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McGann
THINK TANKS,
FOREIGN POLICY and
the EMERGING POWERS
Think Tanks, Foreign Policy
and the Emerging Powers
James G. McGann
Editor
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
I want to thank the scholars and executives from think tanks around the
world who took time out of their busy schedules to help shape the content
of the case examples and provide written statements for the book. I give
special recognition to Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) for its continued
partnership and support for think tanks in Latin America and the emerg-
ing powers.
I want to extend a note of appreciation to my dedicated volunteer
research interns who have helped collect data and edit this manuscript.
Each year the TTCSP provides mentoring and training for over 180 grad-
uate and undergraduate students. Specifically, I would like to recognize
the following interns: Stephen Purcell, Villanova University; Alixandra
Steerman, University of Pennsylvania; Danielle Resar, University of
Pennsylvania; Gregory Koons, University of Pennsylvania; Jonathan
Goodson, University of Pennsylvania; Chloé Reum, University of
Pennsylvania; Serena Tibrewala, University of Pennsylvania; Garth Fowler,
Swarthmore College; and Travis Taylor, Haverford College. Finally, a
word of thanks to Mauro Guillen and the Lauder Institute for the support
and encouragement they have provided me as I worked to finish this
manuscript.
v
Contents
Part I Introduction 1
Part II Africa 103
5 Nigeria: An Overview 105
James G. McGann
vii
viii Contents
Part III Asia 161
11 India: An Overview 191
James G. McGann
13 Singapore: An Overview 219
James G. McGann
20 Argentina: An Overview 303
James G. McGann
22 Brazil: An Overview 329
James G. McGann
24 Mexico: An Overview 351
James G. McGann
x Contents
26 Qatar: An Overview 377
James G. McGann
28 Turkey: An Overview 399
James G. McGann
Part VI Conclusion 419
Appendix 2: H
istory and Evolution of Think Tanks
in Selected Emerging Powers 433
Index 451
About the Editor
xi
xii ABOUT THE EDITOR
xiii
xiv Notes on Contributors
think tank based at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Her
areas of research specialization include the intersection between foreign
policy, regional integration, and human development; the role of the pri-
vate sector in African development initiatives; and South Africa’s role as an
emerging development partner in Africa. Grobbelaar holds an MPhil in
Economic Policy from the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; a
Master’s in Art History from the University of Glasgow, UK; and an
Honours in Business Administration and International Relations from the
University of Pretoria, South Africa.
Arvind Gupta is Director of the Vivekananda International Foundation
(VIF), a New Delhi–based think tank on strategic and international secu-
rity affairs. Formerly he was Deputy National Security Adviser and
Secretary of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS; 2014–2017)
and Joint Secretary, NSCS on deputation from the Ministry of External
Affairs (1999–2007). He dealt with a wide range of national security issues
within the NSC structures and had wide-ranging interactions in an official
capacity with official and non-official delegations from several countries
on security issues. He is also a former Director General of the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi (2012–2014) and Lal
Bahadur Shastri Chair National Security, IDSA (2008–2011), where he
conducted track-two interactions with think tanks from other countries.
He has served in Indian diplomatic missions in Moscow, London, and
Ankara, and dealt with Afghanistan, Kashmir, Soviet Union, Russia, and
Central Asia in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is the author of three
books, and is primarily interested in problems of national and interna-
tional security; foreign policy issues of defense strategy; ancient Indian
thought; and nation-building, science, and technology.
Bruce Jones is vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program
at Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA, and a senior fellow in
the Institution’s Project on International Order and Strategy. He is also a
consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University,
CA, USA. Jones’ research expertise and policy experience are in interna-
tional security. His current research focus is on US strategy, international
order, and the emerging powers. His most recent book on the topic is Still
Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and
Restraint (Brookings Institution Press, 2014). He is also co-author with
Carlos Pascual and Stephen Stedman of Power and Responsibility: Building
International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Brookings
Notes on Contributors
xvii
Institution Press, 2009) and co-editor with Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu
and Pratap Bhanu Mehta of Shaping the Emerging World: India and the
Multilateral Order (Brookings Press, 2013). Other publications include
The State of the International Order, with Thomas Wright (Brookings,
2014), “Managing a Changing World” (Foreign Policy, 2011), and “How
Do Rising Powers Rise?” (Survival, 2010). Jones also has significant expe-
rience on multilateral institutions. He was a senior advisor to Kofi Annan
on UN reform and served as deputy research director to the UN’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as well as lead scholar for
the International Task Force on Global Public Goods. Related publica-
tions include “Beyond Blocs: The West, Rising Powers and Interest-Based
International Cooperation” (Stanley Foundation, 2011), “Libya and the
Responsibilities of Power” (Survival, 2011), and “The G8 and the Threat
of Bloc Politics in the International System” (Brookings, 2011).
Bong-Geun Jun is a Professor and Director General at the Department
of Security and Unification Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic
Academy (formerly the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security),
Seoul, South Korea. Previously he held several governmental and non-
governmental positions: Policy Advisor to the Republic of Korea Minister
of Unification (2003–2004), Visiting Scholar at Keio University in Tokyo,
Japan and Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation Academic Fellow
(2001–2002), Secretary to the President for international security affairs
at the Presidential Office (1993–1997), and a professional staffer at KEDO
New York headquarters (1997–2001). He was a visiting scholar at Asia
Foundation Center for US–Korea Policy in Washington, DC (2010).
Jun’s research area covers the North Korean nuclear issue, inter-Korean
relations, non-proliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy policies.
He received a BA and an MA in Political Science from Seoul National
University, South Korea, and a PhD in Political Science from University of
Oregon, OR, USA.
Kilic Kanat is Research Director at the SETA Foundation in Washington,
DC, USA, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn State
University, Erie, PA, USA. He received his PhD in Political Science and a
Master’s in Political Science from Syracuse University, NY, USA, and a
Master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University, WI, USA. He
was awarded the Outstanding Research Award and Council of Fellows
Faculty Research Award at Penn State. He participated in the Future
Leaders Program of the Foreign Policy Initiative. Kanat’s writings have
xviii Notes on Contributors
issues. She was a research fellow of the Center for International Law,
National University of Singapore, and of the Japan Institute for
International Affairs.
Hung Son Nguyen is Deputy Director-General of the Institute for the
South China Sea, Vietnam, and was previously Deputy Director-General
of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam. He has a BA from the National Economic University of Vietnam,
an MSc in International Economics from Birmingham University, UK,
and a PhD in International Relations from the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam. His research work focuses on geo-political issues, regional secu-
rity architecture, maritime security, and the foreign policy of Vietnam.
Nguyen also served as Director of the Political Affairs division at the
ASEAN department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when he exten-
sively participated in regional summits, and had hands-on experience of
many regional processes and issues involving ASEAN. He was a member
of the Vietnam High Level Task Force delegation negotiating the ASEAN
Charter in 2006–2007, and served as head of the ASEAN Standing
Committee division at the ASEAN department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs when Vietnam presided over the ASEAN Standing Committee
from July 2000 to July 2001.
Theresa Robles is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and
International Studies of the University of Warwick, UK. She is also a ses-
sional tutor and research assistant at Warwick Business School. Prior to
this, she was an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies’ Centre for Multilateralism Studies, Singapore.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is Chief Executive Officer of the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), an independent foreign policy
think tank based in Johannesburg, South Africa. She holds an MA in
International Relations (cum laude) from the University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She has headed the Institute since 2005.
Before her current appointment she was Director of Studies at SAIIA from
1999 to 2005, and was previously Research Director at the South African
Institute of Race Relations and editor of the highly acclaimed Race
Relations Survey (now the South Africa Survey), an annual publication
documenting political and constitutional developments and socio-eco-
nomic disparities in South Africa. She is a member of the International
Advisory Board of the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, the journal of the
Notes on Contributors
xxi
Fig. 3.1 IMF GDP forecasts for the world’s top ten economies
as of 2014 77
Fig. 4.1 Overlap between BRICS, +N11, G20, and MINT 84
Fig. 4.2 Emerging powers timeline 92
Fig. 19.1 Structure of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 290
Fig. 21.1 Organization of the CEEPADE “Manuel Belgrano” 319
xxv
List of Graphs
xxvii
xxviii List of Graphs
Table 1.1 Typology for autonomous and affiliated public policy think
tanks8
Table 5.1 Nigeria at a glance 106
Table 5.2 Think tanks in Nigeria 111
Table 7.1 South Africa at a glance 136
Table 7.2 Overview of think tanks in South Africa 142
Table 9.1 China at a glance 164
Table 9.2 Major macroeconomic targets 167
Table 9.3 Think tanks in China 169
Table 11.1 India at a glance 192
Table 11.2 Overview of Indian think tanks 196
Table 13.1 Singapore at a glance 220
Table 13.2 Think tanks in Singapore 223
Table 14.1 ARF Preventive Diplomacy (PD) Work Plan 235
Table 15.1 South Korea at a glance 240
Table 15.2 Think tanks in South Korea 243
Table 18.1 Vietnam at a glance 282
Table 18.2 Think tanks in Vietnam 284
Table 20.1 Argentina at a glance 304
Table 20.2 Think tanks in Argentina 311
Table 21.1 Strategies, programs, and impact of the Argentine security
and international affairs think tanks 325
Table 22.1 Brazil at a glance 330
Table 22.2 Think tanks in Brazil 337
Table 24.1 Mexico at a glance 352
xxix
xxx List of Tables
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
James G. McGann and Elena Lazarou
We live in turbulent times where the only constant is change, where the
unthinkable has become a reality, and where the line between domestic
and international politics is increasingly blurred. The promise and peril of
globalization have transformed how we view international relations and
opened the policy-making process to a new set of actors, agendas, and
outcomes. International relations was once the exclusive domain of diplo-
mats, bureaucrats, and states, but, when formulating foreign policy today,
policy-makers must consider a diverse set of international actors that
includes news organizations such as CNN and al-Jazeera; non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, International Crisis Group, and Greenpeace; interna-
tional financial institutions such as Deutsche Bank; terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda and ISIS; and regional groups such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Policy-makers thus face a complex and
unique challenge when trying to fashion effective foreign policy.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
E. Lazarou
Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
1
John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pederson, “Chapter 1: Knowledge Regimes and the
National Origins of Policy Ideas,” The National Origins of Policy Ideas, January 2013, 6.
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 5
make informed decisions about public policy by offering such advice in the
form of intellectual argument, platforms for convocation and debate, and
resources, and have significant autonomy from government and societal
interests. As a result, public policy decision-making has been increasingly
shaped by the analysis, ideas, and recommendations of nationally specific
institutions such as think tanks, and, in turn, these knowledge regimes have
become highly embedded into national political and economic systems.
However, while the aforementioned definition of a think tank stresses
notions of “independence” and “non-partisanship,” in actuality there
exists considerable variation in the character of public policy research
organizations, depending on the political reality and nation-state context
the institution in question is operating in, as Chap. 2 discusses in further
detail. In much of the developing world, the absence or restricted nature
of legal, political, and financial frameworks severely limits the intellectual
freedom, independence, and autonomy of think tanks in these regions.
Additionally, these regions experiencing limited economic freedom are
thus characterized by relatively weak philanthropic and private support
for public policy research institutions, forcing many of these institutions
to rely on government contracts, foreign donors, and private-sector con-
sulting; consequently, the intellectual independence of think tanks is
compromised. On the Anglo-American side, while there remains a pro-
clivity for independent, non-partisan, and non-governmental think tanks,
the increase in US ideologically led think tanks from 1970 to 1996 dem-
onstrates that think tanks, institutions traditionally viewed as producing
balanced and non-partisan research, are currently “at risk of polarization
and the subsequent loss of their intellectual independence and credibility”2
due to a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, partisan politics,
the proliferation of specialized think tanks, the growth of liberal and con-
servative advocacy groups, and the influence of 24/7 cable news net-
works. As a result, when analyzing the universal application of think
tanks, a modified version of Paul Dickson’s 1972 definition may be more
representative: “from a global perspective, a think tank can be for profit
or nonprofit; supported by the government, part of the government,
completely free of the government, or supported by a number of institu-
tions, such as a company or university; and, finally, must practice relative
academic freedom.”
2
See Chap. 2.
6 J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU
The origins of think tank culture in the United States are bound up in
America’s Progressive Era traditions of corporate philanthropy, the sharp
distinction between legislative and executive branches of government, weak
political parties, the public commitment to openness and independence,
and the inclination of the public and their elected officials to trust the
private sector to interface with and to provide assistance to government.
These factors combine to provide very few barriers to policy analysts, ideo-
logues, and entrepreneurs who want to enter the marketplace of ideas and
contribute to the policy-making process. Thus, for most of the twentieth
century, independent public policy think tanks were found primarily in the
United States.
There has been more recently a veritable proliferation of “think tanks”
around the world, which began in the 1980s as a result of the forces of
globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of transna-
tional issues. The impact of globalization on the think tank movement is
most evident in regions such as Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and
parts of Southeast Asia, where there was a concerted effort by the interna-
tional community to support the creation of independent public policy
research organizations, with the majority of think tanks in these regions
having been established in the last 10 years. The growth of public policy
research organizations over the last two decades has been nothing less
than explosive—today, there are over 4500 of these institutions around
the world, with many think tanks in the United States exporting their
scholars, brands of policy analysis, and organizational structures to other
countries.3 Not only have these organizations increased in number, but
the scope and impact of their work have expanded dramatically.
Think tanks operate in a variety of political systems, engage in a range
of policy-related activities, comprise a diverse set of institutions that have
varied organizational forms, and all perform the same basic function—
bringing knowledge and expertise to bear on the policy-making process.
These policy organizations, for example, carry out research on policy
problems, provide swift advice on pressing concerns, evaluate government
programs, coordinate a diverse set of policy actors, and so forth, to name
a few activities. Public policy organizations come in a variety of forms, of
3
According to recent data collected by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, there
are over 6500 think tanks worldwide, approximately 1500 of which are found in the United
States.
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 7
which nearly all exist in the United States. In the rest of the world, think
tanks can be a little more limited, with three main categories: government
affiliated (a part of the structure of government), university affiliated
(a policy research center at a university), and political party affiliated
(formally affiliated with a political party; see Table 1.1). Additionally, there
are autonomous institutions (those with significant independence from
any one interest group or donor, and autonomous in their operation and
funding from government), which tend to dominate the top think tank
rankings put out by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program; though
all three types mentioned also appear in the top ranks.4
The emergence of think tanks has not always been viewed by the politi-
cal establishment as an unalloyed good—think tanks can serve as potential
critics of the policies of national governments and international organiza-
tions, speaking with an objective, informed voice, independent of govern-
ment and business interests. Depending on the systems in which think
tanks operate, they vary in degrees of financial, intellectual, and legal inde-
pendence. But irrespective of their structure or level of autonomy, think
tanks have become a permanent part of the political landscape and are now
an integral part of the policy process in many countries.
A large reason behind the substantial growth in think tanks and similar
policy research and advising institutions is the understanding by many that
they are capable of doing what government bureaucracies cannot—or, at
the very least, that they can do what government bureaucracies do, but
more effectively and efficiently. Think tanks are better suited to deal with
the cross-cutting nature of global policy issues—they can convene and
engage state and non-state global actors on worldwide issues. Moreover,
they are better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of
researchers and then engage stakeholders in the policy process with that
information. Think tanks can effectively condense and maximize the effi-
ciency of the policy process, from inception to policy creation. Government
bureaucracies, on the other hand, thrive on the security of the status quo
and are bound by layers of bureaucracy, standards, and prescribed proce-
dures, and are often segmented by areas of specialization and turf. In con-
trast, think tanks tend to be much more future oriented and maintain a
more holistic view and interdisciplinary approach to policy issues.
4
James G. McGann, ed., Think Tank and Civil Society Program. Global Go To Think Tank
Index 2013. University of Pennsylvania, 2013.
8 J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU
Table 1.1 Typology for autonomous and affiliated public policy think tanks
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 9
Because they play such a key role in the policy-making process, think
tanks have grown in importance, especially in the nations we might deem
“emerging powers.” Emerging powers is a term used as recognition of
the rising, primarily economic, influence of nations that have steadily
increased their presence in global affairs. The emergence of these new
powers around the world fundamentally challenges the traditional
approaches to international relations, international political economy,
multilateralism, and security as a range of countries now compete for
regional and global leadership. Globally, established and emerging pow-
ers are forced to reassess their power metrics relative to new and old allies
and adversaries. This change makes for a complex and fluid set of interna-
tional relations. History has demonstrated that shifts in the power poles
and the emergence of a singular power or a multipolar world tend to be
conflict prone, as these powers exercise their influence at the regional and
global levels. The rise of China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, and Nigeria, to name a few, has had profound impacts on
regional and global affairs.
Scholars such as Raphael Kaplinsky and Dirk Messner suggest that
today’s world order—or disorder—is a result of “tectonic shifts” in the
global economy and in governance institutions.5 The rise of Chinese and
Indian economies, with other emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia,
and South Africa following in their wake, is reshuffling the economic as
well as political power balance. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa), a group of nations commonly associated with the term
“emerging powers,” alone account for 40% of the world population, 20%
of the global gross domestic product (GDP), and 18% of the world
economy.6,7 The BRICS additionally contain four of the world’s ten big-
gest economies and the five parties that have the power to question the
constellation of global institutions and make or break deals in interna-
tional negotiations.8
5
Raphael Kaplinsky and Dirk Messner, “Introduction: The Impact of Asian Drivers on the
Developing World,” World Development 36, no. 2 (2008): 199.
6
“World Economic Outlook Database April 2013,” International Monetary Fund, April
17, 2013, Accessed November 22, 2014.
7
Robert Marquand, “Amid BRICS’ Rise and ‘Arab Spring’, a New Global Order Forms,”
The Christian Science Monitor. October 18, 2011. Accessed November 21, 2014.
8
Yana Marull, “BRICS to Launch Bank, Tighten Latin America Ties,” Yahoo! News. July
11, 2014. Accessed December 5, 2014.
10 J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU
9
“The Dragon’s New Teeth,” The Economist, April 7, 2012. Accessed December 5,
2014.
10
“Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” The World Bank, January 1, 2014. Accessed
December 5, 2014.
11
Daryl Copeland, “Hard Power vs. Soft Power,” February 2, 2010. Accessed December
5, 2014.
12
Joseph Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power,” Belfer Center – Harvard. January
10, 2003. Accessed December 5, 2014.
13
Alexey Dolinskiy, “How Moscow Understands Soft Power,” Russia Direct, June 21,
2013. Accessed December 5, 2014.
14
“China’s Soft Power in Africa,” In Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United
States, edited by Carola McGiffert, by Jennifer Cooke. Washington, D.C.: CSIS (Center for
Strategic & International Studies), 2009.
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 11
In the modern age, emerging powers must expand both their hard
and soft powers to compete with the established order in international
relations and generate a potent and effective foreign policy. The impor-
tance of the growth and development of think tanks in emerging powers
cannot be understated. Often, in transitional countries, the basic data
needed to make informed decisions does not exist and must be col-
lected, analyzed, and translated into a form that is usable by parliamen-
tarians and bureaucrats. Think tanks can serve the incredibly useful
function of aiding the transition and, most importantly, aiding the trans-
formation of the nation’s foreign policy to better reflect its changing
status globally.
There is little doubt today that the past decade has marked significant
and substantial change in the international system and the balance—and
nature—of power. From multipolar to inter-polar15 and apolar,16 and from
post-hegemonic17 to post-American18 to a world where no political or eco-
nomic system is dominant,19 the uncertainty about the state of the new
global order and the dynamics that govern it permeates academic litera-
ture and policy inquiries.
The seismic shift that has occurred in the last 5–10 years in the global
economic and political order can be underscored by the emergence of the
Group of Twenty (G20) as the leading forum for international economic
issues. The rise of new powers has already begun to reshape international
relations and the role that G20 countries play in multilateral institutions
15
Giovanni Grevi, “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario,” Occasional Paper 79 (June
26, 2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies.
16
Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, 2008. https://www.for-
eignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity.
17
Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The New Rules: Globalization in a Post-Hegemonic World,”
World Politics Review, April 16, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti-
cles/11845/the-new-rules-globalization-in-a-post-hegemonic-world.
18
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.
19
Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming
Global Turn, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Bruce Jones, “Managing a Changing World,” Foreign Policy, March 14, 2011. http://
foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/14/managing-a-changing-world/.
Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright, The State of the International Order, Policy Paper no.
33, Brookings Institute, 2014.
12 J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU
20
The G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.
21
William Wallace, “Between Two Worlds: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy,” Two Worlds
of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas, London,
Routledge: 1994.
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 13
future foreign policy and security challenges. Overall, the book illustrates
and analyzes how think tanks work within a variety of political and
economic contexts, and how they are able to contribute to their respective
policy-making processes. A broad cross-section of countries and case
studies demonstrates how think tanks, in collaboration with their respec-
tive governments, are able to respond to the new challenges and dynamics
of an increasingly multipolar world. The book has compiled case studies
from think tanks in a sample of countries that are considered emerging
powers: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Qatar, Singapore,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam. The case studies pro-
vided identify and explicate the unique foreign policy challenges that these
emerging powers face, as well as the strategies and programs that have
been developed to effectively respond to these policy issues. In the intro-
duction and conclusion, McGann and Lazarou synthesize the growing
literature on think tanks and on the foreign policies of the emerging pow-
ers within the context of power shifts and new dynamics in current inter-
national affairs. The conclusion identifies the transcendent trends among
the twelve think tanks and highlights the transferable approaches that
could be adopted by other emerging powers. Moreover, it aims to illumi-
nate the policies and strategies of emerging powers as they interact with
other political bodies in a multipolar world.
The results of this study are then broken down by region, to clearly
assess the impact of the previously identified shift in specific regions. To
further substantiate our claim, we trace the individual research foci of sev-
eral think tanks through case studies spanning each region of the world:
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North America, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, and Latin America. We found the same trend within patterns of
annual reports, conference papers, and publications of these cases as within
the objectives used in our wide-sweeping empirical studies, providing fur-
ther support for our initial analysis. A selection of representative case stud-
ies has been constructed to explore how and when the transition took
place and how it impacted each institution. These case studies were drawn
from the TTCSP database of close to 7000 think tanks worldwide. All
7000 think tanks were analyzed and a universe of security and interna-
tional affairs (SIA) think tanks was created. The think tank case studies
were selected based on a clearly articulated mission and programs that are
focused on SIA research, and a date of establishment that spanned the
THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING… 15
Cold War period and fell within the overall parameters of the longitudinal
study. In addition, there was a conscious effort to create a globally repre-
sentative set of think tanks for the study.
The case studies are intended to illuminate and illustrate the nature and
impact of these changes—global trends involving endless technological
advances, social media and social networking, globalization and global
interdependence—on think tanks and the field of security studies. The
study concludes with an assessment of the future of SIA studies, and raises
the possibility of a return to a traditional security focus driven by recent
events in Europe and the Middle East.
The objective for this project is to provide a comprehensive look at
successful foreign policy formulation and the role think tanks play within
emerging powers, by providing a series of case studies (fourteen in all) that
explore how emerging powers and the SIA think tanks that serve them are
meeting the foreign policy security challenges they face now and will con-
tinue to face in the future. These insider, methodological insights hopefully
will serve as examples for other think tanks in similar political and economic
conditions.
In its aggregate, the book identifies and examines how think tanks in a
variety of political and economic contexts help their respective countries
understand and respond to the new challenges and dynamics of a multipo-
lar world. James McGann, from the University of Pennsylvania, provides a
detailed exposition of the literature on defense and security think tanks
and foreign policy international affairs think tanks, and the role they have
played in shaping foreign and defense policies. Bruce Jones, from the
Brookings Institution, offers an overview of the changing character and
context of international politics and the role the emerging powers are
playing in world politics. Each chapter presents a case with a brief intro-
duction and conclusion and relates it to the broader thematic goals of the
volume, with some of the case studies written by participants in those
organizations. The book concludes with a set of overarching observations
and suggestions for future research.
16 J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU
James G. McGann
1
Thomas Medvetz, “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field” The Social Science Research
Council (2008): 1.
2
Simon James, “Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy
Process by Diane Stone” Public Administration 76, no. 2 (1998): 409–410.
3
This is reflected in the following works: Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, 8–9; Smith,
The Idea Brokers, xiii–xvi; McGann, Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy,
11–12; McGann and Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action,
4–5; Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” 563–564; Medvetz, “Think Tanks as
an Emergent Field,” 9–10; Medvetz, “Hybrid Intellectuals,” 1–3; Stone, Think Tanks across
Nations: A Comparative Approach, 2–6; Rich, “Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics
of Expertise,” 11–12; DeMuth, “Thinking about Think Tanks,” in Think Tank’ with Ben
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Wattenberg part one of two, 2; Pautz, “Think Tanks in Scotland,” 2–5; Stone, “Think Tank
Transnationalization,” 28; Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 1–4; Rich, Think
Tanks, 11–12.
4
Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process
(London: Frank Cass, 1996), 10.
Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America. Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 2014: 3.
5
Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 10.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 19
think tank financial and ideological autonomy or ideas about the “social
consequence” responsibility a think tank might carry.
In order to understand the current status of the debate over the mean-
ing of the term, one must follow the trajectory that the definition of “think
tank” has taken over the past century, since its inauguration in 1830.6 I
hope to assess this ideological journey and concurrently derive a current
definition from an application of its previous connotations to the markedly
different and more complex geopolitical terrain existent today.
6
Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
7
Ibid.
8
James McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars, and Influence in the Public Policy
Research. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995. 19.
9
Donald E. Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy. Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006. 54.
10
James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,”
U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 14.
20 J. G. MCGANN
11
Dickson, Think Tanks, 26.
12
R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” Political Science and Politics 22
(1989), 566. This dynamic is also identified in Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 74–77.
13
Ibid.
14
Marcus G. Raskin, Being and Doing (New York: Random House, 1971), xii, xxv.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 21
Thus, the third generation of think tanks emerged during a period when
scholarly attention to the phenomenon first materialized.
During the 1960s and the rise of the new right, an alternative doctrine
of ideas emerged to challenge the liberal orthodoxy that had prevailed
over Washington for the first half of the century. And with it came the
politicization of think tanks as conservative thinkers and think tanks
entered the marketplace of ideas.15 Corporate financing initiatives also fre-
quented the think tank domain during this era, and such an influx of capi-
tal contributed to a veritable proliferation of public policy research
organizations. Two-thirds of all the think tanks that exist today were
established after 1970, and over half have been established since 1980.
This exacerbated the crowding of a marketplace of ideas already divided
on partisan lines. Consequently, competition became rife and the priorities
of think tanks further shifted from “utility” to “visibility.”16
Given that scholars of this period were exploring untraversed terrain,
the literature from the 1970s focused not so much on grappling with this
notion of partisanship and the associated question of academic freedom,
as with ascertaining a broad definition of the term. Scholars became inter-
ested in:
17
Harold Orlans. The Nonprofit Research Institute: Its Operation, Origins, Problems and
Prospects (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 3.
18
McGann, The Competition, 28.
19
Dickson, Think Tanks, 26.
20
McGann, The Competition, 31.
21
Dickson, Think Tanks, 28.
22
Ibid.
23
David Boorstin, “Directions of Policy Research,” Congressional Quarterly 2 (1975):
725–744.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 23
credited for their inauguration of inquiry into the term “think tank,” they
are equally accountable for setting in motion a trend that would inhibit
the majority of scholars from seeking a definition that is at once narrow
and universal, for decades to come.
A number of scholars have written articles on a narrower field of institu-
tions to which they accord the term “think tank.” In contrast to Dickson
and Boorstin, these scholars begin from a point too narrow and each uses
markedly different frameworks for analysis, this making synthesis difficult.
Roger Levien (1969) asserts that there are six characteristics that an insti-
tution must possess within its organizational structure in order to qualify
as an independent public policy research institution. These characteristics
are “a policy orientation, influence, breadth of charter, interdisciplinary
character, an eye to the future and a concern with systems.”24
Nelson Polsby, in the article “Tanks But No Tanks,” introduces the
notion of public policy research institutes by distinguishing them from
what he terms “true think tanks.”25 He contends that public policy
research institutes, or those engaged in the social sciences, are the policy-
oriented progeny of these true, “ivory towerish” think tanks, and are insti-
tutions that represent a paradigm shift in the notion of think tanks, from
abstention from to active participation in public matters.26 George Fauriol,
in his paper “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,” elaborates on this
notion by stating that “the foreign policy think tank acts as a conveyor belt
of thought…a mid-point between the ivory towers of academia and the
hustled atmosphere of the policy making world of government.”27
Building on Levien and Fauriol, Yehezkel Dror defines a think tank as
“a bridge between power and knowledge.”28 For Dror, a public policy
research institute has six independent features: “(1) mission; (2) critical
mass; (3) methods; (4) research freedom; (5) clientele-dependency; and
24
Roger E. Levien, “Independent Public Policy Analysis Organization—A Major Social
Invention,” in Rand Papers Series ed. Rand Corporation (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
1969), 4231.
25
Nelson W. Polsby, “Tanks But No Tanks,” Public Opinion 6 (1983): 14–16, 58–59.
26
Ibid., 58–59.
27
George A. Fauriol, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,” A paper at The Fourth
Tamkang American Strides Conference, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, November
25–28, 1984. 1, 9.
28
Yehezkel Dror, “Think Tanks. A New Invention in Government,” In Making
Bureaucracies Work ed. Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton (Beverly Hills, London: Sage,
1980), 139–152.
24 J. G. MCGANN
29
Ibid., 141–145.
30
Dror, “Think Tanks. A New”, 145.
31
McGann, The Competition, 42.
32
Winard Gellner, “Political Think Tanks: Functions and Perspectives of a Strategic Elite”
A Paper at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 5.
33
McGann, The Transformation, 49.
34
Weaver, “The Changing World,” 563.
35
Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute, 3.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 25
and journal articles that seek to change elite opinion. Contract researcher
think tanks, like universities without students, practice objective analysis
with a “heavy reliance on academics as researchers,” emphasizing rigorous
social science methods.36 Contract researchers are funded by—and pro-
duce reports for—specific agencies, and hence their research agenda is
determined accordingly. In the late 1980s, this assertion was novel and
one that broke with Levien’s and Dror’s belief that one of the defining
characteristics of think tanks was their research freedom. Weaver contends
that throughout the proliferation of advocacy tanks in the 1980s,37 this
new breed of think tank was unabashedly partisan and ideological, and
prioritized putting a “spin on existing research” over the production of
original research,38 decreasing “academicness” in favor of increasing acces-
sibility to policy-makers.39 Normally in the form of policy briefs or white
papers, their product tends to advocate a particular policy rather than the
academic tomes that are associated with the more academic think tanks.
Expectedly, Weaver’s broader treatment of “think tank” aligns fairly con-
cordantly with those of his predecessors.
In their work “Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of
Definitions and Data,” Samantha L. Durst and James A. Thumber attempt
to define public policy think tanks by “sources of funding” and “types of
expenditures.” It is their contention that the source of funds (grants,
endowment, contracts) and nature of the funding (restricted, unrestricted,
public, or private) “has an influence on the objectivity, direction, and
influence of a think tank.”40 This once novel notion of the relationship
between financial independence and ideological and intellectual auton-
omy has become a major point of contention in the literature written
today.
A further point of contention for today’s scholars was first introduced
into the literature by a group of scholars in the late 1980s. These scholars
focus on the politicization of think tanks during the mid-1970s and 1980s,
and expound an underlying premise that think tanks, once the spring of
36
Weaver, “The Changing World,” 568.
37
Ibid., 564.
38
Ibid., 567.
39
Ibid., 564.
40
Samantha Durst and James Thurber, “Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of
Definitions and Data,” Paper presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, the Atlanta Hilton and Towers, August 31–September 3, 1989. 14.
26 J. G. MCGANN
41
Richard M. Weaver. Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948). The notion of a marketplace of ideas and the competition of ideas has its roots in
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, published in 1859, in which he stresses the importance of
liberty of thought and discussion.
42
Robert K. Landers, “Think Tanks: The New Partisans,” Editorial Research Reports 1,
no. 23 (1986): 455.
43
James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New
York: The Free Press, 1991), 236.
44
Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy
Coalition Approach. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 27.
45
Ibid.
46
Weaver, “The Changing World,” 574–575.
47
Robert L. Hollings, Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations: A Sourcebook on
Think Tanks in Government. New York: Garland Publishers, 1993.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 27
51
Diane Stone. “Think Tank Transnationalization and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice and
Advocacy,” Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000), 16.
52
Diane Stone. “Think Tank Transnationalization”, 16.
53
Ibid., 18.
54
Ibid., 19.
55
Thomas Medvetz. “Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Theory of Think Tanks and Public
Policy Experts in the United States,” Cornell University 1 (2007): 35.
56
Ibid., 9–10.
57
Ibid.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 29
majority of the definitions cited in this chapter fall) and, in his application
of Elite Theory to the think tank domain, his contribution to the literature
represents a substantial departure from traditional accounts of “think
tanks” and offers an alternative lens through which to view this institu-
tional sphere.
As explicated in my account of scholarly interpretations of “think tanks”
in the third era, the politicization of the think tank domain poses a signifi-
cant obstacle to any attempt at definition of the term.58 The fact that the
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics now classifies some think tanks as
“organizations of an explicitly partisan interest that seek to offer policy
advice to chosen recipients” only adds further weight to this notion.59 In
1996, centrist or non-ideological think tanks enjoyed a majority share of
45%, numbering 141 out of a total of 306 think tanks in existence.60 Such
a figure is expected, given the long-standing US tradition of producing
balanced and non-partisan research. That being said, think tanks display-
ing an ideological character, either conservative or liberal, represented
54% of the total number of think tanks in existence.61 This proportion is
an increase from 14% in 1970.62 With the continued advent of public
policy research organizations with an ideological partiality into the 1990s
and 2000s, it seems that the paradigm shift that emerged in the 1980s has
now secured permanent tenancy in the once non-partisan marketplace of
ideas.
In her work Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the
Policy Process, Stone notes that a common trend among new think tanks is
the emphasis on marketing and promotion in response to increased com-
petition for funding, media exposure, and political influence: “their advo-
cacy in policy debates combines a strong ideological, policy or partisan
position with aggressive salesmanship.”63 For Stone, however, think tanks
58
In their article “Ideas for Policymakers: Enhancing the Impact of Think Tanks,” Silvia
Montoya and Rachel M. Swanger identify that think tanks have to strike a difficult balance
between “building a close relationship with stakeholders for the purpose of enhancing the
relevance and timeliness of research, and maintaining adequate independence to preserve the
integrity (real and perceived) of the research” (Montoya and Swanger, 4).
59
Iain Maclean, and Alistair MacMillan. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
60
Rich, “U.S. Think Tanks,” 55.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 23.
30 J. G. MCGANN
64
Ibid., 13.
65
Andrew Denham and Diane Stone, Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 5.
66
In Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise, Rich concurs with this notion.
67
Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 5.
68
Ibid.
69
Stone et al, “Bridging Research,” 27–28.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 31
appetite for lobbying.70 For Abelson, although new think tanks establish
legitimate research programs, their “primary goal [is] not to pursue social
science research, but advance their ideological agenda in the political
arena.”71 Wiarda even contends that think tanks exacerbate the partisan
politics that underscores policy-making in the American political system.72
Hence, as a result of the prioritization of engagement with and influence
on decision-makers over objective, non-ideological scholarly research,
think tanks have, according to Abelson, transformed over the past thirty
years from scientific, non-partisan institutions to active participants and
advocates in the political process.
John Chuckman offers further insight into this perspective. He believes
that think tanks are no more than “public relations fronts” that serve the
primary function of fulfilling the “advocacy goals of their sponsors.”73 His
subsequent assertion, that think tanks are “phony institutes where
ideologue-propagandists pose as academics…[into which] money gushes
like blood from opened arteries to support meaningless advertising’s suf-
focation of genuine debate,” is particularly graphic.74 Extending his appli-
cation of Elite Theory to the think tank domain, Medvetz asserts that the
space of a think tank represents a world divided against itself, where the
traditional desire for credibility is at odds with the modern necessity of
visibility. Ultimately, this continuous conflict inflicts a “cost” on the think
tank’s “intellectual production,” immobilizing the institution’s ability to,
quite simply, think. Abelson’s comments on the issue in A Capitol Idea
perhaps best summarize the skeptics’ perspective. Like Stone, he distin-
guishes think tanks from interest groups. However, unlike the former,
such a distinction does not come with hope for the practice of academic
freedom in the think tank domain; instead, it comes laden with disap-
pointment. Abelson contends that whereas interest groups are in the
“business of giving money to attract support for their cause or causes…
think tanks are in the business of raising money to advance their institu-
tional mandates.”75
70
Abelson, American Think Tanks, 125.
71
Ibid., 49.
72
Wiarda, Think Tanks, 31.
73
John Chuckman, “The Real Clash of Civilizations,” Counter Punch, June 23, 2003,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/06/23/the-real-clash-of-civilizations/.
74
Ibid.
75
Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 13–14.
32 J. G. MCGANN
Other scholars are slightly more optimistic, with some even positing
that politicization is beneficial for the think tank domain. Peter Singer’s
Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own is one of the most
recent of these accounts. Singer asserts that the proximity of think tanks to
power and the media has induced confusion in these institutions between
visibility and utility, and prioritizing advocacy over objective intellectual
production.76 In support of these remarks, he notes that over the past
decade, new think tanks have been smaller and more specialized,77 and
that a trend of increasing donor responsiveness and decreasing indepen-
dence and accountability in response to the “shrinking money environ-
ment” has emerged.78
The concurrent dissolution of authoritarian regimes and expansion of
the European Union (EU) towards the end of the 1980s, combined with
the more recent force of globalization, have created “new spaces in which
think tanks can operate,”79 as well as the establishment of both think tanks
in countries outside of the Anglo-American domain, and transnational
think tank networks linking such institutions. Both of these phenomena,
as Stone notes, have caused traditional notions of “think tank” to be
“stretched beyond their original meaning” and “US-inspired taxonomies”
to lose their “relevance.”80 This idea is qualified by a statement in one of
her earlier works where she asserts that the “notion that a think tank
requires independence of autonomy from the state in order to be ‘free-
thinking’ is a peculiar Anglo-American predilection that does not travel
well into other cultures.”81 A small body of literature exists wherein schol-
ars attempt to tackle this issue.
In his article “Think Tanks in Newly Democratic Eastern Europe,”
K.F.F. Quigley documents the rise of think tanks in Eastern Europe, pro-
viding insight into the juxtaposition between the dynamics of the Eastern
European think tank domain and the Anglo-American domain.82 During
communist times, policy analysis and development were solely done by the
76
Singer echoes Abelson, American Think Tanks, in this notion.
77
Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, also notes this trend fifteen years earlier.
78
Singer, “Washington’s Think Tanks,” 5.
79
Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 7.
80
Diane Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding
Policy Analysis Institutes.” Public Administration 85, no. 2 (2007): 260.
81
Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 2. Telgarsky and Ueno, too (Telgarsky and
Ueno, Think Tanks in a Democratic Society), question whether the Anglo-American concep-
tion of the term “think tank” can be “transplanted” into other countries.
82
K.F.F. Quigley, “Think Tanks in Newly Democratic Eastern Europe,” in Think Tanks in
a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1995).
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 33
83
Diane Stone, “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent
Policy Institutes,” Governance (13): 45–70.
84
McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization,” 13–14.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 35
85
McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization,” 16–17.
36 J. G. MCGANN
86
See note 81.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 37
87
Dickson, Think Tanks, 28.
88
James G. McGann, and Erik C. Johnson. Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public
Policy. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 1–2.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 39
fore, that the character of think tanks is to some degree a function of the
priorities of the government and a private funding environment, consti-
tuted by domestic or international donors, that can be particularly sensitive
to issues of government concern. Indeed, in countries where there is little
hope of finding the wealth necessary to support a philanthropic commu-
nity, charitable causes such as feeding the hungry or housing the homeless
absorb the bulk of private domestic and international aid.
Media freedom is another factor that determines the strength of the
correlation between think tanks outside the Anglo-American domain and
those inside it. It is the level of freedom that the media can exercise that is
the primary determinant of the extent of the dissemination operations that
a think tank can pursue.
Outstanding factors may also greatly influence the number and special-
ized nature of think tanks found within a country. For example, the char-
acter of the think tank domain of countries such as South Africa, which
once experienced severe racial tensions, tends to display a disproportion-
ate focus on topics that directly and indirectly address this issue.
Despite the efforts of some scholars and policy-makers to question the
potential transferability of US-style independent think tanks to other
regions and countries of the world, many policy-makers and civil society
groups from around the globe have sought to create truly independent,
free-standing think tanks to help their governments. So, while the trans-
ferability of the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, or Heritage
Foundation model to other countries and political cultures may be
debated, the need and desire to replicate the independence and influence
these institutions enjoy are unchallenged.
In an effort to bridge the conceptual problems encountered consis-
tently throughout this chapter and to create a typology that takes into
consideration the comparative differences in political systems and civil
societies, I have developed a number of categories for think tanks. While
think tanks may perform many roles in their host societies, not all think
tanks do the same things to the same extent. Over the last 85 years, several
distinctive organizational forms of think tanks have come into being that
differ substantially in terms of their operating styles, their patterns of
recruitment, and their aspirations to academic standards of objectivity and
completeness in research. It should be noted that alternate typologies of
think tanks have been offered by other analysts. I will argue here that, in
40 J. G. MCGANN
the global context, most think tanks tend to fall into the broad categories
outlined in the table of typologies.
In this chapter, I have attempted to draw together the various strands
of knowledge into a coherent picture that focuses on a well-defined but
large universe of public policy research institutes.
The independence of a think tank and its scholars is one of the enduring
questions and challenges facing think tanks. Achieving and maintaining
independence require careful stewardship—the debate over this notion is
also inextricably related to the question of academic freedom. Such debates
have a distinctly Anglo-American character, and attempts to transfer past
and present definitions of the term to other socio-political contexts have
proved unworkable. Questions of ideological affiliation or financial obliga-
tion are at the forefront of the Anglo-American debate, whereas the ques-
tion of governmental affiliation is at the center of the global critique.
Think tanks, long regarded as idea factories with an objective output of
independent analysis, are presently at risk of polarization and the subse-
quent loss of their intellectual independence and credibility. There are a
number of environmental forces at work: partisan politics, the growth of
liberal and conservative advocacy groups, the restrictive funding policies
of donors, the growth of specialized think tanks, the narrow and short-
term orientation of Congress and the White House, the tyranny of myopic
academic disciplines, and, finally, the 24/7 cable news networks.
Corporate financing initiatives also became part of the think tank
domain during this era and this influx of capital contributed to a veritable
proliferation of public policy research organizations. Further, such crowd-
ing became increasingly unequal—by 1982, the Republican national com-
mittees took in $191 million compared to $32 million for the Democratic
national committees.89 Consequently, competition became rife and the
priorities of think tanks further shifted from “utility” to “visibility.”90
89
David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 176.
90
Peter W. Singer, “Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own,” Brookings
Institution (2010), accessed December 3, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/arti-
cles/2010/0813_think_tanks_singer.aspx.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 41
91
R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” Political Science and Politics 22
(1989), 567.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid., 577.
94
Ibid., 576–577.
95
Robert K. Landers, “Think Tanks: The New Partisans,” Editorial Research Reports 1
(1986): 455.
96
Gregg Easterbrook, “Ideas Move Nations,” Atlantic Monthly (1986): 66.
42 J. G. MCGANN
Medvetz treats think tanks not “as a distinctive kind of organization per
se, but rather as an organizational device for gathering and assembling
forms of authority conferred by institutions of academics, politics, busi-
ness and journalism.”97 He proposes what he calls a “relational notion” of
think tanks as a hybrid organization—composed of elements of the types
of think tanks and that of the more established institutions the new brands
or breeds that have emerged in the US.98
For Medvetz, think tanks’ status as the progeny of these institutions has
both a “material” and a “symbolic” dimension: “material” in the sense that
such institutions are the sole supply of personnel and patronage; and “sym-
bolic” in the sense that at the level of both think tanks and the policy experts
themselves, there is a clear adoption of the operational models at work in
these parent institutions.99 He asserts that the space of a think tank represents
a world divided against itself, where relevance, influence, impact, quality, and
independence pull at the traditional mission of think tanks. Ultimately, this
continuous conflict inflicts a “cost” on think tanks’ “intellectual produc-
tion,” immobilizing these institutions’ ability to, quite simply, think.
Joseph Nye agrees with the concept that non-governmental organiza-
tions, including think tanks, are beacons of authority within the
international community. He argues that soft power, which allows one to
“get the outcomes you want without coercion or payment,” has become
an incredibly potent force currently as power diffuses from states to non-
state actors.100 The question of financial and ideological autonomy is still
relevant, yet Nye offers up the proposition that non-state actors have the
capacity to be positive-sum, or able to gain through others’ gain as well,
regardless of state or other affiliation. Nye’s work suggests the possibility
that the transnationalization of non-state actors can be powerful enough
to override the need for individual power and security of a single group
and its ties.
However, with the continued advent of public policy research organiza-
tions that have an ideological partiality into the 1990s and 2000s, it seems
that this paradigm shift that emerged in the 1980s has now secured
97
Medvetz, “Think Tanks,” 9–10.
98
Ibid.
99
Medvetz, “Hybrid Intellectuals,” 35–36.
100
Joseph Nye, “Global Power Shifts,” TED Talks, July 2010, http://www.ted.com/
talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts?language=en.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 43
101
Think Tanks, Politics, and the Casualties in the War of Ideas. Acton .... https://acton.
org/event/2017/06/28/think-tankspolitics-and-casualties-war-ideas.
102
Denham and Stone, Think Tanks across Nations, 5.
103
Ibid.
104
Denham and Stone, Think Tanks across Nations, 5.
105
Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions: Policy Analysis across Nations, 5.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
44 J. G. MCGANN
108
Ibid.
109
Evert A. Lindquist, “Three Decades of Canadian Think Tanks: Evolving Institutions,
Conditions and Strategies,” Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas,
ed. Andrew Denham and Diane Stone (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
110
Katz, “American Think Tanks,” 2.
111
Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 15.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 45
112
Katz, “American Think Tanks,” 17.
113
Ronald Meinardus, “Think Tanks and Political Parties,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Liberal Opinion, January 20, 2005, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.fnf.org.ph/
liberalopinion/think-tanks-and-political-parties.htm.
46 J. G. MCGANN
countries.”114 Indeed, the conditions that give rise to this model (namely,
the democratic freedom of civil association) have most often eluded the
nations of the developing world, which, for varying reasons, have been
unable to accommodate the full range of independent research and anal-
ysis.115 Hence, truly independent, non-affiliated think tanks are, in many
places, an implausible model currently.
For example, the institutional, intellectual, and ideological land-
scape of the Soviet Union placed boundaries on this association.
Centralized authority restricted the free expression of original ideas,
especially in subjects that carried particular political or ideological
weight. Despite this climate of reduced intellectual autonomy, think
tanks still occupied an important position on the Soviet–East European
political landscape.
114
Diane Stone and Mark Garnett, “Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance,” in
Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach, eds. Diane Stone, Andrew Denham,
and Mark Garnett (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 2–5.
115
The connection between the freedom of civil association and democracy was first identi-
fied in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 47
and population growth are present in both a different form and magnitude.
For example, Venezuela is rated by Freedom House as only “partly free”
because of its restricted democracy and limited capacity to stimulate inde-
pendent public policy analysis (and it has just three think tanks).
A common problem in Central and South America is not partisanship
and heterogeneity in policy-making, but instead the opposite. The media
sphere imposes a stifling homogeneity on independent public policy ana-
lysts as a result of a strict tradition of self-censorship. Furthermore, many
of the region’s think tanks lack the capital and subsequently the resources
to achieve significant policy influence because of the absence of the kind of
philanthropy found in the United States. Limited economic freedom has
translated into a relatively weak philanthropic culture in Latin America. In
the absence of private support, Latin American think tanks are incentiv-
ized to rely on government contracts, foreign donors, and private-sector
consulting. This has obvious consequences for the intellectual indepen-
dence of public policy research institutions in the region.
There are, however, some similarities between the Central and South
American think tank sphere and think tanks in Anglo-America. Although
the change has been slower in comparison to the United States, Central
and South American think tanks are proliferating in response to an increas-
ingly common interest in reform. Furthermore, think tanks in Latin
America have increased public awareness and engagement in policy issues,
and will likely continue to benefit from this more competitive policy envi-
ronment through increased demand for their services in countries across
the region.
Some countries have systems of government in which the centralization
of power leaves little room for the influence of non-governmental actors.
In limiting these actors’ distribution channels, such systems of govern-
ment reshape the fundamental role of these institutions. In Russia, for
example, its federal semi-presidential republic system of government only
accepts the operation of these organizations as long as they are providing
“useful” services and not engaging in explicit advocacy. Civil opposition is
not welcome. In addition, the reduced freedom of the press in Russia has
meant that media outlets are less inclined to disseminate the research of
independent public policy analysts. Indeed, think tanks operating under
these circumstances are less able to generate the original ideas, informed
48 J. G. MCGANN
discussion, and educative role that are characteristic of think tanks in the
Anglo-American domain. Russia has a low gross domestic product and a
relatively weak economy, and this economic instability suppresses the phil-
anthropic spirit, which represents a major obstruction to the growth and
advance of policy advice in the country.
Asia provides an array of policy problems and political systems markedly
different from those in the United States. Asia is home to three of the four
remaining communist states in the world, many of the economies and
democracies are fragile, and several authoritarian regimes are firmly in
control of power. Other issues, such as extreme environmental degrada-
tion, overpopulation, and a rapidly expanding HIV/AIDS epidemic,
shroud the region. For example, as a result of the marked absence of eco-
nomic freedom, freedom of the press, civil liberties, and religion, all five
think tanks in Vietnam are controlled by the government. In many coun-
tries across the region, these factors contribute to an extremely closed
society that inhibits the ability of think tanks to engage with policy-makers
and offer sound, independent policy advice.
China represses the freedom to publicly oppose government policy
and, despite the fact that its economy has undergone considerable liberal-
ization and decentralization, the Chinese Communist Party severely limits
people’s political freedom and civil liberties, and limits the ability of think
tanks to carry out the role played by analogous institutions in the Anglo-
American domain. The absence of this freedom can be accredited to the
leader and party’s desire to hold onto power through control and
repression of critical voices. Additionally, the absence of freedom of the
press and freedom of private academic institutions to pursue independent
research exacerbates the hostility of Asia to Western think tank models.
Conversely, in stable multiparty systems, there is a much higher tolerance
for critical opinion and debate that provides considerable room for the
establishment of more think tanks. In this way, countries such as Japan
offer a policy-making environment similar to the Anglo-American sphere.
Similarly, the socio-political context of Africa is also markedly different
from that of the United States. Though the policy challenges are numer-
ous and complex—including a rapidly growing population, high incidence
of infant mortality and HIV/AIDS infection, continuing national and
subnational conflicts, environmental degradation, endemic corruption,
and lack of respect for the rule of law—the region has notable potential
and the opportunity for continued political reform and social and economic
development. Indeed, most of the constituent states that are currently
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 49
116
Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think
Tanks in Britain and the USA,” Review of International Studies 20, no. 1 (1994): 15–34.
52 J. G. MCGANN
sensus on certain issues and then encourage their leaders to put those
issues on the BRICS agenda.” Kejin categorizes this as “a form of ‘multi-
multilateralism’ [that] contrasts with the top-down process that has tradi-
tionally characterized multilateralism.”117 However, the literature in this
area is not well developed. Research is generally scarce, and what little one
does come across might very well lack quality. Nevertheless, there appears
to be a certain inundation of Chinese public policy and think tank infor-
mation with respect to that of all other emerging nations. Little is written
with regard to think tanks operating in Russia, India, or South Africa, and
Brazil pulls ahead in terms of information availability only by a small
margin.
Regardless, then, of the degree to which think tank literature is avail-
able for these countries, there appears to be a unifying theme which con-
nects most—though not all—of these writings: the liberalization of
ideology in the public sphere. In Ghana, the emergences of a multiparty
system and particular democratic ideals have allowed think tanks to thrive
in recent years. As China opened its doors to the world economically and
politically, officials began to welcome information from outside sources,
thus granting think tanks more of an opportunity to have a profound
impact on policy. As for Brazil, it is evident that the international commu-
nity became more interested in its think tanks as the country itself began
to be recognized as an emerging power. Ultimately, this liberalization of
ideals and increased access to global forms of ideology have allowed think
tanks to operate more efficiently and thus influence foreign policy on a
larger scale.
China as a nation has risen to prominence in its own right in both the
political and economic sphere, and with it Chinese think tanks have also
become increasingly influential in the policy-making process. In the con-
text of China as an emerging power in the international arena, Chinese
think tanks themselves emerged with a greater scope of policy analysis and
a more defined sense of composition and organization. The literature on
this phenomenon in China is relatively well documented, especially in
comparison with the tangible lack of academic literature focused on the
growth of think tanks in other BRICS nations.
117
Zhao Kejin, “The Limits of Cooperation among BRICS Countries,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/12/01/
limits-of-cooperation-among-brics-countries.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 53
118
Mahmood Ahmad and Raees Ahmad Mughal, “The Foreign Policy Think Tanks in
China: Input, Access, and Opportunity,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38, no. 3
(2011): 143–155.
119
Ibid., 144.
120
Ibid., 146.
54 J. G. MCGANN
121
Ibid., 149.
122
Ibid., 149–150.
123
Ibid., 150.
124
Ibid., 144.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 55
125
Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research
Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 598.
56 J. G. MCGANN
126
Ibid., 606.
127
Ian Marsh, “The Development and Impact of Australia’s ‘Think Tanks’.” Australian
Journal of Management 19, no. 2 (1994): 177–200.
128
Ibid., 191.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS 57
Ibid., 192.
129
Ibid., 193.
130
58 J. G. MCGANN
new Lula government, there was a highly increased need for discourse and
public policy research. With its newly elevated international position,
Brazil sought to insert itself more fully into the global community, and the
global community in turn wanted to understand the country at an in-
depth level. Foreign policy research became a focus, especially research
focusing on relations among BRICS nations.
Ladi and Lazarou, however, argue that while there was an increase in
the number of foreign policy think tanks and a greater push for research,
there was not a translation into great think tank influence at the govern-
mental level. The case study of FGV revealed that think tanks are still
utilized for research, with the head of the Center of International Relations
section of FGV saying, “it is almost becoming a norm that on the eve of
important international negotiations or during the visit of foreign officials,
our researchers are called to inform visitors about the Brazilian viewpoints
and policies.”134 Yet, the head of the FGV’s Center for International
Relations, Eduardo Achilles, also stated that “the main transformation
that the idea of Brazil’s emergence has brought about to our work at FGV
is the increasing interest of foreign institutions in establishing regular links
with us in order to understand more about Brazilian foreign policy. This
creates opportunities not only for the professionalization of national
think-tanks, but also for internationalization.”135
Thus, think tanks have noticed a large draw for their research within the
international community, but have not seen much of an influence within
their own government. Governmental officials may ask for policy analysis,
but think tank researchers on the whole still report that the government
maintains the power and central influence for policy decisions. Achilles
stated, “The real space for impact of ideas from outside the government
apparatus is very limited. On certain occasion it is clear that decision mak-
ers are using think-tanks as channels to disseminate their own ideas and
concepts elaborated inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many times the
visits and contacts result in very little or almost no incorporation of ideas
‘from outside’ into the policy content.”136 In the case of Brazil, it appears
that while there has been a huge increase in the demand for think tank
interaction internationally and a greater exposure of think tank research to
governmental officials, foreign policy think tanks have not yet seen their
influence fully reach the government.
134
Ibid., 20.
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
CHAPTER 3
Bruce Jones
With recent events in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and the East China Sea, it has
become popular to describe the international order as in crisis. The stable,
relatively peaceful post–Cold War order, it is said, is at risk of giving way to
a more traditional, geopolitically driven system marked by increased com-
petition among multiple stakeholders. Underlying this narrative, one finds
the premise that a combination of declining American power and the “rise
of the rest” (especially China, India, and Brazil) is constraining US leader-
ship of the international order, placing new strains on existing institutions
and practices.1 Facing these mounting pressures, it is alleged that the West
is losing its ability to shape a secure and prosperous international system.2
1
On American decline: Gideon Rachman, “Think Again: American Decline. This Time
It’s for Real,” Foreign Policy 184, January/February 2011; Edward Luce, Time to Start
Thinking: America in the Age of Descent, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012. On the
rise of the rest: Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 90,
September/October 2011; Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible
Shift of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs, 2008. On the coming disorder and
the post-Western world: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: Norton,
2008; Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest, New York: Penguin, 2012.
2
Robert Kaplan, “A World with No One in Charge,” Washington Post, December 3, 2010.
B. Jones (*)
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA
Bruce Jones, Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry
3
The economic growth of the emerging economies over the past decade
has been truly breathtaking, and it is easy to understand why the “rise of
the rest” seemed unstoppable. Brazil entered the twenty-first century with
an economy of just over $1 trillion and ended 2014 with an economy
worth almost $2.5 trillion, and in the process overtook Canada, Italy, and
Spain to become the seventh-largest economy in the world. India grew
even faster, though from a lower starting point, beginning the century
with an economy just under $500 billion and growing to the ninth-largest
economy in the world with just over $2 trillion today. China’s growth
started earlier and reached breakneck speeds during the first decade of the
2000s, shooting from an economy worth just over $2 trillion to become
the second-largest economy in the world, at over $10 trillion.4
The huge growth of these economies is reflected in global trade pat-
terns; for every major trading region, the percentage of imports and
exports to and from developing Asia (especially China and India) has sky-
rocketed. And on carbon emissions, the rising powers have more than
caught up to the West; China has overtaken the United States, and India
has overtaken Japan and Russia.5 That particular aspect of growth is a
decidedly mixed blessing for the emerging powers: rising nations confront
insecurity based on their growing energy dependence. They also are expe-
riencing the immediate impacts of climate change induced by their very
economic development, including air pollution and the consequences of
extreme weather. The staggering scale of this growth, ironically, deals
them a formidable hand in global energy and climate diplomacy. By
becoming a greater portion of the problem, countries such as India and
China gain leverage at the international table as their buy-in becomes
necessary for effective solutions.
Nor does the rise of the BRICS comprise an outlier among nations in
the developing world. Many states have risen to middle-income status,
their standard of living and gross domestic product (GDP) profiting from
twenty years of deepening integration into the international economic
order. As with the BRICS, this grouping is geographically disparate in
Union of Concerned Scientists, “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,” August 20,
5
2010, www.ucsusa.org.
64 B. JONES
An Economic Foundation…
Despite speculations otherwise, the US economy is still the world’s larg-
est—and by a good amount. Yes, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recorded the Chinese economy, in terms of purchasing power parity
(PPP), at $17.6 trillion, surpassing the US figure of $17.4 trillion.7 However,
such a judgment is somewhat hasty considering variances in how the two
nations calculate GDP; as Michael Pettis of Peking University notes,
Chinese institutions record debt differently, potentially inflating fi gures.8
Without PPP adjustments, IMF estimates place China’s economy at $10.3
6
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: Norton, 2008.
7
“China’s Back,” The Economist, October 11, 2014.
8
Gwynn Guilford, “Nope, China’s Economy Hasn’t Yet Surpassed America’s,” Quartz,
October 8, 2014.
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 65
9
Ben Carter, “Is China’s Economy Really the Largest in the World?” BBC News Magazine,
December 16, 2014.
10
Sean Starrs, “American Economic Power Hasn’t Declined – It Globalized! Summoning
the Data and Taking Globalization Seriously,” International Studies Quarterly, April 2013.
11
Ibid., 7.
66 B. JONES
The 2008 global financial crisis dented some of this influence, of course;
but for now there is no genuine alternative to America’s financial role.
And it is important to stress that these economic strengths will endure
even if or when China’s economy truly overtakes that of the United States;
there will still be a huge gap between American and Chinese per capita
GDP, and also substantial differences in the nature of the economies. As
one of China’s financial managers told me in 2013, “Unless things go
badly wrong, we’ll overtake the US economy in size at some point in the
next ten years or so. But even then, we can’t go head to head with the US;
we’ll still be a developing economy. We need others at the table to bolster
our influence.”12 China indeed has considerable distance left to cover
regarding per capita GDP; in 2014, Chinese levels had reached only a quar-
ter of their US counterparts.13 Strikingly, the GDP gap between the United
States and China has actually grown since the global financial crisis.
12
Chinese senior national economic official, interview by author, Washington, DC, June
11, 2013.
13
Keith Frey, “China’s Leap Forward: Overtaking the US as World’s Biggest Economy,”
FT Data, The Financial Times, October 8, 2014.
14
SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/
milex/milex_database.
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 67
functions that the United States does to protect the global commons.
Governments in all mature economies recognize that stability in their
regions and the security of their trade rest heavily on American power.15
Furthermore, US intelligence capacity is the best in the world; no
country can begin to match the scale of American intelligence gathering
or the ability to twin this intelligence with special operations forces.
Only Britain, Israel, and Russia are in the same league in terms of human
intelligence capacity, and two of these three are America’s closest allies—
none of these countries can compete with the United States in signals
intelligence.
US diplomatic strength is also substantial. The United States has
around 18,000 diplomats and other members of the Foreign Service.16
Size does not equal influence, of course, but it does help. To give a sense
of comparative scale, in 2015 the 15,000-strong US diplomatic corps
dwarfed the 900 diplomats in the Indian Foreign Service.17 Beyond the
size of the diplomatic service, the United States also has built-in privileges
and powers in the critical global institutions. Although there are institu-
tions in which America has less influence, there remains a direct relation-
ship between a body’s importance and how much power the United States
wields within it. All of this combines to give the United States an enor-
mous amount of gravitational pull in the international system.18
But perhaps the single most important feature of American strength is
that it has more than fifty allies—over a quarter of the world’s states. Of
those, two dozen are strong, close, effective allies with which the United
States shares military technology and intelligence and works diplomati-
cally, all the while providing a guarantee of security. Found on every
continent, these allies are part of almost every regional or diplomatic
group, offering an indirect method of promoting US interests.
15
Interviews by author, Delhi, October 2011 and April 2013; Beijing, October 2009 and
November 2012; Brasilia, April 2011 and July 2013.
16
“Agencies Listed by Size Categories (as Reported in May 2001).” United States
Department of Justice. August 6, 2014. Accessed November 17, 2015. http://www.jus-
tice.gov/crt/ix-agencies-listed-size-categories-reported-may-2001-large-agency-category-
10000-employees.
17
Peter Martin, “Yoga Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, January 25, 2015.
18
The phrase “gravitational pull” is from Bruce Jentleson and Steven Weber, The End of
Arrogance: America and the Global Competition of Ideas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010.
68 B. JONES
19
Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2012).
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 69
20
Bruce Jones, “The Bursting of the BRICs Bubble,” The American Interest, April 9,
2015, www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-bursting-of-the-brics-bubble/.
21
Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles, New York:
Norton, 2012.
70 B. JONES
Financial trouble has been brewing for some time. In 2013, George
Magnus of financial services company UBS described the BRICS countries
as “hitting a BRIC wall,” namely, the middle-income trap.22 This chal-
lenge of shifting from simple manufacturing to the more complex func-
tions of engineering, design, and innovation represents a significant hurdle
for the BRICS to overcome. The period of growth for Brazil, Russia,
India, and China as a group has not yet ended, but the stunningly high
levels of growth that characterized the BRICS narrative are coming to a
close. Normal, or lower than normal, rates of growth are returning. And
even the new lower levels of growth will require that the BRICS nations
undertake tough reforms.
Take Brazil. In 2008, it grew by 5%. In 2013, it grew by just 2.5%, and
the IMF forecasts that in 2015 Brazil’s GDP will actually contract by 1%.23
Behind this already grim picture lies a litany of worrying statistics. In May,
inflation in the country hit a 12-year high, causing the central bank to raise
its interest rate to a 6-year high of 12.75%; and in April, the Brazilian real
hit an 11-year low. There have been important successes in the growth of
the new middle class, but extreme poverty continues to rise and political
reforms have not matched middle-class demands. Corruption runs ram-
pant, and President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings have declined pre-
cipitously since she barely won reelection in October 2014.24 As Petrobras,
the Brazilian state oil company, staggers under the weight of scandal,
Rousseff’s approval rating fell to 13% in March 2015, only three months
into her second term.25 Having campaigned on promises to channel
Brazil’s oil revenue into continued economic growth, while avoiding the
corruption that has plagued oil-rich states, Rousseff’s failing presents per-
haps the most vivid, but hardly the last, instance of a BRICS nation strug-
gling to overcome the middle-income trap.
In Russia, the picture is even drearier. Russia was included initially in
the BRICS grouping due to its recovery from the post-Soviet nadir;
however, its economy has never really matched the others’ in potential.
22
George Magnus, “Hitting a BRIC Wall: The Risk of the Middle Income Trap,” UBS
Investment Research: Economic Insights – by George, UBS Limited, January 21, 2013.
23
Alonso Soto, “UPDATE 2-IMF Sees Brazil Economy Hinging on Austerity,” Reuters,
April 20, 2015.
24
“After the Election, the Reckoning,” Americas View, The Economist, November 8, 2014.
25
Simon Romero, “Brazil’s Slumping Economy and Bribery Scandal Eat Away at Dilma
Rousseff’s Popularity,” The New York Times, March 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/21/world/americas/brazils-slumping-economy-and-bribery-scandal-eat-
away-at-dilma-rousseffs-popularity.html?_r=0.
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 71
In 2013, Russia held just over 2.5% of the world’s GDP. Today, Russian
economic prospects are dire. The low price of oil is a disaster for its econ-
omy. Oil revenues comprise 45% of Russia’s national budget; Moscow
loses approximately $2 billion in revenue for every dollar the price of oil
falls. At $78 per barrel, the World Bank predicted a 2015 contraction of
0.7% to Russian GDP. At $70 per barrel, it predicted a contraction of
1.5%. The Brent crude oil price in April 2015 was just $60 per barrel, and
in June 2015 the World Bank predicted that the Russian economy would
shrink by 2.7% in 2016.26 Biting sanctions slapped on Russia for its annex-
ation of Crimea and continued provocations in eastern Ukraine have com-
pounded these losses. For all the talk of a novel “authoritarian capitalist”
model that promises economic growth without democratic governance, it
will not be Moscow that carries that standard in the coming years.
While the challenges confronting China, the putative leader of the
authoritarian capitalist pack, do not rival those that beset Russia, serious
issues threaten the vitality of Chinese economic development. Projected
growth rates around 6–7% are nothing to sneer at, but when compared to
growth rates in the high teens and low twenties that have marked the last
decades, we see a genuine slowdown. Additionally, these falling growth
rates come at a time when China has been actively pumping debt into its
economy. A 2015 McKinsey & Co. study detailed how China’s debt is
verging on unsustainable, with total debt reaching 282% of GDP in 2014,
ranking among the highest levels for major economies.27 For a govern-
ment that has founded much of its legitimacy in increasing economic
opportunity (alongside providing domestic stability), a financial slow-
down, or even crisis, could undercut Beijing’s growing influence and
power on the global stage.
Chinese leaders face a deep challenge. To secure the next wave of its
growth, they will have to overcome the middle-income trap and transform
China into a more innovative economy. China lacks the natural resources
that have underwritten Russian growth, but that also made Moscow a
renter state. Instead, Beijing’s rapid growth can be attributed in large part
to its emergence as a low-cost manufacturer of goods that sell in the
American and other high-end markets, including Europe. But as the
Chinese economy has risen, so too have its labor costs, requiring the country
26
Bruce Jones, “The Bursting of the BRICs Bubble,” The American Interest, April 9,
2014, www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-bursting-of-the-brics-bubble/.
27
Zhiwu Chen, “China’s Dangerous Debt,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3, May/June
2015.
72 B. JONES
28
Michael Spence, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed
World, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011; Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In
Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles, New York: Norton, 2012.
29
Categorization of these necessary, but challenging, reforms from Chinese scholar
“Youwei” (pseudonym), in: “The End of Reform in China,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3,
May/June 2015.
30
Raymond Zong and Anant Vijay Kala, “India’s Economic Growth Hits Four-Year
High,” The Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015.
31
Ibid.
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 73
32
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the
American World Order, Princeton University Press, 2011.
33
Bruce Jones and David Steven, The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security, and
the Energy Revolution, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014.
74 B. JONES
34
World Bank datasets confirm the positive, and at times massive, GDP growth that the
middle-income countries have experienced over the past decades. To examine GDP growth
rates for the countries in question, see: “GDP Growth (Annual %),” The World Bank.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
35
Both Steven Pinker, in The Better Angels of Our Nature, and the data gathered by the
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) have illustrated a decline in both interstate war and
battlefield deaths over the past several decades. While competing theories exist as to the root
cause of this trend, the norm of non-aggression between states reflects the cornerstone of the
UN system, and, therefore, has been repeatedly buttressed by the great powers over the past
70 years. Arguably the US-created UN system serves as the foundation for this decline in
conflict.
A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD 75
36
Harsh V. Pant “Restraint No More: India Reassesses Its Hard Power,” The Diplomat,
Flashpoints, June 16, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/restraint-no-more-india-
reassesses-its-hard-power/.
76 B. JONES
$24
United States
$20
China
GDP (Current USD, Trllions)
$16
$12
$8
Japan
Germany
$4 India
France
[SERIES NAME]
Brazil
Italy
Russia
$0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Fig. 3.1 IMF GDP forecasts for the world’s top ten economies as of 2014
38
Bruce Jones, “Competitors, Not Cold Warriors,” In Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising
Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2013.
78 B. JONES
Conclusion
The stakes are high. The debate over impulses towards rivalry and restraint
is unfolding during the first period in contemporary history that is not
predominantly shaped by tension among great powers. After the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the world experienced an era of astonishing economic
advancement and cooperation. States effectively rallied to make progress
on a set of devastating problems: poverty, civil war, disease.39 And this col-
laboration spurred a growth in freedoms, as dozens of countries moved
towards democracy and as citizens challenged the economic and political
constraints under which they lived.40
However, the era of unquestioning cooperation under US leadership
has come to a close. This is not to say that international collaboration is
dead. Substantial work on certain issues—the global economy, energy, the
oceans, and, to some extent, Iranian nuclear aspirations—will persist. And,
in spite of intensifying competition in the United States–China relation-
ship, the world is a long way from a fracturing of the international order.
Even in the most evident strain on the post-war system—the great cooling
of United States–Russia relations in the wake of the Ukraine crisis—the
two countries have not severed all links. Nonetheless, in the coming
decades a diverse set of emerging powers will be wading into these global
conversations with ever greater influence. Lacking a unifying ideology or
purpose, these rising nations will not bring a single demand for reform or
revision of the global order, but rather a plethora of new voices that both
complicates international conversations and creates new avenues to tackle
challenges that have thus far stymied the international community.
The pressing question, therefore, is how the relationship between the
United States and these emerging powers, particularly China, unfolds.
A new normal must be established, and it must be a mutual process. As
Washington will remain the commanding presence in the global arena, rising
states would be ill-advised to ignore the American colossus. Yet, the United
States, even with its enduring power and might, must adjust its leadership
style and diplomatic tactics to the realities of these new actors on the inter-
national stage. The middle powers have arrived. They will make their
voices heard. But the United States remains. Will they listen to each other?
39
Andrew Mack, Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War:
Beyond the Mainstream Narrative, Vancouver: Human Security Report Project, 2012.
40
Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance. Washington:
Freedom House, 2013.
CHAPTER 4
James G. McGann
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
1
David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach,”
Princeton University. 2016: 23.
2
Ibid.
3
Detlef Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research
Topics,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 04 (2010): 885.
4
Ibid., 886.
5
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. Power Politics. New York: Continuum, 1946: 65.
6
Ibid., 24.
THE EMERGING POWERS 81
as much as economics to the market” for the field of political risk. For
what little consensus there is in the literature, it can thus be said safely that
emerging powers stand in contrast to “established powers.”
The term “power” suggests that the study of emerging powers has
something to do with the ability to control, the capacity to influence, and
the physical (or material) capability that can challenge others. Power is one
of the most important and well-discussed concepts in politics. Political
theorists such as Hobbes, Morgenthau, Foucault, and Giddens examine
the concept of power on the individual level, broadly disagreeing on how
power exists and operates in society. Hobbes offers two characteristics of
power.7 First, he describes it as one’s “present means to obtain some future
good,” which indicates that he views power as the capability to acquire.
Secondly, he states power is zero-sum, it “simply is no more, but the excess
of the power of one above that of another.”8 Hobbes believes that aspira-
tion for power is “a basic human drive since [it] is the necessary means for
happiness and getting what humans desire.” In line with Hobbes,
Morgenthau argues that in examining history “statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined as power” and that, following this interpretation,
power “imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational
order into the subject matter of politics, and this makes the theoretical
understanding of politics possible.”9 For realists such as Hobbes and
Morgenthau, power can result in conflict due to humankind’s nature to
aspire to it and its zero-sum quality.
Others do not believe that power always leads to conflict. Foucault
defines power as “not simply a relationship between partners, individual or
collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others” and it does
not exist “universally in a concentrated or diffused form.”10 He argues that
violence is not in the “basic nature of power” and that its use does not
always require force. He argues rather that in a relationship of power, “the
other” is “thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a
person who acts,” as opposed to a relationship of violence where the pow-
erful “acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the
7
James H. Read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of Nature, Power in Civil Society,”
Polity 23, no. 4 (1991), 500.
8
Ibid.
9
Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 1948), 5.
10
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982), 789.
82 J. G. MCGANN
11
Ibid.
12
Mark Hauggard, The Constitution of Power: A Theoretical Analysis of Power,
Knowledge, and Structure (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), 107.
13
Elisheva Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice: Theory and Practice of
People-Focused Social Solutions, trans. Richard Flantz (1997; mpow.org, 2004), Chap. 1,
http://www.mpow.org/.
14
Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, 69.
15
Thomas Medvetz, “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field” The Social Science Research
Council (2008): 1.
THE EMERGING POWERS 83
16
Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International
Security 18, no. 2 (1993), 60.
17
Ruchir Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising,” Foreign Affairs,
November 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138219/ruchir-sharma/
broken-brics.
84 J. G. MCGANN
Interest in emerging powers has increased in the past decades due to the
much-debated decline of the current superpowers coupled with the fast
rise of China. What will happen after the fall of a hegemon? Which coun-
try, if any, will emerge as a new superpower?
18
Simon James, “Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the
Policy Process by Diane Stone” Public Administration 76, no. 2 (1998): 409–410.
THE EMERGING POWERS 85
19
Neil MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?,” International
Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006), 42.
20
Robert Gilpin, War and Chang in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981). Quoted in Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History
and Theory,” Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London:
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 2.
21
Lateral Pressure, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Accessed November 2014,
http://lateralpressure.mit.edu/lateral-pressure-theory.
22
Ibid.
86 J. G. MCGANN
23
Vidya Nadkarni, Introduction to Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The
Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries, ed. Vidya Nadjarni and Norma
C. Noonan (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 4.
24
Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,”
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and
Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 7.
25
Ibid., 24.
26
Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 72.
THE EMERGING POWERS 87
27
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” Goldman Sachs,
2007, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/BRICs-and-Beyond.html,
10.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 153.
88 J. G. MCGANN
30
MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs,” 43.
31
Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, “How Do Rising Powers Rise?,” Survival, 52, no.
6 (2010), 68.
32
The Economist, “The Trillion-Dollar Club,” The Economist, April 15, 2010, http://
www.economist.com/node/15912964.
33
Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-be
Great Powers?,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 82, no. 1
(2006), 1–3.
34
Interestingly, the original 2001 Goldman Sachs report stated doubts about the willing-
ness of half of the BRICs (China and India) to participate in a G9 association, arguing that
China’s “social model is still extremely different to the G7 countries,” while India “might
regard any ‘obligations’ as unwelcome, as well as seeing their own experiences as limiting
their ability to give ‘advice,’” 10–11.
35
Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order,” 3.
THE EMERGING POWERS 89
BRICSAM/B(R)ICSAM
In response to the exclusion of some countries in Goldman Sachs’ BRICs,
another model was created that augmented the original list of emerging
36
Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising”; Gokhan Bacik, “Turkey and
the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013), 760.
37
Ibid.
38
In an effort to further research on emerging economies, Goldman Sachs also looked at
a number of countries to analyze which ones had the capability to “become BRIC-like.” In
March 2007, it released a report on the N-11 or the Next Eleven, thereby creating another
level of categorization. The N-11 are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam. Again, this list was created
using the same approach as with the creation of the BRICs (Goldman Sachs, 2007, p. 131).
This “emerging emerging power” stage reinforces our earlier question: when does one
emerge from emergence?
39
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” 131.
40
Ibid.
90 J. G. MCGANN
economies. This consists of the original four BRICs countries and the
addition of Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, and South Korea, creating
BRICSAM or B(R)ICSAM. Scholars using this model argue that BRICs is
not as useful “if one looks beyond material resources to diplomatic logic
and on to forms of soft power, such as public diplomacy and cultural
exports.”41 This expanded list, they argue, is more inclusive and more
representative of world regions in comparison to the BRICs. Arguing for
B(R)ICSAM, especially in the context of global governance, Timothy
Shaw, Agata Antikiewicz, and Andrew Cooper recognize that the “eco-
nomic logic” of this model is not as solid as the original BRICs, but argue
that this is “compensated by the convincing diplomatic-cum-regionalist or
strategic logic.”42 With this model, scholars have stepped away from using
strictly economic measures by considering other factors such as geopolitics
in determining emergence. Shaw, Antikiewicz, and Cooper argue that the
model “allows a sizeable degree of reform without either tipping the bal-
ance away from the G8 [the G7 countries plus Russia] or raising the bar of
expectations too far for other countries.”43 The inclusion of a conservative
number of countries in this group results in a list that is not as diverse as
the BRICs and the N-11.
However, as a whole, given the goal of BRICSAM/B(R)ICSAM to be
more inclusive, the model needs to be updated, since it still underrepre-
sents Africa and the Middle East. Another problem is the lack of coopera-
tion among the states included in this model. Several BRICSAM/B(R)
ICSAM countries have entered into bilateral agreements, but there have
been no agreements that can be seen to signal deeper coordination among
the eight countries.44 Lastly, the model attempted to solve the Russia pre-
dicament of the BRICs, but still remained on the fence regarding the issue.
In the B(R)ICSAM model, Russia was put inside parentheses to note its
membership in the original BRICs and its inclusion in the G8, thus convey-
ing that it is more politically similar to the G7 than the other members of
41
Timothy M. Shaw, Andrew F. Cooper, and Agata Antkiewicz, “The Logic of the B(R)
ICSAM Model for Global Governance” Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons
from the Heiligendamm Process (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 20.
42
Ibid., 21.
43
Ibid., 40.
44
Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, “BRICSAM and the Non-WTO,” The Review of
International Organizations 1 (2006), 240.
THE EMERGING POWERS 91
BRICS
Five years after the initial introduction of the model, dialogue started
among the four original BRICs countries (see Fig. 4.2). Starting with
meetings of foreign ministers in 2006 and finance ministers in 2008, the
leaders of the BRICs met briefly alongside the 2008 G8 summit.47 Aside
from economic cooperation, the summits discussed development, foreign
policy, and other global issues such as terrorism. In 2011, South Africa was
formally invited as a full member, thus resulting in the creation of the
BRICS.
The meetings between what were now five nations effectively trans-
formed Goldman Sachs’ BRICs into more than just a mere grouping. It
demonstrated recognition among the states of their new roles on the
international stage. It may also be interpreted as an indication of the
group’s political aspirations. The two pillars of the BRICS are coordination
in multilateral fora with a focus on economic and political governance and
cooperation between members.48 At their fifth summit in Durban in 2013,
the five countries followed up by establishing the BRICS Development
Bank (BDB) and creating a contingency fund worth $100 billion. This
latest endeavor can be seen as a message that they are indeed ready to take
45
Shaw, Cooper, and Antkiewicz, “The Logic of the B(R)ICSAM Model,” 20; After its
annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has since been removed from the group.
46
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” 5.
First BRIC Summit: Yaketerinburg, June 2009,” President of Russia, accessed
47 “
brics6.itamaraty.gov.br.
92 J. G. MCGANN
a more active role in global affairs. Stuenkel, on the other hand, argues
that the summit signals that these states “do not feel established powers
are willing to provide them with the adequate power and responsibility,”
because they are “western-dominated [institutions] in the eyes of emerg-
ing powers.”49 Also in 2013, the countries also established the BRICS
Think Tanks Council, which is “responsible for sharing and disseminating
information; research, policy analysis and prospective studies; and capacity-
building.”50 The creation of this network of think tanks added another
layer to the BRICS cooperation.
49
Oliver Stuenkel, “Toward a ‘BRICS Consensus’?,” International Affairs Forum 44, no.
1 (2013), 33
Information about BRICS,” VI BRICS Summit, http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br. The
50 “
BRICS Think Tanks Council is composed of five institutions, each one based in a BRICS
country. Brazil has the Institute of Applied Economic Research; Russia houses the National
Committee for BRICS Research; the Observer Research Foundation is in India; China has
THE EMERGING POWERS 93
Criticisms of the Goldman Sachs’ BRICs model did not end with the
addition of new countries. Due to its origins, the BRICS grouping is per-
ceived by some scholars as an inadequate model to be used for other areas
of research, such as environmental issues and global security. Bacik argues
that while the BRICS unite for “self-defense against a common threat,”
which in this case is the established Western powers, this so-called threat is
interpreted differently by each of these states.51 This is because Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa all have different perceptions of the
risks as well as political and economic concerns. Some researchers also cast
doubt on the ability of the BRICS to maintain cooperation and transform
themselves into a “unified political force.”52 There are arguments that
despite their economic performance, the BRICS “lack the strategic pos-
ture and depth either to challenge US leadership or to entrench a new
world order.”53 Some critics did not hesitate to call the summits a “photo-
op” or a “talking shop.”54
While the BRICS took the markets by storm, the G7 stayed put. When,
in 2007, Goldman Sachs advised giddy investors to look beyond the obvi-
ous, the G7 summoned the “outreach five”—Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, and Mexico—to discuss intellectual property rights, investment cli-
mates, “joint responsibilities for development,” and measures to curb car-
bon emissions, all on the G7’s terms.55
Sharma argues that the problem with using acronyms as an approach is
that “once it catches on, it tends to lock analysts into a worldview that may
soon be outdated.”56 While the future of the BRICS is still unknown,
should research on emerging powers continue to focus on these five
countries?
the China Center for Contemporary World Studies; and the Human Sciences Research
Council is in South Africa (http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br).
51
Bacik, “Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?,” 760.
52
Harsh V. Pant, “The Problem with BRICS,” dna, July 15, 2014, http://www.dnaindia.
com/analysis/column-the-problem-with-brics-2002076.
53
Brütsch and Papa, “Deconstructing the BRICS,” 304.
54
Simon Tisdali, “Can the Brics Create a New World Order?,” The Guardian,
March 29, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/
brics-new-world-order.
55
Brütsch and Papa, “Deconstructing the BRICS,” 303.
56
Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising.”
94 J. G. MCGANN
Beyond the BRICS
IBSA
Prior to the development of the BRICS model, an initiative had already
been started by India, Brazil, and South Africa in 2003 to address their
“mutual frustration” regarding limited opportunities to participate in
global governance.57 The India–Brazil–South Africa Trilateral Dialogue or
IBSA is “a grouping of like-minded countries in similar stages of develop-
ment, sharing historical ties.”58 Additionally, Ruchita Beri labels IBSA a
“mechanism that allows the governments of three countries to coordinate
their positions on important issues and strive for cooperation.”59 Each of
these countries occupies a significant position in its respective region as
dominant powers and all are part of the Global South. Thus, this initiative
boosted South–South cooperation and developed “a consolidated posi-
tion…on issues related to global governance.”60 Given that most of these
countries have more established relations with superpowers, initiatives
such as IBSA enable them to look at their own side of the fence and dis-
cuss matters of concern without power relations issues. All three countries
have positive economic projections and all share concerns about develop-
ment challenges such as energy, environmental issues, and agriculture.61
The shared challenges became the main talking points and encouraged
them to strengthen and improve on their cooperation.62
The first is the need for coordinated strategies on issues.63 While con-
sensus on an issue is important, IBSA needs to have an action plan in order
to be more effective and influential on the global stage. Secondly, these
countries come from regions that are very diverse and they will face
challenges as “leaders of the South.”64 In South America, for example,
57
Sean Woolfrey, The IBSA Dialogue Forum Ten Years On: Examining IBSA Cooperation
on Trade (Stellenbosch: tralac, 2013), 3.
58
Ruchita Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum: An Assessment,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 5
(2008), 810.
59
Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum,” 810.
60
Ibid., 816.
61
Sarah Al Doyaili, Andreas. Freyrag, and Peter Draper, “Lessons from/for BRICSAM
about South-North Relations at the Start of the 21st Century,” South African Journal of
International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2013), 300.
62
Doyaili, Freyrag, and Draper, “Lessons from/for BRICSAM about South-North
Relations,” 300.
63
Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum,” 823.
64
Ibid., 824.
THE EMERGING POWERS 95
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid., 825.
67
Ibid., 826.
68
Ibid., 827.
69
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “IBSA: Avoiding Being BRICked Up,” Strategic Analysis 37,
no. 3 (2013), 286.
70
Jagannath P. Panda, “China and IBSA: Possible BRICS Overreach?,” Strategic Analysis
37, no. 3 (2013), 300.
71
Panda, “China and IBSA,” 300.
72
Ibid.
73
Sidiropoulos, “IBSA: Avoiding Being BRICked Up,” 288.
96 J. G. MCGANN
IBSA has held annual summits since 2006, in which the heads of states
and governments meet. In order to connect society at the grassroots level
among India, Brazil, and South Africa, fora such as the Academic Forum,
Intergovernmental Relations and Local Government, and the Tri-Nations
Summit on Small Business have been created.74
G20: G7 and Inclusion
The G20 or Group of 20 is “the premier forum for its members’ interna-
tional economic cooperation and decision-making.”75 The group is com-
posed of the G8 and twelve other countries, namely Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South
Korea, Turkey, and the EU—the top twenty economies. The group started
as a meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in
1999, with the goal of “[discussing] ways to strengthen the global econ-
omy, [reforming] international financial institutions, [improving] financial
regulation and [implementing] the key economic reforms needed in each
member economy” as a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.76 In
2008, another financial crisis prompted a change in strategy. Leaders of
the G20 met for the first time to address that crisis and have been meeting
at least once a year since then.77 In 2010, it was formally announced that
after its meeting in Canada, the G20 would replace the G7/8 as the
primary economic forum.78 This move demonstrates that the G7/8 coun-
tries recognize that reaching a solution to global economic issues requires
the participation of other economically powerful states.
Stewart Patrick, senior fellow and director of the International
Institutions and Global Governance Program, listed four important ways
in which the G20 can alter global diplomacy.79 Firstly, by providing a
venue for established and emerging powers to engage in discussions, it
74
“About IBSA Background,” http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background.
75
“About G20.” G20 Australia 2014, Accessed November 2014, G20.org.
76
Ibid.
77
Jongryn Mo, Middle Powers and G20 Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), 62.
78
Jorge Heine, “Will They Have Table Manners? The G20, Emerging Powers and Global
Responsibility,” South African Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2010), 2.
79
Stewart Patrick, “The G20: Shifting Coalitions of Consensus Rather Than Blocs,” The
New Dynamics of Summitry: Institutional, Policy and Political Innovations for G20 Summits
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2010).
THE EMERGING POWERS 97
80
Ibid., 259.
81
Ibid., 261.
82
Patrick, “The G20,” 261–62.
83
Ibid., 262.
84
Ngaire Woods, “The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance,” Global Leadership in
Transition (Washington, DC: Korea Development Institute and the Brookings Institution,
2011), 43.
85
Woods, “The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance,” 43.
86
Joseph Nye, “Power and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011), 14.
87
Patrick, “The G20,” 263.
98 J. G. MCGANN
CIVETS
Building on the foundation of the well-known BRICS countries, a new con-
glomeration of countries—CIVETS—is gaining attention. CIVETS refers to
Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa. Coined by
Robert Ward at the Economist Intelligence Unit in late 2009, the term was
further disseminated by former HSBC group chief executive Michael
Geoghegan, in a speech to the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce in 2010.
While these countries are spread all over the world and are shaped by
vastly different political, religious, and cultural environments, they share a
number of similarities and demonstrate the potential to grow rapidly over
the coming decades. According to Geoghegan, each of these six countries
“has a very bright future” and together they will take over as “the new
BRICS.” The primary factors in being included in CIVETS are their large,
young populations and diverse economies.
The CIVETS all have relatively young populations, with the average
age being 28. According to the World Factbook, Colombia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and Turkey have a median age of 28.9, 29.2, 29.2, and 29.6,
respectively. In Egypt and South Africa, the average age of the population
is just 25.1 and 25.7, respectively. These relatively young populations
stand in stark contrast to the aging populations of the West, for example
the German population has an average age of 46.1 and in the United
States the average age is 37.6. This young demographic has the potential
to drive the innovation and sales of digital technologies as interest in them
and financial resources increase.
In addition to their large young populations, the CIVETS demonstrate
rapid growth and a promising economic future. Indonesia is one such
country: it “weathered the global financial crisis better than most, helped
by its massive domestic consumption market. After growing 4.5% in 2009,
it rebounded above the 6% mark last year [2008]” and is predicted to stay
there for the next few years. Additionally, Turkey serves as a “key energy
corridor between Europe and Central Asia.”88 It maintains trading links
with the EU, but at present avoids the constraints of EU membership. The
CIVETs all have diverse economies with reasonably sophisticated financial
systems and have, for the most part, been unhampered by high inflation.
The combination of a youthful population and relative economic
growth and success has led to the CIVETS countries being touted as the
next wave of fast-growing emerging economies. In an interview with BBC
News, Philip Poole, HSBC’s global head of investment strategy, noted,
88
Presentation by Dr. James McGann presentation at the 2016 Astana Economic Forum,
Central Asia Think Tank Forum, June 2016.
THE EMERGING POWERS 99
“we see the future as being in emerging markets. They don’t have the debt
problems that we have in the developed world…we think the consump-
tion story will be emphasizing emerging market demand, and those popu-
lation dynamics are very important in this.”
Some commentators, however, disagree on the commonalities between
the CIVETS. They argue that the group has nothing in common beyond
its youthful populations. Darius McDermott, managing director at Chelsea
Financial Services, said, “What does Egypt have in common with Vietnam?
At least the BRIC countries were the four biggest emerging economies, so
there was some rationale for grouping them together.”89 Furthermore,
critics maintain that these countries have faced a number of challenges,
including unemployment, corruption, and inequality.
Moving forward, the CIVETS group will bring a variety of assets to the
table: “diversified economics, attractive investment frameworks and sound
economic policies.”90 They are “attractive to global investors…as their
middle classes expand”; these countries are growing, both economically
and in their scope of influence.91 The CIVETS will prove to be worth tak-
ing note of as they emerge over the next decade.
MINTS
Since Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill coined the term BRICs, these
countries (plus South Africa) have received widespread attention in the
global media and have begun involved projects and track II diplomacy
efforts, with the intent of advancing the interests of developing nations.92
O’Neill has now presented a new collection of rising powers known as the
MINT countries: Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey.
In the Latin American market, Mexico is seen as a favorite spot for
investment. It often draws comparison to Brazil, in part as a counter-
example. While both are open to investment, Mexico does not face the
89
John Greenwood, “After BRICs, CIVETS?” The Wall Street Journal, September 19,
2011. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904716604576546632573895
382.
90
Nils-Sjard Schulz, “The Third Wave of Development Players,” Policy Brief No. 60,
FRIDE, Madrid, Spain
(November 2010), http://fride.org/download/PB60_Third_wave_ENG_nov10.pdf.
91
Ibid.
92
Track II diplomacy is defined as “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts
and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called ‘non-state
actors’” (Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1991). Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide
and Analysis. Iowa Peace Institute. Pg 1).
100 J. G. MCGANN
94
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mints-mexico-indonesia-nigeria-turkey.asp.
95
Matthew Cowley and Luciana Magalhaes, “O’Neill, Man Who Coined ‘BRICs,’
Still Likes BRICs, But Likes MINTs, Too,” The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/09/oneill-man-who-coined-brics-still-likes-
brics-but-likes-mints-too/.
102 J. G. MCGANN
The resulting set of emerging powers for this document started out at
N=19. There was a call for papers, during which we reached out to think
tanks in these nineteen countries offering them an equal opportunity for
representation in the book. From the submitted papers, we chose the ones
that best represented high academic quality and strong arguments. As a
result, there are case studies from thirteen countries. The contributions in
the following chapters have been minimally edited for content to preserve
the unique opinions of the featured authors. The group of thirteen coun-
tries includes those that best represent the overlap between the most
salient definitions of emerging powers. Others are included to compensate
for inadequate representation, especially in the areas of political and/or
soft power. The thirteen countries are Nigeria, South Africa, China, India,
Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Qatar, and Turkey.
An academic consensus on the definition of emerging powers remains
elusive. An agreed-upon definition continues to evade scholars, because
there is discord as to the definition of the words utilized in the term.
There is also consensus that the word emergence connotes a change from
a less desirable category to a more desirable one, and that power suggests
the ability to control, influence, and challenge others. Not only is there a
lack of consensus on a definition of emerging powers, there is a lack of
consensus as to who they are. Various entities have identified differing
groupings of countries as emerging. And while the groupings may be
troubling for scholars who worry about whether they actually share simi-
larities, these groupings have begun to recognize their rising influence on
the world stage. As they attempt to organize themselves to wield their
newfound power, essential questions emerge: How do we identify who the
emerging powers are, what do they intend to do with their power, and
how is the rest of the world going to respond to their wielding of power?
PART II
Africa
CHAPTER 5
Nigeria: An Overview
James G. McGann
Overview
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation.1 In 2014, it overtook South
Africa to become the continent’s largest economy. It is Africa’s largest oil
exporter and its natural gas reserves are the largest on the continent.
1
According to projections by the United Nations, Nigeria will become the world’s fastest-
growing country and by 2100 its population will have reached nearly 1 billion people, which
will make it the third-largest population after India and China.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Economic Scenario
Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960. At that time, the
country’s most important sectors were agriculture, mining, and industry.
Today, many of these sectors have vanished as a result of misguided poli-
cies and failing infrastructures. When Nigeria became an independent
nation in 1999, it implemented a reform agenda that included a decision
to base its annual budget on a conservative reference price for oil and to
save the surplus in the Excess Crude Account (ECA).5 As a result, its
2
“A Powder Keg”, The Economist, April 1, 2015 http://www.economist.com/blogs/
graphicdetail/2015/04/nigerias-election.
3
http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/ophi/index.php/.
4
Ibid.
5
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview.
108 J. G. MCGANN
economy began to grow rapidly. Between 2004 and 2014, Nigeria’s GDP
rose at an average annual rate of 7%, faster than any other African country.6
In an effort to improve the governance and transparency of the oil sector,
the government adopted and implemented the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The NEITI Act became law in 2007, and
the country achieved compliance after four years.7
In 2005, Nigeria launched an initiative aimed at reforming the power
sector. The goal was to expand supply, open the door for private invest-
ment, and resolve issues hindering the improvement of service delivery.8
Oil accounts for close to 90% of the country’s exports and nearly 75%
of its budgetary revenues.9 Although Nigeria is one of the largest oil
producers, the country imports refined oil and gasoline, because the state-
owned refineries are all non-functioning. Additionally, while the low sulfur
content of Nigeria’s oil makes it easier to meet international environmen-
tal regulations, this reduces its price on the open market.
Increasing US production of light oil also presents a hurdle to Nigeria’s
economy.10 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, in 2015 Nigeria
was due to earn $67 billion from oil exports, an 18% drop from 2014
despite an increase in output. The decrease in oil prices has led to a devalu-
ation of the naira—Nigeria’s currency, which has fallen by between 10% and
17% relative to the US dollar—and an increase in the inflation rate.
Weaknesses in the oil industry have also increased macroeconomic risks.
The decline in output and lower prices are likely to lead to a weakening of
the balance of payments and national budget.11 The surplus in the balance
6
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/west-africa/nigeria/.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Seitlheko, Likeleli “Nigeria’s President-Elect and Domestic Oil Policy: Challenges and
Opportunities”, April 13, 2015, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinsti-
tute/2015/04/13/nigerias-president-elect-and-domestic-oil-policy-challenges-and-oppor-
tunities/.
The growing oil and liquids production from US shale plays has been progressively replac-
ing imports of crude oil, particularly the light sweet grade. The decreasing trend in US
imports is affecting especially African oil producers. The region accounted for almost two-
thirds of the light sweet crude imported into the United States from 2009 to 2013.
11
The World Bank, “Nigeria Overview,” Nigeria, September 30, 2015, http://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria.
NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW 109
of payments which was experienced between October 2011 and April 2013
subsequently vanished12 and official foreign reserves declined.13
Analysts argue that fostering revenue diversification would help
return the country to better growth. The need for diversification is
supported by trends in foreign direct investment (FDI), which indicate
that the non-oil sector has been the main source of growth in recent
years, primarily in agriculture and services as well as wholesale and retail
trade.14 Although more than 50% of the FDI capital invested in the
country has been directed to the capital-intensive resource sectors—
particularly oil—nearly 50% of FDI projects are service oriented. More
specifically, there has been a significant increase of investment into tele-
communications, which attracted 23.9% of FDI projects between 2007
and 2013.15
Power shortage is one of the main hindrances to expanding Nigeria’s
economy.16 It is one of the countries with the lowest per capita national
power supply, and business mainly relies on fuel power generators, which
add to the cost of doing business and make it harder to obtain future
industrial development.17 However, the privatization of the power indus-
try should boost the levels of investment into electricity generation and
distribution, transforming the country’s business scenario.
Foreign Policy
Opinions vary on the significance of Nigeria to the world economy, but
what is undisputed is that it is set to become of the world’s leading powers.
It has played a pivotal role in creating the two most important African
organizations, namely the African Union (AU) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Additionally, it has been
one of the main participants in security operations on the continent, and
is Africa’s main contributor to the United Nations’ African peacekeeping
operations.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
“Africa by Numbers: A Focus on Nigeria”, Ernst & Young, 2014, p. 2a.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
110 J. G. MCGANN
18
Since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards its neighbors has been guided by
four principles: (a) the sovereignty of all African states; (b) respect for the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of every African state; (c) non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of other African states; and (d) commitment to functional cooperation as a means
of promoting African unity.
19
Until the 1990s, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards the continent was guided by the same
four principles which feature in its relations with the region, plus an additional one (moti-
vated by the persistence of colonialism): namely, the total eradication of racialism and colo-
nialism from the continent.
20
Ashaver, Benjamin Teryima “Concentricism in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy”, Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences, June 2014, Vol. 9, Issue 6, p. 3.
21
The watershed event which underlined the potential leadership of Nigeria was the
Liberian crisis (1990–1997), which degenerated into civil war and dramatic violations of
human rights.
NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW 111
After the end of military leadership, Nigeria became one of the most
active African nations, participating in peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement operations both unilaterally and under the auspices of the
United Nations and the African Union.
As a result of the effects of the Arab Spring on Africa, Nigeria’s engage-
ment extended beyond the region. The end of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime
in Libya in 2011, the consequences of the popular uprisings in Egypt and
Syria, and more recently the advance of the so-called Islamic State have
created a vacuum of power and highlighted the competition for continental
leadership in Africa. Beyond the Arab Spring and the chronic instability in
the Middle East, Africa is still plagued by continued armed conflicts in
Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali.
Moreover, poor environmental governance hinders Africa’s security.
Finally, the continent is further exposed to threats related to terrorism and
transnational organized crime. The activities of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
and Mali, the resurgence of al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa, the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda, and more recently Boko Haram in Nigeria
constitute severe challenges to the stability of the entire continent and its
future growth and institutional development.
Currently, Boko Haram is a major challenge and has strained the rela-
tionship between domestic and foreign policies in Nigeria. However, the
Nigerian army has been able to push Boko Haram out of all but three
districts with the help of Chad and Niger.22 Nonetheless, to keep the orga-
nization from regrouping, a complete restructuring of the army—which is
plagued by corruption and misgovernment—is needed. Thus, strengthen-
ing national and regional think tank and think tank partnerships will be
crucial to receiving assistance in the fight against Boko Haram and other
extremist groups (Table 5.2).23
22
Baker, Aryn “Here Are 4 Challenges Nigeria’s New Leader Must Overcome”, April 7,
2015 Time, http://time.com/3774076/nigeria-muhammadu-buhari-challenge/.
23
Ibid.
CHAPTER 6
Sharkdam Wapmuk
Background
It is necessary to state from the onset that the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA), established in 1961 as a private organization,
was conceived as a think tank on foreign policy. Following its takeover by
the Nigerian government in 1971, NIIA became the main government
think tank on foreign policy. Even so, its work has been very much linked
to the pursuit of the development of the Nigerian state and the African
continent at large. At NIIA’s conference on Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, held from July 30 to August 1, 2007, the con-
cluding communiqué noted that “there is a clear connection between
Nigeria’s foreign policy and the domestic environment; and a synergy
between the external and internal variables in foreign policy making that
can conduce to the nation’s national interest, especially in terms of
economic growth, prosperity and development.” Aptly put, there is a link
S. Wapmuk (*)
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria
1
A. O. Banjo, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (1961–1986): The Story So Far;
NIIA Monograph Series No. 12: 5.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 115
take her rightful place in resurgent Africa, she requires to be fully informed
on the world of today, which is of paramount functions of the Institute.”2
The Institute, which began as a private project, was therefore saddled
with this grand responsibility. Its role was inextricably linked to the new
position Nigeria would assume in the international community after its
independence from Britain in October 1960. Just a few years after its
establishment, great interest—both within and outside Nigeria—was
shown towards NIIA’s work and progress. Such support was proved also
by the material and financial aid NIIA received in its early years. The fed-
eral government decided to give it appropriate legal anchorage by promul-
gating Decree No. 35 of April 18, 1971, thus designating NIIA a
government institute. The decision of the government to take over the
Institute was influenced by the expectations of the global community.
NIIA has always considered issues related to foreign policy and devel-
opment as being located in both domestic and international contexts. In
the area of foreign policy, it believes that the domestic foundation invari-
ably determines how the Nigerian state relates to the external environ-
ment. Reading the publications of NIIA, it can be deduced that it is
inconceivable for any country’s foreign policy to be bereft of development
considerations. According to Eze,3 “for when a country engages in inter-
national trade, seeks to attract foreign investments or nationalizes/indi-
genizes, adopts measures on immigration having bearing on the economy,
customs, foreign exchange, all in order to improve the domestic economy
and foster development, it sends signals to the outside world that define
relations between it and them.”
From this broad perspective, the issue should not be whether or not
NIIA has taken into consideration the issue of development at the domes-
tic or continental levels, but what forms it has taken, how it has been
expressed, and what role NIIA has played given its mandate. To what
extent have NIIA activities been focused on Nigerian and African develop-
ment? Or, put differently, to what extent has NIIA used its platform to
discuss, analyze, research, and document issues related to development?
What have been the challenges that NIIA has faced in discharging its man-
date and how has it responded to these challenges?
2
Ibid., 3.
3
O. Eze. “NIIA and Nigeria’s Foreign Economic Policy,” Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 100.
116 S. WAPMUK
Think tanks defy exact definition, as they vary in size, legal form, policy
pursuit, longevity, organizational structure, standards of inquiry, and poli-
tics. Not only are there considerable differences over how to define them,
but also the directors and scholars of these organizations often make dis-
tinctions between “research institutes” and “think tanks.” Such disputes
often revolve around the role of advocacy on the one hand and organiza-
tional capacity for quality research on the other.4 For the purpose of this
chapter, the definition provided by Dale Webster is adopted as a working
definition.5 Think tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through
intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying. As such,
they are engaged in the intellectual analysis of policy issues and are con-
cerned with ideas and concepts that underpin policy.
Ahmadu6 has identified three categories of think tanks: academic think
tanks, advocacy think tanks, and contract think tanks. Academic think
tanks hire academics who have proven records in research and publications
in scholarly journals. Unlike at actual universities, the researchers are not
required to teach. According to Abelson, academic think tanks work as
universities in the sense that that their principal mission is to promote a
4
Helleburst, L. Think-Tank Directory: A Guide to Non-Profit Public Policy Research
Organisations, Topeka: Government Research Service: 32.
5
According to Webster dictionary (2000) edition, a think tank is an organization that
conducts research and engages in advocacy in areas such as social policy, political strategy,
economy, science or technology issues, economic policies, or foreign and defense policies. A
think tank is also a public policy research, analysis, and engagement institution that generates
policy-oriented research analysis and advice on domestic and international issues.
6
Ahmadu, “Think-Tanks and their Contributions to Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” paper pre-
sented at the annual conference of the Nigeria Society of International Affairs, held at the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, from 25 to 26 June 2014: 3.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 117
7
D.E. Albeson, American Think-Tanks and Their Role in United States Foreign Policy,
New York: St. Martin Press: 21.
8
James G. McGann, and Robert Kent Weaver, Think-Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts
for Ideas and Action, London: Transaction Press.
9
Simon James, Think-Tanks and Policy Process: Capturing the Political Imagination,
London: 409.
118 S. WAPMUK
Ogwu10 argues that even though Nigeria has its own domestic challenges,
African countries still look up to Nigeria for leadership, security, and pros-
perity, as well as for the promotion of the cause of black people in the
diaspora. These concerns fall within the agenda of the objectives of NIIA,
as Nigeria projects itself internationally into a globalized and more com-
petitive world. It is the responsibility of NIIA to undertake systematic
investigation with regard to Nigeria’s foreign policy and to build public
and political support for it. This is very much in line with developments in
other parts of the world. In leading countries, foreign policy think tanks
enhance the process of defining and redefining foreign policy. Such for-
eign policy think tanks have been created in the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan, Ghana, South Africa, and
other countries; they conduct research into foreign policy issues, enhance
the building of political support for those with such professions and back-
grounds to network and harmonize their views and exploit synergies, as
well as evolve options for the government.
There is no doubt that think tanks all over the world attract talented
individuals who contribute to the building of in-house expertise that can
be placed at the disposal of the country. In this regard, therefore, think
tanks provide talents and experts that can serve the country in official and
diplomatic capacities. NIIA reflects these observations.
The Act of 1971 (CAP.311) that established NIIA states its objectives as
follows:
For the purpose of this chapter, we need to emphasize the core areas of the
mandate that will form the basis for our assessment of the past and present
contributions of NIIA to Nigerian and African development. This is
against the background of the changing dynamics of both the domestic
and international environments.
The work of NIIA on foreign policy and development as well as other
related issue areas are guided by its mandate, which has been clearly stated.
It is a think tank on foreign policy. It carries out research, training, and
enlightenment of the Nigerian people on issues of Nigeria’s foreign policy
and general developments in international affairs. In order to further
understand the Institute’s work on Nigerian and African development, it
will be necessary to look at the country’s foreign policy objectives.
Beginning with the Tafawa Balewa government, the thrust of Nigeria’s
foreign policy was spelt out in the following terms:
One great advantage, which the new nations have, is that the accession to
independence makes a clear break with our past and presents us with the
opportunity to enter the field of international relations untrammeled by
power commitment...it is probably one occasion in the life of a nation when
it is possible to choose policies with the inherent qualities of goodness...We
feel an immense responsibility to the world, we see nation wrangling with
nation and we wonder how we can help.
For Nigeria and indeed for other African countries, the overriding concern
in the 1960s was how to end colonialism and apartheid rule on the conti-
nent. The late pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana argued that
African states should seek first the political kingdom and every other thing
would be added later. Accordingly, Nigeria devoted its attention to ending
colonialism in Africa, as well as ending racism in Southern Africa. Nigeria’s
commitment to the liberation of Africa and the restoration of pride and
respect for the black race remained an unwavering commitment until the
last vestiges of colonialism and racist rule were crushed in Southern Africa
in 1994. Right from 1960, Nigeria was a permanent member of the
Decolonization Committee and chaired the Anti-Apartheid Committee.
The decade of the 1970s and part of the 1980s was a particularly diffi-
cult period for Africa. For Nigeria, it was even more so because of the fact
that Africa was taken as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Throughout
these years, repression under apartheid in South Africa was at its highest
and black people, in countries such as present-day Namibia and Zimbabwe,
fared badly under white minority regimes. Zambia and Mozambique were
subject to incessant military incursions by the security forces of South
Africa. Nevertheless, African countries, Africans in the diaspora, and also
11
H. A. Asobie, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960–2010: An Overview,” Beyond 50 Years of
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs: 1.
122 S. WAPMUK
some non-Africans were of the opinion that apartheid was evil and must
be crushed. Nigeria led the struggle for the liberation of African countries
from the yoke of apartheid and white minority rule. It provided various
forms of support to the liberation movements and also granted asylum and
scholarships to nationals of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
Nigeria’s role in the liberation struggle was widely acknowledged and so
deeply appreciated that independent African countries regarded it as a
frontline state.
The establishment of NIIA in 1961, as noted earlier, was not coinci-
dental, but an outcome of strategic thinking that Nigeria needed to have
an authoritative body with a specialty in studying, collecting, and dissemi-
nating information on contemporary world affairs. The founders of the
Institute had also stressed its role in public enlightenment and dissemina-
tion of information on current issues in Africa and world affairs. In line
with its mandate, NIIA sponsored conferences, seminars, workshops, and
publications on Nigeria’s engagement with the world. At the same time,
its conferences, seminars, workshops, and publications have similarly
shown in the range of their subjects the Institute’s acceptance of its role as
an instrument of public policy directed at Nigeria’s and Africa’s develop-
mental aspirations.
The first major effort in this direction that specifically focused on devel-
opment was a series of lectures delivered under NIIA’s platform. In 1964,
Arnold J. Toynbee, professor emeritus at the University of London, who
had long been associated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs
as the Director of Studies and Research, delivered a lecture titled “Africa’s
Place in World History in Lagos” and another lecture titled “The World’s
Food Crisis and Population Problem,” which took place in Zaria, Nigeria.
After 1972, NIIA witnessed further development of its potential. Banjo
(1986:21) notes that this phase was marked by the development of a wide
range of programs and activities, which mainly focused on the United
Nations (UN). Among these activities were public programs concerning
issues of interest for Nigeria’s foreign policy and development.
The first major conference organized by NIIA was held on January
27–30, 1976 with the theme “Nigeria and the World.” In the context of
the new global order following decolonization, the aim of the conference
included examining Nigeria’s relations with African countries while explor-
ing its contacts with non-African countries, the UN, and multinational
companies. In July 1981, the Institute sponsored the “International
Conference on Disarmament, Development and Regional Security in
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 123
12
O. Eze. “NIIA and Nigeria’s Foreign Economic Policy,” Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 104.
124 S. WAPMUK
13
Olusanya, G.O, Ate, B.E and Olukoshi, O.A, eds. Economic Development and Foreign
Policy in Nigeria, Lagos (1988): Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: ii.
14
Ibid., iii.
15
Ogwu, U. J., and Adebayo Olukoshi. The Economic Diplomacy of the Nigerian State.
Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2002: 17.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 125
The ball game today in international relations is self interest and economic
development in your utterances and in your behavioural pattern, please
remember that Nigeria is a developing country. It needs support from the
international community and that support can only come when you can win
the confidence of those whose support you seek. You begin to win the
confidence through friendliness and loyalty to their cause. What matters is
your ability to win for Nigeria what we cannot do for ourselves, that is, the
economic well being of our people and physical wellbeing of Nigeria.17
16
Ibid., 18.
17
Olusanya, G.O, Ate, B.E and Olukoshi, O.A, eds. Economic Development and Foreign
Policy in Nigeria, Lagos (1988): Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 17.
126 S. WAPMUK
18
Ogwu, U.J and Alli, W.O eds. Debt Relief and Nigeria’s Diplomacy, Lagos (2006):
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 11.
19
Ibid.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 127
At the continental level, African leaders have long recognized the economic
challenges facing the continent and were determined to address them.
With regard to economic integration, cooperation, and development,
throughout the 40 years under the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
government, it emerged that several regional and subregional groupings
reflected an acceptance of transitional, state-led economic cooperation,
involving the pooling of resources in response to shared problems and
opportunities.
This recognition led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)
by the heads of state and government of the OAU in 1980. The LPA and
the Final Act of Lagos were initiated as a central idea of the “collective
self-reliance” of the continent. This idea was strongly reinforced by the
Abuja Treaty of June 1991, establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC), which sought to increase economic self-reliance and promote self-
sustaining development. In the area of continental economic develop-
ment, Nigeria and South Africa are credited with being the chief drivers in
the processes leading to the formation of the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), operating under the African Union (AU). Nigeria’s leadership
role was not limited to the construction of the NEPAD.20 Its pivotal role
is evident from the commitment it has demonstrated in implementing the
NEPAD agenda in the form of reforms at the domestic level. Nigeria has
not only provided the necessary leadership for the purpose of mobilizing
the rest of Africa at the continental level, but has collaborated with other
leading countries on the continent and facilitated the engagement of the
larger international community to partner with Africa under the NEPAD
arrangement. Given Nigeria’s role, NIIA has provided an academic
platform for discussion and publications on African development initia-
tives. For example, in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
it organized a conference, “Nigerian Perspectives on NEPAD,” in 2004.
The outcome of this conference, which according to NIIA sought to pro-
mote a better understanding of NEPAD in Nigeria, was published in a
book titled NEPAD in the Nigerian Dock. Another related conference was
organized in 2004, the outcome of which was published under the title
20
I. Aluko-Olokun, “The Role of Nigeria in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD),” Nigeria and the Development of the African Union, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers
Ltd.: 162.
128 S. WAPMUK
21
U.J Ogwu, and Alli, W.O eds. ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration, Lagos:
(2009) Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
22
NIIA Annual Report File for 2009, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 129
Indeed, there was no better way to wish the Institute added impetus for its
work of mobilizing intellectual public opinion and formulating policy
directions in the sphere of international relations than by openly and pub-
licly acknowledging its giant strides in this regard.
Another form of direct contact between NIIA and the UN’s work on
development is the inclusion of the Director General (DG) and Research
Fellows in official government delegations to crucial diplomatic missions
such as the UN General Assembly Sessions. Their inclusion as part of an
official delegation to the UN does not only afford them the opportunity
to serve as advisors to the Nigerian delegation, but also enables them to
further study the UN system so as to improve their research work. A sig-
nificant development which has raised the Institute’s profile internation-
ally has been the appointment of former NIIA DGs as Nigeria’s Permanent
Representative to the UN. This allowed them to use their personal experi-
ences from NIIA to serve the UN body and also to defend the Nigerian
and African cause directly to the UN. Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, an
academic and diplomat, served as NIIA DG from 1983 to 1984 and as
Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN from 1990 to 1999. Even
after his tenure as Nigeria’s Permanent Representative, the UN Secretary-
General appointed him as Under Secretary to remain in the service of the
UN, owing to his contributions to the working of the UN body. Professor
Joy U. Ogwu, Nigeria’s present Permanent Representative to the UN, was
a Research Fellow and later DG of NIIA from 2001 to 2006. While she
was still serving as DG, she was appointed in 2003 to the Advisory Board
on Disarmament Matters, by the UN Secretary-General. This appoint-
ment was further boosted when Professor Ogwu was elevated to the posi-
tion of Chairperson of the Board in 2006 by the Secretary-General. These
were clearly due to her contributions to the promotion of global peace.
Several other Research Fellows have served UN bodies in various
capacities. Professor Margaret Vogt, an academic and diplomat who was
with NIIA before working with other institutions, such as the Command
130 S. WAPMUK
and Staff College, Jaji, and as Director of the Office of the AU Commission
Chairperson, has served the UN in various functions. She was Acting
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in UN
Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II), before she was
nominated by Ban Ki-moon in 2011 as his Special Representative and
Head of the UN Integrated Peace Building Office in the Central African
Republic (BINUCA). Before this appointment she had served as Deputy
Director of the Africa I Division in the Department of Political Affairs at
the UN Secretariat. Through these roles and contributions, she has not
only helped in expanding the relationship between the UN and the AU,
but also furthered the ties among Nigeria, Africa, and NIIA.
From the foregoing, it is evident that over the years NIIA has—within
the confines of its mandate, which is to research, inform, and educate the
people on Nigeria’s foreign policy and world affairs in general—paid due
attention to issues of foreign policy and development at both national and
continental levels. That is not to say that the working of the Institute is not
without challenges, and to these we now turn our attention.
23
Bola A. Akinterinwa, “The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): My Experience as a Research Fellow and Special Assistant
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Nigeria’s New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of
Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, at 70, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers: 75.
THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS… 131
24
Ibid., 81.
25
Ibid.
132 S. WAPMUK
Conclusion
This chapter examines to what extent the research work and general activi-
ties of NIIA have focused on Nigerian and African development. It argues
that NIIA as a think tank on foreign policy undertakes studies, conducts
analysis, and makes recommendations to the government. The aim of
NIIA is to provide the government with alternative options and direc-
tions, based on painstaking research and objective writing.
134 S. WAPMUK
James G. McGann
Overview
South Africa is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The
President of the country serves both as head of state and as head of gov-
ernment. The President is elected by the National Assembly—the lower
house of the South African Parliament—and must enjoy the confidence of
the Assembly in order to remain in office. South Africans also elect provin-
cial legislatures which govern each of the country’s nine provinces.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Since the end of apartheid in the 1990s, the African National Congress
(ANC) has dominated South Africa’s politics. The ANC is the ruling party
in the national legislature, as well as in eight of the nine provinces (Western
Cape is governed by the Democratic Alliance). The ANC received 62.9%
of the popular vote in the 2011 municipal election and 62.15% of the vote
during the 2014 general election.1
(continued)
1
Independent Electoral Commission, Local Government Elections, 2011, Result
Summary-All Ballots.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW 137
Table 7.1 (continued)
Political parties African Christian Democratic Party, ACDP (Kenneth Meshoe);
and current African Independent Congress, AIC (Mandla Gald); African National
leaders Congress, ANC (Jacob Zuma); African People’s Convention,
APC (Themba Godi); Agamg SA (Andries Tlouamma); Congress
of the People, COPE (Mosiuoa Lekota); Democratic Alliance, DA
(Mmusi Maimane); Economic Freedom Fighters, EFF (Julius Malema);
Freedom Front Plus, FF+ (Pieter Mulder); Inkatha Freedom Party,
IFP (Mangosuthu Buthelezi); National Freedom Party, NFP (Zanele
kaMagwaza-Msibi); Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, PAC (Alton
Mphethi); United Christian Democratic Party, UCDP (Isaac Sipho
Mfundisi); United Democratic Movement, UDM (Bantu Holomisa)
The main challenger to the ANC’s rule is the Democratic Alliance, led
by Helen Zille, which received 22.23% of the vote in the 2014 election.
Another major political party represented in Parliament is the Inkatha
Freedom Party, which mainly represents Zulu voters. The formerly domi-
nant New National Party, which both introduced and ended apartheid
through its predecessor the National Party, disbanded in 2005 to merge
with the ANC.2
Since 2009, Jacob Zuma has served as South Africa’s President. With a
liberation background and Zulu ethnicity, Zuma has appealed to African
cultural tradition to obtain support among Zulus and the larger black
African population in rural and poor areas.3
Despite the significant changes that occurred with the end of the apart-
heid regime, South Africa is still facing several challenges.
Although the country has achieved non-negligible progress in social
democracy and equality in the post-apartheid period, certain disparities
persist, whether racially or spatially. According to the 2011 national cen-
sus, black South Africans were 80% of the total population (51.8 million),
2
Wikipedia contributors, “The Politics of South Africa”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_South_Africa
3
Nicolas Cook, “South Africa: Politics, Economy and U.S. Relations,” in Congressional
Research Service Report, December 19, 2013.
138 J. G. MCGANN
but their average salary (ZAR 60,613) is still only one-sixth of that of
whites (ZAR 365,134), although a 169% increase has been witnessed over
ten years.4
Moreover, geographic inequality is also a prevailing problem in South
Africa the average income differs greatly across the nine provinces.
Corruption represents another plague for the country. The 2012
Transparency International report assigned South Africa an index of 4.3,
ranking 69th out of 176 countries.5 Doubts over the Zuma administra-
tion’s commitment to the rule of law have lingered since he took office in
2009, a month after prosecutors dropped charges against him of taking
bribes from arms dealers. In March 2015, South African graft ombuds-
man Thuli Madonsela alleged that Zuma unjustly benefited from a state-
funded upgrade costing ZAR 215 million (US$18.7 million) on his home
in the village of Nkandla and said he should repay some of the money.
ANC leaders criticized Madonsela, and the party used its parliamentary
majority to absolve Zuma of blame for the misspending.6 According to
the 2013 Afrobarometer Survey, perceptions of the office of the President
being corrupt had more than doubled, from a low of 13% in 2002 to 35%
in 2011.7
Thirdly, public services and public health are still underdeveloped.
HIV/AIDS is one of the most severe public health challenges facing the
country. The South African National HIV Survey estimated that 10.8% of
all South Africans over 2 years old were living with HIV in 2005. There is
an average of almost 1000 deaths from AIDS a day in South Africa.8 In
2013, the adult (15–49 years old) prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in South
4
Mike Cohen, “South Africa’s Racial Income Inequality Persists, Census Shows,”
Bloomberg, October 30, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-30/
south-africa-s-racial-income-inequality-persists-census-shows
5
“Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 Results,” Transparency International. Accessed
December 7, 2012. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results
6
Mike Cohen, “Zuma Accused of Undermining South African Corruption Probes,”
Bloomberg, January 14, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/
zuma-accused-of-undermining-south-african-corruption-probes
7
Newham, Gareth, “Why Is Corruption Getting Worse in South Africa?” ISS Africa.
December 13, 2013. Accessed. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-is-corruption-
getting-worse-in-south-africa
8
“HIV and AIDS in South Africa.” AVERT. May 1, 2015. https://www.avert.org/pro-
fessionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/south-africa
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW 139
Africa was 19.1% (6.3 million individuals). Associated with the high
infection rate of fatal disease, the Central Intelligence Agency’s estimate of
South Africa’s life expectancy is only 49.56 years.9
Economic Scenario
The economy of South Africa is the second largest in Africa, behind
Nigeria, representing 24% of the continent’s purchasing power parity
gross domestic product (PPP GDP), and leading it to be ranked as a mid-
dle–upper-income county by the World Bank.10 Unemployment has long
been one of the most severe problems facing the South African economy.
According to Goldman Sachs’ 2013 report, the unemployment rate
(including people who have given up looking for a job) is 35%. More spe-
cifically, youth unemployment represents a major socio-economic chal-
lenge. In 2013, 63% of the youth labor force was unemployed (3.2
million).11 Although this is partly due to the high national average unem-
ployment rate, both a supply-side lack of employability associated with an
insufficient public education and training system and a demand-side
inequality in terms of accessibility to job opportunities are regarded as the
main causes of high youth unemployment.
Apart from the supply-side interventions via several initiatives (e.g.,
Community Works Program, Public Deployment Program, and National
Rural Youth Service Groups), which still require scalability in size beyond
the local, the government’s agenda should focus on promoting an incen-
tive program on the demand side, with the participation of the private
sector and entrepreneurs.
Compared to other emerging economies, South Africa performs quite
well in terms of capital accessibility, ranked second in financial market
sophistication and having the second-lowest effective business tax rate
among 14 surveyed countries.12 However, in terms of labor supply, South
9
The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
Accessed 2014-06-25. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2102rank.html
10
“South Africa.” South Africa Home, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
southafrica
11
Oosthuizen, Morné, and Aalia Cassim. “The State of Youth Unemployment in South
Africa.” The Brookings Institution. August 15, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
africa-in-focus/posts/2014/08/15-youth-unemployment-south-africa-oosthuizen
12
“SA Fares Well in Emerging Markets Study.” SouthAfrica.info. December 14, 2010.
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/cnisurvey-141210.htm#.VSEtCfnF-wM
140 J. G. MCGANN
Africa is ranked last. This lack of labor availability reflects the insufficient
education system, which is one of the factors that contributes to the high
crime rate across the country (a murder rate of 31.1/100,000 compared
to the world average of 6/100,000). This unstable social environment is
deemed one of the major obstacles to attracting further commercial coop-
eration with the country’s global partners.
Foreign Relations
After its international isolation during the apartheid period, South Africa
has become an active player both globally and regionally. It was elected as
the non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) for both 2008–2010 and 2010–2012. Driven by its vision to
develop good relations with every country, especially within Africa, it has
been putting effort into ending various conflicts and political crises on the
continent.13 Since its admission to the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) in 1994, South Africa has achieved economic and
security-related consensus with the other 13 members, featured by their
aim to create a common market without internal trade barriers and the
sharing of water resources among the community. Moreover, SADC has
attracted further foreign aid as a united entity; for instance, in 2014
Germany committed €300 million to the community.14 SADC was also
placed in top position in a global comparison of indicators of water coop-
eration prepared by international think tank Strategic Foresight Group.15
However, despite its active and constructive role in regional cooperation,
according to Human Rights Watch South Africa has been criticized for its
deportation of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees, thereby breaching the
1951 Refugee Convention and international law.16
13
Wikipedia contributors, “Foreign Relations of South Africa”, Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_South_Africa#Post-
apartheid
14
Southern African Development Community, “SADC and Germany Agree to
Jointly Support the Deepening of Regional Integration,” Southern African Development
Community, December 2, 2014, http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-and-
germany-agree-jointly-support-deepening-regional/
15
“Water Cooperation for a Secure World.” Strategic Foresight Group. http://www.stra-
tegicforesight.com/publication_pdf/20795water-cooperature-sm.pdf
16
“South Africa: Grant Temporary Status to All Zimbabweans.” Human Rights Watch.
June 19, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/19/south-africa-grant-temporary-
status-all-zimbabweans
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW 141
• South Africa–Angola
The relation between these two countries is quite strong, mainly due to
the ANC’s support of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and former South African President Nelson Mandela’s mediation
between MPLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) during Angola’s civil war.
• South Africa–Zimbabwe
With strong historical and cultural links, relations between the EU and
South Africa have prospered during the post-apartheid era. After the sign-
ing of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) in
1999, a strategic partnership evolved between the two parties, as
highlighted by the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA). South Africa
also remains the biggest trader with the EU in Southern Africa.
• South Africa–China
17
Hamill, James, The South Africa-US Relations in the Obama-Zuma Era, World
Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13138/u-s-south-africa-
relations-in-the-obama-zuma-era-part-ii
CHAPTER 8
Neuma Grobbelaar and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
Introduction
South Africa’s high profile in international politics can be ascribed to three
factors. Firstly, its transformation from an international pariah to an
engaged and responsible stakeholder. Secondly, the establishment of an
inclusive constitutional democracy, the process architecture of which has
served as a model for other conflict-resolution processes. Lastly, an iconic
inaugural leadership embodied by Nelson Mandela, and later Thabo
Mbeki, who both put Africa at the center of South Africa’s global engage-
ment. Facing no direct conventional external threats and having given up
its nuclear weapons (the only state to have done so voluntarily), South
Africa’s foreign policy post-apartheid emphasizes the importance of
achieving peace and security on the continent as a prerequisite for devel-
opment. To create an environment more favorable to Africa’s develop-
ment aspirations, Pretoria focused on building effective regional institutions
and transforming global power relations and the system that governs. It is
especially in this last area that South Africa has become known for its
“activist foreign policy.”
South Africa’s activism on the international stage is partly an outcome
of its relative economic clout on the continent that has allowed it entry
into a range of global bodies such as the G20 (the only African member,
together with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union). This activism is also the result of its ability to proj-
ect the soft power imbedded in the moral authority of its peaceful trans-
formation and the values espoused in its constitution.
The scale of South Africa’s global engagement relative to its size and
stature is significant. Until April 2014, when Nigeria overtook it, South
Africa had the largest economy on the continent, yet it still occupied only
26th place in global rankings. South Africa is nevertheless among a group
of countries in the developing world who have attained middle-income
status. Its membership of the BRICS (alongside Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) exemplifies its active engagement in regional and global affairs, its
aspiration to greater influence, and its aim to see the international system
transform to reflect the shifts in political and economic power away from
the West. While South Africa is often described as an emerging power, the
way the term is used may be misleading, because although it is a continen-
tal and regional power in Africa and an active participant in many global
debates, South Africa is not in the same league as China or putatively
India. This relative power imbalance and tension between capacity and
aspiration strongly color the way in which South Africa engages
internationally.
Alongside the radical transformation of the country from international
isolation to integration, this tension is also a touchstone for understanding
the opportunities, the constraints, and the particular political context
within which think tanks operate in South Africa.
Therefore, it is against this background that this chapter discusses the
broader South African political and foreign policy context and challenges,
and how the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has
contributed to the debate about evidence-based policy options and shaped
its research agenda to respond to these in the new South Africa. Two case
studies are selected to illustrate both the type of priorities SAIIA has iden-
tified as being important to the foreign policy-making environment and
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA… 145
the policy-making process. The chapter then discusses some of the systems
and structures SAIIA has put in place for more effective policy engage-
ment, and possible lessons for other think tanks in similar environments.
on three factors: its relative political stability and democratic system; its
sophisticated economy and size in Africa; and its willingness to commit
resources to challenges that it identifies.
However, to ensure continued influence, South Africa will have to
grapple with a number of foreign policy challenges in the next decade.
These challenges include:
What was transformational for civil society and think tanks and how
they previously operated was the coming to power of a democratically
elected and legitimate government. Many actors responded to this change
by seeking to engage more constructively with government, what Adam
Habib refers to as a collegial rather than adversarial relationship.1 In the
process, many actors transformed, in effect into service providers to the
state, particularly in the health sector. Another consequence of the coun-
try’s political transformation was the state’s own interpretation of state–
civil society relations, given the legitimacy of the new system, which it
understood as needing to support the state rather than being in opposition
to it or critical of it. Thus, paradoxically, the internal environment in South
Africa does not always appreciate the role of public policy institutions, or
is extremely sensitive to criticism. Against such a background, think tanks
walk a tightrope between engaging with government in a constructive
manner without alienating it, and maintaining an independent posture.
This tension may be compounded by the fact that most think tanks in
South Africa that are not established by statute rely largely on foreign
funding for their operations.2 This fact led President Mbeki, at the launch
of the South African Peer Review process in November 2005, to question
whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could be truly African
if they were funded largely by foreigners, who have their own agendas.3
However, relations between government and the think tank sector have
developed over time, especially in the area of international affairs. While
the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation
(DIRCO), the National Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), and the Department of Defence now frequently engage think
tanks through competitive tenders or multistakeholder consultations in
their work, it is not always apparent that government fully appreciates how
best to engage with think tanks in a strategic and sustainable manner. This
begs the question of how think tanks in South Africa can better organize
as a collective to raise their profile as important contributors to a vibrant
public policy discourse.
1
Adam Habib (2012).
2
The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the African Institute of South Africa
(AISA) are examples of the latter. AISA has recently being integrated into the HSRC. The
HSRC’s budget is voted annually by the South African Parliament.
3
The deep irony of this statement is that many of Africa’s premier regional institutions and
research bodies, such as the African Union Commission and the regional economic com-
munities (REC), are predominantly reliant on support from abroad.
148 N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS
About SAIIA
The South African Institute of International Affairs was established in
1934 in Cape Town as an autonomous and independent institute in the
mold of Chatham House and similar think tanks in other British domin-
ions of the time. Its constitution proscribed the Institute from taking a
party political position. Its establishment preceded the rise of grand apart-
heid in 1948, when the National Party came to power. From its inception,
SAIIA was funded largely by members’ subscriptions, which included
corporates and individuals. For most of the pre-1994 period, SAIIA was
the only dedicated South African foreign policy research institution in the
country.
For the first sixty years of its existence, SAIIA was a fairly small research
institution with a handful of researchers. The primary focus of the Institute,
especially during the time of South Africa’s isolation, was to provide a
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA… 149
platform for public debate on the country’s engagement with the world.
This began to change with the momentous political transformation that
South Africa underwent in the early 1990s. Established to focus mainly on
South Africa’s international relations and provide a platform for such dis-
cussion, SAIIA’s focus has grown since 1994 largely in line with the priori-
ties highlighted by the democratic government—the African Agenda and
strengthened multilateralism.4 In that vein, SAIIA’s work aims to contrib-
ute to a well-governed, peaceful, economically sustainable, and globally
engaged Africa.5
Since 1994, SAIIA has undertaken a new approach, moving from the
more traditional security domain to non-traditional security elements by
covering economic, environmental, political, and human security issues.
This shift occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, these themes concern
some of the most important and relevant challenges facing African states
in particular, from natural resource management to international trade
and finance, from good governance to the rule of law. Secondly, this
change results from a growing trend in Africa, particularly in the civil soci-
ety space, that highlights the importance of the security of people rather
than the security of states, as often the latter has been used as justification
for domestic political repression.6 Thirdly, the explosion of multiple non-
state actors—that is, NGOs—and also business on the international stage,
combined with the technology revolution, have reshaped the international
relations discourse, requiring a different model of engagement by states in
international affairs. Moreover, the transnational and interdependent
nature of challenges facing the world requires an interdisciplinary approach
which is wider than the traditional state-centric or security approach in
international affairs.
4
South Africa’s African Agenda refers to the centrality of Africa in South Africa’s external
engagement, bilaterally, regionally, and globally. At the heart of South Africa’s African
agenda is the support of good governance, peace, and stability in Africa and the placing of
Africa on a more sustainable development growth path. This is articulated in South Africa’s
foreign policy through African institution-building, support of African infrastructure and
regional integration initiatives, and peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It also
entails South Africa’s active advocacy in international fora of African concerns, in particular
the leveling of the playing field and support for an enabling international environment that
is supportive of Africa’s development aspirations.
5
This is also SAIIA’s programmatic goal, while its vision is to be the leading think tank on
Africa and on global issues as they affect Africa.
6
This is often couched as a human security approach.
150 N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS
SAIIA’s research agenda seeks to tackle some of the key issues facing
South Africa and the continent more broadly, as the world moves from
unipolarity (into which the new South Africa was born in 1994) to multi-
polarity. While Africa remains at the periphery of global affairs, the increas-
ing “Rising Africa” narrative underscores the continent’s growing
prominence as both object and subject of international engagement.
8
A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence – odi.org. https://www.odi.org/
resources/docs/6453.pdf by H Jones – 2011.
152 N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS
From the outset, the project has had regular interactions with South
Africa’s National Treasury on the research agenda and the planning of vari-
ous public and closed policy engagements. From the project’s m id-term
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA… 153
review in 2013 (after one and half years of project implementation), it was
clear that it was valued by the South African Treasury, which saw greater
engagement on the topic from other African countries as an imperative. The
mid-term review also provided an opportunity to reflect, modify, and focus
initiatives based on feedback from both South Africa and external stake-
holders. It was therefore decided to refocus the project on building a policy
community around GEG in Africa, rather than a stand-alone network.
Because of the low baseline of interest on GEG in Africa, the project’s
objective was modeled to put in place the basic building blocks for policy
change in the long term. This approach is particularly relevant for beyond-
the-horizon issues and in the absence of an existing policy and knowledge
community. It also points to a challenge that almost all think tanks face:
the balance between achieving an immediate policy on an issue that is
clearly on the agenda of policy-makers, and the need to invest time and
resources in realizing a shift in consciousness about the policy relevance of
an issue. In addition, the challenge is not only observing and measuring
the policy shift, but attributing it.
The key tools utilized in the areas of relationship and consciousness-
building on GEG-related matters among African partners, South African
government officials, the media, academics, and other research and
capacity-building organizations in Africa included the following:
important element for think tanks in South Africa, in terms of their explo-
ration of cooperation with other similar organizations in Africa, with other
emerging powers, as well as with developed countries. The country’s
membership of groupings such as the G20 and the BRICS has acted as a
driver for many South African think tanks to seek out specific thematic
collaborations with other think tanks in those countries. In most cases
there are formalized track 1.5 processes, such as the BRICS Academic
Forum and the Think 20, which help to catalyze such cooperation further.
This track 1.5 for informal groupings has developed momentum in the last
several years. In a broader African context, the various platforms of dia-
logue between African states and India, China, and Turkey, among others,
have also laid the foundation for interaction between African think tanks
and their counterparts in those countries. SAIIA’s development of think
tank networks to engage on topics that at first glance might not be priori-
ties for institutions in other African countries (such as G20 and the BRICS)
has contributed to a trend of African think tanks diversifying into other
areas. The China–Africa Think Tank network, of which SAIIA is a mem-
ber, has sought, for example, to encourage cooperation on research and
policy engagement between African and Chinese institutes. These types of
interactions can ameliorate the gap in research on China in Africa that
exists among African institutions.
SAIIA has had an office in Cape Town since 2007, and incrementally
used this geographic proximity to good use, especially as regards its pro-
gram on resource governance in Africa, which operates out of that office.
The appointment of a parliamentary liaison officer in Cape Town in 2011
saw engagement with the various parliamentary committees gather
momentum. This function was to track the Portfolio Committees on
Mining and Mineral Resources, Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs,
International Relations and Cooperation, Trade and Industry. Through
regular engagement with the researchers and MPs of those committees,
the liaison officer built up greater awareness of SAIIA’s work and its rele-
vance for the committees. Having a regular presence in Parliament facili-
tated the building of relations and allowed SAIIA to identify and respond
to key policy windows. Several issues stand out where SAIIA’s research
and engagement had some influence. However, the specific case study
identified in what follows is linked to the body of work that SAIIA has
built up over time around resource governance, specifically in the mining
sector.
Mining governance has been a central pillar of SAIIA’s work on
resources since 2007.
The program has tracked and analyzed mining companies and their
interaction with a variety of regulatory frameworks and stakeholders (com-
munities, policy-makers, and international frameworks) across Africa, giv-
ing it a particular comparative focus (which has also benefited from inputs
from the GARN, the continent-wide Governance of Africa’s Resources
Research Network, established and run by SAIIA) in the discussions in
South Africa on its mining framework. This is particularly relevant, as
SAIIA’s work on this topic has coincided with an in-depth reassessment of
the South African regulatory framework on mining and the developmental
and enabling role that the sector is expected to play in South African soci-
ety. The role of mining in the South African economy9 gained additional
prominence and notoriety following the Marikana incident in 2012 in
which 44 people died,10 most of them striking mineworkers.
9
Directly exported minerals and metals account for as much as 60% of all South African
export revenue, while the South African mining sector directly contributes around 6% to
South Africa’s GDP.
10
The fallout of the Marikana incident has been long term and has led to significant labor
unrest in the platinum sector, translating into losses of ZAR 8.7bn in employee wages and
ZAR 19.7bn in company earnings since the beginning of 2014. Moreover, Marikana has also
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA… 157
led to a fragmentation of the labor union movement in South Africa, placing labor stability
in jeopardy.
158 N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS
that exist across the continent, it has invested a great deal in developing
both an associate network of research contributors and specific cross-
continental research networks with thematic foci. SAIIA tries to bring
these networks into contact with its international networks to ensure
cross-pollination of ideas and enrichment of its research outputs.
Stakeholder engagement is an essential aspect of the program design
process, and in SAIIA this is a key task for the program managers who are
imbedded in each program. Engaging policy-makers is a key challenge for
most think tanks in the developing world. SAIIA has developed different
and flexible modes of engagement with different stakeholders to ensure
their participation in its work, from closed sessions with policy-makers to
more open platforms. Interaction with policy-makers at the outset of the
research design process is a preferred mode of engagement, because it
ensures relevance if not always buy-in.
may be much more viable and appropriate than the latter. In addition, the
cooperation with partners both inside and outside a country can provide
alternative avenues for input, discussion, and dissemination. However, the
process of constantly interrogating the outcomes of particular interactions
and initiatives must be part of the institutional system.
Conclusion
The most important lesson to be drawn from the two case studies in this
chapter is the centrality of relationships in SAIIA’s work. Developing trust
with various actors provides a platform for different views, and the fact
that it does not support a particular ideological monopoly is a precondi-
tion for a true exchange of ideas and debate.
Secondly, the correct choice of partners in the development of cross-
continental research networks and policy communities is essential. In this
context, one should recognize that both priorities and capacities of
network partners differ. Creating opportunities for dialogue takes time
and is a human resource–intensive process that requires ongoing engage-
ment and organizational gearing.
Thirdly, engaging with the policy process is challenging, and the impact
of interventions is on the whole only observable in the very long run and
difficult to attribute directly. This requires a careful and targeted design
approach, a clear stakeholder engagement framework, and ongoing moni-
toring of stakeholder responses as the policy cycle unfolds. It is also useful
to make space for innovation, ongoing learning, and a flexible approach.
Program funders need to be convinced of the value of continued engage-
ment and of long-term, flexible support.
These three factors are among an extensive list of preconditions that
need to be in place for successful policy impact to occur. The description
of the impact of SAIIA’s work in the South African mining case study
notes that work in this sector started in 2007. The gap between the start
of the project and the inclusion of SAIIA’s policy recommendations in the
Report on the Public Hearings on the Amended South African Mining
Charter spans a period of seven years—this fact is illustrative in its own
right. It is important to recognize that policy think tanks in the developing
world face particular and complex challenges. A sustainable funding base
that can support ongoing engagement is a continuous challenge, and this
is one area that African governments need to concern themselves more
with to ensure that African policy-making is indeed supported by the best
and most rigorous evidence available.
PART III
Asia
CHAPTER 9
James G. McGann
Overview
The politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) takes places in a
framework of a socialist republic run by a single party, the Communist
Party of China (CCP). The leadership of the CCP is stated in the
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Political Scenario
Throughout 2014 and into 2015, with its unprecedented intensiveness in
the post-Mao era, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was
undoubtedly the highlight of China’s domestic political landscape. With
the prelude of the life imprisonment of disgraced former Chong Qing
Party head and Politburo member Bo Xilai, the campaign caught the “hid-
den tiger” Zhou Yongkang, the former apex Politburo standing commit-
tee member, and uprooted his extensive power network. Moreover, the
high-profile takedown of former Politburo committee member and PLA
general Xu Caihou indicated Xi’s dedication to deepening and expanding
his anti-corruption campaign in the army. President Xi argued that clean-
ing up the 86 million-strong CCP was essential to retain its power,2 while
some commentators maintained that Xi’s campaign was a kill-two-birds-
1
Wikipedia, “The Politics of China,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Politics_of_China.
2
David Lague, Benjamin Kang Lim and Charlie Zhu, “Special Report: Fear and Retribution
in Xi’s Corruption Purge,” Reuters, December 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/12/24/us-china-corruption-purge-specialreport-idUSKBN0K200320141224.
166 J. G. MCGANN
Economic Scenario
In March 2015, during the Chinese National Congress and China’s politi-
cal consultative conference, the State Council’s report declared the major
macroeconomic targets. (There is a detailed comparison with 2014 in
Table 9.2.)
At 7%, China’s 2015 GDP target was the lowest of the previous eleven
years, according to the government report of the PRC Prime Minister, Li
Keqiang. Terming this the “New Normal,” Li addressed the intensifica-
tion of the downward pressure on the economy. However, he also defined
this “New Normal” as a shift from “growing fast” to “growing well,”
indicating the painful process of reform. He emphasized that the govern-
ment would still have plenty of maneuvers to maintain economic growth
within a reasonable interval, since any short-term strong stimulus had not
yet been exercised, which provided sufficient policy space in the future to
tackle the tougher headwind.
3
Shannon Tiezzi, “What’s Behind Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” The Diplomat, April
17, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/whats-behind-xis-anti-corruption-campaign.
4
Joseph A. Bosco, “The Implication of China’s Anti-Corruption Drive,” The Diplomat, July 15,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-implications-of-chinas-anti-corruption-drive.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW 167
The People’s Bank of China cut the interest rate twice, at the end of
2014 and the beginning of 2015, which was accompanied by a fiscal boost
from the government of CNY17.15 trillion spending in 2015. This indi-
cated a CNY1.62 trillion budget deficit, constituting 2.3% of GDP.5 The
loosening of monetary policy and expanding fiscal policy, though described
as stable and mild, still revealed the challenges in striking a balance between
economic growth and reform facing China in 2015.
According to the Central Economic Work Conference in December
2014, nine areas were to be the main focuses of economic reform in 20156:
5
Koh Gui Qing and Kevin Yao, “China Signals ‘New Normal’ with Higher Spending,
Lower Growth Target,” Reuters, March 5, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2015/03/05/china-parliament-idINKBN0M02FE20150305.
6
Tang Danlu, “China to Focus on 9 Reform Areas in 2015,” Xinhua Net, December 11,
2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/11/c_133848476.htm.
168 J. G. MCGANN
Foreign Policy
The relationship between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Brunei) is a mixture of ter-
ritorial disputes and economic cooperation. Although the courtship of
ASEAN against China on South China Sea territorial disputes has been a
heated issue in recent years, the level of conflicts could hardly escalate, due
to the fact that only some of the ASEAN members (Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Brunei) are involved in the disputes, with different levels of
engagement. Moreover, after the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum of Pacific Rim economies in 2014, more
attention shifted to the potential for regional economic cooperation, for
instance the establishment of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
aiming at bridging the financing gap to South Asian developing countries,7
together with a pledged US $20 billion loan to boost Southeast Asian
7
Yang Yi, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to Bridge Financing Gap, Xinhua Net,
June 29, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/29/c_133446999.
htm.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW 169
Table 9.3 (continued)
Alternative think tank: The Unirule Institute of Economics (UIE), established in 1993 in
Beijing, is one of China’s most influential independent think tanks. The Institute ranked
11th Best Think Tank with an Annual Operating Budget under US $5 million and 35th
on the Top Domestic Economic Policy Think Tanks, according to the University of
Pennsylvania’s 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. UIE conducts research
primarily in economics, governance, policy, and social sciences; it is dedicated to the open
exchange of ideas in economics in general, with a particular focus on institutional
economics. It is one of the few independent think tanks in China, in that it does not
receive financial assistance from any government entity, and relies on generous social
donations and provisional grants from donors abroad and within China. As a result,
transparency and credibility are two values closely upheld by the organization in order to
produce high-quality research products. UIE is home to some of the top economists,
sociologists, and jurists. The Institute not only exchanges its views with other scholars
through various social media platforms, it maintains close relationships with other
organizations as well.
8
Yang Yi, “China Pledges over 20-bln-USD Loans to Boost Southeast Asia Connectivity”,
Xinhua Net, November 13, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
11/13/c_133787970.htm.
9
David Gitter, “China’s Friendship Treaty: A Distraction from South China Sea
Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, November 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/
chinas-friendship-treaty-a-distraction-from-south-china-sea-diplomacy.
10
Ian Bremmer, “Is the China–Japan Relation ‘at Its Worst’?” Reuters, February 11, 2014,
http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2014/02/11/is-the-china-japan-relationship-
at-its-worst.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW 171
11
The economic downturn challenge to Abenomics and China’s social unrest.
12
Shannon Tiezzi, “At Long Last, a Xi-Abe Meeting. Now What?” The Diplomat, November
11, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/at-long-last-a-xi-abe-meeting-now-what.
13
Japan has 23,000 companies operating in China, with 10 million Chinese workers on
their payrolls. But Japanese companies are actively diversifying away from China now, with
foreign direct investment waning and Japan shifting to Southeast Asia in particular.
CHAPTER 10
Longdi Xu
Introduction
The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a think tank affiliated
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). It was the first think tank in China in the field of interna-
tional studies. Now, it endeavors to establish itself as a base for academic
research, a think tank on foreign affairs, a platform for track-two diplomacy,
and an opinion leader, with the goal of growing into a world-class think
tank on international studies.
L. Xu (*)
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Beijing, China
in the world, with a GDP surpassing all but the GDP of the United States.
However, China’s presence as a global power has not always been as
pronounced as it has been in recent times.
Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese economy began to take off as a
product of both domestic policy alterations and foreign policy trade agree-
ments. Domestically, massive policy reforms in rural regions in conjunc-
tion with overt political indications to instill confidence in policy credibility
and political stability bolstered confidence in economic trade.1 Germane
to this evolution of economic policy was the leadership of Deng Xiaoping,
who worked to shift the Chinese economy from the opposition to private
business pervasive during the Cultural Revolution to a supportive stance
that invited private-sector growth.2 This shift not only incited massive eco-
nomic growth in township and village enterprise, but also prompted a shift
towards trade openness.
This shift in China’s socio-economic profile is quite palpable. Many
Chinese are aware of China’s ascent socio-economically and, moreover,
are increasingly aware of China’s new role as an international global pow-
er.3 With this shift, think tanks in China have an increasingly important
role. Today, China claims the second largest number of think tanks in the
world after the United States. In contrast to think tanks in the West,
Chinese think tanks work closely with the government leadership and
influence policy through the upper echelons of government.4 Think tanks
are able to facilitate international exchanges and provide innovative policy
solutions for China’s strategy within their new global position. The collec-
tion of international policy think tanks has expanded as China has increased
its interactions with international society. This expansion, in large part, is
due to the need for better analysis of international affairs.5 All think tanks,
with the exception of the China Society for Strategy and Management,
operate within administrative hierarchies under either a State Council
1
Yaseng Huang, “How Did China Take Off,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 26,
No. 4 (Fall 2012): 149.
2
Ibid., 150.
3
Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars
Interact, China Leadership Monitor, No. 29 (Summer 2009): 2, http://www.brookings.
edu/research/articles/2009/08/summer-china-li.
4
Ibid.
5
David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure
and Process,” The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002): 575, http://www.jstor.
org/stable/4618770.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 175
History of CIIS
The Institute was founded in 1956 after the State Council approved a
proposal by then acting Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian to estab-
lish an institute to conduct studies on international issues, receiving the
name of the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS). It then delinked from CAS and was renamed
the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in 1958.
IIR was canceled during the Cultural Revolution. In 1973, Premier
Zhou Enlai instructed rebuilding of the institute, which was renamed the
Institute of International Studies (IIS), to meet the needs of increasing
diplomatic work after the breakthroughs in China–United States relations.
It assumed its current name, China Institute of International Studies, in
December 1986.
Because of the institutional reform and restructuring of the State
Council, the China Center for International Affairs, formerly a research
institution under the State Council, was incorporated into CIIS in 1998.
Now, CIIS also hosts four affiliates: China Foundation of International
Studies and Academic Exchange (CFISAE), China National Committee
for Pacific Economic Cooperation (PECC China), China Committee of
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP China),
and China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). These
four affiliates are very active in their respective fields of expertise.
So far, CIIS has witnessed ten successive presidents since its founding
in the 1950s: Meng Yongqian, Yao Zhongming, Li Huichuan, Zheng
Weizhi, Wang Shu, Du Gong, Yang Chengxu, Song Mingjiang, Ma
Zhengang, and the current president, Qu Xing. It is now located at the
6
Ibid., 580.
7
Ibid., 581.
176 L. XU
Organizational Structure
The staff of CIIS consists of nearly one hundred researchers and other
professionals. Among them are senior diplomats, leading area-study spe-
cialists, and preeminent experts in major fields of foreign affairs. Young
scholars at CIIS all have PhD or MA degrees in international relations or
related disciplines.
CIIS now has both research departments and research centers, with the
former being the main body of the Institute and the latter playing a rein-
forcing, complementary, and increasingly important role. CIIS has seven
area-focused research departments: Department for International and
Strategic Studies, Department for World Economy and Development,
Department for American Studies, Department for Asia-Pacific Security
and Cooperation, Department for European Studies, Department for
Developing Countries Studies, and Department for Eurasian Studies.
CIIS also has five topic- or theme-focused research centers: Center for
China–U.S. Relations, Center for Maritime Security and Cooperation,
Center for Global Governance, Center for International Energy Strategy,
and Center for Arms Control and International Security. Compared with
the departments, the centers are more loosely organized, with their
research staff coming from different departments on an ad hoc basis.
The International Exchange Office is responsible for the liaison affairs
and coordination of various international academic exchange activities
between CIIS and other organizations. The Research Management Office
is in charge of making rules and regulations on research programs, draw-
ing up research plans, managing research programs, organizing research
activities, keeping the research program archives, and undertaking the
administrative and routine affairs of the Academic Board of CIIS.
CIIS has a Library and Information Center that holds over 300,000
books. Its collection on international affairs is among the best in the coun-
try. CIIS hosts a prestigious academic journal, International Studies
(Chinese version) and its English version China International Studies.
The Editorial Department takes charge of the editing and publishing
affairs of the journal.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 177
Research Focus
CIIS now conducts research and analysis on a wide range of foreign policy
issues, with a focus primarily on medium- and long-term policy issues of
strategic importance, particularly those concerning international politics,
the global economy, international security, and China’s relations with the
rest of the world. This focus is also in line with the MoFA specification in
1979 that stated that the main task of the Institute was to conduct long-
term, strategic, and policy-oriented studies on international issues.
As already mentioned, the work of the research departments is mainly
country or area focused, covering domestic and regional situations (such
as the political, economic, and security situation), bilateral and multilateral
relations, and so on. In addition, just as the names of the research centers
indicate, they conduct studies on their respective topical or thematic mat-
ters and issues, such as China–United States relations, maritime security,
global governance, energy security, arms control and disarmament, cyber
security, and other issues concerning international security.
While the research departments are more country or area focused, the
research centers conduct transdisciplinary studies from multiple perspec-
tives. Therefore, there is a cross-cutting relationship between research
Research Products
CIIS research staff are encouraged to work on three kinds of research
products—internal reports, academic books and essays, and media arti-
cles—with the goal of producing and training multifaceted policy research-
ers and analysts.
Media Articles and Commentaries CIIS research staff are often inter-
viewed by various television programs, and invited to contribute short
articles and commentaries to mainstream newspapers and magazines.
CIIS staff have become frequent visitors to such newspapers as People’s
Daily and programs on CCTV (China Central TV Station), especially its
Channel 4 (international channel), Channel 13 (news channel), and
Channel 16 (English-language channel). In 2013, CIIS staff published
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 179
CIIS Report Since 2013, CIIS has published working papers and occa-
sional reports by its research staff on certain issues of special importance
or concern, in publications called CIIS Reports. This is also part of CIIS’s
efforts to catch up with foreign think tanks and to modernize itself in
accordance with international practice. As of the end of 2014, four CIIS
Reports had been published in pdf format in both Chinese and English:
Toward a New Type of Major-Country Relationship between China and the
U.S.: Challenges and Opportunities; In Pursuit of the “World Dream”: The
Progress and Prospects of Promotion of a Harmonious World; Cyber War
Preparedness, Cyber Arms and Controls United Statues; and Change in
EU’s International Status and Influence.
Responsible Protection
Sovereignty has been the founding principle of interstate relations since
the signing of the Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648. Closely related to the
sovereignty principle is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
countries, which has been another fundamental principle of contemporary
international relations and is prescribed in the United Nations (UN)
Charter. However, these are frequently violated in actual state-to-state
relations for various reasons, humanitarian intervention being one of
them. In 2001, Canada put forward a new term for humanitarian protec-
tion, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Later, this was written into the
“2005 World Summit Outcome Document” issued by the Summit
Conference in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the United
Nations. This claims that state sovereignty implies responsibility and that
states must protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes, namely
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The
Libyan War was seen as the first application of R2P in the real world.
10
It now has a special website and more details can be found at http://www.ciis.org.cn/
gyzz/index.html.
11
James McGann, 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia: Think Tanks
and Civil Societies Program, 2015), http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/8.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 181
12
Ruan Zongze, “China Should Advocate Responsible Protection”, Huanqiu, March 7,
2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-03/2501163.html.
13
Ruan Zongze, “Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World,” China International
Studies 34 (2012): 19–41. It can also be found at the CIIS website http://www.ciis.org.cn/
english/2012-06/15/content_5090912.htm.
182 L. XU
than any other states having the legitimacy to carry out humanitarian
intervention. Thirdly, the means of RP are strictly limited, which indicates
that diplomatic and political means must be exhausted before military
means are employed as the last resort. Fourthly, the purpose of “protec-
tion” is to mitigate rather than aggravate humanitarian catastrophe.
Fifthly, the RP sponsors should be responsible for the work of state-
rebuilding in the post-intervention and post-protection period. Sixthly,
the UN should establish mechanisms of supervision, outcome evaluation,
and post factum accountability, to ensure that the means, process, scope,
and results of RP are within its mandate. Therefore, the idea of RP deals
with the dilemmas inherent in R2P and offers a more comprehensive,
pragmatic, and reasonable framework than R2P.
After its proposal, an international conference on “Responsible
Protection: Building a Safer World” was held at CIIS in Beijing on
October 17–18, 2013. Experts from Australia, Denmark, Russia, India,
South Africa, Brazil, and China showed strong interest in the idea of RP
and had a heated and in-depth discussion about it.14 Two weeks later,
Ramesh Thakur, an ICISS15 commissioner in 2001–2002, wrote in The
Japan Times that “China is not an absolutist defender of state sovereignty
and has been trying for the past dozen years to engage with the responsi-
bility to protect (R2P) principle.” He summarized Ruan’s concept of RP
as having four facets.16 He concluded that “Looking at the Brazilian and
Chinese initiatives together, it is clear that the basis of a new consensus on
R2P does exist.” The idea of RP has the potential to be more influential
in the future.
14
CIIS held International Conference on “Responsible Protection: Building a Safer
World”, November 12, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-11/12/con-
tent_6454221.htm.
15
ICISS refers to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
16
It acknowledges individual state and collective global responsibility for the victims of
atrocities. The implementation of the protection agenda demonstrates responsibility to the
international community. It accepts responsibility for the actions of those doing the protec-
tion; that is, it introduces the requirement for an international accountability mechanism.
Finally, it shows that China is a responsible stakeholder in a rules-based global order. In
Ruan’s words, “China must have the courage to speak out and contribute ideas to the
world.” The idea of responsible protection will help China build “a just and reasonable new
international political order.” See Ramesh Thakur, “A Chinese Version of ‘Responsible
Protection’”, The Japan Times, November 1, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opin-
ion/2013/11/01/commentar y/a-chinese-version-of-responsible-protection/#.
UxPrSnmo7dU.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 183
Practices and Limitations
As far as CIIS’s achievements are concerned, they do not come without
cost or effort. In recent years, CIIS has carried out a series of profound
reforms and spent great effort on institution-building, especially in the
realm of academic research, which greatly facilitates its policy analysis and
contributes to its upgraded international ranking and reputation.
which now has a decisive say over many decisions on academic and research
matters. The research staff must run for the posts of heads of the research
departments and centers rather than being appointed by the leadership. As
development and reform are an endless cause, CIIS is expected to con-
tinue to improve, readjust, and perfect its practices in academic manage-
ment in the future.
senior fellow Xu Jian.17 CIIS itself also sponsors various research programs
every year in the light of the changing international situation. CIIS makes
full use of all of these research programs, through which its staff with
different research interests form collaborative teams and engage in innova-
tive and joint research from multiple perspectives.
17
A major research project is the highest-level research program with the highest esteem
among Chinese scholars, funded by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social
Science of China and focusing on the essential issues facing China in its development.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 187
Limitations
It is a fact that CIIS has experienced sound growth and harvested remark-
able achievements in recent years. However, there are also some inadequa-
cies or limitations to its growth. For example, although CIIS has already
strengthened its efforts in building and investing in its website in both
Chinese and English, there is still some room for improvement.
As mentioned earlier, CIIS and the Atlantic Council of the United States
conducted joint research and issued a joint report, China–US Cooperation:
18
The CIIS Forum is an important platform at CIIS for the foreign ministers and senior
officials of other countries to deliver speeches on their respective foreign and domestic poli-
cies, usually with a large audience, such as diplomats from the foreign embassies in Beijing,
journalists, businesses, students, and experts from professional and academic circles.
188 L. XU
Key to the Global Future, in both Chinese and English in 2013. The two
sides also held report launches and discussions in Washington and Beijing
in September and October, respectively, with large audiences, but the
bilingual publication cannot be found on the CIIS website, although its
revised edition appeared later in China International Studies (November/
December 2013).
As far as its website is concerned, CIIS in particular needs to add more
information about its research departments and centers, publish more of
its research products in pdf format, revise and perfect the layout of its
website, update information on its researchers and their publications, and
even add a blog section. Compared with the Chinese-language website,
the English one needs even more effort and investment. In particular,
CIIS needs to publish more of its research products in English, in order to
further increase its internationalism and visibility. Currently, CIIS does not
seem to be good at utilizing the new media like the internet. Nevertheless,
in the age of information, it has to reinforce its capability in this regard.
If the Global Go To Think Tank Program of the University of
Pennsylvania goes well for CIIS, its ranking in the survey conducted by
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) about think tanks within
China does not sound so good. Although one might hold some reserva-
tions about the SASS ranking in its definition, standards, and other factors
of a think tank,19 it sounds like an alert to CIIS. There might be some
reasons: for example, although CIIS researchers are very active interna-
tionally, this is not the case for them in the domestic circles of interna-
tional relations. Of course, during the past few years the situation has been
constantly improving, with CIIS researchers attending and speaking at
more and more conferences on the domestic front. In the coming years,
with the implementation of CIIS’s reform measures, the situation is
expected to continue to improve. However, more efforts on the part of
CIIS staff are needed.
The international situation changes quickly and hot-spot international
issues need rapid responses and even instant answers. Compared with
some top international think tanks, CIIS sometimes seems to be slow in
19
For example, there is no denying that both Peking University (Beijing) and Fudan
University (Shanghai) and some other universities are prominent in China, but could they be
defined and regarded as think tanks? Compared with the definition and standards used by the
Global Go To Think Tank Program, the ranking presented by SASS is not so rigorous and
therefore less convincing than it originally sounded to the Chinese people.
EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD… 189
India: An Overview
James G. McGann
Overview
Politics in India takes place within the framework of its constitution, as
India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic, where the President
is the head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government.
India follows the dual polity system; that is, a double government which
consists of the central authority at the center and states at the periphery.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Domestic Scenario
The win of the Hindu nationalist party BJP led by Narendra Modi in the
2014 election marked a significant change in the Indian political land-
scape. Although against a history of religious manipulation by the BJP, the
government, led by Modi, made promises to shift the focus of Indian poli-
tics to economic growth.
1
M. Laxmikanth, Public Administration (India: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2011), 389–390.
2
Wikipedia, “Indian politics,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_India.
194 J. G. MCGANN
This first time that the BJP as a single, strong right-wing party took
control at a federal level without forming a coalition is remarkable con-
cerning the fragmentation of Indian politics due to its social structure. In
India there exists a great diversity of races, religions, and castes. It is argued
by some that people from poor backgrounds and lower castes in India,
instead of adopting socialism, would instead like to attain a higher posi-
tion under the religious and caste structure. This leads to the creation of
numerous local and national parties representing different religious and
social groups, which made it very difficult for the INC to promote a uni-
fied and coherent leftward mobilization and has caused Indian politics to
remain fragmented since 1989. However, with the election victory of the
BJP and Modi in 2014, many believed that a unified, strong single party
would be more helpful in achieving certain concrete developmental and
nationalist reforms.
During the first few months after Modi was elected President, the
developmental agenda substantially slowed down. Some commentators
were concerned about the BJP’s shift from pro-development to the reli-
gious issue. Some BJP members were trying to push a hard-right religious
agenda. Since BJP attained its position on the basis of its pro-development
and liberal economic vision, its potential shift of focus towards religious
issues (e.g., mass conversion to Hinduism) added uncertainty about
India’s future politics. The country’s ruling party has to deal with a series
of challenges, the first of which concerns the tax scheme. There have been
taxes levied at state borders which are regarded as hindering economic
growth, and a national goods and services tax has been proposed to create
a nationwide common market.3
The manufacturing–services dual development model also presents
some issues. More specifically, since China’s initial economic takeoff highly
depends on export-led, labor-intensive manufacturing industry, this could
hardly be mimicked by India due to the trend of technology advancement
that makes manufacturing industry less labor intensive. However, with a
world-class information technology (IT) industry, India is probably able
to create a dual path in both manufacturing and service industries to boost
its economy, though the huge number of insufficiently educated youngsters
(between 90 million and 110 million) remains a problem to be tackled.
3
The Economist, “A Chance to Fly,” The Economist, February 21, 2015, http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21644145-india-has-rare-opportunity-become-worlds-
most-dynamic-big-economy-chance-fly.
INDIA: AN OVERVIEW 195
Economic Scenario
The economy of India is the tenth largest in the world by nominal GDP
and the third largest by purchasing power parity (PPP).4 The country is
one of the G20 major economies, a member of BRICS (the other mem-
bers of which are Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa), and a develop-
ing economy among the top twenty global traders according to the World
Trade Organization.5
The Indian Finance Ministry projected the growth of the Indian econ-
omy to accelerate to 7.4% in fiscal year 2014–2015, compared with 6.9%
in the previous year. In an annual report, the International Monetary
Fund forecast that the Indian economy would grow by 7.5% in the
2015–2016 fiscal year, up from 7.2% in the previous year.6
India was the nineteenth-largest merchandise and the sixth largest ser-
vices exporter in the world in 2013; it imported a total of US $616.7
billion worth of merchandise and services in 2013, as the twelfth-largest
merchandise and seventh largest services importer.7 The agriculture
sector is the largest employer in India’s economy, but contributes a
4
International Monetary Fund, “India: Economy Stabilizes, but High Inflation, Slow
Growth Key Concerns,” IMF Survey, February 20, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car022014a.htm.
5
World Trade Organization, “World Trade Report 2013,” World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr13_e.htm.
6
Asit Ranjan Misra, “Economic Growth Slows to 7%, Sets Stage for RBI Rate Cut,” Live-
mint, September 1, 2015, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/LIC6WUEiLIG5feOewYC
4nL/Indias-Q1-GDP-growth-at-7.html.
7
World Trade Organization, “Modest Trade Growth Anticipated 2014 and 2015
Following Two Year Slump,” WTO Press Release, April 14, 2014, https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres14_e/pr721_e.htm.
196 J. G. MCGANN
International Relations
India–China relations could be best described as “competition and coop-
eration.” The cooperation side mainly lies in the burgeoning economic
relations, counter-terrorism, and the Middle East issue based on more
frequent dialogue, while certain conflicting factors exist such as the long-
standing border dispute, the Tibetan problem, and, most significantly,
each nation’s relation with a third party, which has created considerable
anxiety for the other. For instance, China is highly concerned about India’s
8
The Economic Times, “Agriculture’s Share in GDP Declines to 13.7% in 2012–13,” The
Economic Times, August 30, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-
08-30/news/41618996_1_gdp-foodgrains-allied-sectors.
9
Government of India, “India’s Fiscal Budget 2012–2013,” Government of India.
10
Wikipedia, “Economy of India,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy_of_India.
11
The Economist, “A Chance to Fly.”
INDIA: AN OVERVIEW 197
relation with Japan and the United States, while the China–Pakistan rela-
tion has been closely monitored by India. Moreover, the shrinking bilat-
eral trade (from 74 billion in 2011 to 65 billion in 2013) and India’s 31
billion trade deficit to China have incurred further uncertainties in the
bilateral economic cooperation outlook.
The US–India–China relation is a complex, dynamic triangle. On the
one hand, the United States would like to see a stable China–India rela-
tionship, especially given other tensions in Asia and the world. Furthermore,
it will not necessarily mind if Chinese investment in India leads to a better
Indian economy and, in particular, infrastructure that can rebound to the
benefit of American business as well. On the other hand, the United States
would not like to see China and India grow too close, China dominate the
Indian economy, or for the two countries to form a tag team—with Russia
possibly in tow as well—in multilateral fora (Table 11.2).12
12
Tanvi Madan, “The Modi-Xi Summit and China-India Relations,” The Brookings Insti-
tute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/09/16-modi-xi-summit-and-
china-india-relations.
CHAPTER 12
Arvind Gupta
Introduction
India has a long tradition of strategic thinking dating back several millennia.
One of the greatest Indian thinkers of all time, Chanakya, also known as
Kautilya, wrote his magnum opus Arthashastra way back in 321 BC on
the art of governance. This important treatise, which is being revived
today as part of global heritage along with other Indian ancient texts on
statecraft, continues to inform Indian strategic thinking. However, centu-
ries of colonization affected the process of natural evolution of strategic
thinking in India. Most of the ancient knowledge was either lost in obliv-
ion or fell into disuse, allowing some of the colonial masters to claim that
India did not have a tradition of strategic thinking. This view was popular
even in the 1990s, when George Tanham alleged that Indian elites showed
(in the past) “little evidence of having thought coherently and systemati-
cally about national strategy.”1
1
George K Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 1992).
A. Gupta (*)
Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, India
2
For a brilliant institutional biography of IDSA and the circumstances leading to its birth
and growth as a think tank of repute in the Indian setting, see K. Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in
Retrospect,” Strategic Analysis, Vol 35, No 4, July 2011, 719–738.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 201
post–Cold War period there has also been a mushrooming of think tanks
in India, some of them sponsored by business houses, engaged in the busi-
ness of analyzing, influencing, and shaping public policy.
In an impressive essay in 2009, an American scholar, Daniel Markey,
acknowledged the growing salience of think tanks in India’s foreign pol-
icy, despite the challenges they face.3 Some of these challenges are in
attracting and retaining talent, in accessing critical information to conduct
relevant policy research, and in combating initial suspicion of the foreign
policy-making establishment about possible leaking of official secrets if
think tanks are allowed to play a larger role in such a critical area. In
Markey’s article, special mention was made of the Ministry of External
Affairs outsourcing discrete analytical tasks to IDSA, which showed that
the compulsion to harness the potential of think-tanks, as well as their
relevance in governmental circles, is growing. Against this setting, it is use-
ful to analyze the role played by IDSA as a think tank in the country’s
overall processes of foreign and security policy-making.
3
Daniel Markey, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software,’” Asia Policy 8 (2009):
73–96, restricted access at http://www.nbr.org/Publications/Asia_policy/AP8/
AP8_Markey_India.pdf.
202 A. GUPTA
Initial Phase
It is a truism that an institution aiming at informing and shaping public
policy will have to constantly navigate its way through challenges emanat-
ing from the prevailing socio-political and economic ecosystem in which it
operates. During the initial days after independence, when India had
opted for a democratic polity with socialist leanings, the system of admin-
istration exhibited the same old reflexes of the British imperial system—
emphasis on secrecy, unwillingness to interact with anybody outside the
system, and an inertial distaste for transparency. It was natural, therefore,
for IDSA to struggle its way through in order to carve out a respectable
space for itself in the teeth of bureaucratic/systemic stiffness, indifference,
and non-cooperation.
Anecdotal recollections of those associated with the IDSA during the
1970s and 1980s would suggest that after setting up the Institute, the
armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy did not cooperate with IDSA to
harness, let alone enhance, its research potential. The armed forces refused
to send their officers to serve in the Institute for fear of contaminating
them with civilian ideas through their interactions with non-servicemen.
There was a similar attitude prevailing in the Foreign Office. More impor-
tantly, the overall environment at the military-bureaucratic level, a func-
tion of the wider socio-political condition which emphasized secrecy and
inflexibility, discouraged sharing of information and ideas between gov-
ernment officials and researchers outside the system. The inertial resis-
tance to sharing official records with researchers for any worthwhile study
of governmental action in the past still persists in the Indian bureaucratic
system today, with lesser intensity, as will be discussed later. Interestingly,
all this happened when the leadership of IDSA was being drawn from the
ranks of civilian bureaucracy, either serving or retired.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 203
Post-1990s
The situation began to turn for the better as the overall political situation
at the domestic and external levels changed over time. Once the Institute
weathered the opposition from bureaucracy and services in the 1970s and
established its reputation as an independent and useful resource, it inspired
the healthy respect of governmental agencies. There was a favorable
response to its offer of providing training to government servants and
officers from the armed forces on strategic issues of relevance to public
policy-making, especially in matters concerning defense and national secu-
rity. As interactions grew between policy-makers at various levels, in
bureaucracy and services, and researchers at the Institute, there was greater
mutual appreciation of each other’s efforts, leading to greater acceptability
of the Institute in governmental circles. At the same time, IDSA’s inter-
face with academia and the media gradually dispelled negative notions
about it as a mere appendage of the government.
As the pall of the command economy began to lift following the end of
the Cold War and India opened up its economy, there was an overall empha-
sis on openness in Indian society and polity. The revival of the democratic
spirit, after the brief unpleasant interlude of the emergency years (exactly
21 months, between June 25, 1975 and March 21, 1977), also provided
the right ambience for profound changes in Indian society.5 The effect of
5
The emergency years (1975–1977) had a constricting impact on the functioning of the
Institute and led to divisions within its executive council (EC). There was a move to encour-
age one of the EC members, a reputed academic and a vocal opponent of the emergency, to
resign from the EC, apparently under pressure from certain quarters in the government,
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 205
Objective and Mission
Designed as a think tank funded by the government, IDSA had a humble
and modest beginning. Its mandated mission was to provide objective
assessments of issues relating to national and international security. As per
its memorandum, the objective of the organization is “to initiate study,
discussion and research on problems of National Security and impact of
Defence measures on economic, social and political processes,” and to
promote research and exchange of information on “defence studies and
analyses, strategy, disarmament and international relations.”6 Over the
years, the ambit of research and analysis at IDSA has expanded. In tune
with the times, along with traditional hard security issues, it has added
non-traditional security issues as an important area of research.
The vision statement of the Institute adopted in 2007 brought further
clarity to its activities and emphasized policy-oriented research, training
and capacity-building, and public education. IDSA has played a crucial
role in shaping India’s foreign and security policies. Its contribution has
been particularly visible in areas related to nuclear weapons, military expen-
diture, and conventional and non-conventional threats to the country.
which was resented by IDSA members. Ultimately, the concerned member, even though he
was asked to continue, did resign, taking exception to that very move. This incident was the
only one where an aborted attempt was made to influence IDSA’s EC. However, this was an
exception and in no way affected the independence and autonomy of the Institute.
6
As per Art 3 (i) and (ii), Memorandum of Association Rules and Regulations, IDSA, New
Delhi.
206 A. GUPTA
Structure
IDSA is funded entirely by India’s Ministry of Defence. However, this in
no way affects its independence. It is governed by a neutral and non-
partisan Executive Council (EC), whose members include distinguished
personalities from all walks of life. The EC consists of both elected mem-
bers, including the president, usually a senior minister in the government,
and a few ex officio members from the government (conventionally serv-
ing secretaries from foreign and defense ministries), the director general,
the deputy director general, and a representative of the research staff.
The elected members of the EC are chosen for two-year terms at the
Annual General Body Meeting (AGBM), consisting of life and “ordinary”
members of the Institute. There are 271 voting members in the AGBM
today; they come from all walks of life, including academics, journalists,
serving or retired bureaucrats, and servicemen, all of them distinguished
for their contribution to strategic affairs. The EC, so chosen, is not answer-
able to the government and plays a critical role in ensuring the smooth
functioning of the Institute in an independent manner. It is fully empow-
ered to take decisions pertaining to personnel, establishment, administra-
tion, and so on. Its activities are supported by committees covering
different aspects of the Institute’s work, including the Human Resources
and Finance Committee, Research Committee, Membership Committee,
and Campus Development Committee. In case any of the EC members
dies, resigns, or is found to be unsuitable, the EC has the power to nomi-
nate somebody to fill the post till an election is held. The independence
and autonomy enjoyed by the Institute are a function of the unencum-
bered freedom the EC enjoys in charting out the research agenda, as well
as the overall functioning of the Institute.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 207
Autonomy
Although IDSA is funded by India’s Ministry of Defence, it has since its
inception protected and maintained its autonomy. The government does
not interfere with the setting up of the Institute’s research agenda, nor
does it censor its content. IDSA, in fact, does not hold a single view. Its
scholars are encouraged to express their views freely. The structure of the
Institute helps it to maintain its autonomy. The EC, as has been noted,
is fully empowered to take decisions pertaining to personnel, establish-
ment, administration, and so on. The IDSA director decides the research
agenda. Working with the government has been a challenging experi-
ence for the Institute; however, there has been a conscious effort to
strike a balance between maintaining institutional autonomy and respect-
ing the genuine concerns of the government in matters concerning
national security. The system has functioned well and is a model for
other government-funded institutes as to how best to maintain their
autonomy.
208 A. GUPTA
Respect for Diversity
The issue of autonomy is best illustrated by the diversity of the views
obtaining at IDSA on any theme of research undertaken by its scholars at
any point in time. The Institute neither encourages uniformity of thinking
not has a singular view on any issue. It has never sought to toe any particu-
lar line, least of all the official line, on any issue, in a bid to retain its finan-
cial grant from the government. On the contrary, thanks to the democratic
culture nourished zealously by the country’s leadership, despite objections
from sections within the government, the founding members of IDSA—
some of them in high positions in the decision-making structure—cham-
pioned the cause of independent thinking, respected differences of
opinion, and encouraged constructive criticism of governmental policies.
The first evaluation committee’s report within five years of the Institute’s
establishment acknowledged the fact that IDSA, through its independent
stance on sensitive issues, had caused embarrassment to the government.
It went on to mention the following:
7
Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 727.
8
Ibid.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 209
1. East Asia
2. West Asia
3. South Asia
4. South East Asia and Oceania
5. North America
6. Europe and Eurasia
7. Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, and United Nations
8. Nuclear Arms and Arms Control
9. Internal Security
10. Military Affairs
11. Non-traditional Security
12. Strategic Technologies
13. Defence Economics and Industry
Strategy
There is a continuing effort at the Institute to adopt the right strategies to
stay relevant in an increasingly competitive matrix, where many private
think tanks are conducting themselves with a great deal of enthusiasm, zeal,
and flexibility to make their presence felt in a highly dynamic strategic envi-
ronment. Both in terms of redefining the foci of research at the Institute in
response to the changing strategic milieu and adopting new methods to
disseminate the output among the larger strategic community, IDSA has
displayed a remarkable capacity to adapt to change. Whether it is through
regular interface with policy-makers, think tanks, or interaction with influ-
ential members of the strategic community, the Institute has always sought
to keep itself abreast of the requirements of decision-makers and tried its
best to furnish them with an unbiased and objective assessment of the chal-
lenges they are facing and the alternatives they may consider. As regards its
mandate to disseminate its research findings, IDSA has made a continuous
effort to take advantage of the latest technology to reach out to the widest
possible audience.10 Some of its strategies are outlined in what follows.
9
The journal can be accessed at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20#.
UrgZUfQW3sE or http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis.
10
As a measure of success of the Institute’s electronic outreach strategy, IDSA’s website
drew more than 1 million visitors, 2.2 million page views, and more than 80 million hits in
2013. As per the leading web analytics service provider Alexa’s traffic estimates, based on
data from its global traffic panel, IDSA has even overtaken some of the leading think tanks
like Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 211
Emphasis on Dissemination
For the dissemination of research outcomes, IDSA organizes regular
workshops and seminars where scholars present their findings in an open
forum subject to critical scrutiny by peers and experts. It has the help of its
publications, which are circulated widely to disseminate the final outcomes
of research. The faculty members also write regularly in vernacular and
English-language print media, and appear in audio-visual media as well to
debate issues relating to their areas of research.
Building Networks
The Institute has signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with more
than thirty think tanks around the world engaged in research on security
and international affairs. Some of them are affiliated to governments in
different countries. This helps IDSA to engage in track-two and track-1.5
dialogues with these partner organizations. Inputs from such bilateral
conversations are fed into track one on a regular basis. These interactions
enable linkages among strategic communities and provide an opportunity
for researchers of these institutes to strengthen their understanding of
bilateral and international issues. At the internal level, within India, IDSA
has also tried to build linkages with other think tanks engaged in strategic
research. It is beginning to collaborate with Indian universities.
212 A. GUPTA
Impact Assessment
It is not always easy to assess the impact or influence of a think tank on
public policy. The accomplishments of think tanks are often measured in
terms of actual changes in public policy that have been occasioned by an
institute’s inputs. However, as noted by some observers, “such output
measures are also much more elusive and difficult to develop” and “there
is no equivalent of a DNA test to declare the parentage with a comparable
degree of certainty!”11
In fact, determining the extent to which a think tank or group of think
tanks influences a particular policy decision is a daunting methodological
task. Sometimes, sections within the government and particular think
tanks share similar policy perspectives and their support to each other
helps shape public policy in one way or another. In some other cases, think
tanks are effectively used by policy-makers to leverage and promote a cer-
tain policy line. During such a process of surrogacy, think tanks bring in
unmistakable influence in the way policies are framed and articulated.
For organizations like IDSA, which is constantly reviewing governmen-
tal policies and helping the process of policy-making, it is difficult and
counterproductive to claim its influence in emphatic terms. Therefore, it
11
Murray Weidenbaum, “Measuring the Influence of Think Tanks,” Society 47 (2010):
135, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12115-009-9292-8#page-1.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 213
12
Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 719–738.
214 A. GUPTA
Similarly, the centers covering South Asia and West Asia were tasked
with the job of looking at foreign policy issues in India’s immediate as well
as extended neighborhoods. The researchers at IDSA looked at the prob-
lems affecting India’s relationship with different countries and suggested
measures to address them through an open critique of governmental poli-
cies. It has been the endeavor at the Institute to enrich research activities
through arranging regular interface with policy-makers, encouraging
researchers to undertake field trips and defend their findings and analyses
in open seminars.
IDSA has been an open institution encouraging multidisciplinary
research. Its research faculty includes academics, diplomats, military per-
sonnel, media persons, economists, and social scientists. There is a healthy
turnover of research staff. In addition, the Institute hosts scores of interns
and visiting fellows from within and outside India every year. It is open to
fresh ideas. IDSA’s research output goes through strict peer review to
maintain high standards. Over the years, it has nurtured the Indian strate-
gic community. Many of its faculty have gone on to head new think tanks.
Many others have taken teaching assignments in India and abroad. IDSA
is also well regarded by students at Indian universities. The Institute’s
website has emerged as a major resource for information and analysis on
Indian positions on key issues.
Constraints
IDSA faces a number of constraints in its work. Some of the constraints or
challenges have already been discussed, particularly the challenge of work-
ing with the Indian government, which funds the Institute’s activities. As
previously mentioned, IDSA has kept pace with the changing times. In the
case of disagreement with the government, it has stuck zealously to its
autonomous agenda and, through its effective communication strategy,
emphasized the need for a think tank to be neutral and mindful of its
responsibility to provide objective analyses of national security issues. The
approach of the government, as a stakeholder, has changed over time, and
there is a greater willingness to work with think tanks like IDSA through
increased interaction and sponsorship of research in critical areas of inter-
est for policy-makers.
Nevertheless, despite such a positive shift in the government’s approach
to think tanks, there are several issues of concern. Among these, the most
important is the inability of the government in India to share its historical
216 A. GUPTA
Conclusion
India’s growing profile as an emerging power has helped IDSA raise its
own profile nationally and internationally. From the 1990s, ever since
India liberalized its economy and clocked up around 8% GDP growth for
almost a decade, there have been significant changes in Indian society and
polity. Growth in the economy has led to business houses taking an inter-
INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES… 217
est in strategic affairs, and some of them have established their own think
tanks engaged in risk analysis and the overall study of the global economic
and security environment. The media has also become more influential
and its interest in matters related to defense and security has grown sub-
stantially. With a demand for greater transparency in the public sphere,
and the passing of the RTI, there has been a greater appreciation of the
value of openness in the way policies are being formulated and imple-
mented. Therefore, policy-makers are also gradually shedding their inhibi-
tions and beginning to deal with think tanks. There is a great deal of
hunger in the media and general public to know more about Indian posi-
tions on strategic issues. Moreover, the evolving global geostrategic situa-
tion, with greater strategic uncertainties surrounding developments in
East and Southeast Asia, as well as ongoing turmoil in the energy-rich
West Asian and North African regions, the governmental interest in inde-
pendent research is likely to grow.
Although the rate of India’s economic growth has declined in recent
years, the long-term forecast for the country is pretty optimistic. Therefore,
the positive changes taking place in the society and polity are unlikely to
be reversed. There is thus a greater opportunity today for think tanks to
increase their relevance through focused research and networking with
business, media, non-governmental organizations, and governmental
agencies. As an autonomous body, funded by the government, IDSA has
a unique advantage to sustain its importance as a leading think tank in
India.
Against this setting, IDSA has positioned itself well, and played a key
role in interacting with policy-makers and raising awareness about strate-
gic issues among the public. The Institute has been able to do so success-
fully despite the fact that it is fully funded by the government and it has
taken a conscious decision not to accept non-public funding. The
objectivity of IDSA publications as well as their quality have ensured that
the Institute is seen as a respectable think tank within India and abroad.
The Institute will continue to play its due role in line with its mandate in
the years to come.
CHAPTER 13
Singapore: An Overview
James G. McGann
Overview
Singapore, officially the Republic of Singapore, is an island country which
became independent from the United Kingdom in 1963. Singapore pro-
gressively turned into one of the world’s most prosperous countries, with
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Economic Situation
Singapore has achieved great economic success for four reasons: its strate-
gic location, a natural harbor, being open to foreign trade and investment,
and having a small and efficient government.4
However, Singapore has one of the highest income inequalities among
developed countries, since it has the world’s highest percentage of mil-
lionaires, with one out of every six households having at least US $1 mil-
lion in disposable wealth.5 The country has no minimum wage, since it is
believed that would negatively affect its competitiveness. Singapore also
rejected the need for a generous welfare system.6
2
World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Singapore,” World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s267_sum_e.pdf.
3
Seth Mydans, “Lee Kuan Yew, Founding Father and First Premier of Singapore, Dies at
91,” The New York Times, March 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/
world/asia/lee-kuan-yew-founding-father-and-first-premier-of-singapore-dies-at-91.html?
module=Notification&version=BreakingNews®ion=FixedTop&action=Click&contentC
ollection=BreakingNews&contentID=31462333&pgtype=Homepage.
4
The Economist, “Why Singapore Became an Economic Success,” The Economist,
March 26, 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/
economist-explains-23.
5
Shibani Mahtani. “Singapore No.1 For Millionaires-Again”. Wall Street Journal Southeast
Asia blog. June 1, 2012. http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2012/06/01/sin-
gapore-no-1-for-millionaires-again/?mg=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.
wsj.com%252Fsearealtime%252F2012%252F06%252F01%252Fsingap
ore-no-1-for-millionaires-again%252F.
6
The Economist, “The Stingy Nanny,” The Economist, February 13, 2010. http://www.
economist.com/node/15524092.
222 J. G. MCGANN
Foreign Relations
Singapore’s foreign policy is focused on security in Southeast Asia and its
surrounding territories. It is the one of the founding members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since the economy of
Singapore is closely linked to the Southeast Asian region, it is a supporter
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area.10
One of the most controversial issues concerns a sovereignty dispute
between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca, a small island located
8 miles off the eastern coast of Johor and 28 miles off the eastern coast of
Singapore. On May 23, 2008, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
7
Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Monetary Policy,” Singapore Government Securities,
http://www.sgs.gov.sg/The-SGS-Market/Monetary-Policy.aspx.
8
US Library of Congress, “Singapore Trade,” Country Studies, http://countrystudies.
us/singapore/36.htm.
9
Jon C. Ogg, “Remaining Countries with AAA Credit Ratings,” NBC News, August 8,
2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44020687/ns/business-world_business/t/remain-
ing-countries-aaa-credit-ratings/#.VSQ2-PnF9rM.
10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, “ASEAN,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://
www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/asean.html.
SINGAPORE: AN OVERVIEW 223
Number of universities: 32
Number of think tanks: 6
% of think tanks out of regional total (Southeast Asia): 6/126, 4.76%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2010–2014):
2010: 46
2011: 46
2012: 46
2013: 51
2014: 46
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide, including US (2014):
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (78)
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (80)
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (92)
Number of top think tanks by area of research;
Top 80 domestic economic policy think tanks: 1
Top 30 energy and resource policy think tanks: 1
Top 65 environment think tanks: 1
Top 85 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 3
Top 80 international development think tanks: 1
Top 50 social policy think tanks: 1
Top transparency and good governance think tanks: 1
Case studies
Top think tank: Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is consistently one of
the top-ranked think tanks in Asia, and among the 150 best in the world. In 2014, SIIA
was ranked the 78th best think tank in the world, climbing up two ranks from 2013.
It is an independent organization dedicated to research, analysis, and discussion of
regional and international issues. The institution aims to make Singapore a more
cosmopolitan and global society through research, policy work, and public education on
international affairs. SIIA is a founding member of the influential ASEAN Institutes of
Strategic and International Studies Network, and works with other think tanks to advise
government and decision-makers.
Alternative think tank: The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is an institute
within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). IDSS’s research covers
mainly maritime security, military studies, military transformations, the regional security
architecture program, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Asia, and the United States.
decided that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca. This decision
resolved the determination of the maritime boundary between the two
countries.11
11
Rusdi Omar, “Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Issues and Strategies,” Universiti Utara
Malaysia/Adelaide University, http://www.academia.edu/1412271/MALAYSIA-SINGA-
PORE_RELATIONS_ISSUES_AND_STRATEGIES.
224 J. G. MCGANN
12
The Economist, “After the Patriarch,” The Economist, March 28, 2015, http://
www.economist.com/news/asia/21647333-island-state-mourns-its-founding-father-its-
politics-changing-after-patriarch.
CHAPTER 14
Introduction
The role of non-state actors in international politics has become more
prominent with the emergence of a number of organizations, think tanks,
and track-two networks that are able to influence policies and interna-
tional relations. Increasingly these actors, through their knowledge and
advocacy, have been able to affect policies and help shape the nature of
interstate relations. The influence that these new actors exert reflects the
salience of regarding them as independent variables in international
1
Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35.
2
The term “track two” was coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville, who was a US diplomat.
He used the term in contrast to track-one diplomacy, which referred to diplomatic efforts to
resolve conflicts through the official channels of government. See James Notter and John
McDonald, “Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace,” USIA
Electronic Journals 1, no. 19 (1996): 32–36.
THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA… 227
Karthik Nachiappan, Enrique Mendizabal and Ajoy Datta, “Think Tanks in East and
4
Southeast Asia: Bringing Politics Back into the Picture,” ODI Research and Policy in
Development Paper (2010): 22.
228 M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.
Created in 1994, the ARF remains the first and only inclusive security
arrangement serving more or less the entire Asia Pacific. It provides a dip-
lomatic avenue to hold multilateral discussions on regional problems,
share information, promote confidence-building, and enhance the prac-
tice of transparency. Preventive diplomacy has been a controversial subject
within the ARF from its inception as the second stage of a three-stage
process whereby it would move from confidence-building to preventive
diplomacy measures to becoming a force for conflict resolution. In the
ASEAN context, preventive diplomacy is defined as “consensual diplo-
matic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all
directly involved parties:
6
ASEAN, “ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” ASEAN, May 17–18,
2001, http://www.asean.org/archive/arf/8ARF/SOM-Vietnam/Doc-6.pdf.
230 M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.
7
ASEAN, “Joint Media Statement of the 20th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Retreat,”
ASEAN, February 26–27, 2014, http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_
releases/agencies/mti/press_release/P-20140227-1/AttachmentPar/0/file/MTI_press-
release.pdf.
8
Nay Pyi Taw, “Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit: Moving Forward in
Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community,” ASEAN, May 11, 2014, http://www.
asean.org/images/documents/24thASEANSummit/24th%20ASEAN%20Summit%20
Chairman’s%20Statement.pdf.
THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA… 233
9
These think tanks were Institute of Policy Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam;
Cambodia Development Research Institute; Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(Indonesia); National Economic Research Institute (Lao PDR); Institute of Malaysian and
International Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia; National ASEAN Free Trade Unit,
Myanmar Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development (representative’s for-
mer affiliation, now retired); Philippine Institute for Development Studies; Singapore
Institute of International Affairs; Thailand Development Research Institute; and Institute for
East Sea Studies, The Development Academy of Vietnam.
THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA… 235
a
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Pacific Forum CSIS, “Joint Study on Best Practices
and Lessons Learned in Preventive Diplomacy,” undertaken for the benefit of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, funding provided by the ASEAN Secretariat (2008)
b
ASEAN Regional Forum, “Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan,” ASEAN, June 10, 2011, http://aseanre-
gionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF%20Chairman’s%20Statements%20and%20Reports/The%20
Eighteenth%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum,%202010-2011/2%20-20ARF%20Work%20Plan%20
on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf
236 M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.
Conclusion
The chapter has discussed two specific attempts by RSIS to influence
regional policy debates, by drawing on its organizational strength and
utilizing its extensive networks. The first involved the work of RSIS to
influence the development of preventive diplomacy within the ARF. This
was done through a joint study that RSIS undertook with the Pacific
Forum CSIS, on behalf of the ARF, to evaluate how selected interna-
tional and regional organizations incorporate preventive diplomacy into
their institutional framework. Based on the findings, the team made spe-
cific recommendations for the institutionalization of preventive diplo-
macy in the ARF.
The second case study examined how RSIS shaped policy debates
around the completion and implementation of the AEC 2015.
Commissioned by the HLTF-EI, RSIS worked with ISEAS to produce a
vision paper, which assessed the progress in the AEC 2015, analyzed the
regional and global challenges confronting the region, as well as recom-
mended policies for the AEC beyond 2015. The policy relevance and
THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA… 237
impact of both studies at the track-one level were also discussed. The
choice of RSIS as one of the two institutions involved in both projects
derived from its contributions to academic and policy dialogue on regional
and multilateral cooperation, as well as from RSIS’s strong familiarity with
the cooperative process within ASEAN.
This discussion should be tied to the broader theme of how think tanks
can shape states’ policies, and raises the question of how one should assess
the policy work of track two or think tanks. Sheldon W. Simon, in his
study on the role of CSCAP, the premier track-two network on security
cooperation in the region, has argued that epistemic communities “are
successful if they:
Going by these criteria, one can assess the work of RSIS as a think tank
and a part of the epistemic community in the region in three ways. The
first is by looking at the research activities that RSIS has conducted over
the years and their impact on track-one and track-two diplomacy. The
second is by analyzing whether in these activities new concepts and pro-
posals have been produced and brought to the attention of policy-makers
at the domestic and regional levels. And finally, it should be assessed
whether the proposals generated by RSIS have sparked international inter-
est, as well as had considerable impact to become part of the discourses
found within and outside the region. This three-step process can help to
clarify and focus on key questions that would arise when we assess further
the nature of the think tank work undertaken by RSIS.
10
Sheldon W. Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific: The CSCAP Experience,” The Pacific Review 15, no. 2 (2002): 167–200. In listing
the four criteria, Simon cites Edward C. Luck, “Blue Ribbon Power: Independent
Commissions and UN Reform,” International Studies Perspectives 1, no. 1 (2000): 89–104.
CHAPTER 15
James G. McGann
Described as the “Miracle of the Han River,” South Korea has grown into
a high-income advanced economy, and plays an important role in the
global economy. However, it also faces many challenges, especially with
North Korea on its northern border, in issues involving security and
regional politics. Think tanks, mostly government affiliated, serve to pro-
vide policy recommendations in the face of such security concerns. This
chapter sheds light on two distinct think tank models that have both con-
tributed to shaping the South Korean policy agenda. In the first case study,
Sook-Jong Lee demonstrates how independent non-profit think tanks
such as the East Asia Institute, despite having limited financial resources,
have produced quality policy recommendations to the South Korean gov-
ernment, proposing “complex diplomacy,” “co-evolutionary strategy,”
and “middle power diplomacy” in the face of Chinese and US influence.
In contrast, the second case study examines how the Institute of Foreign
Affairs and National Security (IFANS), a government-affiliated and top-
ranking foreign policy and security think tank, shaped the development of
a new policy agenda and influenced the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security
Summit, offering various policy initiatives in nuclear disarmament in the
Korean peninsula (Table 15.1).
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Overview
Following Japan’s surrender to the United States in 1945, South Korea
regained its independence. After World War II, a democratic-based
government for the Republic of Korea (ROK) was installed in the south-
ern part of the Korean peninsula. At the same time, a communist-style
SOUTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW 241
Economic Situation
The Bank of Korea (BOK) is the central bank of South Korea and issuer of
South Korean won. Its primary purpose is price stability. After the 1997
financial crisis (known as the Asian financial crisis), the capital account in
South Korea was widely liberalized to a degree compared to advanced
economies in developed countries. Since then, South Korean monetary
policy has been increasingly dependent on the influence of capital flows on
market liquidity and the exchange rate.2
In March 2015, the Bank of Korea unexpectedly cut the policy rate by
25 basis points to 1.75%. The effect of this measure was to spur domestic
demand, avoid deflation, and put downward pressure on the South Korean
currency.3 Government spending in South Korea had constantly increased,
reaching KRW51889.40 billion in the fourth quarter of 2014. As a conse-
quence of economic policy by the South Korean government, household
debt has grown rapidly on the back of low borrowing costs and easier
mortgage rules that are intended to spur the property market and the
national economy.4
1
Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, South,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html.
2
The Bank of Korea. http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=792.
3
Lee Minji and Kim You Jin, “BOK Cuts Base Rate to Record Low 1.75 pct in Surprise
Move,” Yonhap News, March 12, 2015, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2015/
03/12/82/0503000000AEN20150312001454320F.html.
4
Kwanwoo Jun, “South Koreans Are on a Debt Binge,” The Wall Street Journal, February
25, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-are-on-a-debt-binge-1424920718.
242 J. G. MCGANN
South Korea joined the World Trade Organization in 1995 and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1996. Its
main economic partners are China, the European Union (EU), Japan,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States.5 South Korea is a highly export-
driven economy. In terms of trade structure, it has changed greatly.
Compared to 1971, in 2011 South Korea traded much more with emerg-
ing and developing countries. Its trade share with emerging economies
rose from 17.5% to 67%.6
South Korea is aggressively connecting its trade network by free trade
agreements (FTA). There are ten FTAs in effect with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chile, China, European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), EU, India, Peru, Singapore, Turkey, and the United
States.7
Foreign Relations
South Korea maintains diplomatic relations with more than 188 countries.
It is a member of the G20 and hosted the G20 Summit in Seoul in 2010.
South Korea is also a member of ASEAN, and has close connections with
China, EU, Japan, and the United States. Concerning international
disputes, it is worth remembering the following:
11
Scott A. Snyder, “South Korean Middle Power Diplomacy and the U.S. Rebalance,”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/03/24/
south-korean-middle-power-diplomacy-and-the-u-s-rebalance.
12
David Eunpyoung Jee, “Solving the THAAD Puzzle in Korea,” The Diplomat, April 7,
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/solving-the-thaad-puzzle-in-korea.
CHAPTER 16
Sook-Jong Lee
Introduction
While think tanks existed as vehicles for policy research throughout the
twentieth century, they only began to proliferate in the past few decades.
There are now almost 7000 think tanks in the world in more than 182
countries, a 26-fold increase since 1950.1 South Korea in particular has
experienced a rapid rise in the number of think tanks since the first few
institutes were established by the Park Chung-hee administration in the
1960s to support the national development program. After the democra-
tization of South Korea in 1987, the number of think tanks exploded
under the subsequent fairly elected governments. While sources vary on
1
James G. McGann, 2013 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia: Think
Tanks and Civil Societies Program, 2014), http://gotothinktank.com/
the-2013-global-go-to-think-tank-index-ggtti/
the exact number of think tanks in South Korea today, it is estimated that
more than 400 organizations are actively engaged in policy studies.2
The global think tank boom originated from the increasingly complex
changes in world politics which have arisen since the end of the Cold War.
Triggered by the three megatrends of globalization, democratization, and
the information technology (IT) revolution, power is increasingly diffuse
and issues more diverse.3 Now, world governments must cope not only
with their counterparts in other countries, but also with numerous other
non-state actors. Terrorism, climate change, human rights, cyber security,
and other emerging issues have been added to the traditional tasks of
national security and economic growth. This overwhelming challenge has
caused policy-makers around the world to turn to think tanks, the “bridge
between the knowledge and power,”4 a “vehicle for broader questions
about the policy process,”5 and the principal agent of “opinion mobiliza-
tion and unofficial diplomacy.”6 Providing relevant policy knowledge
“through collaboration with diverse public and private actors,” think tanks
can act as “filters and synthesizers that facilitate the identification of policy
issues, the design of policy solutions, and the implementation of and feed-
back on policy decisions,” and save state authorities from an “avalanche of
information.”7
As the role of autonomous think tanks has become more vital in post–
Cold War global politics, Seoul should have witnessed major growth in the
number of independent think tanks in South Korea. The modern phe-
2
Seon-Bin Kim, Policy Knowledge Ecology of South Korea [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung
Economic Research Institute, 2007); Won-taek Kang, In-hwi Park, and Hoon Jiang,
Possibilities of Korean Think Tanks [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research
Institute, 2006).
3
Lester M Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994.
4
James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, (New
York: The Free Press, 1991).
5
Diane Stone, “Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance,” in Think
Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew
Denham, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
6
Inderjeet Parmar, “Institutes of International Affairs: Their Roles in Foreign Policy-
Making, Opinion Mobilization and Unofficial Diplomacy,” in Think Tank Traditions: Policy
Research and the Politics of Ideas. ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2004).
7
James McGann, “Think Tanks: The Global, Regional and National Dimensions,” in
Think Tanks in Policy Making – Do They Matter?, ed. Andrew Rich, (Shanghai: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, 2011).
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 247
8
Seon-Bin Kim, Policy Knowledge Ecology of South Korea [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung
Economic Research Institute, 2007).
9
See Weaver and McGann (2002) for the typology of think tanks.
10
Hankyung Magazine, “Top 100 South Korean Think Tanks” [in Korean], Hankyung
Magazine, December 10, 2012. http://magazine.hankyung.com/business/apps/news?po
pup=0&nid=01&nkey=2012121300889000021&mode=sub_view.
11
Sook-Jong Lee, “Translating Research into Policy: The Experience of South Korea’s
East Asia Institute (EAI),” in Network of Democracy Research Institutes, Democracy Think
Tanks in Action: National Endowment for Democracy, Translating Research into Policy in
Young and Emerging Democracies (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy,
2013), 88–91, http://www.ned.org/docs/DemocracyThinkTanksinAction-full.pdf.
248 S.-J. LEE
Governmental think tanks also share this limitation, as they are consis-
tently consumed by “quick-response policy research” requested by the
government (Abelson 2014, 137). Only independent, non-profit think
tanks that are not swayed by the influence of certain political factions,
government, or particular interest groups are able to assume the role of a
navigator who chooses a desirable direction for the good of the people.
South Korea definitely requires more robust and reliable non-profit think
tanks in response to mid- and long-term challenges that the country is
facing.
Demands for innovative long-term foreign policy research cannot be
higher than today, as the Northeast Asian region undergoes significant
changes in the security environment. The divided Korean peninsula has
been a geopolitically important strategic place, where the great land pow-
ers of China and Russia and the strong sea powers of Japan and the United
States try to increase or maintain their influence. China, as an emerging
great power in the region, is increasing its competition and rivalry with the
United States. While Japan–China relations become aggravated, Japan is
particularly alarmed with its tensions with China over the Senkakku Islands,
and it has changed its constitutional interpretation to acquire the right of
collective security. The nuclear threat from North Korea, which started
with its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in
1993 and escalated with three nuclear tests so far, has remained an immense
threat for more than two decades to South Korea and the region. South
Korea used to be anchored in the strong bilateral relationship with the
United States to deter the threat from North Korea. Now, however, the
alliance faces the increasing need to harmonize with regional peace and
stability beyond the peninsula. While the changing regional security envi-
ronment presses South Korea to think hard and innovatively in order to
manage these complex security challenges, the international society also
demands that it make a global contribution and take more responsibilities.
This external demand has been reciprocated by South Korea’s internal
aspiration to play a constructive role in international society. As an exem-
plary country that has successfully achieved rapid industrialization and
subsequent democratization, South Korea attracts many developing coun-
tries as a model to emulate. Accordingly, it is emerging as a new donor to
the OECD Development Assistance Committee. In the diverse venues of
multilateral diplomacy, South Korea is expanding its presence.
250 S.-J. LEE
12
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2
(1978): 167–214.
13
Dong-Joon Jo, “The Oxymoron of Defense Self-Reliance in the Inter-Korean
Relationship,” [in Korean] The Korean Journal of International Relationship 44, no. 3
(2004): 25–49.
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 251
14
Scott A. Snyder, Global Korea: South Korea’s Contributions to International Security,
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2012); Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh and
252 S.-J. LEE
endeavors and human security issues might lead Beijing to become suspi-
cious that Seoul is interested in joining a US-led encirclement of China.15
South Korea is facing the difficult task of upgrading its role in global secu-
rity problems while harmonizing its good relationships with both the
United States and China.
Complex Diplomacy
EAI’s National Security Panel, the signature research panel of the Institute,
advocated the concept of “complex diplomacy” to address the changed
See Seng Tan, South Korea’s Middle-Power Engagement Initiatives: Perspectives from Southeast
Asia, (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013).
15
Sook-Jong Lee, South Korea as New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, (Seoul:
East Asia Institute, 2012), 23.
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 253
16
Sook-Jong Lee, South Korea as New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, (Seoul:
East Asia Institute, 2012), 23; Young-Sun Ha, Korea’s Grand Strategy for a New Century:
Weaving a Network State, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2006); Young-Sun Ha, The Emergence
of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2010); Young-Sun Ha,
Crisis and Complexity: Changing World Order after the Financial Crisis, (Seoul: East Asia
Institute, 2011); Young-Sun Ha, Toward 2020: Ten Agendas for South Korea’s Foreign Policy,
(Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012).
254 S.-J. LEE
Coevolutionary Strategy
In response to the security challenges originating from North Korea,
EAI’s Future of North Korea Research Panel argued that future South
Korean strategies should start from understanding the strategic environ-
ment facing Pyongyang.18 Pyongyang is currently facing a trilemma of
failing security, economy, and politics due to Songun or “military-first
politics” and its pursuit of a strengthened nuclear weapons program.
North Korea is locked into a vicious circle of economic sanctions and
nuclear tests, a chronic downturn of its autarkic system, and a legitimacy-
building period for the stable succession of the Kim Jong-un regime. For
Pyongyang, it is impossible to secure both regime survival as well as eco-
nomic prosperity if it sticks to Songun principles. EAI’s research team
emphasized that North Korea should make a strategic shift and evolve into
an “economy-first” system. It is an illusion to believe, however, that neigh-
boring states can make North Korea change, either through a “sunshine
policy” or sanctions. After all, the evolution should start from inside the
regime. South Korea and the international community should focus on
forging a favorable environment that helps Pyongyang be willing to pay
certain political costs for change and take the path of transformation and
advancement.
In this context, EAI proposed an alternative North Korea policy beyond
the existing conventional policy options of containment and engagement.
17
David Shambaugh, Tangled Titans: The United States and China, (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2012).
18
Dongho Jo and Young-Sun Ha, Future of North Korea 2032: Coevolutionary Strategy for
the Advancement, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012).
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 255
Middle-Power Diplomacy
Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye stressed responsible
middle-power diplomacy as one of her three pillars of foreign policy.
Conscious positioning of South Korea as a “middle power” had started
from the Lee Myung-bak administration under the slogan of “Global
Korea.” A middle power can be defined as a significant state taking a mid-
dle ranking in the international hierarchy of national power, which is usu-
ally measured by economic and military capabilities, or exercising
diplomatic influence despite the lack of these capabilities. Most middle
powers qualified by their resource power tend to have diplomatic influence
in international politics, but resource power does not necessarily make a
middle-ranking state play a middle-power role regionally or globally.
South Korea has been a middle power since the late 1990s, with its econ-
omy ranking from the world’s top twelfth to top fifteenth largest and a
19
Young-Sun Ha, Chaesung Chun, Won Gon Park, and Dongho Jo, Beyond Trustpolitik
on the Korean Peninsula, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2013), http://eai.or.kr/type_k/
panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=&code=kor_report&idx=12535&page=1
256 S.-J. LEE
20
Sook-Jong Lee, “Future Direction of Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative:
Maritime Disputes and South Korea’s Trustpolitik,” EAI Commentary, November 20, 2013,
http://eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=&code=eng_report&idx=
12616&page=1.
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 257
21
Donald E. Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign
Affairs Think-Tanks,” International Affairs 90, 1 (2014): 141–142.
22
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan’s
Inaugural Address,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.kr/
ENG/press/speeches/minister/former/index.jsp?menu=m_10_40_10&tabmenu=t_2
258 S.-J. LEE
&sp=/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp%3FtypeID=12%26boardid
=304%26seqno=312038
PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA… 259
23
East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Canada and Its Implications for South
Korea’s Foreign Policy,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 1, May 3, 2013;
East Asia Institute, “Strategic Partnerships between India and East Asia with Advent of Asian
Century,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 2, August 2, 2013; East Asia
Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Brazil and Policy Recommendations for South
Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 3, August 29,
2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Australia and Policy Recommendations
for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 4,
October 1, 2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Australia and Policy
Recommendations for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle
Power Diplomacy 4, October 1, 2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of
Mexico and Policy Recommendations for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable
Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 5, December 2, 2013.
260 S.-J. LEE
24
W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested
Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press,
2005).
25
Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage, (New York: Free Press, 1985).
26
First, a competitive-based strategy focuses on competing in the existing market space, a
red ocean, while a blue ocean strategy seeks to create new market space—a blue ocean that
reconstructs the market boundaries. Second, a red ocean strategy focuses on beating the
competition, while a blue ocean strategy does not focus on competition but on creating dif-
ferent strategic offerings and making the competition irrelevant. Third, a red ocean strategy
focuses on the existing demand, while a blue ocean strategy seeks to create new demand by
addressing unexplored customers. Finally, a red ocean strategy chooses an option, either a
differentiation advantage—the process of distinguishing the differences of a product from
others to make it more attractive to a particular target market—or a cost advantage—similar
products at lower cost (P. Kotler, Marketing Management. 10th ed., (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000)), while a blue ocean strategy pursues both differentiation and cost
advantage (Kim and Mauborgne 2005).
27
The initial idea of these four strategies was introduced in Lee (2013).
262 S.-J. LEE
when compared to other think tanks’ research conducted for the domestic
needs of the government or conglomerates.
A network-based research system thrives on the incentives for experts
to work closely with other leading experts in their field on issue-driven
projects. Project participation is based on personal ties and mutual respect
among the experts. The research teams have proven to be sustainable,
maintaining group coherence over several years or more. Personal ties
strengthened by strong networks among experts, effective leadership
demonstrated by senior scholars, and academic incentives have contrib-
uted to the exceptional success of EAI’s model of network-based research.
where two titans—one rising, the other rebalancing—face each other, and
a world community that urges greater contributions from “Global Korea.”
It is evident that South Korea requires more robust and reliable non-profit
think tanks, not only to fill the void left by myopic policy groups in the
government and governmental think tanks, but also to enhance a demo-
cratic and creative policy environment inside the country. As a small
network-based organization with a limited budget and few personnel, EAI
has gained a reputation for innovation and influence with fresh, bold, and
practical ideas. Its products have enabled government decision-makers to
rethink and reformulate their foreign policies. The EAI model has deeper
implications for the future course of South Korea as an emerging middle
power, as well as for the development of the global policy community in
terms of productivity and democracy. Benchmarking the EAI network
model requires certain conditions. Networks of able scholars need a larger
pool of academics and policy experts and close interactions among them.
Fortunately, South Korea has a relatively large pool of intellectuals who
work in higher education and research institutions. If there is no such a
pool of idea-makers or brokers, this model is not a good one to emulate.
The second condition is a welcoming social atmosphere in which both
government and society recognize the input of intellectuals to public poli-
cies. Compared to businesspeople or journalists, South Korean academics
and experts enjoy better access to the consultation or even decision-making
processes on public policies. If this condition is not met, the impact of EAI
based on knowledge networks on public policies would not be possible.
Although the EAI model has so far been successful, it faces several chal-
lenges which are closely related to the success factors in its rapid growth
period. Firstly, EAI’s network-based research strategy has been successful
in overcoming its limited budget, but it has also limited the Institute’s
influence to some extent. Since EAI is unable to host a large number of
experts, it has utilized research networks of non-resident scholars, most of
whom teach at leading universities in South Korea. Many experts affiliated
with its research networks advise the government as policy committee
members or participate in media outlets. Therefore, it is difficult to dis-
cern whether they are representing EAI or other organizations. In addi-
tion, available experts in the EAI network have started to overlap with
other think tank networks in this market as time passes. It is not surprising
that the number of experts on relevant policy research topics is relatively
limited, but the network-based research strategy has been benchmarked
by latecomers. For it to grow further, EAI needs to develop research
266 S.-J. LEE
Bong-Geun Jun
Dr. Jun Bong-Geun is a Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National
Security (IFANS) in the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). Professor
Jun has held several governmental and non-governmental positions: Policy Advisor
to the Minister of Unification; Visiting Scholar at Keio University in Tokyo and
Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation Academic Fellow; Secretary to the President for
international security affairs at the Presidential Office; professional staffer at the
KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) New York
headquarters; and a visiting scholar at the Asia Foundation Center for US–Korea
Policy in Washington, DC. His research area covers the North Korean nuclear
issue, inter-Korean relations, non-proliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear
energy policies. He received a BA and an MA in political science from Seoul
National University and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Oregon.
1
Han-Kyung, “2014 Top 100 Think Tanks in Korea,” Business Weekly June 1, 2014.
IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT… 269
Background and Challenges
2
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines “nuclear security” as “the pre-
vention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal trans-
fer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their
associated facilities.” At the NSS, “nuclear security” was simply defined as all measures to
secure nuclear bomb material, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, to
prevent “nuclear terrorism” by non-state actors.
270 B.-G. JUN
3
According to a public opinion poll in mid-2011, 36% of the Korean public answered that
the North Korean nuclear issue should be a key agenda of the Seoul Summit, 21% were for
non-proliferation issues, 15% for nuclear safety, and only 10% for nuclear security. Jung-yeop
Woo, “Public Understanding of Nuclear Security Summit,” Korea Herald Editorial,
September 8, 2011.
272 B.-G. JUN
seminars and media appearances, to explain to both experts and the public
what nuclear security is and why it matters. In this regard, IFANS helped
the government to publish booklets and brochures for outreach
activities.
After learning that many other countries were also interested in “nuclear
safety and nuclear security interface” and “radiological security” against
dirty bomb terrorism, the Korean government wanted to add these two
new issues to the agenda. IFANS again held dialogues with many foreign
nuclear security experts, and helped the Korean government successfully
add the two new topics to the Seoul Communiqué, the final document of
the Seoul Summit. Keeping in pace with governmental processes to for-
mulate new nuclear security policies, IFANS worked with numerous for-
eign experts to formulate the best policy ideas. It also collaborated with
international partners to encourage foreign governments to become inter-
ested in more innovative nuclear security ideas, such as nuclear safety and
the security interface, global nuclear security governance, and radiological
security.
4
The Fissile Materials Working Group is a non-governmental coalition of over 40 US
experts representing many of the top non-proliferation and nuclear security organizations in
IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT… 273
Capacity-Building and Networking
While preparing for the Seoul Summit, the first task that IFANS encoun-
tered was capacity-building, as there were almost no nuclear security pol-
icy experts either inside or outside the Institute. Therefore, it had to
mobilize both in-house and external experts from other related fields,
such as international security, nuclear technology, and nuclear non-
proliferation. IFANS also had to build and maintain a network of experts.
the country and also includes many international partner organizations. http://www.fissile-
materialsworkinggroup.org/.
274 B.-G. JUN
staff. It was also a rare and precious opportunity for Koreans to review
Korea’s responsibility for and contributions to world peace.
However, to most people, not only in Korea but across the world,
nuclear terrorism by non-state actors was such a remote issue that it had a
low possibility of occurrence. To most Koreans, North Korean nuclear
threats and nuclear safety were more direct and serious nuclear issues.
Despite such low public attention to the issue, IFANS was fortunate to
have dedicated staff, excellent experts from related fields, and governmen-
tal support.
During the preparation period for the Summit, as already mentioned,
IFANS launched and successfully executed three types of tasks: capacity-
building and networking, policy research and consulting, and public
diplomacy and awareness campaigns. What are a few of the notable success
factors that helped IFANS fulfill its missions before and during the Seoul
NSS, and the lessons that can be learned from its experiences?
Firstly, IFANS had a few dedicated scholars who were willing to delve
into new international security issues, such as nuclear security. Recognizing
the historical significance of the Seoul NSS not only for Korea’s global
status, but also for the advancement of the international nuclear security
regime, the staff members approached the Korean government to request
funds for further research and additional recruitment. They also persuaded
the IFANS leadership to establish a new Center for Nuclear Security that
could focus on developing a new nuclear security agenda and assisting the
Korean government. The Center was moreover a core hub of domestic
and international networks of experts.
Secondly, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained a close
and collaborative partnership with IFANS and policy communities from
the beginning, a somewhat unusual phenomenon in Korea. With limited
knowledge of nuclear security within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this
partnership was a smart measure. The Korean Sous-Sherpas for the sum-
mit, responsible for nuclear security policy formulation, appeared fre-
quently at IFANS seminars to brief and seek advice on various policy
issues. This openness of the Korean government was welcomed and appre-
ciated by both Korean and foreign experts. Through this cooperative
relationship between the government and policy communities, the Korean
government was able to develop new policy initiatives for the Seoul
NSS. Policy communities were also pleased to give advice to the Korean
government and exert influence on nuclear security policy.
278 B.-G. JUN
Thirdly, the utilization of foreign experts and think tanks was instru-
mental both to the development of a new policy agenda, and to the suc-
cess of the Seoul Symposium. Fortunately, there was a well-organized
international nuclear security policy community, networked around the
FMWG, which was willing to help IFANS and Korean experts. During the
preparation period for the Summit, IFANS maintained an excellent work-
ing relationship with its foreign partners.
Lastly, IFANS staff ran effective media campaigns by appearing on tele-
vision, contributing articles to newspapers, publishing brochures, making
public speeches to general audiences, and so on. They and other experts
held numerous meetings to discuss how to make the general public pay
attention to nuclear security and the NSS. One of the major themes in the
media campaigns was Korea’s global responsibility for world peace and
nuclear security, as a newly rising middle power. As a new exporter of
nuclear power plants, another theme was Korea’s responsibility for nuclear
security.
IFANS believes that its roles and contributions before and during the
Seoul NSS were well coordinated and instrumental to the successful host-
ing of the summit. Later, a few IFANS staff were recognized for their
contributions with awards from the Korean government. In retrospect,
such choreographed teamwork among IFANS, the government of Korea,
and expert groups in preparation for the NSS was exceptional. Hence it is
reasonable to expect that the NSS case could serve as a suitable model in
launching another summit for global issues. In fact, the current adminis-
tration of Korea intends to include non-traditional security issues, which
are also not a well-known topic to the Korean public and officials, as part
of its diplomatic initiatives with neighboring countries in Asia and with
Europe. At this moment, the NSS case is expected to serve as an excellent
precedent from which we can learn a great lesson.
However, IFANS regrets that its ad hoc Center for Nuclear Security
was disbanded after the summit, despite all the demands for its continua-
tion, due to lack of budget and personnel. Nevertheless, the Institute con-
tinues to hold nuclear experts’ seminars regularly and advise the Korean
government on various nuclear-related issues. IFANS is now better pre-
pared to work with the Korean government, domestic and foreign policy
communities, and the general public. Its experiences of preparing for and
hosting the Seoul NSS are well kept and remembered for global diplo-
matic events in the future.
IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT… 279
In summary, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was probably the most
significant political event in which Korea was seen as a capable emerging
middle power willing to contribute to and share responsibility for world
peace and prosperity. The Summit was also a great opportunity for the
Korean public to recognize Korea’s global responsibility that is part of its
new status as a middle power. IFANS was glad to have played a critical role
in this transformative era of Korean diplomacy and Korea’s view of the
world.
CHAPTER 18
James G. McGann
Overview
The policy agenda of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is defined by a
single-party socialist republic framework, where the President is the head
of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government, in a one-party
system led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Economic Scenario
Vietnam initiated economic reform in 1986, shifting from the centrally
planned economy with state subsidies to a socialist-oriented market econ-
omy in implementation of industrialization, modernization of the coun-
try, diversification, and multilateral development of economic external
relations for an open-door, world integration policy.3 The macroeconomic
condition of Vietnam has been stable, with recovered growth and a single-
digit inflation rate, further aided by the drastic decrease of the global oil
price. Other indicators like domestic demand, exports, exchange rate, cur-
rent account balance, and foreign direct investment all have been stable
and robust.4
1
The Wikipedia contributors, “Politics of Vietnam,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Politics_of_Vietnam.
2
John Gillespie. Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’ in
Vietnam. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.
3
Overview of Vietnam’s Economy, Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency, http://www.viet-
rade.gov.vn/en/index.php?option=com_content&id=759&Itemid=76.
4
Khanh, Vu, Trong and Nguyen, Anh Thu, “Vietnam Economy: Q&A with IMF
SanjayKalra”, Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/04/
vietnam-economy-qa-with-the-imfs-sanjay-kalra/.
284 J. G. MCGANN
5
Ibid.
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: AN OVERVIEW 285
Foreign Relations
Vietnam did not begin to emerge from international isolation until it
withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. Within months of the 1991
Paris Agreements, Vietnam established diplomatic and economic relations
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states
and also with most countries of Western Europe and Asia’s Far East. China
reestablished full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991. The two nations
concluded a land border demarcation agreement in 1999.6 Since the early
1990s, the development of Vietnam’s foreign relations has been exempli-
fied by its joining different international or multilateral organizations
(e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, ASEAN, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, and World Trade Organization).
The tension over boundary disputes between Vietnam and its neigh-
bors has emerged in recent times. More specifically, the maritime bound-
ary with Cambodia still has to be defined; in addition, Vietnam is involved
in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), Malaysia, Philippines, and possibly Brunei. The issue of
the maritime boundary with Thailand was resolved in August 1997, while
the dispute with the PRC in the Gulf of Tonkin was resolved in 2000.
Another unresolved issue concerns the Paracel Islands, which were occu-
pied by the PRC, and the offshore islands and sections of the boundary
with Cambodia are also in dispute. With regard to land borders, an agree-
ment between Vietnam and the PRC was signed in December 1999
(Table 18.2).7
6
Wikipedia contributors, “Foreign relations of Vietnam,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Foreign_relations_of_Vietnam.
7
Ibid.
CHAPTER 19
Thi Lan Anh Nguyen and Hung Son Nguyen
Introduction
Vietnam, like many other countries in Asia, has a long tradition of paying
high respect to the knowledgeable and intellectuals. In every feudal regime
of Vietnam, the Court regularly organized examinations to select the most
knowledgeable to serve and advise the king. Names of people with high
intellectual capabilities were often carved in stones placed in sacred places,
which still exist and are visible today in the stone turtles in Van Mieu
T. L. A. Nguyen (*)
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam
H. S. Nguyen
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Institute for the South China Sea,
Hanoi, Vietnam
1
Karthik Nachiappan, Enrique Mendizabal and Ajoy Datta, Think Tanks in East and
Southeast Asia, Overseas Development Institute (2010): 3, 12.
SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM… 289
PRESIDENT BOARD
(PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENTS)!
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY COUNCILS!
AFFAIRS AND TRAINING!
ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAINNING SECTION! RESEARCH SECTION!
SECTION!
INSTITUTE INSTITUTE
FOR FOREIGN POLICY FOR EAST SEA
AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (SOUTH CHINA SEA) STUDIES
CENTRE FOR
CENTRE FOR
DEVELOPMENT & INTL
INTEGRATION! LEGAL STUDIES!
CENTRE FOR
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL
AND SECURITY STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION!
CENTRE FOR
INFORMATION
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY STUDIES CENTRE!
2
Prime Minister Decision No. 82/2008/QĐ-Ttg dated on 23 June 2008
SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM… 291
The fact that the original Vietnamese proposal singled out China versus
the other downstream countries might have raised China’s suspicion. It
was due to this initial suspicion that Ambassador Ma Zhengang, head of
China’s CSCAP, attending the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, did not imme-
diately vote for the project. However, after further clarification from the
Vietnamese delegation on specific questions that Vietnam proposed to the
Study Group, and the readiness of the Vietnamese delegation to rename
the study group “Water Resource Security in Mainland South East Asia,”
Vietnam finally received the approval of all members of the Steering
Committee. The proposed questions to be answered were:
SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM… 295
Three other countries co-chaired the Study Group with Vietnam, the
CSCAP’s way of expressing co-sponsorship or shared responsibility in
steering the projects. The countries were Cambodia and Thailand—two
very important Mekong downstream countries—and Japan, a very impor-
tant stakeholder and investor on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).
The CSCAP Study Group planned four meetings, which were to take
place in all of the respective co-chairs’ countries, within a timeframe of 2
years.
What needs to be noted was that although it looked like the Study
Group would focus on the Mekong, and indeed the Mekong later served
as the context of many of the studies and discussions, it was not Vietnam’s
intentions to focus only on the Mekong. Vietnam wanted region-wide
studies of how water resources were being managed and used, and to draw
in the experiences and best practices of all other countries in the
Asia-Pacific.
first meeting was also supposed to investigate all regional and international
mechanisms and agreements in relation to the usage and management of
water resources. The second meeting was proposed to be held in mid-July
or August 2011, focusing on finding possible ways to promote regional
cooperation. The Study Group also aimed to identify potential partners,
regional and international organizations to be involved in the cooperative
process, and to start discussing possible policy recommendations. The
third and fourth meetings, which were to be held in 2012, would focus on
making practical proposals for cooperation and, as is required for every
Study Group, to draft the Study Group’s Memorandum. Two meetings
were reserved for making recommendations and drafting the Memorandum,
in anticipation that diverse viewpoints might lengthen or defer the
process.
DAV scheduled the first meeting of the Study Group on March 22,
2011 in Hanoi. It purposefully chose March 22 because it is World Water
Day and DAV thought of it as a meaningful way to celebrate both this day
and to attract the most attention and participation from relevant people to
the event.
In preparing for the first meeting, DAV’s first step was to network and
draw in expertise from the rather well-established and institutionalized
agencies that dealt with the various aspects of water security in Vietnam.
The Academy then proposed a national meeting of all stakeholders in
water usage and management in Vietnam: the Vietnam National Mekong
Committee, which is under the Mekong River Commission, various agen-
cies such as the Directorate on Dykes, the Centre for Water Resources
Management, the Vietnam River Network Association, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and so on. These organizations had a brainstorming ses-
sion in January 2011 to suggest topics for discussions and the agenda for
the first meeting.
DAV did not receive initial or outright support from the participants of
the meeting. They felt strange that a “political” entity like DAV would
take the lead on such a highly “technical” issue such as water manage-
ment. However, after listening to DAV’s explanation that its only interest
was to promote regional and international cooperation and to have a bet-
ter understanding of and cooperation on those “technical” issues, then the
participants began to cooperate and give their full support. It was during
this national meeting on water management that DAV gained more under-
standing of the breadth of the issue and the roles, views, and interests of
the various agencies and their respective experts. Based on the suggestions
SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM… 297
and the network built during the first meeting, the Academy was able to
identify local and international experts that could make valuable contribu-
tions to the first meeting of the Study Group.
The first meeting went on as scheduled. More than forty participants
took part in the event from different organizations, such as CSCAP mem-
ber committees and other institutions, United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Hanoi, United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) based in Thailand,
International Centre for Water Management, International Association
for Water Law, and local audiences. CSCAP China sent the largest delega-
tion, showing China’s full support. Four people from the two leading
Chinese think tanks and from the state-run hydropower cooperative par-
ticipated. Hence, the CSCAP Study Group on Water Security became the
only mechanism with full participation and cooperation from China on
water management issues. The first meeting was very useful in conceptual-
izing water security and its management from the various perspectives of
the involved stakeholders. While international relations experts debated
the notion of “absolute sovereignty” over rivers, legal experts discussed
international norms concerning the sharing and management of cross-
boundary rivers; development specialists focused on the social and eco-
nomic impacts and of water mismanagement. A historical perspective on
the issue also came from an expert who was involved in drafting the 1995
Mekong Agreement.
The second meeting of the Study Group was held in Siem Reap,
Cambodia on July 14–15, 2011 and it focused on how to tackle the issues.
The meeting benefited from reports written by several Cambodian stake-
holders that depended on the Mekong rivers, and further benefited from
a field trip to the Tonle Sap, the Cambodian sea lake in the middle of the
Mekong. Among other things, the most important part of the meeting
was the debate on and, thus, the understanding of the roles of various
stakeholders in water security and management (e.g., the riparian states,
international organizations, private sector organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the military, the media, etc.). DAV
also benefited from having a better knowledge of the pluralistic nature of
water security and management, perspectives not easily seen from within
Vietnam, where most stakeholders are either governmental or have links
with the government.
The third and fourth meetings in Japan and Thailand, respectively,
spent a large portion of time discussing specific recommendations and
298 T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN
drafting the Memorandum of the Study Group. DAV once again played
the leading role in both drafting the Memorandum and moderating the
discussions, taking into account viewpoints and suggestions of all partici-
pants and redrafting the papers. A draft was finally agreed at the final
meeting of the Study Group in Chiang Rai, Thailand, where the Mekong
Agreement was signed in 1995. Minor revisions to the text continued to
follow, and further clarifications of viewpoints were made at the CSCAP
Steering Committee, the higher body of CSCAP that approves and autho-
rizes all CSCAP Memorandums. The final draft of the Memorandum was
approved in June 2014.
there could be a way to meet the interests of Laos and still secure Vietnam’s
water security interests. Technology in dam construction and operations
had developed to the point that it might be possible to limit the environ-
mental impact of dam construction (although there will still be some neg-
ative impact). The key is that dams need to be built and operated in an
expensive but environmentally friendly way, which also means a reduction
in operating profit for Laos. Therefore, DAV tried to convince Hanoi’s
government that instead of pursuing a reactive and negative path, Vietnam
should choose to convince Laos to accept the higher cost and assure a
certain standard for dam construction. Vietnam could proactively assist its
neighbor in acquiring the necessary expertise, most likely from interna-
tional cooperation and assistance from more technologically advanced
partners, for such construction and during future operations.
The new approach advocated by DAV seemed to receive the attention
of certain audiences in policy-making circles, as the Vietnamese govern-
ment became more ready to accept continuation of the projects under the
condition that Laos ensured an environmentally friendly design standard.
Generally, DAV has helped policy-makers on water security in the fol-
lowing ways:
Conclusion
The evolution of the leading Vietnamese think tank on foreign policy,
from the Diplomatic School to the Institute for International Relations to
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, reflects the rising importance and
professionalization of independent research and analysis in Vietnam’s
policy-making process. This was the joint product of the Vietnamese tradi-
tion of highly valuing intellectual power and authority, and the deeper
interactions and integration of the country into the dynamic regional and
international community that required Hanoi to have a more dynamic and
nuanced foreign policy.
DAV greatly benefited from being both an independent academic insti-
tution and a government think tank. As a consequence, it could draw the
most benefit from both worlds: enjoying academic freedom while remain-
ing highly relevant and up to date on day-to-day policy issues.
The Academy has clearly capitalized on this strength to insert itself as
an influential policy advisor to the Vietnamese government, and an increas-
ingly respected government-affiliated think tank, rising to be among the
top thirty-five think tanks in the Asia Pacific in 2013. The academic and
practical experiences perhaps represent DAV’s greatest strength, contrib-
uting to its achievements and success.
PART IV
Latin America
CHAPTER 20
Argentina: An Overview
James G. McGann
Argentina has experienced both economic crises and instable political break-
downs. One of the challenges that security and international affairs think
tanks grapple with is the Malvinas islands issue. The Center for Strategic
Affairs “Manuel Belgrano” of the Ministry of Defense, the government-
affiliated think tank, suggests dividing the Argentine Sea into geopolitical
sets, one of which would be the Malvinas. The Argentine Council for
International Relations created a subcommittee to provide academic con-
ferences and research on this issue. The Argentine Center of International
Studies founded the “Peoples for Malvinas” initiative to address the poten-
tial of these territories for implementing the advocacy strategy (Table 20.1).
Overview
Stretching 4000 km from the subtropical north to the sub-Antarctic
south, Argentina is the fourth-largest economy in South America—after
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—with a GDP of more than US $777.9 bil-
lion.1 According to the US Energy Information Administration, Argentina
is ranked second and fourth worldwide in terms of deposits of recoverable
1
Argentina Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/argentina.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
shale gas and oil, respectively, and if exploited these reserves could make
the country a net energy exporter.2
In the last few decades, the country has faced severe economic d
ifficulties
which foreshadowed its financial collapse in 2001. Since then, Argentina
had to deal with record debt defaults (about 150% of GDP3) and currency
devaluation.
The progressive deterioration of the country’s economic situation has
affected its posture both regionally and internationally. Within a rapidly
changing regional scenario, Argentina’s third spot among Latin American
economies was overtaken in 2014 by Colombia which, in contrast, boasts
a stable currency and a low inflation rate.4 In the international arena,
cooled relations with the United States and the main financial institutions
have been counterbalanced by stronger ties with leading emerging powers
such as China and Russia.
On top of the economic and financial uncertainties, Argentina is also
facing increasing civil turmoil due to growing corruption, and dramatic
social unrest after the death of Alberto Nisman, the prosecutor investigat-
ing the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, who
had publicly accused President Fernández de Kirchner of conspiracy.5
Economic Situation
Argentina’s economy has been through a 100-year cycle of ups and downs.
In the early 1920s, the country was one of the world’s richest thanks to
cattle and farm goods. Its workforce was educated and mostly made up of
European immigrants and their descendants.6 However, starting from the
1930s, Argentina’s crises have been constant.
2
Keith Johnson. “Argentina’s Brilliant, Terrible, Very Unclear Energy Future” (2014) http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/13/argentinas-brilliant-terrible-very-unclear-energy-future/.
3
Guillermo Vuletin. “Argentina in Default: Why 2014 Is Different from 2001.” The
Brookings Institution (2014) http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/
08/05-argentina-default-vuletin.
4
Patricia Rey Mallén. “Colombia Surpasses Argentina as Latin America’s Third-Largest
Economy Due to Inflation, Currency Changes, GDP Growth”, The International Business
Times. (2014) http://www.ibtimes.com/colombia-surpasses-argentina-latin-americas-
third-largest-economy-due-inflation-currency-changes-gdp.
5
Karen Zraick. “The Mysterious Death of Alberto Nisman” The New York Times, February
20, 2015.
6
“Chronology: Argentina’s Turbulent History of Economic Crises.” Reuters. (2014)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/us-argentina-debt-chronology doi
USKBN0FZ23N20140730.
306 J. G. MCGANN
The most recent and dramatic financial crash occurred between 2001
and 2002. However, its origins are much older and, precisely, go back to
the 1990s boom years.7 Under Menem’s presidency, Argentina’s eco-
nomic policy focused on busting foreign investments, reducing import
tariffs, and privatizing inefficient state enterprises. These reforms, which
opened up its market, helped Argentina to drop inflation.
However, by the end of Menem’s term (1999), corruption had begun
afflicting the country, driving away investors. Furthermore, contagion
from Russia and from East Asian countries at the end of 1990s caused
capital outflows. At the beginning of the Twenty-First century, Argentina
was about to experience the biggest sovereign debt default that had ever
happened.
In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a loan
which allowed Argentina to restructure its public debt and provide credi-
tors with new bonds to replace the defaulted ones. However, with half of
the population living in poverty and one of the highest unemployment
rates in the world, Argentinians scarcely benefited from the economic
recovery of the early 2000s.
For the second time in 13 years, Argentina defaulted again in the sum-
mer of 2014 as a consequence of a failed agreement with holdout inves-
tors. Following the decision of US Judge Thomas Griesa, Argentina was
required to pay US $1.5 billion8 to NML Capital and Aurelius Capital
Management—the hedge funds which had not accepted previous restruc-
turing offers.
Despite the 2014 crisis being modest if compared to previous ones, the
default on sovereign debt still impacted the country’s economy. A signifi-
cant decline in GDP, a serious currency devaluation, and a high rate of
inflation technically put Argentina into an exacerbated recession.
According to recent figures (Ernst and Young 2014), during last year,
moderate policy changes were enacted: the peso was devaluated, interest
rates increased, and data reporting was upgraded.9 However, forecasts for
this year (2015) expect a contraction of GDP by 1.5% due to the govern-
ment’s rigid controls and ineffective macroeconomic policies.
7
Timothy Geithner. “Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina” p.6. International Monetary
Fund, October 8, 2003.
8
Jon Hartley. “Argentina’s Default: Lessons Learned, What Happens Next” Forbes
Magazine. (2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/08/04/argentinas-
default-lessons-learned-and-what-happens-next/.
9
Emerging Markets Center. http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/worldmap/argentina/.
ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW 307
Political Scenario
Argentina’s foreign policy in the last few decades seems to have been
largely driven by national interest and influenced by its domestic vulnera-
bilities. This situation has progressively eroded Buenos Aires leadership
both regionally and internationally, especially within important fora such
as the G20.
The two-year period of 1982 (the Falklands war) and 1983 (the return
to democracy) signed an important moment in the history of Argentina’s
foreign policy. The issue of the Malvinas Islands on the one hand, and the
improved relations with the international community on the other, became
the two axes of Buenos Aires international relations.
In the late 1980s, and above all during Menem’s presidency
(1989–1999), the country left the non-aligned movement to draw up
closer relations with a former competitor: the United States. This approach
took the label of a “carnal relation,” the definition given by Guido di Tella
to the newly established alliance between Argentina and the United
States.14
10
Argentina Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/argentina.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
“Relaciones Carnales: el vínculo con Estados Unidos en la década del 90,” December 5,
2013 http://www.argentina.ar/temas/democracia-30-anos/24129-relaciones-carnales-el-
vinculo-con-estados-unidos-en-los-90.
308 J. G. MCGANN
15
Frederico Merke. “Argentina’s Foreign Policy in Kirchner’s Second Term.” International
Affairs at LSE. (2012) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/03/argentinas-foreign-policy-
in-kirchners-second-term/.
16
Johnson, Keith. “Argentina’s Brilliant, Terrible, Very Unclear Energy Future”, Foreign
Policy, (2014) http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/13/argentinas-brilliant-terrible-very-
unclear-energy-future.
ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW 309
tors to develop the Vaca Muerta shale field, estimated to be the largest oil
field in the western hemisphere and one of the biggest in the world.17
Since 2012, when its national oil company YPF was renationalized from
Spain’s Repsol, Buenos Aires has been seeking partners. Russian’s
Gazprom and China’s Sinopec have been the main targets of Kirchner’s
action. However, there is a risk that the Vaca Muerta site—in which the
United States also has an interest—will turn into a new challenge for the
Southern Cone nation.
In the last decade, Argentina has also tightened its ties with Beijing. At
the beginning of 2015, Argentina received US $400 million from the
Bank of China as the fourth installment of a US $11 billion currency swap
agreement between Beijing and Buenos Aires,18 according to which
Argentina would pay for Chinese imports with the yuan.19 According to
some analysts, Buenos Aires might use the currency swap with China in
order to avoid isolation from the international financial system, and above
all to stabilize the exchange rate until the end of Fernández de Kirchner’s
term in December 2015.20
Many factors support stronger ties between Argentina and China,
whose partnership was officially endorsed on the occasion of the first
China–Argentina intergovernmental standing committee.21 Politics, trade,
and migration represent the principal areas of collaboration between the
two parties. Furthermore, China is a crucial economic partner for invest-
ments in infrastructure, the construction of hydroelectric power plants,
the reorganization of the national railroad network, and the management
of energy resources.22 In fact, in July 2014, then President Fernández de
Kirchner and her counterpart President Xi Jinping signed a deal for
Argentina to borrow US $7.5 billion from China, escaping the interna-
tional pressure over the unpaid debt issue.
17
Spencer Abraham. “Keeping Putin’s Hands off Argentina’s Oil”, Foreign Policy, (2014)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/25/keeping-putins-hands-off-argentinas-oil/.
18
The Editors, “With Currency Swap, Argentina Becomes Dependent on China”, World
Politics Review. (2015) http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14966/
with-currency-swap-argentina-becomes-dependent-on-china.
19
Eliana Raszewski.“China Lends Argentina $7.5 Billion for Power, Rail Projects” Reuters (2014)
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/19/argentina-china-idUKL2N0PT2N220140719.
20
The Editors, “With Currency Swap, Argentina Becomes Dependent on China”, January
29, 2015 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14966/with-currency-swap-
argentina-becomes-dependent-on-china.
21
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1235611.shtml.
22
Ibid.
310 J. G. MCGANN
23
Ibid.
24
Argentina still has not settled its quarrel with the United Kingdom over sovereignty of
the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, which London governs as a British overseas territory and
Buenos Aires claims as part of the national territory, despite a vote by the residents in favor
of British rule.
25
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. “Nisman’s Death and Argentinian Politics”, International Policy
Digest, (2015) http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/02/15/nismans-death-
argentinian-politics/.
26
Alberto Nisman was investigating a 1994 bombing attack which killed 85 people in a
Jewish center. His death, which occurred only few hours before his report to Congress, is still
questioned and there has been speculation about the President’s involvement.
27
Tokatlian, “Nisman’s Death and Argentinian Politics.”
ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW 311
Ariel Gonzàlez Levaggi
Introduction
Argentina is the third-largest economy in Latin America, after Brazil and
Mexico, and a member of the Group of 20 (G20), which is the most
important arena that fosters international cooperation on global economic
and financial issues. and an important forum which promotes dialogue
between traditional and emerging powers. However, neither academia,
international consulting firms, nor the press consider this key South
American country as an emerging, or even a middle, power.1 At the
1
An exception to this trend could be the proposal of the VISTA Group as the second ring
of emerging countries, see Cardozo, G.; Gonzalez Levaggi, A. & Escudero, E. (2013), “Los
nuevos países emergentes: el grupo VISTA y las oportunidades para Argentina”, Policy Brief
A. G. Levaggi (*)
Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
moment, there are many reasons why it is important to discuss the role
played by Argentina in the current international system.
From a realistic point of view, Argentina has an important role in South
America simply due to its diplomatic relevance and economic weight.
Throughout the twentieth century, until the Malvinas War in 1982,
Argentina competed in a quest with Brazil for political, economic, and
military hegemony in the region. During the second half of the century,
Brazil increased its material power while Argentina entered an era of polit-
ical instability and decline in its relative position compared with its com-
petitor. The Malvinas War broke the peaceful tradition of Argentine
diplomacy, which was used to solve controversies (as in the case of the
border disputes with Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia) and to resort to
peaceful solutions like mediations and treaties.
The last Military Process (1976–1983) changed the attitude of
Argentina towards internal and external threats. The country was respon-
sible for threatening the use of force (Beagle Conflict with Chile in 1978),
for perpetuating human rights abuses, and for using military violence
(i.e., the Malvinas War). With the end of the Military Regime in 1983,
the return of democracy favored a return to the former diplomatic peace-
ful behavior, and greater participation of civil society and of public opin-
ion in international affairs. During the last three decades, the growth of
the third sector coexisted with the most dramatic economic and political
crises that affected the country in the late 1980s and in 2001/2002.
Fortunately, Argentina’s economy has now recovered from the
2001/2002 crisis. Nevertheless, some crucial issues, such as those related
to the international financial sector, infrastructure, and foreign invest-
ments, still need a solution.
When it comes to the political sphere, the country focuses on its inter-
nal problems without seizing the opportunities of globalization. The lack
of long-term planning, the economic crisis, and the sudden changes in
national objectives by different governments, even during the same period
of governance, have generated a series of pendulum effects in Argentina’s
foreign policy around its general orientation (alliance with the “West” vs.
deepening partnerships with “The Rest”), its modus operandi (high
profile vs. low profile), and its relation with the global economy (eco-
nomic liberalism vs. nationalizations).
During the Cold War, Argentina promoted the creation of new think
tanks that were usually influenced by the economic and political sectors,
which did not guarantee generalized representation and hindered the
think tanks’ chances to play an active role. Even though some issues per-
sist, the country is one of the most important regional players and has a
serious interest in multipolarism. This chapter presents a national focus
and considers Argentina as an emerging middle power in the contempo-
rary “interpolar world.”2
During the last ten years, the debate regarding Argentina’s foreign pol-
icy has focused on whether a foreign policy strategic program exists. The
main question is: “Is there a plan?” Three answers have been provided:
yes, perhaps, and no.
Regarding the first answer, “yes,” there is a strategy foreign policy pro-
gram, the main supporters emphasize identitarian variables. In brief,
Kirchner’s era changed the traditional alignment with the United States—
and more generally with the West—by promoting regional integration
with Latin America, through deeper relations with non-Western countries.
This new approach produced tensions with international economic orga-
nizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of their
“progressist” political identity.3 The second answer, “perhaps,” is a hybrid
solution that claims the governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner
developed an “original” foreign policy, juxtaposing two peripheral variants
of realism and two of idealism: naive geopolitical realism and pragmatic
realism, Wilsonian-peripheral idealism and Grotian-peripheral idealism.4
The second answer argues that Kirchner’s foreign policy had different
approaches, but not a specific plan. The third answer, “no,” claims that
foreign policy in the Kirchner era did not exist because of the absence5 or
2
We choose this concept from Giovanni Grevi to define the current international system,
see Grevi, Giovanni (2009). “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper N° 79.
3
Pedro Brieger. “La política exterior de la era Kirchner” (2010), Consenso Progresista,
Buenos Aires, Vol. 1, 35–62 & Alejandro Simonoff. “Regularidades de la Política Exterior de
Néstor Kirchner”, (2009) CONfines de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política, Vol.5,
Monterrey, 71–86.
4
Francisco Corigliano. “Híbridos teóricos y su impacto en la política exterior: El caso de
los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner”, (2008) 8–10. Boletín del Instituto de Seguridad
Internacional y Asuntos Estratégicos (ISIAE), Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
Internacionales (CARI), Buenos Aires, No. 47.
5
Cardenas, E. (2006) “Argentina pierde imagen, por ausencia de Política Exterior”,
Agenda Internacional N°8, Buenos Aires, pp. 13–18.
316 A. G. LEVAGGI
6
Petrella, F. (2013) “La política exterior de la automarginación”, La Nación, Buenos
Aires, 23 de Agosto.
7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship (2012), The Question of the Malvinas Islands: A
History of Colonialism. A United Nations Cause, Buenos Aires, 5.
DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING… 317
and the World Bank. The end of the neoliberal experience also affected
the way society perceived international affairs, especially related to eco-
nomics. From 2003, the decision-making process in international
affairs—and of course in the Malvinas issue—was managed by govern-
mental agencies and by an important segment of civil society that had an
active role in the Malvinas, the ex-combatants. Academic institutions,
think tanks, and other civil society organizations, on the other hand,
played a marginal role.
New research centers were established during these years, but the real
influence on policy-making decreased due to different reasons: the per-
sonality of the key decision-makers, the orientation of foreign policy, and
the characteristics of the major SIA think tanks. The Malvinas issue is still
one of the most important foreign policy and security challenges for
Argentina. SIA Argentine think tanks responded in different ways in sup-
porting the country’s official diplomatic position. In the following sec-
tions, we describe the main features of each institute and examine their
strategies, practices, and impact related to the Malvinas issue.
ACADEMIC COUNCIL
demics. The main programs of action are publications and events, espe-
cially the closed summits that allow open and frank discussion on strategic
issues. In terms of impact, CARI used to be very influential in Argentina’s
foreign policy until the last few years, when the relation between the gov-
ernment and the institute deteriorated.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship used to fund CARI from
1994 until 2012, when the government decided to halt its institutional
and financial support.8 One of the most important committees is the
“Malvinas Question, South Georgia and South Sandwich Committee,”
which was created in 1982, and since 1996 has been under the direction
of Lilian del Castillo de Laborde. The main objective of the committee is
to conduct research about this issue, analyzing its legal and historical
development, in order to propose solutions for a peaceful settlement of
the dispute with the United Kingdom. It has developed multiple activities,
including conferences, meetings, and seminars. For example, in the last
few years the committee organized the publication, and then presentation,
of the books Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur: Diplomacia Argentina
en Naciones Unidas 2000–2007 and Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur:
Diplomacia Argentina en Naciones Unidas 1991/1999. Another impor-
tant branch of CARI related to the Malvinas issue and the South Atlantic
is the Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs (ISIAE),
which organized the seminars “Argentina in the Atlantic South at the XXI
Century” (2011) and “Rethinking Malvinas” (2013); it also publishes a
regular bulletin that has been circulated from 1998 onwards.
8
Natasha Niebieskikwiat. “Un prestigioso centro de política exterior, sin fondos oficiales”,
(2012) Clarin. http://www.clarin.com/politica/prestigioso-centro-politica-exterior-oficia-
les_0_768523213.html
322 A. G. LEVAGGI
Table 21.1 Strategies, programs, and impact of the Argentine security and inter-
national affairs think tanks
CARI CEEPADENavy CAEI IRI-UNLP
Office
focused on research and publishing, but they also organize events (e.g.,
CARI and IRI-UNLP).
The unusual case is the press campaign and social activities conducted
by CAEI, which moved away from its academic profile to an advocacy
effort. Normally, these topics are chosen because of independent research
(IRI-UNLP and CAEI); however, in the case of CARI, the requests came
informally from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in the case of CEEPADE
Navy Office, the requests were officially from the Ministry of Defense.
Among the selected SIA think tanks, cooperation is limited to partici-
pation in events, interchange of publications, and sometimes exchanges of
researchers or members. CARI and IRI-UNLP have historically good rela-
tions and normally the members of one institution invite members of the
second and vice versa. For example, at the seminar “Rethink Malvinas” in
2013, CARI invited Federico Martín Gómez, the Secretary of the
Malvinas, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands Department at IRI-UNLP.
Another example is the biannual Congress of International Relations
organized by IRI-UNLP in which normally all of the SIA think tanks
participate.
In terms of impact, each institution has its own indicators to evaluate its
impacts on the governmental agenda, the press, or civil society. However,
Argentina’s foreign policy towards the Malvinas has been scarcely affected
by the SIA think tanks’ work, neither at the bilateral nor at the multilateral
level. This lack of change in policy is due to two basic reasons. Firstly, from
326 A. G. LEVAGGI
Conclusions
Although not all Argentine SIA think tanks discuss Argentina’s position in
the international system explicitly, we infer that they all identify the coun-
try as an emerging middle power, in light of their activities and publica-
tions. One of the foreign policy and security challenges that Argentina is
now facing—and surely will in the coming decades—is the Malvinas islands
issue. This chapter has compared the responses of four different Argentine
think tanks towards a traditional security issue inherited from the n
ineteenth
century, by trying to identify and examine these think tanks’ positions on
the Malvinas issue from Argentina’s foreign policy perspective.
DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING… 327
The four Argentine SIA think tanks discussed have different structural
orientations (independent, quasi-independent, university, and govern-
mental), but they share similar strategies and programs based on an aca-
demic approach to government and the civil society agenda. They have
undertaken numerous investigations, publications, and events, but the
impact is still low compared to the influence of think tanks in Western
countries like the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom.
A number of lessons can be learned from Argentina’s case. Argentina
has the seventh largest number of think tanks in the world and ranks first
in the region according to the 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Index
Report. However, only a few think tanks are specifically focused on secu-
rity and international affairs. Each of the selected SIA think tanks has
taken action to legitimatize Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas,
South Georgias, and South Sandwich islands. Even though they are not
directly related to the government, with the exception of CEEPADE
Navy Office, the SIA think tanks have supported the official position
despite their ideological differences. It is important to note that Argentine
SIA think tanks have had very few chances to successfully recommend
policies to the government, due to the inattention of the political leader-
ship that has handled the Malvinas issue and defined Argentina’s foreign
policy during the last 10 years.
These considerations can be extended to think tanks in other emerging
countries. The end of the neoliberal period with the 2001/2002 crisis and
the return of statism left little space for civil society and private initiatives.
Another important element is that the old foreign policy elites were
pushed aside and new groups without experience and without much
power emerged. The former elites were not replaced but rather eroded.
Despite the SIA think tanks’ growth, their impact and influence on gov-
ernmental policies towards the Malvinas issue have not increased as fast.
CHAPTER 22
Brazil: An Overview
James G. McGann
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Overview
Brazil’s geographic, economic, and political dimensions are impressive.
Militarily, it cannot be considered a great power since it is not a nuclear
power and it does not possess a strong conventional arsenal. Nonetheless,
it is prominent from other perspectives.1
It is the fifth-largest country in terms of territorial extension; the fifth
most populous country; the seventh-largest economy after the United
States, China, India, Japan, Germany, and Russia in terms of value added
to its economic output adjusted for differentials in purchasing power;2 and
also one of the world’s biggest democracies.
Brazil is also the “B” in the acronym BRICS, which refers to the five
emerging countries (the others are Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
that since the beginning of the twenty-first century have been considered
as soon-to-be superpowers.3
In the last two decades, Brazil has achieved global prominence both
politically and economically. In 2011, the US Council on Foreign Relations
stated that Brazil was in the “short list of countries that will most shape
the twenty-first century.”4 However, as many scholars have pointed out,
Brazil’s growth model seems to have reached its limits.
After the 2008 financial crisis, Brazil’s economy kept on growing.
However, between 2010 and 2012, annual growth in GDP went from
7.5% (2010) to 2.5% (2011) to 1% (2012).5 Internal issues such as income
inequality, weak institutions, and widespread corruption—the last scandal
1
Hart, Andrew F. and Jones, Bruce D. “How Do Rising Powers Rise?”, Survival, vol. 52,
no. 6 (2010).
In the last two decades, Brazil has steadily increased its defense spending. However, this
has not translated into concrete capabilities that would allow the country to conduct signifi-
cant operations beyond its borders.
2
Porzecanski, Arturo C “Brazil’s Place in the Global Economy”, Forthcoming in Brazil on
the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the Liberal International Order, ed. by Oliver Stuenkel
and Matthew Taylor (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)., School of
International Service Research Paper No. 2014–1, 3.
3
Jim O’Neill. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs,
2001; Foreign Policy Association. Great Decisions 2015 Topics.
http://www.fpa.org/news/index.cfm?act=show_announcement&announcement.
Samuel Bodman, Julia Sweig, and James Wolfensohn. “Global Brazil and US–Brazil
Relations” Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations.
4
Samuel Bodman, Julia Sweig, and James Wolfensohn. “Global Brazil and US–Brazil
Relations” Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations.
5
The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
332 J. G. MCGANN
Economic Situation
Brazil’s exponential growth during the last decade has allowed impressive
development gains. Between 2002 and 2010, the number of poor people
in the country fell by 51%. Throughout the 2000s, the per capita income
of 50% of the poorest class rose by 68%.8 GDP per person (adjusted for
inflation) grew at an annual rate of 2.5% between 2003 and 2014. The
past decade also experienced new trends with regard to the reduction of
poverty and inequality, as a result of income and employment growth as
well as of increased government social spending and programs.9 For exam-
ple, in 2003 the government launched the Bolsa Familia, a social welfare
program based on a cash-transfer system for low-income households.
6
Alfredo Valladão. “Emergent Brazil and the Curse of the ‘Hen’s Flight’” (2013). CEPS
Working Document No. 379.
7
The Economist, “Rough Weather Ahead. The Mistakes Dilma Rousseff Made during her
First Presidential Term Mean Her Second Will Be Stormy”, Jan 3, 2015 http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/americas/21637436-mistakes-dilma-rousseff-made-during-her-first-presi-
dential-term-mean-her-second-will-be.
8
Translated from Neri, M “A Evolucao dos indicadores sociais baseados em Renda—
Desigualdade de Renda na Decada”, Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Getulio Vargas—Centro de
Polıticas Sociais, 2011.
9
Jake Jonhson, Stephan Lefebre, and Mark Weisbrot. “The Brazilian Economy in
Transition” (2014) page 1, Center for Economic and Policy Research.
BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW 333
10
Franklin Serrano and Ricardo Summa. “Macroeconomic Policy, Growth and Income
Distribution in the Brazilian Economy in the 2000s.” (2011) Washington, DC: Center for
Economic and Policy Research. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/brazil-
2011-06.pdf.
11
Weisbrot, Jonhson and Lefebre,“The Brazilian Economy in Transition,” 11.
12
Ibid., 2.
13
Joe Leahy. “Dilma Rousseff Puts Brazil Back on Path to Economic Orthodoxy”, The
Financial Times, (2014) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b75aaf9e-6a40-11e4-bfb4-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XxbPFUHP.
14
Phil Izzo and Sudeep Reddy, “Most Economists in Survey Say Recession Is Here,” Wall
Street Journal, March 13, 2008, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120534519452630845.
15
Brazil: Economic Forecast Summary http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/brazil-eco-
nomic-forecast-summary.htm.
334 J. G. MCGANN
Foreign Policy
Analyzing Brazil’s role in the international arena is particularly important
when considering its double identity:20 as a Latin American country and as
a member of the BRICS bloc. In this sense, its regional and international
foreign policies are deeply interconnected.
Since 2003, Brazil’s government has been actively engaged in a foreign
policy strategy. The aim of its leadership has been to give the country a
new role in the international scenario: namely, to make Brazil an influential
16
George Jelmayer and Paul Kiernan. “Brazil’s Economy Clouds out of Recession”, The
Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2014 http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-economy-
claws-out-of-recession-gdp-up-0-1-on-quarter-1417174556.
17
Harold Trinkunas. “Brazil’s Global Ambitions”, (2015) The Brookings Institute, origi-
nally published on Americas Quarterly, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
articles/2015/02/04-brazil-global-ambitions-trinkunas.
18
Denise Godoy and Filipe Pacheco. “Brazil’s Fiscal Policy to Help Lift Economic
Growth” (2015) Bloomberg Business. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
03-03/brazil-s-fiscal-policy-to-help-lift-economic-growth-anbima-says.
19
Ibid.
20
Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s
Prominent Role in the Americas” (2013), CEPS Working Document no. 374.
BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW 335
and respected global player. This strategy, known as “autonomy for diver-
sification,” aimed to release the country from the traditional patterns of
dependency and to create a dense network of relations compatible with a
more flexible foreign policy.21
Brasilia also made efforts to assume a stronger regional role and to fos-
ter the creation of a South American space based on MERCOSUR
(Mercado Común del Sur) and UNASUR (Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas) as its main axes. Regionalism is crucial to Brazil not only
per se, but also to counterbalance the United States on the global
chessboard.
Literature on the topic presents different views as far as Brazil’s foreign
policy orientation is concerned. To some commentators, Brazil’s relations
have been quite balanced between South–South cooperation and relations
with developed countries.22 On the contrary, according to another per-
spective, Brazil’s foreign policy approach after 2003 has been mainly look-
ing towards developing countries, similar to the country’s foreign policy
tradition before the authoritarian regime of 1964.23 In addition, authors
underlined that, differently from China or Russia, Brazil’s foreign policy
features a clear reliance on non-military power. In this sense, the use of soft
power is likely to reinforce its capacity to influence international affairs.24
Many sources highlight that Brazil’s agenda has been focusing on
strengthening South–South cooperation, both regionally with other Latin
American countries, and internationally with other regions such as Africa
or the Middle East.25 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (2003–2010)
project was to overcome the timid approach towards the country’s neigh-
bors and turn Brazil into the leader of the developing and emerging econ-
omies.26 The was apparent in the form of the so-called Technical
21
Stella Ladi and Elena Lazarou, “Think Tanks and Policy Transformation: The Case of
Brazil,” 19.
22
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo. “A política externa do Brasil no século XXI: os eixos”
(2008) Revista Brasileira de Relaciones Internacionales, 51, no. 2.
23
Paulo Roberto de Almeida. “O Brasil como ator regional e como emergente global:
extrategia de politica externa e impact ona nova ordem internacional” (2007) Cena
Internacional, Vol. 9, No.1.
24
Peter Daurvegne and Deborah Farias. “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5, (2012): 903.
25
Steen Fryba Christensen. “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 34, No.2, 2013, p. 274.
26
Zanini, Fabio “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate”, October 23, 2014 http://
hir.harvard.edu/archives/7486.
336 J. G. MCGANN
27
Daurvegne, Peter and Farias, Deborah BL “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third Wordl Quarterly, vol. 33, n.5, 2012, p. 909.
28
Fabio Zanini. “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate” (2014) http://hir.har-
vard.edu/archives/7486.
29
Gratius, Susanne and Gomes Saraiva, Miriam “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s
Prominent Role in the Americas”, CEPS Working Document, no. 374, (February 2013): 4.
30
Daurvegne, Peter and Farias, Deborah BL “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third World Quarterly, 33, no 0.5, (2012): 910.
31
Venezuela is unstable, Argentina is suffering from the consequences of the last default,
Colombia is still dealing with the problem of terrorism, while Bolivia and Peru are experienc-
ing chronic social unrest.
Zanini, Fabio “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate”, October 23, 2014 http://
hir.harvard.edu/archives/7486.
BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW 337
Adriana Erthal Abdenur
Introduction
International relations (IR) scholars often highlight that this field is char-
acterized by an overwhelming predominance of Western approaches.
Acharya and Busan (2010) explain the ideational phenomena that feed
into “both Gramscian hegemonies, ethnocentrism and the politics of
exclusion,” and they try to fill this theoretical gap by supporting and call-
ing attention to Asian perspectives of IR. This dilemma concerning IR has
long set the tone for some important debates at the Institute of
International Relations (IRI) at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio
A. E. Abdenur (*)
Instituto Igarapé, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
policy, for instance, the South Atlantic region acquired the same level of
importance previously granted to the Amazon. The new policy framework
included not only naval buildup (focused on the development, through
cooperation with France, of a nuclear propulsion attack submarine), but
also efforts to intensify military cooperation with the littoral states of
Africa (Ministry of Defense 2012). The government justified this shift by
stressing the need to protect Brazil’s maritime resources, including the
substantial pre-salt oil reserves, whose discovery had been announced in
2007.
Within defense policy discussions, there was also growing interest as
well as an increasing concern regarding the flow of illicit goods and peo-
ple, and the expansion of piracy off the coast of West Africa. At the same
time, the Brazilian government’s distance from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alliance seemed to have particular salience within
the context of the South Atlantic. Brazilian foreign policy has long stressed
the principle of respect for national sovereignty. Even recently, this posi-
tion generated discomfort in American and European policy circles when
Brazil refrained from supporting proposals for military intervention in
Libya and Syria. Although the NATO alliance does not have significant
interests in the South Atlantic region, Brazilian foreign and defense poli-
cies stress that the region’s security issues should be addressed primarily by
local actions rather than by external interventions. The South Atlantic, in
other words, is a space in which Brazilian opposition to interventionism
has become particularly pronounced, even if in a pre-emptory way.
In order to deepen understanding of these positions, their ensuing ini-
tiatives, and the resulting reactions, at the end of 2011 the BPC research
team began to study this topic more systematically, mapping and analyzing
the changing landscape and working to identify the opportunities and
challenges it poses to Brazilian foreign and defense policy. While investi-
gating the rather scarce literature on the South Atlantic by scholars from
the United States and Europe, we encountered, and admittedly at first
adopted, a rather uncritical perception that the South Atlantic represents
a “strategic backwater” (see, for instance, Lesser 2010). As the team
researched the history of the region, conducting archival research and
interviews with key stakeholders, we began to unearth and incorporate
into our analysis different perspectives, primarily from Brazil. We quickly
realized that the language of “backwater” reflected the mainstream,
American and Eurocentric geographic biases and cognitive maps of power.
We also began to question the practice of transposing certain analogies to
BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY… 343
Some of our team’s findings are included in academic papers that have
been published both nationally and internationally. Some of these journals
are Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, Polar Journal, and Revista CIDOC d’Afers Internacionals.
Another essay was included in a book jointly edited by the Instituto de
Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada (IPEA), a government think tank whose
portfolio includes international security topics, and the Ministry of
Defense. In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed the book to
all of its embassies, to the diplomatic delegations of the states along the
South Atlantic, as well as to the delegation of Brazil at the UN agencies.
Other aspects of the research were investigated in policy briefs, through
executive summaries or bulleted recommendations, in order to facilitate
their reading by policy circles. These studies were published not only by
the BRICS Policy Center, but also by partner institutions in other South
Atlantic states, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs.
At the same time, debate with external actors was encouraged through
participation in a variety of workshops and presentations, held in Brazil
and in Africa. BPC’s network of partner institutions, especially in South
Africa and Angola, was essential to gain access to key information and to
audiences on the African side of the South Atlantic. When requested, we
also released interviews to the media, such as the Folha de São Paulo or the
BBC, for reports on Brazil–Africa relations.
Particularly remarkable is BPC’s effort to involve undergraduate and
graduate students (some of them were taking a class on the South Atlantic,
while others were interns or research assistants) on the research team. Far
from being passive participants, the students actively contributed to the
project. They scrutinized the minutiae of maritime law in order to figure
out how UNCLOS enables or constrains the actions of states and of other
international actors within the South Atlantic. They also drafted a policy
brief (forthcoming) describing the role of the BRICS countries in the
Commission of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
While working on the project, we realized that we had to strike a bal-
ance between offering a new perspective on the South Atlantic that was
not limited by “Northern” perspectives and IR frameworks, and making
research relevant to the national as well as international audiences.
Breaking too abruptly with the established theories of security and IR
would mean restricting our chance to rapidly influence the ongoing debate
on the South Atlantic and on Brazil’s approach within the region. Since
policy-makers often favor brief and direct forms of communication, we
BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY… 345
has partnered with the Naval War College in Rio de Janeiro and the
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul to conduct more fieldwork and
expand the project.
In 2014, as part of efforts to promote dialogue with academics and
non-state sectors, the Ministry of External Relations held a series of pan-
els discussions meant to provide input to Brazil’s first foreign policy
white paper, and BPC participated in some of the sessions, describing the
research we are conducting on the South Atlantic. More recently, we
have embarked on a series of case studies concerning Brazil’s security
interests in, and defense ties to, a number of states and territories along
the South Atlantic. As part of the research, we have participated in closed
meetings with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of External
Relations and carried out interviews with their representatives. The first
two publications resulting from this project were published in 2014: an
article on Brazil’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau (Journal of
Peacebuilding and Development) and an article on Brazilian interests in
Antarctica (Polar Journal). In order to promote this research in Brazil
and in other Lusophone countries, we are currently translating the texts
into Portuguese.
Although direct effects on policy are difficult to identify, diplomats
have confirmed that the project’s publications have helped in the decision-
making process and in priority-setting discussions regarding the South
Atlantic. The research also had some impact on how Brazil is resuming
cooperation with Guinea-Bissau—which had been suspended after the
coup d’état which occurred in Bissau in April 2012—by calling the atten-
tion of Brazilian and UN policy-makers to the need to better intertwine
the reforms of the security sector with development initiatives, particularly
those geared at creating new income-generating activities.
Channels and Challenges
To research the debate about the security situation in the South Atlantic,
the team drew on BPC’s internal assets as well as other connections. The
think tank has a dynamic agenda of events and publications that helped to
move the discussion along through workshops and colloquia. Because
BPC is a university-affiliated think tank, we built up links to curricular and
extracurricular activities at PUC, designing a research-based course for
students and encouraging the direct participation of undergraduate and
graduate students as interns and researchers.
BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY… 347
With regard to its external links, BPC has established channels of dia-
logue with several government divisions, including the Ministry of Defense
and its newly established in-house think tank, the Instituto Pandiá
Calógeras, which aims to actively contribute to the discussion and research
of Brazil’s security and defense concerns. Conversations with researchers
and officials from the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, helped BPC
researchers to understand some of the military tactical concerns and strat-
egies in the South Atlantic, as well as the technological demands of the
region’s security challenges. Ongoing dialogue with colleagues from the
state-affiliated Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada (IPEA), also
based in Brasília, has kept BPC researchers abreast of the government’s
research agenda in international security, and has provided another outlet
for our team’s publications.
A multiyear grant from the Ministry of Defense and the Brazilian
Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES),
won by the Institute of International Relations in partnership with the
Nava War College and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, envi-
sioned a series of joint workshops, fieldwork trips, and publications in
2015 and 2016. Also in Brasília, regular conversations with the Ministry
of Foreign Relations and other government divisions helped to contextu-
alize Brazil’s initiatives regarding the South Atlantic, as well as other
domestic priorities within the broader framework of Brazilian foreign
policy.
Through contacts at the UN and other institutions focused on mari-
time law, the BPC team was able to learn more about the role of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). At the same
time, ties with non-state actors, including major companies operating in
African and Brazilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with
activities related to foreign policy and security (such as the São Paulo–
based Conectas), helped to move the analysis beyond a narrowly state-
centric perspective, particularly with regard to relations with Africa.
The BPC team has also drawn on the Center’s vast network of think
tanks abroad. Since its establishment, the BPC has participated in the
think tank network associated with the BRICS Academic Forum, which
belongs to a series of civil society initiatives that take place simultaneously
with the BRICS summits.
The BPC has signed Memoranda of Understanding with dozens of
partner institutions, including other think tanks, research centers, univer-
sities, and policy institutions located in developing countries (within and
348 A. E. ABDENUR
outside the BRICS states). These connections have been essential to its
work on the South Atlantic, both in terms of advancing the research and
with respect to disseminating the results. For instance, through a series of
workshops organized in Johannesburg and in Rio de Janeiro with the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), BPC has been
able to include African perspectives on region-building and maritime
power in the South Atlantic, and learned about comparable security issues
in the Indian Ocean.
BPC’s network of scholars and institutions is not restricted to other
developing countries. In the area of maritime issues, recent collaborations
include the Brookings Institution and the Naval Postgraduate School in
the United States, as well as the German Marshall Fund of the United
States in Brussels. Likewise, participation in events about NATO and mili-
tary intervention, some of which were convened by European think tanks,
has been crucial for refining understanding of how the Brazilian govern-
ment’s perspective on the organization has changed across time, as well as
external reactions to these viewpoints.
Through these events, BPC was able to present ongoing research and
publications related to its projects, in both English and Portuguese.
In addition to these institutional ties, until 2013 the BPC also had a
visiting scholars program, the BRICS Policy Center Fellows, which
brought researchers and experts from other BRICS countries to Rio de
Janeiro for residencies varying between one and three months. Fellows
from India and China, collaborating with our research team, noted that
rising powers are increasingly engaged in region-building, including their
maritime spaces. Presentations by, and conversations with, Haibin Niu of
the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) helped us to under-
stand how the growing importance of sea lines of communication (SLOCS)
and maritime natural resources have contributed to a shift in Chinese naval
policy. Indian colleagues shed light on changing dynamics of competition
and cooperation in the Indian Ocean. We found some similarities with
Brazil’s experience in the South Atlantic, despite the vast differences in
geopolitical context, eventually yielding some comparative studies.
Interviews in Pretoria and London helped to shed light on the surge in
piracy, as well as on the efforts to combat the phenomenon off the coast of
Somalia. This type of comparative perspective contributed to shaping our
perceptions of South Atlantic dynamics, and allowed a cross-regional com-
parative analysis that helped to situate the power dynamics of the South
Atlantic in light of the broader changes affecting the international system.
BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY… 349
Throughout these initiatives, the BPC team has dealt with a number of
challenges. At a practical level, the relative scarcity of funding available in
Brazil for research, particularly for research on international affairs, has
limited the number of countries in South America and Africa that the
team could visit for interviews and other data collection, as well as the
amount of time we could spend in each place. Team members have tried
to handle this scarcity by undertaking some field research, especially inter-
views, when participating as guests at events organized by other South
Atlantic states, such as Argentina and South Africa. In addition, BPC’s
location outside of Brasília makes it difficult to establish and maintain
lines of communication with the government and diplomatic delegations
in Brazil. This requires not only ensuring that these relations are main-
tained through emails, but also making an effort to set up meetings when-
ever in town for other commitments, or when government interlocutors
come to Rio de Janeiro for events. Finally, in order to strengthen relations
among think tanks within the South Atlantic, we are replying on the
emerging platform of the Pró-Defesa research partnership to strengthen
ties with think tanks in Argentina as well as across the South Atlantic, with
already established contacts with other institutions in South Africa,
Angola, Nigeria, and Cape Verde.
Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of how the BPC research team is con-
tributing to security policy debates on the South Atlantic by “reframing”
the geopolitical understanding of the region in the light of local interests
and perspectives, and considering a broad range of actors. The project
found intellectual inspiration in Acharya and Busan’s argument about the
need to diversify international relations approaches beyond Western per-
spectives and focus on policy issues, with an attempt to propose an innova-
tive viewpoint. Thereby, it balanced the aim to provide alternative views
on South Atlantic security with content that would be relevant and intel-
ligible to policy interlocutors in Brazil and abroad.
It is important to highlight and summarize these efforts within the
broader context of the think tank landscape in Brazil. First, the case ana-
lyzed illustrates some of the advantages of a newly founded institution: in
particular, the possibility of considering “moving targets” and of
developing a new perspective on traditional topics, as well as some of the
main challenges in establishing a credible voice and, as a consequence,
350 A. E. ABDENUR
Mexico: An Overview
James G. McGann
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Claudia Calvin Venero
Presentation
In 2012, Mexico held the Presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) Summit.
Different groups and forums, labeled “Partners,”1 had traditionally gath-
ered, such as the business community through the Business 20 (B20),
Civil society (C20), Labour (L20), and Youth (Y20), plus other groups
like the Young Girls (Girls202). Groups of think tank specialists who had
never gathered before within the framework of the meeting, nor had been
invited to participate in the process, were included for the first time. Think
tanks met at the highest governmental level in Mexico to debate, analyze,
and make proposals that were presented to the Mexican Sherpa and
Summit Coordinator, Ambassador Lourdes Aranda, and addressed to the
1
“Working with Partners,” G20 2014, http://www.g20australia.org/g20_priorities/
working_partners.
2
“G(irls)20 Summit: G(irls)20,” http://www.girls20.org/programs/girls20-summit/.
C. C. Venero (*)
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI), Mexico City, Mexico
Leaders’ Sherpas, who met in Los Cabos, Baja California, Mexico that
year. The Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) co-hosted
the meeting with the Mexican Foreign Ministry and presented the debate
to the Mexican Sherpa and head of the Summit.
How could this change happen? What was debated? What was the
impact and further consequences? What can be expected in future
Summits?
The underpinning of this analysis is based in epistemic community the-
ory.3 In this theory, the role of ideas is considered an independent variable
in the policy-making process and portrayers of ideas have an important
role. In this case, the “portrayers of ideas” and their capacity to link ideas
to policies, their characteristics, their ability to operate, act, and impact, as
well as their understanding of the institutional and political framework
within which they can participate, are key factors.
The results of the two-day discussions were practical and specific pro-
posals that were presented directly to the Sherpas who gathered in the
preparation meetings that took place in Los Cabos later that year.
Participants
The participants were from twenty-one institutions from sixteen coun-
tries.7 Here is the list with their names, institutional affiliation, and coun-
try of origin:
5
Thomas Kerr and Brindusa Fidanza, “Mexico’s ‘Green Growth’ Revolution Gathers
Pace,” World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2012/10/
mexicos-green-growth-revolution-gathers-pace/.
6
Aranda, “México Y El G-20,” 5.
7
“Think 20—Cobertura del Think 20 por COMEXI,” http://think20.consejomexicano.
org/.
THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT 359
• Australia
Mark Thirlwell, Lowy Institute for International Policy
• Brazil
Rogério Sobreira, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
• Canada
Paul Martin, Council of the Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA)
Barry Carin, Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI)
Thomas Bernes, Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI)
• China
Liwei Qian, China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR)
• Germany
Nancy Alexander, Heinrich Boell Foundation of North America
Thomas Fues, German Development Institute (DIE)
• India
Parthasarathi Shome, Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations (ICRIER)
Rakesh Mohan, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University
• Indonesia
Maria Monica Wihardja, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)
• Japan
Shinichi Kitajima, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
• Mexico
Andrés Rozental, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Enrique Berruga, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Carlos A. Heredia, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
(COMEXI)
360 C. C. VENERO
• Russia
Vladislav Inozemtsev, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies
• Rwanda
Antonia Mutoro, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
(IPAR-Rwanda)
• Singapore
Barry Desker, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
• South Korea
Wonhyuk Lim, Korea Development Institute (KDI)
• Spain
Giovanni Grevi, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)
• Turkey
Sarp Kalkan, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
(TEPAV)
• United States
Stewart Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
David Shorr, The Stanley Foundation
Colin Bradford, Brookings Institution
Stephen John, Stedman Spogli Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University
These institutions were invited because they are experts in think tanks
with areas of interest related to the topics discussed at the G20; namely,
the fact that they could have the capacity to influence the world’s “premier
forum for global economic coordination.”8 These think tanks have ana-
lyzed, studied, and debated the G20’s impact, role, and agenda.
8
Reuters, “Analyst View – G20 Ends Reign of G7 in Pittsburgh,” http://in.reuters.com/
article/idINIndia-42720920090926.
THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT 361
Topics Discussed
The two-day meeting revolved around five core sessions with the follow-
ing topics:9
9
This information was taken from the working materials that COMEXI prepared for the
Think Tank Summit (Think 20). It is public and can be found on the G20’ website as well as
in COMEXI’s “Think-20 Meeting: Report to G20 Sherpas” (Mexico, March 2012), http://
think20.consejomexicano.org/?page_id=69.
10
“Agricultural Market Information System: About,” http://www.amis-outlook.org/
amis-about/en/.
362 C. C. VENERO
action. The idea also was to explore the type of measures and actions
that Mexico could undertake, at the time, to better communicate
key G20 messages to the general public. Issues to be considered
would range from the format and methodology of the G20 Summit
to the preparatory process and the Summit itself. This session also
tried to address the possibility of transiting from a crisis management
to a global steering committee, considering the financial crisis the
world was going through at that moment (2011).
• The role of think tanks in the G20. The session aimed to promote
and exchange ideas among the participants regarding the contribu-
tions and role that think tanks play in the design and decision-making
of public policy, specifically in the G20. Among the guiding ques-
tions were: How can think tanks be sources of information and new
ideas? How can they participate in the follow-up of the process, com-
mitments, and results (accountability) of the G20? The think tank
international network was also considered and the question raised:
What would happen after Mexico in Russia, Australia, and Turkey?
The sessions took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and every-
thing was discussed following Chatham House Rules. Throughout the
process, the Ministry informed the public about the meeting with press
releases.11
An important aspect of the Think Tank Summit was the public working
breakfast that was hosted by COMEXI on 29 February. This was a public
event with the media, COMEXI’s associates, and embassy officials, with a
panel discussion on Think 20 and the future of the G20. The aim of the
event was to publicize the general debate that took place and present it to
the media and Mexican experts in international relations, as well as foreign
diplomatic officials who worked in Mexico and also participated in the
Council.
Going public was crucial to the debate for Mexican public opinion to
get involved. Traditional and mainstream media were invited, but an inno-
vation for the whole process at that time was the creation of a social media
hub for the event and for the Summit, and a specific webpage: http://
think20.consejomexicano.org.
COMEXI made an alliance with the Mexico Chapter of the Social
Media Club12 and CISCO supported the initiative, providing the techno-
logical infrastructure to broadcast the meeting. The whole public event
was tweeted, transmitted, and blogged. Special one-on-one interviews
were organized for the media with the participants.
The webpage embedded in COMEXI’s website included all the rele-
vant information surrounding Think 20:
11
“La reunión Think-20 concluye exitosamente,” http://think20.consejomexicano.
org/?page_id=30.
12
“Social Media Club,” https://socialmediaclub.org/chapters/chapter-directory?fwp_
country=Mexico. At that moment, the only chapter on Mexico was about Mexico City and
the others were in the process of being constituted.
364 C. C. VENERO
In 2012, COMEXI was setting a precedent not only among its think
tank colleagues worldwide, but also in terms of communication for an
international event.
a. Preparatory Process
b. Leaders’ Summits
The text is precise, concrete, and addresses the major concerns for the
participant economies at the G20 in 2012. It is a critical and assertive
document that reflects the major challenges of the time and has specific
proposals for the topics that were addressed during the Summit.
Highlighting the importance of creating financial stability and of limiting
the negative effect of the Eurozone crisis, it implied a shared responsibility
of all countries and non-governmental actors, as well as the necessity to
find new solutions and include new participants in the conversation.
The relevance of green growth and food stability must be emphasized;
the fact that the issue is considered as a central area of international gov-
ernance for the years to come is vital. Financial and economic policies
should be addressed simultaneously with “green” and agricultural ones.
Finally, the recommendations show a generalized consensus that there is a
demand for adequate G20 organizational and procedural aspects to repre-
sent the actual needs and threats with a very concrete proposal: the need
to have an “idea bank” should be represented by the “Think 20,” which
was taking place and could help the leaders analyze and debate the rele-
vant aspects of their meetings from that Summit onward.
368 C. C. VENERO
For Mexico
Mexico has gone through a major shift in the orientation of its foreign
policy in the last decades. Since the signing of NAFTA, a radical change
had taken place. From having as a guideline for its international participa-
tion a set of basic principles, it became more pragmatic and recognized de
facto that the country also had interests to achieve. Self-determination,
non-intervention, pacific solutions to international controversies, non-
acceptance of threats or use of force to solve problems, judicial equality of
states, international cooperation for development, and a permanent aim of
international peace and security, among others, have been present in the
country’s international actions and policies, but now national economic
interests have been recognized and the impact of the international sce-
nario is considered. Since 1994, the international political and economic
agenda has gone through a similar path, implying the need for adequate
participation by Mexico in the new world reality. As an emerging power,
new paths of leadership should be taken.
Apart from bilateral relations with the United States, which undoubt-
edly are key for Mexico and have defined historically major actions in
political and economic terms, and bilateral relations with other countries,
essentially Spain and Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico has a long
tradition of multilateral participation.15 The Mexican Presidency of the
G20 represented the modernization of that tradition and posed a new
momentum in Mexico’s international presence.
15
Curzio, Leonardo. México: ¿Cómo fortalecer su tradición multilateral?, COMEXI,
México, 2010.
THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT 369
16
Aranda, “México Y El G-20.”
17
Ambassador Andrés Rozental had been exploring this possibility months before with
other think tanks and experts, mainly CIGI from Canada, and the window of opportunity
was set up in Mexico that year as the country held the G20 Presidency.
370 C. C. VENERO
Policy Network COMEXI was, and is up to this moment, the only think
tank in Mexico devoted to the analysis of international affairs and the
impact of the international agenda on Mexican politics. It organizes meet-
ings and roundtables in which policy-makers, analysts, and diverse leaders
gather in off-the-record or Chatham House Rules meetings to debate rel-
evant international issues.
18
A general overview of its membership can be consulted here: “Asociados Ordinarios,”
Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, http://consejomexicano.org/es/comexi-en/
associados/amigos.
372 C. C. VENERO
accessible. The meetings were closed, but the results were made public,
and the open event COMEXI organized was key in socializing the think
tanks’ work and the issues that were debated and presented.
It was also the first time that an international issue had been presented
in Mexico through a social media hub, and COMEXI was the first think
tank to do it in that framework. Today, it is unthinkable to plan a meeting
without a social media strategy. Back in 2011, COMEXI was an innovator
in planning and incorporating a social media strategy for the Summit.
#Think20 was a trending topic and there was an interesting conversation
going on in social media. The alliance with CISCO was key to reaching
international audiences interested in what was being debated and
presented.
After the Mexican Think 20, all the Summits have included a Think 20:
Russia, Australia, Turkey, and China.19 It is important to highlight that the
Think 20 Summits are independent of the G20 Presidency, but they work
as partners and are considered in the Summits.
Final Considerations
In a complex world, where policy-makers are involved in everyday issues
and sometimes do not have the time—though they are supposed to work
for that—to think about the medium- or long-term impact of their actions
and policies, think tanks are aimed at playing a key role. How? Think tanks
are independent analysts of policies and their impact in the world and the
international arena, as “ideas banks.” Their added value is that they are
specialists and not isolated academics, they understand the everyday pres-
sures of policy-makers, opinion leaders, and civil society and try to act in
accordance with them. This type of knowledge, among other things, is
what makes them valuable.
The example presented here of how COMEXI was able to push for-
ward the idea of a Think 20 Summit to the Mexican Presidency of the
G20 in 2012 is an excellent example of how timing, policy networks,
alliances, and outreach are needed more than ever in a world of intercon-
nected complexity.
Alliances and connections among think tanks are vital in this context.
The exchange of information, best practices, innovation, and communica-
19
“Working with Partners,” G20 2014, http://www.g20australia.org/g20_priorities/
working_partners.
THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT 373
tion are needed in today’s world for key international actors with local
roots, and this is necessary to better understand the national meaning of
international challenges and vice versa.
A context overloaded with information requires credible sources. Think
tanks are becoming reliable ones, something that poses a challenge to
them and their objectives: Should they keep on doing long-term analysis
and research or become new media outlets? How should their structure
(financial and organizational) adapt to this; or should they not adapt to it
at all? Should they respond to immediate questions or not lose the focus
on long-term policies? Can they work on both fronts?
Think tanks devoted to international affairs have the challenge of mak-
ing international issues interesting to local audiences, which most of the
time are focused on criticizing particular and national issues and do not
care or seem to understand the connection of world relations and prob-
lems to their local matters.
These are questions that most think tanks are facing and that need to
be solved in the short term. Sharing experiences and challenges is impor-
tant in the think tank global network in order to maximize results and find
new ways of becoming not only influential, but also relevant nationally
and internationally.
PART V
Middle East
CHAPTER 26
Qatar: An Overview
James G. McGann
The abundant oil reserves allow Qatar to enjoy booming economic pros-
perity, while the political system is a monarchy dominated by the Al Thani
family. One feature of the modern Qatari state highlighted is that Qatar
plays a role as a mediator in several regional and international issues. The
understanding of the geopolitical challenges in the Gulf region and its
openness increased Qatar’s impact gradually, from soft power to a combi-
nation of soft and hard power. Research and study centers are involved
directly in policy formulation and providing guidelines. Al Jazeera Centre
for Studies (AJSC) highly emphasizes its scientific research methodology
on issues and phenomena addressed by other media. The main challenges
that research centers in Qatar are currently facing include funding, meth-
odology problems, and political bias (Table 26.1).
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Overview
Qatar is located in the Middle East, a peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf
and Saudi Arabia.1 According to 2015 figures, 88% of the population is
non-Qatari, and only 12% of the population is Qatari. Indians form the
largest expatriate community.2 Most Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims.3
Islam is the dominant religion. Arabic is the official language, and English
is commonly used as a second language.4
Qatar is an absolute monarchy and has been ruled by the Al-Thani family
since independence from Great Britain in 1971. Since 2013, Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad Al-Thani has been in power. It is estimated that the country has
25 billion barrels of oil reserves and has the third largest natural gas reserves
in the world. With these oil and gas reserves, it enjoys the world’s highest
standard of living.5 Qatar is going to host the FIFA World Cup in soccer in
2022, and will be the first Arab country to host this tournament.6
Economic Situation
Qatar has the highest GDP per capita, driven largely by the oil and gas
sector.7 It is the smallest member country of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in terms of both area and population.8 The
unemployment rate is almost zero. In Qatar, health, housing, low-interest
loans, and education are all provided to citizens. Al Jazeera, a world-class
television network, is located in Doha.9
1
Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook: Qatar”. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
2
Jure Snoj. “Population of Qatar by Nationality”. Last modified July 12, 2014. http://
www.bqdoha.com/2013/12/population-qatar.
3
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “International Religious Freedom
Report”. U.S. Department of State. http://m.state.gov/md14011.htm.
4
Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
5
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/qatar.
6
CNN. “Qatar World Cup: Final on December 18, 2022”. March 19, 2015. http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2015/03/19/football/world-cup-qatar/.
7
Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
8
OPEC. “Qatar Facts and Figures”. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_
us/168.htm.
9
Ron Nordland. “New Hope for Democracy in a Dynastic Land”. June 25, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/world/middleeast/emir-of-qatar-abdicates-handing-
power-to-his-son.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
380 J. G. MCGANN
The oil reserves in Qatar are expected to run dry by 2023, from the
estimates of its current rate of production. The government has altered its
economic focus to the production of natural gas, since it has the third-
largest proven natural gas reserves in the world.10 In addition to this, the
country attracts foreign investment in its non-energy sectors, especially
financial services and tourism, by liberalizing the economy.11
Construction and financial services are the largest industries that
contribute to non-hydrocarbon growth. There are many ongoing major
projects in the construction industry, especially in the transport and real
estate sectors. Qatar Rail is building 260 km of rail for the new Doha
Metro, a US $45 billion project. Lusail is another large project, a water-
front development to the north of Doha costing US $40 billion.12
From a demographic perspective, it is important to underline that the
population is made up of more foreigners than Qatari nationals. Foreign
nationals constituted 94.1% of the labor force in the private sector in 2013;
jobs in the private sector account for 74.5% of total jobs in Qatar.
Construction is the sector which employs the vast majority of the foreign
population living in the country. Almost 40% of foreign nationals, mostly
low-skilled manual laborers, work in the construction industry. The second-
largest industry for foreign nationals in Qatar is wholesale and retail trade
(about 13.3%). On the other hand, most Qatari nationals hold jobs in the
public sector (nearly 80%) because of higher pay and better benefits.
Political Scenario
The political system in Qatar is a monarchy, the Al Thani family, which has
ruled Qatar since 1825. Under Qatari law, political bodies are not allowed
to be established. There are no civil society–related organizations for
human rights, nor any institutions for public affairs. Therefore, there is no
transparency on major public policy decisions.13 Qatar is a member of
10
Economywatch. “Qatar Economy”. June 29, 2010. http://www.economywatch.com/
world_economy/qatar
11
Gulfbase. “State of Qatar”. http://www.gulfbase.com/GCC/Index/6.
12
Qatar National Bank (QNB). “Qatar Economic Insight”. September 2014. http://
www.qnb.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id
&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355505319193&ssbinary=true.
13
Ali Khalifa al-Kuwari. “The People Want Reform… in Qatar, Too”. Jadaliyya.
December 10, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8880/the-people-want-
reform%E2%80%A6-in-qatar-too.
QATAR: AN OVERVIEW 381
14
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/pub-
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
CHAPTER 27
Jamal Abdullah
Introduction
Research centers and think tanks have assumed a prominent and increas-
ingly influential role in decision-making processes related to security and
foreign policy in various countries, and especially in the more advanced
states. Several emerging countries have also seen the need to establish
research centers to support decision-makers as they attempt to address the
considerable political, security, economic, social, and cultural challenges
they face, both internally and externally.
In this chapter, the role of research centers in the formulation of for-
eign and security policies in emerging countries is discussed. The case of
Qatar is investigated since it has an active foreign policy. A specific focus
will be dedicated to the role that certain research centers based in Qatar
Dr. Jamal Abdullah is a specialist in Gulf affairs and Qatari foreign policy.
J. Abdullah (*)
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJCS), Doha, Qatar
1
François Thual, Méthode de la géopolitique: Apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité, Paris:
Ellipses, 1996.
RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE… 385
Hamad Al Thani, who had been the deputy emir and crown prince since
2003. Finally, the shifts that have been evident since Sheihk Tamim
assumed power are investigated.
In the second part of the chapter, the major tasks carried out by research
centers are considered. The geopolitical issues in the Arab world, particu-
larly in Qatar, are the object of study. The main challenges that face these
centers and hinder them from fulfilling their missions are taken into
account. Finally, some recommendations are proposed, which, in light of
the Qatari experience, might help to further enhance and activate the role
of similar research centers in the region.
2
Jamal Abdullah, ‘As-siyasa al-kharijiya al-qatariya: at-tahawwulat wal-aafaq’ [Qatar’s
Foreign Policy: Transformations and Prospects] Diplomat Magazine 10, June 2014.; Jamal
Abdullah, As-siyasa al-kharijiya li-dawlat Qatar, 1995–2013: rawafi’uha wa-strateejiyyatuha
[Qatar’s Foreign Policy, 1995–2013: Leverages and Strategies]. Beirut: Al Jazeera Center
for Studies and Arab Scientific Publishers. 2014; Jamal Abdullah and Nabil Al-Nasseri.
‘Siyasat qatar al-kharijiya: istimrariya am i’aadatu tawjeeh?’ [Qatar’s Foreign Policy:
Continuation or Re-orientation?], AJSC report, June 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/
reports/2014/06/201462411230518576.htm; Nabil Al-Nasseri, ‘Siyasat qatar al-khari-
jiya: qati’aa am istimrariya’ [Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Halt or Continuation], AJSC report,
July 2013. http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2013/07/201371195759610610.htm;
Nazem Abdul-Wahid Atheer, ‘Dawr as-siyasa al-kharijiya al-qatariya fi thil al-azmat al-ara-
386 J. ABDULLAH
One way or another, each of these has dictated a shift in Qatar’s foreign
policy, especially in relation to “openness”—the underlying approach that
can be seen as the “secret of Qatar’s foreign policy success.”
As previously noted, the rise of Sheikh Hamad to power in June 1995
signaled the starting point of this openness. It has also gradually pushed
Qatar to the center of the world stage, as it constituted a drastic transfor-
mation in Qatari policy, especially in relation to foreign affairs. While
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, the sixth emir of Qatar who ruled
between 1972 and 1995, had maintained a conservative international rela-
tions policy, his son has carried out a set of internal reforms and estab-
lished a more active and pre-emptive approach to diplomacy.
biya wal-iqlimiya’ [The Role of Qatar’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Arab and Regional
Crisis], Journal of International Studies, 43: 137. 2010.
RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE… 387
neighboring countries and other nations active in the region, and enhanc-
ing the image of Qatar abroad.
Qatar’s strategy of building alliances stems from its policy of active
diplomacy, which is based on a realistic and pragmatic understanding of
the geopolitical challenges facing the Gulf region. After the openness pol-
icy was adopted in the mid-1990s, the first alliance to be built with the
official approval of Sheikh Hamad was with the United States. An invita-
tion extended to US forces to set up military bases on the Qatari peninsula
was a milestone in this alliance, and Al Udeid Air Base is now one of the
largest US Air Force bases outside American territory. As part of its alli-
ance with international superpowers, Qatar also concluded defense agree-
ments with France in August 1994 and in October 1998. No doubt, this
strategic alignment with the United States and other superpowers was
dictated by the need to protect national security.
At the level of good neighborliness, no fundamental changes occurred
after Sheikh Hamad took power. However, the country’s foreign policy
was perhaps more systematically implemented. Thus, while it is true that
the openness policy embraced by Sheikh Hamad is more evident in alli-
ances built with superpowers and medium-sized powers, the policy was
also characterized by a keenness to preserve and develop good ties with
neighboring Gulf countries. In the first decade of the new millennium,
Doha moved to settle border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
and to mend its fences with other neighbors.
Generally speaking, Qatar’s foreign policy had to respond to particular
geographic and political contexts. Accordingly, Qatar tried to secure itself
through ensuring regional balance, and by establishing bilateral and mul-
tilateral ties at the international level. Since the policy of “good neighbor-
liness” is a basic element of Qatar’s foreign policy, it seems unlikely to
change in the near future. Rather, it will remain a key foreign policy strat-
egy. The diplomatic crisis that shook Qatar’s relations with some of its
neighbors in March 2014, leading Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
and Bahrain to recall their ambassadors from Doha, appears to be merely
a passing cloud and is unlikely to taint the ties between Gulf states. The
Riyadh Document, signed by the six states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in April 2014, and under which all members committed
themselves to ending the crisis, was testimony to this neighborly position.3
3
For more on this see, Jamal Abdullah, ‘Azmat sahb as-sufaraa min ad-Doha: Al-bawa’eth
wat-tada’iyaat’ [The Crisis of Withdrawing Ambassadors from Doha: Motives and
388 J. ABDULLAH
Besides, Qatar’s policy on the central cause of the Arab and Islamic nation,
the Palestinian issue, has remained constant and is supported by the good
ties Qatar maintains with all Palestinian parties.
Regarding its “image,” Qatar has adopted a “branding” strategy which
has, to a large extent, succeeded in changing perceptions of the country in
various arenas, including sport, the socio-political and economic fields, the
educational-cultural and media world, as well as in diplomatic circles.
Thanks to this strategy, Qatar has become a key player in the international
community within the space of just a few years.
and Syria. Qatar’s foreign policy shifted from the exercise of soft power to
that of smart power. A term often attributed to Joseph Nye (Assistant US
Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, who has written
several books on the topic), “smart power” refers to a combination of soft
power and hard power, while maintaining the principles and values of a
country’s foreign policy.5
Observers of Qatar’s diplomatic activities have noted that such activities
have become more deliberate than they were before June 2013, a change
that can be attributed to the new emir’s inclination to adopt a new foreign
policy, as stipulated in Article VII of Qatar’s Constitution, which came into
force in 2005.6 This relatively quiet activity does not constitute a retreat of
Qatari diplomacy, but rather a shift in the country’s model of diplomatic
action and an enhancement of the tools of soft diplomacy—including launch-
ing new satellite channels and investing strategically both internally and
externally. Some of these investments are concerned with building the
knowledge and educational capacity of the nation, and sponsoring high-
profile international events in various fields of culture, art, and sports. Such
activities will be key elements of the external activities of the state in the com-
ing years, especially as Qatar prepares to host various international sporting
and cultural events, including the FIFA World Cup in soccer in 2022.
Moreover, the deliberation that has characterized Qatar’s foreign activ-
ities since 2013 is paralleled by the state’s focus on its internal affairs. In
May 2014, for example, a draft bill was announced that, if passed, would
cancel the guardianship system implicit in Qatari labor law and replace it
with a system based on employment contracts. This bill puts into effect
the policy guidelines that Sheikh Tamim outlined in his first speech after
assuming power, in which he focused on plans for state reform and
development.
5
Yahya Al-Yahyawi, ‘Obama wa-otrohat al-quowwa al-thakiya’ [Obama and the Notion of
“Smart Power”], Al Jazeera.net, November 18 2013, http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/
pages/a87a6bd8-1515-4106-8917-774fede68303; Mehdi Lazar, ‘Qatar 2008–2014: Du
soft au smart power’, Diploweb: La Revue Geopolitique, March 23 2014. http://www.
diploweb.com/Qatar-2008-2014-du-soft-au-smart.html.
6
An English translation of The Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar is available
at www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/.../qatar_constitution.doc. Article VII
reads as follows: “The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening
international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international
disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere
in the domestic affairs of states; and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations.”
390 J. ABDULLAH
Thus it can be argued that these slight changes in Qatari policy reflect,
to a degree, the constant interplay between foreign and internal policies—
a phenomenon known in both the advanced and developing worlds. The
aim of these policy shifts is to entrench state rule and popularity in the
aftermath of the rise of a new leader to power; they do not denote a
declining interest in external affairs.
that is of concern to the state, the individual, and society. They have
become a means through which all matters related to societal issues and
challenges may be scientifically examined and assessed. Such organizations
are therefore vital national institutions that should represent the interests
of both citizens and governments in relation to science, knowledge, cul-
tural advancement, and futuristic studies.
Research institutions also contribute directly and indirectly to formu-
lating general state policies, including on security and foreign relations.
They have therefore become an integral part of the political landscape in
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, among others. These centers have carved out a niche that has
made them influential in devising political, social, economic, and educa-
tional guidelines for their countries; they are seen as participants in the
search for solutions to societal problems. To achieve this, they harness
scientific research to address problems, and sketch out possible options
that support higher-level decision-making and policy formulation.7
In the Arab world, interest in research organizations began in the early
2000s. As the scope of their activities has expanded, so have their contri-
butions. The private sector took the initiative to establish specialized
research centers, making a qualitative change in a number of Arab coun-
tries. The phenomenon has since grown rapidly. While hosting an increas-
ing number of international conferences, symposiums, seminars, and
scientific publications, research centers have focused on various social,
economic, and political issues at local, regional, and international levels,
amid successive changes in the Middle East and the world at large.
Nevertheless, in several Arab countries research centers remain rela-
tively inactive. This is not because such organizations do not have the
capacity to play a role, but due to the obstacles they face. In some cases,
the nature of the Arab political model, and ruling regimes that shun
institutional models applied in Western countries, means that research
centers are assigned no meaningful tasks.8
7
Xavier Bertrand, “Le nouveau think tank” Observatoire des think tanks. http://oftt.eu/
think-tanks/generalites/article/le-nouveau-think-tank?lang=it; Marie-Anne Kraft, ‘Quel
rôle jouent les “think tanks” dans la vie politique?’ Blogpost at Mediapart, November 2009.
http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/marie-anne-kraft/111109/quel-role-jouent-les-think-
tanks-dans-la-vie-politique; Leptit, Pierre (n.d.). Le rôle des think tanks. http://www.notre-
europe.eu/media/noteple-thinktanks.pdf?pdf=ok.
8
Khalid Walid Mahmoud, “Dawr marakiz al-abhath fil-watan al-arabi: al-waqi’ al-rahin wa
shorout al-intiqal ila fai’liya akbar [The Role of Research Centers in the Arab World: The
392 J. ABDULLAH
Status Quo and What They Require to Become More Effective],” Arab Center for Research
and Policy Studies, January 2013. http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/3c6dea13-7bd7-
4ea8-83af-f95b9cefb574.
RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE… 393
cies on state security and foreign relations, is an issue that needs in-depth
scientific study. It would also be interesting to compare Qatar-based
research centers with their peers in other countries in terms of the roles
they play in relation to policy formulation, informing and advising
decision-makers, and contributing to the expansion of scientific research
and knowledge.
In general, the role played by Qatar-based research and study centers
can be summed up as follows:
The specific focus areas of research centers often vary according to the
interests of their funders or sponsoring institutions. Some focus, for exam-
ple, on women’s issues, political reform, governance, democracy, or
human rights. When compared to their European and US counterparts,
however, the roles played by Qatari research centers are still relatively lim-
ited when it comes to influencing decision-making and public policy.
Despite its young age, AJSC has become a destination for Arab and
foreign researchers that aspire to contribute to its publications and intel-
lectual products, and who cite the center as a credible scientific authority
when analyzing Arab, regional, and international phenomena and affairs.
It is therefore hoped that AJSC will continue with its pioneering role as a
respectable research institution that provides decision-makers with scien-
tifically based research and recommendations that contribute to decision-
making processes at various levels in the state of Qatar.
The main challenges facing research centers, and restricting their activi-
ties in emerging countries generally (and in the Arab world in particular),
are summed up as follows:
• Securing the necessary financing through grants from the state trea-
sury. The task of delegating funds could be vested in state planning
ministries. Alternatively, an independent body could be established
to oversee research centers and to serve as the authority in charge of
securing moral and financial support for scientific research centers
from both the private and public sectors, and for coordinating
research their fields of interest and specialization.
• Committing themselves to “scientific principles and objectivity.”
This would help to build the trustworthiness of research centers in
the eyes of both the public sector and ordinary citizens. In this con-
text, states would see the value of drawing on the expertise of
research centers when undertaking strategic planning and attempt-
ing to address the various problems of society, as is the case in
advanced countries.
• Enhancing coordination between research centers in ways that
improve the quality of their outputs and allow them to attain the
status they deserve. A mainstream culture needs to be created that
believes that no decision or policy should be made until all related
issues have been thoroughly researched, analyzed, and assessed, and
alternatives considered. An annual exchange of planned research
activities could help to create real integration between research
centers, allowing each center to support others in its own field of
specialization.
• Securing a wider margin of freedom and independence, as well as
access to information, and to the scientific and intellectual products
of other research institutions.
• Recruiting the most highly qualified and experienced researchers,
and then supporting them to further develop their skills.
398 J. ABDULLAH
Conclusion
Despite the increasing number and diffusion of research centers in the
Arab world since the early 2000s, few have earned the status they deserve
due to the many factors outlined in this chapter. It is high time that these
research centers assumed a more pioneering role in serving the societies in
which they are located. In order to work to the benefit of society and the
state, many will need to consider adopting the necessary options outlined
in this chapter to address the obstacles they face that prevent them from
playing an optimum role.
In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge that I have not been able to
fully address all aspects of the situation facing research centers in emerging
countries—such a study would require more time as well as a variety of
resources and documents that are not easily accessible.
CHAPTER 28
Turkey: An Overview
James G. McGann
Situated in the Middle East, Turkey has taken off both economically and
politically since a decade ago (Table 28.1). Though the think tank indus-
try is relatively new and is limited to centralized bureaucracy, an increase
in the number of civil organizations has led to more involvement in policy
areas. The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
(SETA), a foreign policy think tank in Turkey, works on a variety of issues,
including Turkey–European Union relations, the Kurdish issue, and inter-
action with neighbors, so that Turkey’s foreign policy can be implemented
more strategically. It is also aimed at diversifying research in foreign policy
and informing the public. The challenges facing think tanks in Turkey
include political polarization and human resources management.
Overview
Turkey is a transcontinental country and is located in southeastern Europe
and southwestern Asia, bordering the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the
Mediterranean Sea.1 It shares borders with eight countries: Armenia,
1
“Turkey.” The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tu.html.
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Economic Situation
Turkey has the seventeenth-largest GDP in the world and is one of the
founding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Also, it is a Group of 20 (G20) major economy.
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), established in 1930,
has as its main objective to achieve price and financial stability in the coun-
try. CBRT also determines the exchange rate jointly with the Turkish gov-
ernment and is responsible for managing the gold and foreign exchange
reserves.6
According to observers, Turkey appears to be stuck in the “middle-
income trap.” The instability in its neighborhood has affected its export
markets and capital inflows in a negative way. For example, exports to Iran
decreased by 61% between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, Turkey’s exports to
Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 dropped by 15 and 21%,
respectively. Therefore, many economists suggest that Turkey needs to
2
“Turkey: A Country Overview.” Angloinfo. http://turkey.angloinfo.com/moving/
country-file/country-overview/.
3
“Turkey.” The World Factbook.
4
“Turkey.” The World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/
overview.
5
“Turkey: A Country Overview,” Angloinfo.
6
“Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Head Office.” http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/
wcm/connect/tcmb+en/tcmb+en/bottom+menu/about+the+bank.
402 J. G. MCGANN
Political Scenario
Turkey is located in one of the most important intersections of different
foreign policy dynamics. It is situated on the Afro-Eurasian chessboard,
where such challenges and risks interact in the most intensive way. In par-
allel, Turkey’s negotiation process for accession to the EU is still
pending.11
7
Kirisci, Kemal “Getting Out of the ‘Middle-Income Trap,” Hurriyet Daily News. February 18,
2015.http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/18-getting-out-middle-income-
trap-turkey-kirisci.
8
World Bank “Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union”. March 28, 2014. http://
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/turkey/tr-eu-customs-
union-eng.pdf.
9
Ibid.
10
Martin Raiser “European Economic Integration Is the Key to Turkey’s Past and Future”.
March 11, 2015 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/03/
11-europe-turkey-raiser.
11
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa.
TURKEY: AN OVERVIEW 403
12
Bayram Balci “A New Turkish Foreign Policy?”. August 27, 2014. http://www.world-
policy.org/blog/2014/08/27/new-turkish-foreign-policy.
404 J. G. MCGANN
13
Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times,” January 25, 2015,
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/25/turkish-foreign-policy-in-turbulent-times/.
14
Yuksel Inan-Yucel Acer, “The Agean Disputes” http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/docu-
ments/251202.pdf.
CHAPTER 29
Kadir Ustun and Kilic Kanat
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the think tank environment in Turkey
and explains the kinds of instances in which think tanks such as the
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) can have
an impact on policy decisions and public opinion.
Since think tanks are a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey, many of
the issues they deal with are parallel to the weaknesses and strengths of the
country’s policy-making community in general. As Turkey has virtually
taken off economically and politically over the past decade, the country’s
foreign policy has also broadened its scope and intensity within the broader
issues were not taken into account by the state establishment. These issue
areas are considered too critical to allow civilians to engage in them. In the
early 2000s, there was a strong demand from society for further democra-
tization of the country at all levels. This environment welcomed the start
of the European Union (EU) membership negotiation process, which led
to the explosion of civil society organizations, thanks partly to the inflow
of EU funds for a diverse set of civil society projects. Estimates show that
the number of NGOs in Turkey has quadrupled since the early 2000s.
An increase in the number of civil society organizations led to the enlarge-
ment of civilian initiatives in all policy areas. Think tanks benefited from
these developments, and several of them focused on specific policy areas
emerged. The state institutions were subjected to a reform process demanded
by the EU and they became much more open to outside opinion and analy-
ses. During this period, different civil initiatives were established that aimed
to influence the country’s foreign policy. Groups of scholars formed their
own campaigns and platforms in order to promote their views. They were
less institutional and more informal gatherings of experts in the field. In
particular, these different groups emerged during the EU integration pro-
cess. Especially during the EU’s negotiations with Turkey, civil society plat-
forms tried to intervene in the process and expedite political reform in
Turkey. To be sure, the Turkish bureaucratic institutions remain highly cen-
tralized and somewhat close to outside influences, but in comparison to the
rigidity of separation between the state and society in the 1980s and 1990s,
in the 2000s there was a much higher level of interaction and give-and-take
between civil society organizations and state institutions.
As the Turkish economy has been successful in continued growth over
the past decade, the Turkish private sector—with the help of legal changes
favorable to private donations to civil society organizations—has grown to
be much more supportive of NGOs in general. As a result of the EU nego-
tiation process, unprecedented levels of funding became available to uni-
versities and civil society projects. Much of this funding created a high
degree of focus on “EU studies” in Turkish universities and EU-oriented
policy studies. The Turkish public became much more informed about
EU-related policy issues, but think tanks focused on other policy areas
remained in the minority. The main focus of the newly emerging think
tanks during this period was EU-–Turkey relations. Both Euro-skeptics
and pro-EU circles formed small think tanks and institutes in order to sup-
port their positions in regard to Turkey’s European integration process.
Despite the fact that there was arguably an overemphasis on the institutional
408 K. USTUN AND K. KANAT
study of the EU, many undergraduate and graduate students were able to
travel to the EU at much higher rates than in previous decades. This led to
a much more realistic assessment of what the EU was about and what
Turkey’s expectations from becoming a member should have been. The
debate over the EU following the emergence of these think tanks and
studies has also become more sophisticated, based on accurate informa-
tion and influenced by Euro-skeptic and integrationist positions within
the EU.
Complex policy concerns, such as the Kurdish issue, were always diffi-
cult to discuss in Turkey. The main locus of such discussions were their
security dimension, and thus most of the experts and go-to people in these
fields were former generals or mayors. The development of NGOs in the
2000s contributed to a much freer environment for debate and exchange
of ideas on this issue. Some public opinion polls (an important one was
published by SETA) challenged some of the conventional wisdom in this
regard. For instance, the support for independence among the Kurdish-
speaking public was actually much lower than it was thought to be.
Similarly, workshops and conferences on matters such as the Alevi and
Armenian issues allowed for public recognition of previously unacknowl-
edged ethnic and sectarian problems lying beneath the surface. Of course,
the political reform packages that were adopted during the first years of
the AK Party government, in order to launch accession negotiations with
the EU, greatly helped the emergence of these platforms. Intellectuals,
journalists, and academics for the first time started to discuss these issues
in workshops without any fear of possible persecution. Although during
these years the think tank industry in Turkey was far from being estab-
lished and mature, it had helped in strengthening public awareness and
recognition of policy issues. A new generation of civilian experts emerged
in areas that were deemed as being within the monopoly of the state and
its bureaucracy.
Turkish foreign policy has long been considered part of the national
security outlook, but it was rarely part of the public debate. It remained
within the purview of the ruling civilian and military bureaucratic institu-
tions. As a major NATO partner, Turkey aligned its policies with the West
during the Cold War and there was not much room or the need for it to
develop a cohesive foreign policy of its own. In the post–Cold War era,
Turkish ruling elites saw “opportunities” in the crumbling of the Soviet
empire and made some overtures to Central Asia in the hopes of extend-
ing Turkish influence in the region. This was not a very successful strategy,
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION… 409
tanks to provide answers for questions that were not necessarily within the
scope of their areas of research or interest. For example, whenever there
arose a foreign policy issue, media organizations and news shows turned
to think tanks without necessarily worrying about the particular issues on
which these think tanks worked. Even if a think tank did not have a spe-
cialist on, say, Iran, the expectation was there for the think tank to respond.
This perception of think tanks at times led to overstretching of resources
and a push by the media on think tanks towards focusing on more day-to-
day developments, rather than long-term concerns and projects. To a large
extent, think tanks have to worry about both short-term and long-term
issues, but it is safe to say that there has been more of a focus on the short
term in Turkey because of the fast pace of developments in recent years
and the demand by the general public for quick and easy expertise.
Similarly, sometimes various segments of the business community expected
think tanks to provide business risk analysis, which was outside their exper-
tise and focus. Moreover, the domestic political developments in Turkey
have also made it more difficult for think tanks and experts on foreign
policy to meet rising expectations, as the public expected responses to
their questions on domestic politics, too. This has also distracted the
attention of foreign policy think tanks from their expertise towards domes-
tic politics. Both of these developments have raised issues in regard to the
need for the institutionalization of the think tank industry.
When think tank experts spoke about foreign policy issues, they were
often judged by their stance on domestic issues. As the foreign policy
issues were treated within a framework of failures and successes only, the
opposition rushed to present the virtually failed states in Syria or Iraq as
the natural consequence of the ruling party’s policies towards the region.
The political polarization hampered specialists’ and academics’ efforts to
arrive at a deeper understanding of the regional developments and their
impact on Turkey. As any fallout or political problem emanating from the
Arab Spring was considered a failure of the ruling party in Turkey, under-
taking a healthy debate became increasingly difficult. The general percep-
tion that SETA is close to the current government in Turkey made it
difficult to provide objective analysis, as most analyses produced by the
organization were perceived to be endorsing the government’s policy in
one way or another.
For instance, in Libya, Turkish think tanks were confronted with the
question of how to secure the lives of some 20,000 Turkish citizens, to
protect trade relations, and at the same time be part of the Western alli-
ance that was on the side of the rebels. Turkey’s initial hesitation to
endorse Western intervention drew criticism at home and abroad that
Turkish foreign policy-makers were for democratic ideals only when it
served the country’s national interests. Ensuring the safety of its citizens
was the main priority for the country, but it was a delicate task for think
tanks to come up with ideas about how to convince the Qaddafi regime to
give up power while preventing an impending civil war that would result
in the division of Libya.
Turkish think tanks such as SETA endorsed a policy of dialogue with
the Qaddafi regime until the end, with the idea that negotiations could
yield a last-minute deal and prevent further militarization of the situation.
Especially given the dismal legacy of Western interventions in the region,
Turkey was reluctant about an intervention in Libya. This view was pro-
moted by foreign policy think tanks and the general public were very
attentive to the issue, given the large number of Turkish citizens living in
Libya as well as the long-standing economic relationship between the two
countries. When this policy was undercut by the efforts of France at the
time, Turkey readjusted its Libya policy and agreed to bring the issue to
the NATO platform, instead of a “coalition of the willing” under the lead-
ership of France. Turkey supported the humanitarian aspects of the NATO
intervention and realigned its position once all efforts to convince Qaddafi
had failed. SETA, alongside some other think tanks, was instrumental in
advising that Turkey should find a way to strike a deal between the rebels
and the Qaddafi regime in order to prevent a civil war and potential divi-
sion of the country, while securing Turkish citizens and Turkey’s interests.
A negotiation was not possible, but Turkey was able to secure its citizens
and, to a large degree, its economic interests. Turkey remains a critical
actor in Libya, but the country continues to have serious security chal-
lenges, which SETA had foreseen and warned the government and the
Turkish public about. In this way, some of SETA’s policy recommenda-
tions were adopted, but the developments on the ground as well as the
international dynamics prevented a de facto partition of Libya.
This case demonstrated the difficulty of balancing long-term policy
research goals and short-term policy recommendations, which needed to
be produced urgently. SETA as a whole has had considerable expertise on
the Middle East, but its expertise on Libya was rather limited. There was
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION… 415
little readily available literature on Libya and it did not deal with policy
issues. The think tanks had to very quickly acquaint themselves with the
current dynamics in an environment with fast-moving developments on
the ground. They also had to gauge international attitudes towards the
issue in order to make recommendations on how the country should posi-
tion itself vis-à-vis other international actors and allies. This was a rather
difficult task, especially in the context of the Arab Spring, which shook the
whole region to its core and brought to the fore deep-seated structural
problems. The unfolding of events at such a rapid pace required very quick
answers and did not leave much time even for short-term projects, let
along long-term research. Nevertheless, think tanks like SETA were able
to identify the broader regional dynamics and warn against impending
civil war and disintegration.
about it launched an extensive debate in the public realm. The tone and
content of this debate were different than previous discussions that had
taken place on this topic. Adding to the analysis of the conflict, the poten-
tial ways to resolve the conflict also started to be discussed among scholars
and experts in Turkey. This started to be discussed with a different dis-
course that focused on the resolution of ethnic conflicts and the role of
democratization in resolving these issues, instead of the previously uti-
lized security and military discourse.
In addition, SETA convened workshops on this issue to include expert
opinion to guide research and recommendations. It also researched and
catalogued specific demands of Kurdish political actors. Think tank
research combined with up-to-date data on public opinion can clear the
way for bolder reform. In this example, SETA was instrumental in helping
better understand the specific demands of the Kurdish public and gauging
the Turkish public’s sensitivities. Finally, its approach to the Kurdish prob-
lem not only influenced the domestic perception of this question and the
government’s attitude, but also created an impact on the foreign policy
dimension. For instance, SETA’s reports and work on the Kurdish issue
promoted a policy of engagement with the Kurdish Regional Government
in Iraq (KRG) in order to help redefine Turkey’s threat perception. For
many years, Turkish foreign policy had been skeptical of the role of the
Kurdish political parties and organizations in northern Iraq. SETA, in its
workshops and in the works of its experts, promoted the idea of engaging
with northern Iraq in order to create a win–win situation for both Turkey
and the KRG that would help Turkey deal with the threat of the PKK and
t provide economic benefit for both countries. This viewpoint contributed
to helping to change the perception that any Kurdish political actor was a
potential threat to Turkey.
Human Resources
One of the main challenges with which organizations like SETA have to
deal has to do with human resources. Think tanks usually attract academ-
ics with policy-oriented research to bridge the gap between academia and
the government, and previous practitioners of foreign and domestic policy
who will inform the public about the real practice of these policies. In the
case of Turkey, until very recently, academia has traditionally been quite
closed to interaction with the government in terms of researching and
providing policy solutions. The government bureaucracy, for its part, is
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION… 417
also closed to input from outside expertise. This level of weak interaction
between the universities and the bureaucracy has prevented the produc-
tion of policy experts with academic credentials to enter the policy realm
and inform and influence government policy. Very often, researchers and
assistants applying for jobs in think tanks assume that these institutions are
essentially academic. They assume that they would be conducting research
essentially in the same way as academics do. This means that the human
resource pool on which think tanks draw tends to have little exposure to
policy research, which should entail engaging policy-makers as well as
political actors from different ideological backgrounds.
Think tanks such as SETA find themselves having to orient their experts,
researchers, and assistants towards policy research and, to some extent,
away from pure academic research. Thus, part of the understated mission
of think tanks like SETA is to train experts who can connect theory and
practice and conduct more policy-oriented research. The same problems
arise in regard to the linkage between bureaucracy and think tanks. Because
of the lack of political and civil appointees, there has been a lack of con-
nection between the two worlds. Even the interest among retired former
bureaucrats in think tanks was so low that the think tanks had difficulty in
recruiting former bureaucrats and learning from their experiences. Because
of this situation, think tanks in most instances failed to close the gap in
information about the functioning and decision-making of the govern-
ment and bureaucracy.
Conclusions
As the Turkey-based think tanks grapple with policy questions, they have
benefited from the country’s increased economic success and profile. They
exert much greater influence today than they have in the past thanks to the
civilianization of politics in general. At the same time, they suffer from the
detrimental effects of political polarization and lack of sufficient human
capacity in policy research, among other difficulties. Nevertheless, the
think tank industry continues to grow and mature, and to prove, by at
least partial successes, its ability to influence foreign policy in specific
instances. In the next few years and beyond, Turkey would greatly benefit
from further proliferation of think tanks with niche areas of policy research.
Greater involvement of both the private and public sector in funding this
kind of research would also be a boon to the industry, and ultimately to
the refinement of policy-making in Turkey.
PART VI
Conclusion
CHAPTER 30
James G. McGann
The emergence of new powers in the past decade has opened up a number
of new fields of academic and policy inquiry regarding the role of these
newly empowered state actors in the international environment, in the
management of the global order, and in the recalibration of international
relations. Similarly, it has brought about new, challenging conditions for
these emerging powers themselves to assert their position and voice within
international institutions and, more generally, an ever more complex
global setting. The challenge, as many of the chapters in this book have
demonstrated, is rendered even harder by the simultaneous need to claim
a more active international role while at the same time dealing with the
numerous internal political and social transformations that most of these
countries are witnessing, and with the regional dynamics in which these
emerging powers are involved as stakeholders.
This edited volume has aimed to look at rising powers and the impact
that their emergence has had on their foreign and security policy through
the viewpoint of their national think tanks. A key question throughout the
J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
book has been whether and in what way the transformation of foreign
policies has opened up relatively more space for policy advice, and thus
given impetus for the emergence of a new think tank culture in these
countries. As all of the chapters demonstrate, foreign and security policy
think tanks have undoubtedly grown in importance in emerging powers,
and the nature and relevance of their role in the evolution of these coun-
tries’ foreign policy cannot be neglected. In much of the formulation and
secondary diplomacy of these countries, think tanks have become actors in
their own right.
As McGann points out in the introduction, think tanks have come a
long way from their initial definition and have assumed varying—at times
hybrid—forms. While loosely based on the archetypal US model, when
compared to Anglo-American and Western European think tanks
emerging- power think tanks have a different history, which not only
begins later in time, but is also formulated by legal, political, social, and
financial conditions that differ substantially from the former. As most
scholars concur, non-US think tanks (which now exceed US think tanks in
number) can assume varying and very diverse characteristics, including
with regard to their degree of independence, partisanship, funding, and
administration.
The term “emerging powers” itself remains one which can refer to a
very diverse set of countries. While by and large it is used to describe the
set of countries with substantial projected economic power in the foresee-
able future (as in Jim O’Neill’s initial predictions regarding the BRICS), it
describes nations characterized by varying degrees of democracy, social
equality, market liberalization, populations, and military expenditures, and
certainly with diverging foreign and security policy concerns. To take the
BRICS group—a popular subcategory of the “emerging power” set—as
an example, two of the members are permanent members of the UN
Security Council, while the rest are not. This in itself provides for a very
different foreign and security policy tradition and doctrine. Military
expenditure in Brazil and South Africa is a little over 1% of GDP, while in
the Russian Federation it reaches up to 4.2% of GDP.
These differences become even more acute when one considers larger
groups of emerging countries such as the BRICSAM, referred to in the
introduction to this book, and the G20, which is the group that has been
used as the pool for the case studies included here. At the same time, how-
ever, the simultaneous development of the need for a more active and
far-reaching foreign policy which has accompanied the “emerging power”
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL… 423
label has led to a common trend for more visibility of foreign and security
policy think tanks in these countries. This fundamental shift in global role
and the impact it has had on the demand for think tank activity have been,
in one way or another, a cross-cutting trend in these chapters.
Beyond this general conclusion, a comparison between the case studies
illustrates several other observations regarding the ongoing trends and
challenges for emerging-power foreign policy think tanks in terms of their
activities, networks, functions, and obstacles. The aim of this conclusion is
to bring together these aspects and provide food for thought regarding
future research agendas in this area.
Agendas
As has been mentioned, the process of transformation of the global order
that has been set in motion by the emergence of new powers has necessi-
tated a stronger involvement of these same countries in issues of global
and collective governance. In fact, a common characteristic of emerging
powers has been the collective demand for a reform of the institutional
architecture of global governance, particularly of the Bretton-Woods insti-
tutions which—emerging economies argue—do not reflect the current
distribution of economic power. As maintained in the introduction, the
empowering of the G20, viewed as a more representative mechanism, has
been a key priority on emerging powers’ agendas. It thus comes as little
surprise that the global aspects of the agendas of the foreign policy think
tanks of these countries are strongly linked to issues of multilateral coop-
eration and the reform of global governance.
Yet, it would seem that global issues in general assume a secondary
position on think tanks’ agendas, while regional ones take a much more
prominent role. Indeed, traditionally most of these states’ foreign policy
has been concerned with their immediate region. While the “emerging”
label has brought with it a greater demand and responsibility to be involved
in global issues, the regional dimension remains strong. It is telling that
most Asian think tanks have research strands on regional organizations on
the continent, while the Latin American counterparts focus on their own
region, including the South Atlantic, which assumes great importance in
both the Brazilian and Argentinian cases. Indeed, prior to the past decade
and to the significant upgrading of their weight in international affairs, a
number of the countries studied maintained explicit foreign policy goals
only with regard to their neighborhoods and to major trading partners
424 J. G. MCGANN
such as the United States and the European Union. At the same time,
emerging-power think tanks are situated in critical regions in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America and their local expertise provides in-depth and expert
analyses of regional events with a global impact. The example of the Arab
Spring on the agenda of the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (Qatar) is one
where the think tank serves as a gateway for the world.
Emerging-power foreign policy is also traditionally linked inextricably
with domestic issues. The spillover onto the agenda of think tanks is evi-
denced in most case studies, most characteristically in that on South Africa,
which highlights this by pointing out that development and racial issues
constitute primary items on the foreign policy agenda. Similarly, the
IFANS case study (South Korea) illustrates how an issue of national
pride—the successful hosting of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security
Summit—became a key project for the think tank. Argentinian think
tanks’ engagement with the Malvinas issue is once again illustrative of the
“close to home” approach of think tank agenda-setting.
Another discernible trend is the development of new area studies
research lines. This can be partially explained by the need for knowledge
to support the more assertive and wide-ranging foreign policies adopted
by their governments. At the same time, as Abdenur points out in the
chapter on Brazil, the development of expertise on other developing
regions is a result and a necessary condition for the expansion of new types
of regionalisms and minilateralisms among emerging powers and develop-
ing regions (BRICS, South–South cooperation, IBSA, G20). These for-
mats bring together nations previously little known to each other. The
case, thus, seems to be that in this scenario think tanks assume the task of
providing knowledge that bridges the gap between these emerging “new
partners.”
Finally, in terms of agenda again, as has been posited already, foreign
and security policies and the challenges from which they derive differ sig-
nificantly across emerging powers. The issue of defense, for example, is
more pronounced in some countries, such as China, and much less so in
others, like Singapore. The trend among emerging-power think tanks
would suggest that non-traditional security issues assume a more promi-
nent role compared to traditional ones, constituting a significant differ-
ence from archetypal think tanks of the Western world. International
economic relations also figure prominently on the agenda.
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL… 425
Roles
As was pointed out in the introduction, a question that permeates most of
the literature on think tanks is the role that these institutions play in the
policy process and the public sphere. Various typologies have been devel-
oped to this effect, a number of which are included in earlier chapters.
Importantly, the defining features of the polity in which they operate
(more or less democratic, more or less centralized bureaucracy, more or
less economic prosperity) constitute critical facilitators or constraints for
the way think tanks operate and the roles that they assume.
The overview of foreign and security policy think tanks in emerging
powers suggests significant variations in terms of their role as direct pro-
viders of policy advice and policy ideas to government. While this is the
case with a number of government-sponsored think tanks (e.g., IFANS,
CIIS, IDSA), the accounts of think tanks which are based on non-
governmental financing and leadership often display difficulty in having
direct access to policy-makers and direct input in the policy-formulation
process. The compact nature of government in a number of these coun-
tries could serve to explain this point.
This has led these think tanks to expand their agenda and idea-
promoting roles through other means, most of which are common across
the case studies. We notice, for instance, an emphasis on the networking
and public outreach functions. The networking aspect is particularly
important: think tanks in emerging powers engage heavily in interaction
with like institutions in their own countries and with their counterparts in
the United States and the EU, but also notably in other emerging powers
and—where applicable—other Southern partners. In so doing, they mir-
ror the transforming international relations of the states themselves, which
are rapidly engaging in multilateral cooperation in formats such as the
BRICS, the G20, and South–South cooperation. This trend is facilitated
by the increasing relevance of track-two diplomacy, in which most of our
case study think tanks are involved, and which consists of meetings of
think tank representatives in formats that mirror high-level state meetings.
The BRICS Think Tank Council and the Think 20 format of the G20 are
examples of this phenomenon. This activity gives think tanks the opportu-
nity to collectively communicate policy ideas to policy-makers on the mul-
tilateral level, but also to interact with the ideas formulated in other
emerging powers, thus giving them direct access to the knowledge of their
partners.
426 J. G. MCGANN
Another role that the group of think tanks studied here assume is that
of public diplomacy, referring here to the function of communicating to
the domestic and foreign public the foreign and security policy and issues
on the state agenda. All of the case studies point to the necessity of that
function and to the strategies developed to foster the communication and
dissemination of ideas. Events and conferences feature highly on the list of
activities, not least as a result of demand for information on and under-
standing of emerging powers and their foreign policy goals by foreign
partners and actors who are keen to supply the funding for such events.
Media awareness and engagement form another key feature of the pub-
lic educator role that think tanks assume. Open access publishing is also
common, and the use of social media for dissemination very popular as a
means to ensure that research reaches its intended audience. Finally, there
are important ongoing efforts to overcome the language barrier that
restricts accessibility to publications. The East Asia Institute’s (Korea) use
of multilanguage platforms is an exemplary case which has helped the
Institute achieve global recognition and outreach, but most of the think
tanks are pursuing publication in English in order to increase their audi-
ence and demand.
The lack of sufficient knowledge about emerging powers, their societ-
ies, economies, and politics, has also led to their think tanks assuming a
role of communicator of the state brand. A number of the authors in this
volume (the cases of Qatar, Korea, South Africa, and Brazil) refer to their
function as promoters of information regarding the transformation of the
country (what is termed “emergence”) and its potential to be a significant
actor in the region or in specific policy areas. In a similar light, these think
tanks act as carriers of the country’s power—hard but also soft power.
Finally, a large number of the case study think tanks are either university
based (such as the BRICS Policy Centre in Brazil or the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies in Singapore) or act as “non-degree-
granting” universities, to repeat Orlan’s notion mentioned in the intro-
duction. The pursuit of publications in high-ranking international journals,
based on sound in-depth research, is a common goal among think tanks in
rising powers. This could be explained by the need for recognition and
respect from their US and EU peers, who operate to a large degree within
a system where journal rankings define research performance. A second
explanation could be the relatively recent culture of think tanks in these
countries, as opposed to a more established university culture which links
prestige and serious research to academic publication. In fact, a great
THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL… 427
Challenges
Perhaps more than anything else, foreign and security policy think tanks in
emerging powers share similar challenges and obstacles in the promotion
of their work and the sustainability of their enterprises. Funding, relations
with government, scarcity of human resources, and managerial/leadership
challenges are of shared concern among the authors of this volume, albeit
to different degrees.
Engagement with the official policy process is perhaps the most variable
of these challenges. As some think tanks, such as the Chinese CIIS or the
Indian IDSA, are government funded and affiliated, actual inclusion in
consultations and access to the policy process are made easier. For others,
which are independently funded, the opening of the official apparatus to
think tank ideas is characterized as slow, but gradually improving as the
demands of foreign policy and relevant expertise grow. Often, the bureau-
cratic structures of these countries are highly centralized and difficult to
permeate as a result of historical developments, and think tanks have to
fight their way into the policy consultation process. While there are clear
signs of think tank discourse and concepts being incorporated into official
policy, the impact of interventions is on the whole only observable in the
very long run and difficult to attribute directly to the think tanks them-
selves. At the same time, governments in these rapidly transforming coun-
tries often operate at a fast pace with quick responses to new challenges, a
fact which renders the long-term, research-based approach of several of
the think tanks unattractive to officials. The East Asia Institute’s experi-
ence is a case in point.
For the non-government-financed think tanks, funding is a critical
problem. Research and project agendas are—to an extent—defined by the
demands of potential funders, and the challenge to balance that with intel-
lectual freedom and independence is a constant one. Proactive external
project financing is being pursued and most think tanks are in the process
of creating incentives in order to gather more regular donations. Yet, since
the culture of philanthropy mentioned in the introduction is very limited
in these nations, donations often come in the form of contractual relations
428 J. G. MCGANN
state and non-state global actors. As shown in the case of China, think
tanks like the CIIS have played a key role in offering innovative research
and policy solutions to advance Chinese interests in the country’s rising
and influential global position (through foreign policy proposals such as
“Responsible Protection”) and in facilitating international exchanges and
dialogue. The global landscape is constantly in motion and is altered by
political and economic developments; as a result, the focus on emerging
powers has begun to shift away from the BRICS framework towards alter-
native groupings like CIVETS and MINTS. Consequently, as more and
more states press for a greater role at the global high table, think tanks
provide much-needed support in the face of complex policy demands and
transition periods through agenda-setting, legitimating processes, or pol-
icy formulation. In contrast, in terms of states that might take the opposite
stance and resort to illiberalism, think tanks may seek to counterbalance
their restrictive environment by serving as potential critics of the policies
of national governments and international organizations.
While emerging powers have become an essential part of international
relations and global governance today, it was not until recently that many
of these countries developed an assertive foreign policy. Moreover, as the
concepts of democracy and policy consultation contain different meanings
in emerging powers compared to those in their US and European coun-
terparts, the tradition of engagement of non-governmental actors such as
research institutes in policy-making is scarce. Together, these two factors
explain why think tanks are a new phenomenon in many of these rising
powers. This is particularly true in the area of foreign and security policy
which lies at the heart of national sovereignty and territoriality, concepts
which are particularly important to these countries, many of which carry
with them the legacy of colonialism.
Yet, as the case studies in this volume have demonstrated, emergence
and the transformation it has brought about in terms of demand for a
more sophisticated and expertise-based foreign policy have inevitably
pushed think tanks to the surface. Changing social and political dynamics
have also led to more public and international interest in foreign affairs. As
the case studies on Qatar, Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea—among oth-
ers—demonstrate, outsiders too have become very interested in the
domestic developments of countries and regions that have grown signifi-
cantly in economic and political relevance.
All of the above formulate the conditions for the current status of for-
eign and security think tanks in emerging powers. Whether the trend will
430 J. G. MCGANN
continue and how it will evolve will depend on the sustainability of the
economic and political rise of these countries, but also on the ability of the
think tanks themselves to deal with the internal and external challenges
they face. The degree to which democracy evolves in many of these coun-
tries and whether that will open up official policies to consultation, criti-
cism, and analysis will also be vital to the course of think tanks and their
work.
All of these trends should continue to be monitored and analyzed on a
consistent basis, since the speed and nature of transformation of the global
order are such that even the term “emerging power” may refer to a differ-
ent set of countries some years from now. In this task, think tanks will be
not only a subject of research, but also part of the intellectual community
that continues to investigate the phenomenon of rising powers and their
evolving foreign and security policies.
Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms
Health and Environment
These think tanks are involved in shaping health-care policies, as well as
providing assistance and guidance to deal with severe diseases such as
AIDS and Ebola. Some of them are also involved in the protection of the
environment and water resources, as well as reducing global warming/
climate change.
Agriculture
These think tanks are involved in promoting farming and enhancing farm-
ing and agricultural techniques, as well as fostering rural development
with a focus on agriculture.
Cultural
These think tanks are involved in the study of societal history and tradi-
tions, as well as media communications.
Disaster Management
These think tanks are engaged in dealing with natural disasters such as
earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, and so on. They are involved in both antic-
ipation as well reaction plans.
Energy
These think tanks are dedicated to mineral extraction, power supply, and
the oil industry.
Good Governance
These think tanks promote democracy, civil rights, anti-corruption, and
fair elections.
Appendix 2: History and Evolution
of Think Tanks in Selected
Emerging Powers
Nigeria Analysis
1995–1999
The end of military rule led to a new type of governance in Nigeria.
Human rights and good governance think tanks were the leading category
in the number of new think tanks established, followed by economic pol-
icy. This demonstrates that whenever a new government system is set up,
or a particular regime comes to an end, the services of think tanks dealing
with good governance, human rights, and economic policy are in high
demand, leading to the establishment of such policy research institutes by
the government or private entities.
2005–2009
The oil price collapse coincided with another surge in economic policy-
related think tanks. Oil exports are heavily weighted in Nigeria’s GDP and
overall economic performance. A steep drop in the price of commodities
such as oil has severe impacts on oil export-dependent economies. Such
events often require the help of economic consultants in order to adjust or
recommend new economic policies for the government to adopt in order
to avoid further damage to the economy.
APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…
435
8 Declared Republic
6
0
1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014
Time Period (5 Years interval)
Graph A.4 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (South Africa)
China Analysis
India Analysis
Singapore Analysis
Vietnam Analysis
Graph A.14 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (South Korea)
Indonesia Analysis
Argentina Analysis
1995–1999: Recession
Recessions in Argentina have been an ongoing theme that not only requires
assistance on economic policy, but also governance, as often Argentinian
government decisions have been blamed for these recessions. This particu-
lar recession coincided with the emergence of more human rights and
good governance, as well as economic policy-oriented, think tanks.
Brazil Analysis
Mexico Analysis
through the yellow bars. The one event that really matched the establish-
ment of a specific category of think tanks is the discovery of an offshore oil
reserve, which coincided with the establishment of newer economic policy
and business development–oriented think tanks during 1975–1979.
Qatar Analysis
2005–2009
Qatar became more and more present in the rest of the world, whether it
was concerning sports or foreign aid. This time period demonstrates a
high establishment of foreign policy-oriented think tanks.
Turkey Analysis
1995–1999 and 2000–2004
Both of these periods were heavily dominated by the establishment of SIA
thinks, especially following the start of the war with Kurdish insurgent
groups in 1990–1994.
L P
Liberalization, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57, Political repression, 149
195, 196, 200, 205, 385, 422 Pontifical Catholic University of Rio
de Janeiro (PUC-RIO), 340
Post-Cold War, 61, 66, 200, 201, 246,
M 253, 408
McGann, James, 7n4, 13, 13n23, Power balance, 9, 428
15–17, 19n10, 38n88, 117n8, Public policy organizations, 6
245n1, 246n7 PUC-RIO, see Pontifical Catholic
MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del University of Rio de Janeiro
Sur), 308, 316
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
(COMEXI), 351, 356, 363, R
364, 369–372 Regions
Military power Africa, 6, 14
China’s military expenditures, 10 Central Asia, 6
hard power, 10, 10n11, 75, 75n36, Eastern Europe, 6, 14
79, 253, 377, 389 Southeast Asia, 6
INDEX
455
Research, 4, 18, 92, 111, 142, 148, 163, American Enterprise Institute, 20
175, 191, 200, 223, 227, 243, 247, America’s Progressive Era, 6
268, 281, 288, 303, 317, 340, 377, Anglo-American, 5, 32, 33, 37–41,
383, 399, 405, 423, 433 45, 46, 48, 50, 422
Tanks But No Tanks, 23, 23n25 autonomous institutions, 7, 340
RSIS, see S. Rajaratnam School of autonomy, 5, 7, 8, 19, 25, 30, 32,
International Studies 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 75,
76, 130, 148, 217, 226, 246,
320, 323
S bias, 44
SAIIA, see South African Institute of Campbell, John L. and Pederson,
International Affairs Ove K., 4, 4n1
Seoul 2012 Summit, Dickson, Paul, 5, 19n6, 20n11, 22,
239, 267–280, 424 22n19, 22n21, 23, 27, 38
SIA think tanks, 14, 15, 317–327, first era, the, 19
436, 438, 439, 443, 445 government-affiliated, 7, 177, 178,
South African Institute of 239, 272, 284, 303, 318
International Affairs (SAIIA), Medvetz, Thomas, 17, 17n1, 18n4,
133, 135, 144, 145, 148–152, 28, 28n55, 31, 42, 42n97,
149n5, 154–160, 348 42n99, 82n15
S. Rajaratnam School of International National Origins of Policy Ideas,
Studies (RSIS), 219, 223, the, 4
225–237, 426 non-partisan, 4, 5, 19, 29–31, 36,
preventive diplomacy, 228–230, 37, 43, 58, 201, 206
229n6, 233–237 non-partisanship, 5
Stone, Diane, 13, 13n23, 16, 17n2, Nye, Joseph, 42
17–18n3, 18n4, 18n5, 27, policy creation, 7, 35
27n50, 28n51, 28n52, 29–32, policy formulation, 13, 15,
29n63, 30n65, 30n67, 30n69, 117, 277, 298, 390,
32n77, 32n79, 32n80, 32n81, 425, 429
34, 34n83, 36n86, 43–45, policy making process, 3, 6, 9, 13,
43n102, 43n104, 43–44n105, 14, 18, 52, 55, 117, 145, 300,
44n111, 46n114, 51, 51n116, 350, 356
84n18, 246n5, 246n6 present era, the, 27–40
RAND Corporation, 20, 39, 201
second era, the, 20
T third era, the, 20–26
Tectonic shifts, 9, 428 university affiliated, 7, 53, 54,
Think tanks 323, 346
academic freedom, 5, 26, 30, 31, Weaver, R. Kent, 17n3, 20n12,
38, 40, 43, 44 21n15, 24, 24n34, 25, 25n36,
agenda-setting, 13, 150, 226, 26n46, 27, 41, 41n91,
424, 429 117n8, 247n9
456 INDEX
Think Tanks and Civil Societies United Nations (UN), 74, 97, 105n1,
Program (TTCSP), 6n3, 7, 12, 109, 112, 122, 128, 180, 230,
14, 394 270, 316, 336, 343
Transnational issues, 6 US leadership, 61, 68, 69, 73, 78,
93, 244
U
UNASUR (Unión de Naciones W
Suramericanas), 316, 317, 329, World Bank (WB), 71, 74n34, 75, 123,
335, 338 124, 139, 285, 308, 318, 365, 401