, and hence that those lines are the
ultimate source for the doxographical ascription. We are thus in a position to assess the
judiciousness of the Aristotelian interpretation; and the doxographers have no in-
dependent evidential value on the point.
It may be admitted that the traditional adulation of Simplicius' scholarship is over-
done;" and there are reasons for thinking that his text of Parmenides was not the
only one available to ancient commentators.12 Moreover, his claim to have copied
out τΰ ju-ρΐ του ενός δντος έπη does not strictly imply — and probably was not
meant to imply — that every word bearing on The One was contained in the verses
which he proceeds to quote. Nevertheless, it remains a reasonable hypothesis that
Parmenides urged real monism in Β 8 if he urged it at all. And in that case we may
properly ignore the doxography.
IV. The Fragments
If we are to ascribe monism to Parmenides, we must ground that

ascription on the surviving fragments of his poem — and the ascription
will, of course, be incontestable if we can discover a text which un-
equivocally states or argues for the monistic thesis. The riches may
here embarrass us; for there are no less than nine passages in which
scholars have descried such monistic pretensions (though no one
scholar has adduced all nine texts). I shall examine the passages
seriatim.
10
The argument is repeated, with modifications, by Theophrastus (Phys. Op. fr. 7 D)
and Eudemus (fr. 43 W), whose criticism of it derives from Phys A 3, 186a23—5
(texts in Simplicius, in Phys 115.11-7 = A 28). All the doxographers copy it (see
esp. Untersteiner [1], p. XXXIV, n.40); Porphyry adds an embellishment of his
own (Simplicius, in Phys 116.11-8; cf. 236.6-12). — Simplicius (in Phys 116.25—
117.13) appears to think that the argument derives from B 2 and B 6; but those
fragments have nothing to do with monism, and Aristotle's text audibly echoes
B 8.36-7.
11
Thus Whittaker, pp. 19—21, argues that Simplicius did not have the Academy
Library available to him when he commented on the Physics; and, pointing to
B 8.33 and 57, and to the scholion (Simplicius, in Phys 31.3-7 = Diels—Kranz,
1.240.11-5 — see Diels, pp. 96-100), he infers that Simplicius' copy of Parmenides
"was the product of unintelligent transcription from an annotated source". That
verdict is unjust; and, in general, a more careful account of Simplicius' intellectual
milieu may be found in A. Cameron, "The Last Days of the Academy at Athens",
PCPS n.s.15, 1969, 7-29.
12
See below on B 8.4-6.

(A) 28 B 4:
λεΰσσε δ' όμως άπεόντα νόω παρεόντα βεβαίως·
ου γαρ άποτμήξει το έόν του έόντος εχεσθαι,
ούτε σκιδνάμενον πάντη πάντως κατά κόσμον
ούτε συνιστάμενον.
These lines are difficult, even by Parmenidean standards. Their context is lost: some
scholars locate them on the Way of Opinion, others place them along the Way of
Truth; and both their general purport and their particular meaning are matters of
uncertainty and dispute.13 1 am concerned only with the potential monism of Β 4,
and hence only with line 2; for it is in that line, if anywhere, that we must discover
the Eleatic One.
The syntax of the line is obscure, but its sense is clear: 'You cannot separate what
is from what is'. Now that assertion is not overtly monistic; nor will a closer
investigation reveal a latent monism. We may imagine some train of thought such as
this: 'You cannot separate one entity from all others; for if you did, there would be
gaps about it, and those gaps would be filled by το μη δν — which, as we know,
is impossible'. Such a line of reasoning does not lead to monism. Other reasonings may,
of course, be excogitated; but I can think of none which is both plausible and
monistic in aim — indeed, I sympathise with those who see pluralism explicit in the
fragment.14
We may forget about Β 4: it was, in any event, the weakest of the nine stays of
monism.
(B) 28 Β 8.4:
The next three passages form consecutive lines; Diels-Kranz print them thus:
εστί γαρ ούλομελές τε και άτρεμες ήδ' άτέλεστον
ουδέ ποτ' ην ούδ' εσται, έπει νυν εστίν όμοϋ παν,
£ν, συνεχές' τίνα γαρ γένναν διζήσεαι αυτού;
The subject of Parmenides' metaphysical predications is invariably expressed in the
singular. Here, in line 6, it is picked out by αυτό (cf. 13(7), 29), elsewhere by μιν
(9, 23, 31, 46) or by το (37, 44). Sometimes instead of those colourless pronouns
we find the phrase το έόν (19(7), 32, 35, 37). It is thus beyond dispute that the subject
of Β 8 is το έόν, "what is". And in our present three lines there have been found
three assertions that το έόν is unique.
Line 4 is as controversial as any in Parmenides. The central third of the verse
( . . . τε και άτρεμες ήδ'...) is free from suspicion: beginning and end arc holly
disputed. I restrict my attention to the beginning, for which the ancient authorities
appear to offer us three versions.
13
For a budget of interpretations see: Reinhardt, pp. 48-50; Bollack |1j; Unter -
steiner, pp. XC-CI; Tar n, pp. 48-50; U. H lscher, Anf ngliches Fragen (G ttin
14
gen, 1968), pp. 117-26; H lscher, pp. 115-24; Bormann, pp. 84-90.
So B umker, p. 556 (who also finds pluralism at .25); Bollack 111, pp. 57-8;
contra: Guthrie, vol. II, p. 32.
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X Jonathan Harnes
(i) Simplicius, who is our prime source, quotes line 4 five times in all,15 and he
always starts it w i t h : οι'ιλον μοι»νογι:νΓς tr .. . I'hiloponus (in I'hys 65.7) offers the
same t e x t , so do Clement (Strom V.xiv.114), liusebius (/'/: XIH.xiii.39) and Theo-
dorctus (( ur IV.7). (ii) Husebius and Theodoretus elsewhere give a different reading:
μοϋνον μουνογ* vrq τι . . . (/*/·,' l.viii.5 — pseudo-Plutarch, Λ 22; Cur II.108).16 (iii)
Proclus once quotes Parmenides as saying: . . . ούλομελές τε καΐ άτρεμές . . . (in
Γαηη I I.S2.24: two oblique reports iterate ούλομελές - 1077.24; 1084.29); and
Plutarch says of Parmenides' One: εστί γαρ ούλομελές τε και άτρεμές ήδ' άγενητόν,
UK άρτος rtoi|Kt (adv. Cot 11 14 C). These traces of a third version of line 417 require
a supplement; and the obvious suggestion is: (μοϋνον τ') ούλομελές τε . . .18.
Most scholars now accept Simplicius' version, regarding (ii) and (iii) as the result
of scribal slips or erroneous memories.19 That is plausible with (ii)20, but less so
w i t h ( i i i ) ; and in any case, it will be prudent to allow the advocates of Parmenidean
monism their choice among all three versions.
Their case will depend in part on the interpretation of the word "μουνογενές".
In all its classical occurrences, the word "μονογενής" can perhaps be translated as
"only begotten": -γενης draws its sense from γίγνεσθαι.21 But Parmenides' subject is
άγτνητόν (Β #.3): it cannot, therefore, have been characterised as only begotten. And
we might hastily infer that versions (i) and (ii) of line 4 are inauthentic.22
That inference is premature. For the termination -γενης may draw its sense from
γένος rather than from γίγνεσθαι; that is to say, μονογενής may attach itself seman-
15
in Phys 30.2; 78.13; 87.21; 120.23; 145.4; cf. 147.15. μονογενές is a common
variant for μουνογενές; τε is sometimes omitted: otherwise the citations are iden-
tical.
16
And at Cur IV.7 μοϋνον is a variant for ούλον.
17
The passages do not represent an independent fragment, as Loenen, pp. 75—7,
supposes (his three 'new fragments' of Parmenides are all illusory). — I do not
know if Simplicius, in Phys 137.15, indicates knowledge of the reading ούλομελές
(so Whittaker, p. 30 n. 17).
18
The εστί γαρ printed by Diels—Kranz is absurd (but popular: references in Unter-
steiner [1], p. XXIX): it makes nonsense of the argument and has no textual
authority. (The phrase belongs to Plutarch: compare e.g. Simplicius, in Phys 120.23;
see e.g. Bollack [2], p. 534 n.2.) For (μοϋνον τ') see R.Westman, Plutarch gegen
Kolotes, Acta Philosophica Fennica 7 (Helsinki, 1955), pp. 236—9: the conjecture
makes the Proclan text morphologically close to the Simplician; and it invites us to
explain Eusebius' version as a conflation.
19
References in Untersteiner [1], pp. XXVII-XXX; Taran, pp. 88—9.
20
But note (a) that the reading is not pleonastic, and (b) that μοϋνον might readily
be corrupted to ουλον.
21
Seeesp. Plato, 77m 31 Β 3; 92 C9; Critias 113 D 2; Laws 691 E 1 (cf. Wilson, p. 33).
But in the Timaeus I am inclined to think that "unique of its kind" is as plausible
a translation as "only begotten".
22
So e.g. Diels-Kranz, 1.235n (cf. Diels, p. 74); Untersteiner [1], pp. XXVII-XXXI;
Wilson. - In Patristic Greek, μονογενής is a standing epithet of the Son (see Lampe,
Patristic Greek Lexicon, S.V.); and Wilson, p. 34, suggests that μουνογενές in B SA
may be a Christian 'emendation' of Parmenides. Note that όλος (ούλος) is also
said of the Son (Lampe, S.V., 2d).

tically now to γίγνεσθαι and now to γένος. (Εγγενής and συγγενής provide early
and irreproachable parallels for such a mild ambiguity in a -γενης compound23.) Thus
the texts of Simplicius and Eusebius cannot be eliminated on linguistic grounds.
If we connect -γενης with γένος, we may, I think, translate "μονογενής" in either
of two ways. It may mean "unique of its kind", and it may mean "belonging to only
one kind": analogy with other compounds in μονό favours the second version; but
nothing rules out the first.24
Thus line 4 may say of Parmenides' subject either (ia) that it is "whole, unique
of its kind", or (ib) that it is "whole, belonging to only one kind", or (iia) that
it is "alone, unique of its kind", or (iib) that it is "alone, belonging to only one
kind", or (iii) that it is "alone, whole-limbed". Of those five possibilities, (iia), (iib),
and (iii) explicitly assert real monism, in virtue of the word μοΰνον; (ia) will assert
real monism if the 'kind' in question is the 'kind' entity;25 and (ib) has nothing to do
with monism at all.
How are we to select the right reading? I agree with those scholars who see in
Β 8A—5 a 'programme' or prospectus for the Way of Truth: we may therefore hope
that the unfolding of the Way will indicate which, if any,26 of our five possibilities we
should opt for. Since we can only interpret the programme after we have judged the
concert, line 4 cannot in itself make Parmenides a monist.
(C) 28Β 8.5:
The Diels—Kranz text evidently has no bearing upon monism. This text is thrice
quoted by Simplicius with no significant variant readings (in Phys 30.3; 78.14; 145.5);
in addition, the half-line έπε! νυν εστίν όμοΰ παν is cited separately both by Simpli-
cius (in Phys 143.13; cf. 147.13) and by Proclus (in Parm 665.26).27
Asclepius, however, offers us a different text of line 5 (in Met 42.30); and his
variant is twice repeated (38.17—8; 202.16). Asclepius took it from his teacher,
Ammonius (in Int 136.24); and it is also found in the works of two further pupils
23
Of the 40—odd pre-Platonic compounds in -γενης several show clear affinities
with γίγνεσθαι, eight or so with γένος (see C. D. Buck and W. Petersen, A Reverse
Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives (Chicago, 111., 1944), pp. 723-4). In the
majority of cases, neither affinity is specially favoured; and of course all -γενης
compounds have, at bottom, a common unity (see C.H.Kahn, The Verb Be in
Ancient Greek (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 107 n.26). - I ignore the suggestion that the
-γενης element in μουνογενές is inoperative, though in later Greek that is certainly
possible (e.g. Ammonius Alex., in Joh 3 (85. 1412 A Migne)).
24
For "unique of its kind" see e.g. Cornford, p. 36 n. 1; Taran, pp. 92-3 (Clement
of Rome, ad Corinth 25.2 calls the phoenix μονογενής); for "belonging to only
one kind" see Mourelatos, pp. 113-4. Mourelatos aptly compares Plato's use ot
μονοειδης (Phaedo 78 D 5; 80 Β 2; 83 Ε 2; Symp 211 B l ; E4; Thran 205 D 1);
note also such compounds in μονό- as μονότροπος, μανοψνής, μονόχροος.
25
26
So Bormann, p. 153.
Wilson, p. 34, conjectures οΰλον μουνομελέο τε (μοννομτλί^ means much the same
as ου ... οιαιρετόν at #.22: cf. Empcdoclcs, 31 /? 58).
27
Proclus apparently omits πάν; but that (pace Whiftakcr, p. 25. n. 1) is hau1l\
significant.

of Ammonius. Plnlopomis (in Phys 65.9) and Olympiodorus (in Ph 75.9). There are
minor differences in reading; 28 hut the six passages clearly point to the following text:
ου γαρ r ην οιΉΥ Fermi όμοΰ πάν £στι δι% μοΰνον
The crucial word here, from our present point of view, is μοΰνον; for εστί οέ μοΰνον
might he translated as "it alone exists"; and that might be read as an assertion of real
monism.
The Ammoniun text is horrid Greek,29 and it contains a suspicious echo of Plato's
/'ifnttfu\ U ) ; it is probably no more than a lapsus memoriae on Ammonius' part, neg-
ligently adopted by his pupils31. And even if his text is taken as evidence for the
existence of an edition of Parmenides different from the one used by Simplicius,32 we
shall still have reason to prefer the Simplician edition.33
But in any case, the Ammonian text does not impose monism on us. For we may
read "εστί δε μοΰνον" with the emphasis on "έοτι" — "it only is"; and we may gloss
the whole Ammonian line in exactly the same way as we should gloss its Simplician
counterpart: 'It is not the case that it was or will be — it only is9. That gloss is
not only the easiest construe of the text; it is also the way Ammonius himself took
it (in Int 133.18-20 = A 30).
(D) 28 Β 8.6:
The text of line 6 is not uniquely transmitted. Simplicius, who quotes the line twice
(in Phys 78.15; 145.6), read εν, συνεχές; and, at first blush, we have in εν as explicit
an assertion of monism as you could wish for. But Asclepius, after his heterodox
28
ουκ ην, Philoponus (ου γαρ έην, cett); ουκ εσται, Ammonius (MS G), Asclepius,
Olympiodorus, Philoponus (ούδ' έσται, Ammonius).
29
The verse must be punctuated before ομού (Whittaker, pp. 22-3; contra: Unter-
steiner [1], p. XLIII, who puts a comma after παν); the postposition of δε is then
hard (see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, 19542), pp. 187—9).
30
Sec Tim 37 E. - B 8.5 doubtless influenced the Timaeus (see esp. G.E.L.Owen,
Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", Monist 50, 1966, 317—40 =
Mourelatos (ed); Schofield); and the ancient commentators normally adduce Tim
37 E in explication of B 8.5 (e.g. Simplicius, in Phys 79.1).
31
The Ammonian variants are "Neoplatonic completions of a partially remembered
verse" (Diels, p. 75; cf. Taran, pp. 188-90 n.37).
32
Ammonius worked in Alexandria; Simplicius probably wrote his Physics commen-
tary at Athens in the 540's: the libraries of Athens and Alexandria may have
possessed different editions of Parmenides.
33
Contra: Untersteiner [1], pp. XLIII—L (Untersteiner [2], pp. 215—8, argues uncon-
vincingly that Plato and Aristotle knew the Ammonian text of B 8.5—6); Whit-
taker, pp. 16-32. Whittaker (pp. 17-8) argues that Simplicius' text of B 8.5-6 is
suspiciously similar to Plotinus, Enn III.7.11.1; that Plotinus cannot be influenced
by Parmenides, consciously or unconsciously; and therefore that Simplicius presents
"a Neoplatonic attempt at tendentious emendation, based on Plotinus". The similar-
ity between Simplicius and Plotinus is unremarkable; Plotinus frequently alludes
to Parmenides (see the Index to Henry—Schwyzer; Whittaker, p. 26 n. 10; V. Cilento,
Saggi su Plotino (Milan, 1973), pp. 123—34), and is no doubt alluding to him at
III.7.11.1. (Enn V.l.8.22-3 and VI.6.18.42 indicate that Plotinus read εν at Β 8.6
and thus had the Simplician text before him.)

version of line 5, offers the word "ούλοφυές", "all of a piece", in place of "εν, συν-
εχές" (in Met 42.30—I). 34 Some scholars argue that "ούλοφυές" is no casual slip
by Asclepius, but represents the text read by his master Ammonius; and they prefer
Ammonius to Simplicius.35 If they are right, then line 6 does not, after all, state
monism: to be 'all of a piece' is not to be unique.
Yet even if Parmenides wrote εν, συνεχές, there is no reason to find monism
in the line. "A' is εν" may indeed mean "A' is unique" (as it does, for example, in
Empedocles, 31 Β /7.1); but that is neither the only nor the easiest meaning of the
phrase. Aristotle says that το ένί είναι το άδιαιρέτω εστίν είναι, οπερ τόδε δντι και
ιδία χωριστφ ή τόπψ ή είδει ή διάνους (Met Ι 1, 1052b 16-8); and his account of
the uses of εις in Metaphysics Δ 6 contains the following passage: των δε καθ' αυτά
εν λεγομένων, τα μεν λέγεται τω συνεχή είναι, οίον φάκελος δεσμω και ξύλα κόλλη*
και γραμμή, καν κεκαμμένη ή, συνεχής δε, μία λέγεται, ώσπερ και των μερών
εκαστον, οίον σκέλος και βραχίων (1015b36- 1016a3).36 "A' is εν" may thus mean
"A' is a single thing", "X forms a unity"; and one way of forming a unity is by being
continuous, συνεχής. When Parmenides juxtaposes "εν" and "συνεχές", it is only
reasonable to suppose that the second word is intended to explicate the first: "What
exists is one, continuous" means 'Whatever exists is a unity in virtue of being con-
tinuous'. That assertion, with which most modern philosophers would agree, has
nothing at all to do with monism. Thus the orthodox Simplician text of line 6 is not
monistic — indeed, εν, συνεχές gives very much the same sense as ούλοφυές.37
(Ε) 28 Β 8.12-3:
ουδέ ποτ' εκ μη έόντος έφήσει πίστιος ισχύς
γίγνεσθαι τι παρ' αυτό . . .
These lines, again, are controversial38. Again, I shall not offer a positive interpretation,
but only ask the question: Do the lines assert real monism?
One interpretation39 takes αυτό to refer to το έόν, and translates the Greek thus:
"nor ever will the strength of persuasion allow anything to come into being from
what does not exist apart from it". A paraphrase then runs: 'Nothing apart from what
34
ούλοφυής is variously glossed by Simplicius, in Phys 382.16—8; Philoponus, in Phys
320.2-3; cf. Aristotle, PA Δ 12, 693a23-b2.
35
See Untersteiner [1], pp.XLVIII-L; Whittaker, p. 24. Reale, pp. 109-16, suggests,
romantically enough, that Parmenides first wrote ούλοφυές; and that later, becom-
ing a monist under Melissus' influence, he changed his text to §v, συνεχές.
36
Cf. Met I 1, 1052al9-34; see Stokes, pp. 1-23.
37
The textual question is therefore of little importance. Ούλοφυής is Prcsocratic
(Empedocles, 31 Β 62), and εν, συνεχές might represent a gloss on that moderately
rare word. But συνεχές is of course Parmenidean (B £.25), and όλοφυής is Nco-
platonic (e.g. Damascius, dub. sol. 51 (103.13 R); 271 (139.11 R)); so that the
gloss might have gone the other way.
3« Various interpretations discussed in: Untersteiner [1], pp. CXL—CXLII; Taran.
pp. 95-102; Zellcr and Mondolfo, pp. 204-5. I incline to accept Kcinhanlt's
emendation (έκτου έόντος for εκ μη ιόντος), but not his interpretation (pp.39 4.*).
the lines, I think, attack όλεθρος - but this is no place to argue tor that view
39
Upheld by Cornford, p. 37; Kirk and Raven, p. 275; Mourclatos, pp. 100 2.

oMsis will ever conic into existence'. And the inference is then drawn that just one
thing, vi/. to tov, will ever exist. 40
Both the inference and the interpretation on which it is based seem to me to be
erroneous. First, the interpretation ascribes to Parmenides an argument against 'epi-
HCIICMS', or the coming into existence of entities apart from those that now exist.
Hut Parmenides has no call to argue against epigenesis: lines 12—3 are embedded in
an argument which attempts to abolish genesis as such, and which has no need to
advert to the special notion of epigenesis. Other interpretations of the line are
possible; and they do not interpolate epigenesis into Parmenides' reasoning.
Secondly, an argument against epigenesis neither constitutes nor implies an argu-
ment for monism. Empedocles explicitly argued against epigenesis (31 B 77.30—3);
and Hmpedocles was a pluralist. The Empedoclean position is perfectly consistent:
"Nothing can come into being apart from X" evidently does not imply "X is the only
object in existence". Even if we accept an implausible epigenetic interpretation of
H 8.12 — 3, there is no argument there for monism.
(F) 18 B 8.22-5:
ούοε οιαιρετόν εστίν, έπεί πάν εστίν όμοΐον
ούόε τι τη μάλλον, το κεν ειργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι,
ούοέ τι χειρότερον, παν ό' έμπλεον εστίν έόντος'
τω συνεχές παν εστίν έον γαρ έόντι πελάζει.
These lines are usually taken to fulfill the promise of οΰλον, μουνογενές (Β 8A) or
of εν, συνεχές (Β 8.6); and they are sometimes supposed to prove monism41.
There are notorious problems of interpretation; but I can be brief. Parmenides'
conclusion, twice stated, is that 'whatever exists is not διαιρετόν but συνεχές'. Now
whether "διαιρετόν" means "divided" or "divisible", and whether "συνεχές" refers to
spatial or to temporal continuity42, that conclusion is entailed by the proposition that
whatever exists is both spatially and temporally indivisible. But that proposition does
not entail monism. Hence Parmenides' conclusion, whatever it may be, does not entail
monism. Hence there is no argument for monism in lines 22—5. (The lines in fact
argue for the unity or wholeness of what exists; and that, as we saw in section (D),
does not amount to monism)
(G) 28 Β 8.36-7:
From Aristotle onward, scholars have sighted in these lines the official Eleatic
argument for monism.43 Can Aristotle and his scholarly crew have erred?
40
So Cornford, pp. 36 n. 1; 37. (Cornford first says that monism is an unproven
presupposition of Parmenides' deduction; then he locates its proof at Β 8.12— 3;
and he supposes that Β 8.36—7 repeat that earlier argument.)
41
So, e.g., W. Br cker, "Parmenides", Archiv f r Begriffsgeschichte 9, 1964, 79—86;
E. L.Hussey, The Presocratics (London, 1972), pp. 92-3.
42
I prefer "divided" to "divisible" (see e.g., K lscher, pp. 53,93), and time to space
(see Loenen, pp. 74-5; Owen, pp. 96-7; contra: Schofield, pp. 132—3). See also
Taran, pp. 106-9.
43
See e.g. Cornford, p. 35; Taran, pp. 135, 190; Stokes, p. 142; Bormann, pp. 168-71;
contra: Untersteiner [l], pp. XXXIV; Mourelatos, p. 131 n.41.

Let us first observe that it would be odd were Aristotle's interpretation correct; for
it would have Parmenides bury his argument for monism in the middle of a larger piece
of reasoning. That reasoning occupies lines 34—41, the conclusion of which is that
mortal thought is inane. Among the inanities of mortal thought listed in lines 39—41
pluralism does not appear. Lines 36—7 fit snugly into an argument whose other parts
show no interest in monism: if those lines really are monistic, Parmenides chose to
prove his major thesis in hugger-mugger.
A close inspection of the lines reveals textual problems. Simplicius reports lines
36-7 twice: once (in Phys 86.31-2) he offers:
. . . ουδέν γαρ εστίν ή έσται πάρεξ
άλλο πάρεξ του έόντος
once (ι/ι Phys 146.9-10) he gives:
. . . ουδέ ει χρόνος εστίν ή έσται
άλλο πάρεξ του έόντος
The second report is part of Simplicius' official transcription of Β 8, and that fact
gives it an edge over its rival. Unfortunately it makes no sense; and the first report
is unmetrical. None of the emendations so far proposed is satisfactory; and I suspect
that the corruption is more extensive than is usually imagined44. Moreover, even if the
text of 36—7 were clear, the sense of the immediate context remains dark; and we may
despair of discovering the details of Parmenides' argument.
'But come', it will be said; 'if the details of lines 34 — 41 are mysterious, the general
drift of the passage is plain enough — and that drift is monistic. For may we not
paraphrase the lines as follows? "What exists is whole and motionless (line 38); hence
nothing exists apart from what exists (36 — 7); hence nothing can be thought of apart
from what exists (35); hence thinking and thinking that it exists are the same (34);
hence all mortal language which implies that it does not exist is empty (39—41)". 45
That reconstruction is moderately intelligible; and it is not at odds with anything
Parmenides says elsewhere in his poem. But whatever its proponents may say. it does
not ascribe monism to its author. In lines 35—6 (ου . . . άνευ του έόντος . . . εΰρησεις
το νοεϊν), Parmenides asserts that if anyone thinks, then there is something that exists
of which he is thinking. The argument of 35 —7 must therefore be expanded as follows:
44
(i) At 86.31—2, the first πάρεξ is a simple scribal error. Preller's emendation
(ουδέν γαρ (ή) εστίν ή εσται) restores the metre; and it is generally accepted.
But it produces worse than mere "rhetorical superfluity" (Diels, p. 86): it probably
conflicts with Β 8.5; and it seems to me to make very dubious grammar (is oiV>rv
. . . ή . . . ή . . . a Greek collocation?). Bergk's ούδ' ην γαρ (ή) εστίν . . . is no
better, (ii) At 146.9—10 various emendations have been put forward: ουδέ χρ«ον
(Karsten), ουδέν χρέος (Stein), ουδέ χρημ' (Zeller) - see Dicls, p. 86; <nuV
χρόνος (A.H.Coxon, "The Philosophy of Parmenides", CQ 28, 1934, 134-44);
ούδ' εί χρόνος εστίν, ή έσται (Loenen, pp. 114-5). (iii) Perhaps ή ισται was
originally a marginal record of a variant for εστί, and the text was something like:
ουδέν γαρ έτ' εστί νοήσαι, or: ουδέν γαρ έτ' Fjijirvai rmiv.
45
I ignore the finer points of interpretation; for discussion sec: Tjiran, pp. 120-4-4.
Zeller and Mondolfo, pp. 218-32; H lschcr, pp. 97-100; Mnurclaios. ch. 7; Boi
mann, pp. 78-84; Jantzen, pp. 93-106.

14 Jon;ith;«n Barnes
*(i) If anyone ihinks, there is something of which he thinks; (ii) there is nothing which
does not exist; <·/·#<>, ( i i i ) if anyone thinks, there is something existent of which he
thinks*. It is premiss ( i i ) which lines 36-7 serve to express; and it is evident that that
premiss does not state or imply real monism.
I infer that we cannot extract the Peripatetic argument — or any other argument for
monism Iron» lines 36 — 7.
(Π) Plato, Thcaetetus 1X0i)l£:

ολίγοι« tV επιλαβόμην, ώ Θεόδωρε, ότι άλλοι αύ τάναντία τούτοις άπεφηναντο
foiov άκινητον τελέϋει τω πάντι δνομ' είναι t και αλλά οία Μέλισσοι τε και
l Ιαρμ^νιοαι έναντιούμενοι πάσι τούτοις διϊσχυρίζονται ως εν τε πάντα εστί και
Γοτηκίτ-ν αυτό εν αύτώ ουκ έχον χωράν εν ή κινείται.
The obelized words contain an Eleatic verse. Simplicius twice repeats it, ascribing it
to Parmenides (in Phys 29.16-8; 143.10).46
The text of the verse is corrupt; but Simplicius has been thought to shed light on
it: at 29.16 he introduces the quotation thus: άκινητον αυτό (sc. το εν] ανυμνεί και
μόνον ως πάντων έξϊίρημένον, οίον . . . "He hymns it as motionless and unique,
because it is transcendent over everything . . .". Simplicius' άκινητον pairs with Par-
menides' άκινητον. Simplicius' ως πάντων έξηρημένον must pair with the last phrase
of the verse (so that πάντι should be emended to πάντα47). Thus Simplicius' μόνον
is left to pair with Parmenides' οίον: the pairing is perfected by amending οίον to
οίον — and we find in Parmenides' poem an explicit assertion of real monism: "It
is οίον, unique".48
That argument is powerful, but it can be parried. First, I doubt if the text of
Simplicius' introductory sentence is sound: the reference to uniqueness is out of place
in the Simplician context, where it is transcendence that occupies the stage.49
Secondly, Simplicius' μόνον is intelligible even if οίον is retained in the text.
Taking "οίον" to mean "such a thing"50, Simplicius may have construed the verse
thus: "Such a thing, motionless, it is, by everything's being a name". 'If everything
else is a mere name', he will have reasoned, 'το έόν is all-transcendent and therefore
46
The line is also found in the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus, col. 70.
36-43 (edd. H. Diels and W.Schubart, Berliner Klassikertexte Π (Berlin, 1905));
and in Eusebius (PE XIV.4.6) and Theodoretus (Cur. 11.15), who quote Theaet
180 DE.
47
So Diels, in his edition of Simplicius, where he records variants παν and πάντη.
48
See Campbell, p. 144; Diels, in: Simplicius, in Phys 29.36; F. M. Cornford, "A New
Fragment of Parmenides", CR 49, 1935, 122-3; id., Plato's Theory of Knowledge
(London, 1935), p. 94 n. 1. Cornford reads τε θέλει for τελέθει (cf. Heraclitus,
22 Β 32 — in fact the anonymous commentary on Theaet reads τε θέλει), and
attaches the 'new fragment' to the end of Β 19 by way of some such line as:
(τούτων ούδενι πίστις ενι- μοϋνον γαρ Ανάγκη).
49
Perhaps read μόνως for μόνον ως. — The phrase πάντων έξηρημένον is also used
of Parmenides' One by Produs, in Parm 708.9; see too Lampe, Patristic Greek
Lexicon, S.V. έξαιρέω.
50
For this use of οίος see e.g. Simplicius, in Phys 1136.30; cf. Mourelatos, p. 185 n.47.

unique'. Μόνον, in short, represents an inference from the text, where it has no direct
counterpart.
Thirdly, even if we read οίον in Simplicius, we need not read οίον in Plato. For
Plato does not imply that the verse he quotes propounded monism51. And if, as is
probable, Simplicius' source is Plato52, then it is Plato's text that is authoritative for us.
Fourthly, it is improbable that the Platonic quotation has any standing as a 'new
fragment' of Parmenides. Β 8.38 reads:
ούλον άκίνητον τ εμεναι/ τω πάντ' δνομ' εσται53
The close similarity between that line and Plato's has not escaped the commentators;
and most suppose that Plato's line is merely a garbled version of Β 8.38s4. Simplicius
no doubt thought that he had an independent fragment before him; but his inter-
pretation of the line is impossible, and the various modern construes are equally bad.55
It is possible that Plato misremembered - or deliberately misquoted - line 3856;
but that is not very likely, inasmuch as line 38 does not form a syntactic unity. It is
more plausible to think that Plato concocted the 'Eleatic' verse himself, in jocular or
parodic vein57 — he does not explicitly claim to be quoting. But the verse is a singularly
feeble piece of invention. It is, I fear, probable that the 'new fragment' is due to nothing
more exciting than textual corruption. Plato, I guess, quoted Parmenides correctly, thus:
. . .άπεφήναντο οίον58
ούλον άκίνητον τ' έμενα ι
καΐ αλλ' δσα . . ,59
51
The verse και άλλα show that εν τε πάντα εστί και εοτηκεν: perhaps the verse
is adduced to prove that πάντα εστηκεν, and άλλα indicate that εν ... εστίν.
52
He was, of course, thoroughly familiar with his Plato. Guthrie, vol. II, p. 40, cor-
rectly states that Simplicius quotes the verse "without reference to the Theaetetus*';
but that does not show that he was not drawing on the Theaet.
53
Simplicius' MSS read όνομα εσται (in Phys 87.1, aFD; 146.11, a) or όνόμασται
(in Phys 87.1, E) or ώνόμασται (in Phys 146.11, DEF). Woodbury argued for όνό-
μασται (cf. Mourelatos, pp. 180-5); contra: e.g. Tar n, pp. 129-36. See most
recently J. Owens, "Parmenides on Naming", in: J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk
(edd.), Kephalaion (Assen, 1975). - I prefer ονομ' εσται; but the question does
not affect my argument here.
54
So e.g. Diels, p. 86; Untersteiner [1], p. CLVII n. 148; Tar n, pp. 133-6. On
Cornford's side see Loenen, pp. 75-6; Woodbury, pp. 148-9, 153-5; Guthrie,
vol. Π, p. 40; Mourelatos, pp. 185-8.
55
Cornford: Reality "is one, immovable: "Being" is the name of the All"; Woodbury:
" 'Being' is the one and unchanged name of all of it"; Mourelatos; "Such, immobile,
is that for which as a whole the name is "to be"" (see Mourelatos, pp. 185-8).
56
Plato frequently misquotes — often, it seems, by design: see D.Tarrant, "Plato's
Use of Quotations", CQ 45, 1951, 59-67.
57
So J. Bollack, Empedocle (Paris, 1965- ), vol.111, p. 498.
5
« For this use of οίον see e.g. Aristotle, Rhct Γ 2, 1405a37; 5, 1407H22; <>, 140ΟΗΛ4.
etc. Dies in the Budo and McDowell in the Clarendon Plato construe οίον in this
way; so do the editors of Euscbius and Thcodoretus. But οίον cannot be so rend
in the anonymous commentary or in Simplicius.
59
Cobet proposed ούλον for οίον, Buttmann τ' fyu'vai for τελτΟιι (sex- Oimphcll.
p. 144). Burnet in I he OCT prudently prints the verse between obeli.

16 Jonathan Barnes
Λ learned reader jolted the eonliruialion of the quotation in his margin; in the course
ol time, that mur^nm/t· was incorporated into the text, ούλον was omitted by haplo-
^raphy. am! T l i M K N A I was misread as ΤΗΛΗΘΕΙ or ΤΕΘΕΛΕΙ. Thus the text
which Simplieius and we pu/./.le over was invented.
In sum, the rtteaetetus offers us no new cobblestone from the Way of Truth; and
even if it did we should have no reason for reading on it the word "οίον" and the
thesis of real monism.
( J ) J«V H «V.53 -4
Mortal men go astray at the very start of the Way of Opinion:
μορ<|ας γαρ κατεΟεντο δυο γνώμαις όνομάζειν60,
τόιν μίαν ου χρεών εστίν, εν φ πεπλανημένοι είαίν.
In what, exactly, have mortals erred? The error is presumably to be discovered in
the phrase των μίαν ου χρεών εστίν. Mortals set up in their minds two forms for
naming, "of which one it is not right". What does that mean?
Some scholars gloss των μίαν ου χρεών εστίν as One of which they should not
have set up for naming'; i.e. 'Mortals hit upon two forms; but that is one too many —
they should have begun their cosmogony with a single form'. The fundamental error
in the Way of Opinion is thus a primordial pluralism. And if pluralism is the signal
error of Opinion, we may reasonably infer that monism is the signal characteristic of
Truth.*1
That construe of line 54 cannot be conclusively refuted. The long dispute over the
sense of the line suggests that Parmenides' text is irresolubly ambiguous62. For all that,
1 incline to find the monistic construe the least plausible of the available options; and
I prefer the reading which glosses των μίαν ου χρεών εστίν by: 'Not one of which
should they have set up for naming'63. Mortals begin with two μορφαί: their error lies
not in picking on two forms, but in picking on forms at all; the first faux pas along
the Way of Opinion is not the slide into pluralism — it is the initial step into cosmo-
gony, the initial supposition that there is a generated and changing world to be
described.
Yet we may accept the implausible monistic construe of line 54 without commit-
ting Parmenides to real monism. For the μορφαί of line 53 are stuffs64 — they represent
the basic materials of the world, corresponding to Anaximenes' air or Empedocles'
four roots. Thus if lines 53—4 reject pluralism, they reject material pluralism, not real
pluralism; and if they commit Parmenides to monism, they commit him to material
60
Simplieius' MSS — and perhaps Simplieius himself — offer both γνώμας and γνω-
μαΐς: for γνωμαϊς see Furley, p. 5.
61
See e.g. Diels, p. 83; Schwabl, p. 151; Fr nkel, p. 180; Mourelatos, pp. 80-5.
62
For the dispute see e.g. Diels, pp. 92—3; Long, pp. 98—104; Tar n, pp. 217—26;
Zeller and Mondolfo, pp. 244-50; H lscher, pp. 103-7; Mourelatos, pp. 80—5;
Jantzen, pp. 66—74.
63
So Cornford, p. 46; Stokes, pp. 144—6; Furley, pp. 5—9; Jantzen, p. 74.
64
The use of μορφαί is peculiar: see Long, p. 101 (contra: Guthrie, vol.11, p. 53 n.3).

monism, not to real monism. In short, however we read the lines, they do not bear
upon the issue of Parmenidean monism.
V. Monism Presupposed?
The conclusion of section IV is unequivocal: no passage in the Way
of Truth states or argues for real monism. That conclusion allows us
to solve the problem of Β 8Λ: since the Way of Truth does not argue
for monism, its prospectus can hardly have promised monism; con-
sequently, we should accept the Simplician text of line 4, and adopt
construe (ib): read "οΰλον, μουνογενές τε . . ." and translate "whole,
and belonging to only one kind".
But if the fragments do not state monism, perhaps they imply or
presuppose it? Perhaps Parmenides commits himself to monism, even
if he does not openly embrace that doctrine?
Some scholars believe that the subject of Parmenides' metaphysical deductions is
The One, το εν65. The doxographers regularly refer to that subject as το εν; and Par-
menides himself, as I have already remarked, regularly denotes it by way of a singular
expression. The poem is about The One: it does not state or argue for monism simply
because monism is the fundamental presupposition of all its deductions, its single
unquestioned axiom.
That suggestion is wholly absurd: how could Parmenides have assumed monism
axiomatically? how could he have taken as a first, unargued posit a proposition of such
gigantic and unprecedented implausibility? Again, how could he have expected his
audience to grasp that his whole argumentation rested upon such an axiom? or, having
grasped it, to refrain from ridicule and ribaldry? The thing is grotesque: plainly, Par-
menides did not simply presuppose monism.
As for the doxographers, there is nothing remarkable in their use of το εν. Assum-
ing that Parmenides was a real monist, they understandably used that term to refer
to the subject of his poem. Their usage does not imply that Parmenides so referred
to his subject (they knew he did not); nor that such a mode of reference reveals an
unspoken presupposition of the poem (they believed that monism was demonstrated,
not presupposed).
Again, Parmenides' use of singular expressions is quite irrelevant to the matter of
monism. Aristotle's Metaphysics studies το v fj v without implying, by the gram-
matically singular phrase το v, that there is a unique existent. Parmenides' deduction
in 8 is the earliest essay in Aristotelian metaphysics: its theorems arc naturally
So e.g. Cornford, pp. 29; 35. - Owen, pp. 92-3, rejects this on the grounds that
Parmenides proves the uniqueness of TO rov; I cannot, of course, endorse that
argument.
2 Arch. Gcsch. Philosophic lid. 61
18 Jonathan Harnes
expressed in (lie form "TO ov fcm «I»"; and lhat form docs not imply the uniqueness
of TO ov Rather. "TO ov ί<ττι <I>" means "Whatever exists, is Φ" — just as "The triangle
has an angle-sum of 180"" means "Whatever is a triangle has an angle-sum of 180°".
In general, "το Λ" in Greek, and "the A"' in English, eommonly have a universal
function: **τό Λ fort Β" and "The X is Y" mean "Whatever is . . ., is — ".
I have already anticipated that account of το όν; and I think that all the singular
expressions along the Way of Truth are properly explained by means of that account.
Their existence gives no support to the view that το εν is the surreptitious subject of
the poem.
There is a second and subtler method of extracting monism from the presuppositions
of Parmenides' poem. Suppose we assume, as several scholars do, that the latent subject
of the poem is in fact nature or the universe, ή φύσις or το πάν66; and suppose we
admit, as most scholars do, that Parmenides argues that το έόν is qualitatively homo-
geneous or wholly undifferentiated. Now consider the following inference: There is,
tautologically, at most one universe; hence anything that is distinct from the universe
is a part of the universe. But the universe exists, and hence is qualitatively homo-
geneous, and hence has no parts. Therefore, nothing exists apart from the universe:
το πάν is the single real entity.
The argument is plausible; but are its initial suppositions true? Did Parmenides
assert the qualitative homogeneity of το έόν? And was his subject το πάν?
Homogeneity is apparently asserted at Β 8.22:
. . . έπει πάν εστίν όμοΐον
For "όμοιος" may well mean "qualitatively homogeneous"; indeed, it is probable that
Melissus used it in just that sense of his unique entity67. But that appearance is mis-
leading. The proposition πάν εστίν όμοΐον functions as a premiss in the argument
of lines 22—5; consequently, either it should state a commonplace that needs no special
justification, or else it should pick up a thesis which Parmenides has already estab-
lished. Now that το έόν is qualitatively homogeneous neither is a platitude nor has
been proved earlier on the Way of Truth; hence it cannot happily serve as a premiss
for lines 22-5. We must, therefore, seek a different interpretation of "πάν εστίν
όμοΐον" — one that fits it for its role as premiss.
Such an interpretation is to hand.68 Place a comma after "όμοΐον", and suppose
that lines 23—4 explain the sort of όμοιότης that Parmenides alludes to: το έόν is
πάν όμοΐον, altogether homogeneous, just insofar as it contains no gaps. And lines
22—5 infer, unexcitingly, that since το έόν contains no gaps it is συνεχές or con-
tinuous. If we suppose that the continuity in question is spatial, then the premiss that
το έόν is spatially homogeneous must be derived from lines 6—21 by implicitly trans-
66
See Verdenius, pp. 31—2; id., "Parmenides, Β 2,3", Mnemosyne 15, 1962, 237;
Woodbury, p. 152; E. Tugendhat, "Das Sein und das Nichts", Durchblicke: Martin
Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1970), p. 137; contra: Loenen,
pp. 9-10. Cf. Plato, Farm 128 A; Aristotle, Met A4, 986 b 10.
67
See 30 B 7; pseudo-Aristotle, MXG 974al2-4; Reale, ch.5.
68
Owen, p. 92, takes όμοΐον adverbially: "it exists all alike" (see Holscher, p. 23;
Stokes, p. 135); but his repunctuation is enough in itself to sustain the new eluci-
dation of the line — the adverbial construe of όμοΐον is an optional extra.

ferring that argument from time to space. If, as I prefer to think, the continuity in
question is temporal, then the premiss that το έόν is temporally homogeneous follows
immediately from lines 6—21.69
Line 22 does not assert that το έόν is qualitatively homogeneous; nor, as far as I
can see, does any other passage of the Way of Truth. For all that Parmenides actually
says, we are at liberty to dress το έόν in all the colours of the rainbow.
The question of the subject of Parmenides' poem arises primarily in connection
with Β 2.1-6:
ε£ δ' άγ' έγών έρέω, κόμισαι δε συ μΰθον άκουσας,
αϊπερ οδοί μοϋναι διζήσιός είσι νοήσαι-
ή μεν δπωσ εστίν τε και ως ουκ εστί μη είναι,
πειθούς εστί κέλευθος· άληθείη γαρ όπηδεΓ
ή δ' ως ουκ εστίν τε και ως χρεών εστί μη είναι,
την δη τοι φράζω παναπευθέα εμμεν άταρπόν.
Most scholars hold that εστί in lines 3 and 5 requires a logical subject; and some
argue that το πάν or ή φύσις is the best candidate for the position.
I find the suggestion uncompelling. First, το παν is not a natural supplement to
make. In a sense, Parmenides, like his Milesian predecessors, is indeed talking about
the universe, about everything there is. But such talk need not be conducted by way
of sentences of the form "το παν εστί Φ"; and such sentences did not, so far as we
know, trip off the Milesian tongue. If you picked up a copy of Parmenides' poem — or
of any other Presocratic text — you would expect instruction περί παντός; but you
would not expect sentences of the form "το παν εστί Φ", and you would not readily
supply "το πάν" as the suppressed subject of an "εστίν".
Secondly, there is no cause to grub around for a subject for "εστί".70 We rightly
translate "εστί" in lines 3 and 5 by "it exists"; but we err if we ask what "it" here
refers to: "it" refers to nothing; it does not function as a referring expression, but has
an ordinary anaphoric role. Let me explain. Lines 2—3 translate thus: " . . . the only
roads of inquiry there are for thinking of — one, that it exists and that it cannot not
exist". I paraphrase as follows: '. . . the only thinkable ways of inquiring into some-
thing — one, that it exists . . .' In the paraphrase, the word "it" in "it exists" picks up
the preceding "something"; more rigorously stated, Parmenides' thesis is this: 'If some-
thing is inquired into, then either it exists . . . or .. .'.
That interpretation71 sits close to the Greek, and makes good sense of Parmenides"
subsequent argumentation. If it is right, then "εστί" in lines 3 and 5 has no logical
subject; a fortiori neither "το παν" nor "ή φύσις" is its logical subject.
69
Owen, p. 92, connects όμοΐον with Β 8Λ\ (so too Guthrie, vol.11, p. 34 n . l ) ;
Stokes, p. 136, thinks of 8.15-6; I would rather refer it to R «S. 5, ομού παν
70
I do not, of course, endorse the nonsensical suggestion thai fcm is 'impersonal' -
71
like βροντςι or ύεΐ.
It is closely modelled on Owen's account (pp. 89-95); see also Stokes, pp. 11«*- 22
— For discussion of the subject of fccm see, e.g. Untersteincr 11 ], pp. LXXVII
LXXXVIII; Taran, pp. 33-40; Zeller and Mondnlfo, pp. 185-90; Hormann.
pp. 91-4.

20 Jonathan Harnes
VI. The Way of Truth

Monistic interpreters of Parmcnidcs have a final throw: if the poem
neither states nor implies monism, does not its overall structure reveal
it as essentially committed to monism? does it not lack all sense and
coherence with monism removed? I think that the structure of Par-
menides' poem is far less clear, and far less careful, than some scholars
have been pleased to imagine 72 ; but it is, for all that, possible to give
a rough sketch of the general train of reasoning in the Way of Truth,
thus: -
Objects of rational enquiry must exist (B 2, 3, 6, 7). Qua existent
they must possess certain derivative properties. First, they are άγένητα
and άνώλεθρα, ungenerated and undestroyed (B 8.3); that is argued
for in lines 6—21, where the proof is somehow subordinate to a thesis
on the relation of το έόν to time. Secondly, they are whole or con-
tinuous: the thesis is stated at line 4, and proved in lines 22—5.
Thirdly, they are μουνογενή and άτρεμή — they never alter or change
kind, and they never change place73 (line 4: proof, lines 26—33).
Fourthly, they are τετελεσμένα or complete (see line 4, where ήδ'
άτέλεστον is certainly corrupt74; proof in lines 42—9)'.75
The Way of Truth is short, and there are few σήματα along it. It
requires little reflexion to see that those σήματα in no fashion point
to monism; and my sketch was deliberately couched in pluralistic
language in order to underscore the point.
I conclude, tentatively, that it is not the case that Parmenides was
a monist.76 I do not assert that he was a pluralist: if it is not true
that he believed that only one thing existed, it does not follow that
72
E.g. Owen, pp. 101-2; Holscher, p. 90; Schofield, p. 117.
73
I take μουνογενές τε και άτρεμές to be a unitary phrase, denying alteration (change
in kind) and locomotion (change in place).
74
The well-attested variant άγενητόν (Simplicius, in Phys 120.23; Plutarch, adv. Col.
1114C; Proclus, in Farm 1152.24; etc.) is worthless. Of conjectures, the simplest
is Covotti's ήδέ τελεστόν (see Tar n, pp. 93—5), the most seductive is ήδ' άταλαντόν
(see T.J.Reilly, "Parmenides, Fragment 8.4: a Correction", AGPh 58, 1976, 57).
75
B 8.34—41 is a puzzling passage: it will not do to say (with Owen, p. 97; Guthrie,
vol. II, p. 40) that the lines are a summary of the Way of Truth (see Holscher,
p. 91 n.2); nor (pace Holscher, p. 90) does the Way end at line 33. G.Calogero,
"Parmenide e la genesi della logica classica", Ann. Scuol. Norm. Sup. di Pisa,
cl. lett. II.5, 1936, pp. 168 n.2, 177 n.2, suggests transposing the lines to follow
line 49: that suggestion relieves much of the difficulty posed by the passage.
76
I mean that his poem was not monistic: doubtless his unpublished thoughts exceeded
his writings in scope and in detail (see the realistic comments of Verdenius, p. 2;
Fr nkel, p. 206 n.2). But for us, there is no Parmenides apart from the poem.

it is true that he believed that not only one thing existed. As far as
we know, the question of how many items the universe contains did
not concern him77. That issue he left for Melissus; and Melissus may
go down in the history books as the inventor of real monism.
The elephant of monistic orthodoxy is perhaps less powerful a beast
than his keepers have imagined; indeed, I wonder if he is not a bit
of a fraud — a toy creature, inflated by hot doxographical air and
collapsing on the application of a critical pin. But the deflation need
cause no tears: even without the bizarre accoutrements of real
monism, Parmenides is a figure quite outrageous enough to secure
a perpetual niche in the halls of philosophy.
77
Why, then, do the doxographers make him a monist? Melissus soon became the
chief representative of the Eleatic School; and Parmenides' obscure verses were
read — and misread — in the light of his successor's clear prose. The careless con-
flation of the two men by Plato began a tradition which still trammels us. — Unter-
steiner [1], p. XXXVIII, thinks that the Megarian monists may have caused the
ascription of monism to Parmenides. The Megarians were followers of the Eleatic
School (see K. Doling, Die Megariker (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 83 —5; cf. Cicero,
Luc 42.129 = fr. 26 A Doling; Diogenes Laertius, 11.106 = fr. 31 D); but the evi-
dence for their monism is frail (Aristocles, fr. 5 H = Eusebius, PE XIV.I7.1 =
fr. 17D), and there is no reason to think that they played any part in distorting
the history of philosophy. (Unterste!ner's argument in his Senofane — testimonianze
e frammenti (Florence, 1956), pp. XVII-CXVIII, that the pseudo-Aristotelian
MXG is a Megarian production has rightly won little credence; see also Zeller and
Mondolfo, pp. 1-55.)


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Parmenides and the Eleatic One1

o HI Id not he infinite hut would have hounds against one another"

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unconvincingly expressed, and they have failed to shake the ortho-

//. Fifth Century Thought

'The first Milesian philosophers posited a primordial unity or One;

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thing could never t u r n into many. Of Parmcnidcs' followers, Zeno

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///. The Doxography

Doxographical reports are valuable only if their original source is

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IV. The Fragments

If we are to ascribe monism to Parmenides, we must ground that

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(Π) Plato, Thcaetetus 1X0i)l£:

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VI. The Way of Truth

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