2013-2014 Remedial Cases

2013-2014 REMEDIAL CASES
Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:
Civil Procedure
Action to annul judgment or final order; jurisdiction. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas
Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this
legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order
as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter
was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction
over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of
pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which
replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had
jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about
judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the
action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule
47, directing in Section 2 thereof that “[t]he annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.” Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far
East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January
20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; lack of jurisdiction; types. Lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for
it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order
issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is
always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil
949 [1918]), “in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” But the defect
of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by the
party concerned either expressly or impliedly. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v.
Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926,
January 20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; nature. The Court has expounded on the nature of the
remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (681 SCRA 580, 586-587 [2012]), viz:
“A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily
abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus
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instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. x x x”
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the
judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause
or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings
are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the
judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on
motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed
judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error
allegedly committed by the trial court. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East
Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20,
2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; prescriptive period. The third requirement sets the time
for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought
before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far
East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January
20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; requisites. The first requirement prescribes that the
remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the
petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as “a last remedy,” is not an alternative to
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver,
therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for
relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for
the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud),
simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either
collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred
by laches.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does.
Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA
168, 180 [1996]), “where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
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case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.”
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic
fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on
lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for
particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either
fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition
is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the
number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified
true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner;
(b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c)
the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five days therefrom. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and
Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.
Appeal; trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by CA are binding on appeal. To start with,
considering that the Court of Appeals (CA) thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the
Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court’s factual findings as
affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of
facts. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty
Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; covers questions of law only; exceptions. The Court has
consistently held that as a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
covers questions of law only. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following
exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
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when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et
al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; effect of failure to file motion for reconsideration within 15-
day reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes
final and executory. Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara
Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618.
January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual questions may not be raised. Well entrenched in this
jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in
issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No.
193986, January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when affirmed by CA, are
binding on Supreme Court. Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the CA, are binding on the Court, the Court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding
Eduardo’s exercise of the right of repurchase. Roberto could no longer assail the factual
findings because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the review and determination
of questions of law only. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a
certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were
complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David,
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represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting

through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review limited. Anent the correct amount of surety
bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the CA. The allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters
within the competence of the trial court. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters
Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review. At the outset, it must be pointed out that
the petitioners’ assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the evidence to
determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the
southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which
are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia,
Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011,
January 27, 2014.
Ejectment; immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in Chua v. Court of
Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant
to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-
appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of asupersedeas bond will not
stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then,
the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file
a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency
of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15,
2014.
Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded
on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory
power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its
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rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of
possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for
a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right
on the property:
“[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may
command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a
determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties
in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title
to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be
necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore
the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the
claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied.”
Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia,
et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the
Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the
parties.A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren
Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.
Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of
the suit. Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded
against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the
fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the
prevailing party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely,
Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Grave abuse of discretion; concept. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Here, while
the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing
jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog’s
prayer for injunctive relief. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses
Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.
Grave abuse of discretion; concept. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
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jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations
of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,
Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money

judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment
debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for
another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of
the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia,
substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15,
2014.
Judgments; Law of the case; concept. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once
declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like
damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues
thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v.
Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.
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Judgments; remedies of third person claiming property taken by sheriff. Section 16, Rule 39
specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to
determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to
the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of
ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the
judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia,
substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15,
2014.
Jurisdiction; concurrence of jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts. To be sure, the Court, the Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.
Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose
the venue of his action lest he run afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a
becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Supreme Court. A.L. Ang
Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No.
200804. January 22, 2014.
Jurisdiction; Justiciable question; definition. The Court clarified, too, that the issue of whether a
Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question.
A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the
exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Emilio A. Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Jurisdiction; Small Claims cases. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions
should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with
when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her
husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.
Motions; motion to extend time to file motion for reconsideration prohibited in all courts except in
the Supreme Court. While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a
petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar
motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all
other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon (226
Phil. 144 [1986]) wherein it was held that:
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Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may
be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested.
Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders
Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15,
2014.
Motion for reconsideration; effect of non-filing. At the outset, the Court noted that Gonzales and
Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s September 4, 2012
Decision; only the Office of the President, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of
our ruling reinstating Gonzales.
This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for
the validity or invalidity of the presidential action.
If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman
and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the
OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s
decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on
the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for
the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are
deemed waived; exceptions. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed
“within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had
failed is not one of the exceptions.Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs
and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son
Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita
D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.
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Pleadings; Failure to allege compromise efforts in complaint not jurisdictional defect. Why the
objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the
same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza (135 Phil. 84,
94 [1968]), a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that
there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article
151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint
cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed
amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article
222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without
this amendment, the subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of
children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an amendment which “merely
corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then
stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action.” We there ruled out as inapplicable the
holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an amendment cannot be made so as to
confer jurisdiction on the court x x x
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after
filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required
allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to muto proprio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Heirs of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and
Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein
by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15,
2014.
Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the
court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr. (481
Phil. 168, 180 [2004]), the Court held:
“x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the
court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to
comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio [sic] dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except
for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of
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Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under
the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.”
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A.
Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors
represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No.
185922, January 15, 2014.
Preliminary injunction; improper where act sought to be enjoined is already consummated. Case
law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already
become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since the
consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition
moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. Spouses Nicasio C.
Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No.
184045. January 22, 2014.
Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,

the right of Planters Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and
conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998
was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of
the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ
of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the
present case.LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R.
No. 187973, January 20, 2014.
Writ of possession; nature. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession.
This is clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v United Overseas Bank Phils. (616
SCRA 353) which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a
judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex
partepetition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial
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proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale.
It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK Holdings and
Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014
Other Proceedings
Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay purely executive in

nature. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to
“maintain public order in the barangay.” Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding
Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January
22, 2014.
Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It

is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either
during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. To
this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (579 Phil 454 [2008]), citing several
cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser
should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of
the court.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial

foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by
adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno
(693 SCRA 110 [2013]), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that “the
phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such
as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably,
the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan
Lending Investors Corporation (633 SCRA 173 [2010]), the third person must therefore claim a
right superior to that of the original mortgagor. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J.
Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.
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Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262; concept. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA 352,
401 [2013]), wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in
protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household
member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that
petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to
issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of
the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to
protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations
in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex
parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security. x x x
Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite;
and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under Section 15 of RA 9262; court’s authority to issue ex
parte. Clearly, the court, under Section 15 of RA 9262, is authorized to issue a TPO on the date
of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex partemeans that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for
the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the
affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for
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the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang,
Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701.
January 22, 2014.
Evidence
Admissions; contradiction. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require
proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The
petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his
rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is
unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Theresita, Juan,
Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A.
Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that
through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had
clearly relied on the petitioners’ admission and so amended their original complaint for partition
to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are
now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v.
Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Best evidence rule; concept and exception. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule
provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. x x x The cadastral maps and
the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to
the best evidence rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed
Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Burden of proof in civil cases; quantum of evidence. Land Bank failed to prove that the amount
allegedly “miscredited” to Oñate’s account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans
of its clients. It is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making the allegations has the
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burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C. Oñate,G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014.
Hearsay rule; entries in official records as exception. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the
rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in
the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the
innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in
the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the
hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion,
Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No.
201011, January 27, 2014.
Judicial notice; discretionary notice of records of other cases. The taking of judicial notice is a
matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to
achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to “take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.” They may, however, take
judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1)
the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the
court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear
boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.
Offer of evidence; court considers evidence only when formally offered; exceptions. Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:
Section 34. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is
formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to
base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties.
A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal
offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence
which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.
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However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence
not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate the Court in
Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al. (632 SCRA 236 [2010]),
enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer
it, namely: “first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.” In People v.
Vivencio De Roxas et al. (116 Phil 977 [1962]), the Court also considered exhibits which were
not formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial
by the counsel of the accused.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the
relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be
seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a
thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before
the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Rodolfo Laborte, et
al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014.
Preponderance of evidence; definition. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had
the burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term “greater
weight of the evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Theresita, Juan,
Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A.
Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January
15, 2014.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists
when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the
right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question
of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v.
Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365.
January 15, 2014.
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Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:
Civil Procedure
Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional
ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed
to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which
was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The underlying reason
is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest.”
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban
Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013
Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not toll
fifteen-day period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial
justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order to
serve substantial justice.
In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004,
we held that:
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioner’s counsel was
understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyer’s negligence without any participatory
negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the
CA.
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More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case NO. Q-99-37219, as both are
patently erroneous. x x x
Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the
rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum
shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each party’s respective claims and
defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to
purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on mere technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraint of
technicalities.
After a conscientious view, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case
since the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was not
occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioner’s lawyer in charge of the case, the latter
having a valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her father’s sudden
demise. There is likewise no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the
GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro; G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013
Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be executed if
party-pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural
requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these
procedural requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has
been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the guidelines respecting
non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the relevant
portions of which are as follows:
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, xxx,

is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance or presence of ‘special
circumstances or compelling reasons’.
xxxx
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.
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The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation on the
part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is
the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the
filing of a petition in that case.” Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to
sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating
her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by counsel
without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013
Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by subsequent submission

unless there is substantial compliance or special circumstance. In this light, the Court finds that
the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of
non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority
to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an
SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective
certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in
some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did
so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the
effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v.
Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013
Certification against forum shopping and Verification; ratification by the Board of Directors. A
closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate submitted by BPI reveals
that, at the time the subject complaint was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have the
express authority to file and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping
attached to BPI’s complaint. The SPA, which appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G.
Delegencia as BPI’s attorneys-in-fact in the case against the petitioners, was executed only on
July 8, 2008. Even the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate that named the officers authorized by
the BPI’s Executive Committee to grant and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank was
executed only on February 21, 2007. The Executive Committee is part of the bank’s permanent
organization and, in between meetings of BPI’s Board of Directors, possesses and exercises all
the powers of the board in the management and direction of the bank’s affairs.
BPI’s subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramos’

unauthorized representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners. A corporation
can act only through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its
board of directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act of
ratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficient
authority.
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In PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization

(PSTMSDWO) v. PNCC Skyway Corporation, we considered the subsequent execution of a
board resolution authorizing the Union President to represent the union in a petition filed against
PNCC Skyway Corporation as an act of ratification by the union that cured the defect in the
petition’s verification and certification against forum shopping. We held that “assuming that Mr.
Soriano (PSTMSDWO’s President) has no authority to file the petition on February 27, 2006, the
passing on June 30, 2006 of a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the union is
deemed a ratification of his prior execution, on February 27, 2006, of the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.” Sps. Eugene L. Lim and
Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station, et al.;G.R. No. 192615, January 30,
2013
Certification against forum shopping and Verification; requirements not jurisdictional. In any
case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping
are not jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-
compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against
forum shopping us required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory,
non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or
submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of “substantial
compliance.” Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao
Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013
Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by

acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard
of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the
order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order
of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing
is forbidden or required. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B.
Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013
Ejectment; possession de facto; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases. At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts
resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
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party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of
the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Juanita Ermitaño,
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436.
January 23, 2013
Execution; issuance of writ is trial court’s ministerial duty once decision is final; writ of execution
must conform to dispositive portion of judgment; order of execution which varies tenor of
judgment is void. In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition
and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse.
It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory.
As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the
decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the
issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty. The writ of execution, however, must
conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must
conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no further
interpretation. It would also be inequitable for the petitioners to pay and for the respondents,
who did not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the 12% per annum interest, to
receive more than what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution dated
December 21, 2009 and the alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void.
Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the
judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Spouses Ricardo and Elena
Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro; G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013
Forcible entry; when proper; when issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving
the issue of possession. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for
forcible entry, and unlawful detainer, is proper:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
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or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1)
prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant
through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof
lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by
preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and
proved the required elements.
We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be
material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession.
The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception
and is allowed only in this limited instance– to determine the issue of possession and only if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Save for
this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case. Nenita Quality
Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013
Forum Shopping; definition and nature. “Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
forcertiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable decision.
x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades
the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of
the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also
constitute direct contempt.” Estrellla Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna
U. Tomas;G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013
Grave abuse of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari but not in a petition for
review on certiorari. It is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the CA, which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but not in the present petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45. Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust
Company, et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013
Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We

emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
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forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse. In Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:
The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences, the strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it, the Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an exception to the policy.
xxx
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from
which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a rule, the Court is a
court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section
4 of Rule 65. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales of the Department of Justice,G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; distinction. This Court has laid down the distinction between
interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
xxx A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the court except to await the parties’ next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and
executory.”
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s
task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the court is
“interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting
a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting
or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things,
etc. unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable. As above pointed out, an
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“interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma. Carmina Calderon
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to

support pendente lite. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and
support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support, and conjugal assets. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9,
2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not appeal. The remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the
CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose
Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013
Judgment; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a
compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling
their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an
end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a
compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately
binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court
and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with
the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public
order.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin
Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013
Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in civil cases; voluntary appearance. In civil cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of
the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy, we had occasion to state:
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Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a
general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to
its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) special appearance operates as an
exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in
an unequivocal manner; (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed
and submitted to the court for resolution. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive
Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Litis pendentia; elements. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil.
Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Motion to dismiss; remedy against denial is not appeal; denial may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to dismiss, as an interlocutory order, cannot be the
subject of an appeal until a final judgment or order is rendered in the main case. An aggrieved
party, however, may assail an interlocutory order through a petition for certiorari but only when it
is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station,
et al.; G.R. No. 192615. January 30, 2013
Parties; authority of private counsel to represent local officials in suit. The present case
stemmed from Special Civil Action 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages
sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to
have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental,the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal
liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services
of private counsel, explaining:
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it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity, is later held to
have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten
by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other
hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge
of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers,
except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof.
In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case,
We held that where rigid acceptance to the law on representation of local affairs in court actions
could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel
would be proper. And in Alburra v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in
his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains
other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be
satisfied by them in their private capacity. Romeo Gontang, in his official capacity as Mayor of
Gainza, Camarines Sur v. Engr. Cecilia Alayan; G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013
Parties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Under the Rules, parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the
collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment case by dropping her as a
party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect her conjugal share, but
also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by their conflicting
actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the collection case, Estrella was
foregoing collection of her share in the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does
not imply a waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.
While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her – amending the complaint
and filing a motion to drop her as a party – she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the
annulment case directly after these remedies were denied her by the collection court without
first questioning or addressing the propriety of these denials. While she may have been
frustrated by the collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to
appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition
for certiorari or otherwise question the trial courts denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff,
citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder
of parties are the proper subject of certiorari. Estrella Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C.
Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); contents; not an absolute rule that will lead to
dismissal; liberal construction. The court significantly pointed out in F.A.T Kee Computer
Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc. that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose violation would automatically lead
to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact,
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the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court “may require or allow the filing of the such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda, or documents, as it may deem necessary within such periods
and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate”; and “[i]f the petition is given due
course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or
specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.” These provisions are in keeping with
the overriding standard that procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is
a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusively and binding
unless any of the following exceptions, obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. However, none of the aforementioned exception applies herein. Special
People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda,
et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is
well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. This Court, in numerous instances, has had the occasion to
explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court
respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR, giving them
a certain measure of finality. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of
which is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, et
al. v. Ruben S. Afable, et al., G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. We
first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires
us to delve into factual issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a
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Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. This rule is read with the
equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and
are therefore not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when,
as here, conflict attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the
CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which we deem important to point, the petition needlessly
impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nenita Quality Foods
Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191. January 30, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; applicable to
expropriation cases. This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a
petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition may only raise questions of law. This rule
applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented
leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to deviate from the findings of fact of the
trial and appellate courts.
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court
may, after hearing, accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in accordance
therewith. This is what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical findings of fact
concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest respect, and are
binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in
drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA
committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their findings. Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro
Bautista and Valentina Malabanan,G.R. No. 181218. January 28, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); review errors of judgment; orders granting execution
are interlocutory and should be subject of petition for certiorari under Rule 65; exceptions. The
petition filed in this case is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitions filed under this rule bring up for review errors of judgment. It is an ordinary appeal and
the petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed.
The present petition, however, assails the RTC Order of execution dated December 21, 2009
and alias writ of execution dated May 27, 2010. It is a settled rule that orders granting execution
are interlocutory orders; hence the petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. This is categorically provided in Rule 41, viz:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be applicable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
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(f) An order of execution;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the writ of execution varies
the judgment. Thus, in Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. V. Court of Appeals the Court acknowledged
that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the
order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. Other exceptions
include: (1) There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust; (2) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from
execution; (3) It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(4) The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or (5) It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been
paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.
In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to
the aggrieved party. Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may
interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and vice versa.
In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the
petitioners from their procedural lapse. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos
and Amelita Navarro, G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013
Pleadings; relief. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Tecson, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement, it is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice, which affords the opposing
party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of
the requirement that allegations of the complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant
who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance,
amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the
Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section
3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. xxx The raison d’etre in limiting the
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extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not
file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will be
accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt,
the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to
due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of the Court,
is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies “the sporting idea of fair play” and
forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be
heard thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo
Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559.
January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; abuse of discretion if writ issued despite absence of clear legal right. The
issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion if the court taking
cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of
injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum
absque injuria. In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the “grave and
irremediable” financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156’s
enforcement, finding such prejudice “inequitable.” No doubt, by importing used vehicles in
contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk,
however, was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to
courts for an injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum
absque injuria.Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage,
without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection. Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of Customs, Port of Aparri,
Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land
Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; requirement of actual and existing right. Petitioners’ argument fails to
impress. The CA did not nullify the October 15, 2004 Order merely because of the interchanged
pages. Instead, the CA determined that the applicant, Vitaliano, was not able to show that he
had an actual and existing right that had to be protected by a preliminary injunction. The most
that Vitaliano was able to prove was a future right based on his victory in the suit. Contrasting
this future right of Vitaliano with respondents’ existing right under the GIS, the CA determined
that the trial court should not have disturbed the status quo. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel
Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No.
170770. January 9, 2013
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Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in

Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a
showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the
defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly
founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with
the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the
added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.
These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the
course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against
them. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of
customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La
Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R.
No. 199324. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists un restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing
legal right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid
injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled
to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768.
January 7, 2013
Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the present case
evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in
G.R. No. 172942.
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Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who
can no longer question the respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the
CA. The Court’s determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal
interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through
the present recourse.
Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is
inextricably related to the ruling in the former. City of Cebu v. Apolonio M. Dedamo, Jr.; G.R.
No. 172852. January 30, 2013
Res judicata; elements. In Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de
Hipolito, we enumerated the following as the elements of res judicata:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of
the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between
the same parties.
In the case at bar, the validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was the primary
issue raised by the parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full-blown trial. On
September 10, 2004, the issue was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment, no matter
how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court. Inevitably, res judicata operates to bar
PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no end to litigation. Philippine
National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013
Res judicata; effect of minute resolutions. In Alonso, we declared that a “minute resolution may
amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent.” However, we continued to state
that “it can not bind non-parties to the action.” Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute
resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties
therein, and calls for res judicata’s application.
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Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama is instructive anent the effects of the
issuance of a minute resolution, viz:
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a
disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the
CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. x x x
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. x x x (Underlining
ours)
It is therefore clear from the above that for purposes of the application of res judicata, minute
resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions, hence,
binding upon the parties to the action Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-
AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of jurisdiction,
acts without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope
and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
and not a petition for certiorari.
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the
legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though
within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect
to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the
general power in respect of it are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a
certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing
that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to
substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as
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President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No.
169005. January 28, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; an extraordinary remedy; judicial and quasi-
judicial functions. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari as well as to
grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for
certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly
observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed
aside as mere technicality.
As provided in Section 1, Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or
discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.
The Central Bank Monetary Board (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions
with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and
branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly,
the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function.
Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. & Eduardo B.
Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, Represented by its Chairman, Governor Armando
M. Tetangco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 192986. January 15, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof For a special civil action
of certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board or officer, must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies
on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is available
only when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. “The sole office of the writ of certiorari,” according to Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
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xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave which means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64; proper mode of review of COMELEC en
bancResolutions not relating to pre-proclamation controversies. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the
Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within
30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by
the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the
review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010
were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, the said Resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition
for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to the
composition and the proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the
COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not
qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.Kamarudin K. Ibrahim v.
Commission on Elections and Rolan G. Buagas, G.R. No.192289. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to

begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative
concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The
issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to
dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the administrative
agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of
its competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to
resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do
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so. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor
M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available. Similarly, the petition could not be
one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court.” The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ
ofmandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course
of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the
Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056.
January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties. A key
principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those
that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman,
Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Unlawful detainer; nature. Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-
fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013
Unlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as grounds. We find that the
RTC’s ruling upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the building premises was
proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima;
and second, the Contract of lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation
thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration.Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive
Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
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Unlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorney’s fees. As to the award of
monthly compensation, we find that Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since
the former continued to occupy the leased premises even after the expiration of the lease
contract.
Finally we uphold the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P30, 000 and judicial costs in
the light of Hertz unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises, thus forcing Optima
to file the instant case in order to protect its rights and interest. Optima Realty Corporation v.
Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Special Proceedings
Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v.

Garcia,Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent
as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he
set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the
estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law
and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the
estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 5, Rule 86).
The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous
possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v O’Brien, it explained that
the term “implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law
where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied
contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts
should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that
may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent
one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R.
No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Settlement of Estate; specific rules on settlement prevail over general rules. We read with
approval the CA’s use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate
generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court;
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be
filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for
ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply
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suppletorily. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R.
No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Other Proceedings
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4

of E.O. No. 1008, in order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, two requisites must concur: “first,
the dispute must somehow be related to a construction contract; and second, the parties must
have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings.” The Manila Insurance Company,
Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a

construction contract. In William Golangco Construction Corporation v. Ray Burton
Development Corporation, we declared that monetary claims under a construction contract are
disputes arising from “differences in interpretation of the contract” because the “matter of
ascertaining the duties and obligations of the parties under their contract all involve
interpretation of the provisions of the contract. Following our reasoning in that case, we find that
the issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the performance bond issued
by petitioner is a “dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of [the CCA]
by reason of difference in the interpretation of the contract documents.” The Manila Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful

reading of the Performance Bond reveals that the “bond is coterminous with the final
acceptance of the project.” Thus, the fact that it was issued prior to the execution of the
Construction Contract Agreement does not affect its validity or effectivity.
In fact, in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc., we rejected the
argument that the jurisdiction of CIAC is limited to the construction industry, and thus cannot be
extended to surety contracts. In that case, we declared that “although not the construction
contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main construction
contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is
significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt
it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.” The
Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628.
January 16, 2013
Election Cases; review extends only to final decisions or resolutions of COMELEC en banc and
not to interlocutory orders issued by a division. The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary
remedy ofcertiorari to assail and interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is
amiss. “A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course.
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xxx
Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are
present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the
COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the
members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Governor Sadikul
A. Sahali and Vice-Governor Ruby M. Sahali v. Commission on Elections (First Division),
Rashidin H. Matba and Jilkasi J. Usman, G.R. No. 201796. January 15, 2013
Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act; prospective application of the law. Sec. 146 of the
FRIA, which makes it applicable to “all further proceedings in insolvency, suspension of
payments and rehabilitation cases xxx except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice,” still presupposes a prospective
application. The wording of the law clearly shows that it is applicable to all further proceedings.
In no way could it be made retrospectively applicable to the Stay Order issued by the
rehabilitation court back in 2002. Situs Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., G.R.
No. 180036. January 16, 2013
HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgage; ruling of HLURB affects only the lot subject of the
buyer’s complaint. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad
enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to
the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous
developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the knowledge of
the former and the consent of the HLURB.
In Far East Bank, we held that:
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. Hence,
the mortgage over the lot is null and void insofar as private respondent is concerned.
The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the President is proper only
insofar as it refers to the lot of respondent. In short, the mortgage contract is void as against
him. Since there is no law stating the specifics of what should be done under the circumstances,
that which is in accord with equity should be ordered. The remedy granted by the HLURB in the
first and the second paragraphs of the dispositive portion of its Decision insofar as it referred to
respondent’s lot is in accord with equity.
The HLURB, however, went overboard in its disposition in paragraphs 3 and 4, which pertained
not only to the lot but to the entire parcel of land mortgaged. Such ruling was improper. The
subject of this litigation is limited only to the lot that respondent is buying, not to the entire parcel
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of land. He has no personality or standing to bring suit on the whole property, as he has
actionable interest over the subject lot only. (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In Far East Bank, we sustained the HLURB when it declared the mortgage entered into between
the subdivision developer and the bank as unenforceable against the lot buyer. However, we
were categorical that the HLURB acted beyond bounds when it nullified the mortgage covering
the entire parcel of land, of which the lot subject of the buyer’s complaint is merely a part.
In the case now before us, while it is within Lim’s right to file a complaint before the HLURB to
protect her right as a condominium unit buyer, she has no standing to seek for the complete
nullification of the subject mortgage. She has an actionable interest only over Unit 48C of
Cluster Dominiko of Vista de Loro, no more and no less. Philippine National Bank, substituted
by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No.
171677. January 30, 2013
HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of

PD No. 957 limits the HLURB’s jurisdiction to three kinds of cases: (a) unsound real estate
business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. While paragraphs (b) and (c) limit the HLURB cases to those between the buyer and
the subdivision or condominium owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman, (a) is broad
enough to include third parties to the sales contract.
Jurisprudence consistently recognizes the rationale behind the enactment of PD No. 957 – to
protect innocent lot buyers from scheming developers. For this reason, the Court has broadly
construed the jurisdiction of the HLURB to include complaints for annulment of mortgages of
condominium or subdivision units. Indeed, in Manila Banking Corporation v. Spouses Rabina,
even if the mortgagee bank was under receivership/liquidation, the Court declared that the
HLURB retains jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of the mortgage:
The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of
mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to
the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as
mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio Gonzales, Bormacheco, Inc., Nazario
Santos, Teresita Chua Tek, Charito Ong Lee, and Ernesto Sibal, G.R. No. 155113. January 9,
2013
Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the

case: (a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; and (b) the nature of the
question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the
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regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties’ rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria are
satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has
jurisdiction over it. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo,
Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013
Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section

145 of the Corporation Code protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate
actors against other corporate actors. The statutory provision assures an aggrieved party that
the corporation’s dissolution will not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies
against the corporation, its stockholders, directors and officers. It also states that corporate
dissolution will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its stockholders,
directors or officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actor’s cause of action and
remedy against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also preserves the nature of
the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.
The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However,
despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The
dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-
corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which
arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an
intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the
subsequent dissolution of the corporation. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc.,
Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013
Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the

foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for
the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial,
if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid
a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial
compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory
until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is
dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law.
Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy and public order.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja
Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013
Evidence
Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption

found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants,
provides as follows:
Page
41
Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxxx
(b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title
asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that
relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has
expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent,
if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what respondent is
claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. Juanita
Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño vs. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R.
No. 174436. January 23, 2013
Evidence; disputable presumptions; presumption of regularity. The court is inclined to give more
evidentiary weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being the officer having
jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more familiar
with the property in issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of regularity in its
issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents,
however, failed to present any evidence to rebut that presumption. Heirs of Luis A. Luna, et
al. v. Ruben S. Afable, et al.; G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013.
Page
42

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represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money

Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,

Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay purely executive in

Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It

The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, xxx,

Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by subsequent submission

BPI’s subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramos’

In PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization

Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by

Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We

Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to

No appeal may be taken from:

(f) An order of execution;

Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in

a) The former judgment or order must be final;

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to

Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v.

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful

In Far East Bank, we held that:

HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of

Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the

Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section

Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the

Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption

Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

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