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Edited by James G.

McGann

THINK TANKS,
FOREIGN POLICY and
the EMERGING POWERS
Think Tanks, Foreign Policy
and the Emerging Powers
James G. McGann
Editor

Think Tanks, Foreign


Policy and the
Emerging Powers
Editor
James G. McGann
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-60311-7    ISBN 978-3-319-60312-4 (eBook)


https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018935933

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Acknowledgments

I want to thank the scholars and executives from think tanks around the
world who took time out of their busy schedules to help shape the content
of the case examples and provide written statements for the book. I give
special recognition to Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) for its continued
partnership and support for think tanks in Latin America and the emerg-
ing powers.
I want to extend a note of appreciation to my dedicated volunteer
research interns who have helped collect data and edit this manuscript.
Each year the TTCSP provides mentoring and training for over 180 grad-
uate and undergraduate students. Specifically, I would like to recognize
the following interns: Stephen Purcell, Villanova University; Alixandra
Steerman, University of Pennsylvania; Danielle Resar, University of
Pennsylvania; Gregory Koons, University of Pennsylvania; Jonathan
Goodson, University of Pennsylvania; Chloé Reum, University of
Pennsylvania; Serena Tibrewala, University of Pennsylvania; Garth Fowler,
Swarthmore College; and Travis Taylor, Haverford College. Finally, a
word of thanks to Mauro Guillen and the Lauder Institute for the support
and encouragement they have provided me as I worked to finish this
manuscript.

v
Contents

Part I Introduction   1

1 Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing


the Emerging Powers   3
James G. McGann and Elena Lazarou

2 Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers  17


James G. McGann

3 A Not Quite Multipolar World  61


Bruce Jones

4 The Emerging Powers  79


James G. McGann

Part II Africa 103

5 Nigeria: An Overview 105
James G. McGann

6 The Role of the Nigerian Institute of International


Affairs (NIIA) in Nigerian and African Development 113
Sharkdam Wapmuk

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viii   Contents

7 Republic of South Africa: An Overview 135


James G. McGann

8 Foreign Policy and Security Challenges Facing South


Africa: The South African Institute of International
Affairs 143
Neuma Grobbelaar and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Part III Asia 161

9 People’s Republic of China: An Overview 163


James G. McGann

10 Emergence of a Think Tank and a Rising Power


on the World Stage: China Institute of International
Studies 173
Longdi Xu

11 India: An Overview 191
James G. McGann

12 India’s Strategic Think Tank: The Institute for Defense


Studies and Analyses 199
Arvind Gupta

13 Singapore: An Overview 219
James G. McGann

14 The Role of Think Tanks in Shaping Policy Debates


in Asia: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 225
Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, Theresa Robles,
and Sarah Teo

15 South Korea: An Overview 239


James G. McGann
 Contents 
   ix

16 Pushing Korea to Think in a World of Complexity:


The East Asia Institute 245
Sook-Jong Lee

17 IFANS and the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit:


The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 267
Bong-Geun Jun

18 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam: An Overview 281


James G. McGann

19 Shaping the Security and Foreign Policy of Vietnam:


The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 287
Thi Lan Anh Nguyen and Hung Son Nguyen

Part IV Latin America 301

20 Argentina: An Overview 303
James G. McGann

21 Dealing with Argentina’s Foreign Policy in the Emerging


Multipolar World—a Comparative Analysis of Think
Tank Responses to the Malvinas Issue: The Argentine
Center of International Studies 313
Ariel Gonzàlez Levaggi

22 Brazil: An Overview 329
James G. McGann

23 Beyond “Backwater” and “Backyard”—Reframing


Security in the South Atlantic: The BRICS Policy Center 339
Adriana Erthal Abdenur

24 Mexico: An Overview 351
James G. McGann
x   Contents

25 Think 20: An Innovative Proposal for the G20 Summit 355


Claudia Calvin Venero

Part V Middle East 375

26 Qatar: An Overview 377
James G. McGann

27 Research Centers and the Challenges of Formulating


State Security and Foreign Policies in Emerging States:
The Case of Qatar 383
Jamal Abdullah

28 Turkey: An Overview 399
James G. McGann

29 Shaping Foreign Policy Debates in Turkey: The SETA


Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Studies 405
Kadir Ustun and Kilic Kanat

Part VI Conclusion 419

30 Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and National, Regional,


and Global Politics 421
James G. McGann

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms 431

Appendix 2: H
 istory and Evolution of Think Tanks
in Selected Emerging Powers  433

Index 451
About the Editor

James  G.  McGann  is a senior lecturer in International Studies at the


Lauder Institute, director of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program
(TTCSP), and senior fellow, Fels Institute of Government at the University
of Pennsylvania. He conducts research on the trends and challenges facing
think tanks and policy-makers around the world and provides advice and
technical assistance to think tanks, governments, and public and private
donors on how to improve the quality and impact of policy research. He
is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a think tank
based in Philadelphia, where he directs the Think Tanks and Foreign
Policy Program. Prior to coming to the Lauder Institute, Dr. McGann was
assistant director of the International Relations Program, University of
Pennsylvania. His current research interests include assessing global trends
in security and international affairs research; the role of think tanks in
shaping US foreign and domestic policy; think tanks and policy advice in
the BRICS and G20 countries; transnational issues and global public pol-
icy; and how to assure the quality, independence, and integrity of public
policy research.
Dr. McGann has served as a consultant and advisor to the World Bank;
the United Nations; the Asian Development Bank; the United States
Agency for International Development; the Soros, Rockefeller, MacArthur,
Hewlett, and Gates Foundations; the Carnegie Corporation; and foreign
governments on the role of non-governmental, public policy, and public
engagement organizations in civil society. He was an assistant professor of
Political Science at Villanova University, where he taught international
relations, international organizations, and international law. He has served

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xii   ABOUT THE EDITOR

as the senior vice president for the Executive Council on Foreign


Diplomats, as the public policy program officer for the Pew Charitable
Trusts, and as the assistant director of the Institute of Politics, John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He also served
as a senior advisor to the Citizens’ Network for Foreign Affairs and the
Society for International Development.
Dr. McGann earned his MA and PhD from the University of Pennsylvania.
He was a National Fellow at Stanford University while writing his doctoral
thesis, which examined the nature and evolution of public policy research
organizations in the United States, such as the Brookings Institution,
Heritage Foundation, RAND, Urban Institute, and others. He compared
and contrasted the mission, structure, and operating principles of these
leading think tanks to determine how those factors influenced the institu-
tions’ role in policy-making. His research and consulting have enabled him
to work with governments and civil society organizations in over 104
countries. He has authored over fifteen books on think tanks and is the
creator and editor of the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index.
Notes on Contributors

Adriana Erthal Abdenur  is a Fellow at the Instituto Igarapé in Rio de


Janeiro, and a researcher at the Brazilian Center for International Relations
(CEBRI). Her research focuses on the role of rising powers, especially the
BRICS, in international security and development. Recent publications
include articles in Global Governance, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, Third World Quarterly, International Peacekeeping, Journal of
Peacebuilding and Development, and IDS Quarterly. She co-edited, with
Thomas G. Weiss, Emerging Powers at the UN (Routledge, 2015). She has
carried out fieldwork on development cooperation in several countries,
including Brazil, China, Japan, India, South Africa, Mozambique, and
Lebanon, and has worked as a consultant for the UN, the World Bank,
and the Inter-American Development Bank, and is an Advisory Board
member for several European projects, including Horizon2020.
Jamal  Abdullah is a researcher; he worked at Al Jazeera Centre for
Studies (AJCS) in Doha, Qatar, from May 2011 to May 2016, and also
headed Gulf Studies at the Centre. He holds a PhD in the Law of
International Relations from Avignon University and a Master’s in
International Relations and Diplomacy from Jean Moulin University, both
in France. His doctoral thesis was “Foreign Policy of the State of Qatar
(1995–2010): Contribution for Understanding the Foreign Policy of a
State in the Gulf.” He also holds two more Master’s degrees in Political
Sociology and Political Science, both from Lumière University in France.
Before joining AJCS, Abdullah trained in 2005 at the Permanent Mission
of Iraq to the United Nations Office in Geneva, and in 2006 at the United

xiii
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Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). In 2009–2010,


he worked at the Department of Public Relations and Protocol at the
Embassy of the State of Qatar in Paris, France. He is trilingual in French,
Arabic, and English. Abdullah is a member in the Arab Foresight Group,
created in 2014 by the European Union Institute for Security Studies in
Paris. He has participated since 2013 in the ranking process conducted by
the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University of
Pennsylvania to rank think tanks in the world. His books include Qatar’s
Foreign Policy 1995–2013: Leverages and Strategies (AJCS, 2014), The
Gulf in a Changing Strategic Context (AJCS, 2014), and The March of the
Gulf Cooperation: Current Challenges and Possible Scenarios (Al Jazeera
Centre for Studies, 2015). He has published widely on Gulf issues, and
overseen the publication of many reports and papers on the AJCS website,
as well as critically reviewing books and papers for AJCS. In 2015 Abdullah
was a referee for the Fulbright US Visiting Scholar Program. He is a
Visiting Lecturer at NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, Italy, and at
the Diplomatic Institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),
Doha, Qatar. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for the Study of
the International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa
(CIRMENA) at the University of Cambridge, UK, a Visiting Researcher
at the Middle East Center (MEC) at the London School of Economics,
London, UK, and an Academic Visitor at the Middle East Centre at Saint
Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK.
Mely Caballero-Anthony  is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre
for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. She is also Secretary-General of the Consortium on Non-
Traditional Security Studies in Asia, Chair of the UN Secretary-General’s
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, as well as Chair of the Board of
Trustees of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Until May 2012,
she served as Director of External Relations at the ASEAN Secretariat, and
until recently was a member of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global
Agenda Council on Conflict Prevention. Cabellero-Anthony’s research
interests include regionalism and regional security in the Asia Pacific, mul-
tilateral security cooperation, politics and international relations in
ASEAN, conflict prevention and management, as well as human security.
She was the principal investigator of the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative
(ASI) project on Internal Security Challenges in Asia and Cross-Border
  Notes on Contributors 
   xv

Implications. She has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals on a


broad range of security issues in the Asia Pacific, and her publications,
both single authored and co-edited, include An Introduction to Non-
Traditional Security Studies (Sage, 2015), “Understanding ASEAN
Centrality” (Pacific Review, 2014), “Human Security in ASEAN: 20 Years
On” (Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 2014), Non-Traditional Security in
Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action (ISEAS, 2013), Human
Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing Risk and
Resilience (Routledge, 2013), “The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast
Asia: Opening up Spaces for Advancing Human Security” (Pacific Review,
2012), Energy and Non-Traditional Security (NTS) in Asia and Rethinking
Energy Security in Asia: A Non-Traditional View of Human Security (both
Springer, 2012).
Ralf Emmers  is Associate Dean and Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore. He concurrently heads the Centre for Multilateralism
Studies (CMS) at RSIS. He completed his MSc and PhD under the supervi-
sion of the late Professor Michael Leifer in the International Relations
Department of the London School of Economics, London, UK. Emmers’
research interests cover security studies and international relations theory,
maritime security, international institutions in the Asia Pacific, and the secu-
rity and international politics of Southeast Asia. He is the author or editor
of eleven books and monographs. He is also the co-Series Editor of Warwick
Studies in Globalisation (Routledge) and an Editorial Board member of the
Pacific Review. He has published articles in peer-reviewed journals such as
Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Survey,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asian Security, Harvard Asia
Quarterly, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Contemporary Politics, Asian
Journal of Peace-Building, and Political Science, and numerous book chap-
ters in edited volumes. At RSIS, Emmers has served as the Coordinator of
the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme (2009–2013), the Acting
Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (2011), and the
Head of Graduate Studies (2006–2009).
Neuma  Grobbelaar  is an experienced foreign policy and development
expert with twenty-eight years of specialist research, project, research
management, fundraising, and policy practitioner experience. A former
South African diplomat, she is the research director of the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), a leading African foreign policy
xvi   Notes on Contributors

think tank based at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Her
areas of research specialization include the intersection between foreign
policy, regional integration, and human development; the role of the pri-
vate sector in African development initiatives; and South Africa’s role as an
emerging development partner in Africa. Grobbelaar holds an MPhil in
Economic Policy from the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; a
Master’s in Art History from the University of Glasgow, UK; and an
Honours in Business Administration and International Relations from the
University of Pretoria, South Africa.
Arvind Gupta  is Director of the Vivekananda International Foundation
(VIF), a New Delhi–based think tank on strategic and international secu-
rity affairs. Formerly he was Deputy National Security Adviser and
Secretary of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS; 2014–2017)
and Joint Secretary, NSCS on deputation from the Ministry of External
Affairs (1999–2007). He dealt with a wide range of national security issues
within the NSC structures and had wide-ranging interactions in an official
capacity with official and non-official delegations from several countries
on security issues. He is also a former Director General of the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi (2012–2014) and Lal
Bahadur Shastri Chair National Security, IDSA (2008–2011), where he
conducted track-two interactions with think tanks from other countries.
He has served in Indian diplomatic missions in Moscow, London, and
Ankara, and dealt with Afghanistan, Kashmir, Soviet Union, Russia, and
Central Asia in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is the author of three
books, and is primarily interested in problems of national and interna-
tional security; foreign policy issues of defense strategy; ancient Indian
thought; and nation-building, science, and technology.
Bruce Jones  is vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program
at Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA, and a senior fellow in
the Institution’s Project on International Order and Strategy. He is also a
consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University,
CA, USA. Jones’ research expertise and policy experience are in interna-
tional security. His current research focus is on US strategy, international
order, and the emerging powers. His most recent book on the topic is Still
Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and
Restraint (Brookings Institution Press, 2014). He is also co-author with
Carlos Pascual and Stephen Stedman of Power and Responsibility: Building
International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Brookings
  Notes on Contributors 
   xvii

Institution Press, 2009) and co-editor with Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu
and Pratap Bhanu Mehta of Shaping the Emerging World: India and the
Multilateral Order (Brookings Press, 2013). Other publications include
The State of the International Order, with Thomas Wright (Brookings,
2014), “Managing a Changing World” (Foreign Policy, 2011), and “How
Do Rising Powers Rise?” (Survival, 2010). Jones also has significant expe-
rience on multilateral institutions. He was a senior advisor to Kofi Annan
on UN reform and served as deputy research director to the UN’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as well as lead scholar for
the International Task Force on Global Public Goods. Related publica-
tions include “Beyond Blocs: The West, Rising Powers and Interest-Based
International Cooperation” (Stanley Foundation, 2011), “Libya and the
Responsibilities of Power” (Survival, 2011), and “The G8 and the Threat
of Bloc Politics in the International System” (Brookings, 2011).
Bong-Geun Jun  is a Professor and Director General at the Department
of Security and Unification Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic
Academy (formerly the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security),
Seoul, South Korea. Previously he held several governmental and non-
governmental positions: Policy Advisor to the Republic of Korea Minister
of Unification (2003–2004), Visiting Scholar at Keio University in Tokyo,
Japan and Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation Academic Fellow
(2001–2002), Secretary to the President for international security affairs
at the Presidential Office (1993–1997), and a professional staffer at KEDO
New  York headquarters (1997–2001). He was a visiting scholar at Asia
Foundation Center for US–Korea Policy in Washington, DC (2010).
Jun’s research area covers the North Korean nuclear issue, inter-Korean
relations, non-proliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy policies.
He received a BA and an MA in Political Science from Seoul National
University, South Korea, and a PhD in Political Science from University of
Oregon, OR, USA.
Kilic Kanat  is Research Director at the SETA Foundation in Washington,
DC, USA, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn State
University, Erie, PA, USA. He received his PhD in Political Science and a
Master’s in Political Science from Syracuse University, NY, USA, and a
Master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University, WI, USA. He
was awarded the Outstanding Research Award and Council of Fellows
Faculty Research Award at Penn State. He participated in the Future
Leaders Program of the Foreign Policy Initiative. Kanat’s writings have
xviii   Notes on Contributors

appeared in Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, The Diplomat, Middle East


Policy, Arab Studies Quarterly, Mediterranean Quarterly, Journal of South
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies, and Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. He is a columnist at Daily
Sabah, and the author of A Tale of Four Augusts: Obama’s Syria Policy
(SETA, 2015).
Elena  Lazarou is Assistant Professor at the Center for International
Relations at FGV’s School of Social Sciences (CPDOC), Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. She received a PhD in International Relations from the University
of Cambridge in 2008, and has held postdoctoral research positions at
POLIS/University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics
and Political Science, all in the UK. Her interests include European stud-
ies, foreign policy analysis, and regional integration. Her current research
focuses on the impact of the crisis of the Euro on the EU’s external rela-
tions and EU–Brazil relations. She also coordinates a pilot program on
think tanks and foreign policy in Brazil funded by the Ford Foundation,
and FGV’s European Studies group, financed by the Brazilian Science and
Technology Council (CNPq). Other posts previously held include Head
of the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory, Hellenic Centre for European
Studies-EKEM, Athens, Greece (2009–2010); Research Associate at the
Centre for International Policy Research, University of Sheffield, UK
(2007–2008); and Visiting Scholar at Columbia University and NYU,
USA (2005). She is also affiliated to the Hellenic Foundation for European
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and Visiting Professor at Sciences-Po
Grenoble. Lazarou has published several articles, edited volumes, and
book chapters in English and Portuguese and is a regular contributor to
the Brazilian press.
Sook-Jong Lee  is the President of the East Asia Institute, an indepen-
dent, non-profit think tank based in Seoul, South Korea. She is also a
Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University, South
Korea. She received her BA from Yonsei University, South Korea, and MA
and PhD in Sociology from Harvard University, USA.  Currently, she
holds a number of advisory positions in the South Korean government,
including the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, Presidential
Committee for Unification Preparation, and councils for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International
Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Lee also participates as a member of the
Trilateral Commission, Council of Councils, and many other transnational
  Notes on Contributors 
   xix

networks on research and policy studies. Her research interests include


multilateralism, democracy, and civil societies, focusing on South Korea,
Japan, and other East Asian countries. Previously, she was a Research
Fellow at the Sejong Institute, South Korea; a Visiting Fellow at the
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA; a Professorial Lecturer at
the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, MD, USA; and a visiting fellow at the German
Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany. Her publica-
tions include Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (EAI, 2013),
South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy (EAI,
2012), Korea’s Role in Global Governance for Development Cooperation
(EAI, 2012), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (Palgrave,
2011), Japan and East Asia: Regional Cooperation and Community
Building (EAI, 2011), and Toward Managed Globalization: The Korean
Experience (EAI, 2010).
Ariel Gonzàlez Levaggi  is from Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is a PhD
candidate in International Relations and Political Science at Koç University,
Istanbul, Turkey. He holds an MA in Political Science and Sociology from
the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO, Buenos Aires,
Argentina). Gonzàlez Levaggi was Executive Director of the Argentine
Center of International Studies (CAEI) from 2007 to 2013, and was cho-
sen as one of the “Top 99 Foreign Policy Leaders under 33” by the
Diplomatic Courier and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
(Washington, DC). He is Secretary of the Turkish Studies Chair of the
Eurasia Department at the National University of La Plata, Argentina, and
founder of the Latin America and Caribbean – Turkey Academic Network
(LACTAN). He is co-editor of America Latina and the Caribbean  –
Turkey: An Emergent Association (Bahçeşehir University Press, 2016).
Thi Lan Anh Nguyen  is Deputy Director General of the Institute for
East Sea (South China Sea) Studies and Vice Dean of the International
Law Faculty of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, where her main
duties include research and teaching for undergraduate students, post-
graduate students, and mid-career officials. She has a PhD in International
Law from University of Bristol and an LLM from University of Sheffield,
both in the UK. Nguyen often participates and leads Vietnamese delega-
tions to track-two and -1.5 conferences and workshops in order to engage
other regional countries on ocean law and policy. She has research inter-
ests in ocean law and policy, maritime security, and South China Sea
xx   Notes on Contributors

issues. She was a research fellow of the Center for International Law,
National University of Singapore, and of the Japan Institute for
International Affairs.
Hung Son Nguyen  is Deputy Director-General of the Institute for the
South China Sea, Vietnam, and was previously Deputy Director-General
of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam. He has a BA from the National Economic University of Vietnam,
an MSc in International Economics from Birmingham University, UK,
and a PhD in International Relations from the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam. His research work focuses on geo-political issues, regional secu-
rity architecture, maritime security, and the foreign policy of Vietnam.
Nguyen also served as Director of the Political Affairs division at the
ASEAN department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when he exten-
sively participated in regional summits, and had hands-on experience of
many regional processes and issues involving ASEAN. He was a member
of the Vietnam High Level Task Force delegation negotiating the ASEAN
Charter in 2006–2007, and served as head of the ASEAN Standing
Committee division at the ASEAN department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs when Vietnam presided over the ASEAN Standing Committee
from July 2000 to July 2001.
Theresa  Robles  is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and
International Studies of the University of Warwick, UK. She is also a ses-
sional tutor and research assistant at Warwick Business School. Prior to
this, she was an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies’ Centre for Multilateralism Studies, Singapore.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos  is Chief Executive Officer of the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), an independent foreign policy
think tank based in Johannesburg, South Africa. She holds an MA in
International Relations (cum laude) from the University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. She has headed the Institute since 2005.
Before her current appointment she was Director of Studies at SAIIA from
1999 to 2005, and was previously Research Director at the South African
Institute of Race Relations and editor of the highly acclaimed Race
Relations Survey (now the South Africa Survey), an annual publication
documenting political and constitutional developments and socio-eco-
nomic disparities in South Africa. She is a member of the International
Advisory Board of the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, the journal of the
  Notes on Contributors 
   xxi

Graduate Institute of International Development in Geneva, and the


international journal Chinese Quarterly of Strategic Studies under the
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). She is the editor-in-
chief of the South African Journal of International Affairs. Sidiropoulos
serves on the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda Council on
the Future of Regional Organisations, and the WEF Think Tank Leaders
Forum. Until recently, she also served on the International Advisory
Board of the EU Development Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs. Her most
recent works include the co-edited volumes Institutional Architecture and
Development: Responses from Emerging Powers (SAIIA, 2015) and
Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old
Patterns (Zed Books, 2012), as well as Institutional Architecture and
Development: Responses from Emerging Powers (Jacana, 2015). Her research
focus is South Africa’s foreign policy, global governance, and the role of
emerging powers in Africa, and currently Russia’s renewed presence in
Africa, against the background of South Africa’s membership of the
BRICS grouping.
Sarah  Teo is Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security
Architecture Programme at the S.  Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
She received her Master of Science (International Relations) from RSIS in
2012 and her Bachelor of Communication Studies from Nanyang
Technological University in 2009. Her research interests include multilat-
eral security and defense cooperation in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific, mid-
dle powers in the Asia Pacific, South Korea’s foreign policy, as well as the
international relations of Northeast Asia. Her research papers have been
published in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Survey, and
Australian Journal of International Affairs, while her commentaries have
been published in The Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao, and East Asia Forum.
She was also a delegate to the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and
Security Institutions (NADI) from 2012 to 2015.
Kadir  Ustun is the Executive Director at the SETA Foundation at
Washington, DC, where he was previously Research Director. He cur-
rently serves as an Assistant Editor of Insight Turkey, an academic journal
published by the SETA Foundation. Ustun holds a PhD in Middle Eastern,
South Asian, and African Studies from Columbia University, USA, and a
xxii   Notes on Contributors

Master’s in History from Bilkent University, Turkey. He has contributed


to various SETA reports and his writings have appeared in various publica-
tions such as Insight Turkey, Al Jazeera English, Hurriyet Daily News,
Daily Sabah, Mediterranean Quarterly, and Cairo Review of Global
Affairs. He is also co-editor of History, Politics and Foreign Policy in
Turkey (SETA, 2015), Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives (SETA, 2015), and Change and Adaptation in
Turkish Foreign Policy (SETA, 2013).
Claudia Calvin Venero  has been the Executive Director of the Mexican
Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) since 2011 and is Founder of
Mujeres Construyendo (mujeresconstruyendo.com), the first platform for
female bloggers in Latin America, promoting women’s empowerment
through ICT (information and communication technologies). She is also
External Advisor to the UN Women Office in Mexico. Venero has a PhD
in Political Science from the Latin-American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO), Mexico, an MA in International Journalism from the
University of Southern California, USA, and a Bachelor’s in International
Relations from the National University of Mexico. Professionally, she has
experience as a public officer at both federal and legislative levels in the
Senate, Ministry of the Interior, and for the Presidency of Mexico, and has
been an international consultant. She was selected as a finalist of the GEM-
Tech Awards 2014 (ITU and UN Women) for her commitment to pro-
moting women’s empowerment and gender equality through ICT. She is
also a blogger for Animal Politico, one of the leading online newspapers in
Mexico and Latin America.
Sharkdam Wapmuk  is a Research Fellow and Head of the Division of
African Politics and Integration, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
Lagos, Nigeria. He obtained his MSc in Political Economy and
Development Studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria, where he also com-
pleted a PhD in International Relations and Strategic Studies. He has over
ten years of research experience and has carried out research and studies in
close collaboration with universities and think tanks in Nigeria and abroad.
He has attended and participated in many conferences, seminars, and
workshops on topical national and international issues, including think
tank dialogues. He is editor of Nigerian Forum. While his geographic
areas of interest include Africa and Asia, his research interests are in the
thematic fields of Africa–India relations, think tanks and national develop-
ment, cooperation and integration in Africa, development initiatives, dias-
  Notes on Contributors 
   xxiii

pora studies, democratization, security, and development. His articles


have been published in many national and international journals. He is a
member of scholarly bodies including the Nigerian Society of International
Affairs (NSIA).
Longdi Xu  is a PhD and Associate Research Fellow at China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS), Beijing, China. He received his PhD in
International Relations from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2009 and joined CIIS thereafter. His exper-
tise covers international relations theory, international security, and EU
politics and foreign policy. Now he runs a research program on International
Norms and Cyber Security. His publications include “Cyber War
Preparedness, Cyberspace Arms Control and the United States” (co-
authored with Teng Jianqun, CIIS Report, 2014) and “China’s Internet
Development and Cybersecurity  – Policies and Practices” (in Chinese
Cybersecurity and Defense, Wiley, 2014).
List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 IMF GDP forecasts for the world’s top ten economies
as of 2014 77
Fig. 4.1 Overlap between BRICS, +N11, G20, and MINT 84
Fig. 4.2 Emerging powers timeline 92
Fig. 19.1 Structure of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 290
Fig. 21.1 Organization of the CEEPADE “Manuel Belgrano” 319

xxv
List of Graphs

Graph A.1 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Nigeria) 434


Graph A.2 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Nigeria)434
Graph A.3 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (South Africa) 435
Graph A.4 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(South Africa) 436
Graph A.5 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (China) 437
Graph A.6 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (China) 437
Graph A.7 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (India) 438
Graph A.8 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (India) 438
Graph A.9 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Singapore) 439
Graph A.10 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Singapore)440
Graph A.11 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Vietnam) 441
Graph A.12 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Vietnam)441
Graph A.13 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (South Korea) 442
Graph A.14 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(South Korea) 442
Graph A.15 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Indonesia) 443
Graph A.16 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Indonesia)443
Graph A.17 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Argentina) 444
Graph A.18 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Argentina)445
Graph A.19 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Brazil) 446
Graph A.20 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Brazil) 446

xxvii
xxviii   List of Graphs

Graph A.21 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Mexico) 447


Graph A.22 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Mexico)447
Graph A.23 Number of new think tanks established (Qatar) 448
Graph A.24 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Qatar) 448
Graph A.25 Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Turkey) 449
Graph A.26 Fields of operation of newly established think tanks
(Turkey)450
List of Tables

Table 1.1 Typology for autonomous and affiliated public policy think
tanks8
Table 5.1 Nigeria at a glance 106
Table 5.2 Think tanks in Nigeria 111
Table 7.1 South Africa at a glance 136
Table 7.2 Overview of think tanks in South Africa 142
Table 9.1 China at a glance 164
Table 9.2 Major macroeconomic targets 167
Table 9.3 Think tanks in China 169
Table 11.1 India at a glance 192
Table 11.2 Overview of Indian think tanks 196
Table 13.1 Singapore at a glance 220
Table 13.2 Think tanks in Singapore 223
Table 14.1 ARF Preventive Diplomacy (PD) Work Plan 235
Table 15.1 South Korea at a glance 240
Table 15.2 Think tanks in South Korea 243
Table 18.1 Vietnam at a glance 282
Table 18.2 Think tanks in Vietnam 284
Table 20.1 Argentina at a glance 304
Table 20.2 Think tanks in Argentina 311
Table 21.1 Strategies, programs, and impact of the Argentine security
and international affairs think tanks 325
Table 22.1 Brazil at a glance 330
Table 22.2 Think tanks in Brazil 337
Table 24.1 Mexico at a glance 352

xxix
xxx   List of Tables

Table 24.2 Think tanks in Mexico 353


Table 26.1 Qatar at a glance 378
Table 26.2 Think tanks in Qatar 381
Table 28.1 Turkey at a glance 400
Table 28.2 Think tanks in Turkey 403
PART I

Introduction
CHAPTER 1

Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy


Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers

James G. McGann and Elena Lazarou

We live in turbulent times where the only constant is change, where the
unthinkable has become a reality, and where the line between domestic
and international politics is increasingly blurred. The promise and peril of
globalization have transformed how we view international relations and
opened the policy-making process to a new set of actors, agendas, and
outcomes. International relations was once the exclusive domain of diplo-
mats, bureaucrats, and states, but, when formulating foreign policy today,
policy-makers must consider a diverse set of international actors that
includes news organizations such as CNN and al-Jazeera; non-­
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, International Crisis Group, and Greenpeace; interna-
tional financial institutions such as Deutsche Bank; terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda and ISIS; and regional groups such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Policy-makers thus face a complex and
unique challenge when trying to fashion effective foreign policy.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
E. Lazarou
Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

© The Author(s) 2019 3


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_1
4   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

The key to a potent foreign policy lies in information. There are


difficulties with information: it can be unsystematic, unreliable, and
possibly tainted by the interests of those who are disseminating it. Policy-
makers are frequently besieged by more information than they can possi-
bly use—the issue in many nations is not a lack of information, but an
avalanche thereof. Some information may be so technical that generalist
policy-­makers cannot understand or make use of it, while other informa-
tion may be simply impractical. Some information may be entirely within
a policy-­maker’s field and understanding, but obscured by multitudinous
other information. Government officials must balance the information
directed at them by international institutions, the media, and, in many
cases, constituents. The greatest modern complication is that information
no longer translates into power unless it is in the right form, in the right
hands, and at the right time. Governments are often moved to seize the
moment because particular social and political forces are in alignment or
because a crisis compels them to take action. In either case, they frequently
move quickly and make decisions based on available information, which
does not always lead to the most informed policy. Because of this reality,
policy-­makers require information that is timely, understandable, reliable,
accessible, and, generally, useful.
There are many potential sources for this information, but politicians
and bureaucrats around the world have increasingly turned to a specialized
group of institutions to serve their needs. Public policy research and analy-
sis organizations, commonly known as “think tanks,” have filled policy-­
makers’ insatiable need for information and relevant systematic analysis.
Think tanks are independent, non-profit, non-partisan policy research,
engagement, and formulation organizations that generate policy-oriented
research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues. In The
National Origins of Policy Ideas, Campbell and Pederson view think tanks
as knowledge-based regimes that confront problems involving ambiguity
and uncertainty to advance policy-making; they are “sense-making appara-
tuses.” These authors write, “Sense making is often a contested process
involving varying degrees of competition, negotiation, and compromise –
often involving power struggles – over the interpretation of problems and
solutions for them.”1 Think tanks enable policy-makers and the public to

1
 John L.  Campbell and Ove K.  Pederson, “Chapter 1: Knowledge Regimes and the
National Origins of Policy Ideas,” The National Origins of Policy Ideas, January 2013, 6.
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    5

make informed decisions about public policy by offering such advice in the
form of intellectual argument, platforms for convocation and debate, and
resources, and have significant autonomy from government and societal
interests. As a result, public policy decision-making has been increasingly
shaped by the analysis, ideas, and recommendations of nationally specific
institutions such as think tanks, and, in turn, these knowledge regimes have
become highly embedded into national political and economic systems.
However, while the aforementioned definition of a think tank stresses
notions of “independence” and “non-partisanship,” in actuality there
exists considerable variation in the character of public policy research
organizations, depending on the political reality and nation-state context
the institution in question is operating in, as Chap. 2 discusses in further
detail. In much of the developing world, the absence or restricted nature
of legal, political, and financial frameworks severely limits the intellectual
freedom, independence, and autonomy of think tanks in these regions.
Additionally, these regions experiencing limited economic freedom are
thus characterized by relatively weak philanthropic and private support
for public policy research institutions, forcing many of these institutions
to rely on government contracts, foreign donors, and private-sector con-
sulting; consequently, the intellectual independence of think tanks is
compromised. On the Anglo-American side, while there remains a pro-
clivity for independent, non-partisan, and non-governmental think tanks,
the increase in US ideologically led think tanks from 1970 to 1996 dem-
onstrates that think tanks, institutions traditionally viewed as producing
balanced and non-partisan research, are currently “at risk of polarization
and the subsequent loss of their intellectual independence and credibility”2
due to a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, partisan politics,
the proliferation of specialized think tanks, the growth of liberal and con-
servative advocacy groups, and the influence of 24/7 cable news net-
works. As a result, when analyzing the universal application of think
tanks, a modified version of Paul Dickson’s 1972 definition may be more
representative: “from a global perspective, a think tank can be for profit
or nonprofit; supported by the government, part of the government,
completely free of the government, or supported by a number of institu-
tions, such as a company or university; and, finally, must practice relative
academic freedom.”
2
 See Chap. 2.
6   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

The origins of think tank culture in the United States are bound up in
America’s Progressive Era traditions of corporate philanthropy, the sharp
distinction between legislative and executive branches of government, weak
political parties, the public commitment to openness and independence,
and the inclination of the public and their elected officials to trust the
private sector to interface with and to provide assistance to government.
These factors combine to provide very few barriers to policy analysts, ideo-
logues, and entrepreneurs who want to enter the marketplace of ideas and
contribute to the policy-making process. Thus, for most of the twentieth
century, independent public policy think tanks were found primarily in the
United States.
There has been more recently a veritable proliferation of “think tanks”
around the world, which began in the 1980s as a result of the forces of
globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of transna-
tional issues. The impact of globalization on the think tank movement is
most evident in regions such as Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and
parts of Southeast Asia, where there was a concerted effort by the interna-
tional community to support the creation of independent public policy
research organizations, with the majority of think tanks in these regions
having been established in the last 10 years. The growth of public policy
research organizations over the last two decades has been nothing less
than explosive—today, there are over 4500 of these institutions around
the world, with many think tanks in the United States exporting their
scholars, brands of policy analysis, and organizational structures to other
countries.3 Not only have these organizations increased in number, but
the scope and impact of their work have expanded dramatically.
Think tanks operate in a variety of political systems, engage in a range
of policy-related activities, comprise a diverse set of institutions that have
varied organizational forms, and all perform the same basic function—
bringing knowledge and expertise to bear on the policy-making process.
These policy organizations, for example, carry out research on policy
problems, provide swift advice on pressing concerns, evaluate government
programs, coordinate a diverse set of policy actors, and so forth, to name
a few activities. Public policy organizations come in a variety of forms, of
3
 According to recent data collected by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, there
are over 6500 think tanks worldwide, approximately 1500 of which are found in the United
States.
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    7

which nearly all exist in the United States. In the rest of the world, think
tanks can be a little more limited, with three main categories: government
affiliated (a part of the structure of government), university affiliated
(a policy research center at a university), and political party affiliated
(formally affiliated with a political party; see Table 1.1). Additionally, there
are autonomous institutions (those with significant independence from
any one interest group or donor, and autonomous in their operation and
funding from government), which tend to dominate the top think tank
rankings put out by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program; though
all three types mentioned also appear in the top ranks.4
The emergence of think tanks has not always been viewed by the politi-
cal establishment as an unalloyed good—think tanks can serve as potential
critics of the policies of national governments and international organiza-
tions, speaking with an objective, informed voice, independent of govern-
ment and business interests. Depending on the systems in which think
tanks operate, they vary in degrees of financial, intellectual, and legal inde-
pendence. But irrespective of their structure or level of autonomy, think
tanks have become a permanent part of the political landscape and are now
an integral part of the policy process in many countries.
A large reason behind the substantial growth in think tanks and similar
policy research and advising institutions is the understanding by many that
they are capable of doing what government bureaucracies cannot—or, at
the very least, that they can do what government bureaucracies do, but
more effectively and efficiently. Think tanks are better suited to deal with
the cross-cutting nature of global policy issues—they can convene and
engage state and non-state global actors on worldwide issues. Moreover,
they are better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of
researchers and then engage stakeholders in the policy process with that
information. Think tanks can effectively condense and maximize the effi-
ciency of the policy process, from inception to policy creation. Government
bureaucracies, on the other hand, thrive on the security of the status quo
and are bound by layers of bureaucracy, standards, and prescribed proce-
dures, and are often segmented by areas of specialization and turf. In con-
trast, think tanks tend to be much more future oriented and maintain a
more holistic view and interdisciplinary approach to policy issues.

4
 James G. McGann, ed., Think Tank and Civil Society Program. Global Go To Think Tank
Index 2013. University of Pennsylvania, 2013.
8   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

Table 1.1  Typology for autonomous and affiliated public policy think tanks
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    9

Because they play such a key role in the policy-making process, think
tanks have grown in importance, especially in the nations we might deem
“emerging powers.” Emerging powers is a term used as recognition of
the rising, primarily economic, influence of nations that have steadily
increased their presence in global affairs. The emergence of these new
powers around the world fundamentally challenges the traditional
approaches to international relations, international political economy,
multilateralism, and security as a range of countries now compete for
regional and global leadership. Globally, established and emerging pow-
ers are forced to reassess their power metrics relative to new and old allies
and adversaries. This change makes for a complex and fluid set of interna-
tional relations. History has demonstrated that shifts in the power poles
and the emergence of a singular power or a multipolar world tend to be
conflict prone, as these powers exercise their influence at the regional and
global levels. The rise of China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, and Nigeria, to name a few, has had profound impacts on
regional and global affairs.
Scholars such as Raphael Kaplinsky and Dirk Messner suggest that
today’s world order—or disorder—is a result of “tectonic shifts” in the
global economy and in governance institutions.5 The rise of Chinese and
Indian economies, with other emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia,
and South Africa following in their wake, is reshuffling the economic as
well as political power balance. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa), a group of nations commonly associated with the term
“emerging powers,” alone account for 40% of the world population, 20%
of the global gross domestic product (GDP), and 18% of the world
economy.6,7 The BRICS additionally contain four of the world’s ten big-
gest economies and the five parties that have the power to question the
constellation of global institutions and make or break deals in interna-
tional negotiations.8

5
 Raphael Kaplinsky and Dirk Messner, “Introduction: The Impact of Asian Drivers on the
Developing World,” World Development 36, no. 2 (2008): 199.
6
 “World Economic Outlook Database April 2013,” International Monetary Fund, April
17, 2013, Accessed November 22, 2014.
7
 Robert Marquand, “Amid BRICS’ Rise and ‘Arab Spring’, a New Global Order Forms,”
The Christian Science Monitor. October 18, 2011. Accessed November 21, 2014.
8
 Yana Marull, “BRICS to Launch Bank, Tighten Latin America Ties,” Yahoo! News. July
11, 2014. Accessed December 5, 2014.
10   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

It is important, as well, to take a more general approach to the meaning


of “emerging power”—and even to the meaning of “power.” Naturally,
there are the traditional dimensions of military and economic power. In
terms of military power, China’s military expenditures, for example, grew
from $30 billion in 2000 to around $120 billion in 2010 by some
estimates; other estimates place them around $160 billion.9 Due in part to
the economic crisis, the same increase is not present for some other nations
deemed emerging powers, such as Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa.
However, Russia has displayed military expenditure growth, from 3.6% of
its GDP in 2000 to 3.9% in 2010, and even higher at 4.2% in 2013.10 In
the long run, though, we can likely expect to see growth in the military
expenditures of other emerging powers if they are to remain emerging
powers. We will not explore here the economic growth in emerging pow-
ers, since it has been lauded, decried, and analyzed over the last decade by
a myriad of news outlets, academic journals, and policy-makers, although
we will take it up in later chapters.
The traditional elements of military and economic strength comprise a
nation’s “hard power,” which is the use of threats of force or coercive
means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies.11
“Soft power,” by contrast, is more “seductive.” Soft power is about the
underlying social and cultural capital a country possesses globally—the
ability to attract and co-opt the interests of other nations.12 Developed
countries in the North and West nations enjoy an advantage with soft
power, having established brands and media outlets, for example, but
countries such as Russia and China have been rolling out their own soft
power initiatives, displaying the attractiveness of their nations in areas like
Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which are generally targeted by the
current world powers, with the exception of China.13,14

9
 “The Dragon’s New Teeth,” The Economist, April 7, 2012. Accessed December 5,
2014.
10
 “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” The World Bank, January 1, 2014. Accessed
December 5, 2014.
11
 Daryl Copeland, “Hard Power vs. Soft Power,” February 2, 2010. Accessed December
5, 2014.
12
 Joseph Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power,” Belfer Center – Harvard. January
10, 2003. Accessed December 5, 2014.
13
 Alexey Dolinskiy, “How Moscow Understands Soft Power,” Russia Direct, June 21,
2013. Accessed December 5, 2014.
14
 “China’s Soft Power in Africa,” In Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United
States, edited by Carola McGiffert, by Jennifer Cooke. Washington, D.C.: CSIS (Center for
Strategic & International Studies), 2009.
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    11

In the modern age, emerging powers must expand both their hard
and soft powers to compete with the established order in international
relations and generate a potent and effective foreign policy. The impor-
tance of the growth and development of think tanks in emerging powers
cannot be understated. Often, in transitional countries, the basic data
needed to make informed decisions does not exist and must be col-
lected, analyzed, and translated into a form that is usable by parliamen-
tarians and bureaucrats. Think tanks can serve the incredibly useful
function of aiding the transition and, most importantly, aiding the trans-
formation of the nation’s foreign policy to better reflect its changing
status globally.
There is little doubt today that the past decade has marked significant
and substantial change in the international system and the balance—and
nature—of power. From multipolar to inter-polar15 and apolar,16 and from
post-hegemonic17 to post-American18 to a world where no political or eco-
nomic system is dominant,19 the uncertainty about the state of the new
global order and the dynamics that govern it permeates academic litera-
ture and policy inquiries.
The seismic shift that has occurred in the last 5–10 years in the global
economic and political order can be underscored by the emergence of the
Group of Twenty (G20) as the leading forum for international economic
issues. The rise of new powers has already begun to reshape international
relations and the role that G20 countries play in multilateral institutions

15
 Giovanni Grevi, “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario,” Occasional Paper 79 (June
26, 2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies.
16
 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs, 2008. https://www.for-
eignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity.
17
 Thomas P.M.  Barnett, “The New Rules: Globalization in a Post-Hegemonic World,”
World Politics Review, April 16, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti-
cles/11845/the-new-rules-globalization-in-a-post-hegemonic-world.
18
 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.
19
 Charles A.  Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming
Global Turn, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Bruce Jones, “Managing a Changing World,” Foreign Policy, March 14, 2011. http://
foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/14/managing-a-changing-world/.
Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright, The State of the International Order, Policy Paper no.
33, Brookings Institute, 2014.
12   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

and forums.20 Collectively, its members represent two-thirds of the world’s


population and generate more than 85% of GDP.  The G20 is the only
international forum in which major developed and developing nations
meet as equals to discuss key economic issues. The continuing economic
crisis and a host of other global issues highlight the importance of sharing
the burden of and finding solutions to the world’s problems. The G20 can
play a key role in forging an alliance that spans the developed and develop-
ing world.
As the policy agenda of the G20 expands beyond economic growth,
trade, and job creation to include a range of political and security issues, a
new space is created for think tank activity. G20 foreign policy think tanks
are uniquely positioned to provide the analysis and advice necessary for
G20 states to successfully adapt to their new regional and international
roles and responsibilities. This is especially true where the so-called emerg-
ing powers are concerned, for these nations are gradually playing more
significant roles in the international system. However, at the same time,
the lack of a think tank culture in a number of those countries creates
substantial challenges for those actors which are now called upon to par-
ticipate more intensely in the policy-making and policy-advising process.
It is with this imperative in mind that the Think Tanks and Civil
Societies Program (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania (USA) and
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in Brazil agreed to co-sponsor an inter-
national conference that brought together the leading security and inter-
national affairs think tanks to explore the role of the G20 countries and
the challenges faced by their foreign policy think tanks in a changing
global order.
For decades, scholars have tried to define the role of think tanks in the
foreign policy process. Wallace21 has argued that policy-makers need advis-
ers in order to rethink the dominant assumptions of policy. Think tanks
are there to provide this “rethink” and generate new, innovative ideas

20
 The G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.
21
 William Wallace, “Between Two Worlds: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy,” Two Worlds
of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas, London,
Routledge: 1994.
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    13

when necessary. The data collected and analyzed by James McGann22


supports this observation by providing evidence of a surge in the establish-
ment of think tanks that are clustered around periods of domestic or inter-
national upheaval, such as wars or economic crises. Others have identified
think tanks as the bridges between academia and the policy-making
process, making academic research findings more palatable for politicians
and practitioners.23 Haass and McGann explore the role think tanks play
in the foreign policy process and how it has change over the last 20 years.
Stone’s conceptualization of think tanks consists of experts that provide
policy analysis rather than produce new knowledge. In both cases, whether
creating or translating and transforming knowledge, think tanks can set
the policy agenda and prioritize certain topics and, therefore, play an
important role in policy design.
While definitions and explanations of the exact nature of think tanks
vary, two key conclusions permeate the current literature on think tanks:
(a) think tanks play a part—whether large or small—in the policy-mak-
ing process, be it through agenda-setting, legitimating processes, or
policy formulation; and (b) the role of think tanks becomes particularly
relevant in moments of change or transformation and in the face of more
complex policy demands. Today’s ongoing transformation of the inter-
national environment is a moment of critical change that is generating
increasingly complex demands for the so-called emerging world and the
established world powers. This book aims to understand the changing
role of think tanks in a sample of states with growing relevance in inter-
national affairs.
The Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing Emerging
Powers Project is an outgrowth of the aforementioned 2012 G20 Foreign
Policy Think Tanks Summit. The book consists of fourteen case studies
that explore how security and international affairs think tanks in emerging
powers collaborate with their policy-makers to meet current and anticipate
22
 James G. McGann, Democratization and Market Reform in Developing and Transitional
Countries: Think Tanks as Catalysts. UK: Routledge, 2010.
23
 Richard N. Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective,”
U.S. Department of State: Policy Planning Staff, News release, 2002.
James G. McGann, “The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign Policy: Think Tanks and
the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (November
2002).
Diane Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding
Policy Analysis Institutes,” Public Administration, Vol. 85 (No.2). pp. 259–278. June 2007.
14   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

future foreign policy and security challenges. Overall, the book illustrates
and analyzes how think tanks work within a variety of political and
economic contexts, and how they are able to contribute to their respective
policy-making processes. A broad cross-section of countries and case
studies demonstrates how think tanks, in collaboration with their respec-
tive governments, are able to respond to the new challenges and dynamics
of an increasingly multipolar world. The book has compiled case studies
from think tanks in a sample of countries that are considered emerging
powers: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Qatar, Singapore,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam. The case studies pro-
vided identify and explicate the unique foreign policy challenges that these
emerging powers face, as well as the strategies and programs that have
been developed to effectively respond to these policy issues. In the intro-
duction and conclusion, McGann and Lazarou synthesize the growing
literature on think tanks and on the foreign policies of the emerging pow-
ers within the context of power shifts and new dynamics in current inter-
national affairs. The conclusion identifies the transcendent trends among
the twelve think tanks and highlights the transferable approaches that
could be adopted by other emerging powers. Moreover, it aims to illumi-
nate the policies and strategies of emerging powers as they interact with
other political bodies in a multipolar world.
The results of this study are then broken down by region, to clearly
assess the impact of the previously identified shift in specific regions. To
further substantiate our claim, we trace the individual research foci of sev-
eral think tanks through case studies spanning each region of the world:
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North America, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, and Latin America. We found the same trend within patterns of
annual reports, conference papers, and publications of these cases as within
the objectives used in our wide-sweeping empirical studies, providing fur-
ther support for our initial analysis. A selection of representative case stud-
ies has been constructed to explore how and when the transition took
place and how it impacted each institution. These case studies were drawn
from the TTCSP database of close to 7000 think tanks worldwide. All
7000 think tanks were analyzed and a universe of security and interna-
tional affairs (SIA) think tanks was created. The think tank case studies
were selected based on a clearly articulated mission and programs that are
focused on SIA research, and a date of establishment that spanned the
  THINK TANKS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING…    15

Cold War period and fell within the overall parameters of the longitudinal
study. In addition, there was a conscious effort to create a globally repre-
sentative set of think tanks for the study.
The case studies are intended to illuminate and illustrate the nature and
impact of these changes—global trends involving endless technological
advances, social media and social networking, globalization and global
interdependence—on think tanks and the field of security studies. The
study concludes with an assessment of the future of SIA studies, and raises
the possibility of a return to a traditional security focus driven by recent
events in Europe and the Middle East.
The objective for this project is to provide a comprehensive look at
successful foreign policy formulation and the role think tanks play within
emerging powers, by providing a series of case studies (fourteen in all) that
explore how emerging powers and the SIA think tanks that serve them are
meeting the foreign policy security challenges they face now and will con-
tinue to face in the future. These insider, methodological insights ­hopefully
will serve as examples for other think tanks in similar political and economic
conditions.
In its aggregate, the book identifies and examines how think tanks in a
variety of political and economic contexts help their respective countries
understand and respond to the new challenges and dynamics of a multipo-
lar world. James McGann, from the University of Pennsylvania, provides a
detailed exposition of the literature on defense and security think tanks
and foreign policy international affairs think tanks, and the role they have
played in shaping foreign and defense policies. Bruce Jones, from the
Brookings Institution, offers an overview of the changing character and
context of international politics and the role the emerging powers are
playing in world politics. Each chapter presents a case with a brief intro-
duction and conclusion and relates it to the broader thematic goals of the
volume, with some of the case studies written by participants in those
organizations. The book concludes with a set of overarching observations
and suggestions for future research.
16   J. G. MCGANN AND E. LAZAROU

Citation Information: Think Tanks and Emerging


Power Networks (Chapter 1)
Hayes (2015) Hayes, Peter. “Think Tanks, ‘Think Nets’ and Their Evolution in Asia.”
Global Asia 10, no. 1 (2015): 86–95.
Pautz (2014) Pautz, Hartwig. “British Think-Tanks and Their Collaborative and
Communicative Networks.” Politics 34, no. 4 (2014): 345–361.
Thunert Thunert, Martin. “Players Beyond Borders? German Think Tanks as
(2000) Catalysts of Internationalisation.” Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000):
191–211.
Drezner Drezner, Daniel. “American Think-Tanks in the Twenty-First Century.”
(2015) International Journal 70, no. 4 (2015): 637–644.
Shambaugh Shambaugh, David. “China’s International Relations Think Tanks:
(2002) Evolving Structure and Process.” China Quarterly 171 (2002): 575–596.
Wallace Wallace, William. “Between two worlds, Think-tanks and foreign policy.”
(1994) In Two worlds of international relations: Academics, practitioners and the
trade in ideas, edited by Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (London
and New York: Routledge-LSE, 1994).
McGann The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy
(1990, 1994) Research Industry, University of Pennsylvania, Doctorial Dissertation.
Also see same title published version Rowman & Littlefield – University
Press of America, 1994 SSBN 0-891-9750-5
McGann McGann, James. “Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy: an historical
(2002) view.” US Foreign Policy Agenda (US Department of State) 7, no. 3
(2002): 9–12.
McGann McGann, James. “2010 Global Go To Think Tanks Index Report”
(2010) (2010). TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports. 5. http://
repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/5?utm_source=repository.upenn.
edu%2Fthink_tanks%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_
campaign=PDFCoverPages
Please note all Go To Reports can be accessed the University of
Pennsylvania’s Scholarly Commons site at http://repository.upenn.edu/
think_tanks/
McGann McGann, James and Richard Sabatini. Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks
(2011) and Governance. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.
Hass (2002) Haass, Richard. “Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy: a policy-maker’s
perspective.” US Foreign Policy Agenda (US Department of State) 7, no.
3 (2002): 5–8.
Stone (2007) Stone, Diane. “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three
Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes.” Public Administration 85,
no. 2 (2007): 259–278.
CHAPTER 2

Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging


Powers

James G. McGann

What Are Think Tanks?


The most agreed-upon characteristic of “think tank” seems to be the elu-
siveness of its etymology. To Thomas Medvetz, it is a “murky object” that
is difficult to nail down precisely.1 James McGann, too, posits that, resul-
tantly, the “discussion of think tank’s [sic]…often degenerates into futile
semantics.”2 Indeed, the majority of scholars in the literature attempt to
tackle such a difficulty, albeit to varying degrees of effort.3 Some offer a

1
 Thomas Medvetz, “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field” The Social Science Research
Council (2008): 1.
2
 Simon James, “Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy
Process by Diane Stone” Public Administration 76, no. 2 (1998): 409–410.
3
 This is reflected in the following works: Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?, 8–9; Smith,
The Idea Brokers, xiii–xvi; McGann, Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy,
11–12; McGann and Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action,
4–5; Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” 563–564; Medvetz, “Think Tanks as
an Emergent Field,” 9–10; Medvetz, “Hybrid Intellectuals,” 1–3; Stone, Think Tanks across
Nations: A Comparative Approach, 2–6; Rich, “Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics
of Expertise,” 11–12; DeMuth, “Thinking about Think Tanks,” in Think Tank’ with Ben

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 17


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_2
18   J. G. MCGANN

broad definition, a pursuit that, as Medvetz comments, “gesture[s]


towards both sides of the dilemma…then step[s] backwards to acknowl-
edge the concept’s slippery, mutable, fuzzy nature” with which it started.4
I shall classify these scholars into the minimalist school of approach, a
school in which the majority of the literature falls. However, some con-
tinue their pursuit and attempt to provide a narrower definition, although
this can be too limited, ignoring the diversity of think tanks and excluding
a number of institutions commonly accepted as such.5 This type of research
I shall classify into the parochialist school of approach. Scholars identifi-
able with what I shall term the typologist school of approach accept the
difficulty and obscurity of defining the term (indeed, just as those above
do), but proceed to wrestle with the points of contention until they appre-
hend a notion of “think tank” that is as universal and portable as possible.
In what follows, I shall explore the existing literature on think tanks as I
struggle, like those before me have, with the nature and role of these insti-
tutions in developing a definition in the manner of the typologist school
of approach.
During the fifty years that the body of literature grappling with the
etymology of “think tank” has existed, there has been a gradual develop-
ment of a broad definition that identifies core institutional characteristics
on which there is a wide consensus. Even at a broad level, however,
attempts to define and/or categorize think tanks immediately start a
debate over the meaning of basic terms such as “public policy research,”
“think tank,” and “advocacy.” It is no wonder, then, that a struggle
exists among think tanks concerning their role in the policy-making pro-
cess; are they academics, advisors, or advocates? This debate reflects the
inherent clash of academic and policy cultures. While there is a general
consensus at the broadest level of scholarly attempts to define the term
“think tank” (irrespective of the aforementioned debate), when scholars
seek a more specific approach a number of points of contention emerge—
the core loci of divergence in the literature. These can be notions like

Wattenberg part one of two, 2; Pautz, “Think Tanks in Scotland,” 2–5; Stone, “Think Tank
Transnationalization,” 28; Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 1–4; Rich, Think
Tanks, 11–12.
4
 Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process
(London: Frank Cass, 1996), 10.
Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America. Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 2014: 3.
5
 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 10.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    19

think tank financial and ideological autonomy or ideas about the “social
consequence” responsibility a think tank might carry.
In order to understand the current status of the debate over the mean-
ing of the term, one must follow the trajectory that the definition of “think
tank” has taken over the past century, since its inauguration in 1830.6 I
hope to assess this ideological journey and concurrently derive a current
definition from an application of its previous connotations to the markedly
different and more complex geopolitical terrain existent today.

The First Era (1830–1946)


The “think tank” classification once described non-partisan, truly inde-
pendent public policy research organizations which advised the US gov-
ernment as early as the 1830s.7 They grew out of the intellectual and social
movements of the nineteenth century,8 survived with the generosity of
outside donors, and provided a more passive source of non-partisan,
policy-­primed advice.9 The rise of “think tanks” during this period follows
a trajectory similar to the emergence of the United States as a global
leader, and various institutions of this character—Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (1910), Kiel Institute for Economics (1914),
Brookings Institution (1916), and the Royal Institute for International
Affairs (1920), as well as the more informal assembly of prominent schol-
ars known as “The Inquiry” (1917–1918)—were established during the
early twentieth century. This first generation institutionalized the link
between the academics frequenting the various disciplines of the social sci-
ences and policy-makers in Washington, creating both a tool to profes-
sionalize the government during the progressive era, and a set of
institutions that could satisfy the growing information imperative (the lat-
ter a force that continues to be the primary energy behind the prolifera-
tion of public policy research organizations today).10

6
 Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
7
 Ibid.
8
 James McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars, and Influence in the Public Policy
Research. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995. 19.
9
 Donald E.  Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy. Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006. 54.
10
 James G.  McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,”
U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 14.
20   J. G. MCGANN

The Second Era (1946–1970)


While independent public policy research organizations had existed in the
United States before the outbreak of World War I, the term “think tank”
was initially employed in the United States during World War II to refer to
a physically secure room or environment where expert defense, military,
and civilian strategists discussed military plans.11 Though the term had
been associated with human intelligence prior to this military-specific
usage (in 1900 it was first coined as a flippant colloquialism for the brain),
the immediate post–World War II period was the inaugural time the term
was associated with institutionalized intelligence engaging in research
activity and producing policy or strategy-primed advice. This second gen-
eration of think tanks could be classified as “contract researchers,” since
they received generous and direct legal, financial, and administrative sup-
port from the US government, compelled to allocate resources to scien-
tists and researchers, which was symptomatic of their involvement in the
Cold War.12 The RAND Corporation (1948) is a paradigmatic example of
the nature of think tanks during this period and an institution that played
a core role in the formulation of defense policy.13 That said, institutions
were also established during this era separate from military preoccupa-
tions, such as the “general-purpose” American Enterprise Institute (1943)
and the Institute for Policy Studies (1963), operating from a perspective
that it called “existential pragmatism.”14

The Third Era (1971–1994)


Scholarly inquiry into the meaning of “think tank” is a distinctly post–
World War II pursuit. Academia began to acknowledge the emergence of
a knowledge-value society from a previously industrial one. Value came
to be treated as a consequence of information and analysis generated by
humankind, and, in turn, these inputs of human intelligence were recog-
nized as the cornerstone of modern society. Hence, think tanks, seen as
factories of such value, began to harness not only the interest of their
two main consumers, policy-makers and the media, but also scholars.

11
 Dickson, Think Tanks, 26.
12
 R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” Political Science and Politics 22
(1989), 566. This dynamic is also identified in Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 74–77.
13
 Ibid.
14
 Marcus G. Raskin, Being and Doing (New York: Random House, 1971), xii, xxv.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    21

Thus, the third generation of think tanks emerged during a period when
scholarly attention to the phenomenon first materialized.
During the 1960s and the rise of the new right, an alternative doctrine
of ideas emerged to challenge the liberal orthodoxy that had prevailed
over Washington for the first half of the century. And with it came the
politicization of think tanks as conservative thinkers and think tanks
entered the marketplace of ideas.15 Corporate financing initiatives also fre-
quented the think tank domain during this era, and such an influx of capi-
tal contributed to a veritable proliferation of public policy research
organizations. Two-thirds of all the think tanks that exist today were
established after 1970, and over half have been established since 1980.
This exacerbated the crowding of a marketplace of ideas already divided
on partisan lines. Consequently, competition became rife and the priorities
of think tanks further shifted from “utility” to “visibility.”16
Given that scholars of this period were exploring untraversed terrain,
the literature from the 1970s focused not so much on grappling with this
notion of partisanship and the associated question of academic freedom,
as with ascertaining a broad definition of the term. Scholars became inter-
ested in:

I. The competition between independent research institutions and


the new “research” universities.
II. The methodology and uses of applied social research.
III. The methodology, uses, and limits of professionalized public pol-
icy research.
IV. The emergence of interdisciplinary pursuits in a world of disciplin-
ary research.

The first comprehensive scholarly attempt to categorize and define


“think tank” came with The Non-Profit Research Institute: Its Origins,
Operations, Problems and Prospects (1972) by Harold Orlans. Orlans’
departure point is the second generation of think tanks, the defense-­
related research and development centers established after World War
15
 Michael L.  Katz, “American Think Tanks: Their Influence Is on the Rise,” Carnegie
Reporter 5, issue 2 (2009): 7. http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/
Reporter/PDF/carnegiereporter_v5n2.pdf.
16
 Peter W.  Singer, “Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own,” Brookings
Institution (2010) http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/0813_think_tanks_singer.
aspx.
22   J. G. MCGANN

II.  He concluded that think tanks were “independent, often separately


incorporated, non-degree granting organizations that devote most of their
annual expenditures to the development of new technology and to research
in the natural and social sciences, engineering, humanities and
professions.”17 Such a notion of “independence,” one that disassociated
think tanks from institutions of higher education as well as from govern-
ment, was field breaking, and Orlans is to be credited for introducing the
whole notion of independent non-profit research institutes into the
literature.18
Other works from the 1970s, such as Paul Dickson’s Think Tanks
(1972) and David Boorstin’s article “Directions of Policy Research”
(1975), conduct their inquiries in a similar vein.19 Despite the breadth of
the definition—or rather, the absence of clarity—Dickson can be seen as
having contributed substantially to the field by way of his distinction
between research and development centers and think tanks.20 To him,
think tanks conduct “policy research or research that provides ideas, analy-
sis, and alternatives relevant to people who make ‘policy,’” whereas
research and development centers, by contrast, are committed to tradi-
tional science and solely produce “scientific knowledge for scientists and
researchers.”21 Put simply, think tanks act as a “bridge between knowledge
and power” and are “closer to being agents of new knowledge and discov-
ery than creators of new knowledge.”22 Boorstin also attempts to define
what he terms a “think tank,” though, like Dickson, he lacks some preci-
sion in his definition. To Boorstin, think tanks are “a special class of R and
D institutions [designed] to act as synthesizers bringing together scholar-
ship and scientific and technological tools for the use of policymakers
combining the ‘know-how’ and the ‘know-who.’”23 Despite Dickson’s
attempts to provide a typology of public policy research organizations, it
remains that both Dickson’s and Boorstin’s definitions are rather all-­
inclusive and deficient in clarity. Hence, while both scholars are to be

17
 Harold Orlans. The Nonprofit Research Institute: Its Operation, Origins, Problems and
Prospects (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 3.
18
 McGann, The Competition, 28.
19
 Dickson, Think Tanks, 26.
20
 McGann, The Competition, 31.
21
 Dickson, Think Tanks, 28.
22
 Ibid.
23
 David Boorstin, “Directions of Policy Research,” Congressional Quarterly 2 (1975):
725–744.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    23

credited for their inauguration of inquiry into the term “think tank,” they
are equally accountable for setting in motion a trend that would inhibit
the majority of scholars from seeking a definition that is at once narrow
and universal, for decades to come.
A number of scholars have written articles on a narrower field of institu-
tions to which they accord the term “think tank.” In contrast to Dickson
and Boorstin, these scholars begin from a point too narrow and each uses
markedly different frameworks for analysis, this making synthesis difficult.
Roger Levien (1969) asserts that there are six characteristics that an insti-
tution must possess within its organizational structure in order to qualify
as an independent public policy research institution. These characteristics
are “a policy orientation, influence, breadth of charter, interdisciplinary
character, an eye to the future and a concern with systems.”24
Nelson Polsby, in the article “Tanks But No Tanks,” introduces the
notion of public policy research institutes by distinguishing them from
what he terms “true think tanks.”25 He contends that public policy
research institutes, or those engaged in the social sciences, are the policy-­
oriented progeny of these true, “ivory towerish” think tanks, and are insti-
tutions that represent a paradigm shift in the notion of think tanks, from
abstention from to active participation in public matters.26 George Fauriol,
in his paper “Think Tanks and U.S.  Foreign Policy,” elaborates on this
notion by stating that “the foreign policy think tank acts as a conveyor belt
of thought…a mid-point between the ivory towers of academia and the
hustled atmosphere of the policy making world of government.”27
Building on Levien and Fauriol, Yehezkel Dror defines a think tank as
“a bridge between power and knowledge.”28 For Dror, a public policy
research institute has six independent features: “(1) mission; (2) critical
mass; (3) methods; (4) research freedom; (5) clientele-dependency; and

24
 Roger E.  Levien, “Independent Public Policy Analysis Organization—A Major Social
Invention,” in Rand Papers Series ed. Rand Corporation (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
1969), 4231.
25
 Nelson W. Polsby, “Tanks But No Tanks,” Public Opinion 6 (1983): 14–16, 58–59.
26
 Ibid., 58–59.
27
 George A.  Fauriol, “Think Tanks and U.S.  Foreign Policy,” A paper at The Fourth
Tamkang American Strides Conference, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, November
25–28, 1984. 1, 9.
28
 Yehezkel Dror, “Think Tanks. A New Invention in Government,” In Making
Bureaucracies Work ed. Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton (Beverly Hills, London: Sage,
1980), 139–152.
24   J. G. MCGANN

(6) outputs and impacts.”29 In addition, he adopts the views of Boorstin


and Levien, proposing that a public policy think tank’s mission should be
focused on “interdisciplinary science-based contributions to policy-­
making,” and that its research staff should enjoy a considerable level of
freedom in defining and exploring the problem.30 Dror contributes in a
number of ways to the literature, from introducing into his definition the
requirement of a full-time staff to providing the first detailed definition
that centers solely on public policy research institutes, yet is universal
enough to encompass a whole range of these organizations.31 To some
degree, Dror represents the first scholarly attempt to surpass the minimal-
ism and parochialism of definitions before him, reconciling the uniqueness
of think tanks in relation to other institutional forms with their diversity
within their own form. Winard Gellner, along with Howard J.  Wiarda,
refines Dror’s notion of “outputs and impacts.” Gellner identifies four
functions or outputs: “generation of ideas and ideologies; convocation
[networking]; publication [diffusion]; transformation [of elites].”32 In
these attempts to define “think tank,” the simultaneous pursuit of clarity
yet universal applicability to all institutions of this form is notable, and
Dror’s, Gellner’s, and Wiarda’s approaches will constitute a vital influence
in the construction of the definition that I will be composing.
Perhaps the most influential example of this approach is R.  Kent
Weaver’s path-breaking treatment of the term in his article “The Changing
World of Think Tanks.” This approach amounts to classifying such institu-
tions under organizational structure, product lines, and marketing strate-
gies.33 Weaver’s work focuses on those institutions with organizational
independence and asserts that institutions (“think tanks”) in this group
follow one of three organizational models: universities without students,
the contract researcher, and advocacy tanks.34 Building on Orlans’ notion
of think tanks as “non-degree granting”35 institutions, universities without
students rely heavily on academics as researchers and private-sector fund-
ing, and primarily produce book-length studies, academic monographs,

29
 Ibid., 141–145.
30
 Dror, “Think Tanks. A New”, 145.
31
 McGann, The Competition, 42.
32
 Winard Gellner, “Political Think Tanks: Functions and Perspectives of a Strategic Elite”
A Paper at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 5.
33
 McGann, The Transformation, 49.
34
 Weaver, “The Changing World,” 563.
35
 Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute, 3.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    25

and journal articles that seek to change elite opinion. Contract researcher
think tanks, like universities without students, practice objective analysis
with a “heavy reliance on academics as researchers,” emphasizing rigorous
social science methods.36 Contract researchers are funded by—and pro-
duce reports for—specific agencies, and hence their research agenda is
determined accordingly. In the late 1980s, this assertion was novel and
one that broke with Levien’s and Dror’s belief that one of the defining
characteristics of think tanks was their research freedom. Weaver contends
that throughout the proliferation of advocacy tanks in the 1980s,37 this
new breed of think tank was unabashedly partisan and ideological, and
prioritized putting a “spin on existing research” over the production of
original research,38 decreasing “academicness” in favor of increasing acces-
sibility to policy-makers.39 Normally in the form of policy briefs or white
papers, their product tends to advocate a particular policy rather than the
academic tomes that are associated with the more academic think tanks.
Expectedly, Weaver’s broader treatment of “think tank” aligns fairly con-
cordantly with those of his predecessors.
In their work “Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of
Definitions and Data,” Samantha L. Durst and James A. Thumber attempt
to define public policy think tanks by “sources of funding” and “types of
expenditures.” It is their contention that the source of funds (grants,
endowment, contracts) and nature of the funding (restricted, unrestricted,
public, or private) “has an influence on the objectivity, direction, and
influence of a think tank.”40 This once novel notion of the relationship
between financial independence and ideological and intellectual auton-
omy has become a major point of contention in the literature written
today.
A further point of contention for today’s scholars was first introduced
into the literature by a group of scholars in the late 1980s. These scholars
focus on the politicization of think tanks during the mid-1970s and 1980s,
and expound an underlying premise that think tanks, once the spring of

36
 Weaver, “The Changing World,” 568.
37
 Ibid., 564.
38
 Ibid., 567.
39
 Ibid., 564.
40
 Samantha Durst and James Thurber, “Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of
Definitions and Data,” Paper presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, the Atlanta Hilton and Towers, August 31–September 3, 1989. 14.
26   J. G. MCGANN

objective policy-oriented discourse in a desert of rising partisanship, are


now mirages, absorbed into the politics of Capitol Hill and transformed
into ideologues, actively fighting in the “war of ideas.”41 Robert K. Landers
believes that the influence of politics on the think tank domain has caused
the “more overtly ideological” to rise to prominence at the expense of the
more centrist institutions that have thus far served to mediate public dis-
cussion” and attain “compromise and consensus.”42 James A. Smith is a
leading proponent of this notion, asserting in The Idea Brokers: Think
Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite that the “war of ideas” has
battered the loyalties of the think tank domain to academia and objectivity
to such an extent that rational discourse has been ousted by a “factious
and sectarian disputatiousness.”43 Derived from Heclo’s concept of “issue
networks,” Paul Sabatier identifies the presence of “advocacy coalitions
within these networks.”44 He also asserts that “the distinction between an
advocate and a broker is, however, a continuum.” For Sabatier, an idea
broker is not the same thing as an advocate; “some brokers will have some
policy bent,” but advocates must “show some serious concern with system
maintenance.”45 Many scholars acknowledge that the value of academic
freedom is disappearing at all levels of the organizational structure of think
tanks.46 It remains to be seen, however, whether such politicization has
created overly partisan organizations and denatured the traditional institu-
tional form of a think tank so much so that its academic integrity is
compromised.
While there have been some promising anomalies in the form of Dror,
Weaver, and so on, attempts at defining the concept of a think tank during
this era have resorted to minimalism or parochialism in the face of the “ill-­
defined, subjective and debated” term “think tank.”47

41
 Richard M.  Weaver. Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948). The notion of a marketplace of ideas and the competition of ideas has its roots in
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, published in 1859, in which he stresses the importance of
liberty of thought and discussion.
42
 Robert K. Landers, “Think Tanks: The New Partisans,” Editorial Research Reports 1,
no. 23 (1986): 455.
43
 James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New
York: The Free Press, 1991), 236.
44
 Paul A.  Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy
Coalition Approach. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 27.
45
 Ibid.
46
 Weaver, “The Changing World,” 574–575.
47
 Robert L.  Hollings, Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations: A Sourcebook on
Think Tanks in Government. New York: Garland Publishers, 1993.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    27

The Present Era (1994–): Unstable Foundations


and Fluid Terrain

A large proportion of the components of most modern definitions of think


tanks are not novel notions. Rather, they have their roots in the inaugural
attempts at defining the term made by scholars such as Orlans, Dickson,
and Boorstin, using many of the same characteristics as these and other
predecessors.
I shall commence this section with a review of the broader definitions
that have been offered in the past two decades. Some twenty-first-century
accounts of “think tanks” have propagated the growing tendency in the
literature to borrow heavily from the definitions of scholars before them.48
As evident in the definition of Silvia Montoya and Rachel Swanger, char-
acteristics such as “non-governmental,” “non-profit,” “evidence-based
advice,” and that a more precise definition “remains elusive” are common
go-to terms for some contemporary scholars.49
In his work Think Tanks and U.S.  Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s
Perspective, Robert N.  Haass offers substantial insight into the twenty-­
first-­century meaning of “think tank” by way of his unique approach to
the term, one that could only be taken by a policy-maker, not a detached
scholar. To this effect, he conducts an empirical assessment of the observ-
able influence of think tanks as opposed to a normative one that would
focus primarily on their agendas. To Haass, think tanks affect foreign
policy-­makers in five different ways: “by generating original ideas and
options for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in
government, by offering venues for high-level discussion, by educating
U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to
mediate and resolve conflict.”50
In her article “Think Tank Transnationalization and Non-Profit
Analysis, Advice and Advocacy,” Diane Stone offers an updated categori-
zation of the think tank domain that builds on Weaver’s seminal typology
of the late 1980s. Constructing a demand-side explanation of this domain,
Stone asserts that there are three types of services that independent public
policy research institutions offer which meet the diversity of demand
48
 Lee Michael Katz, “American Think Tanks: Their Influence Is on the Rise,” Carnegie
Reporter 5, no. 2 (Spring 2009).
49
 Montoya and Swanger, “Ideas for Policymakers,” 1–2.
50
 Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy”, 5. Stone concurs on a number of these
points (civic education, broad output, conveners, marketing, and advocacy pursuits).
28   J. G. MCGANN

existent in the marketplace of ideas.51 The first service is “Knowledge and


Expertise.” This service is more widely practiced by think tanks in devel-
oping countries, and in these countries it is one born out of excess demand
for research.52 The second service is “Advocacy and Argumentation.”
In this function, think tanks serve as a repository of credibility for corpora-
tions and foundations which seek to articulate their interests in the most
legitimate manner possible.53 The third and final type of services that think
tanks provide are “Organizational and Technical Services.” This amounts
to think tanks facilitating dialogue and consensus-building between the
policy-maker and civic education.54
Medvetz is another example of a twenty-first-century scholar who
breaks with the tendency already identified, also approaching the term
from perhaps the most distinctive angle evident in the literature to date. In
his initial inquiry into the term, Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Theory of
Think Tanks and Public Policy Experts in the United States, Medvetz
departs from a somber recognition that there exists a “constitutive blurri-
ness” in the term itself, describing think tanks as structurally ambiguous
organizations that exist in an intermediate zone between two clearly
defined organizational domains.55 In fact, he treats think tanks not “as a
distinctive kind of organization per se, but rather as an organizational
device for gathering and assembling forms of authority conferred by insti-
tutions of academics, politics, business and journalism.”56 Medvetz pro-
poses what he calls a “relational notion” of think tanks as “structurally
hybrid offspring”—composed of elements from both their own develop-
ing “institutional niche” and that of these more established institutions—
that exist in a “hybrid interstitial field” between the spaces of such
institutions. As Medvetz himself acknowledges, one could argue that his
account is “too seamless,” “too mechanical,” and reductive of the think
tank domain.57 Regardless, such premises refute both constructivist and
structuralist accounts of “think tanks” (two categories under which the

51
 Diane Stone. “Think Tank Transnationalization and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice and
Advocacy,” Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000), 16.
52
 Diane Stone. “Think Tank Transnationalization”, 16.
53
 Ibid., 18.
54
 Ibid., 19.
55
 Thomas Medvetz. “Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Theory of Think Tanks and Public
Policy Experts in the United States,” Cornell University 1 (2007): 35.
56
 Ibid., 9–10.
57
 Ibid.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    29

majority of the definitions cited in this chapter fall) and, in his application
of Elite Theory to the think tank domain, his contribution to the literature
represents a substantial departure from traditional accounts of “think
tanks” and offers an alternative lens through which to view this institu-
tional sphere.
As explicated in my account of scholarly interpretations of “think tanks”
in the third era, the politicization of the think tank domain poses a signifi-
cant obstacle to any attempt at definition of the term.58 The fact that the
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics now classifies some think tanks as
“organizations of an explicitly partisan interest that seek to offer policy
advice to chosen recipients” only adds further weight to this notion.59 In
1996, centrist or non-ideological think tanks enjoyed a majority share of
45%, numbering 141 out of a total of 306 think tanks in existence.60 Such
a figure is expected, given the long-standing US tradition of producing
balanced and non-partisan research. That being said, think tanks display-
ing an ideological character, either conservative or liberal, represented
54% of the total number of think tanks in existence.61 This proportion is
an increase from 14% in 1970.62 With the continued advent of public
policy research organizations with an ideological partiality into the 1990s
and 2000s, it seems that the paradigm shift that emerged in the 1980s has
now secured permanent tenancy in the once non-partisan marketplace of
ideas.
In her work Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the
Policy Process, Stone notes that a common trend among new think tanks is
the emphasis on marketing and promotion in response to increased com-
petition for funding, media exposure, and political influence: “their advo-
cacy in policy debates combines a strong ideological, policy or partisan
position with aggressive salesmanship.”63 For Stone, however, think tanks

58
 In their article “Ideas for Policymakers: Enhancing the Impact of Think Tanks,” Silvia
Montoya and Rachel M. Swanger identify that think tanks have to strike a difficult balance
between “building a close relationship with stakeholders for the purpose of enhancing the
relevance and timeliness of research, and maintaining adequate independence to preserve the
integrity (real and perceived) of the research” (Montoya and Swanger, 4).
59
 Iain Maclean, and Alistair MacMillan. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
60
 Rich, “U.S. Think Tanks,” 55.
61
 Ibid.
62
 Ibid.
63
 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 23.
30   J. G. MCGANN

and interest groups are different in their aspirations—“while the line


between analysis and advocacy becomes blurred, policy institutes aspire to
be rigorous and balanced”—and seek to uphold the diversity of their
agenda, addressing multiple issues whereas interest groups tend to focus
only on one.64 She asserts that think tanks are primarily concerned with
engagement, not advocacy, and thus looks upon the categorization of
think tanks as intellectual glorifications of interest groups with an unsatis-
fied glance. Indeed, “think tanks need to have some kind of engagement
with government if they are to succeed in influencing policy.”65 In reality,
think tanks require a relationship with their primary target, policy-makers,
and this materializes in the form of engagement, not advocacy.66 Stone
builds on her previous musings on the think tank domain in Think Tank
Transnationalization and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice and Advocacy, argu-
ing that relative, as opposed to absolute, independence and autonomy
form a necessary prerequisite for think tanks to fulfill their function.
Ultimately, she recognizes, “complete autonomy and independence for
think tanks is illusory.”67 However, Stone also contends that absolute
independence and autonomy are less favorable if a think tank is to fulfill its
primary objective of policy influence.68 In her later article, “Bridging
Research and Policy,” Stone contends that the product of even the most
avowedly objective and non-partisan think tanks is, to some degree, sub-
jective. She identifies three obstacles to a think tank’s ability to practice
absolute academic freedom: the funding of the research, the values of the
researcher, and the intended application of the research.69 Stone concludes
that this normative dimension to the product of think tanks is an
­unavoidable obstacle blocking the path of the bridge between policy and
research. Yet the defining facet of her account is that she accepts this bias
as an inevitable facet of any research organization that seeks policy
influence.
Some scholars, however, view the politicization of the think tank
domain with a more skeptical eye. Donald Abelson is a major proponent
of this perspective, believing in the existence of institutional policy and an

64
 Ibid., 13.
65
 Andrew Denham and Diane Stone, Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 5.
66
 In Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise, Rich concurs with this notion.
67
 Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 5.
68
 Ibid.
69
 Stone et al, “Bridging Research,” 27–28.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    31

appetite for lobbying.70 For Abelson, although new think tanks establish
legitimate research programs, their “primary goal [is] not to pursue social
science research, but advance their ideological agenda in the political
arena.”71 Wiarda even contends that think tanks exacerbate the partisan
politics that underscores policy-making in the American political system.72
Hence, as a result of the prioritization of engagement with and influence
on decision-makers over objective, non-ideological scholarly research,
think tanks have, according to Abelson, transformed over the past thirty
years from scientific, non-partisan institutions to active participants and
advocates in the political process.
John Chuckman offers further insight into this perspective. He believes
that think tanks are no more than “public relations fronts” that serve the
primary function of fulfilling the “advocacy goals of their sponsors.”73 His
subsequent assertion, that think tanks are “phony institutes where
ideologue-­propagandists pose as academics…[into which] money gushes
like blood from opened arteries to support meaningless advertising’s suf-
focation of genuine debate,” is particularly graphic.74 Extending his appli-
cation of Elite Theory to the think tank domain, Medvetz asserts that the
space of a think tank represents a world divided against itself, where the
traditional desire for credibility is at odds with the modern necessity of
visibility. Ultimately, this continuous conflict inflicts a “cost” on the think
tank’s “intellectual production,” immobilizing the institution’s ability to,
quite simply, think. Abelson’s comments on the issue in A Capitol Idea
perhaps best summarize the skeptics’ perspective. Like Stone, he distin-
guishes think tanks from interest groups. However, unlike the former,
such a distinction does not come with hope for the practice of academic
freedom in the think tank domain; instead, it comes laden with disap-
pointment. Abelson contends that whereas interest groups are in the
“business of giving money to attract support for their cause or causes…
think tanks are in the business of raising money to advance their institu-
tional mandates.”75

70
 Abelson, American Think Tanks, 125.
71
 Ibid., 49.
72
 Wiarda, Think Tanks, 31.
73
 John Chuckman, “The Real Clash of Civilizations,” Counter Punch, June 23, 2003,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/06/23/the-real-clash-of-civilizations/.
74
 Ibid.
75
 Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 13–14.
32   J. G. MCGANN

Other scholars are slightly more optimistic, with some even positing
that politicization is beneficial for the think tank domain. Peter Singer’s
Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own is one of the most
recent of these accounts. Singer asserts that the proximity of think tanks to
power and the media has induced confusion in these institutions between
visibility and utility, and prioritizing advocacy over objective intellectual
production.76 In support of these remarks, he notes that over the past
decade, new think tanks have been smaller and more specialized,77 and
that a trend of increasing donor responsiveness and decreasing indepen-
dence and accountability in response to the “shrinking money environ-
ment” has emerged.78
The concurrent dissolution of authoritarian regimes and expansion of
the European Union (EU) towards the end of the 1980s, combined with
the more recent force of globalization, have created “new spaces in which
think tanks can operate,”79 as well as the establishment of both think tanks
in countries outside of the Anglo-American domain, and transnational
think tank networks linking such institutions. Both of these phenomena,
as Stone notes, have caused traditional notions of “think tank” to be
“stretched beyond their original meaning” and “US-inspired taxonomies”
to lose their “relevance.”80 This idea is qualified by a statement in one of
her earlier works where she asserts that the “notion that a think tank
requires independence of autonomy from the state in order to be ‘free-­
thinking’ is a peculiar Anglo-American predilection that does not travel
well into other cultures.”81 A small body of literature exists wherein schol-
ars attempt to tackle this issue.
In his article “Think Tanks in Newly Democratic Eastern Europe,”
K.F.F. Quigley documents the rise of think tanks in Eastern Europe, pro-
viding insight into the juxtaposition between the dynamics of the Eastern
European think tank domain and the Anglo-American domain.82 During
communist times, policy analysis and development were solely done by the

76
 Singer echoes Abelson, American Think Tanks, in this notion.
77
 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, also notes this trend fifteen years earlier.
78
 Singer, “Washington’s Think Tanks,” 5.
79
 Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 7.
80
 Diane Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding
Policy Analysis Institutes.” Public Administration 85, no. 2 (2007): 260.
81
 Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 2. Telgarsky and Ueno, too (Telgarsky and
Ueno, Think Tanks in a Democratic Society), question whether the Anglo-American concep-
tion of the term “think tank” can be “transplanted” into other countries.
82
 K.F.F. Quigley, “Think Tanks in Newly Democratic Eastern Europe,” in Think Tanks in
a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1995).
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    33

government, at government-controlled academies and research institutes.


Quigley notes that those institutions that did produce high-quality research
generated work that was primarily theoretical, and thus inapplicable to the
policy-making domain. Since 1989, however, there has been a rapid
increase in the number of think tanks in Eastern Europe that conduct
more policy-oriented research. That being said, due to historical obstacles
such as the lack of public participation in policy-making, emerging think
tanks in Eastern Europe are facing formidable obstacles to success. Indeed,
while think tanks foster civic engagement, they are doing so in a political
environment that suppresses that very democratic liberty; disagreement is
often interpreted, and punished, as political hostility. For Quigley, think
tanks operate with a different agenda outside of the Anglo-­ American
domain—most institutions rely on the leadership of a single individual and
do not have many qualified leaders; newly created think tanks often try to
do too many things—and they are a far cry from the project-specific public
policy research institutions emerging in the United States: the marketing
skills of these institutions are deficient, their constituency is narrow and
not as well informed, and, even if their advocacy operations were even rela-
tively competent, the government exercises its power to curtail any such
pursuits. Hence, while Quigley does not offer a definition that reconciles
these differences with the Anglo-American domain, he provides consider-
able insight to the inapplicability of the Anglo-American notion of a think
tank to political contexts outside of that sphere.
No clear boundaries have been placed on this universe of institutions; it
has been almost impossible to arrive at a shared definition for institutions
that conduct public policy research. Most of the attempts at definitions are
either too broad or too narrow and, when approaching the term from a
narrower perspective, many of the authors have failed to build on existing
literature on the subject, resulting in duplication and confusion. While I
concede that it is not easy to define these complex institutions, we now
have enough information to begin to develop a working definition.
Now that I have explicated the present viewpoints of various scholars in
this field, I shall construct my own working definition of the term, one
that I hope to be at once universal, portable, and as reconciliatory of the
current points of debate as possible. As I formulate this definition, I hope
to draw liberally on the works of my predecessors.
Current debates over what constitutes a think tank and the lack of an
established definition have led the classification of think tanks to be either
narrowed to an American-centric view or expanded into an over-inclusive
34   J. G. MCGANN

term that encompasses an increasingly diverse set of organizations. Think


tanks now engage in public policy research, analysis, advocacy, education,
and formulation. Nevertheless, amid this striking diversity of focus, size,
and function, there does exist a discernible group of organizations, all of
which share the common goal of analyzing and influencing public policy
in a specific context.
Think tanks are one type of civil society organization. In seeking to
bridge the gap between knowledge and power, think tanks satisfy a neces-
sity born out of a limitation inherent in all modern political systems—
time. Policy-makers do not have the time to research comprehensively the
topics for which they must formulate and evaluate policies. Equally, aca-
demics do not have the time to investigate the complete landscape of
issues that policy-makers traverse. Each possesses a comparative advantage
in their respective fields and thus, in alignment with the law of specializa-
tion, the two trades are split. Indeed, without such a liaison, policy-makers
would formulate policy uninformed, and academics would conduct
research unheeded.
Think tanks also satisfy a demand that has persisted ever since the
concept first emerged in the early nineteenth century: the demand for
information. Stone introduces an important idea about “policy transfer.”
Specifically, her paper addresses the role of think tanks in promoting the
spread of policy ideas about privatization.83 Policy-makers need basic
information about the world and the societies they govern, how current
policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely costs and conse-
quences. Not only do policy-makers need information, but they need
information that is primed for them, information that is practical, reliable,
not too technical that it cannot be understood, or not tainted in any way
by the interests of those disseminating it. Hence, think tanks have filled
policy-makers’ insatiable need for information and systematic analysis that
is policy relevant.84
Structured as permanent bodies, in contrast with ad hoc commissions
or research panels, think tanks devote a substantial portion of their finan-
cial and human resources to commissioning and publishing research and
policy analysis in the social sciences: political science, economics, public
administration, and international affairs. The major outputs of these

83
 Diane Stone, “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent
Policy Institutes,” Governance (13): 45–70.
84
 McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization,” 13–14.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    35

organizations are books, monographs, reports, policy briefs, conferences,


seminars, briefings, and informal discussions with policy-makers, govern-
ment officials, and key stakeholders. While purely academic research is
focused on creating new knowledge, think tanks are focused on producing
research, analysis, and advice that are in a form that is accessible and
understandable for policy-makers and the public. Some of the functions
that think tanks engage in are:

• Carrying out research and analysis on policy problems.


• Providing advice on immediate policy concerns.
• Evaluating government programs.
• Interpreting policies for electronic and print media, thus facilitating
public understanding of and support for policy initiatives.
• Facilitating the construction of issue networks that involve a diverse
set of policy actors that come together on an ad hoc basis around a
particular policy issue or problem.

Think tanks are unique public policy research organizations in a num-


ber of ways. They:

• Are more effectively future oriented than government research func-


tionaries, who work in an environment in which efforts at creative
disposition are rarely rewarded.
• Are more likely to generate reconfigured policy agendas, while
bureaucracies thrive on a security-maximizing environment of stan-
dard operating procedures.
• Are better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of
researchers for a common purpose, because they have no permanent
vested interest in any one domain.
• Aid intellectual synthesis that results from breaking down bureau-
cratic barriers because they are better able to disseminate informa-
tion to targets; better suited to deal with the interdisciplinary nature
of global policy issues; able to function as conveners; better able to
telescope the policy process, from data collection to knowledge/
policy creation; and better able to conceive the means of implemen-
tation than government bureaucracies, which may be internally
segmented by department and area of specialization.85

85
 McGann, “Think Tanks and the Transnationalization,” 16–17.
36   J. G. MCGANN

In light of this discussion, think tanks, in the broadest sense of the


term, are independent, non-profit, non-partisan policy research, engage-
ment, and formulation organizations that generate policy-oriented
research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues; that
enable policy-makers and the public to make informed decisions about
public policy by offering such advice in the form of intellectual argument,
platforms for convocation and debate, and resources; and that have signifi-
cant autonomy from government and societal interests such as business
firms, interest groups, and political parties.86
Independent, non-partisan, or non-governmental think tanks are those
that are not affiliated with political parties, governments, interest groups,
or corporations. The intellectual, financial, and legal independence from
governments, political parties, and for-profit organizations is a defining
characteristic of truly independent think tanks. The freedom to develop
and promulgate positions free from the influence and interference of gov-
ernment is what makes these non-governmental organizations critical civil
society actors and affords them greater credibility with the public. Today,
however, such institutions, in the absolute sense, exist only in an ideal
environment. There are a number of environmental forces at work: parti-
san politics, the growth of liberal and conservative advocacy groups, the
restrictive funding policies of donors, the growth of specialized think
tanks, the narrow and short-term orientation of Congress and the White
House, the tyranny of myopic academic disciplines, and, finally, the 24/7
cable news networks. All of these factors prove inhibitory to the capacity
of think tanks for independent analysis and advice.
There is considerable variation in the character of public policy research
organizations according to which nation-state context the institution in
question is operating in. It is vital to recognize that the conditions that
enable think tanks to operate as an effective counterweight to the state
and for-profit sector are not necessarily present in every civil society.
Indeed, certain conditions are required if think tanks are to be afforded
the independence and, consequently, permitted the objectivity they
require. In the advanced industrialized democracies of Europe and North
America, there exist legal, political, and financial frameworks that reserve
a space in the political arena for the independent policy analysis that think
tanks provide. In contrast, the absence or restricted nature of such
frameworks in much of the developing world acts to severely limit the

86
 See note 81.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    37

intellectual freedom of think tanks in these regions. Yet, the assumption


that think tanks are unique to the US political system continues to lead to
the imposition of an American-centric definition to classify its global
counterparts. Such an imposition could not be more inaccurate. Think
tanks now operate in a variety of political and economic systems—in
mature democratic nations as well as emerging democracies, in post-
industrial economies as well as developing market systems—and, while
the vast majority of think tanks are found in the United States as opposed
to any other country, the number of think tanks operating in the rest of
the globe now exceeds the number found in the United States. It must be
recognized that the character of these organizations emerging outside of
the Anglo-­American sphere represents a changing dynamic in the think
tank domain.
While there is a proclivity for nominally independent, non-partisan,
non-governmental think tanks in the United States, the majority of the
think tanks throughout the rest of the world are explicitly affiliated with
political parties, governments, or corporations. It is not surprising, then,
that as think tanks have crossed borders and political systems, the meaning
and the international usage of the term have become fuzzy. While in the
United States there is a tension between think tanks with affiliations and
those without, the debate outside of America is a little different. The ques-
tion of independence in the Anglo-American domain arises from the polit-
icization of the domain and the subsequent emerging trend of reduced
financial autonomy in both newly established and existing policy research
institutions. For the most part, outside the Anglo-American domain, the
questions of financial, legal, and administrative independence do not exist.
If anything, a lack of any such independence is a prerequisite for recog-
nized existence outside this domain.
For think tanks outside of the Anglo-American domain, substantial
independence from government and the private sphere is highly uncom-
mon and, in certain instances, prohibited. Corruption and the constant
struggle by governments to maintain power, along with many other fac-
tors, mean that even minor affiliations with government can compromise
the intellectual liberty of an affected think tank. It is also often the case
that the same individuals espouse government and business interests, in
cases where corrupt political officials effectively control the private sector.
It is no surprise that, given their proximity to government and the nature
of policy advice, think tanks are often targets for government intervention
38   J. G. MCGANN

in countries where there are authoritarian, corrupt, non-transparent


governments.
When analyzing the universal application of think tanks, a modified ver-
sion of Dickson’s 1972 definition is more representative: from a global
perspective, a think tank can be for-profit or non-profit; supported by the
government, part of the government, completely free of the government,
or supported by a number of institutions, such as a company or university;
and, finally, must practice relative academic freedom.87
The market for new ideas reflects the conditions into which these ideas
are to be introduced. It can be seen that there are fourteen determinants
of the number and character of think tanks in a particular nation-state or
region.88 These are political freedom, political system, number of years as
a democracy, number and strength of political parties, nature of civil soci-
ety, freedom of the press, economic freedom, gross domestic product per
capita, public-sector demand for independent policy advice, population,
philanthropic culture, number and independence of universities, level of
global integration, and number and type of think tanks. However, a theo-
retical explanation of the correlation between these indicators and the
think tank environment of a given nation-state or region is beyond the
purpose of this chapter.
Open democratic societies provide the best conditions for independent
policy analysis and advice. Therefore, a multiparty democracy seems to be
the system that is most hospitable to think tanks of the character of the
Anglo-American domain. One must note, however, that the system
implicit in the political reality of a country is much more formative of that
country’s think tank domain than the system that it is formally associated
with.
Philanthropy makes a significant difference in the character of the think
tanks that occupy a given country’s third sector. Wealth and disposable
income are not enough. Countries can be wealthy, but if they do not
believe in spending their money on public goods like independent policy
analysis, or if they do not value this good specifically, think tanks will not
benefit. For example, in many countries there are more pressing domestic
issues, for example health epidemics in Africa, demanding funds that
might otherwise be dedicated to public policy research. It seems, there-

87
 Dickson, Think Tanks, 28.
88
 James G. McGann, and Erik C. Johnson. Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public
Policy. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 1–2.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    39

fore, that the character of think tanks is to some degree a function of the
priorities of the government and a private funding environment, consti-
tuted by domestic or international donors, that can be particularly sensitive
to issues of government concern. Indeed, in countries where there is little
hope of finding the wealth necessary to support a philanthropic commu-
nity, charitable causes such as feeding the hungry or housing the homeless
absorb the bulk of private domestic and international aid.
Media freedom is another factor that determines the strength of the
correlation between think tanks outside the Anglo-American domain and
those inside it. It is the level of freedom that the media can exercise that is
the primary determinant of the extent of the dissemination operations that
a think tank can pursue.
Outstanding factors may also greatly influence the number and special-
ized nature of think tanks found within a country. For example, the char-
acter of the think tank domain of countries such as South Africa, which
once experienced severe racial tensions, tends to display a disproportion-
ate focus on topics that directly and indirectly address this issue.
Despite the efforts of some scholars and policy-makers to question the
potential transferability of US-style independent think tanks to other
regions and countries of the world, many policy-makers and civil society
groups from around the globe have sought to create truly independent,
free-standing think tanks to help their governments. So, while the trans-
ferability of the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, or Heritage
Foundation model to other countries and political cultures may be
debated, the need and desire to replicate the independence and influence
these institutions enjoy are unchallenged.
In an effort to bridge the conceptual problems encountered consis-
tently throughout this chapter and to create a typology that takes into
consideration the comparative differences in political systems and civil
societies, I have developed a number of categories for think tanks. While
think tanks may perform many roles in their host societies, not all think
tanks do the same things to the same extent. Over the last 85 years, several
distinctive organizational forms of think tanks have come into being that
differ substantially in terms of their operating styles, their patterns of
recruitment, and their aspirations to academic standards of objectivity and
completeness in research. It should be noted that alternate typologies of
think tanks have been offered by other analysts. I will argue here that, in
40   J. G. MCGANN

the global context, most think tanks tend to fall into the broad categories
outlined in the table of typologies.
In this chapter, I have attempted to draw together the various strands
of knowledge into a coherent picture that focuses on a well-defined but
large universe of public policy research institutes.

The Legal, Financial, and Intellectual Independence


of Think Tanks

The independence of a think tank and its scholars is one of the enduring
questions and challenges facing think tanks. Achieving and maintaining
independence require careful stewardship—the debate over this notion is
also inextricably related to the question of academic freedom. Such debates
have a distinctly Anglo-American character, and attempts to transfer past
and present definitions of the term to other socio-political contexts have
proved unworkable. Questions of ideological affiliation or financial obliga-
tion are at the forefront of the Anglo-American debate, whereas the ques-
tion of governmental affiliation is at the center of the global critique.
Think tanks, long regarded as idea factories with an objective output of
independent analysis, are presently at risk of polarization and the subse-
quent loss of their intellectual independence and credibility. There are a
number of environmental forces at work: partisan politics, the growth of
liberal and conservative advocacy groups, the restrictive funding policies
of donors, the growth of specialized think tanks, the narrow and short-­
term orientation of Congress and the White House, the tyranny of myopic
academic disciplines, and, finally, the 24/7 cable news networks.
Corporate financing initiatives also became part of the think tank
domain during this era and this influx of capital contributed to a veritable
proliferation of public policy research organizations. Further, such crowd-
ing became increasingly unequal—by 1982, the Republican national com-
mittees took in $191 million compared to $32 million for the Democratic
national committees.89 Consequently, competition became rife and the
priorities of think tanks further shifted from “utility” to “visibility.”90

89
 David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 176.
90
 Peter W.  Singer, “Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own,” Brookings
Institution (2010), accessed December 3, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/arti-
cles/2010/0813_think_tanks_singer.aspx.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    41

This new breed of think tank (“advocacy tank”) is unabashedly partisan


and ideological, and prioritizes putting a “spin on existing research” over
the production of original research.91 In the words of Weaver, they “com-
bine a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesman-
ship and an effort to influence policy debates,” decreasing their academic
character in favor of increasing their accessibility to policy-makers.92
Advocacy tanks frequently draw their resources disproportionately from
sources linked to specific interests (e.g., corporations for conservative
think tanks, labor unions for liberal think tanks). Their staffs, in compari-
son, are typically drawn more heavily from government, political parties,
and interest groups than from university faculties, and may be less creden-
tialed in terms of social science expertise. Weaver acknowledges the politi-
cization of the think tank domain as a future point of contention, identifying
the contradiction between the image of academic objectivity that public
policy research institutions seek to present and the organizational form
that advocacy think tanks represent, as well as their survival impulse to
satisfy budgetary necessity. He also identifies the distinctly Anglo-American
character and lack of portability of current definitions as a forbidding ety-
mological difficulty.93 Finally, while he admits the irreconcilability of each
of his aforementioned models with each other, he asserts that newly estab-
lished think tanks are beginning to hybridize to some degree.94
Robert Landers believes that the influence of politics on the think tank
domain has caused the “more overtly ideological” to rise to prominence,
at the expense of the more centrist institutions that have thus far served to
mediate public discussion and attain compromise and consensus.95 Gregg
Easterbrook reaches a similar conclusion: “while the political ascent of
conservatism has taken place in full public view, the intellectual transfor-
mation has for the most part occurred behind the scenes, in a network of
think tanks.”96 To Easterbrook, it appears that think tanks are a major
player in making the American political landscape increasingly partisan.

91
 R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” Political Science and Politics 22
(1989), 567.
92
 Ibid.
93
 Ibid., 577.
94
 Ibid., 576–577.
95
 Robert K.  Landers, “Think Tanks: The New Partisans,” Editorial Research Reports 1
(1986): 455.
96
 Gregg Easterbrook, “Ideas Move Nations,” Atlantic Monthly (1986): 66.
42   J. G. MCGANN

Medvetz treats think tanks not “as a distinctive kind of organization per
se, but rather as an organizational device for gathering and assembling
forms of authority conferred by institutions of academics, politics, busi-
ness and journalism.”97 He proposes what he calls a “relational notion” of
think tanks as a hybrid organization—composed of elements of the types
of think tanks and that of the more established institutions the new brands
or breeds that have emerged in the US.98
For Medvetz, think tanks’ status as the progeny of these institutions has
both a “material” and a “symbolic” dimension: “material” in the sense that
such institutions are the sole supply of personnel and patronage; and “sym-
bolic” in the sense that at the level of both think tanks and the policy experts
themselves, there is a clear adoption of the operational models at work in
these parent institutions.99 He asserts that the space of a think tank represents
a world divided against itself, where relevance, influence, impact, quality, and
independence pull at the traditional mission of think tanks. Ultimately, this
continuous conflict inflicts a “cost” on think tanks’ “intellectual produc-
tion,” immobilizing these institutions’ ability to, quite simply, think.
Joseph Nye agrees with the concept that non-governmental organiza-
tions, including think tanks, are beacons of authority within the
international community. He argues that soft power, which allows one to
“get the outcomes you want without coercion or payment,” has become
an incredibly potent force currently as power diffuses from states to non-
state actors.100 The question of financial and ideological autonomy is still
relevant, yet Nye offers up the proposition that non-state actors have the
capacity to be positive-sum, or able to gain through others’ gain as well,
regardless of state or other affiliation. Nye’s work suggests the possibility
that the transnationalization of non-state actors can be powerful enough
to override the need for individual power and security of a single group
and its ties.
However, with the continued advent of public policy research organiza-
tions that have an ideological partiality into the 1990s and 2000s, it seems
that this paradigm shift that emerged in the 1980s has now secured

97
 Medvetz, “Think Tanks,” 9–10.
98
 Ibid.
99
 Medvetz, “Hybrid Intellectuals,” 35–36.
100
 Joseph Nye, “Global Power Shifts,” TED Talks, July 2010, http://www.ted.com/
talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts?language=en.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    43

permanent tenancy in the once non-partisan marketplace of ideas. As in


the third era, in the present one scholars fall across a broad spectrum of
interpretation. Some are skeptics, believing the politicization of the
domain to be contributing to the rise of overly partisan institutions and
the decline of objective research. Others are more balanced in their
approach, acknowledging the influence of partisan politics on think tanks
and the “risk of distortion,” but also holding that their academic freedom
has not been compromised to the extent that one could classify the pres-
ent era of institutions as representing the “demise of think tanks.” Some
go one step further, and suggest that the politicization of think tanks has
had a very deleterious effect on them and that they have become the casu-
alties in the war of ideas.101
In her collaborative effort with Andrew Denham, Think Tanks across
Nations, Stone builds on her distinction between think tank output and
interest group advocacy.102 In reality, think tanks require a relationship
with their primary target, policy-makers, and this materializes in the
form of engagement, not advocacy.103 Stone, once more, notes that while
think tanks’ innate desire to preserve absolute academic freedom con-
flicts with the growing necessity of sacrificing financial autonomy, rela-
tive academic freedom and nominal independence are still achievable.104
She further addresses the question of autonomy, developing from the
notion that think tanks practice variable levels of it.105 Ultimately, she
recognizes, “complete autonomy and independence for think tanks is
illusory.”106 However, Stone also contends that absolute independence
and autonomy are less favorable if a think tank is to fulfill its primary
objective of policy influence.107 Thus, in reality, this compromise is a
necessary component for any non-profit, policy research organization to
be considered a think tank.

101
 Think Tanks, Politics, and the Casualties in the War of Ideas. Acton .... https://acton.
org/event/2017/06/28/think-tankspolitics-and-casualties-war-ideas.
102
 Denham and Stone, Think Tanks across Nations, 5.
103
 Ibid.
104
 Denham and Stone, Think Tanks across Nations, 5.
105
 Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions: Policy Analysis across Nations, 5.
106
 Ibid.
107
 Ibid.
44   J. G. MCGANN

Consequently, there exists a “mobilization of bias,” symptomatic of


either the researcher’s compulsion to heed the demands and ideology of
those commissioning the research, the researcher’s institutional obliga-
tion to prime the product in a manner most likely to influence the target,
or the researcher’s own subconscious ideological, cultural, and historical
partialities that color even the strongest attempt to commit to objectivity
and scientific rigor.108 Yet, the defining facet of Stone’s account is that she
accepts this bias as an inevitable part of any research organization that
seeks policy influence, contending that, albeit it is non-­absolute, think
tanks still practice some degree of academic freedom. For her, resource
dependency is not coterminous with ideological indoctrination.
Evert Lindquist argues that those think tanks that rely on governmen-
tal support face fierce competition from institutions such as universities.
He writes that, with the current shortage in capital, this competition is
becoming increasingly problematic and that the more academic think
tanks face a moral quandary: do they sacrifice some of their academic free-
dom for financial support, or do they maintain absolute intellectual inde-
pendence and suffer the budgetary consequences?109 Lindquist is to be
credited for his introduction of the notion that reduced capital available to
the tenants of the marketplace of ideas has led to increased competition,
and a tension between “dancing with the devil” and safeguarding credibil-
ity and independence.
Bruce Katz concurs with Lindquist, classifying today’s top think tanks
as major financial operations that constitute a community wherein increas-
ing financial muscle is not limited to any point on the ideological spec-
trum.110 For “in the interests of continued existence and financial viability,
institutes need to accommodate some of the expectations of funders.”111
However, he qualifies this statement with an assertion that, in the United
States at least, think tanks are at once competitive and cooperative, and

108
 Ibid.
109
 Evert A. Lindquist, “Three Decades of Canadian Think Tanks: Evolving Institutions,
Conditions and Strategies,” Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas,
ed. Andrew Denham and Diane Stone (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
110
 Katz, “American Think Tanks,” 2.
111
 Stone, “Think Tank Transnationalization,” 15.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    45

still provide a modicum of bipartisanship where partisanship would other-


wise dominate.112
Among academics, it is common practice to conduct research first, and
draw conclusions second. To Jonathan Rowe, an American lawyer and
writer, this process is often reversed in the think tank domain, and he com-
ments that “think tank” is a misnomer: “they don’t think; they justify.”113
To Singer, new think tanks establish themselves in such a way as to
attract specific donors and thus allow them to compete with the more
established think tanks.

Think Tanks Outside the United States: Differing


Socio-Political Contexts and Implications
Think tanks now operate in a variety of political and economic sys-
tems—in mature democratic nations as well as emerging democracies, in
post-industrial economies as well as developing market systems—and it
must be recognized that the character of these organizations emerging
outside the Anglo-American sphere represents a changing dynamic in
the think tank domain. The majority of the think tanks throughout the
rest of the world are explicitly affiliated with political parties, govern-
ments, or corporations. The question of independence in the Anglo-
American domain arises from the upsurge of partisan politics,
specializations of think tanks by topic and political orientation, and
donors that have advocated for and funded more advocacy-oriented
think tanks. This domain and the subsequent emerging trend of reduced
financial autonomy in both newly established and existing policy research
institutions. Once again the questions of financial, legal, and administra-
tive independence have been constrained by these forces.
The classification of independent think tanks as an ideal model,
according to some, reflects the Anglo-American-centric dimension of
this definition. To this end, Stone and Mark Garnett assert that “the
notion that a think tank requires independence or autonomy from the
state and private interests in order to be ‘free-thinking’ is a peculiarly
Anglo-American ­ predilection that does not travel well in other

112
 Katz, “American Think Tanks,” 17.
113
 Ronald Meinardus, “Think Tanks and Political Parties,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Liberal Opinion, January 20, 2005, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.fnf.org.ph/
liberalopinion/think-tanks-and-political-parties.htm.
46   J. G. MCGANN

countries.”114 Indeed, the conditions that give rise to this model (namely,
the democratic freedom of civil association) have most often eluded the
nations of the developing world, which, for varying reasons, have been
unable to accommodate the full range of independent research and anal-
ysis.115 Hence, truly independent, non-affiliated think tanks are, in many
places, an implausible model currently.
For example, the institutional, intellectual, and ideological land-
scape of the Soviet Union placed boundaries on this association.
Centralized authority restricted the free expression of original ideas,
especially in subjects that carried particular political or ideological
weight. Despite this climate of reduced intellectual autonomy, think
tanks still occupied an important position on the Soviet–East European
political landscape.

Think Tank Growth and Changes in the Developing


World: Regional Examples
In Central and South America there exists considerable polarity in polit-
ical systems and political culture, and thus in the fundamental way in
which these issues are approached. Indeed, even though a large propor-
tion of countries in Central and South America have embraced market-
based economies and democratic principles of governance, the countries
in the region are fragile democracies still plagued by a legacy of colo-
nialism, military rule, command economics, and the geopolitics of the
Cold War.
These inhibitions on political and economic development are also the
result of the current legacy of these countries, wherein the social and politi-
cal maladies of drug trafficking and corruption serve to undermine the rule
of law and democratic institutions. Hence, the policy environment of these
countries is distinguished from that of the Anglo-American domain not
only by the existence of partially democratic states, but also in that problems
such as crime and lawlessness, poverty, unemployment, rapid urbanization,

114
 Diane Stone and Mark Garnett, “Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance,” in
Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach, eds. Diane Stone, Andrew Denham,
and Mark Garnett (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 2–5.
115
 The connection between the freedom of civil association and democracy was first identi-
fied in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    47

and population growth are present in both a different form and magnitude.
For example, Venezuela is rated by Freedom House as only “partly free”
because of its restricted democracy and limited capacity to stimulate inde-
pendent public policy analysis (and it has just three think tanks).
A common problem in Central and South America is not partisanship
and heterogeneity in policy-making, but instead the opposite. The media
sphere imposes a stifling homogeneity on independent public policy ana-
lysts as a result of a strict tradition of self-censorship. Furthermore, many
of the region’s think tanks lack the capital and subsequently the resources
to achieve significant policy influence because of the absence of the kind of
philanthropy found in the United States. Limited economic freedom has
translated into a relatively weak philanthropic culture in Latin America. In
the absence of private support, Latin American think tanks are incentiv-
ized to rely on government contracts, foreign donors, and private-sector
consulting. This has obvious consequences for the intellectual indepen-
dence of public policy research institutions in the region.
There are, however, some similarities between the Central and South
American think tank sphere and think tanks in Anglo-America. Although
the change has been slower in comparison to the United States, Central
and South American think tanks are proliferating in response to an increas-
ingly common interest in reform. Furthermore, think tanks in Latin
America have increased public awareness and engagement in policy issues,
and will likely continue to benefit from this more competitive policy envi-
ronment through increased demand for their services in countries across
the region.
Some countries have systems of government in which the centralization
of power leaves little room for the influence of non-governmental actors.
In limiting these actors’ distribution channels, such systems of govern-
ment reshape the fundamental role of these institutions. In Russia, for
example, its federal semi-presidential republic system of government only
accepts the operation of these organizations as long as they are providing
“useful” services and not engaging in explicit advocacy. Civil opposition is
not welcome. In addition, the reduced freedom of the press in Russia has
meant that media outlets are less inclined to disseminate the research of
independent public policy analysts. Indeed, think tanks operating under
these circumstances are less able to generate the original ideas, informed
48   J. G. MCGANN

discussion, and educative role that are characteristic of think tanks in the
Anglo-American domain. Russia has a low gross domestic product and a
relatively weak economy, and this economic instability suppresses the phil-
anthropic spirit, which represents a major obstruction to the growth and
advance of policy advice in the country.
Asia provides an array of policy problems and political systems markedly
different from those in the United States. Asia is home to three of the four
remaining communist states in the world, many of the economies and
democracies are fragile, and several authoritarian regimes are firmly in
control of power. Other issues, such as extreme environmental degrada-
tion, overpopulation, and a rapidly expanding HIV/AIDS epidemic,
shroud the region. For example, as a result of the marked absence of eco-
nomic freedom, freedom of the press, civil liberties, and religion, all five
think tanks in Vietnam are controlled by the government. In many coun-
tries across the region, these factors contribute to an extremely closed
society that inhibits the ability of think tanks to engage with policy-makers
and offer sound, independent policy advice.
China represses the freedom to publicly oppose government policy
and, despite the fact that its economy has undergone considerable liberal-
ization and decentralization, the Chinese Communist Party severely limits
people’s political freedom and civil liberties, and limits the ability of think
tanks to carry out the role played by analogous institutions in the Anglo-­
American domain. The absence of this freedom can be accredited to the
leader and party’s desire to hold onto power through control and
­repression of critical voices. Additionally, the absence of freedom of the
press and freedom of private academic institutions to pursue independent
research exacerbates the hostility of Asia to Western think tank models.
Conversely, in stable multiparty systems, there is a much higher tolerance
for critical opinion and debate that provides considerable room for the
establishment of more think tanks. In this way, countries such as Japan
offer a policy-making environment similar to the Anglo-American sphere.
Similarly, the socio-political context of Africa is also markedly different
from that of the United States. Though the policy challenges are numer-
ous and complex—including a rapidly growing population, high incidence
of infant mortality and HIV/AIDS infection, continuing national and
subnational conflicts, environmental degradation, endemic corruption,
and lack of respect for the rule of law—the region has notable potential
and the opportunity for continued political reform and social and economic
development. Indeed, most of the constituent states that are currently
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    49

authoritarian and unstable are following a trajectory towards stable,


representative democracies and thus an environment more conducive to
independent public policy analysis and advice. That being said, Africa is a
region of extremes. The politically repressive and economically ruinous
situation in Angola stands in stark contrast with the more stable, yet falter-
ing Ivorian context, and with the exceptional conditions present in the
South African case. In Angola, the scarcity of philanthropic support and
lack of demand for policy advice distinguishes the notion of a think tank
in Africa from that of its counterparts in the United States. Yet in the Ivory
Coast and South Africa, there is a substantial demand for economic policy
advice and the philanthropic culture is strong. In general, however, capital
to fund and develop think tanks is scarce on the continent.
In Africa especially, there appears to be a chasm between the legal defi-
nition of a given political system and the reality of everyday power and
politics. For example, on paper, South Africa, Angola, and Ivory Coast are
supposed to be operating as presidential-parliamentary electoral democra-
cies. However, in practice each of these governments operates very differ-
ently, and it thus seems that the reality, not the formal structure of a
political system, is the most important determinant of the environment in
which think tanks operate. Thus, we have Angola being run as a single-­
party authoritarian state, and political competition and the demand for
policy advice are the opposite of what would be expected of a presidential-­
parliamentary electoral democracy.
The character of think tanks in Africa is also dependent on the nature
of civil society. The higher the tolerance for civil society, the greater the
number and intellectual independence of think tanks found in the country
in question. As is evident in other regions, the availability and allocation of
capital to support think tanks are definitive of the institutions occupying a
given think tank environment. Once more though, given the diversity of
political reality in the African domain, it is equally problematic to identify
a trend using this alternative metric. If the paradox of think tanks’ situa-
tion is that they must operate within the very environment they seek to
change, then in Africa, by virtue of the different environments that clus-
ters of the constituent nation-states offer, think tanks’ operations and
character display great variance.
The Middle East does not have a thriving civil society; each country,
with the exception of Israel, has yet to develop the democratic values and
atmosphere that are conducive to independent civil society organizations
and think tanks. Censorship is commonplace, and anti-government
50   J. G. MCGANN

opinions are prevented from publication, while authors of such materials


may face fines and imprisonment. In addition to these hindrances,
countries of the Middle East are torn between the forces of globalization,
religious fundamentalism, and traditional patriarchal society. Furthermore,
governments face issues of war and peace, economic stagnation, lack of
participatory government, competition for water resources, and high pop-
ulation rates.
Evident in the Middle East think tank domain is the potential for ongo-
ing conflict and political tension to markedly distort the environment in
which think tanks operate. Such conflict attracts investors, both domestic
and global, who are seeking to articulate their goals of peace in the region.
For example, Egypt receives substantial foreign assistance, partly to ensure
the government supports the peaceful resolution of conflict, but also to
invest in policy decisions that align with those funders’ partiality on certain
issues. As in the Anglo-American domain, this dependency on interest-­
based capital provision compromises, to some extent, the intellectual
autonomy of the institutions in the Middle East. In other countries, such
as Iran, the government does not allow domestic or international funds to
support think tanks. Hence, the two think tanks in the country are gov-
ernment run. Think tanks in Egypt, too, possess formal affiliations with
external institutions; many think tanks in the country are strongly affili-
ated with universities. Thus, intellectual independence, as a function of
nominal financial and organizational autonomy, is something of an elusive
ideal in the Middle East, and cannot be justifiably included in a universal
definition of its constituent think tanks.
In the Middle East, however, as in the case of Africa, there is variation
in the freedom of civil society and media. In Israel the non-profit sector is
thriving, with collaboration and deliberation over policy issues rampant,
whereas in Egypt this parallel vibrancy is closely monitored by the govern-
ment and checked when the government feels threatened. This variation
further renders a universal definition of the think tank domain in the
region problematic. One must note that the system implicit in the political
system of a country is much more formative of that country’s think tank
landscape than the characteristics that are formally associated with think
tanks around the world. Think tanks tend to reflect the strengths and
weaknesses of the political systems and civil societies in the countries
where they are located.
How are think tanks funded and how does the diversity of funding
sources impact the degrees of freedom of a think tank as well as the quality
and independence of the research? Countries can be wealthy, but if they
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    51

do not believe in spending their money on public good like independent


policy analysis or do not value this good specifically, think tanks will not
benefit. In addition, the societies where the only source of funding for
think tanks is government or a ministry also tend to have political and
bureaucratic bias. It seems, therefore, that the character of think tanks is
to some degree a function of the priorities of the government and a private
funding environment, constituted by domestic or international donors
who can be particularly sensitive to issues of government concern. Indeed,
in countries where there is little hope of finding the wealth necessary to
support a philanthropic community, charitable causes such as feeding the
hungry or housing the homeless absorb the bulk of private, domestic and
international aid.

Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers


Undoubtedly, in today’s international arena, the rise of emerging powers
has gained incredible momentum, and it is now considered a pivotal phe-
nomenon for a complete understanding of the global system. As this
review has already touched upon, there is a significant depth to the avail-
able literature within this subject matter. Nonetheless, when one considers
the environment of these emerging powers as associated with a think tank
and civil society presence, the results are certainly not as conclusive.
Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, in “The Limits of Influence: Foreign
Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,” analyze the role of foreign
policy think tanks in influencing foreign relations. Drawing on historical
and empirical analysis, they identify several types of foreign policy think
tanks and examine patterns in the nature and degree of their influence
over time. As the foreign policy process has become more multifaceted, so
have think tanks. Think tanks seek to extend their agenda from the “high
politics” of diplomacy and strategy to the “low politics” of international
economics and environmental issues. Consequently, the paper argues,
think tanks can be used as a barometer of change in international relations
over time.116
Some researchers predict that think tanks can assist in strengthening
cooperation among emerging powers. Recent initiatives such as the BRICS
Think Tank Council signal that these states recognize the importance of
think tanks in policy-making. Zhao Kejin argued that this can “build con-

116
 Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think
Tanks in Britain and the USA,” Review of International Studies 20, no. 1 (1994): 15–34.
52   J. G. MCGANN

sensus on certain issues and then encourage their leaders to put those
issues on the BRICS agenda.” Kejin categorizes this as “a form of ‘multi-­
multilateralism’ [that] contrasts with the top-down process that has tradi-
tionally characterized multilateralism.”117 However, the literature in this
area is not well developed. Research is generally scarce, and what little one
does come across might very well lack quality. Nevertheless, there appears
to be a certain inundation of Chinese public policy and think tank infor-
mation with respect to that of all other emerging nations. Little is written
with regard to think tanks operating in Russia, India, or South Africa, and
Brazil pulls ahead in terms of information availability only by a small
margin.
Regardless, then, of the degree to which think tank literature is avail-
able for these countries, there appears to be a unifying theme which con-
nects most—though not all—of these writings: the liberalization of
ideology in the public sphere. In Ghana, the emergences of a multiparty
system and particular democratic ideals have allowed think tanks to thrive
in recent years. As China opened its doors to the world economically and
politically, officials began to welcome information from outside sources,
thus granting think tanks more of an opportunity to have a profound
impact on policy. As for Brazil, it is evident that the international commu-
nity became more interested in its think tanks as the country itself began
to be recognized as an emerging power. Ultimately, this liberalization of
ideals and increased access to global forms of ideology have allowed think
tanks to operate more efficiently and thus influence foreign policy on a
larger scale.
China as a nation has risen to prominence in its own right in both the
political and economic sphere, and with it Chinese think tanks have also
become increasingly influential in the policy-making process. In the con-
text of China as an emerging power in the international arena, Chinese
think tanks themselves emerged with a greater scope of policy analysis and
a more defined sense of composition and organization. The literature on
this phenomenon in China is relatively well documented, especially in
comparison with the tangible lack of academic literature focused on the
growth of think tanks in other BRICS nations.

117
 Zhao Kejin, “The Limits of Cooperation among BRICS Countries,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/12/01/
limits-of-cooperation-among-brics-countries.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    53

Chinese think tanks aimed towards foreign policy analysis particularly


bloomed as Chinese political life allowed for greater freedom in research
topics. According to Mahmood Ahmad and Raees Ahmad Mughal, while
the great majority of Chinese foreign policy think tanks had been in opera-
tion for decades, their policy interpretations were far more limited and typi-
cally reflected the concepts of the overarching political ideals of Marxism.118
Mao’s government particularly denounced any policy research and set
severe boundaries on think tanks.119 However, as the height of Mao’s lead-
ership waned, think tanks increasingly found opportunities to conduct for-
eign policy research. While most still maintained ties to the government,
many think tanks were able to splinter off into different styles of function-
ing bodies that affect policy in varying ways. According to Ahmad and
Mughal, the three types of think tanks most relevant to foreign policy
research are (a) official/government think tanks, (b) semi-­official/aca-
demic think tanks, and (c) civilian/university-affiliated think tanks.
Official/government think tanks are especially significant in the con-
text of Chinese foreign policy research, due to the fact that their staff are
solely responsible for providing in-depth policy analysis and advice to gov-
ernment officials, and are far removed from the administrative duties and
titles that overwhelm many think tank researchers.120 These types of think
tanks are directly tied to the government, yet the policy analysts them-
selves are not members of the governmental body. The China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS) is touted as a main example of this think tank
category, which until recently was not a major contributor to Chinese
foreign policy. However, under the guidance of former Ambassador Yang
Chengxu, CIIS joined forces with the China Centre for International
Studies and gained higher-quality researchers and greater financial back-
ing, which aided its rise to prominence. Think tanks in this category are
highly successful because of their educated researchers, but also due to
their subordinate relationship to the government.
Semi-official/ministerial think tanks in China, on the other hand,
struggle because of their relative distance from governmental policies.

118
 Mahmood Ahmad and Raees Ahmad Mughal, “The Foreign Policy Think Tanks in
China: Input, Access, and Opportunity,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38, no. 3
(2011): 143–155.
119
 Ibid., 144.
120
 Ibid., 146.
54   J. G. MCGANN

Regarded as “public institutions,” semi-official/academic think tanks are


often thought of as too academic and contradictory to China’s political
interests. Semi-official/academic foreign policy think tanks also face prob-
lems because of “their distance from the center of decision making, and
second, their research works were often regarded as too academic and not
relevant enough to policy.”121 However, in recent years there has been a
slow but notable closure of the gap between these institutions and foreign
policy specialists who seek their research.
Civilian/university-affiliated think tanks are by far the least influential
policy organizations, due to the fact that their research is deemed too aca-
demic in nature, and additionally because of the limited opportunities for
these institutions to share their research.122 While not traditionally
regarded as having very significant inputs to foreign policy research,
Ahmad and Mughal argue that “they have had substantial influence in
developing, examining, and criticizing alternatives in policy-relevant
realms or in helping to create images of other countries.”123 While cer-
tainly not commanding the attention and respect that official/govern-
ment think tanks do, these types of institutions have still grown more
active in the foreign policy arena, and have found niche areas such as envi-
ronmental policy and energy security in which they can provide excellent
policy analysis.
While not every individual organization may wield the power that it
should, Chinese think tanks without a doubt grow more powerful and
complex by the day. According to Ahmad and Mughal, foreign policy
think tanks have increasingly important roles and are able to influence pol-
icy decisions through their research. With the expanding liberalization of
Chinese civil society, there has undoubtedly been a growth in opportunities
for think tanks to break into the policy arena and for their impact to be
better noted. As Ahmad and Mughal conclude, “there will be further
demand for policy input and increasing professionalism in both govern-
mental agencies and think tanks. In all likelihood this will push the intel-
lectuals and scholars to play an ever greater role in the years to come.”124
Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, on the other hand, delve less into
the differences between foreign policy research institutes in China, and

121
 Ibid., 149.
122
 Ibid., 149–150.
123
 Ibid., 150.
124
 Ibid., 144.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    55

instead consider their general similarities and the sweeping trends of


changes seen within them over the past few decades. Glaser and Saunders
agree with the earlier assertions of Ahmad and Mughal that the rise of
foreign policy think tanks occurred as a result of China’s own changing
foreign policy. In the late 1970s, China went through major reforms and
implemented an opening-up policy, which in turn thrust it onto the global
stage as a growing geopolitical power. China turned outward and with it
sought greater involvement in the international sphere and broader ideo-
logical freedom in general. Its renewed participation called for policy
research and analysis, with particular specialization in foreign policy. As
Glaser and Saunders neatly summarize, “The shift to greater pragmatism,
increased reliance on the bureaucracy, and policy-making by consensus
that followed Beijing’s decision to open up to the outside world set the
stage for a radical increase in the role and influence of Chinese foreign
policy research institutes.”125
These authors add that foreign policy think tanks have continued to
evolve greatly after these changes to Chinese civil society. Just as Ahmad
and Mughal surmised, Chinese think tanks used to be not much more
than institutions set up to repeat Marxist rhetoric. Chinese international
relations think tanks have now expanded their research topics and have
become more influential at different levels of the policy-making process.
There are still only a few think tanks that regularly contribute to foreign
policy analysis, like the CIIS, but there is certainly a growing movement of
think tank policy research at the governmental level.
China’s relative liberalization also allowed for other trends to begin
within foreign policy think tanks. Glaser and Saunders note that there are
more linkages between researchers and other organizations in China,
whereas before individual think tanks remained isolated from the input of
other groups. These “horizontal” linkages foster collaborations between
Chinese researchers and allow for the sharing of research at conferences
and other things of this nature. While there is certainly more collabora-
tion, the proliferation of think tanks has also caused greater competition
among organizations to get their research noticed by policy-makers.
Additionally, while the number of Chinese foreign policy think tanks has
grown, the quality of the research has not necessarily improved at the same
rate. Yet, Glaser and Saunders note that the overall level of education of

125
 Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research
Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 598.
56   J. G. MCGANN

the researchers at these institutions has increased, as has their exposure to


foreigners and Western literature.
Glaser and Saunders further write that the functions of foreign policy
think tanks have also evolved as the political and economic nature of China
has changed. The government and other policy-makers depend on foreign
policy think tanks to provide research and analysis of complicated interna-
tional relations issues, and these think tanks are expected to conduct
research for government analysis and for academic institutions as well.
Universities and other academic organizations also count on foreign pol-
icy think tanks to contribute to the domestic education of Chinese civil-
ians through lectures and classes. Most relevant to the nature of China’s
status as an emerging power is foreign policy think tanks’ focus on
­compiling information from foreign sources to better assess their own
policy needs, as well as their push to influence foreign views of China. The
country’s participation in the global sphere spurred researchers on to
study information put out by non-Chinese sources. China’s opening up
policy additionally allowed for a context that could “provide opportunities
for Chinese analysts to influence foreign perspectives on Beijing’s policies
and to express their objections to other countries’ policies, especially those
of the United States.”126
In the last 15–20 years, Australia has witnessed a significant increase in
the number of think tanks within public, private, and academic sectors, a
claim which is evident when considering data such as the 1994 institution
survey conducted by the Committee for Economic Development of
Australia.127 In this article, Ian Marsh writes to describe the specific think
tank environment characterized by this proliferating growth in a country
which emerges as a power more and more with the passing of time.
He first provides a general introduction to the field, stating that political
learning is essential to the work of think tanks. According to him, this
concept has three elements, the first being that “ideas and analysis have a
leading role to play in the politics of policy making.”128 This certainly con-
nects to the decreased power of traditional sources of information and
authority (such as the church and political parties) and to the weakening
of certain norms (like hierarchy, class solidarity, and deference) which

126
 Ibid., 606.
127
 Ian Marsh, “The Development and Impact of Australia’s ‘Think Tanks’.” Australian
Journal of Management 19, no. 2 (1994): 177–200.
128
 Ibid., 191.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    57

resulted in the shift to a liberal-democratic society. Second, political learn-


ing is a function of “the way the policy making system mobilizes relevant
interests, the temporal character of this process, and the institutional and
normative framework through which it occurs.”129 Third, the concept of
political learning “links the policy making and economic competitiveness
literatures.”130
Next, Marsh goes on to paint a picture of think tanks in the context
created by the framework of political learning. Specifically, think tanks are
classified as macro-level institutions which contribute to major strategic
issues affecting the entire policy-making system; or as micro-level entities
which contribute to the societal understanding of a specific issue.
With regard to Australia particularly, the growth of think tanks is wide-
spread and diversified; one might seek to categorize them for organiza-
tional purposes, and this can be done, according to Marsh, with respect to
sector characteristics. In the academic sector, for instance, think tanks are
of a more theoretical nature, and they often are concerned with “issue
refinement.” An example of such an institution is the Social Policy Research
Center. In the public sector, think tanks are, evidently, under public
departments (as exemplified by those like the Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, or ABARES). Lastly, as the private
sector struggles with funding issues, think tanks within it find it necessary
to work closely with other stakeholders, and some even appear to advocate
a specific political agenda. Examples of these types of think tanks are abun-
dant and can be found in entities such as the Institute of Public Affairs, the
Centre for Independent Studies, or the Tasman Institute.
Ultimately, although the literature dealing with public policy research
in Australia is not yet fully developed (nor does it seem like it will be in the
near future), this piece of writing does shed some light on the makeup of
the think tank environment in this particular emerging power.
As for Ghana, it is undoubtedly clear that think tanks, most commonly
referred to as private research institutions there, are locally a fairly new
phenomenon. Frank Louis Kwaku Ohemeng, in “Society and Policy
Making in Developing Countries: Assessing the Impact of Think Tanks on
Policy Outcomes in Ghana,” attributes this proliferation to the recent
political liberalization of the policy environment in the nation in the early

 Ibid., 192.
129

 Ibid., 193.
130
58   J. G. MCGANN

1990s.131 Among the characteristics of think tanks in Ghana are those of


highly specialized and educated personnel, an overall non-partisan nature,
and close relationships with international organizations (both governmen-
tal and non-governmental).
These institutions are, according to Ohemeng, greatly demanded by
these countries’ governments, which often seek assistance as they struggle
with short supply or unreliability of public policy information. Through use
of empirical studies, opinion surveys, cost–benefit analysis, and other fore-
casting methods, think tanks provide objective, independent information
for use by administrative powers. As with think tanks in other emerging
powers, tools of disseminating information include, but are certainly not
limited to, the publication of surveys and reports; the educational platforms
of seminars, roundtable discussions, and workshops; the appeal to media,
particularly the print media; and the general process of issue advocacy.
Ultimately, Ohemeng claims that civil society largely has a “pivotal role
in determining the role of the state in modern day governance,” and that
it does so by acting as a catalyst for ideas in emerging countries around the
world—with Ghana being no exception to that overarching claim.132
Brazil, another emerging BRICS nation, has undergone similar levels of
foreign policy changes over the past few decades. Its growth as an eco-
nomic force propelled it into the global community, with other nations
waiting for it to define its international presence. S. Ladi and E. Lazarou
argue that when Brazil became known as a BRICS nation it arrived at a
critical juncture, or an important historical moment that has long-lasting
consequences for a nation and its relationships. Ladi notes from her previ-
ous research that “It is during these critical junctures that think-tanks
increase their visibility as carriers of new discourse.”133 In their study, Ladi
and Lazarou focus on Fundacão Getulio Vargas (FGV) as a case study to
analyze the changes and challenges faced by think tanks during this critical
juncture and Brazil’s rise to global prominence.
They begin by noting that think tanks are carriers of discourse, and that
discourse is essential for the progress of events and public policy decisions,
particularly during critical junctures. When Brazil became a BRICS nation
and underwent a number of foreign and social policy changes under the
131
 Frank Louis Kwaku Ohemeng, “Society and Policy Making in Developing Countries:
Assessing the Impact of Think Tanks on Policy Outcomes in Ghana,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies, June 13, 2014: 1–16.
132
 Ibid.
133
 Ladi, S. and Lazarou, E. (2012), Think-Tanks and Policy Transformation: The Case of
Brazil, IPSA, Madrid, 8–12 July 2012. 3 http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_13275.pdf.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND EMERGING POWERS    59

new Lula government, there was a highly increased need for discourse and
public policy research. With its newly elevated international position,
Brazil sought to insert itself more fully into the global community, and the
global community in turn wanted to understand the country at an in-­
depth level. Foreign policy research became a focus, especially research
focusing on relations among BRICS nations.
Ladi and Lazarou, however, argue that while there was an increase in
the number of foreign policy think tanks and a greater push for research,
there was not a translation into great think tank influence at the govern-
mental level. The case study of FGV revealed that think tanks are still
­utilized for research, with the head of the Center of International Relations
section of FGV saying, “it is almost becoming a norm that on the eve of
important international negotiations or during the visit of foreign officials,
our researchers are called to inform visitors about the Brazilian viewpoints
and policies.”134 Yet, the head of the FGV’s Center for International
Relations, Eduardo Achilles, also stated that “the main transformation
that the idea of Brazil’s emergence has brought about to our work at FGV
is the increasing interest of foreign institutions in establishing regular links
with us in order to understand more about Brazilian foreign policy. This
creates opportunities not only for the professionalization of national
think-tanks, but also for internationalization.”135
Thus, think tanks have noticed a large draw for their research within the
international community, but have not seen much of an influence within
their own government. Governmental officials may ask for policy analysis,
but think tank researchers on the whole still report that the government
maintains the power and central influence for policy decisions. Achilles
stated, “The real space for impact of ideas from outside the government
apparatus is very limited. On certain occasion it is clear that decision mak-
ers are using think-tanks as channels to disseminate their own ideas and
concepts elaborated inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many times the
visits and contacts result in very little or almost no incorporation of ideas
‘from outside’ into the policy content.”136 In the case of Brazil, it appears
that while there has been a huge increase in the demand for think tank
interaction internationally and a greater exposure of think tank research to
governmental officials, foreign policy think tanks have not yet seen their
influence fully reach the government.
134
 Ibid., 20.
135
 Ibid.
136
 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

A Not Quite Multipolar World

Bruce Jones

With recent events in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and the East China Sea, it has
become popular to describe the international order as in crisis. The stable,
relatively peaceful post–Cold War order, it is said, is at risk of giving way to
a more traditional, geopolitically driven system marked by increased com-
petition among multiple stakeholders. Underlying this narrative, one finds
the premise that a combination of declining American power and the “rise
of the rest” (especially China, India, and Brazil) is constraining US leader-
ship of the international order, placing new strains on existing institutions
and practices.1 Facing these mounting pressures, it is alleged that the West
is losing its ability to shape a secure and prosperous international system.2

1
 On American decline: Gideon Rachman, “Think Again: American Decline. This Time
It’s for Real,” Foreign Policy 184, January/February 2011; Edward Luce, Time to Start
Thinking: America in the Age of Descent, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012. On the
rise of the rest: Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 90,
September/October 2011; Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible
Shift of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs, 2008. On the coming disorder and
the post-Western world: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New  York: Norton,
2008; Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest, New York: Penguin, 2012.
2
 Robert Kaplan, “A World with No One in Charge,” Washington Post, December 3, 2010.

B. Jones (*)
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 61


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_3
62   B. JONES

However, this assessment is an oversimplification of shifting international


dynamics. Certain states are gaining influence on the global stage, to be
sure. And other states harbor ill intentions for the current international
order. However, these two facts do not translate into a genuine decline of
either the United States or the international system. The United States,
buttressed by its allies, remains the most influential actor on the world
stage—and will be for some time to come. The United States retains the
capability to shape the international system, and to limit competition while
bolstering cooperation.
And, despite the rhetoric depicting a unified rise of the rest, the emerg-
ing powers are both a more diverse and less threatening group than is
often described. Sharp divides complicate relations among the emerging
powers; furthermore, the divisions between the emerging powers and the
established powers are exaggerated—there are far more overlapping inter-
ests between them than the common narrative suggests.3 Room for coop-
eration, in other words, is larger than one might think, especially
considering the new wave of economic challenges confronting the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The reality is that the
grouping may have already experienced the high-water mark of collective
influence.
With the BRICS lacking in mortar and the United States still in a privi-
leged position, the role of the emerging powers becomes a significant
question. US preeminence clearly does not preclude other nations from
exercising power. Nor does a fracturing of the BRICS undercut the ability
of individual rising powers to gain global sway. Therefore, we are faced
with a considerable space in which emerging powers may still operate,
seeking to expand their influence through marginal changes and revisions
to the international order. These powers will strive to capture greater
influence within the existing international system. Such a process will be
chaotic. Without a unifying thread among the BRICS (which was arguably
never present), there will be no concentrated challenge to the global order,
but rather a more complex jockeying as rising powers engage with each
other, the established powers, and the developing world, in order to
expand their global influence.

 Bruce Jones, Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry
3

and Restraint, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.


  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    63

New Realities of the International Order: The Rise


of the Rest

The economic growth of the emerging economies over the past decade
has been truly breathtaking, and it is easy to understand why the “rise of
the rest” seemed unstoppable. Brazil entered the twenty-first century with
an economy of just over $1 trillion and ended 2014 with an economy
worth almost $2.5 trillion, and in the process overtook Canada, Italy, and
Spain to become the seventh-largest economy in the world. India grew
even faster, though from a lower starting point, beginning the century
with an economy just under $500 billion and growing to the ninth-largest
economy in the world with just over $2 trillion today. China’s growth
started earlier and reached breakneck speeds during the first decade of the
2000s, shooting from an economy worth just over $2 trillion to become
the second-largest economy in the world, at over $10 trillion.4
The huge growth of these economies is reflected in global trade pat-
terns; for every major trading region, the percentage of imports and
exports to and from developing Asia (especially China and India) has sky-
rocketed. And on carbon emissions, the rising powers have more than
caught up to the West; China has overtaken the United States, and India
has overtaken Japan and Russia.5 That particular aspect of growth is a
decidedly mixed blessing for the emerging powers: rising nations confront
insecurity based on their growing energy dependence. They also are expe-
riencing the immediate impacts of climate change induced by their very
economic development, including air pollution and the consequences of
extreme weather. The staggering scale of this growth, ironically, deals
them a formidable hand in global energy and climate diplomacy. By
becoming a greater portion of the problem, countries such as India and
China gain leverage at the international table as their buy-in becomes
necessary for effective solutions.
Nor does the rise of the BRICS comprise an outlier among nations in
the developing world. Many states have risen to middle-income status,
their standard of living and gross domestic product (GDP) profiting from
twenty years of deepening integration into the international economic
order. As with the BRICS, this grouping is geographically disparate in

 World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, April 2015.


4

 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,” August 20,
5

2010, www.ucsusa.org.
64   B. JONES

nature; the “middle-income nations” encompass countries from around


the globe. The sizable growth found in Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, and
Nigeria reflects only a sampling of the countries that have experienced this
steep upward trajectory.
This economic activity has fueled an expectations bubble about how
these rising powers, led by the BRICS, would soon possess the capacity to
reshape the international order. Their unprecedented growth seemed to
signal our entering a “post-American world,”6 one in which the “rise of
the rest” would restructure the international order. The West’s role, in
other words, was waning, and America was in decline, in retreat, or both.

The United States Is an Enduring,


Not a Declining, Power
Yet, the rhetoric of US decline runs well ahead of reality. There are, of
course, newly important actors on the world stage, but the United States
remains by far the strongest. There is no other actor on the international
stage, nor will there be in the near or medium term, with anything
remotely comparable to the capabilities and reach that the United States
wields. When supported by the range of alliances and relationships that
America enjoys, Washington’s economic, military, and diplomatic influ-
ence is unrivaled.

An Economic Foundation…
Despite speculations otherwise, the US economy is still the world’s larg-
est—and by a good amount. Yes, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recorded the Chinese economy, in terms of purchasing power parity
(PPP), at $17.6 trillion, surpassing the US figure of $17.4 trillion.7 However,
such a judgment is somewhat hasty considering variances in how the two
nations calculate GDP; as Michael Pettis of Peking University notes,
Chinese institutions record debt differently, potentially inflating fi ­ gures.8
Without PPP adjustments, IMF estimates place China’s economy at $10.3

6
 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: Norton, 2008.
7
 “China’s Back,” The Economist, October 11, 2014.
8
 Gwynn Guilford, “Nope, China’s Economy Hasn’t Yet Surpassed America’s,” Quartz,
October 8, 2014.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    65

trillion, leaving an over $7 trillion gap between Washington and Beijing.9


Thus it is evident that while the hype may be real, the data underlying asser-
tions of Chinese economic dominance is far from conclusive.
Nor should size be considered the only factor that speaks to the influ-
ence of the American economy. For one, the United States has a dominant
lead in innovation and high-end products. The market segmentation is
only slowly beginning to shift, as manufacturers like South Korea’s
Samsung challenge American firms in design and technical edge. But it is
relevant that the firms capable of challenging their American counterparts
in high-tech innovation are located in countries that are US allies—and
typically in countries that experienced their first wave of growth some
decades ago. The US economy may be only 20% of the global economy,
but it is the richest and most lucrative 20%, yielding an outsized
influence.
Furthermore, though America’s share of global GDP may be receding,
American economic influence is also a function of the size, profit share,
and role of its corporations. The vast share of the world’s economic activ-
ity is transacted by large corporations, whether private or state owned. A
2013 study of the world’s top corporations reveals a striking reality: US
firms continue to dominate in terms of profit share in critical sectors.10
Whereas in 2006, American financial services firms accounted for 45% of
profits from the global financial services market, by 2012 that number had
risen to 53%.11 And the study suggests that these numbers actually under-
estimate American influence, because there is a heavy imbalance in the
extent of US ownership of overseas firms and overseas ownership of US
firms. In other words, Americans own a far greater share of the world’s
wealth than the US share of global GDP implies.
American service firms also still dominate international finance, and, to
date, most of the world’s economic flows are transacted in US dollars,
flowing through Wall Street. These are traditional sources of American
financial power, along with the capacity and will of the US Treasury to
rescue other economies during crises, which give the United States the
power to set the rules by which the international financial game is played.

9
 Ben Carter, “Is China’s Economy Really the Largest in the World?” BBC News Magazine,
December 16, 2014.
10
 Sean Starrs, “American Economic Power Hasn’t Declined – It Globalized! Summoning
the Data and Taking Globalization Seriously,” International Studies Quarterly, April 2013.
11
 Ibid., 7.
66   B. JONES

The 2008 global financial crisis dented some of this influence, of course;
but for now there is no genuine alternative to America’s financial role.
And it is important to stress that these economic strengths will endure
even if or when China’s economy truly overtakes that of the United States;
there will still be a huge gap between American and Chinese per capita
GDP, and also substantial differences in the nature of the economies. As
one of China’s financial managers told me in 2013, “Unless things go
badly wrong, we’ll overtake the US economy in size at some point in the
next ten years or so. But even then, we can’t go head to head with the US;
we’ll still be a developing economy. We need others at the table to bolster
our influence.”12 China indeed has considerable distance left to cover
regarding per capita GDP; in 2014, Chinese levels had reached only a quar-
ter of their US counterparts.13 Strikingly, the GDP gap between the United
States and China has actually grown since the global financial crisis.

…to Support the Tools of Statecraft


Based on this robust economic foundation, the United States maintains a
wide variety of means to bolster the international system.
Militarily, the United States remains legions above everyone else. In
2011, it spent just under $700 billion on its military; Russia and China
combined spent just over $250 billion (though the Chinese number may
have been larger, given the opacity of Chinese military accounting).14 And
those numbers underestimate American military dominance, because they
do not account for three additional US strengths: military spending by its
allies; a substantial technological and experience gap between the United
States and its competitors; and the accumulation of assets during almost a
quarter century of post–Cold War spending. The financial and technology
gap between the United States and its putative competitors means that any
one of them could substantially increase the quantity of its military assets
and still not remotely approach a capacity to compete with the United
States militarily at a global level, or to perform the worldwide security

12
 Chinese senior national economic official, interview by author, Washington, DC, June
11, 2013.
13
 Keith Frey, “China’s Leap Forward: Overtaking the US as World’s Biggest Economy,”
FT Data, The Financial Times, October 8, 2014.
14
 SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/
milex/milex_database.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    67

functions that the United States does to protect the global commons.
Governments in all mature economies recognize that stability in their
regions and the security of their trade rest heavily on American power.15
Furthermore, US intelligence capacity is the best in the world; no
country can begin to match the scale of American intelligence gathering
or the ability to twin this intelligence with special operations forces.
Only Britain, Israel, and Russia are in the same league in terms of human
intelligence capacity, and two of these three are America’s closest allies—
none of these countries can compete with the United States in signals
intelligence.
US diplomatic strength is also substantial. The United States has
around 18,000 diplomats and other members of the Foreign Service.16
Size does not equal influence, of course, but it does help. To give a sense
of comparative scale, in 2015 the 15,000-strong US diplomatic corps
dwarfed the 900 diplomats in the Indian Foreign Service.17 Beyond the
size of the diplomatic service, the United States also has built-in privileges
and powers in the critical global institutions. Although there are institu-
tions in which America has less influence, there remains a direct relation-
ship between a body’s importance and how much power the United States
wields within it. All of this combines to give the United States an enor-
mous amount of gravitational pull in the international system.18
But perhaps the single most important feature of American strength is
that it has more than fifty allies—over a quarter of the world’s states. Of
those, two dozen are strong, close, effective allies with which the United
States shares military technology and intelligence and works diplomati-
cally, all the while providing a guarantee of security. Found on every
­continent, these allies are part of almost every regional or diplomatic
group, offering an indirect method of promoting US interests.

15
 Interviews by author, Delhi, October 2011 and April 2013; Beijing, October 2009 and
November 2012; Brasilia, April 2011 and July 2013.
16
 “Agencies Listed by Size Categories (as Reported in May 2001).” United States
Department of Justice. August 6, 2014. Accessed November 17, 2015. http://www.jus-
tice.gov/crt/ix-agencies-listed-size-categories-reported-may-2001-large-agency-category-
10000-employees.
17
 Peter Martin, “Yoga Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, January 25, 2015.
18
 The phrase “gravitational pull” is from Bruce Jentleson and Steven Weber, The End of
Arrogance: America and the Global Competition of Ideas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010.
68   B. JONES

The scale and strength of America’s alliances are unprecedented in the


modern era. And American allies are not minor actors; America’s closest
allies include the vast majority of the world’s largest economies and mili-
tary powers, almost three-quarters of the forty wealthiest countries in the
world. It is a reality that should give pause to anyone crafting an analogy
based in previous great power shifts. While the lessons of history are not
irrelevant here, the timeless narrative of rising powers provoking inevitable
clashes must make room for careful consideration of these unique aspects
of the current moment.
Even where the “rest” are rising, there is good news for the United
States. The surfeit of attention on China’s economic rise has lessened the
scrutiny of the rise of India and Brazil (each of which, as we will see later,
faces its own difficulties). Further, it has obscured the fact that other
economies, ones friendlier to the United States, are rising as well, among
them Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, and Germany. And while some of
America’s long-standing allies (like Japan, the United Kingdom, and
France) are experiencing a slump, so too is America’s long-standing rival
Russia. The large majority of the most powerful economies remain US
allies and friends. Thus, the rise of the rest offers US leadership as many
opportunities as challenges, as long as Washington invests in managing
the transition.

All About the BRICS


To begin, it is important to clarify that though many emerging middle
powers are rising, only the BRICS hold the potential to genuinely chal-
lenge US leadership. That the economic development of countries such as
Mexico and South Korea undoubtedly has increased the international clout
of a wide set of states is undeniable; as then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton noted in 2011: “For the first time in modern history, nations are
becoming major global powers without also becoming global military
powers.”19 Nonetheless, successful economic growth alone is not an ade-
quate foundation for mounting an attack on the global order. For that
goal, a nation must possess not only an expanding economy, but an expand-
ing economy of significant size, preferably coupled with a large population.
It is this combination of economic power and population that undergirds
a state’s ability to project both financial and military influence abroad.

19
 Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2012).
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    69

Based on such criteria, the list of nations sufficiently powerful to


challenge the United States is extremely limited. That the emerging
middle powers fall short of this mark is unsurprising; not even all the
BRICS constitute credible challenges to US leadership. South Africa,
included more for geographic representation than actual power, inhabits
an entirely separate league from the “big three” nations of China, India,
and Brazil. Even Russia, linked with the BRICS largely due to the fact that
its petro-fueled post-Soviet recovery was coincident with the others’ peri-
ods of growth, is openly acknowledged as a stuttering, or even declining,
force, not an ascendant power on a par with the big three. Moscow may
maintain considerable influence through a combination of its nuclear arse-
nal, institutionalized privileges (Security Council veto), and the employ-
ment of its energy reserves to geopolitical ends, but such tools make it a
powerful spoiler of the existing order, not the author of a future one.
This is not to assert that the middle-income countries are unimportant;
they represent a set of second-tier powers that both the United States and
the various BRICS will seek to woo for support. However, while they will
be important players in the game, the emerging middle powers will not be
setting the rules of the game itself.

The Burst of the BRICS Bubble


As for the BRICS themselves, they are not actually rising as steadily as
predicted. Following two decades of explosive economic growth, and a
near-decade of rising geopolitical clout, the BRICS bubble is beginning to
leak, perhaps even burst.20
Several of the BRICS economies are set to experience a significant slow-
down in the next few years. Brazil has already slowed to negative growth,
and India to 5%. Considerable debate surrounds whether China will be
able to sustain what is officially listed as a 7% growth rate; Ruchir Sharma,
a market analyst and author who has been prescient about short- and
medium-term trends in emerging economies, argues that China will be
fortunate to sustain a 5% growth rate in the short term. And, in both the
short and medium term, he insists that China faces serious challenges in
the form of inflation and other structural obstacles to growth.21

20
 Bruce Jones, “The Bursting of the BRICs Bubble,” The American Interest, April 9,
2015, www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-bursting-of-the-brics-bubble/.
21
 Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles, New York:
Norton, 2012.
70   B. JONES

Financial trouble has been brewing for some time. In 2013, George
Magnus of financial services company UBS described the BRICS countries
as “hitting a BRIC wall,” namely, the middle-income trap.22 This chal-
lenge of shifting from simple manufacturing to the more complex func-
tions of engineering, design, and innovation represents a significant hurdle
for the BRICS to overcome. The period of growth for Brazil, Russia,
India, and China as a group has not yet ended, but the stunningly high
levels of growth that characterized the BRICS narrative are coming to a
close. Normal, or lower than normal, rates of growth are returning. And
even the new lower levels of growth will require that the BRICS nations
undertake tough reforms.
Take Brazil. In 2008, it grew by 5%. In 2013, it grew by just 2.5%, and
the IMF forecasts that in 2015 Brazil’s GDP will actually contract by 1%.23
Behind this already grim picture lies a litany of worrying statistics. In May,
inflation in the country hit a 12-year high, causing the central bank to raise
its interest rate to a 6-year high of 12.75%; and in April, the Brazilian real
hit an 11-year low. There have been important successes in the growth of
the new middle class, but extreme poverty continues to rise and political
reforms have not matched middle-class demands. Corruption runs ram-
pant, and President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings have declined pre-
cipitously since she barely won reelection in October 2014.24 As Petrobras,
the Brazilian state oil company, staggers under the weight of scandal,
Rousseff’s approval rating fell to 13% in March 2015, only three months
into her second term.25 Having campaigned on promises to channel
Brazil’s oil revenue into continued economic growth, while avoiding the
corruption that has plagued oil-rich states, Rousseff’s failing presents per-
haps the most vivid, but hardly the last, instance of a BRICS nation strug-
gling to overcome the middle-income trap.
In Russia, the picture is even drearier. Russia was included initially in
the BRICS grouping due to its recovery from the post-Soviet nadir;
however, its economy has never really matched the others’ in potential.

22
 George Magnus, “Hitting a BRIC Wall: The Risk of the Middle Income Trap,” UBS
Investment Research: Economic Insights – by George, UBS Limited, January 21, 2013.
23
 Alonso Soto, “UPDATE 2-IMF Sees Brazil Economy Hinging on Austerity,” Reuters,
April 20, 2015.
24
 “After the Election, the Reckoning,” Americas View, The Economist, November 8, 2014.
25
 Simon Romero, “Brazil’s Slumping Economy and Bribery Scandal Eat Away at Dilma
Rousseff’s Popularity,” The New  York Times, March 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/21/world/americas/brazils-slumping-economy-and-bribery-scandal-eat-
away-at-dilma-rousseffs-popularity.html?_r=0.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    71

In 2013, Russia held just over 2.5% of the world’s GDP. Today, Russian
economic prospects are dire. The low price of oil is a disaster for its econ-
omy. Oil revenues comprise 45% of Russia’s national budget; Moscow
loses approximately $2 billion in revenue for every dollar the price of oil
falls. At $78 per barrel, the World Bank predicted a 2015 contraction of
0.7% to Russian GDP.  At $70 per barrel, it predicted a contraction of
1.5%. The Brent crude oil price in April 2015 was just $60 per barrel, and
in June 2015 the World Bank predicted that the Russian economy would
shrink by 2.7% in 2016.26 Biting sanctions slapped on Russia for its annex-
ation of Crimea and continued provocations in eastern Ukraine have com-
pounded these losses. For all the talk of a novel “authoritarian capitalist”
model that promises economic growth without democratic governance, it
will not be Moscow that carries that standard in the coming years.
While the challenges confronting China, the putative leader of the
authoritarian capitalist pack, do not rival those that beset Russia, serious
issues threaten the vitality of Chinese economic development. Projected
growth rates around 6–7% are nothing to sneer at, but when compared to
growth rates in the high teens and low twenties that have marked the last
decades, we see a genuine slowdown. Additionally, these falling growth
rates come at a time when China has been actively pumping debt into its
economy. A 2015 McKinsey & Co. study detailed how China’s debt is
verging on unsustainable, with total debt reaching 282% of GDP in 2014,
ranking among the highest levels for major economies.27 For a govern-
ment that has founded much of its legitimacy in increasing economic
opportunity (alongside providing domestic stability), a financial slow-
down, or even crisis, could undercut Beijing’s growing influence and
power on the global stage.
Chinese leaders face a deep challenge. To secure the next wave of its
growth, they will have to overcome the middle-income trap and transform
China into a more innovative economy. China lacks the natural resources
that have underwritten Russian growth, but that also made Moscow a
renter state. Instead, Beijing’s rapid growth can be attributed in large part
to its emergence as a low-cost manufacturer of goods that sell in the
American and other high-end markets, including Europe. But as the
Chinese economy has risen, so too have its labor costs, requiring the country

26
 Bruce Jones, “The Bursting of the BRICs Bubble,” The American Interest, April 9,
2014, www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-bursting-of-the-brics-bubble/.
27
 Zhiwu Chen, “China’s Dangerous Debt,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3, May/June
2015.
72   B. JONES

to compete through other means, like innovation and enhancing domestic


production and consumption—a much tougher challenge. Many countries
have started on this pathway to change, but then failed to surmount the
middle-income trap. The next wave of Chinese growth will be much harder
to weather than the last.28 And the Chinese leadership, particularly President
Xi Jinping, appreciates the scope of these obstacles, hence the continued
drive for domestic reform. Nevertheless, as certain Chinese domestic schol-
ars have noted, recognizing the need for reform cannot remove the prob-
lem that the easy changes have already been made. Now Xi confronts “the
harder changes,” including critical state monopolies, the issue of land priva-
tization, and the creation of an independent judiciary.29 Without these fur-
ther liberalizing measures, it will be difficult to maintain the growth that has
catapulted China to a power with global influence.
India stands as the sole exception to this pattern of bursting bubbles. It,
of course, faces many challenges, including 300 million citizens mired in
acute poverty with limited or no access to electricity; corruption; and poor
infrastructure. But it has great potential. India’s free-market economy is
diverse, suggesting the potential for more sustainable growth than is pos-
sible in China with its state-driven companies. Given the slowdowns across
the emerging markets, India is a welcome outlier. Since his election, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi has demonstrated a willingness to embrace a
staunchly reformist path to jumpstart India’s economy, following initial
shocks from the US Federal Reserve’s contemplation of slowing bond
purchases in 2013. Modi’s initiatives appear to be working; despite some
speculations of inflated figures, the Indian government released a growth
figure of 7.5% in May 2015, surpassing that of its Chinese counterpart at
7%.30 In the March 2015 words of IMF Managing Director Christine
Lagarde, “in this cloudy global horizon, India is a bright spot.”31
Furthermore, India’s economy enjoys untapped resources, most
prominently human capital. India’s workforce has high intellectual, tech-
nical, and engineering skills—and whole swaths of the population are yet

28
 Michael Spence, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed
World, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011; Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In
Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles, New York: Norton, 2012.
29
 Categorization of these necessary, but challenging, reforms from Chinese scholar
“Youwei” (pseudonym), in: “The End of Reform in China,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3,
May/June 2015.
30
 Raymond Zong and Anant Vijay Kala, “India’s Economic Growth Hits Four-Year
High,” The Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015.
31
 Ibid.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    73

to be impacted by potentially transformative education, leaving room for


great human resource potential. Finally, this steady growth has occurred
against a backdrop of weak governance and poor infrastructure. If the
Modi government can deliver on its promises and improve these aspects,
then India holds the potential for a continued era of sustained growth,
marking the central divergence between Delhi and its BRICS colleagues.

The Rising Powers: Reformers, Not Revolutionaries


With the notion that the BRICS are a unified force capable of challenging
the United States shown to be more fiction than fact, it becomes clear that
the rising non-Western powers are better positioned to shape the global
order, gaining greater influence from acting within the international sys-
tem rather than overthrowing it.32 The larger rising powers, such as India
and Brazil, as well as traditional US allies like Korea and Turkey, have
repeatedly demonstrated that they do not seek to break the international
order, but rather to profit from it while their own power continues to grow.
For these nations, a collapse of the international order would only result in
unprofitable chaos, offering little incentive for rising powers to reject the
US-led system for anarchy. Certainly, in this changing environment, the
emerging powers will press for a greater role at the global high table, rather
than merely accept Western edicts. Yet, in pursuing their own independent
agendas, the emerging powers face a dilemma. They may have an impulse
to rivalry and some interest in restraining US influence, but they also hold
fundamental stakes in a stable global economy, and in protecting the sea
and air routes through which global trade and energy flow. This is particu-
larly true of China, which needs to maintain very rapid growth both to
sustain its domestic stability and to project international influence—but
this requires energy imports, the flow of which largely depends on the
security maintained by American military might.33 In the end, these states
will not forget that their very rise came about through integration into the
established global economic system, not by rebelling against it.
Select actors, like China and Russia, will continue efforts to curtail US
leadership in certain domains. However, even these revisionist powers are
likely to elect to cooperate with Washington and its allies in some fields,

32
 G.  John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the
American World Order, Princeton University Press, 2011.
33
 Bruce Jones and David Steven, The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security, and
the Energy Revolution, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014.
74   B. JONES

namely counter-terror and nuclear non-proliferation, the latter illustrated


by the investment by Russia and China in the recently successful nuclear
negotiations with Iran by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the
United Nations [UN] Security Council, China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany). Their own need for con-
tinued economic growth constrains these would-be revolutionaries. On its
own, neither Moscow nor Beijing is strong enough to completely topple
the US-led system—they can only challenge American leadership if others
follow, and so far they have found few takers.
The rising middle-income nations should provide these missing follow-
ers; yet they are absent. The fundamental reality is that, for most of these
states, their stories mirror that of the majority of the BRICS: the allure of
remaining in the US-led system is greater than the potential benefits of
working against it. As with India and Brazil, the second-tier powers have
grievances with the current international order. However, these aspects
point them towards reform, not revolt. Emerging potential middle powers
from Nigeria to Indonesia have experienced tremendous economic growth
under the Western-organized order, growth that their leaders know cannot
be guaranteed if the global economic system were to collapse.34 Similarly,
they appreciate the greater danger inherent in a more anarchic world. While
the Western order cannot fully prevent conflict, the US-backed post-1945
norm against interstate aggression has contributed to a decline in interstate
warfare since the mid-twentieth century.35 The second-tier nations have
benefited significantly from this fact. For governments seeking to maintain
economic growth, not having to dedicate vast resources to territorial
defense is a large boon. What is more, many of these emerging middle-
income countries are in Asia, and there they cast a wary eye on a growing
and increasingly assertive China, clearly preferring the continuation of the
existing order to what would amount to an international free-for-all.

34
 World Bank datasets confirm the positive, and at times massive, GDP growth that the
middle-income countries have experienced over the past decades. To examine GDP growth
rates for the countries in question, see: “GDP Growth (Annual %),” The World Bank.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
35
 Both Steven Pinker, in The Better Angels of Our Nature, and the data gathered by the
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) have illustrated a decline in both interstate war and
battlefield deaths over the past several decades. While competing theories exist as to the root
cause of this trend, the norm of non-aggression between states reflects the cornerstone of the
UN system, and, therefore, has been repeatedly buttressed by the great powers over the past
70 years. Arguably the US-created UN system serves as the foundation for this decline in
conflict.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    75

Moreover, the middle-income states paradoxically benefit most from a


halfhearted BRICS challenge to the global order. In pressing the West for
revisions to the international order, the BRICS shoulder the burden of
opening the door for a conversation on reforming the international sys-
tem. However, this push lacks the momentum to successfully create a new
order. Instead, it leaves an opening for the second-tier states to put for-
ward their own demands. Furthermore, as the BRICS economies stumble
and the group’s cohesion frays, this opening only expands, enabling these
middle powers to punch above their weight. Thus, these second-tier
nations are likely to engage in a strategy akin to the geopolitical balance of
power theory, except in economic terms. Alternating support for Western-­
backed institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, will be matched
with endorsements of BRICS alternatives as the middle powers effectively
hedge against either group gaining concrete dominance over the interna-
tional economic order.
Within this framework of support for the general tenets of the interna-
tional order, the emerging powers possess a strong impulse towards rivalry
with the United States. At a minimum these countries have a strong
impulse towards autonomy, grounded in what I call the “psychology of
rise,” in which rising powers seek to undo the humiliation done unto them
in their first encounters with a globalizing West and in their resulting posi-
tions within the post-war order. The psychology of rise is most evident in
China’s assertive stance in defense of its interests and influence in East
Asia, but it is equally present in India’s defense of its interests in the
­evolving climate change regime, and in Brazil’s aspiration for a bigger role
in global security affairs.
And, despite some economic constraints and challenges, the emerging
powers have the tools to advance their aims, and even, at times, to reshape
portions of the international order. China is on track to augment its
regional sway through the economic diplomacy of the nascent Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has successfully drawn in
US allies and partners from across the globe. Though Delhi appears to be
flirting with increased use of its hard power, India enjoys a wide range of
soft-power assets to draw upon.36 It boasts, as Peter Martin notes,
“Bollywood, Yoga, Buddhism, and a rich philosophical tradition. It has a

36
 Harsh V. Pant “Restraint No More: India Reassesses Its Hard Power,” The Diplomat,
Flashpoints, June 16, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/restraint-no-more-india-
reassesses-its-hard-power/.
76   B. JONES

world-class cadre of global public intellectuals from Amartya Sen to


Salman Rushdie. It also has an extensive, wealthy, and increasingly politi-
cally engaged diaspora spread across the political and economic capitals of
the world.”37 While the permanent members of the UN Security Council
rejected the 2010 Turkish-Brazilian diplomatic foray to broker a nuclear
deal with Iran, the initiative itself, as well as global reaction, reflected
Brasilia’s increasing weight in the international arena.
Thus, while the rising powers will strive for autonomy, this struggle is
unlikely to entirely overcome the incentives for restraint towards, and even
cooperation with, the current international order and the United States.
This balance between the impulse to rivalry and the incentives for restraint
is the most important dynamic in contemporary international affairs; and
for the moment, the balance tips towards restraint.
Russia, however, with its moves on Crimea and in eastern Ukraine,
demonstrates a hard shift towards rivalry in its new confrontational stance
vis-à-vis the West and the international order. As the weakest of the “ris-
ing” powers, Moscow is more limited and more regionally bound than
Beijing. Still, Russia’s large remaining military and nuclear capacity, com-
bined with its veto at the UN Security Council, makes it a singular chal-
lenge for the international order in the coming period. Perhaps the most
important consequence of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is the precedent
that the crisis is setting for Beijing’s future behavior. Of particular interest
is not the West’s future policy to check Chinese aggression, but how the
other emerging powers will respond to a Chinese challenge to the interna-
tional rule of law. When the United States bypassed the UN with the inva-
sion of Iraq, in violation of international law, the rising powers were not
hesitant to speak out; so far, they have been more reluctant to question
Russia, at least publicly. But if Russia continues to seek to erode interna-
tional stability, China’s and India’s interests will be ever more threatened,
and Brazil’s foreign policy philosophy as well. How they respond, to
Russia today and, most importantly, to China tomorrow, will be a critical
variable for the health of the international order.
For though Russia’s antagonism reflects the “canary in the coal mine”
for the resilience of the international order, China constitutes the most
credible challenge to the global system. As discussed, Chinese economic
growth is slowing; however, Beijing already has secured lasting influence
through its dramatic and rapid economic ascent. Even with lower growth
37
 Peter Martin “Yoga Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, January 25, 2015, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2015-01-25/yoga-diplomacy.
  A NOT QUITE MULTIPOLAR WORLD    77

$24
United States

$20

China
GDP (Current USD, Trllions)

$16

$12

$8

Japan
Germany
$4 India
France
[SERIES NAME]
Brazil
Italy
Russia

$0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Fig. 3.1  IMF GDP forecasts for the world’s top ten economies as of 2014

rates, China alone among other potential competitors will be capable of


approaching the US economic trajectory (see Fig. 3.1). With the rest of
the world—both established and rising powers—trailing Washington and
Beijing from a sizable distance, it becomes evident that the duo of the
United States and China will be the principal actors defining the global
order in the twenty-first century. Thus, how China seeks to influence the
international system remains the critical, but far from answered, question.
Whether the Chinese leadership selects a policy of rivalry or restraint is a
debate still unfolding in Beijing, as a variety of contrasting viewpoints
contest to hold the tiller on Chinese foreign policy.38 Nevertheless, this
debate is a dynamic process, leaving the potential for external actors, from
the United States, the BRICS, and the emerging middle-income powers,
to influence China’s choice. And that is the game yet to be played.

38
 Bruce Jones, “Competitors, Not Cold Warriors,” In Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising
Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2013.
78   B. JONES

Conclusion
The stakes are high. The debate over impulses towards rivalry and restraint
is unfolding during the first period in contemporary history that is not
predominantly shaped by tension among great powers. After the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the world experienced an era of astonishing economic
advancement and cooperation. States effectively rallied to make progress
on a set of devastating problems: poverty, civil war, disease.39 And this col-
laboration spurred a growth in freedoms, as dozens of countries moved
towards democracy and as citizens challenged the economic and political
constraints under which they lived.40
However, the era of unquestioning cooperation under US leadership
has come to a close. This is not to say that international collaboration is
dead. Substantial work on certain issues—the global economy, energy, the
oceans, and, to some extent, Iranian nuclear aspirations—will persist. And,
in spite of intensifying competition in the United States–China relation-
ship, the world is a long way from a fracturing of the international order.
Even in the most evident strain on the post-war system—the great cooling
of United States–Russia relations in the wake of the Ukraine crisis—the
two countries have not severed all links. Nonetheless, in the coming
decades a diverse set of emerging powers will be wading into these global
conversations with ever greater influence. Lacking a unifying ideology or
purpose, these rising nations will not bring a single demand for reform or
revision of the global order, but rather a plethora of new voices that both
complicates international conversations and creates new avenues to tackle
challenges that have thus far stymied the international community.
The pressing question, therefore, is how the relationship between the
United States and these emerging powers, particularly China, unfolds.
A new normal must be established, and it must be a mutual process. As
Washington will remain the commanding presence in the global arena, rising
states would be ill-advised to ignore the American colossus. Yet, the United
States, even with its enduring power and might, must adjust its leadership
style and diplomatic tactics to the realities of these new actors on the inter-
national stage. The middle powers have arrived. They will make their
voices heard. But the United States remains. Will they listen to each other?

39
 Andrew Mack, Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War:
Beyond the Mainstream Narrative, Vancouver: Human Security Report Project, 2012.
40
 Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance. Washington:
Freedom House, 2013.
CHAPTER 4

The Emerging Powers

James G. McGann

There is a lack of consensus about the definition of “emerging powers” in


academia. Some scholars limit the emerging powers to those countries
that possess military power, while others focus on economic power, and
yet others suggest that an emerging power must possess and project mili-
tary, economic, and political/diplomatic power at the regional or global
level. The term has come to be interchangeable with others such as
“emerging market,” “middle power,” and “regional power.” While these
terms can be synonymous with “emerging power,” none captures the full
dimension of the concept of power. All of these terms seek to define dif-
ferent types of power that have resulted in competing groupings of emerg-
ing powers. To account for these differences, regional influence, and
representation, the selected universe for this book aims to put forward
work from a collection of states that best represent the overlap between all
these criteria for emerging powers. The book considers four main types of
power that act in combination with each other: economic power, military
or hard power, soft power such as cultural influence, and a state’s ability to
project power and influence beyond its own borders. These terms seek to
define different types of power which have resulted in competing group-
ings of emerging powers. In an effort to account for these differences,

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 79


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_4
80   J. G. MCGANN

regional influences, and to ensure that the diversity of these countries is


fully represented, this book aims to put forward a collection of works from
the states that best represent the overlap of the aforementioned criteria.
Literature on the subject of what an emerging power is poses more
questions than it seems to answer. David Baldwin, senior political scientist
at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, in his seminal piece “Power and International
Relations,” explains that there is scholarly debate over the understanding
of power in the international relations field. He states that the two princi-
pal approaches are the “power as resources”/“elements of national power”
approach and the “relational power” approach.1 The former sees power as
a “possession or property of states.” The latter views power as an “actual
or potential relationship between two or more actors (persons, states,
groups, etc.).”2
Martin Wight, in his classic text Power Politics, first published in 1946,
distinguishes between “regional great powers” and “middle powers.”
Regional great powers, he explains, are “focused on a limited region where
they can act on their own accord” and are also “potential candidates for
the status of middle powers in the international system.”3 Middle powers,
on the other hand, are defined “on the basis of their power in comparison
with great powers.”4 A middle power is “a power with such military
strength, resources and strategic position that in peacetime the great pow-
ers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a
war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out
of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it.”5
James H. Mittelman, professor emeritus of international affairs at American
University, explains that the concept of emergence “suggests increasing
influence and stature in global order.”6 Ian Bremmer, an eminent scholar
of international affairs and chief executive officer of the Eurasia Group,
defines an “emerging market” as “a country where politics matters at least

1
 David A.  Baldwin, “Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach,”
Princeton University. 2016: 23.
2
 Ibid.
3
 Detlef Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research
Topics,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 04 (2010): 885.
4
 Ibid., 886.
5
 Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. Power Politics. New York: Continuum, 1946: 65.
6
 Ibid., 24.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    81

as much as economics to the market” for the field of political risk. For
what little consensus there is in the literature, it can thus be said safely that
emerging powers stand in contrast to “established powers.”
The term “power” suggests that the study of emerging powers has
something to do with the ability to control, the capacity to influence, and
the physical (or material) capability that can challenge others. Power is one
of the most important and well-discussed concepts in politics. Political
theorists such as Hobbes, Morgenthau, Foucault, and Giddens examine
the concept of power on the individual level, broadly disagreeing on how
power exists and operates in society. Hobbes offers two characteristics of
power.7 First, he describes it as one’s “present means to obtain some future
good,” which indicates that he views power as the capability to acquire.
Secondly, he states power is zero-sum, it “simply is no more, but the excess
of the power of one above that of another.”8 Hobbes believes that aspira-
tion for power is “a basic human drive since [it] is the necessary means for
happiness and getting what humans desire.” In line with Hobbes,
Morgenthau argues that in examining history “statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined as power” and that, following this interpretation,
power “imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational
order into the subject matter of politics, and this makes the theoretical
understanding of politics possible.”9 For realists such as Hobbes and
Morgenthau, power can result in conflict due to humankind’s nature to
aspire to it and its zero-sum quality.
Others do not believe that power always leads to conflict. Foucault
defines power as “not simply a relationship between partners, individual or
collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others” and it does
not exist “universally in a concentrated or diffused form.”10 He argues that
violence is not in the “basic nature of power” and that its use does not
always require force. He argues rather that in a relationship of power, “the
other” is “thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a
person who acts,” as opposed to a relationship of violence where the pow-
erful “acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the

7
 James H. Read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of Nature, Power in Civil Society,”
Polity 23, no. 4 (1991), 500.
8
 Ibid.
9
 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 1948), 5.
10
 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982), 789.
82   J. G. MCGANN

wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities.”11 Foucault,


therefore, suggests that power is the ability to influence without necessar-
ily resorting to force.
British sociologist Anthony Giddens also believes that conflict is not an
inevitable result of striving for power.12 He moves away from the hierar-
chical view, to define power as a process that “intervenes between human
agency and social structure,” and argues that it is not “a quality or a
resource of people or a position in the social structure, but a social factor
which influences both these components of human society and is also cre-
ated by them.”13 Giddens posits that power enables the actor to have an
impact on his or her surroundings despite the existence of “structures of
domination.”14 While these theorists focus on the individual and societal
levels of power, their definitions can be applied to relations between states.
That is, states demonstrate different approaches to foreign relations, either
as a zero-sum game where they seek to maintain dominance through eco-
nomic or military power, or as a method of influencing other states unilat-
erally or otherwise through soft power.
In international relations, emerging power is one of the many categories
used to classify a state. The word emergence connotes change. It suggests
movement from a less desirable categorical condition to a better one. In
international relations, the concept of emergence is often tied to economic
growth. At the very least, the state’s calculated potential based on eco-
nomic projections usually warrants its consideration as an emerging power.
This is warranted since economic growth often leads to improvements to
other spheres of power, such as military capability, political influence, and
diplomatic clout (hard, soft, and diplomatic power).15 As renowned
American political scientist Kenneth Waltz argues, the relationship
between economic growth and military power “cannot be equated.
However, with the use of military force for consequential advantage…the

11
 Ibid.
12
 Mark Hauggard, The Constitution of Power: A Theoretical Analysis of Power,
Knowledge, and Structure (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), 107.
13
 Elisheva Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice: Theory and Practice of
People-Focused Social Solutions, trans. Richard Flantz (1997; mpow.org, 2004), Chap. 1,
http://www.mpow.org/.
14
 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, 69.
15
 Thomas Medvetz, “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field” The Social Science Research
Council (2008): 1.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    83

more productive and the more technologically advanced countries have


more ways of influencing international outcomes than do the laggards.”16
Using the word emerging to label countries experiencing growth has
raised some questions. Is there an exact point where emergence starts?
When does it end? How can one state emerge from emergence? Some
researchers have begun to question a sole reliance on economic markers in
determining emergence. They argue that all economically prosperous
nations do not have equal reach; that is, not all states are able to translate
economic growth into other forms of power. Others have questioned the
concept of emergence itself, calling these countries’ “convergence” with
established economies a “myth” based on the economic performance of
these states in the past.17
Over the last few decades, the countries that scholars perceived as
emerging powers have changed. For example, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa), once considered the quintessential
grouping of emerging powers, is now viewed as an outdated grouping. In
2001, Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs first used the term BRIC to refer to
Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Later, in 2011, South Africa was added
to this elite group of nations. By 2015, however, Ernst & Young had
identified additional countries such as Argentina, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey,
Russia, and more in its list of emerging powers. New groupings such as
CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South
Africa) and MINTS (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) have come
to the attention of scholars and professionals in international affairs (see
Fig. 4.1 for a visual representation of the groupings). As the global land-
scape is altered by political events and economic developments, some
countries have begun to draw the focus of international relations scholars
away from others.
The opposing views on emergence and power have resulted in a diverse
literature on the topic of emerging powers. In truth, a commonly accepted
definition is yet to be created. However, given the credence possessed by
states labeled as emerging powers on the international stage, it is undeni-
able that understanding their behavior, influence, and role—in the present
and in the future—is crucial in determining what lies ahead for the world.

16
 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International
Security 18, no. 2 (1993), 60.
17
 Ruchir Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising,” Foreign Affairs,
November 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138219/ruchir-sharma/
broken-brics.
84   J. G. MCGANN

Fig. 4.1  Overlap between BRICS, +N11, G20, and MINT

Interest in emerging powers has increased in the past decades due to the
much-debated decline of the current superpowers coupled with the fast
rise of China. What will happen after the fall of a hegemon? Which coun-
try, if any, will emerge as a new superpower?

The Challenge of Emergence


There are three important questions regarding emerging powers. The first
is what these states would like to do with their emergence.18 Neil
MacFarlane, international relations fellow at the University of Oxford,

18
 Simon James, “Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the
Policy Process by Diane Stone” Public Administration 76, no. 2 (1998): 409–410.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    85

argues that “the notion of ‘emerging power’ is partly informed by a


theoretical assumption that the international behavior of states is deter-
mined by their place in the international system.”19 A number of research-
ers have pointed out the threat of emerging powers to international
stability due to their desire for more power and influence. There is a realist
assumption that emerging powers seek to change the existing structure
and subsequently replace the reigning superpower as a reaction to their
newly recognized position. In this view, emerging powers are inherently
dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to gain a more important place on
the international stage.
On the contrary, Robert Gilpin, professor emeritus of politics at
Princeton University, argues that “a state will attempt to change the inter-
national system only if it has some relative advantage over other states, that
is, if the balance of power in the system is to its advantage.”20 Gilpin posits
that emerging powers will only challenge the status quo if there is the
perception that the benefits of changing the system will outweigh the
costs. Nazli Choucri, professor of political science at MIT, proposes the
theory of lateral pressure, which seeks to explain this phenomenon by
analyzing the relation between domestic growth and the state’s behavior
internationally.21 She defines lateral pressure as “any tendency (or propen-
sity) of individuals and societies to expand their activities and exert influ-
ence and control beyond their established boundaries, whether for
economic, political, military, scientific, religious, or other purposes,”
which can be accomplished in either a peaceful or a hostile manner. She
argues that the level of a state’s lateral pressure is related to its power.
Using this theory, emerging powers are likely to attempt to alter the sys-
tem, which in turn can shift the polarity of power.22
The second important question is how the rest of the world, especially
established powers, would respond to the emerging ones. Political scien-
tist Vidya Nadkarni claims that “a readjustment in the power hierarchy of

19
 Neil MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?,” International
Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006), 42.
20
 Robert Gilpin, War and Chang in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981). Quoted in Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History
and Theory,” Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London:
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 2.
21
 Lateral Pressure, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Accessed November 2014,
http://lateralpressure.mit.edu/lateral-pressure-theory.
22
 Ibid.
86   J. G. MCGANN

states in the international system that reorders earlier patterns of relations


between super-ordinate and subordinate states comes about when there is
significant change in the distribution of power.”23 As with the first ques-
tion, experts and statespersons offer different answers and suggest differ-
ent policies. Realists believe that emerging powers constitute a threat and
thus need to be kept in check. Liberals oppose this view, arguing that the
current structure of the international system, characterized by interdepen-
dence and maintained by multilateral institutions, prevents this from hap-
pening. They contend that established and emerging powers can work
together for the benefit of all. There are six ways in which a state may
respond: preventive war, balancing, bandwagoning, binding, engagement,
and distancing.24 While this review will not be able to go into detail regard-
ing each of these methods, it is important to note that a state’s choice of
policy will likely depend on its perception of threat, its own capabilities,
and the context within which the state is acting. For Schweller, the “pace
and context” of power transition shape the responses of emerging and
established powers.25 He argues that changes should be “gradual and
incremental” for it not to erupt in conflict, therefore preserving order.
The third question is who the emerging powers are. What countries
should be included when talking about the emerging powers? Here, there
is no consensus. As discussed at length in the preceding section, there is
no one universally accepted definition of an emerging power. Economic
growth was initially the focus, but attention has also been given to other
facets of power in determining emergence. It can be argued that states are
emerging when they start behaving as one, as opposed to solely being
labeled as such. But how do emerging powers behave? As Waltz stated,
“The old and the new great powers will have to relearn old roles, or learn
new ones, and figure out how to enact them on a shifting stage.”26 In the
following section, emerging power blocs will be looked at to understand
who they are, how they were labeled as emerging, and what they are doing
as the world’s new powers.

23
 Vidya Nadkarni, Introduction to Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The
Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries, ed. Vidya Nadjarni and Norma
C. Noonan (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 4.
24
 Randall L.  Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,”
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and
Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 7.
25
 Ibid., 24.
26
 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 72.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    87

BRICS as Emerging Powers

Goldman Sachs’ BRICs (+N-11)


The BRICS may be the most prominent and studied grouping of coun-
tries in the literature of emerging powers. The term “BRICs” first appeared
in Goldman Sachs’ Global Economics Paper titled “Building Better Global
Economic BRICs,” published on November 30, 2001. The term is an
acronym of the names of countries that, according to Goldman Sachs,
have economies that will surpass that of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and is composed
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (South Africa was added subsequently,
but the discussion here will use the original term). The annual increase in
US dollar spending by the BRICs is projected to exceed that of the G7 as
well, while the BRICs’ real exchange rates could appreciate by up to 300%
over the next 50 years. The BRICs model is rooted in economic perfor-
mance and economic potential, based on measures such as gross domestic
product (GDP) and purchasing power parity (PPP). It was mainly created
in order to stress the importance of emerging economies to the global
economy. Goldman Sachs argued that the inclusion of the BRICs in
policy-­making and discussion is necessary since “various shocks to the
world economy have appeared from outside the G7, making a coordi-
nated policy response from those inside difficult.”27 Given this, it sug-
gested that the G7 be expanded and replaced by a G9, which includes the
BRICs and a G5 composed of the United States, Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU).28
One popular criticism of the BRICs is the exclusion of some countries
that some researchers think warrant inclusion in the group. Goldman
Sachs stated that it recognized that Mexico and Indonesia “[have] the
potential to be as big as the BRICs,” but maintained that the BRICs
remain “one of the most, if not the most, important investment themes of
our generation, with more and more financial market movements influ-
enced by these countries’ economic progress and their actions.”29 There
are also criticisms regarding the inclusion of Russia in the group, because

27
 Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” Goldman Sachs,
2007, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/BRICs-and-Beyond.html,
10.
28
 Ibid.
29
 Ibid., 153.
88   J. G. MCGANN

many commentators view it as a unidimensional economy built on


petrochemicals. Macfarlane argues that Russia does not fit the definition
of an emerging power and instead it should be viewed as “a state that has
recently experienced substantial damage and is attempting to stop the
bleeding.”30 Others point out that Russia is actually declining instead of
emerging, given its sluggish economy and population decline.31
Furthermore, for the purposes of climate change, Russia is considered a
developed country under the Kyoto protocol, thus transforming the
BRICs into BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China).32
Approaching these four countries together as a bloc is also criticized.
However, some researchers argue that there is nothing wrong with this
method. Andrew Hurrell lists four justifications for analyzing these coun-
tries as a group.33 First, he argues, these states have capabilities and
resources that contribute to their economic, military, and political power.
Secondly, the BRICs countries all believe that they have an “entitlement
to a more influential role in world affairs” and seek that the rest recognize
this.34 Thirdly, Hurrell contends that the grouping follows naturally from
existing connections among these countries. For example, he notes
­military exercises between China and Russia and coordination between
Brazil and India. Lastly, he argues that these countries are in a class of their
own and are separate from the middle powers. Using Ikenberry’s argument
regarding a “US-led order built around the institutional and multilateral
structures,” Hurrell maintains that the BRICs “lie either outside, or on
the margins” of this arrangement, in comparison to countries like Canada
or Japan.35

30
 MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs,” 43.
31
 Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, “How Do Rising Powers Rise?,” Survival, 52, no.
6 (2010), 68.
32
 The Economist, “The Trillion-Dollar Club,” The Economist, April 15, 2010, http://
www.economist.com/node/15912964.
33
 Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-be
Great Powers?,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 82, no. 1
(2006), 1–3.
34
 Interestingly, the original 2001 Goldman Sachs report stated doubts about the willing-
ness of half of the BRICs (China and India) to participate in a G9 association, arguing that
China’s “social model is still extremely different to the G7 countries,” while India “might
regard any ‘obligations’ as unwelcome, as well as seeing their own experiences as limiting
their ability to give ‘advice,’” 10–11.
35
 Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order,” 3.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    89

Other researchers, however, argue that the BRICs countries are so


diverse that their grouping results in meaningless generalizations. Thus,
using the BRICs model outside of its original context is deemed problem-
atic. Scholars argue that aside from current economic performance and
having positive economic projections, these countries have very few com-
mon interests and are without a “common ideology.”36 Sharma, for exam-
ple, argues that these countries actually “generate growth in different and
often competing ways.”37
It is quite interesting to note that while researchers debate the routine
use of the BRICs model in their analyses, Goldman Sachs has been cau-
tious in the interpretations of its own calculations. The group was careful
to note that with the BRICs and the N-11 or Next 1138—a group of coun-
tries that it predicts will become BRICs-like—it is “conscious of the leap
of faith that is needed to believe that this potential might be realized.”39
This consciousness was further demonstrated by the group when it stated,
in the case of the N-11, that it is “an interesting group from an investment
perspective,” and that of the eleven, only Mexico, South Korea, and maybe
Turkey and Vietnam “have both the potential and the capacity to rival the
current major economies or the BRICs themselves.”40 As industrialized or
newly industrializing countries, these four countries perform well on mac-
roeconomic stability, political maturity, openness of trade and investment
policies, and the quality of education, enhancing their prospects of transi-
tioning to major economies in the future.

BRICSAM/B(R)ICSAM
In response to the exclusion of some countries in Goldman Sachs’ BRICs,
another model was created that augmented the original list of emerging
36
 Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising”; Gokhan Bacik, “Turkey and
the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013), 760.
37
 Ibid.
38
 In an effort to further research on emerging economies, Goldman Sachs also looked at
a number of countries to analyze which ones had the capability to “become BRIC-like.” In
March 2007, it released a report on the N-11 or the Next Eleven, thereby creating another
level of categorization. The N-11 are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam. Again, this list was created
using the same approach as with the creation of the BRICs (Goldman Sachs, 2007, p. 131).
This “emerging emerging power” stage reinforces our earlier question: when does one
emerge from emergence?
39
 Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” 131.
40
 Ibid.
90   J. G. MCGANN

economies. This consists of the original four BRICs countries and the
addition of Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, and South Korea, creating
BRICSAM or B(R)ICSAM. Scholars using this model argue that BRICs is
not as useful “if one looks beyond material resources to diplomatic logic
and on to forms of soft power, such as public diplomacy and cultural
exports.”41 This expanded list, they argue, is more inclusive and more
representative of world regions in comparison to the BRICs. Arguing for
B(R)ICSAM, especially in the context of global governance, Timothy
Shaw, Agata Antikiewicz, and Andrew Cooper recognize that the “eco-
nomic logic” of this model is not as solid as the original BRICs, but argue
that this is “compensated by the convincing diplomatic-cum-regionalist or
strategic logic.”42 With this model, scholars have stepped away from using
strictly economic measures by considering other factors such as geopolitics
in determining emergence. Shaw, Antikiewicz, and Cooper argue that the
model “allows a sizeable degree of reform without either tipping the bal-
ance away from the G8 [the G7 countries plus Russia] or raising the bar of
expectations too far for other countries.”43 The inclusion of a conservative
number of countries in this group results in a list that is not as diverse as
the BRICs and the N-11.
However, as a whole, given the goal of BRICSAM/B(R)ICSAM to be
more inclusive, the model needs to be updated, since it still underrepre-
sents Africa and the Middle East. Another problem is the lack of coopera-
tion among the states included in this model. Several BRICSAM/B(R)
ICSAM countries have entered into bilateral agreements, but there have
been no agreements that can be seen to signal deeper coordination among
the eight countries.44 Lastly, the model attempted to solve the Russia pre-
dicament of the BRICs, but still remained on the fence regarding the issue.
In the B(R)ICSAM model, Russia was put inside parentheses to note its
membership in the original BRICs and its inclusion in the G8, thus convey-
ing that it is more politically similar to the G7 than the other members of

41
 Timothy M. Shaw, Andrew F. Cooper, and Agata Antkiewicz, “The Logic of the B(R)
ICSAM Model for Global Governance” Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons
from the Heiligendamm Process (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 20.
42
 Ibid., 21.
43
 Ibid., 40.
44
 Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, “BRICSAM and the Non-WTO,” The Review of
International Organizations 1 (2006), 240.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    91

the group.45 This debate surrounding Russia demonstrates there still is


confusion about the definition of what an emerging power is. Are research-
ers overly fixated with the BRICs model such that it leads them to ignore
criticisms and questions regarding the groupings? China, for one, was pow-
erful and prosperous until a decline in the early twentieth century. Should
it also be considered as emerging. Or what about South Africa, whose
economy and political transformation have faltered in recent years? For its
part, Goldman Sachs argued that the BRICs as well as Mexico and South
Korea should “not be thought of as ‘emerging markets’ in the classical
sense.” Instead, they should be considered as a “critical part of the modern
globalized economy” with functions as important as those of the G7.46

BRICS
Five years after the initial introduction of the model, dialogue started
among the four original BRICs countries (see Fig.  4.2). Starting with
meetings of foreign ministers in 2006 and finance ministers in 2008, the
leaders of the BRICs met briefly alongside the 2008 G8 summit.47 Aside
from economic cooperation, the summits discussed development, foreign
policy, and other global issues such as terrorism. In 2011, South Africa was
formally invited as a full member, thus resulting in the creation of the
BRICS.
The meetings between what were now five nations effectively trans-
formed Goldman Sachs’ BRICs into more than just a mere grouping. It
demonstrated recognition among the states of their new roles on the
international stage. It may also be interpreted as an indication of the
group’s political aspirations. The two pillars of the BRICS are coordination
in multilateral fora with a focus on economic and political governance and
cooperation between members.48 At their fifth summit in Durban in 2013,
the five countries followed up by establishing the BRICS Development
Bank (BDB) and creating a contingency fund worth $100 billion. This
latest endeavor can be seen as a message that they are indeed ready to take

45
 Shaw, Cooper, and Antkiewicz, “The Logic of the B(R)ICSAM Model,” 20; After its
annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has since been removed from the group.
46
 Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, “BRICs and Beyond,” 5.
  First BRIC Summit: Yaketerinburg, June 2009,” President of Russia, accessed
47 “

November 2014, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/bric_1.shtml.


  Information about BRICS,” VI BRICS Summit, Accessed November 2014,
48 “

brics6.itamaraty.gov.br.
92   J. G. MCGANN

Fig. 4.2  Emerging powers timeline

a more active role in global affairs. Stuenkel, on the other hand, argues
that the summit signals that these states “do not feel established powers
are willing to provide them with the adequate power and responsibility,”
because they are “western-dominated [institutions] in the eyes of emerg-
ing powers.”49 Also in 2013, the countries also established the BRICS
Think Tanks Council, which is “responsible for sharing and disseminating
information; research, policy analysis and prospective studies; and capacity-­
building.”50 The creation of this network of think tanks added another
layer to the BRICS cooperation.

49
 Oliver Stuenkel, “Toward a ‘BRICS Consensus’?,” International Affairs Forum 44, no.
1 (2013), 33
  Information about BRICS,” VI BRICS Summit, http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br. The
50 “

BRICS Think Tanks Council is composed of five institutions, each one based in a BRICS
country. Brazil has the Institute of Applied Economic Research; Russia houses the National
Committee for BRICS Research; the Observer Research Foundation is in India; China has
  THE EMERGING POWERS    93

Criticisms of the Goldman Sachs’ BRICs model did not end with the
addition of new countries. Due to its origins, the BRICS grouping is per-
ceived by some scholars as an inadequate model to be used for other areas
of research, such as environmental issues and global security. Bacik argues
that while the BRICS unite for “self-defense against a common threat,”
which in this case is the established Western powers, this so-called threat is
interpreted differently by each of these states.51 This is because Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa all have different perceptions of the
risks as well as political and economic concerns. Some researchers also cast
doubt on the ability of the BRICS to maintain cooperation and transform
themselves into a “unified political force.”52 There are arguments that
despite their economic performance, the BRICS “lack the strategic pos-
ture and depth either to challenge US leadership or to entrench a new
world order.”53 Some critics did not hesitate to call the summits a “photo-
­op” or a “talking shop.”54
While the BRICS took the markets by storm, the G7 stayed put. When,
in 2007, Goldman Sachs advised giddy investors to look beyond the obvi-
ous, the G7 summoned the “outreach five”—Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, and Mexico—to discuss intellectual property rights, investment cli-
mates, “joint responsibilities for development,” and measures to curb car-
bon emissions, all on the G7’s terms.55
Sharma argues that the problem with using acronyms as an approach is
that “once it catches on, it tends to lock analysts into a worldview that may
soon be outdated.”56 While the future of the BRICS is still unknown,
should research on emerging powers continue to focus on these five
countries?

the China Center for Contemporary World Studies; and the Human Sciences Research
Council is in South Africa (http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br).
51
 Bacik, “Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?,” 760.
52
 Harsh V. Pant, “The Problem with BRICS,” dna, July 15, 2014, http://www.dnaindia.
com/analysis/column-the-problem-with-brics-2002076.
53
 Brütsch and Papa, “Deconstructing the BRICS,” 304.
54
 Simon Tisdali, “Can the Brics Create a New World Order?,” The Guardian,
March 29, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/
brics-new-world-order.
55
 Brütsch and Papa, “Deconstructing the BRICS,” 303.
56
 Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising.”
94   J. G. MCGANN

Beyond the BRICS

IBSA
Prior to the development of the BRICS model, an initiative had already
been started by India, Brazil, and South Africa in 2003 to address their
“mutual frustration” regarding limited opportunities to participate in
global governance.57 The India–Brazil–South Africa Trilateral Dialogue or
IBSA is “a grouping of like-minded countries in similar stages of develop-
ment, sharing historical ties.”58 Additionally, Ruchita Beri labels IBSA a
“mechanism that allows the governments of three countries to coordinate
their positions on important issues and strive for cooperation.”59 Each of
these countries occupies a significant position in its respective region as
dominant powers and all are part of the Global South. Thus, this initiative
boosted South–South cooperation and developed “a consolidated posi-
tion…on issues related to global governance.”60 Given that most of these
countries have more established relations with superpowers, initiatives
such as IBSA enable them to look at their own side of the fence and dis-
cuss matters of concern without power relations issues. All three countries
have positive economic projections and all share concerns about develop-
ment challenges such as energy, environmental issues, and agriculture.61
The shared challenges became the main talking points and encouraged
them to strengthen and improve on their cooperation.62
The first is the need for coordinated strategies on issues.63 While con-
sensus on an issue is important, IBSA needs to have an action plan in order
to be more effective and influential on the global stage. Secondly, these
countries come from regions that are very diverse and they will face
challenges as “leaders of the South.”64 In South America, for example,
57
 Sean Woolfrey, The IBSA Dialogue Forum Ten Years On: Examining IBSA Cooperation
on Trade (Stellenbosch: tralac, 2013), 3.
58
 Ruchita Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum: An Assessment,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 5
(2008), 810.
59
 Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum,” 810.
60
 Ibid., 816.
61
 Sarah Al Doyaili, Andreas. Freyrag, and Peter Draper, “Lessons from/for BRICSAM
about South-North Relations at the Start of the 21st Century,” South African Journal of
International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2013), 300.
62
 Doyaili, Freyrag, and Draper, “Lessons from/for BRICSAM about South-North
Relations,” 300.
63
 Beri, “IBSA Dialogue Forum,” 823.
64
 Ibid., 824.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    95

Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela can challenge Brazil’s ability to represent


their interests. Thirdly, more effort needs to be exerted to improve South–
South trade relations.65 Currently, the IBSA countries are still “competi-
tors” in the market as opposed to “partners.” Fourthly, shifting focus to
the South may be viewed as unfavorable domestically. Beri used Brazil as
an example where strengthened relations with established powers are pre-
ferred by the local elite.66 The fifth challenge is building competition for
influence in Africa.67 Currently all three countries have exerted effort in
forming ties to the continent, as demonstrated by diplomatic visits, invest-
ments, and partnerships. The sixth is competition with other regional
powers for leadership.68 Due to the number of countries that are growing
and building their influence, there are more contenders for leadership in
the South.
Drawing from their similarities as democratic countries and as regional
hegemons, the three IBSA countries intend to show that the group is dif-
ferent and separate from the BRICS.69 In comparison to the BRICS, IBSA
countries have worked more together in addressing issues of security and
politics.70 They have the IBSA Maritime (IBSAMAR) program under
which they have conducted a number of military exercises over the years.71
IBSA and the BRICS also utilize different frameworks in dealing with
developing countries, with IBSA employing a “pan-continental” frame-
work and the BRICS a “cross-continental” framework.72 The differences
from the BRICS allow IBSA to be considered another worthy model for
emerging powers. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos argues that the group’s future
depends on “the extent to which the grouping becomes an important
global actor in norm setting and the advancement of global public goods
in the first instance and, in the second, the extent to which its contribution
receives external affirmation.”73

65
 Ibid.
66
 Ibid., 825.
67
 Ibid., 826.
68
 Ibid., 827.
69
 Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “IBSA: Avoiding Being BRICked Up,” Strategic Analysis 37,
no. 3 (2013), 286.
70
 Jagannath P. Panda, “China and IBSA: Possible BRICS Overreach?,” Strategic Analysis
37, no. 3 (2013), 300.
71
 Panda, “China and IBSA,” 300.
72
 Ibid.
73
 Sidiropoulos, “IBSA: Avoiding Being BRICked Up,” 288.
96   J. G. MCGANN

IBSA has held annual summits since 2006, in which the heads of states
and governments meet. In order to connect society at the grassroots level
among India, Brazil, and South Africa, fora such as the Academic Forum,
Intergovernmental Relations and Local Government, and the Tri-Nations
Summit on Small Business have been created.74

G20: G7 and Inclusion
The G20 or Group of 20 is “the premier forum for its members’ interna-
tional economic cooperation and decision-making.”75 The group is com-
posed of the G8 and twelve other countries, namely Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South
Korea, Turkey, and the EU—the top twenty economies. The group started
as a meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in
1999, with the goal of “[discussing] ways to strengthen the global econ-
omy, [reforming] international financial institutions, [improving] financial
regulation and [implementing] the key economic reforms needed in each
member economy” as a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.76 In
2008, another financial crisis prompted a change in strategy. Leaders of
the G20 met for the first time to address that crisis and have been meeting
at least once a year since then.77 In 2010, it was formally announced that
after its meeting in Canada, the G20 would replace the G7/8 as the
­primary economic forum.78 This move demonstrates that the G7/8 coun-
tries recognize that reaching a solution to global economic issues requires
the participation of other economically powerful states.
Stewart Patrick, senior fellow and director of the International
Institutions and Global Governance Program, listed four important ways
in which the G20 can alter global diplomacy.79 Firstly, by providing a
venue for established and emerging powers to engage in discussions, it

74
 “About IBSA Background,” http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background.
75
 “About G20.” G20 Australia 2014, Accessed November 2014, G20.org.
76
 Ibid.
77
 Jongryn Mo, Middle Powers and G20 Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), 62.
78
 Jorge Heine, “Will They Have Table Manners? The G20, Emerging Powers and Global
Responsibility,” South African Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2010), 2.
79
 Stewart Patrick, “The G20: Shifting Coalitions of Consensus Rather Than Blocs,” The
New Dynamics of Summitry: Institutional, Policy and Political Innovations for G20 Summits
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2010).
  THE EMERGING POWERS    97

may change the dynamics of dialogues in other international organizations


such as the United Nations and reduce the North–South divide.80
Secondly, the G20 forum can assist in determining and establishing
responsibilities and obligations, especially for emerging powers.81 Thirdly,
working as a “pre-negotiation forum,” the G20 can push reform of the
United Nations, thereby assisting it to keep up with the changing times.82
Lastly, the structure of the G20 allows the current superpower, the United
States, to interact with countries it does not usually engage with to create
new “potential alignments.”83 Based on Patrick’s list, it can be deduced
that the membership of emerging powers in what was previously exclusive
G7/8 turf opens up the opportunity to actually alter the international
institutional system to one that reflects the changing world landscape.
As members of the group, the emerging powers played an important
role in the G20. The participation of China, India, and Brazil “decreased
the backsliding that might have occurred as some G7 members encoun-
tered opposition to regulation by their powerful global financial sectors.”84
G20 participation also contributed to changes in the International
Monetary Fund, with China, Brazil, India, and Russia gaining veto power
on the granting of credit lines.85 For others, however, even if emerging
powers gained seats, the established powers still host the party. After all,
even if emerging powers are invited to be members of any institution, “the
rules of the game have already been set by those who arrived there first.”86
Given the potential of the G20, can it be used as a forum for addressing
non-economic issues? It has previously discussed issues important to the
global economy—climate change, development, and energy.87 However,
there remains no publicly announced intention to expand its area of dis-
cussion beyond this.

80
 Ibid., 259.
81
 Ibid., 261.
82
 Patrick, “The G20,” 261–62.
83
 Ibid., 262.
84
 Ngaire Woods, “The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance,” Global Leadership in
Transition (Washington, DC: Korea Development Institute and the Brookings Institution,
2011), 43.
85
 Woods, “The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance,” 43.
86
 Joseph Nye, “Power and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011), 14.
87
 Patrick, “The G20,” 263.
98   J. G. MCGANN

CIVETS
Building on the foundation of the well-known BRICS countries, a new con-
glomeration of countries—CIVETS—is gaining attention. CIVETS refers to
Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa. Coined by
Robert Ward at the Economist Intelligence Unit in late 2009, the term was
further disseminated by former HSBC group chief executive Michael
Geoghegan, in a speech to the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce in 2010.
While these countries are spread all over the world and are shaped by
vastly different political, religious, and cultural environments, they share a
number of similarities and demonstrate the potential to grow rapidly over
the coming decades. According to Geoghegan, each of these six countries
“has a very bright future” and together they will take over as “the new
BRICS.” The primary factors in being included in CIVETS are their large,
young populations and diverse economies.
The CIVETS all have relatively young populations, with the average
age being 28. According to the World Factbook, Colombia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and Turkey have a median age of 28.9, 29.2, 29.2, and 29.6,
respectively. In Egypt and South Africa, the average age of the population
is just 25.1 and 25.7, respectively. These relatively young populations
stand in stark contrast to the aging populations of the West, for example
the German population has an average age of 46.1 and in the United
States the average age is 37.6. This young demographic has the potential
to drive the innovation and sales of digital technologies as interest in them
and financial resources increase.
In addition to their large young populations, the CIVETS demonstrate
rapid growth and a promising economic future. Indonesia is one such
country: it “weathered the global financial crisis better than most, helped
by its massive domestic consumption market. After growing 4.5% in 2009,
it rebounded above the 6% mark last year [2008]” and is predicted to stay
there for the next few years. Additionally, Turkey serves as a “key energy
corridor between Europe and Central Asia.”88 It maintains trading links
with the EU, but at present avoids the constraints of EU membership. The
CIVETs all have diverse economies with reasonably sophisticated financial
systems and have, for the most part, been unhampered by high inflation.
The combination of a youthful population and relative economic
growth and success has led to the CIVETS countries being touted as the
next wave of fast-growing emerging economies. In an interview with BBC
News, Philip Poole, HSBC’s global head of investment strategy, noted,
88
 Presentation by Dr. James McGann presentation at the 2016 Astana Economic Forum,
Central Asia Think Tank Forum, June 2016.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    99

“we see the future as being in emerging markets. They don’t have the debt
problems that we have in the developed world…we think the consump-
tion story will be emphasizing emerging market demand, and those popu-
lation dynamics are very important in this.”
Some commentators, however, disagree on the commonalities between
the CIVETS. They argue that the group has nothing in common beyond
its youthful populations. Darius McDermott, managing director at Chelsea
Financial Services, said, “What does Egypt have in common with Vietnam?
At least the BRIC countries were the four biggest emerging economies, so
there was some rationale for grouping them together.”89 Furthermore,
critics maintain that these countries have faced a number of challenges,
including unemployment, corruption, and inequality.
Moving forward, the CIVETS group will bring a variety of assets to the
table: “diversified economics, attractive investment frameworks and sound
economic policies.”90 They are “attractive to global investors…as their
middle classes expand”; these countries are growing, both economically
and in their scope of influence.91 The CIVETS will prove to be worth tak-
ing note of as they emerge over the next decade.

MINTS
Since Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill coined the term BRICs, these
countries (plus South Africa) have received widespread attention in the
global media and have begun involved projects and track II diplomacy
efforts, with the intent of advancing the interests of developing nations.92
O’Neill has now presented a new collection of rising powers known as the
MINT countries: Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey.
In the Latin American market, Mexico is seen as a favorite spot for
investment. It often draws comparison to Brazil, in part as a counter-­
example. While both are open to investment, Mexico does not face the

89
 John Greenwood, “After BRICs, CIVETS?” The Wall Street Journal, September 19,
2011. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904716604576546632573895
382.
90
 Nils-Sjard Schulz, “The Third Wave of Development Players,” Policy Brief No. 60,
FRIDE, Madrid, Spain
(November 2010), http://fride.org/download/PB60_Third_wave_ENG_nov10.pdf.
91
 Ibid.
92
 Track II diplomacy is defined as “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts
and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called ‘non-state
actors’” (Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1991). Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide
and Analysis. Iowa Peace Institute. Pg 1).
100   J. G. MCGANN

challenges of a bureaucracy that slows down business. Its pro-business


reforms and inspiration under President Enrique Nieto, in addition to
being a part of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA),
make it an attractive market for foreign investment. Mexico’s inclusion
within the MINT countries will help it move away from a negative media
narrative emphasizing the drug trade and cartel violence in the country,
and provide a more balanced picture of both its strengths and its
weaknesses.
Indonesia has also enjoyed a reputation for promise and growth in the
global limelight, in large part due to its peaceful transition from military
dictatorship to democracy. This democracy has proven to be stable.
Political stability led to enduring domestic demand, which managed to
rise at a time when other nations were suffering the repercussions of the
2008 financial crisis.
Nigeria has recently been favorably represented in the media as an eco-
nomic sweet spot for investment. Although corruption and illegal occupa-
tion of its natural resources pose a significant obstacle to development, a
GDP reassessment measurement is expected to be promising. In 2013,
Nigeria’s economy had an estimated worth of $405 billion, a full $50 bil-
lion more than South Africa. South Africa had stood out from the rest of
the African continent and was added to the BRIC countries because of its
relatively high level of economic development, strong business sector,
adherence to the rule of law, and mineral and agricultural resources. Many
authors are now making the case that Nigeria should replace South Africa
as a member of the BRICS. Others argue that it should be simply added
as a member, because there are 53 countries in Africa as compared to Asia
and Latin America where China has two members and Latin America has
one. The case for Nigeria is compelling because of its natural resources,
large population, well-regulated and well-­capitalized banks, and opportu-
nities to expand retail credit.
Many commentators have contested O’Neill’s inclusion of Turkey in
the MINT acronym, arguing that the country is not a commodity pro-
ducer, it does not have an investment-friendly business environment, and
its capital outflow represents an obstacle to growth. However, O’Neill
stands by his decision, highlighting Turkey’s unique position as a geo-
graphic and cultural bridge between the East and the West—two tradi-
tionally polemic hemispheres.93 He says:
93
 Jim O’Neil, “The Mint Countries: Next Economic Giants?,” BBC News, January 6,
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25548060.
  THE EMERGING POWERS    101

In conclusion, the MINTs countries have large, young populations, which


make for a strong work force; have legal systems favorable to business growth;
have governments that are pro-economic growth; are geographically well-
positioned for trade; and aren’t overly dependent on a single industry.
Nigeria is included because of its natural resources, large population, well-
regulated and well-capitalized banks, and opportunities to expand retail
credit. Mexico is expected to grow as the U.S. economy recovers further
from the recession of 2008, and Indonesia’s workforce is considered a major
asset. The MINTs are also poised to become major exporters of both raw and
finished goods, and Nigeria, Mexico and Indonesia are already major oil
exporters. Indonesia is also growing thanks to its coal exports to China, and
Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa. Turkey may be the weak link in the
bunch, as it struggles with high inflation and doesn’t produce commodities.
Still, investors hope that MINTs will prove to be as savvy an investment as
the BRICs did, with strong growth in GDP and stock prices.94
Curiously, however, the MINTs may have more in common with each
other than the BRICs. While Brazil, Russia, India and China have gone to
great ends to come up with a coordinated plan of action at global forums
such as the G-20, there are always gaping differences. At last week’s World
Trade Organization talks in Bali, India objected to a global trade pact sup-
ported by the other three nations.95

The Emerging Power Think Tank Universe


This book discusses the countries that best represent the overlap between
competing definitions and groupings of emerging powers. Combining all
these groups and selecting from the overlap produces a wide variety of
emerging powers. Some are more established than others, while some are
on the decline, as many authors have started to argue about Russia.
However, regions such as the Middle East and others with large Muslim
populations are not well represented here. To rectify that, the book aimed
to include the following countries in its universe of emerging powers:
Pakistan, Israel, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. It also wanted
to include the Philippines because of its notable geopolitical influence.

94
 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mints-mexico-indonesia-nigeria-turkey.asp.
95
 Matthew Cowley and Luciana Magalhaes, “O’Neill, Man Who Coined ‘BRICs,’
Still Likes BRICs, But Likes MINTs, Too,” The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/09/oneill-man-who-coined-brics-still-likes-
brics-but-likes-mints-too/.
102   J. G. MCGANN

The resulting set of emerging powers for this document started out at
N=19. There was a call for papers, during which we reached out to think
tanks in these nineteen countries offering them an equal opportunity for
representation in the book. From the submitted papers, we chose the ones
that best represented high academic quality and strong arguments. As a
result, there are case studies from thirteen countries. The contributions in
the following chapters have been minimally edited for content to preserve
the unique opinions of the featured authors. The group of thirteen coun-
tries includes those that best represent the overlap between the most
salient definitions of emerging powers. Others are included to compensate
for inadequate representation, especially in the areas of political and/or
soft power. The thirteen countries are Nigeria, South Africa, China, India,
Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Qatar, and Turkey.
An academic consensus on the definition of emerging powers remains
elusive. An agreed-upon definition continues to evade scholars, because
there is discord as to the definition of the words utilized in the term.
There is also consensus that the word emergence connotes a change from
a less desirable category to a more desirable one, and that power suggests
the ability to control, influence, and challenge others. Not only is there a
lack of consensus on a definition of emerging powers, there is a lack of
consensus as to who they are. Various entities have identified differing
groupings of countries as emerging. And while the groupings may be
troubling for scholars who worry about whether they actually share simi-
larities, these groupings have begun to recognize their rising influence on
the world stage. As they attempt to organize themselves to wield their
newfound power, essential questions emerge: How do we identify who the
emerging powers are, what do they intend to do with their power, and
how is the rest of the world going to respond to their wielding of power?
PART II

Africa
CHAPTER 5

Nigeria: An Overview

James G. McGann

Nigeria has become one of the fastest-growing countries in Africa,


surpassing South Africa in both population and gross domestic product
(GDP). Unfortunately, much of its economic growth has been danger-
ously dependent on high oil prices and the economy has suffered as oil
prices have dropped globally. Furthermore, poverty in Nigeria remains a
huge issue and income inequality has skyrocketed. Another challenge that
Nigeria faces is the recent rise in terrorism within the country via groups
such as Boko Haram. This chapter offers a case study of a dominant think
tank in Nigeria, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), and
examines the kind of work it does in the country (Table 5.1).

Overview
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation.1 In 2014, it overtook South
Africa to become the continent’s largest economy. It is Africa’s largest oil
exporter and its natural gas reserves are the largest on the continent.

1
 According to projections by the United Nations, Nigeria will become the world’s fastest-
growing country and by 2100 its population will have reached nearly 1 billion people, which
will make it the third-largest population after India and China.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 105


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_5
106   J. G. MCGANN

Table 5.1  Nigeria at a glance

Country name The Federal Republic of Nigeria


Capital Abuja
Population 181,562,056 (July 2015 est.)
Location Africa
(continent)
Ethnic groups 21% Yoruba, 29% Hausa and Fulani, 18% Igbo (Ibo), 10% Ijaw, 4%
Kanuri, 3.5% Ibibio, 2.5% Tiva
Language English (official), Hausa, Igbo (Ibo), Yoruba, Fulani, over 500
additional indigenous languages
Currency (name Naira, 1 naira = 0.0051 US dollar (2015 est.)
and exchange
rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Federal Republic
Chief of state President Muhammadu Buhari
Head of President Muhammadu Buhari
government
Cabinet Federal Executive Council
Elections President elected by popular vote for a 4-year term; eligible for a
second term
Legislative branch Bicameral National Assembly consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives
Judicial branch Supreme Court (15 justices and the Chief Justice), Court of Appeal,
Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory,
Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Customary
Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory
Political parties Accord Party (ACC), All Progressives Congress (APC), All
Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), Labor Party (LP), Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP)

Some economic facts


GDP: US $1.105 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $6400 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 20.3%, industry 23.6%, services 56.1% (2013 est.)

According to WorldAtlas: http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-nigeria.html


a

Coupled with these features, Nigeria’s successful transition from a military


dictatorship to civilian-led democratic rule make it a pivotal power, whose
role will be crucial both regionally and internationally in terms of eco-
nomic development and geopolitical dynamics.
  NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW    107

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected in 2014 that


Nigeria’s economy would increase by $400 billion by the end of 2016. In
2014, the country enjoyed a one-off statistical boost when its GDP
increased due to the rapid growth of new sectors, such as mobile phones.2
This impressive economic growth is drawing the attention of big foreign
investors who, until very recently, saw South Africa as the continent’s busi-
ness gateway. Nigeria’s rapid economic growth has been fueled by high oil
prices. However, like many oil-producing countries, its economy will suf-
fer from plummeting oil prices. Although Nigeria’s economy has begun to
make efforts to diversify (industries such as manufacturing and communi-
cation have begun to flourish in recent years), many economists have
marked down their forecasts for the future. Poor transportation, infra-
structure, and electricity shortages remain major obstacles to the coun-
try’s development.
Additionally, Nigeria’s poverty rate remains high and there is still high
regional disparity in the standard of living experienced by its inhabitants.
The poverty rate in southern Nigeria is relatively low, but poverty rates
range from 76.8% in the northeast to 80.9% in the northwest.3 This dis-
parity in living standards is the result of discrepancies in the provision of
public services and the degree of connectedness with larger markets.4
These issues have been compounded by recent security challenges in the
northern part of Nigeria.

Economic Scenario
Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960. At that time, the
country’s most important sectors were agriculture, mining, and industry.
Today, many of these sectors have vanished as a result of misguided poli-
cies and failing infrastructures. When Nigeria became an independent
nation in 1999, it implemented a reform agenda that included a decision
to base its annual budget on a conservative reference price for oil and to
save the surplus in the Excess Crude Account (ECA).5 As a result, its

2
 “A Powder Keg”, The Economist, April 1, 2015 http://www.economist.com/blogs/
graphicdetail/2015/04/nigerias-election.
3
 http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/ophi/index.php/.
4
 Ibid.
5
 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview.
108   J. G. MCGANN

economy began to grow rapidly. Between 2004 and 2014, Nigeria’s GDP
rose at an average annual rate of 7%, faster than any other African country.6
In an effort to improve the governance and transparency of the oil sector,
the government adopted and implemented the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The NEITI Act became law in 2007, and
the country achieved compliance after four years.7
In 2005, Nigeria launched an initiative aimed at reforming the power
sector. The goal was to expand supply, open the door for private invest-
ment, and resolve issues hindering the improvement of service delivery.8
Oil accounts for close to 90% of the country’s exports and nearly 75%
of its budgetary revenues.9 Although Nigeria is one of the largest oil
producers, the country imports refined oil and gasoline, because the state-­
owned refineries are all non-functioning. Additionally, while the low sulfur
content of Nigeria’s oil makes it easier to meet international environmen-
tal regulations, this reduces its price on the open market.
Increasing US production of light oil also presents a hurdle to Nigeria’s
economy.10 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, in 2015 Nigeria
was due to earn $67 billion from oil exports, an 18% drop from 2014
despite an increase in output. The decrease in oil prices has led to a devalu-
ation of the naira—Nigeria’s currency, which has fallen by between 10% and
17% relative to the US dollar—and an increase in the inflation rate.
Weaknesses in the oil industry have also increased macroeconomic risks.
The decline in output and lower prices are likely to lead to a weakening of
the balance of payments and national budget.11 The surplus in the balance

6
 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/west-africa/nigeria/.
7
 Ibid.
8
 Ibid.
9
 Ibid.
10
 Seitlheko, Likeleli “Nigeria’s President-Elect and Domestic Oil Policy: Challenges and
Opportunities”, April 13, 2015, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinsti-
tute/2015/04/13/nigerias-president-elect-and-domestic-oil-policy-challenges-and-oppor-
tunities/.
The growing oil and liquids production from US shale plays has been progressively replac-
ing imports of crude oil, particularly the light sweet grade. The decreasing trend in US
imports is affecting especially African oil producers. The region accounted for almost two-
thirds of the light sweet crude imported into the United States from 2009 to 2013.
11
 The World Bank, “Nigeria Overview,” Nigeria, September 30, 2015, http://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria.
  NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW    109

of payments which was experienced between October 2011 and April 2013
subsequently vanished12 and official foreign reserves declined.13
Analysts argue that fostering revenue diversification would help
return the country to better growth. The need for diversification is
supported by trends in foreign direct investment (FDI), which indicate
that the non-oil sector has been the main source of growth in recent
years, primarily in agriculture and services as well as wholesale and retail
trade.14 Although more than 50% of the FDI capital invested in the
country has been directed to the capital-intensive resource sectors—
particularly oil—nearly 50% of FDI projects are service oriented. More
specifically, there has been a significant increase of investment into tele-
communications, which attracted 23.9% of FDI projects between 2007
and 2013.15
Power shortage is one of the main hindrances to expanding Nigeria’s
economy.16 It is one of the countries with the lowest per capita national
power supply, and business mainly relies on fuel power generators, which
add to the cost of doing business and make it harder to obtain future
industrial development.17 However, the privatization of the power indus-
try should boost the levels of investment into electricity generation and
distribution, transforming the country’s business scenario.

Foreign Policy
Opinions vary on the significance of Nigeria to the world economy, but
what is undisputed is that it is set to become of the world’s leading powers.
It has played a pivotal role in creating the two most important African
organizations, namely the African Union (AU) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Additionally, it has been
one of the main participants in security operations on the continent, and
is Africa’s main contributor to the United Nations’ African peacekeeping
operations.

12
 Ibid.
13
 Ibid.
14
 “Africa by Numbers: A Focus on Nigeria”, Ernst & Young, 2014, p. 2a.
15
 Ibid.
16
 Ibid.
17
 Ibid.
110   J. G. MCGANN

Osuntokun (2007) underlines that between 1960 and 1966, Nigeria’s


foreign policy focused primarily on pan-Africanism. This paradigm later
shifted to concentricism. The theory of concentric circles, elaborated by
Professor Gambari at Nigeria’s External Affairs Ministry from 1984 to
1985, has been usually adopted to analyze Nigeria’s foreign policy.
According to this approach, Nigerian foreign policy had to follow four
concentric circles with the final aim of putting the country’s interest first.
The first circle concerns Nigeria and its neighbors18; the second refers to
Nigeria’s relations with West African countries; the third focuses on Africa
as a whole19; and finally, the fourth circle revolves around Nigeria’s ties
with the international community.
The first three circles represent how Nigeria has traditionally approached
foreign policy. Before 1999, the main axes of Abuja’s foreign policy were
the West African subregion and the rest of Africa. Regionally, Nigeria con-
tributed to the ending of conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone by providing
economic assistance. It is estimated that in West Africa, Nigeria has com-
mitted US $13 billion to peacekeeping operations.20 Across Africa, the
country’s foreign policy was focused on the decolonization process and
eradicating the apartheid regimes in South Africa and Namibia.
The year 1999 marked a shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy. After the first
democratic elections, the country’s main concern was development. Its
government focused on its economic priorities: attracting foreign invest-
ments and foreign capital inflows. Nigeria considers itself the natural
leader of Africa and its mission is to protect the interest of the black people
in the continent and beyond. This perspective progressively put the coun-
try at the center of African relations, especially starting from the 1990s
within the ECOWAS framework.21

18
 Since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards its neighbors has been guided by
four principles: (a) the sovereignty of all African states; (b) respect for the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of every African state; (c) non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of other African states; and (d) commitment to functional cooperation as a means
of promoting African unity.
19
 Until the 1990s, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards the continent was guided by the same
four principles which feature in its relations with the region, plus an additional one (moti-
vated by the persistence of colonialism): namely, the total eradication of racialism and colo-
nialism from the continent.
20
 Ashaver, Benjamin Teryima “Concentricism in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy”, Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences, June 2014, Vol. 9, Issue 6, p. 3.
21
 The watershed event which underlined the potential leadership of Nigeria was the
Liberian crisis (1990–1997), which degenerated into civil war and dramatic violations of
human rights.
  NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW    111

Table 5.2  Think tanks in Nigeria

Number of universities: 128


Number of think tanks: 48
% of think tanks in Africa region: 48/615, 7.48%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2010–2014):
 2010: 46
 2011: 46
 2012: 46
 2013: 51
 2014: 46
 2015: 48
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (United States included;
2014):
 None
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy
 Top 70 security and international affairs think tanks: 0
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 0
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 0
 Top 80 domestic economics think tanks: 0
 Top 50 social policy think tanks: 0
 Think tanks with outstanding policy-oriented research programs: 0
Case studies
Top think tank: The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), established in
1964, is one of the nation’s leading think tanks in foreign policy and African
development. The NIIA is a key player in the formation of foreign policy and policy-­
making in the country, serving its purpose of providing the government with policy
advice on the nation’s international affairs. It serves as an intellectual base upon which
decision-makers rely for informed opinion and expert advice in order to make rational
choices between contending policy options. Since its inception, the NIIA has been
organizing conferences, roundtables, and lectures. These are aimed at addressing current
foreign policy issues and anticipating others still on the horizon. With its recent endeavors
of expansion and reinvention, the NIIA is set to be a premier think tank in the region.
Alternative think tank: The African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies
(ACDESS) is a private multidisciplinary research and developmental think tank founded
in 1991. It is dedicated to policy research and strategic studies of Africa, with areas of
focus in the role of post-apartheid South Africa, exiting external debts, mastering African
conflicts, and sustaining democracy. Although ACDESS is a private think tank, it does
receive funding and support for specific projects and seminars from international
organizations and governments. It engages African partner states and institutions through
academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term,
collaborative relationships.
112   J. G. MCGANN

After the end of military leadership, Nigeria became one of the most
active African nations, participating in peacekeeping and peace-­
enforcement operations both unilaterally and under the auspices of the
United Nations and the African Union.
As a result of the effects of the Arab Spring on Africa, Nigeria’s engage-
ment extended beyond the region. The end of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime
in Libya in 2011, the consequences of the popular uprisings in Egypt and
Syria, and more recently the advance of the so-called Islamic State have
created a vacuum of power and highlighted the competition for ­continental
leadership in Africa. Beyond the Arab Spring and the chronic instability in
the Middle East, Africa is still plagued by continued armed conflicts in
Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali.
Moreover, poor environmental governance hinders Africa’s security.
Finally, the continent is further exposed to threats related to terrorism and
transnational organized crime. The activities of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
and Mali, the resurgence of al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa, the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda, and more recently Boko Haram in Nigeria
constitute severe challenges to the stability of the entire continent and its
future growth and institutional development.
Currently, Boko Haram is a major challenge and has strained the rela-
tionship between domestic and foreign policies in Nigeria. However, the
Nigerian army has been able to push Boko Haram out of all but three
districts with the help of Chad and Niger.22 Nonetheless, to keep the orga-
nization from regrouping, a complete restructuring of the army—which is
plagued by corruption and misgovernment—is needed. Thus, strengthen-
ing national and regional think tank and think tank partnerships will be
crucial to receiving assistance in the fight against Boko Haram and other
extremist groups (Table 5.2).23

22
 Baker, Aryn “Here Are 4 Challenges Nigeria’s New Leader Must Overcome”, April 7,
2015 Time, http://time.com/3774076/nigeria-muhammadu-buhari-challenge/.
23
 Ibid.
CHAPTER 6

The Role of the Nigerian Institute


of International Affairs (NIIA) in Nigerian
and African Development

Sharkdam Wapmuk

Background
It is necessary to state from the onset that the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA), established in 1961 as a private organization,
was conceived as a think tank on foreign policy. Following its takeover by
the Nigerian government in 1971, NIIA became the main government
think tank on foreign policy. Even so, its work has been very much linked
to the pursuit of the development of the Nigerian state and the African
continent at large. At NIIA’s conference on Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, held from July 30 to August 1, 2007, the con-
cluding communiqué noted that “there is a clear connection between
Nigeria’s foreign policy and the domestic environment; and a synergy
between the external and internal variables in foreign policy making that
can conduce to the nation’s national interest, especially in terms of
economic growth, prosperity and development.” Aptly put, there is a link

S. Wapmuk (*)
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria

© The Author(s) 2019 113


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_6
114   S. WAPMUK

between foreign policy and a nation’s growth, prosperity, and development.


As a foreign policy think tank, therefore, the role of NIIA is ­inextricably
linked with Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuits, its engagement with the
world, and the quest for economic prosperity and development.
Today, NIIA is known as a center of excellence in research, training,
and enlightenment of the Nigerian public on issues concerning the coun-
try’s foreign policy and general developments in world affairs. The idea to
establish a research think tank was conceived even before independence
(October 1, 1960). At that time, some visionaries were convinced that if
Nigeria had to assume the posture that both other African countries and
the entire international community were expecting in the aftermath of its
independence, there was the need to set up an institute similar to those
existing in other Commonwealth and foreign countries.
A pioneer thinker in this regard, Dr. Kenneth Onwuka Dike, who was
then the principal of University College Ibadan (now known as the
University of Ibadan), held consultations on the matter with Sir Louis
Mbanefo, Sir Adetokumbo Ademola, Honourable Shettima Kashim, Chief
S.O.  Adebo, and Dr. R.A.B.  Dikko. These eminent and far-thinking
Nigerians consulted other Nigerians and some foreign friends of their
country. Eventually, their ideas received the strong support of the late
Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. At the All
Nigerian Peoples Conference held in Lagos from August 19 to August 21,
1961, the participants in attendance were also convinced that Nigeria
needed to adequately prepare in order to be effective in the expected role
in African affairs. They were also convinced of the need to have an authori-
tative body with specialty in studying, collating, and disseminating infor-
mation on contemporary world affairs. Therefore, it was not surprising
that one of the key committees that were established during this confer-
ence was the Research Institute Committee, which recommended the cre-
ation of an Institute of African and International Studies. These efforts
and subsequent correspondence with the Prime Minister and consulta-
tions with regional premiers culminated in the establishment of the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, on October 11, 1961. The sig-
nificance of establishing “a Nigerian Institute in Lagos, an African Institute
in Nigeria and a World Institute in Africa”1 was captured in the words of
the late Prime Minister: “If Nigeria is to acquit herself honourably and to

1
 A. O. Banjo, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (1961–1986): The Story So Far;
NIIA Monograph Series No. 12: 5.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    115

take her rightful place in resurgent Africa, she requires to be fully informed
on the world of today, which is of paramount functions of the Institute.”2
The Institute, which began as a private project, was therefore saddled
with this grand responsibility. Its role was inextricably linked to the new
position Nigeria would assume in the international community after its
independence from Britain in October 1960. Just a few years after its
establishment, great interest—both within and outside Nigeria—was
shown towards NIIA’s work and progress. Such support was proved also
by the material and financial aid NIIA received in its early years. The fed-
eral government decided to give it appropriate legal anchorage by promul-
gating Decree No. 35 of April 18, 1971, thus designating NIIA a
government institute. The decision of the government to take over the
Institute was influenced by the expectations of the global community.
NIIA has always considered issues related to foreign policy and devel-
opment as being located in both domestic and international contexts. In
the area of foreign policy, it believes that the domestic foundation invari-
ably determines how the Nigerian state relates to the external environ-
ment. Reading the publications of NIIA, it can be deduced that it is
inconceivable for any country’s foreign policy to be bereft of development
considerations. According to Eze,3 “for when a country engages in inter-
national trade, seeks to attract foreign investments or nationalizes/indi-
genizes, adopts measures on immigration having bearing on the economy,
customs, foreign exchange, all in order to improve the domestic economy
and foster development, it sends signals to the outside world that define
relations between it and them.”
From this broad perspective, the issue should not be whether or not
NIIA has taken into consideration the issue of development at the domes-
tic or continental levels, but what forms it has taken, how it has been
expressed, and what role NIIA has played given its mandate. To what
extent have NIIA activities been focused on Nigerian and African develop-
ment? Or, put differently, to what extent has NIIA used its platform to
discuss, analyze, research, and document issues related to development?
What have been the challenges that NIIA has faced in discharging its man-
date and how has it responded to these challenges?

2
 Ibid., 3.
3
 O.  Eze. “NIIA and Nigeria’s Foreign Economic Policy,” Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 100.
116   S. WAPMUK

In this study, we shall attempt to answer these questions. The chapter


clarifies the notion of a think tank, revisits the mandate of NIIA, and
examines the connection between the Institute’s work and the question of
development. It also discusses what NIIA has done in the areas of Nigerian
and African development, the challenges facing NIIA as a think tank in
foreign policy, and NIIA’s responses to these challenges.

Think Tanks and NIIA as a Think Tank


in Foreign Policy

Think tanks defy exact definition, as they vary in size, legal form, policy
pursuit, longevity, organizational structure, standards of inquiry, and poli-
tics. Not only are there considerable differences over how to define them,
but also the directors and scholars of these organizations often make dis-
tinctions between “research institutes” and “think tanks.” Such disputes
often revolve around the role of advocacy on the one hand and organiza-
tional capacity for quality research on the other.4 For the purpose of this
chapter, the definition provided by Dale Webster is adopted as a working
definition.5 Think tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through
intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying. As such,
they are engaged in the intellectual analysis of policy issues and are con-
cerned with ideas and concepts that underpin policy.
Ahmadu6 has identified three categories of think tanks: academic think
tanks, advocacy think tanks, and contract think tanks. Academic think
tanks hire academics who have proven records in research and publications
in scholarly journals. Unlike at actual universities, the researchers are not
required to teach. According to Abelson, academic think tanks work as
universities in the sense that that their principal mission is to promote a

4
 Helleburst, L. Think-Tank Directory: A Guide to Non-Profit Public Policy Research
Organisations, Topeka: Government Research Service: 32.
5
 According to Webster dictionary (2000) edition, a think tank is an organization that
conducts research and engages in advocacy in areas such as social policy, political strategy,
economy, science or technology issues, economic policies, or foreign and defense policies. A
think tank is also a public policy research, analysis, and engagement institution that generates
policy-oriented research analysis and advice on domestic and international issues.
6
 Ahmadu, “Think-Tanks and their Contributions to Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” paper pre-
sented at the annual conference of the Nigeria Society of International Affairs, held at the
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, from 25 to 26 June 2014: 3.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    117

greater understanding of important social, economic, and political issues.


Examples of academic think tanks may include the Brookings Institution
in the USA and the NIIA. Advocacy think tanks focus on providing policy-­
makers with information on current issues that they need to know. These
think tanks often try to market their ideas to particular audiences.7
Contract think tanks are usually funded by government and donors
typically play an active role in setting the agenda that the think tanks pur-
sue.8 Like academic think tanks, contract think tanks hire staff with strong
academic backgrounds, emphasize doing rigorous research, and strive to
maintain the perception that the research is objective and credible.
Broadly speaking, what distinguishes academic think tanks and contract
think tanks is primarily their source of funding. Again, NIIA fits this latter
description.
In the attempt to understand the workings of think tanks and their
place in foreign policy, the fundamental problem is that the definition is
quite contentious. As Simon James aptly noted in 1998, “discussion on
think tanks has a tendency to be bogged down in the vexed question of
defining what we mean by think tanks – an exercise which often degener-
ates into future semantics.”9 However, it is necessary to underline that
think tanks provide major contributions to the policy-making process of
their countries and societies. Think tanks may be funded by the state,
advocacy groups, or corporate bodies, or derive their revenue from con-
sulting or research work related to their project. Think tanks are non-­
profit organizations and enjoy tax exemption in most countries.
The systematic and scientific investigation of domestic and interna-
tional affairs, the linkages between them, and the delineation of policy
options thus fall within the purview of foreign policy think tanks. It is this
logic that informs the role of NIIA as an instrument of the foreign policy-­
formulation process. The position and role of NIIA as Nigeria’s foremost
foreign policy think tank are unique. The role of NIIA is thus inextricably
linked to Nigeria’s engagement with the world. This role is even more
pertinent at a time when the dynamics of globalization and d ­ emocratization
have opened new ways for deepening the development of partnerships
with old powers, as well as with emerging powers such as China and India.

7
 D.E.  Albeson, American Think-Tanks and Their Role in United States Foreign Policy,
New York: St. Martin Press: 21.
8
 James G. McGann, and Robert Kent Weaver, Think-Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts
for Ideas and Action, London: Transaction Press.
9
 Simon James, Think-Tanks and Policy Process: Capturing the Political Imagination,
London: 409.
118   S. WAPMUK

Ogwu10 argues that even though Nigeria has its own domestic challenges,
African countries still look up to Nigeria for leadership, security, and pros-
perity, as well as for the promotion of the cause of black people in the
diaspora. These concerns fall within the agenda of the objectives of NIIA,
as Nigeria projects itself internationally into a globalized and more com-
petitive world. It is the responsibility of NIIA to undertake systematic
investigation with regard to Nigeria’s foreign policy and to build public
and political support for it. This is very much in line with developments in
other parts of the world. In leading countries, foreign policy think tanks
enhance the process of defining and redefining foreign policy. Such for-
eign policy think tanks have been created in the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan, Ghana, South Africa, and
other countries; they conduct research into foreign policy issues, enhance
the building of political support for those with such professions and back-
grounds to network and harmonize their views and exploit synergies, as
well as evolve options for the government.
There is no doubt that think tanks all over the world attract talented
individuals who contribute to the building of in-house expertise that can
be placed at the disposal of the country. In this regard, therefore, think
tanks provide talents and experts that can serve the country in official and
diplomatic capacities. NIIA reflects these observations.

NIIA’s Mandate and Connection of Its Work


to Nigerian and African Development

The Act of 1971 (CAP.311) that established NIIA states its objectives as
follows:

(a) To encourage and facilitate the understanding of international


affairs and of the circumstances, conditions and attitudes of foreign
countries and their peoples.
(b) To provide and maintain means of information upon international
questions and promote the study and investigation of international
questions by means of conferences, lectures and discussions, and by
the preparation and publication of books, reports, or otherwise as
may seem desirable so as to develop a body of informed opinions
on world affairs.
10
 U.J. Ogwu, ‘Think Tanks in Foreign Policy: NIIA’, in Ogwu, U. J (ed) New Horizons
for Nigeria in World Affairs, Lagos (2005): Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 70.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    119

(c) To establish contacts with other organizations with similar objects.


To achieve these objectives, the Institute is charged with promot-
ing the scientific study of international politics, economics and
jurisprudence. The Institute shall also:

(i) Provide such information to the Government of the Federation


and members of the public as respects matters concerning
international affairs;
(ii) Provide facilities for the training of Nigerian diplomats and
personnel and those of other countries whose vocations relate
to international affairs;
(iii) Promote and encourage the study of and research into all
aspects of international affairs;
(iv) From time to time arrange international seminars and confer-
ences on any matter relating to its objectives;
(v) Promote and undertake such other things and to carry out
such other activities as may in the opinion of the Institute be
deemed necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the
Institute.

For the purpose of this chapter, we need to emphasize the core areas of the
mandate that will form the basis for our assessment of the past and present
contributions of NIIA to Nigerian and African development. This is
against the background of the changing dynamics of both the domestic
and international environments.
The work of NIIA on foreign policy and development as well as other
related issue areas are guided by its mandate, which has been clearly stated.
It is a think tank on foreign policy. It carries out research, training, and
enlightenment of the Nigerian people on issues of Nigeria’s foreign policy
and general developments in international affairs. In order to further
understand the Institute’s work on Nigerian and African development, it
will be necessary to look at the country’s foreign policy objectives.
Beginning with the Tafawa Balewa government, the thrust of Nigeria’s
foreign policy was spelt out in the following terms:

(a) Sovereign equality of all African states;


(b) Respect for independence, sovereign and territorial integrity of all
African states;
120   S. WAPMUK

(c) Non-interference in internal affairs of other African states;


(d) Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting
African Unity;
(e) Total eradication of racism and colonialism from Africa.

The Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979 and 1999


did not depart from these objectives. The 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria outlines the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign
policy as follows:

(a) Promotion and protection of national interests;


(b) Promotion of African Integration and support for African unity;
(c) Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of
universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimina-
tion of discrimination in all its manifestations;
(d) Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the
seeking of settlement of international dispute by negotiation,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication;
(e) And promotion of a just world order.

The foreign policy objectives as enunciated in the Constitution pro-


vide the direction and define the context for Nigeria’s commitment to
African solidarity: the promotion of peace and stability in Africa, the
support of the rights of peoples to self-determination, unwavering sup-
port for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, peacekeeping
efforts and support for other countries, and so on. It is within the
framework of the Constitution that Nigeria has sought to address most
of these issues that border on its foreign policy in Africa and beyond.
NIIA’s work has inextricably been linked to the foreign policy objec-
tives of successive Nigerian governments since the creation of the
Institute. Being a Nigerian foreign policy research institute includes the
responsibility, among others, to offer policy options to the government
on world issues as they arise. NIIA does this by forwarding policy papers
to the government. In addition to research, it provides a forum for the
articulation of diverse views on foreign policy. The government is also
made aware of various policy options available to it through NIIA’s
publications.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    121

What NIIA Has Done on Nigerian and African


Development
Nigeria entered the comity of nations in 1960 as an innocent country,
determined to make a difference in global politics.11 As noted by no other
person than the late Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa:

One great advantage, which the new nations have, is that the accession to
independence makes a clear break with our past and presents us with the
opportunity to enter the field of international relations untrammeled by
power commitment...it is probably one occasion in the life of a nation when
it is possible to choose policies with the inherent qualities of goodness...We
feel an immense responsibility to the world, we see nation wrangling with
nation and we wonder how we can help.

For Nigeria and indeed for other African countries, the overriding concern
in the 1960s was how to end colonialism and apartheid rule on the conti-
nent. The late pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana argued that
African states should seek first the political kingdom and every other thing
would be added later. Accordingly, Nigeria devoted its attention to ending
colonialism in Africa, as well as ending racism in Southern Africa. Nigeria’s
commitment to the liberation of Africa and the restoration of pride and
respect for the black race remained an unwavering commitment until the
last vestiges of colonialism and racist rule were crushed in Southern Africa
in 1994. Right from 1960, Nigeria was a permanent member of the
Decolonization Committee and chaired the Anti-Apartheid Committee.
The decade of the 1970s and part of the 1980s was a particularly diffi-
cult period for Africa. For Nigeria, it was even more so because of the fact
that Africa was taken as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Throughout
these years, repression under apartheid in South Africa was at its highest
and black people, in countries such as present-day Namibia and Zimbabwe,
fared badly under white minority regimes. Zambia and Mozambique were
subject to incessant military incursions by the security forces of South
Africa. Nevertheless, African countries, Africans in the diaspora, and also

11
 H. A. Asobie, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960–2010: An Overview,” Beyond 50 Years of
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs: 1.
122   S. WAPMUK

some non-Africans were of the opinion that apartheid was evil and must
be crushed. Nigeria led the struggle for the liberation of African countries
from the yoke of apartheid and white minority rule. It provided various
forms of support to the liberation movements and also granted asylum and
scholarships to nationals of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
Nigeria’s role in the liberation struggle was widely acknowledged and so
deeply appreciated that independent African countries regarded it as a
frontline state.
The establishment of NIIA in 1961, as noted earlier, was not coinci-
dental, but an outcome of strategic thinking that Nigeria needed to have
an authoritative body with a specialty in studying, collecting, and dissemi-
nating information on contemporary world affairs. The founders of the
Institute had also stressed its role in public enlightenment and dissemina-
tion of information on current issues in Africa and world affairs. In line
with its mandate, NIIA sponsored conferences, seminars, workshops, and
publications on Nigeria’s engagement with the world. At the same time,
its conferences, seminars, workshops, and publications have similarly
shown in the range of their subjects the Institute’s acceptance of its role as
an instrument of public policy directed at Nigeria’s and Africa’s develop-
mental aspirations.
The first major effort in this direction that specifically focused on devel-
opment was a series of lectures delivered under NIIA’s platform. In 1964,
Arnold J. Toynbee, professor emeritus at the University of London, who
had long been associated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs
as the Director of Studies and Research, delivered a lecture titled “Africa’s
Place in World History in Lagos” and another lecture titled “The World’s
Food Crisis and Population Problem,” which took place in Zaria, Nigeria.
After 1972, NIIA witnessed further development of its potential. Banjo
(1986:21) notes that this phase was marked by the development of a wide
range of programs and activities, which mainly focused on the United
Nations (UN). Among these activities were public programs concerning
issues of interest for Nigeria’s foreign policy and development.
The first major conference organized by NIIA was held on January
27–30, 1976 with the theme “Nigeria and the World.” In the context of
the new global order following decolonization, the aim of the conference
included examining Nigeria’s relations with African countries while explor-
ing its contacts with non-African countries, the UN, and multinational
companies. In July 1981, the Institute sponsored the “International
Conference on Disarmament, Development and Regional Security in
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    123

Africa.” In September 1981, NIIA and the United Nations Conference on


Trade and Development (UNCTAD) co-sponsored and collaborated in
organizing “An International Seminar on Economic Cooperation between
Nigeria and the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe.” In 1985, NIIA
organized a seminar on “Options for Nigeria’s Economic Recovery and
Development,” which was the Institute’s contribution to the nationwide
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank–inspired Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) debate. According to Eze,12 prior to the
introduction of the SAP under the regime of Ibrahim Babangida,
1985–1986, the developmental aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy were
unarticulated. During this period, NIIA sponsored conferences and pub-
lications on the implications of SAP in Nigeria, West Africa, and Africa as
a whole. It also held a conference on the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and regional development. However, after the
collapse of the oil prices in the 1980s and the economic crisis which fol-
lowed, resulting primarily from the structure of the post-colonial economy
which had not been reformed despite the enormous oil revenues from the
1970s, there was an attempt to reach out to the world. Even before then,
the development of a strong economic nationalist approach in the
wake of increased returns on oil revenues marked the first major step in
employing foreign policy as an instrument of economic development.
The Indigenization Decree of 1972 gave Nigerians greater control of the
national economy. The law was a clear instrument of foreign policy, in the
sense that it indicated to the world the boundaries between external and
domestic economic activities.
Another path through which NIIA has analyzed and documented issues
on Nigeria and Africa’s development is through its publications. While
some of these publications are direct results of the Institute’s research,
conference, and lecture activities, others are the products of the research
efforts of its Research Fellows. The retreat from economic nationalism,
which has been further deepened under the new global economic archi-
tecture dominated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), represents
an instance of employing foreign policy as an aid to economic relations.
NIIA has in a way responded to these developments. A major effort in this
regard was the conference it organized in 1987, whose proceedings were
published in 1988. Apart from the theoretical aspects, the book dealt with

12
 O. Eze. “NIIA and Nigeria’s Foreign Economic Policy,” Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s
Economic Development, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 104.
124   S. WAPMUK

areas such as trade, investments, oil, domestic economic interests, and


general economic factors that impact on foreign policy. Its Preface , w
­ ritten
by the then Director General of NIIA, Professor Gabriel O.  Olusanya,
with Professors Bassey Ate and Adebayo Olukoshi, could be considered as
representing the Institute’s position. After carefully analyzing the reasons
for the economic crisis that Nigeria faced, it stated: “If SAP is the preoc-
cupation of government policy for the purpose of engendering national
revival and sustained growth, then it follows that this quest should neces-
sarily form the focus, though not exclusively so, of Nigeria’s foreign
policy.”13 Put differently, the national economic agenda of the govern-
ment in a period of national economic reconstruction should define the
thrust, broadly conceived, to be geared towards attaining Nigeria’s eco-
nomic development. As a consequence, the country’s foreign policy
sought a positive alignment with its foreign economic interests and policy.
Of course, this proposition was particularly pertinent in a period of
national economic crisis, because the success of the SAP rested so precari-
ously on vital external inputs, such as the World Bank’s structural adjust-
ment loans and the willingness of the major Western banks and other
creditor agencies to reschedule Nigerians’ loan obligations.14
In 1990, a conference organized by the Nigerian Society of
International Affairs (NSIA) gave another impetus for understanding
the relationship between development and diplomacy. This conference,
titled “Economic Diplomacy in the Contemporary World,” provided
material published in the 1991 special edition of the Institute’s flagship
journal, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (NJIA), as part of its
mandate to promote the understanding of international relations. With
the introduction of the Obasanjo Economic Policy in 1999–2003, and
given the continuous economic decline, demands for a reevaluation of
Nigeria’s economic diplomacy led to the publication of updated NJIA
special issue articles in a book titled The Economic Diplomacy of the
Nigerian State, edited by Professors U.  Joy Ogwu and A.  Olukoshi.15
This publication covered various aspects of linkages between the domes-
tic and global economies.

13
 Olusanya, G.O, Ate, B.E and Olukoshi, O.A, eds. Economic Development and Foreign
Policy in Nigeria, Lagos (1988): Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: ii.
14
 Ibid., iii.
15
 Ogwu, U.  J., and Adebayo Olukoshi. The Economic Diplomacy of the Nigerian State.
Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2002: 17.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    125

There is an acceptance of a direct linkage between foreign policy and


the domestic economy. Both contexts of domestic economic crisis and
structural adjustment, as well as a rapidly changing international political
and economic environment, affected Nigeria’s decision to adopt economic
diplomacy as an object of foreign policy action, expecting that it would be
an effective external supplement to the international economic reforms.16
However, in analyzing the context of economic diplomacy as enunciated
under the regime of Ibrahim Babangida, it is doubtful whether the objec-
tives of self-reliant, just, and equitable development would be achieved. As
General Ike Sanda Nwachukwu, the then Minister of External Affairs,
stated:

The ball game today in international relations is self interest and economic
development in your utterances and in your behavioural pattern, please
remember that Nigeria is a developing country. It needs support from the
international community and that support can only come when you can win
the confidence of those whose support you seek. You begin to win the
confidence through friendliness and loyalty to their cause. What matters is
your ability to win for Nigeria what we cannot do for ourselves, that is, the
economic well being of our people and physical wellbeing of Nigeria.17

This statement underscores the quest for Nigeria’s development driven by


the diplomatic machinery. It also speaks volumes about the character and
approach of Nigeria’s relations with the global economy. This approach
was continued by Nigeria’s membership of the WTO. NIIA commissioned
Nigeria and the World Trade Organisation (2004) by Osita Eze and other
works in the field of development that have attempted to have an input to
government policy. For instance, the book edited by Ogwu and Olaniyan
(2005) titled Nigeria’s International Economic Relations: Dimensions of
Dependence and Change is not just another work on economics from
NIIA. On the contrary, it attempted to provide deeper insights and analy-
sis of Nigeria’s and Africa’s economic relations with the rest of the world.
Another publication edited by the duo of Chibuzo N. Nwoke and Daniel
A.  Omoweh, titled The Management of Nigeria’s Energy Resources for
National Development, was an outcome of two seminars held on 28–29
July 1998. The seminars examined the origin, nature, and dynamics of the

16
 Ibid., 18.
17
 Olusanya, G.O, Ate, B.E and Olukoshi, O.A, eds. Economic Development and Foreign
Policy in Nigeria, Lagos (1988): Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 17.
126   S. WAPMUK

protracted crisis facing Nigeria’s energy sector, and proffered alternative


strategies for overcoming it. Apart from the theoretical context, the book
covered the state and crisis in the energy sector in Nigeria, problems and
issues in the development of the country’s oil and gas resources, and
petroleum and national development, among other areas.
The debt crisis is a major issue that has affected both Nigeria and other
African countries. The Nigerian example provides an illustration of the
burden posed by debt overhang on African economies, with serious impli-
cations for development. In 1999, Nigeria transited to a democratic gov-
ernment under President Olusegun Obasanjo after a long period of
military rule. In his inaugural speech on May 29, 1999, he clearly pointed
out that one of the priority issues which his administration must deal with
was the debt issue. Both external and internal debts, which stood at about
US $25 billion in 1999 when the government of Obasanjo assumed office,
had risen to US $34 billion at the end of 2004.
Undoubtedly, debt represented a heavy burden on the nation and stood
as a major obstacle to sustainable development. Nigeria was spending
about US $1 billion annually to service the debt, leaving the country with
less than US $2 billion to meet its developmental commitments, especially
in the area of provision of amenities and infrastructure for human develop-
ment and social economic growth.18 The biggest achievement of
Obasanjo’s debt relief diplomacy was the October 2005 debt deal, which
led to the exit of Nigeria from the Paris Club as Africa’s largest debtor.
This debt relief offered to Nigeria amounted to an US $18 billion debt
write-off, with the country needing to pay off the balance of approxi-
mately US $12.4 billion to creditors over a period of six months. Even
though NIIA had provided a platform for the debate on debt in Nigeria
and Africa, the success story of Nigeria’s debt relief was followed by a
publication from NIIA on Debt Relief and Nigeria’s Diplomacy. According
to the editors, U. Joy Ogwu and W.O. Alli:

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) is mandated to make


inputs in the formulation of the nation’s foreign policy. It is also a platform
for the scholarly assessment of policy outputs. This book is one of such con-
tributions to the deeper understanding of the twists and turns in one of the
critical aspects of the nation’s diplomacy – its economic diplomacy.19

18
 Ogwu, U.J and Alli, W.O eds. Debt Relief and Nigeria’s Diplomacy, Lagos (2006):
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs: 11.
19
 Ibid.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    127

At the continental level, African leaders have long recognized the economic
challenges facing the continent and were determined to address them.
With regard to economic integration, cooperation, and development,
throughout the 40 years under the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
government, it emerged that several regional and subregional groupings
reflected an acceptance of transitional, state-led economic cooperation,
involving the pooling of resources in response to shared problems and
opportunities.
This recognition led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)
by the heads of state and government of the OAU in 1980. The LPA and
the Final Act of Lagos were initiated as a central idea of the “collective
self-reliance” of the continent. This idea was strongly reinforced by the
Abuja Treaty of June 1991, establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC), which sought to increase economic self-reliance and promote self-­
sustaining development. In the area of continental economic develop-
ment, Nigeria and South Africa are credited with being the chief drivers in
the processes leading to the formation of the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), operating under the African Union (AU). Nigeria’s leadership
role was not limited to the construction of the NEPAD.20 Its pivotal role
is evident from the commitment it has demonstrated in implementing the
NEPAD agenda in the form of reforms at the domestic level. Nigeria has
not only provided the necessary leadership for the purpose of mobilizing
the rest of Africa at the continental level, but has collaborated with other
leading countries on the continent and facilitated the engagement of the
larger international community to partner with Africa under the NEPAD
arrangement. Given Nigeria’s role, NIIA has provided an academic
platform for discussion and publications on African development initia-
tives. For example, in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
it organized a conference, “Nigerian Perspectives on NEPAD,” in 2004.
The outcome of this conference, which according to NIIA sought to pro-
mote a better understanding of NEPAD in Nigeria, was published in a
book titled NEPAD in the Nigerian Dock. Another related conference was
organized in 2004, the outcome of which was published under the title

20
 I. Aluko-Olokun, “The Role of Nigeria in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD),” Nigeria and the Development of the African Union, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers
Ltd.: 162.
128   S. WAPMUK

NEPAD for Journalists. NIIA has also sponsored publications that


discussed questions related to the AU and the future of Africa, and
­
ECOWAS and regional integration.21 Some of the major works on Nigerian
and African development are essentially products and contributions of the
Institute’s Research Fellows.
Apart from these publications, several issues concerning Nigerian and
African development are featured as articles or contributions from schol-
ars in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, and also in the
Nigerian Forum, Dialogue series, Lecture series, Monograph series, and
NIIA News. In addition, NIIA has a huge collection of books, mono-
graphs, journals, and documents on Nigerian and African development.
Rich titles on developmental issues concerning Nigeria and African coun-
tries are found in its library collection. In the early years of the Institute,
most of the collection reflected the preoccupations of the Nigerian state,
which consisted of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in
Southern Africa. In recognition of Nigeria’s contributions to the anti-
apartheid struggle in the region, and NIIA’s role as the nerve center of
scholarly input in this regard, the UN and NIIA’s Governing Authority
entered into an agreement in August 1984 to establish an anti-apartheid
documentation depository at NIIA. The timing of the establishment of
the depository coincided with Nigeria’s hosting of the “International
Seminar on the Legal Aspects of Apartheid and Its Debilitating Effects on
the Majority of the African Population of South Africa.” Locating the
center at NIIA marked the recognition of the Institute as a link between
individuals and organizations around the world who shared a commit-
ment to development in Africa. The UN, distinguished persons, and
organizations made donations of books, speeches, and documents to
NIIA. By the end of 2009, the total number of UN titles in the NIIA
library stood at 4807.22 It is on record that NIIA has done excellent
research work on Africa’s development, particularly on the struggle for
liberation in Southern Africa. For instance, while presenting books and
documents to NIIA in 1987, the Director of the United Nations
Information Centre, Joseph W.O. Findlay, Jr, said:

21
 U.J Ogwu, and Alli, W.O eds. ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration, Lagos:
(2009) Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
22
 NIIA Annual Report File for 2009, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    129

Let me publicly recognise the quality and excellence of the continuous


research being undertaken by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA) on developments in South Africa and their repercussions on the
implementation by governments and organisations, of the United Nations
Resolutions; in a much wider sense the developments arise out of the inter-
national campaign against apartheid, of which Nigeria stands resolutely in
the forefront.

Indeed, there was no better way to wish the Institute added impetus for its
work of mobilizing intellectual public opinion and formulating policy
directions in the sphere of international relations than by openly and pub-
licly acknowledging its giant strides in this regard.
Another form of direct contact between NIIA and the UN’s work on
development is the inclusion of the Director General (DG) and Research
Fellows in official government delegations to crucial diplomatic missions
such as the UN General Assembly Sessions. Their inclusion as part of an
official delegation to the UN does not only afford them the opportunity
to serve as advisors to the Nigerian delegation, but also enables them to
further study the UN system so as to improve their research work. A sig-
nificant development which has raised the Institute’s profile internation-
ally has been the appointment of former NIIA DGs as Nigeria’s Permanent
Representative to the UN. This allowed them to use their personal experi-
ences from NIIA to serve the UN body and also to defend the Nigerian
and African cause directly to the UN. Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, an
academic and diplomat, served as NIIA DG from 1983 to 1984 and as
Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN from 1990 to 1999. Even
after his tenure as Nigeria’s Permanent Representative, the UN Secretary-­
General appointed him as Under Secretary to remain in the service of the
UN, owing to his contributions to the working of the UN body. Professor
Joy U. Ogwu, Nigeria’s present Permanent Representative to the UN, was
a Research Fellow and later DG of NIIA from 2001 to 2006. While she
was still serving as DG, she was appointed in 2003 to the Advisory Board
on Disarmament Matters, by the UN Secretary-General. This appoint-
ment was further boosted when Professor Ogwu was elevated to the posi-
tion of Chairperson of the Board in 2006 by the Secretary-General. These
were clearly due to her contributions to the promotion of global peace.
Several other Research Fellows have served UN bodies in various
capacities. Professor Margaret Vogt, an academic and diplomat who was
with NIIA before working with other institutions, such as the Command
130   S. WAPMUK

and Staff College, Jaji, and as Director of the Office of the AU Commission
Chairperson, has served the UN in various functions. She was Acting
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in UN
Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II), before she was
nominated by Ban Ki-moon in 2011 as his Special Representative and
Head of the UN Integrated Peace Building Office in the Central African
Republic (BINUCA). Before this appointment she had served as Deputy
Director of the Africa I Division in the Department of Political Affairs at
the UN Secretariat. Through these roles and contributions, she has not
only helped in expanding the relationship between the UN and the AU,
but also furthered the ties among Nigeria, Africa, and NIIA.
From the foregoing, it is evident that over the years NIIA has—within
the confines of its mandate, which is to research, inform, and educate the
people on Nigeria’s foreign policy and world affairs in general—paid due
attention to issues of foreign policy and development at both national and
continental levels. That is not to say that the working of the Institute is not
without challenges, and to these we now turn our attention.

Challenges Facing NIIA as a Think Tank


in Foreign Policy

As a government-funded institution, one of the challenges facing NIIA is


that of autonomy.23 As long as NIIA is funded by the government and
supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the independent
status of the Institute has to be understood in that context. The indepen-
dence of the Institute can only be total in terms of independence of action
in the area of research activities; choice of themes to be investigated; and
organization of such research activities. That is not necessarily so in the
area of administration, where the Institute is responsible to the govern-
ment of Nigeria. For instance, the Institute operates simultaneously under
the civil service regulations on the one hand, and according to specific
public service regulations, particularly university regulations, on the other.
The conditions for assessment and promotion of Research Fellows are the
same as required in Nigerian universities. The other members of staff in

23
 Bola A.  Akinterinwa, “The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): My Experience as a Research Fellow and Special Assistant
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Nigeria’s New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of
Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, at 70, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers: 75.
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    131

the Library Department, Department of Administration and Office of the


Director General are assessed and promoted on the basis of civil service
rules and public service regulations. Since Research Fellows depend mainly
on government funding for research activities, how do we determine aca-
demic freedom? Can Research Fellows criticize the government and its
officials openly, or might this cause a suspension of funding for their
research activities? Generally speaking, academic freedom implies non-­
submission or not necessarily agreeing with the position of constituted
authorities. The personality of the Director General to a large extent
determines the extent of academic freedom of Research Fellows. While
some Directors General were on record as having taken different positions
to that of the government, others seem more inclined to agree with official
positions. The same applies to the Research Fellows, who may agree or
disagree with the Director General. For sure, the more academically
inclined Directors General of the Institute have always encouraged more
participation of Research Fellows in public discussions, seminars, confer-
ences and particularly in print and electronic media, which at times may
also disagree with some government positions and policies.
The second challenge facing NIIA arises from its relationship with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This challenge hinges on issues of
supervision and functional relevance.24 The question of who should super-
vise the Institute has always been a thorny one. In over 50 years of exis-
tence, NIIA has come under the supervision of the MFA as well as directly
under the supervision of the Presidency or office of the Vice-President of
Nigeria. Before June 15, 1981, when it was transferred to the Executive
Office of the President, NIIA was under the control of the Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA). The explanation given by the Nigerian govern-
ment was that it intended to bring the work of the Institute to the direct
attention of the President. NIIA was eventually returned to the supervi-
sion of the MFA in 2007. While under the MFA, the relationship between
the two institutions was often difficult for various reasons. The Ministry
sometimes perceives Directors General as not adhering to instructions.
This problem arises principally due to a lack of or a breakdown in com-
munication between a bureaucratic organization and a research-oriented
think tank.25

24
 Ibid., 81.
25
 Ibid.
132   S. WAPMUK

The difficulty in the relationship can also be traced to the problems of


underfunding of both the MFA and NIIA.  This brings us the third
challenge facing NIIA, which is the problem of funding. There are advan-
tages and disadvantages for NIIA in existing under the MFA and under
the Presidency. Under the MFA, Research Fellows have access to empirical
experiences that complement their theoretical knowledge of international
relations. This impacts their research. The Office of the President and
Vice-President tend to deal more with domestic than foreign policy issues.
It is in this regard that NIIA is brought in as a competent research body
to break the bureaucracy of the MFA, which may be seen as slow. Working
under the Office of the President or Vice-President is more prestigious for
NIIA, which is likely to be better funded under the direct supervision of
the President or Vice-President. At the same time, it affords the Institute
the opportunity to directly showcase the outcome of its work directly to
the government. Underfunding of research activities can be counterpro-
ductive. At the level of NIIA, for example the acquisition of new books,
the conduct of field work by Research Fellows is made difficult. Poor
funding also makes it tricky for Research Fellows to attend seminars, con-
ferences, or workshops and to engage in research activities outside the
Institute. The implications of this are quite serious. Nothing threatens the
integrity of a think tank more than the proliferation of different institu-
tions and centers that are privately owned but well funded, and that are
increasingly engaged in the analysis of foreign policy.

NIIA’s Responses to the Challenges


Given the above, NIIA has responded to these challenges with a view to
enhancing its work. NIIA Directors General have responded to the chal-
lenge concerning the issue of autonomy and relationship with the MFA by
developing closer contacts, particularly with MFA officials, as well as bet-
ter relations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and NIIA’s Director
Generals. The two institutions also involve each other in their activities.
For instance, while NIIA invites the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other
Ambassadors, both serving and retired, to participate in NIIA confer-
ences, seminars and workshops, the MFA includes the NIIA Director
General and Research Fellows as part of inter-ministerial meetings on
issues of foreign policy and on official delegations to the UN, AU,
ECOWAS, EU, and many others. The issue of funding to a great extent
  THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS…    133

remains a cog in the wheel of progress of the Institute’s research activities.


Being a government institution, NIIA is careful and selective in sourcing
funding options to augment its resources from the government, which is
often not enough. Additional funds are often sought from reliable
­corporate bodies, other government ministries, departments and agencies,
private foundations, and wealthy individuals.
At the same time, the Institute has entered into partnership and had
several jointly organized conferences, seminars, workshops and dialogue
series with several think tanks sharing similar objectives. These include the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), International Affairs Institute of China,
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Brazilian Centre for
International Studies of the University of Rio de Janeiro, Institute of
African Studies of the Russian Federation, China Institute of International
Affairs, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and
Institute of Security Studies in South Africa. Despite these partnerships
with other think tanks, NIIA could do more to enhance its work. In par-
ticular, its independent status should be maintained. Even though NIIA
has become virtually dependent on the government and foreign founda-
tions for financial support, its independent status has not been called into
question, thus it should neither be an obstacle to more partnerships with
other foreign think tanks or lead to a poor relationship between NIIA and
the MFA.
The issue of adequate funding cannot be underestimated. A successful
think tank in foreign policy is essentially a function of adequate funding.
In this regard, the government needs to provide NIIA with additional
funds for its research activities, and internally NIIA needs to raise addi-
tional funds to supplement government subventions.

Conclusion
This chapter examines to what extent the research work and general activi-
ties of NIIA have focused on Nigerian and African development. It argues
that NIIA as a think tank on foreign policy undertakes studies, conducts
analysis, and makes recommendations to the government. The aim of
NIIA is to provide the government with alternative options and direc-
tions, based on painstaking research and objective writing.
134   S. WAPMUK

With respect to the issues of national and continental development


activities, this chapter underscores that since its establishment after 1960
at Nigeria’s independence, NIIA has done extensive research work in
these areas. It has plated this notable role by focusing on major issues such
as trade, investment, the new economic order; economic development,
economic diplomacy, debt, and African development initiatives such as the
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD). In recent times NIIA has also focused attention
on issues such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the
post-2015 development agenda under the AU. In line with the Institute’s
mandate, it has organized various public enlightenment lectures, confer-
ences, roundtables, colloquia, and publications on developmental issues.
There are several challenges facing the Institute, such as the problem of
autonomy, the sometimes uneasy relationship between the Institute and
the MFA, and finally the lack of funding. In conclusion, it is possible to
argue that even though the achievements of NIIA in the last 50 years have
been modest, the Institute has not failed to live up to the expectations of
its founding fathers as “a nursery of ideas on what direction in interna-
tional affairs Nigeria should take.” NIIA is still held in very high esteem
within and outside the country as a “Nigerian Institute in Lagos, an
African Institute in Nigeria and a World Institute in Africa” that carries out
in-depth theoretical and practical research, public enlightenment, and dis-
semination of information on both African issues and global affairs.
CHAPTER 7

Republic of South Africa: An Overview

James G. McGann

South Africa is a unique country due to its long history of combating


apartheid and establishing social justice. It is also plagued by deeply rooted
corruption that is ingrained in the politics of the state. Since the end of
apartheid in the 1990s, numerous think tanks have established themselves
in the country. This chapter aims to offer a background on South Africa to
provide the context for the South African Institute of International Affairs
(SAIIA) case study. While South Africa’s foreign affairs have historically
only dealt with the African continent, they have had a more global outlook
in recent years. It is vital to recognize the specific context in which think
tanks in developing countries function and the complex challenges they
face (Table 7.1).

Overview
South Africa is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The
President of the country serves both as head of state and as head of gov-
ernment. The President is elected by the National Assembly—the lower
house of the South African Parliament—and must enjoy the confidence of
the Assembly in order to remain in office. South Africans also elect provin-
cial legislatures which govern each of the country’s nine provinces.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 135


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_7
136   J. G. MCGANN

Since the end of apartheid in the 1990s, the African National Congress
(ANC) has dominated South Africa’s politics. The ANC is the ruling party
in the national legislature, as well as in eight of the nine provinces (Western
Cape is governed by the Democratic Alliance). The ANC received 62.9%
of the popular vote in the 2011 municipal election and 62.15% of the vote
during the 2014 general election.1

Table 7.1  South Africa at a glance

Country name Republic of South Africa


Capital Pretoria (administrative), Cape Town (legislative),
Bloemfontein (judicial)
Population 53,675,563
Location Southern Africa, at the southern tip of the continent of Africa
(continent)
Ethnic groups Black African 80.2%, white 8.4%, colored 8.8%, Indian/Asian 2.5%
Note: Colored is a term used in South Africa, including on the
national census, for persons of mixed-race ancestry (2015 est.)
Language IsiZulu (official) 22.7%, IsiXhosa (official) 16%, Afrikaans (official)
13.5%, English (official) 9.6%, Sepedi (official) 9.1%, Setswana (official)
8%, Sesotho (official) 7.6%, Xitsonga (official) 4.5%, siSwati (official)
2.5%, Tshivenda (official) 2.4%, isiNdebele (official) 2.1%, sign
language 0.5%, other 1.6% (2011 est.)
Currency Rand (ZAR), 1 rand = 12.63 US dollars (2015 est.)
(name and
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government Republic
type
Chief of state President Jacob Zuma
Head of President Jacob Zuma
government
Cabinet Appointed by the President
Elections President elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term
(eligible for a second term)
Legislative Bicameral Parliament consists of the National Council of Provinces
branch and the National Assembly
Judicial branch Supreme Court of Appeals (consists of the court president, deputy
president, and 21 judges); Constitutional Court (consists of the chief
and deputy chief justices and 9 judges); High Courts; Magistrates’
Courts; labor courts; land claims courts

(continued)

1

Independent Electoral Commission, Local Government Elections, 2011, Result
Summary-All Ballots.
  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW    137

Table 7.1 (continued)
Political parties African Christian Democratic Party, ACDP (Kenneth Meshoe);
and current African Independent Congress, AIC (Mandla Gald); African National
leaders Congress, ANC (Jacob Zuma); African People’s Convention,
APC (Themba Godi); Agamg SA (Andries Tlouamma); Congress
of the People, COPE (Mosiuoa Lekota); Democratic Alliance, DA
(Mmusi Maimane); Economic Freedom Fighters, EFF (Julius Malema);
Freedom Front Plus, FF+ (Pieter Mulder); Inkatha Freedom Party,
IFP (Mangosuthu Buthelezi); National Freedom Party, NFP (Zanele
kaMagwaza-Msibi); Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, PAC (Alton
Mphethi); United Christian Democratic Party, UCDP (Isaac Sipho
Mfundisi); United Democratic Movement, UDM (Bantu Holomisa)

Some economic facts


GDP: US $724 billion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $13,400 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 2.4%, industry 30.3%, services 67.4% (2015 est.)

The main challenger to the ANC’s rule is the Democratic Alliance, led
by Helen Zille, which received 22.23% of the vote in the 2014 election.
Another major political party represented in Parliament is the Inkatha
Freedom Party, which mainly represents Zulu voters. The formerly domi-
nant New National Party, which both introduced and ended apartheid
through its predecessor the National Party, disbanded in 2005 to merge
with the ANC.2
Since 2009, Jacob Zuma has served as South Africa’s President. With a
liberation background and Zulu ethnicity, Zuma has appealed to African
cultural tradition to obtain support among Zulus and the larger black
African population in rural and poor areas.3
Despite the significant changes that occurred with the end of the apart-
heid regime, South Africa is still facing several challenges.
Although the country has achieved non-negligible progress in social
democracy and equality in the post-apartheid period, certain disparities
persist, whether racially or spatially. According to the 2011 national cen-
sus, black South Africans were 80% of the total population (51.8 million),
2
 Wikipedia contributors, “The Politics of South Africa”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_South_Africa
3
 Nicolas Cook, “South Africa: Politics, Economy and U.S. Relations,” in Congressional
Research Service Report, December 19, 2013.
138   J. G. MCGANN

but their average salary (ZAR 60,613) is still only one-sixth of that of
whites (ZAR 365,134), although a 169% increase has been witnessed over
ten years.4
Moreover, geographic inequality is also a prevailing problem in South
Africa the average income differs greatly across the nine provinces.
Corruption represents another plague for the country. The 2012
Transparency International report assigned South Africa an index of 4.3,
ranking 69th out of 176 countries.5 Doubts over the Zuma administra-
tion’s commitment to the rule of law have lingered since he took office in
2009, a month after prosecutors dropped charges against him of taking
bribes from arms dealers. In March 2015, South African graft ombuds-
man Thuli Madonsela alleged that Zuma unjustly benefited from a state-
funded upgrade costing ZAR 215 million (US$18.7 million) on his home
in the village of Nkandla and said he should repay some of the money.
ANC leaders criticized Madonsela, and the party used its parliamentary
majority to absolve Zuma of blame for the misspending.6 According to
the 2013 Afrobarometer Survey, perceptions of the office of the President
being corrupt had more than doubled, from a low of 13% in 2002 to 35%
in 2011.7
Thirdly, public services and public health are still underdeveloped.
HIV/AIDS is one of the most severe public health challenges facing the
country. The South African National HIV Survey estimated that 10.8% of
all South Africans over 2 years old were living with HIV in 2005. There is
an average of almost 1000 deaths from AIDS a day in South Africa.8 In
2013, the adult (15–49 years old) prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in South

4
 Mike Cohen, “South Africa’s Racial Income Inequality Persists, Census Shows,”
Bloomberg, October 30, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-30/
south-africa-s-racial-income-inequality-persists-census-shows
5
 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 Results,” Transparency International. Accessed
December 7, 2012. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results
6
 Mike Cohen, “Zuma Accused of Undermining South African Corruption Probes,”
Bloomberg, January 14, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/
zuma-accused-of-undermining-south-african-corruption-probes
7
 Newham, Gareth, “Why Is Corruption Getting Worse in South Africa?” ISS Africa.
December 13, 2013. Accessed. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-is-corruption-
getting-worse-in-south-africa
8
 “HIV and AIDS in South Africa.” AVERT. May 1, 2015. https://www.avert.org/pro-
fessionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/south-africa
  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW    139

Africa was 19.1% (6.3 million individuals). Associated with the high
infection rate of fatal disease, the Central Intelligence Agency’s estimate of
South Africa’s life expectancy is only 49.56 years.9

Economic Scenario
The economy of South Africa is the second largest in Africa, behind
Nigeria, representing 24% of the continent’s purchasing power parity
gross domestic product (PPP GDP), and leading it to be ranked as a mid-
dle–upper-income county by the World Bank.10 Unemployment has long
been one of the most severe problems facing the South African economy.
According to Goldman Sachs’ 2013 report, the unemployment rate
(including people who have given up looking for a job) is 35%. More spe-
cifically, youth unemployment represents a major socio-economic chal-
lenge. In 2013, 63% of the youth labor force was unemployed (3.2
million).11 Although this is partly due to the high national average unem-
ployment rate, both a supply-side lack of employability associated with an
insufficient public education and training system and a demand-side
inequality in terms of accessibility to job opportunities are regarded as the
main causes of high youth unemployment.
Apart from the supply-side interventions via several initiatives (e.g.,
Community Works Program, Public Deployment Program, and National
Rural Youth Service Groups), which still require scalability in size beyond
the local, the government’s agenda should focus on promoting an incen-
tive program on the demand side, with the participation of the private
sector and entrepreneurs.
Compared to other emerging economies, South Africa performs quite
well in terms of capital accessibility, ranked second in financial market
sophistication and having the second-lowest effective business tax rate
among 14 surveyed countries.12 However, in terms of labor supply, South

9
 The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
Accessed 2014-06-25. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2102rank.html
10
 “South Africa.” South Africa Home, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
southafrica
11
 Oosthuizen, Morné, and Aalia Cassim. “The State of Youth Unemployment in South
Africa.” The Brookings Institution. August 15, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
africa-in-focus/posts/2014/08/15-youth-unemployment-south-africa-oosthuizen
12
 “SA Fares Well in Emerging Markets Study.” SouthAfrica.info. December 14, 2010.
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/cnisurvey-141210.htm#.VSEtCfnF-wM
140   J. G. MCGANN

Africa is ranked last. This lack of labor availability reflects the insufficient
education system, which is one of the factors that contributes to the high
crime rate across the country (a murder rate of 31.1/100,000 compared
to the world average of 6/100,000). This unstable social environment is
deemed one of the major obstacles to attracting further commercial coop-
eration with the country’s global partners.

Foreign Relations
After its international isolation during the apartheid period, South Africa
has become an active player both globally and regionally. It was elected as
the non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) for both 2008–2010 and 2010–2012. Driven by its vision to
develop good relations with every country, especially within Africa, it has
been putting effort into ending various conflicts and political crises on the
continent.13 Since its admission to the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) in 1994, South Africa has achieved economic and
security-related consensus with the other 13 members, featured by their
aim to create a common market without internal trade barriers and the
sharing of water resources among the community. Moreover, SADC has
attracted further foreign aid as a united entity; for instance, in 2014
Germany committed €300 million to the community.14 SADC was also
placed in top position in a global comparison of indicators of water coop-
eration prepared by international think tank Strategic Foresight Group.15
However, despite its active and constructive role in regional cooperation,
according to Human Rights Watch South Africa has been criticized for its
deportation of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees, thereby breaching the
1951 Refugee Convention and international law.16
13
 Wikipedia contributors, “Foreign Relations of South Africa”, Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_South_Africa#Post-
apartheid
14
  Southern African Development Community, “SADC and Germany Agree to
Jointly Support the Deepening of Regional Integration,” Southern African Development
Community, December 2, 2014, http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-and-
germany-agree-jointly-support-deepening-regional/
15
 “Water Cooperation for a Secure World.” Strategic Foresight Group. http://www.stra-
tegicforesight.com/publication_pdf/20795water-cooperature-sm.pdf
16
 “South Africa: Grant Temporary Status to All Zimbabweans.” Human Rights Watch.
June 19, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/19/south-africa-grant-temporary-
status-all-zimbabweans
  REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW    141

Several significant bilateral relations are worthy of highlighting.

• South Africa–Angola

The relation between these two countries is quite strong, mainly due to
the ANC’s support of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and former South African President Nelson Mandela’s mediation
between MPLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) during Angola’s civil war.

• South Africa–Zimbabwe

During the political crisis in Zimbabwe, South Africa’s ex-president


Thabo Mbeki acted as a mild mediator between the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union–
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to form a unity government. In 2013, grow-
ing tension emerged between South Africa’s administration under
President Jacob Zuma and the Zimbabwean government under Robert
Mugabe. The underlying escalating tension was mainly due to Zuma’s
harder stance compared to that of his predecessor towards Zimbabwe’s
democratic reform process. However, bilateral relations were expected to
improve following Mugabe’s state visit in April 2015, hosted by Zuma.

• South Africa–European Union

With strong historical and cultural links, relations between the EU and
South Africa have prospered during the post-apartheid era. After the sign-
ing of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) in
1999, a strategic partnership evolved between the two parties, as
­highlighted by the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA). South Africa
also remains the biggest trader with the EU in Southern Africa.

• South Africa–United States

During Thabo Mbeki’s administration, bilateral relations were strained,


mainly due to South Africa’s allegation of CIA activities in the country and
US criticism of Mbeki’s denial of the HIV/AIDS issue. Some commenta-
tors argue that South Africa is relatively marginal to the United States’
priorities in Africa. Terrorism and access to oil resources through the Gulf
142   J. G. MCGANN

Table 7.2  Overview of think tanks in South Africa


Number of universities: 23 institutions of public higher education
Number of think tanks: 86
% of think tanks out of region: 86/615, 14%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2015):
 2012: 86
 2013: 88
 2014: 87
 2015: 86
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2015): 4
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
 Top 70 defense and national security think tanks: 0
 Top 70 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 0
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 2
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 0
 Top 80 domestic economics think tanks: 0
 Top 50 social policy think tanks: 2
—Think tanks with outstanding policy-oriented research programs: 2

of Guinea, together with the divergent opinions of the two countries


regarding certain international issues (e.g., sanctions against Iran), have
affected the relationship between Pretoria and Washington. Moreover,
anti-United States sentiment is said to be quite prevalent in ANC due to
the strong left-wing influence.17

• South Africa–China

This bilateral relation is marked by the non-recognition of Taiwan and


the establishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
between 1996 and 1998, which involved strategic concern over diplo-
matic and commercial aspects. Bilateral talks during the sixth BRICS
summit in 2014 identified a further future partnership in trade, diplo-
matic, financial, and capital cooperation and other spheres.

17
 Hamill, James, The South Africa-US Relations in the Obama-Zuma Era, World
Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13138/u-s-south-africa-
relations-in-the-obama-zuma-era-part-ii
CHAPTER 8

Foreign Policy and Security Challenges


Facing South Africa: The South African
Institute of International Affairs

Neuma Grobbelaar and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Introduction
South Africa’s high profile in international politics can be ascribed to three
factors. Firstly, its transformation from an international pariah to an
engaged and responsible stakeholder. Secondly, the establishment of an
inclusive constitutional democracy, the process architecture of which has
served as a model for other conflict-resolution processes. Lastly, an iconic
inaugural leadership embodied by Nelson Mandela, and later Thabo
Mbeki, who both put Africa at the center of South Africa’s global engage-
ment. Facing no direct conventional external threats and having given up
its nuclear weapons (the only state to have done so voluntarily), South
Africa’s foreign policy post-apartheid emphasizes the importance of
achieving peace and security on the continent as a prerequisite for devel-
opment. To create an environment more favorable to Africa’s develop-
ment aspirations, Pretoria focused on building effective regional institutions

N. Grobbelaar (*) • E. Sidiropoulos


South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa

© The Author(s) 2019 143


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_8
144   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

and transforming global power relations and the system that governs. It is
especially in this last area that South Africa has become known for its
“activist foreign policy.”
South Africa’s activism on the international stage is partly an outcome
of its relative economic clout on the continent that has allowed it entry
into a range of global bodies such as the G20 (the only African member,
together with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union). This activism is also the result of its ability to proj-
ect the soft power imbedded in the moral authority of its peaceful trans-
formation and the values espoused in its constitution.
The scale of South Africa’s global engagement relative to its size and
stature is significant. Until April 2014, when Nigeria overtook it, South
Africa had the largest economy on the continent, yet it still occupied only
26th place in global rankings. South Africa is nevertheless among a group
of countries in the developing world who have attained middle-income
status. Its membership of the BRICS (alongside Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) exemplifies its active engagement in regional and global affairs, its
aspiration to greater influence, and its aim to see the international system
transform to reflect the shifts in political and economic power away from
the West. While South Africa is often described as an emerging power, the
way the term is used may be misleading, because although it is a continen-
tal and regional power in Africa and an active participant in many global
debates, South Africa is not in the same league as China or putatively
India. This relative power imbalance and tension between capacity and
aspiration strongly color the way in which South Africa engages
internationally.
Alongside the radical transformation of the country from international
isolation to integration, this tension is also a touchstone for understanding
the opportunities, the constraints, and the particular political context
within which think tanks operate in South Africa.
Therefore, it is against this background that this chapter discusses the
broader South African political and foreign policy context and challenges,
and how the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has
contributed to the debate about evidence-based policy options and shaped
its research agenda to respond to these in the new South Africa. Two case
studies are selected to illustrate both the type of priorities SAIIA has iden-
tified as being important to the foreign policy-making environment and
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    145

the policy-making process. The chapter then discusses some of the systems
and structures SAIIA has put in place for more effective policy engage-
ment, and possible lessons for other think tanks in similar environments.

Political Context and South Africa’s Foreign


Policy Challenges
A discussion of South Africa’s foreign policy and security challenges in the
twenty-first century needs to be seen not only through the prism of the
changing geopolitical landscape, but also within the context of its reen-
gagement emanating from its particular history.
Under apartheid, South Africa was isolated politically from its neigh-
bors to the north. Its policy of destabilization against the Front Line States
(Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe) was characterized by cross-border raids and hot pursuits
against the armed liberation movement operating from bases in those
states. With the end of apartheid and the assumption of power by the
African National Congress (ANC), the new government began to rebuild
relations with the rest of the continent. The ANC government also
believed that it owed a debt of gratitude to those African countries which
had helped the movement. The country therefore recognized the central
role that the continent of Africa should play in its foreign policy, and that
it would have to tread carefully not to enforce perceptions of being a “big
brother,” given the size of its economy and the history of regional desta-
bilization. President Nelson Mandela also espoused a human rights–based
foreign policy; after all, the anti-apartheid struggle was fundamentally
about asserting human rights and dignity. Linked to the human rights–
based foreign policy was the conviction that South Africa’s domestic pro-
cess of peaceful transformation could be a model for the resolution of
other conflicts on the continent and beyond.
Under President Thabo Mbeki, the need to transform relations between
the North and the South and establish a more equitable global governance
system also grew in prominence, related to which was the imperative of
making Africa’s voice more audible in the global debates. Over twenty
years into South Africa’s democracy, the global attraction of the “miracu-
lous” transformation in 1994 is starting to fray, especially with the passing
of former President Mandela in 2013. The country’s ability to punch
above its weight and project influence in Africa and the world is predicated
146   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

on three factors: its relative political stability and democratic system; its
sophisticated economy and size in Africa; and its willingness to commit
resources to challenges that it identifies.
However, to ensure continued influence, South Africa will have to
grapple with a number of foreign policy challenges in the next decade.
These challenges include:

• To translate its hyperactive international relations into outcomes that


address its endemic socio-economic problems, related to consistently
high unemployment and low skills levels.
• To recognize that complacency is the enemy of achievement, whether
that refers to South Africa’s economic size or its moral authority
born of its peaceful transformation.
• To recalibrate its African engagement to take account of the rise of
other African regional powers.
• To engage an increasingly complex world of new global actors apart
from traditional state-centric institutions and players.
• To contribute to the construction of effective global institutions
driven by progressive norms, values, and principles embracing a ris-
ing South and a recalibrating West, which is astutely adjusting to the
global realignment of power and priorities.
• To integrate global challenges, climate change, food security, bio-­
diversity, migration, and terrorism into coherent, impact-driven poli-
cies and approaches.
• To exercise leadership through credible, evidence-based policy-­
making emboldened by broad-based consultation and participation
of the full spectrum of domestic actors.
• To ensure focus and coherence in South African foreign policy goals
and initiatives.

The Think Tank Environment


Under apartheid political rights were severely curtailed, yet the activism of
civil society, its numbers, and its diversity were important factors in help-
ing the struggle for democracy. A large section of civil society was highly
adversarial to the apartheid state. Many of the resources for sustaining
activism in civil society in those days came from abroad, whether through
private foundations or foreign governments who supported the anti-­
apartheid movement.
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    147

What was transformational for civil society and think tanks and how
they previously operated was the coming to power of a democratically
elected and legitimate government. Many actors responded to this change
by seeking to engage more constructively with government, what Adam
Habib refers to as a collegial rather than adversarial relationship.1 In the
process, many actors transformed, in effect into service providers to the
state, particularly in the health sector. Another consequence of the coun-
try’s political transformation was the state’s own interpretation of state–
civil society relations, given the legitimacy of the new system, which it
understood as needing to support the state rather than being in opposition
to it or critical of it. Thus, paradoxically, the internal environment in South
Africa does not always appreciate the role of public policy institutions, or
is extremely sensitive to criticism. Against such a background, think tanks
walk a tightrope between engaging with government in a constructive
manner without alienating it, and maintaining an independent posture.
This tension may be compounded by the fact that most think tanks in
South Africa that are not established by statute rely largely on foreign
funding for their operations.2 This fact led President Mbeki, at the launch
of the South African Peer Review process in November 2005, to question
whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could be truly African
if they were funded largely by foreigners, who have their own agendas.3
However, relations between government and the think tank sector have
developed over time, especially in the area of international affairs. While
the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation
(DIRCO), the National Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), and the Department of Defence now frequently engage think
tanks through competitive tenders or multistakeholder consultations in
their work, it is not always apparent that government fully appreciates how
best to engage with think tanks in a strategic and sustainable manner. This
begs the question of how think tanks in South Africa can better organize
as a collective to raise their profile as important contributors to a vibrant
public policy discourse.

1
 Adam Habib (2012).
2
 The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the African Institute of South Africa
(AISA) are examples of the latter. AISA has recently being integrated into the HSRC. The
HSRC’s budget is voted annually by the South African Parliament.
3
 The deep irony of this statement is that many of Africa’s premier regional institutions and
research bodies, such as the African Union Commission and the regional economic com-
munities (REC), are predominantly reliant on support from abroad.
148   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

Some of the challenges of influencing policy in developing-country


contexts and especially in Africa can be grouped into (a) ability to access
resources; (b) quality of outputs; (c) know-how around policy influence;
and (d) government attitude to the role of research institutions and civil
society in robust policy debate. The last two points affect the ability of
NGOs and think tanks more specifically to gain access to policy-makers or
influencers, which thus becomes a further complicating factor. In the rest
of the continent there are often too few voices in the think tank commu-
nity, especially in the realm of international affairs, although security-­
focused institutes with research/early warning and capacity-building
competencies proliferate for understandable reasons.
Think tanks in the security and international affairs realm in South
Africa face many of these challenges, although they are often better posi-
tioned to tackle them than on the rest of the continent. Paradoxically, one
of the challenges facing African think tanks more generally is a predilec-
tion for governments to look to international research institutions rather
than home-grown ones for research and analysis. Utilizing foreign institu-
tions instead of domestic ones can be partly attributed to the quality of
local institutions. However, as noted earlier, sometimes local instruments
are insufficient to support the work of think tanks, and governments
themselves do not often recognize the role that think tanks can play in
framing ideas and creating awareness of policy issues, providing evidence-­
based policy alternatives, and even in helping shape decision-making.

About SAIIA
The South African Institute of International Affairs was established in
1934 in Cape Town as an autonomous and independent institute in the
mold of Chatham House and similar think tanks in other British domin-
ions of the time. Its constitution proscribed the Institute from taking a
party political position. Its establishment preceded the rise of grand apart-
heid in 1948, when the National Party came to power. From its inception,
SAIIA was funded largely by members’ subscriptions, which included
corporates and individuals. For most of the pre-1994 period, SAIIA was
the only dedicated South African foreign policy research institution in the
country.
For the first sixty years of its existence, SAIIA was a fairly small research
institution with a handful of researchers. The primary focus of the Institute,
especially during the time of South Africa’s isolation, was to provide a
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    149

platform for public debate on the country’s engagement with the world.
This began to change with the momentous political transformation that
South Africa underwent in the early 1990s. Established to focus mainly on
South Africa’s international relations and provide a platform for such dis-
cussion, SAIIA’s focus has grown since 1994 largely in line with the priori-
ties highlighted by the democratic government—the African Agenda and
strengthened multilateralism.4 In that vein, SAIIA’s work aims to contrib-
ute to a well-governed, peaceful, economically sustainable, and globally
engaged Africa.5
Since 1994, SAIIA has undertaken a new approach, moving from the
more traditional security domain to non-traditional security elements by
covering economic, environmental, political, and human security issues.
This shift occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, these themes concern
some of the most important and relevant challenges facing African states
in particular, from natural resource management to international trade
and finance, from good governance to the rule of law. Secondly, this
change results from a growing trend in Africa, particularly in the civil soci-
ety space, that highlights the importance of the security of people rather
than the security of states, as often the latter has been used as justification
for domestic political repression.6 Thirdly, the explosion of multiple non-­
state actors—that is, NGOs—and also business on the international stage,
combined with the technology revolution, have reshaped the international
relations discourse, requiring a different model of engagement by states in
international affairs. Moreover, the transnational and interdependent
nature of challenges facing the world requires an interdisciplinary approach
which is wider than the traditional state-centric or security approach in
international affairs.

4
 South Africa’s African Agenda refers to the centrality of Africa in South Africa’s external
engagement, bilaterally, regionally, and globally. At the heart of South Africa’s African
agenda is the support of good governance, peace, and stability in Africa and the placing of
Africa on a more sustainable development growth path. This is articulated in South Africa’s
foreign policy through African institution-building, support of African infrastructure and
regional integration initiatives, and peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It also
entails South Africa’s active advocacy in international fora of African concerns, in particular
the leveling of the playing field and support for an enabling international environment that
is supportive of Africa’s development aspirations.
5
 This is also SAIIA’s programmatic goal, while its vision is to be the leading think tank on
Africa and on global issues as they affect Africa.
6
 This is often couched as a human security approach.
150   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

SAIIA’s research agenda seeks to tackle some of the key issues facing
South Africa and the continent more broadly, as the world moves from
unipolarity (into which the new South Africa was born in 1994) to multi-
polarity. While Africa remains at the periphery of global affairs, the increas-
ing “Rising Africa” narrative underscores the continent’s growing
prominence as both object and subject of international engagement.

Specific Policy Influences


SAIIA’s engagement with the South African government, other govern-
ments, and intergovernmental institutions is both demand and supply
driven. Regarding the former, it provides technical expertise and input
where appropriate based on specific requests from policy-makers; and on the
latter, it undertakes independent research and proactive policy engagement
on issues that it considers important if it is to fulfill its mandate as a think
tank, whose primary function must be to provide thought leadership.
This chapter focuses on two cases concerning the non-traditional secu-
rity area. The first focuses on creating an African policy community around
those themes on the agenda of the G20 that have relevance for Africa. It
is not about influencing policy directly, but rather, as emphasized by
Andrew Selee, about helping to frame ideas and issues through the cre-
ation of policy communities on themes that no one else was working on at
the time, and using that to become an anchor institution or hub in this
particular field.7 The second case study looks at specific outreach to the
South African Parliament on resource governance, and reflects a more
direct input into shaping the way in which a policy issue is understood by
the state, via the parliamentary process.
In analyzing SAIIA’s approach, it is useful to note that its theory of
change is based on the assumption that ideas shape the world. In other
words, institutions and processes are based on ideas about the way the
world works, or should work. Policy think tanks furthermore emphasize
that these ideas need to be informed by evidence-based research. In addi-
tion to contributing to the pool of knowledge, think tanks see their role as
helping ideas gain traction, most notably among policy-makers and
decision-­makers. SAIIA’s understanding of the way in which ideas gain
traction is informed by John W. Kingdon’s classic theory of agenda-setting
focused on the convergence of problems, policies, and politics, by that of
Peter M. Haas and Emanuel Adler on epistemic communities, and by the
7
 Andrew Selee (2014).
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    151

broader discourse on the role of policy networks. In these processes, pol-


icy champions serve to move the agenda forward.
Furthermore, SAIIA emphasizes the importance of ensuring that insti-
tutions, processes, and policies emerge from inclusive processes. Across all
its research programs and activities, inclusivity refers first and foremost to
the fact that Africa’s voice has to be present on the international stage
when issues that may have an impact on the continent are discussed.
Secondly, it refers to the fact that all the relevant stakeholder groups—
from the public and private sector as well as civil society—need to be rep-
resented in formulating responses to such discussions.
This theory of change highlights SAIIA’s overall programmatic
approach and is reflected in the evidence-based research that it conducts
and commissions, in the way in which it prioritizes the building of rela-
tionships with key stakeholders and peers, and in the priority it accords to
networks (both formal and informal) as part of its intervention strategy. It
targets policy processes through key policy windows in the policy cycle
and through engagement with key policy champions. This is also ulti-
mately how it positions itself as a “bridge” between knowledge (academic)
and the policy community.
Lastly, the ODI identifies three types of policy-influencing activities: (a)
evidence and advice; (b) public campaigns and advocacy; and (c) lobbying
and negotiation.8 The two examples elaborated in what follows contain a
mixture of methods, but are mainly focused on evidence-­based policy
advice and analysis.

Creating a Policy Community in Africa


Around Global Economic Governance
As early as 2008, SAIIA identified global economic governance (GEG) as
a beyond-the-horizon topic on which very few countries in Africa (if any)
besides South Africa were focusing. The G20 finance ministers’ meeting,
of which South Africa was a member, had still not been elevated to summit
level to become the premier grouping on global economic matters. SAIIA
saw this theme as one for which policy-makers in the near future would
need an evidence base to improve policy-making. This view was borne out
by the effects of the 2008 global financial meltdown, which elevated the
G20 to be the premier global economic governance forum. It also shortly

8
 A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence – odi.org. https://www.odi.org/
resources/docs/6453.pdf by H Jones – 2011.
152   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

thereafter precipitated the formation of the Brazil–India–Russia–China


(BRIC) forum in 2009, which South Africa joined in 2011, leading to the
name change to BRICS. South Africa’s membership of the G20 also made
clear the importance of ensuring that Africa’s broader concerns were at
least aired at this level. Likewise, with regard to South Africa’s joining of
BRICS, as underscored by the country’s Africa outreach initiative when it
hosted the 2013 BRICS summit in Durban, the government is actively
working to ensure that African voices are heard at the international level.
SAIIA seeks to insert itself into the related policy processes that both
strengthen and bring greater transparency to evolving policy formation.
SAIIA’s work on economic diplomacy (under which this initiative was
developed) is premised on the view that trade and investment policies are
critical components of Africa’s economic development. Against the back-
drop of the growing importance of GEG frameworks where Africa is often
a marginal player, SAIIA’s GEG project focuses primarily on the World
Trade Organization and Africa’s (specifically South Africa’s) engagement,
as well as the G20 and the BRICS (how the changing international finan-
cial system and related norm-setting are impacting on Africa).
One of the primary aims of the project was to initiate and coordinate an
African network of scholars and think tanks conducting analytical work on
GEG themes from an African perspective and dissemination thereof in
support of (a) South Africa’s participation in, inter alia, the G20 and the
BRICS; and (b) South Africa’s formulation and articulation of African
interests on GEG issues. The project has the support of the South African
National Treasury, although it is targeted at a broader audience among
other African policy-makers, government officials, and researchers.
The expected impacts of the project were as follows:

• Qualitative improvement in analysis provided by targeted think


tanks, researchers, and policy-makers and the related discourse on
discrete global economic governance topics and the role of the G20
therein.
• Stronger representation of the views of African countries in global
economic governance fora.
• Linkages established and sustained between South African officials
and a broad network of African stakeholders.

From the outset, the project has had regular interactions with South
Africa’s National Treasury on the research agenda and the planning of vari-
ous public and closed policy engagements. From the project’s m ­ id-­term
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    153

review in 2013 (after one and half years of project implementation), it was
clear that it was valued by the South African Treasury, which saw greater
engagement on the topic from other African countries as an imperative. The
mid-term review also provided an opportunity to reflect, modify, and focus
initiatives based on feedback from both South Africa and external stake-
holders. It was therefore decided to refocus the project on building a policy
community around GEG in Africa, rather than a stand-­alone network.
Because of the low baseline of interest on GEG in Africa, the project’s
objective was modeled to put in place the basic building blocks for policy
change in the long term. This approach is particularly relevant for beyond-­
the-­horizon issues and in the absence of an existing policy and knowledge
community. It also points to a challenge that almost all think tanks face:
the balance between achieving an immediate policy on an issue that is
clearly on the agenda of policy-makers, and the need to invest time and
resources in realizing a shift in consciousness about the policy relevance of
an issue. In addition, the challenge is not only observing and measuring
the policy shift, but attributing it.
The key tools utilized in the areas of relationship and consciousness-­
building on GEG-related matters among African partners, South African
government officials, the media, academics, and other research and
capacity-­building organizations in Africa included the following:

• Capacity-building on the topic in partnership with the University of


Pretoria through the hosting of dedicated two-week GEG gover-
nance courses, which included policy officials and the think tank
community from the region.
• Engagement of the African network partners in the GEG Africa
Project dialogue events (which included side events at the annual
African Development Bank meeting, among others).
• Participation by the African network partners in the annual advisory
board meeting to help shape the research agenda of the policy
community.
• Commissioning of the network partners on specific topics of interest
with a country- or region-specific GEG intersection.
• Hosting of dedicated and tailored study group sessions on GEG for
South African policy-makers.
• Engagement with the African financial media through dedicated
media briefings, including facilitating their participation in the
BRICS Summit and other GEG events.
154   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

• Rigorous annual assessment of the implications of the G20 decisions


on Africa.
• Active participation in the annual G20 and BRICS second-track ini-
tiatives, such as the Think-20 and the BRICS Academic Forum.

The mid-term review showed that the South African government—in


particular—found the study groups useful, because they allowed govern-
ment officials to interact with civil society representatives on a more regu-
lar and informal basis. African network partners increased their participation
and contribution to the policy network, thereby increasing the profile of
GEG in their respective countries, with one network partner establishing
a dedicated GEG program within its institute. Policy-makers attending the
GEG course at the University of Pretoria noted the value of sensitizing an
African policy audience to GEG issues, while representatives from the
African think tank community also highlighted the opportunity created by
the course format to directly engage policy-makers from their respective
countries. Furthermore, the media training and media briefings on high-­
profile events, such as the BRICS Summit in South Africa in 2013, helped
facilitate more sophisticated and evidence-based media coverage of the
issues. In addition to this, South African government respondents noted
that there were no other organizations in the country offering spaces for
the discussion of GEG-related issues, specifically those relating to the G20
and BRICS. The interventions have served to open up a new platform for
multistakeholder engagement on GEG issues, from both a South African
and an African perspective.
The example described here shows the difficulty of creating a policy and
knowledge community from a zero baseline, and the range of activities
that are required to create a shift in awareness and real engagement on the
issues. However, the high level of public, media, and policy interest in the
G20 and the BRICS, and the related policy initiatives associated with these
two fora, have created opportunities for SAIIA to insert its engagement
within these two policy cycles. SAIIA also has a very active international
and regional trade portfolio, which serves to complement its engagement
on international finance issues, thereby assisting it to amplify its voice in a
variety of fora. Importantly, through engagement with the African knowl-
edge community and beyond, SAIIA is able to direct African policy con-
cerns into the broader policy debates through various platforms.
Of all African countries, South Africa is probably the most engaged in
numerous international fora, both formal and informal. This has been an
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    155

important element for think tanks in South Africa, in terms of their explo-
ration of cooperation with other similar organizations in Africa, with other
emerging powers, as well as with developed countries. The country’s
membership of groupings such as the G20 and the BRICS has acted as a
driver for many South African think tanks to seek out specific thematic
collaborations with other think tanks in those countries. In most cases
there are formalized track 1.5 processes, such as the BRICS Academic
Forum and the Think 20, which help to catalyze such cooperation further.
This track 1.5 for informal groupings has developed momentum in the last
several years. In a broader African context, the various platforms of dia-
logue between African states and India, China, and Turkey, among others,
have also laid the foundation for interaction between African think tanks
and their counterparts in those countries. SAIIA’s development of think
tank networks to engage on topics that at first glance might not be priori-
ties for institutions in other African countries (such as G20 and the BRICS)
has contributed to a trend of African think tanks diversifying into other
areas. The China–Africa Think Tank network, of which SAIIA is a mem-
ber, has sought, for example, to encourage cooperation on research and
policy engagement between African and Chinese institutes. These types of
interactions can ameliorate the gap in research on China in Africa that
exists among African institutions.

Engagement with the South African Parliament


The second case study on SAIIA’s engagement with the South African
Parliament focuses on influencing the domestic agenda, in contrast to the
much larger scope of the GEG project. The post-1994 Parliament is the
legitimate legislative authority, scrutinizes and oversees executive action,
and provides a national forum for public consideration of issues. Although
Parliament is central to the country’s constitutional democracy, it has nev-
ertheless failed to rise to the challenge, partly because of the proportional
system of representation, which makes Members of Parliament (MPs)
beholden to their party rather than to their constituents. In addition, there
is not sufficient research capacity within Parliament to help to interrogate
matters before the various committees (whether these committees have a
legislative or only a deliberative function). A further difficulty is that the
Parliament is based in Cape Town, some 1300  km away from the
administrative capital, Pretoria. This physical distance makes it more
difficult for institutions to engage regularly with the various parliamentary
committees, unless they are based in the city.
156   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

SAIIA has had an office in Cape Town since 2007, and incrementally
used this geographic proximity to good use, especially as regards its pro-
gram on resource governance in Africa, which operates out of that office.
The appointment of a parliamentary liaison officer in Cape Town in 2011
saw engagement with the various parliamentary committees gather
momentum. This function was to track the Portfolio Committees on
Mining and Mineral Resources, Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs,
International Relations and Cooperation, Trade and Industry. Through
regular engagement with the researchers and MPs of those committees,
the liaison officer built up greater awareness of SAIIA’s work and its rele-
vance for the committees. Having a regular presence in Parliament facili-
tated the building of relations and allowed SAIIA to identify and respond
to key policy windows. Several issues stand out where SAIIA’s research
and engagement had some influence. However, the specific case study
identified in what follows is linked to the body of work that SAIIA has
built up over time around resource governance, specifically in the mining
sector.
Mining governance has been a central pillar of SAIIA’s work on
resources since 2007.
The program has tracked and analyzed mining companies and their
interaction with a variety of regulatory frameworks and stakeholders (com-
munities, policy-makers, and international frameworks) across Africa, giv-
ing it a particular comparative focus (which has also benefited from inputs
from the GARN, the continent-wide Governance of Africa’s Resources
Research Network, established and run by SAIIA) in the discussions in
South Africa on its mining framework. This is particularly relevant, as
SAIIA’s work on this topic has coincided with an in-depth reassessment of
the South African regulatory framework on mining and the developmental
and enabling role that the sector is expected to play in South African soci-
ety. The role of mining in the South African economy9 gained additional
prominence and notoriety following the Marikana incident in 2012  in
which 44 people died,10 most of them striking mineworkers.

9
 Directly exported minerals and metals account for as much as 60% of all South African
export revenue, while the South African mining sector directly contributes around 6% to
South Africa’s GDP.
10
 The fallout of the Marikana incident has been long term and has led to significant labor
unrest in the platinum sector, translating into losses of ZAR 8.7bn in employee wages and
ZAR 19.7bn in company earnings since the beginning of 2014. Moreover, Marikana has also
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    157

SAIIA’s comparative analysis provided a robust evidence base for a sub-


mission that it made to Parliament in the public hearings which began in
2011, on the development of a South African mining charter. Key
advantages in helping to inform SAIIA’s recommendations were its rela-
tions with the relevant committee and key stakeholders in the business
community and beyond, as well as knowledge of best practice across the
continent and the world. Two years later, some of its recommendations
were incorporated into the Report on the Public Hearings on the Amended
South African Mining Charter adopted by the Portfolio Committee on
Mining and Minerals in March 2013 (with exact wording in three places)
and submitted to Cabinet for consideration in June 2013.
SAIIA has continued its engagement on the issue. In September 2013,
at the invitation of the South African Portfolio Committee on Mineral
Resources, SAIIA made a submission to the public hearings on the amend-
ments to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act
(MPRDA). The SAIIA submission was also posted online, from where it
was downloaded in the space of a week in excess of 12,000 times. SAIIA
focused specifically in its submission on the opportunities and risks of
replacing the First-In-First-Assessed (FIFA) system with a competitive
bidding process—one of the key sticking points in the MPRDA. At the
time of writing, the MPRDA awaits ratification by the President.
One of the key outcomes of SAIIA’s engagement in this area is that
policy stakeholders have expressed appreciation for the neutral platform
provided by it to discuss often contentious issues around the governance
of the extractive industries. SAIIA played a convening role and has the
ability to engage multiple and diverse stakeholders on topics of key policy
interest.

Think Tank Structure and Practices


In the last decade SAIIA has aimed to develop a body of evidence around
which to engage policy-makers and influencers in South Africa and beyond
on African matters. To contribute to the debate or influence policy, think
tanks need solid research capacities, a system to monitor and evaluate their
interactions with policy-makers and in the public domain, and a well-­
developed synergy between research and the communications unit.

led to a fragmentation of the labor union movement in South Africa, placing labor stability
in jeopardy.
158   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

In addition, if we want to make more African voices heard on the global


stage, it cannot be done if Africa itself lacks awareness and debate on these
issues. The two case studies in this chapter highlight a number of the strat-
egies and practices that SAIIA has put in place to improve its access and
influence on policy questions of key concern to African stakeholders.
These practices exist primarily to facilitate effective and efficient
dissemination of its findings to relevant audiences. SAIIA utilizes both
direct and indirect channels to facilitate this process.

Media:  Developing greater media awareness of issues by engaging directly


with journalists and editors is a key SAIIA strategy to ensure that its
research reaches its intended audience. This does not only entail making
SAIIA staff and associates available for comment and analysis; it has also
translated into the establishment of a dedicated communications team. To
ensure optimal alignment with topical issues, SAIIA also targets policy
windows (such as those created through binational commission meetings,
state visits, and/or summitry) at the outset of its project design. These are
utilized to help both shape and inform public views on particular policy
challenges through the placement of targeted opinion pieces.

Open Access Publishing: SAIIA adopted an open access publishing


model in 2007 to ensure the widest possible dissemination of research, in
which its website is a central tool. Access to information is a crucial aspect
of its mode of engagement, given that it works in a developing-world
context where access to information is often impeded. This required it
both to simplify its various publishing formats, but also to restructure its
publication outputs in a way that best speaks to the needs of its various
audiences. SAIIA’s work draws heavily on field work, with more than
600 days spent in the field by its small in-house research team in 2013.
Therefore, its publication modes make provision for both lengthier reports
and short policy briefings, with actionable policy recommendations for
policy-makers and other stakeholders. It has a dedicated website and a
publications team that is integrated into its communications department
alongside its media team. SAIIA has also increasingly invested in the devel-
opment of information portals on particular thematic issues that it runs as
“sister” platforms, as well as social media platforms.

Policy Communities and Knowledge Networks: Given that SAIIA


works on issues across Africa and its wish to reflect the different opinions
  FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SOUTH AFRICA…    159

that exist across the continent, it has invested a great deal in developing
both an associate network of research contributors and specific cross-­
continental research networks with thematic foci. SAIIA tries to bring
these networks into contact with its international networks to ensure
cross-pollination of ideas and enrichment of its research outputs.
Stakeholder engagement is an essential aspect of the program design
process, and in SAIIA this is a key task for the program managers who are
imbedded in each program. Engaging policy-makers is a key challenge for
most think tanks in the developing world. SAIIA has developed different
and flexible modes of engagement with different stakeholders to ensure
their participation in its work, from closed sessions with policy-makers to
more open platforms. Interaction with policy-makers at the outset of the
research design process is a preferred mode of engagement, because it
ensures relevance if not always buy-in.

Continuous Learning and Innovation:  SAIIA utilizes ongoing review,


which is underpinned by an integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
system in which every staff member has a role to imbed a learning culture
and support greater awareness of why certain approaches succeed and oth-
ers do not. It is also willing to pilot innovations and their future utility
across the Institute. SAIIA’s relatively small size and flat organizational
structure, combined with significant autonomy at a programmatic level,
encourage participation by every staff member in program design and
implementation. The creation of opportunities for the research support
divisions (media, publications, events, membership, and finance) to inter-
act with research teams and processes provides a powerful platform for
mutual learning.

Many of the tools highlighted relating to media, policy communities,


and learning and adapting to changes in the environment are not necessar-
ily dependent on financial resources for reasonable success; yet they are
critical for any think tank in an emerging country to make a contribution
to policy debates, build up a profile, and achieve a degree of intellectual
soundness. Clearly, in certain emerging-power contexts some of these
tools may be more politically fraught, but SAIIA’s approach has been to
mix closed, substantive engagements with policy-makers and officials with
more public debates or policy alternatives. In certain countries the former
160   N. GROBBELAAR AND E. SIDIROPOULOS

may be much more viable and appropriate than the latter. In addition, the
cooperation with partners both inside and outside a country can provide
alternative avenues for input, discussion, and dissemination. However, the
process of constantly interrogating the outcomes of particular interactions
and initiatives must be part of the institutional system.

Conclusion
The most important lesson to be drawn from the two case studies in this
chapter is the centrality of relationships in SAIIA’s work. Developing trust
with various actors provides a platform for different views, and the fact
that it does not support a particular ideological monopoly is a precondi-
tion for a true exchange of ideas and debate.
Secondly, the correct choice of partners in the development of cross-­
continental research networks and policy communities is essential. In this
context, one should recognize that both priorities and capacities of
network partners differ. Creating opportunities for dialogue takes time
and is a human resource–intensive process that requires ongoing engage-
ment and organizational gearing.
Thirdly, engaging with the policy process is challenging, and the impact
of interventions is on the whole only observable in the very long run and
difficult to attribute directly. This requires a careful and targeted design
approach, a clear stakeholder engagement framework, and ongoing moni-
toring of stakeholder responses as the policy cycle unfolds. It is also useful
to make space for innovation, ongoing learning, and a flexible approach.
Program funders need to be convinced of the value of continued engage-
ment and of long-term, flexible support.
These three factors are among an extensive list of preconditions that
need to be in place for successful policy impact to occur. The description
of the impact of SAIIA’s work in the South African mining case study
notes that work in this sector started in 2007. The gap between the start
of the project and the inclusion of SAIIA’s policy recommendations in the
Report on the Public Hearings on the Amended South African Mining
Charter spans a period of seven years—this fact is illustrative in its own
right. It is important to recognize that policy think tanks in the developing
world face particular and complex challenges. A sustainable funding base
that can support ongoing engagement is a continuous challenge, and this
is one area that African governments need to concern themselves more
with to ensure that African policy-making is indeed supported by the best
and most rigorous evidence available.
PART III

Asia
CHAPTER 9

People’s Republic of China: An Overview

James G. McGann

The People’s Republic of China (Table 9.1) has been emerging as a world


power by cultivating ties with the international world through economic
reform, regional institutions, and a more open diplomacy. Think tanks
serve to assist the government’s desire for such changes through research
and policy recommendations. The China Institute of International Studies,
in particular, is affiliated to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works
closely with the government to cater its demand for track-two diplomacy.
CIIS has had influence over Chinese diplomacy, such as in defining the
Chinese role in the responsibility to protect. Although the organization
faces challenges on keeping fast-changing Chinese needs up to date and in
internationalizing their research, they have proven to be domestically and
regionally influential through the publication of various journals and
papers, as well as outreach efforts through international exchange efforts.

Overview
The politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) takes places in a
framework of a socialist republic run by a single party, the Communist
Party of China (CCP). The leadership of the CCP is stated in the

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 163


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_9
164   J. G. MCGANN

Table 9.1  China at a glance

Country name People’s Republic of China


Capital Beijing
Population 1,367,485,388 (July 2015 est.)
Location Asia, Eastern Asia, bordering the East China Sea, Korea Bay,
(continent) Yellow Sea, and South China Sea, between North Korea and
Vietnam
Ethnic groups 91.6% Han, 1.3% Zhuang, Other (includes Hui, Manchu, Uighur,
Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai, Korean,
Hani, Li, Kazakh, Dai, and other nationalities) 7.1%
Note: the Chinese government officially recognizes 56 ethnic
groups (2010 est.)
Language Standard Chinese or Mandarin (official; Putonghua, based on the
Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei
(Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka
dialects, minority languages
Currency (name Renminbi (CNY, Chinese yuan renminbi), 1 yuan = 0.15 US
and exchange rate) dollars
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Communist state
Chief of state Xi Jinping (President)
Head of government Li Keqianq (Premier)
Cabinet National People’s Congress
Elections President and Vice-President elected by National People’s
Congress for a 5-year term
Legislative branch National People’s Congress
Judicial branch The People’s Court System is divided into three levels. The
Supreme People’s Court is the highest level, then the local people’s
courts, and then the Courts of Special Jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court consists of over 340 judges, including the chief justice and
13 grand justices organized into a civil committee. The local courts
are divided into three levels: high people’s court (provinces,
autonomous regions, and special municipalities), intermediate
people’s court (autonomous prefectures and municipalities), and
basic people’s court (autonomous counties, towns, and municipal
districts). Lastly, the Courts of Special Jurisdiction are the Military
Court of China, Railway Transport Court of China, and Maritime
Court of China.
Political parties Chinese Communist Party or CCP (XI Jinping)
Note: China has eight nominally independent small parties
ultimately controlled by the CCP

Some economic facts


GDP: US $11.38 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $14,300 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 8.9%, industry 42.7%, services 48.4% (2015 est.)
  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW    165

Constitution of the PRC. State power within the PRC is exercised through


the CCP, the Central People’s Government, and their provincial and local
representation.
Under the dual leadership system, each local bureau or office is under
the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the correspond-
ing office, bureau, or ministry at the next higher level. People’s Congress
members at the county level are elected by voters. These county-level
People’s Congresses have the responsibility for oversight of local govern-
ment, and elect members to the Provincial (or Municipal in the case of
independent municipalities) People’s Congress. The Provincial People’s
Congress in turn elects members to the National People’s Congress,
which meets each year in March in Beijing. The ruling Communist Party
committee at each level plays a large role in the selection of appropriate
candidates for election to the local congress and to the higher levels.
The President of China is the titular head of state, serving as the ceremo-
nial figurehead under the National People’s Congress. The Premier of
China is the head of government, presiding over the State Council com-
posed of four vice-premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.
As this is a single-party state, the General Secretary of the Communist Party
of China holds ultimate power and authority over state and government.1

Political Scenario
Throughout 2014 and into 2015, with its unprecedented intensiveness in
the post-Mao era, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was
undoubtedly the highlight of China’s domestic political landscape. With
the prelude of the life imprisonment of disgraced former Chong Qing
Party head and Politburo member Bo Xilai, the campaign caught the “hid-
den tiger” Zhou Yongkang, the former apex Politburo standing commit-
tee member, and uprooted his extensive power network. Moreover, the
high-profile takedown of former Politburo committee member and PLA
general Xu Caihou indicated Xi’s dedication to deepening and expanding
his anti-corruption campaign in the army. President Xi argued that clean-
ing up the 86 million-strong CCP was essential to retain its power,2 while
some commentators maintained that Xi’s campaign was a kill-two-birds-­

1
 Wikipedia, “The Politics of China,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Politics_of_China.
2
 David Lague, Benjamin Kang Lim and Charlie Zhu, “Special Report: Fear and Retribution
in Xi’s Corruption Purge,” Reuters, December 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/12/24/us-china-corruption-purge-specialreport-idUSKBN0K200320141224.
166   J. G. MCGANN

with-one-stone strategy: a portrait of himself as a corruption fighter


through mobilizing public anti-corruption sentiment and an effective
elimination of his political rival.3
Witnessing the anti-corruption campaign in both political and military
bureaucracies, Xi’s intent to consolidate his political and military power
was obvious. However, the diplomatic implication of this dynamic needs a
more comprehensive examination. On one hand, a primary target of this
anti-corruption campaign was to regain CCP’s domestic legitimacy pillar,
established by the economic growth since the 1980s but suffering severe
deterioration from the enlarging economic unfairness, which might reduce
the probability of CCP playing the anti-West or anti-Japan nationalism
card to release domestic pressure.4 On the other hand, the potential of
strengthening the political and military power of the CCP would put
China in a more self-assured or firm stance on certain international issues.
However, all this analysis is based on the assumption that anti-corruption
of this scale and speed will not lead to ultimate domestic or regional
instability.

Economic Scenario
In March 2015, during the Chinese National Congress and China’s politi-
cal consultative conference, the State Council’s report declared the major
macroeconomic targets. (There is a detailed comparison with 2014  in
Table 9.2.)
At 7%, China’s 2015 GDP target was the lowest of the previous eleven
years, according to the government report of the PRC Prime Minister, Li
Keqiang. Terming this the “New Normal,” Li addressed the intensifica-
tion of the downward pressure on the economy. However, he also defined
this “New Normal” as a shift from “growing fast” to “growing well,”
indicating the painful process of reform. He emphasized that the govern-
ment would still have plenty of maneuvers to maintain economic growth
within a reasonable interval, since any short-term strong stimulus had not
yet been exercised, which provided sufficient policy space in the future to
tackle the tougher headwind.

3
 Shannon Tiezzi, “What’s Behind Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” The Diplomat, April
17, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/whats-behind-xis-anti-corruption-campaign.
4
 Joseph A. Bosco, “The Implication of China’s Anti-Corruption Drive,” The Diplomat, July 15,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-implications-of-chinas-anti-corruption-drive.
  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW    167

Table 9.2  Major macroeconomic targets


2015 2014 target 2014 realized

GDP 7.0% 7.5% 7.4%


CPI 3% 3.5% 2%
Registered urban unemployment 4.5% 4.6% 4.1%
Government deficit 1.62 trillion 1.35 trillion
Rate of M2 (money supply) increase 12% 13% 12.2%
Rate of ex(im)port increase 6% 7.5% 3.4%
Rate of national defense spending increase 10.1% 12.2%
Infrastructure investment 1.6 trillion 0.87 trillion

Notes: CPI, consumer price inflation; GDP, gross domestic product

The People’s Bank of China cut the interest rate twice, at the end of
2014 and the beginning of 2015, which was accompanied by a fiscal boost
from the government of CNY17.15 trillion spending in 2015. This indi-
cated a CNY1.62 trillion budget deficit, constituting 2.3% of GDP.5 The
loosening of monetary policy and expanding fiscal policy, though described
as stable and mild, still revealed the challenges in striking a balance between
economic growth and reform facing China in 2015.
According to the Central Economic Work Conference in December
2014, nine areas were to be the main focuses of economic reform in 20156:

(i) Capital market


(ii) Market access for private banks
(iii) Administrative approval process
(iv) Investment
(v) Pricing
(vi) Monopolies
(vii) Franchising
(viii) Government purchasing
(ix) Outbound investment

5
 Koh Gui Qing and Kevin Yao, “China Signals ‘New Normal’ with Higher Spending,
Lower Growth Target,” Reuters, March 5, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2015/03/05/china-parliament-idINKBN0M02FE20150305.
6
 Tang Danlu, “China to Focus on 9 Reform Areas in 2015,” Xinhua Net, December 11,
2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/11/c_133848476.htm.
168   J. G. MCGANN

Specifically, several reform areas were further addressed in 2015. The


reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including restructuring
ownership (market capitalization, privatization, etc.), establishing an
incentive-­based payment scheme for executives, and insulation of state
groups from political intervention, were extensively discussed with the aim
of promoting the efficiency of SOEs and so dealing with the over-capacity
and over-­subsidiarity of high-energy-consuming and high-polluting indus-
tries. Also, the local government debt, still in the auditing process associ-
ated with the shadow bank system, had attracted enough attention from
the central government. Moreover, Prime Minister Li also addressed the
significance of the transformation of the Chinese economy from an
investment-­oriented one to a more consumption-oriented one, mainly
through stimulating domestic consumption demand. Last but not least,
the upgrading and upstreaming of different industries was addressed to
reform China’s economy from one based on manufacturing and exports
to one with higher value-added.

Foreign Policy
The relationship between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Brunei) is a mixture of ter-
ritorial disputes and economic cooperation. Although the courtship of
ASEAN against China on South China Sea territorial disputes has been a
heated issue in recent years, the level of conflicts could hardly escalate, due
to the fact that only some of the ASEAN members (Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Brunei) are involved in the disputes, with different levels of
engagement. Moreover, after the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum of Pacific Rim economies in 2014, more
attention shifted to the potential for regional economic cooperation, for
instance the establishment of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
aiming at bridging the financing gap to South Asian developing countries,7
together with a pledged US $20 billion loan to boost Southeast Asian

7
 Yang Yi, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to Bridge Financing Gap, Xinhua Net,
June 29, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/29/c_133446999.
htm.
  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW    169

Table 9.3  Think tanks in China

Number of universities: 2,305


Number of think tanks: 435
% of the total think tanks in Asia: 435/1262, 34.47%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2010–2014):
 2010: 425
 2011: 425
 2012: 429
 2013: 426
 2014: 428
 2015: 435
Rankings of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2015):
 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (31)
 China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) (China) (35)
 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (39)
 Development Research Center of the State Council (50)
 Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), FKA Center for International
and   Strategic Studies (China) (64)
 Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (72)
 Unirule Institute for Economics (China) (103)
 Center for China and Globalization (110)
 Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies (RDCY) (149)
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
 Top 70 defense and national security think tanks: 2
 Top 70 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 3
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 3
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 2
 Top 80 domestic economics think tanks: 5
 Top 50 social policy think tanks: 1
 Think tanks with outstanding policy-oriented research programs: 4
Case studies
Top think tank: The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a research institute
directly administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. As an influential
government-affiliated foreign policy think tank, the Institute focuses primarily on policy
issues having to do with global politics and economics. Moreover, research at the
Institute deals with medium- and long-term policy issues of strategic importance, while
actively providing commentary and policy recommendations on major world events and
issues. The Institute hosts various seminars and conferences to discuss the latest
international developments and advance issue-specific studies. Since its establishment
CIIS has formed an extensive international and domestic scholarly and second-track
exchange network, holding regular meetings with foreign research institutions and
running collaborative research projects with both domestic and foreign scholars on issues
of shared interest.
(continued)
170   J. G. MCGANN

Table 9.3 (continued)
Alternative think tank: The Unirule Institute of Economics (UIE), established in 1993 in
Beijing, is one of China’s most influential independent think tanks. The Institute ranked
11th Best Think Tank with an Annual Operating Budget under US $5 million and 35th
on the Top Domestic Economic Policy Think Tanks, according to the University of
Pennsylvania’s 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. UIE conducts research
primarily in economics, governance, policy, and social sciences; it is dedicated to the open
exchange of ideas in economics in general, with a particular focus on institutional
economics. It is one of the few independent think tanks in China, in that it does not
receive financial assistance from any government entity, and relies on generous social
donations and provisional grants from donors abroad and within China. As a result,
transparency and credibility are two values closely upheld by the organization in order to
produce high-quality research products. UIE is home to some of the top economists,
sociologists, and jurists. The Institute not only exchanges its views with other scholars
through various social media platforms, it maintains close relationships with other
organizations as well.

connectivity.8 Some commentators argued that Beijing was trying to


construct a win–win framework to consolidate its territorial claims in the
South China Sea in exchange for economic gain.9
Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fu Ying, mentioned in January
2014 that the China–Japan relation was “at its worst.”10 The intense ter-
ritorial conflicts in the East China Sea region centered on Senkaku/Diaoyu
Island had reached deadlock, without the slightest sign of compromise at
any level or on either side. In November 2013, Beijing’s declaration of an
East Asian Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) had intensified the dif-
ficulties in the bilateral relation to a new high. Moreover, the troubling
history between China and Japan in World War II contributed to further
entangling the bilateral relation, highlighted by Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine, associated with Japanese
militarism during the war, and his intent to rewrite the country’s collective

8
 Yang Yi, “China Pledges over 20-bln-USD Loans to Boost Southeast Asia Connectivity”,
Xinhua Net, November 13, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
11/13/c_133787970.htm.
9
 David Gitter, “China’s Friendship Treaty: A Distraction from South China Sea
Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, November 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/
chinas-friendship-treaty-a-distraction-from-south-china-sea-diplomacy.
10
 Ian Bremmer, “Is the China–Japan Relation ‘at Its Worst’?” Reuters, February 11, 2014,
http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2014/02/11/is-the-china-japan-relationship-
at-its-worst.
  PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: AN OVERVIEW    171

self-­defense constitution. The complications in this bilateral history lie in


the fact that disputes over historical issues associated with confrontation
lead to severe political distrust, while no viable solutions exist to what hap-
pened over seventy years ago. In addition, both nations’ uncompromising
stances are deemed nationalism cards played to release the escalating
domestic pressure.11
The risk inherent in current China–Japan bilateral relations is especially
notable for the extinction of diplomatic outreach and dialogue, although
the situation did gradually improve after the meeting between Xi and Abe
during APEC 2014 and the establishment of a “four-point consensus.”12
Most significantly, this indicated the potential for a “maritime liaison
mechanism” in the future, which is essential to the settlement of accidents.
The future complexity in China–Japan relations arises from economic
integration combined with strategic divergence. Despite the disturbance
of the business climate emanating from the diplomatic tension, the rela-
tively strong bilateral economic linkage between the world’s second and
third largest economic entities will remain a positive force to drive the
China–Japan relation back on track. (Table 9.3).13

11
 The economic downturn challenge to Abenomics and China’s social unrest.
12
 Shannon Tiezzi, “At Long Last, a Xi-Abe Meeting. Now What?” The Diplomat, November
11, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/at-long-last-a-xi-abe-meeting-now-what.
13
 Japan has 23,000 companies operating in China, with 10 million Chinese workers on
their payrolls. But Japanese companies are actively diversifying away from China now, with
foreign direct investment waning and Japan shifting to Southeast Asia in particular.
CHAPTER 10

Emergence of a Think Tank and a Rising


Power on the World Stage: China Institute
of International Studies

Longdi Xu

Introduction
The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a think tank affiliated
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). It was the first think tank in China in the field of interna-
tional studies. Now, it endeavors to establish itself as a base for academic
research, a think tank on foreign affairs, a platform for track-two diplomacy,
and an opinion leader, with the goal of growing into a world-class think
tank on international studies.

History of Think Tanks in China


Formed into a unified state headed by the Communist Party of China in
1949, the PRC is the world’s largest country, with a population of over
1.35 billion. Moreover, China currently boasts the second largest economy

L. Xu (*)
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Beijing, China

© The Author(s) 2019 173


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_10
174   L. XU

in the world, with a GDP surpassing all but the GDP of the United States.
However, China’s presence as a global power has not always been as
pronounced as it has been in recent times.
Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese economy began to take off as a
product of both domestic policy alterations and foreign policy trade agree-
ments. Domestically, massive policy reforms in rural regions in conjunc-
tion with overt political indications to instill confidence in policy credibility
and political stability bolstered confidence in economic trade.1 Germane
to this evolution of economic policy was the leadership of Deng Xiaoping,
who worked to shift the Chinese economy from the opposition to private
business pervasive during the Cultural Revolution to a supportive stance
that invited private-sector growth.2 This shift not only incited massive eco-
nomic growth in township and village enterprise, but also prompted a shift
towards trade openness.
This shift in China’s socio-economic profile is quite palpable. Many
Chinese are aware of China’s ascent socio-economically and, moreover,
are increasingly aware of China’s new role as an international global pow-
er.3 With this shift, think tanks in China have an increasingly important
role. Today, China claims the second largest number of think tanks in the
world after the United States. In contrast to think tanks in the West,
Chinese think tanks work closely with the government leadership and
influence policy through the upper echelons of government.4 Think tanks
are able to facilitate international exchanges and provide innovative policy
solutions for China’s strategy within their new global position. The collec-
tion of international policy think tanks has expanded as China has increased
its interactions with international society. This expansion, in large part, is
due to the need for better analysis of international affairs.5 All think tanks,
with the exception of the China Society for Strategy and Management,
operate within administrative hierarchies under either a State Council

1
 Yaseng Huang, “How Did China Take Off,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 26,
No. 4 (Fall 2012): 149.
2
 Ibid., 150.
3
 Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars
Interact, China Leadership Monitor, No. 29 (Summer 2009): 2, http://www.brookings.
edu/research/articles/2009/08/summer-china-li.
4
 Ibid.
5
 David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure
and Process,” The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002): 575, http://www.jstor.
org/stable/4618770.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    175

ministry, a Central Committee department, or one of the general


­departments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).6 The functions and
responsibilities of these think tanks have evolved over time. Their influ-
ence in foreign policy has grown as China has increased its involvement in
global affairs.7 Under this current environment of increased think tank
activity, CIIS has emerged as a key policy institution involved in interna-
tional studies.

History of CIIS
The Institute was founded in 1956 after the State Council approved a
proposal by then acting Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian to estab-
lish an institute to conduct studies on international issues, receiving the
name of the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS). It then delinked from CAS and was renamed
the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in 1958.
IIR was canceled during the Cultural Revolution. In 1973, Premier
Zhou Enlai instructed rebuilding of the institute, which was renamed the
Institute of International Studies (IIS), to meet the needs of increasing
diplomatic work after the breakthroughs in China–United States relations.
It assumed its current name, China Institute of International Studies, in
December 1986.
Because of the institutional reform and restructuring of the State
Council, the China Center for International Affairs, formerly a research
institution under the State Council, was incorporated into CIIS in 1998.
Now, CIIS also hosts four affiliates: China Foundation of International
Studies and Academic Exchange (CFISAE), China National Committee
for Pacific Economic Cooperation (PECC China), China Committee of
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP China),
and China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). These
four affiliates are very active in their respective fields of expertise.
So far, CIIS has witnessed ten successive presidents since its founding
in the 1950s: Meng Yongqian, Yao Zhongming, Li Huichuan, Zheng
Weizhi, Wang Shu, Du Gong, Yang Chengxu, Song Mingjiang, Ma
Zhengang, and the current president, Qu Xing. It is now located at the

6
 Ibid., 580.
7
 Ibid., 581.
176   L. XU

site where the embassy of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire to China used


to be located, with its main building being the same as the original one of
a Western style.

Organizational Structure
The staff of CIIS consists of nearly one hundred researchers and other
professionals. Among them are senior diplomats, leading area-study spe-
cialists, and preeminent experts in major fields of foreign affairs. Young
scholars at CIIS all have PhD or MA degrees in international relations or
related disciplines.
CIIS now has both research departments and research centers, with the
former being the main body of the Institute and the latter playing a rein-
forcing, complementary, and increasingly important role. CIIS has seven
area-focused research departments: Department for International and
Strategic Studies, Department for World Economy and Development,
Department for American Studies, Department for Asia-Pacific Security
and Cooperation, Department for European Studies, Department for
Developing Countries Studies, and Department for Eurasian Studies.
CIIS also has five topic- or theme-focused research centers: Center for
China–U.S.  Relations, Center for Maritime Security and Cooperation,
Center for Global Governance, Center for International Energy Strategy,
and Center for Arms Control and International Security. Compared with
the departments, the centers are more loosely organized, with their
research staff coming from different departments on an ad hoc basis.
The International Exchange Office is responsible for the liaison affairs
and coordination of various international academic exchange activities
between CIIS and other organizations. The Research Management Office
is in charge of making rules and regulations on research programs, draw-
ing up research plans, managing research programs, organizing research
activities, keeping the research program archives, and undertaking the
administrative and routine affairs of the Academic Board of CIIS.
CIIS has a Library and Information Center that holds over 300,000
books. Its collection on international affairs is among the best in the coun-
try. CIIS hosts a prestigious academic journal, International Studies
(Chinese version) and its English version China International Studies.
The Editorial Department takes charge of the editing and publishing
affairs of the journal.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    177

Research Focus and Products


Just like RAND8 in the United States, CIIS is intellectually independent in
its research, though not financially independent, as it is a government-­
affiliated think tank in China. Specifically, intellectual independence means
that CIIS and its research staff decide for themselves the research pro-
grams in which they are interested, make research plans on their own foot-
ing, and carry out their research autonomously. Although they also obtain
research programs and grants from various governmental organs, they will
conduct their research in a way that is free of outside interference, and
draw objective rather than biased conclusions in line with their research.
In a word, objectivity and high quality are the lifeline of CIIS research
products. Of course, the views and opinions expressed are solely those of
CIIS staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

Research Focus
CIIS now conducts research and analysis on a wide range of foreign policy
issues, with a focus primarily on medium- and long-term policy issues of
strategic importance, particularly those concerning international politics,
the global economy, international security, and China’s relations with the
rest of the world. This focus is also in line with the MoFA specification in
1979 that stated that the main task of the Institute was to conduct long-­
term, strategic, and policy-oriented studies on international issues.
As already mentioned, the work of the research departments is mainly
country or area focused, covering domestic and regional situations (such
as the political, economic, and security situation), bilateral and multilateral
relations, and so on. In addition, just as the names of the research centers
indicate, they conduct studies on their respective topical or thematic mat-
ters and issues, such as China–United States relations, maritime security,
global governance, energy security, arms control and disarmament, cyber
security, and other issues concerning international security.
While the research departments are more country or area focused, the
research centers conduct transdisciplinary studies from multiple perspec-
tives. Therefore, there is a cross-cutting relationship between research

 RAND Corporation, “Standards for High-Quality Research and Analysis”, RAND


8

Corporation Publications, 2014, http://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP413-


2014-02.html.
178   L. XU

departments and research centers, with a loose division of labor among


them, as a researcher might cover more than one area of research interest.
This relationship also adds to the research quality of CIIS products and
the input dynamics of CIIS staff. Now every research center is required to
publish an annual report on its respective research areas.

Research Products
CIIS research staff are encouraged to work on three kinds of research
products—internal reports, academic books and essays, and media arti-
cles—with the goal of producing and training multifaceted policy research-
ers and analysts.

Academic Publications  CIIS research staff are asked to write academic


books on an individual or collective basis, as well as essays for both
Chinese and foreign-language academic journals. In recent years, CIIS
has attached special importance to publishing academic research products
and made this a requirement for every researcher and part of their work-
load. In 2013, CIIS witnessed the publication of 87 essays by its research
staff in various academic journals, and 15 books: 4 books by individual
researchers, 4 annual report books, and 7 books edited and translated by
CIIS staff.

Internal Reports  Since CIIS is a government-affiliated think tank, inter-


nal reports are an integral part of its routine research work. The research
staff at CIIS work on internal reports according to their respective research
areas and research interests, and submit them to the Chinese government.
CIIS is also invited on various occasions by governmental organs to sub-
mit special internal reports on certain issues of great importance to China’s
top leaders. In particular, CIIS internal reports usually contain policy rec-
ommendations that have to be practical, operable, concise, and to the
point.

Media Articles and Commentaries  CIIS research staff are often inter-
viewed by various television programs, and invited to contribute short
articles and commentaries to mainstream newspapers and magazines.
CIIS staff have become frequent visitors to such newspapers as People’s
Daily and programs on CCTV (China Central TV Station), especially its
Channel 4 (international channel), Channel 13 (news channel), and
Channel 16 (English-language channel). In 2013, CIIS staff published
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    179

52  commentaries in a special volume co-sponsored with Takungpao


(www.takungpao.com) of Hong Kong. In addition, CIIS also publishes
policy analyses and commentaries on its website www.org.cn, which usu-
ally are instant analyses and responses to evolving international situations
and interstate relations. It plans to make these a series, such as of policy
analysis, policy briefs, or commentaries, and to publish them in pdf for-
mat, with a view to further increasing their formality and authoritative-
ness and facilitating their download and spread.

CIIS Report  Since 2013, CIIS has published working papers and occa-
sional reports by its research staff on certain issues of special importance
or concern, in publications called CIIS Reports. This is also part of CIIS’s
efforts to catch up with foreign think tanks and to modernize itself in
accordance with international practice. As of the end of 2014, four CIIS
Reports had been published in pdf format in both Chinese and English:
Toward a New Type of Major-Country Relationship between China and the
U.S.: Challenges and Opportunities; In Pursuit of the “World Dream”: The
Progress and Prospects of Promotion of a Harmonious World; Cyber War
Preparedness, Cyber Arms and Controls United Statues; and Change in
EU’s International Status and Influence.

Joint Publications CIIS has built a worldwide scholarly and second-­


track exchange network, holding regular meetings with many foreign
research institutions and running collaborative research projects with both
domestic and foreign scholars on issues of shared interests. In 2013, CIIS
and the Atlantic Council of the United States issued their first joint report,
China–US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, in both Chinese and
English.9 Along with the deepening and institutionalization of coopera-
tion between CIIS and its partners, more joint publications will emerge in
the future.

International Studies and China International Studies  International


Studies is a prominent academic journal in the field of international studies
in China, whose contributors include both Chinese and foreign experts.
Its English version, China International Studies, was formally launched in
December 2005, the first English-language academic journal in China on
9
 China-US Joint Working Group, “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,”
Atlantic Council, September 17, 2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/
reports/china-us-cooperation-key-to-the-global-future.
180   L. XU

diplomacy and international politics for formal circulation. It now has


become an important window and database for foreign scholars, experts,
and diplomats in understanding China’s foreign policies. Since its initia-
tion, its circulation and subscription have risen steadily. In particular, it has
become increasingly popular among diplomats of foreign embassies in
Beijing.10

Influence over Policy: Case Studies


After years of experience in academic and policy studies on international
issues, CIIS has become one of the most influential foreign policy think
tanks in China and gained recognition in the international community of
foreign and international studies. Its upgraded ranking in the Global Go
To Think Tank Index of the University of Pennsylvania is a case in point.11
The following are some case studies in those policy areas or thematic issues
in which CIIS enjoys some influence over policy in China.

Responsible Protection
Sovereignty has been the founding principle of interstate relations since
the signing of the Westphalia Peace Treaty in 1648. Closely related to the
sovereignty principle is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
countries, which has been another fundamental principle of contemporary
international relations and is prescribed in the United Nations (UN)
Charter. However, these are frequently violated in actual state-to-state
relations for various reasons, humanitarian intervention being one of
them. In 2001, Canada put forward a new term for humanitarian protec-
tion, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Later, this was written into the
“2005 World Summit Outcome Document” issued by the Summit
Conference in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the United
Nations. This claims that state sovereignty implies responsibility and that
states must protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes, namely
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The
Libyan War was seen as the first application of R2P in the real world.

10
 It now has a special website and more details can be found at http://www.ciis.org.cn/
gyzz/index.html.
11
 James McGann, 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia: Think Tanks
and Civil Societies Program, 2015), http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/8.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    181

In the face of the large-scale casualties, displaced persons, and refugees


from the Libyan War, the overwhelming probability of R2P being applied
to Syria, as well as the inadequacies of R2P, Ruan Zongze, a senior fellow
and vice-president of CIIS, proposed in 2012 the idea of “Responsible
Protection” (RP) in the uproar at the Syrian crisis. The idea first appeared
in Global Times (Huanqiu) on March 7, 2012,12 and was then fully elabo-
rated in an academic paper, “Responsible Protection: Building a Better
World,” published in China International Studies.13
In fact, as a relatively new idea in international relations, R2P faces
numerous questions. Ruan not only reflected on R2P with regard to its
inadequacies, but also offered an alternative to it within the framework
of RP. For instance, since R2P could be abused for regime change, which
contradicts the UN Charter and the sovereignty and non-interference
principles, its legitimacy is undoubtedly questionable. Many countries
see it as another version of interventionism. Secondly, who will be
responsibility for the “inhuman” consequences resulting from R2P? In
many cases, so-called humanitarian military interventions have caused
more casualties than the lives they saved. Thirdly, how is it possible to
ensure that the Brazilian concept of “responsibility while protecting” is
implemented? Fourthly, is military force absolutely necessary for carry-
ing out R2P? In reality, many military humanitarian interventions are
just a pretext for power politics. Fifthly, who should be protected, who
should be left alone, and how are double standards dealt with in carrying
out R2P? Furthermore, in cases where a government violates the rights
of its citizens, when should or should not the international community
provide protection? Even if protection is needed, what is the red line or
boundary?
The idea of RP contains the following elements. Firstly, the objects of
RP are the innocent people of the target country, and the peace and
­stability of the relevant region, rather than specific political parties or
armed forces. Secondly, the legitimate subjects or RP sponsors are primar-
ily the government of a given state, with the UN Security Council, rather

12
 Ruan Zongze, “China Should Advocate Responsible Protection”, Huanqiu, March 7,
2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-03/2501163.html.
13
 Ruan Zongze, “Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World,” China International
Studies 34 (2012): 19–41. It can also be found at the CIIS website http://www.ciis.org.cn/
english/2012-06/15/content_5090912.htm.
182   L. XU

than any other states having the legitimacy to carry out humanitarian
intervention. Thirdly, the means of RP are strictly limited, which indicates
that diplomatic and political means must be exhausted before military
means are employed as the last resort. Fourthly, the purpose of “protec-
tion” is to mitigate rather than aggravate humanitarian catastrophe.
Fifthly, the RP sponsors should be responsible for the work of state-
rebuilding in the post-intervention and post-protection period. Sixthly,
the UN should establish mechanisms of supervision, outcome evaluation,
and post factum accountability, to ensure that the means, process, scope,
and results of RP are within its mandate. Therefore, the idea of RP deals
with the dilemmas inherent in R2P and offers a more comprehensive,
pragmatic, and reasonable framework than R2P.
After its proposal, an international conference on “Responsible
Protection: Building a Safer World” was held at CIIS in Beijing on
October 17–18, 2013. Experts from Australia, Denmark, Russia, India,
South Africa, Brazil, and China showed strong interest in the idea of RP
and had a heated and in-depth discussion about it.14 Two weeks later,
Ramesh Thakur, an ICISS15 commissioner in 2001–2002, wrote in The
Japan Times that “China is not an absolutist defender of state sovereignty
and has been trying for the past dozen years to engage with the responsi-
bility to protect (R2P) principle.” He summarized Ruan’s concept of RP
as having four facets.16 He concluded that “Looking at the Brazilian and
Chinese initiatives together, it is clear that the basis of a new consensus on
R2P does exist.” The idea of RP has the potential to be more influential
in the future.

14
 CIIS held International Conference on “Responsible Protection: Building a Safer
World”, November 12, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-11/12/con-
tent_6454221.htm.
15
 ICISS refers to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
16
 It acknowledges individual state and collective global responsibility for the victims of
atrocities. The implementation of the protection agenda demonstrates responsibility to the
international community. It accepts responsibility for the actions of those doing the protec-
tion; that is, it introduces the requirement for an international accountability mechanism.
Finally, it shows that China is a responsible stakeholder in a rules-based global order. In
Ruan’s words, “China must have the courage to speak out and contribute ideas to the
world.” The idea of responsible protection will help China build “a just and reasonable new
international political order.” See Ramesh Thakur, “A Chinese Version of ‘Responsible
Protection’”, The Japan Times, November 1, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opin-
ion/2013/11/01/commentar y/a-chinese-version-of-responsible-protection/#.
UxPrSnmo7dU.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    183

Energy Security and Development


As already mentioned, CIIS has a Center for International Energy Strategy
(CIES), whose mission is primarily to conduct academic and policy-­
oriented studies concerning energy security and energy diplomacy,
together with the geopolitical and economic influence imposed by the
trend of the international energy landscape. In fact, CIIS is a herald in the
study of energy security in China. Since the mid-1990s, it has conducted
research on energy security. Shi Ze, a senior fellow and head of CIES, is
among the primary team. He now serves as a consultant to the National
Energy Administration (NEA) and undertakes research programs on
energy security and pipeline security for NEA. He presides over many dis-
cussion and review meetings of NEA research programs conducted by
other research institutions. CIES is also a focal unit or linkage unit of
MoFA, offering consultations on issues of energy security and diplomacy,
especially under the policy framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and
the Maritime Silk Road.
The Center has extensive cooperation with Chinese enterprises, such as
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), mainly providing advice
and consultation to them on issues related to energy security. Shi serves as
a distinguished expert at China International Engineering Consulting
Corporation (CIECC), which he advises on the international and energy
security issues concerning its engineering projects. CIES also advises pri-
vate enterprises on petroleum investments in foreign countries, including
investment risks, prospects of oil reserves, and local economic and political
conditions of related countries. These efforts are conducive to implement-
ing the “going out” strategy of Chinese enterprises.
The Center has close academic cooperation with other research institu-
tions in China, including Peking University, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute
(ETRI), and so ob. It is also very active in conducting international
exchanges and cooperation, having established a working relationship
with the Energy Foundation of the United States (USEE), the Netherland
Institute of International Relations or Clingendael Institute, National
Energy Security Foundation (NESF) of Russia, and so on. CIES staff
attended the International Gas Union (IGU) council meeting held in
Beijing in October 2013.
184   L. XU

The cooperative mechanisms for energy security cooperation in Asia are


largely fragmented rather than unitary, for example there are different
mechanisms of energy cooperation in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia,
South Asia, and Central Asia. Given the plain but complex reality that
China lies at the center of this web of cooperative mechanisms on energy
security, CIES participates actively in regional and multilateral discussions,
particularly within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), with a view to finding common ground with various
relevant parties and facilitating multilateral dialogue.
Moreover, Shi also undertook a research program for the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) on the development strategy of Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region and submitted a final report to ADB in 2009. Now,
many of the proposals in the ADB final report have been implemented and
have been written into the 12th Five-Year Plan of the local government.
For example, in accordance with the policy recommendations in the ADB
final report, it was decided in 2010 that the Urumqi Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade Fair, which has been held in Urumqi every year since
1992, should be upgraded to become the China-Eurasia Expo. The first
China-Eurasia Expo was held on September 1–5, 2011 in Urumqi. Now,
the Expo has extended trade not just for Central and South Asian coun-
tries but also to the rest of Asia and Europe, while Xinjiang has become a
vital bridge connecting China and other Asian and European countries.
Therefore, through its research, CIIS has contributed to the regional
development of Xinjiang and promoted economic and trade relations
between China and the outside world, fully demonstrating the role that a
think tank should and could play in the real world.

Practices and Limitations
As far as CIIS’s achievements are concerned, they do not come without
cost or effort. In recent years, CIIS has carried out a series of profound
reforms and spent great effort on institution-building, especially in the
realm of academic research, which greatly facilitates its policy analysis and
contributes to its upgraded international ranking and reputation.

Carrying Out Administrative Reforms


In recent years, CIIS has conducted a series of administrative reforms and
made new rules and regulations on academic research. For instance, the
president of CIIS no longer serves as the chair of the Academic Board,
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    185

which now has a decisive say over many decisions on academic and research
matters. The research staff must run for the posts of heads of the research
departments and centers rather than being appointed by the leadership. As
development and reform are an endless cause, CIIS is expected to con-
tinue to improve, readjust, and perfect its practices in academic manage-
ment in the future.

Strengthening Academic Endeavors


As already mentioned, CIIS encourages its staff to produce multiple prod-
ucts, including books, essays for academic journals, internal reports for
governmental organs, and short commentaries for newspapers and maga-
zines, thus laying a solid foundation for policy analysis. This practice con-
stitutes a departure from the past when only internal reports were required,
while academic ones were discouraged and regarded as policy irrelevant.
In fact, without a solid foundation and systemic training for academic
qualifications, it would be rather hard to produce high-quality research
products. Therefore, the new practices are not only good for the growth
of CIIS, but also beneficial to the researchers themselves in fighting for
their academic credit and reputation.
Though greater importance has been attached to the academic dimen-
sion of their research, internal reports still constitute one of the most sig-
nificant missions for CIIS staff. In recent years, both the quality and
quantity of CIIS internal reports have seen remarkable improvement.
Compared with other think tanks in China, CIIS enjoys the privilege of
submitting its research products directly to relevant governmental organs
on a regular and independent basis (when its staff complete a report), on
their invitation or request, thus making its voices and views heard by high-­
level decision-makers. If academic publications were the basis for CIIS
researchers, internal reports would be their lifeline.

Innovating Research Programs


Due to the Institute’s advantageous position in the field of international
studies in China, CIIS staff undertake many research programs for various
governmental organs and enterprises. For instance, the National Planning
Office of Philosophy and Social Science of China granted CIIS a major
research project in July 2013, which was entitled “New Changes in China’s
Strategic Opportunities in the Coming Decade” and headed by CIIS
186   L. XU

senior fellow Xu Jian.17 CIIS itself also sponsors various research programs
every year in the light of the changing international situation. CIIS makes
full use of all of these research programs, through which its staff with
different research interests form collaborative teams and engage in innova-
tive and joint research from multiple perspectives.

Conducting Track-Two Diplomacy


As a think tank on foreign policy, CIIS plays a unique role in conducting
track-two diplomacy, thus effectively facilitating and complementing
China’s overall diplomacy. For instance, the MoFA of China entrusted
CIIS in 2013 to host over ten major international conferences, including
“Retrospect and Prospect: The 10th Anniversary of the Six-Party Talks,”
“The Arab World and China: Historical Changes and Going-Forward
Together,” Workshop on China–U.S.  Relations, the 8th SCO Forum,
“Silk Road Economic Belt in the Context of Economic Globalization,”
China–U.S. Young Leaders Dialogue, ARF Workshop on Cyber Security,
and “Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Cairo Declaration.” These
conferences with an official background play an effective role in facilitating
ties between China and relevant countries and regions.

Engaging in Public Diplomacy


CIIS also conducts public diplomacy in an active manner, explaining and
introducing China’s foreign policy to the outside world. CIIS staff are
frequently interviewed by radio stations and mainstream newspapers and
appear in television programs to share their views and analyses on hot-spot
international issues and China’s foreign policy, especially on occasions of
great significance, such as during the annual conferences of the National
People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC). The academic journal International Studies
(Chinese version), with its English version China International Studies, is
an important window for understanding China and its foreign behavior.
In 2013, the journal invited State Councilor Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister
Wang Yi, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zheng Zeguang, and others
to contribute and share their thinking on China’s foreign affairs and

17
 A major research project is the highest-level research program with the highest esteem
among Chinese scholars, funded by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social
Science of China and focusing on the essential issues facing China in its development.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    187

international issues to its readers. CIIS is also investing more in building


its website www.org.cn, which covers news reports of its activities and
research products by its staff, and offers a platform for presenting a Chinese
perspective on various international issues.

Developing International Cooperation


CIIS has built regular or annual mechanisms of academic exchange with
over thirty foreign think tanks through which various activities (such as
annual conferences, seminars, workshops, and dialogues) are hosted alter-
nately between CIIS and its partners. In 2013, the international confer-
ences CIIS held included the China–France Policy Annual Workshop, the
7th China–U.S. High-Level Security Dialogue, the China–U.S. Seminar
on South China Sea, the 10th China-Europe Think Tank Roundtable, and
the Conference on the Challenges of American Foreign Policy. CIIS also
established new cooperative and exchange mechanisms with the French
Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and the Hoover Institution at
Stanford University in the United States in 2013. CIIS research staff usu-
ally receive hundreds of foreign visitors each year, including the diplomats
of foreign embassies in Beijing, for interviews, exchanges of ideas, and
cooperation, and this has become the routine work of CIIS. For example,
in 2013 CIIS held over 800 interviews and informal discussions, spon-
sored 3 CIIS Forums,18 organized 32 international conferences that had
over 20 participants, dispatched 122 academic teams to visit foreign coun-
tries, and received 8 large-scale visiting delegations.

Limitations
It is a fact that CIIS has experienced sound growth and harvested remark-
able achievements in recent years. However, there are also some inadequa-
cies or limitations to its growth. For example, although CIIS has already
strengthened its efforts in building and investing in its website in both
Chinese and English, there is still some room for improvement.
As mentioned earlier, CIIS and the Atlantic Council of the United States
conducted joint research and issued a joint report, China–US Cooperation:

18
 The CIIS Forum is an important platform at CIIS for the foreign ministers and senior
officials of other countries to deliver speeches on their respective foreign and domestic poli-
cies, usually with a large audience, such as diplomats from the foreign embassies in Beijing,
journalists, businesses, students, and experts from professional and academic circles.
188   L. XU

Key to the Global Future, in both Chinese and English in 2013. The two
sides also held report launches and discussions in Washington and Beijing
in September and October, respectively, with large audiences, but the
bilingual publication cannot be found on the CIIS website, although its
revised edition appeared later in China International Studies (November/
December 2013).
As far as its website is concerned, CIIS in particular needs to add more
information about its research departments and centers, publish more of
its research products in pdf format, revise and perfect the layout of its
website, update information on its researchers and their publications, and
even add a blog section. Compared with the Chinese-language website,
the English one needs even more effort and investment. In particular,
CIIS needs to publish more of its research products in English, in order to
further increase its internationalism and visibility. Currently, CIIS does not
seem to be good at utilizing the new media like the internet. Nevertheless,
in the age of information, it has to reinforce its capability in this regard.
If the Global Go To Think Tank Program of the University of
Pennsylvania goes well for CIIS, its ranking in the survey conducted by
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) about think tanks within
China does not sound so good. Although one might hold some reserva-
tions about the SASS ranking in its definition, standards, and other factors
of a think tank,19 it sounds like an alert to CIIS.  There might be some
reasons: for example, although CIIS researchers are very active interna-
tionally, this is not the case for them in the domestic circles of interna-
tional relations. Of course, during the past few years the situation has been
constantly improving, with CIIS researchers attending and speaking at
more and more conferences on the domestic front. In the coming years,
with the implementation of CIIS’s reform measures, the situation is
expected to continue to improve. However, more efforts on the part of
CIIS staff are needed.
The international situation changes quickly and hot-spot international
issues need rapid responses and even instant answers. Compared with
some top international think tanks, CIIS sometimes seems to be slow in

19
 For example, there is no denying that both Peking University (Beijing) and Fudan
University (Shanghai) and some other universities are prominent in China, but could they be
defined and regarded as think tanks? Compared with the definition and standards used by the
Global Go To Think Tank Program, the ranking presented by SASS is not so rigorous and
therefore less convincing than it originally sounded to the Chinese people.
  EMERGENCE OF A THINK TANK AND A RISING POWER ON THE WORLD…    189

offering its ideas. On the one hand, it is up to the researchers themselves


to decide in which topics they are interested; on the other hand, the lead-
ership of the Institute could play more of a coordinating role in generating
certain research products to keep up with the continuously evolving inter-
national situation and offering some possible solutions. In addition, since
the Institute’s leaders are traveling more they also have more chances to
meet with Chinese and foreign governmental leaders and scholars, and
they could offer more briefings about the situation on the ground to less-­
traveled staff, to make their analyses more to the point and even inspire
new perspectives. Besides, numerous fundamental and valuable issues
deserve much more attention, but they are still not in the purview of CIIS
staff. Therefore, CIIS needs to broaden the scope of its research, enhance
the depth and systematicity of its studies, and better coordinate its research
programs to bring the potential of its staff into full play in an increasingly
competitive academic environment.
CHAPTER 11

India: An Overview

James G. McGann

After the government transition in 2014, India faced a series of policy


challenges, including infrastructural and labor reform domestically, and
US–India–China relations internationally. Indian think tanks have an
important role in providing information and research on fast-paced
changes. The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) serves to
provide policy research for the Indian government, particularly in the
realm of strategic affairs. IDSA has encountered various challenges, such
as non-cooperative armed forces and resource scarcity, but its innovative
approach that expands research foci beyond traditional national defense
has placed the Institute as an influential player in the country (Table 11.1).

Overview
Politics in India takes place within the framework of its constitution, as
India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic, where the President
is the head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government.
India follows the dual polity system; that is, a double government which
consists of the central authority at the center and states at the periphery.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 191


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_11
192   J. G. MCGANN

Table 11.1  India at a glance

Country name Republic of India


Capital New Delhi
Population 1,251,695,584 (July 2015 est.)
Location South Asia
(continent)
Ethnic groups Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongoloid and other 3%, according
to CIA World Factbook
Language Hindi 41%, Bengali 8.1%, Telugu 7.2%, Marathi 7%, Tamil 5.9%, Urdu
5%, Gujarati 4.5%, Kannada 3.7%, Malayalam 3.2%, Oriya 3.2%, Punjabi
2.8%, Assamese 1.3%, Maithili 1.2%, other 5.9%
Currency Indian rupee (INR), 1 rupee = US dollars
(name and
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government Republic
type
Chief of state President Ram Nath Kovind
Head of Prime Minister Narendra Modi
government
Cabinet Union Council of Ministers appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister
Elections President elected by an electoral college consisting of elected members
of both houses of Parliament and the legislatures of the states for a
five-year term (no term limits)
Legislative Bicameral Parliament consists of the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha
branch
Judicial branch Supreme Court (chief justice and 25 associate justices); note that
Parliament approved an additional 5 judges in 2008; High Courts;
District Courts; Labour Court
Political parties Aam Aadmi Party, AAP (Arvind Kejriwal); All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam, AIADMK (J. Jayalalithaa); All India Trinamool
Congress, AITC (Mamata Banerjee); Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP (Amit
Shah); Communist Party of India, CPI (Suravaram Sudhakar Reddy,
Secretary-General); Communist Party of India-Marxist, CPI(M)
(Prakash Karat); Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, DMK (M. Karunanidhi);
Indian National Congress, INC (Sonia Gandhi)

Some economic facts


GDP: US $8.027 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $6,300 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 16.1%, industry 29.5%, services 54.5% (2015 est.)
  INDIA: AN OVERVIEW    193

The constitution defines the organization, powers, and limitations of


both central and state governments, and it is well recognized, rigid, and
considered supreme; that is, the laws of the nation must conform to it.
There is a provision for a bicameral legislature consisting of an Upper
House—Rajya Sabha—which represents the states of the Indian ­federation;
and a lower house—Lok Sabha—which represents the people of India as a
whole. The Indian constitution provides for an independent judiciary
which is headed by the Supreme Court. The court’s mandate is to protect
the constitution, to settle disputes between the central government and
the states as well as interstate disputes, and to nullify any central or state
laws that go against the constitution.1
India has a multiparty system, where there are a number of national as
well as regional parties. A regional party may gain a majority and rule a
particular state. If a party is represented in more than four states, it would
be labeled a national party. Out of the sixty-six years of India’s indepen-
dence, India has been ruled by the Indian National Congress (INC) for
fifty-three years.2 In addition, a significant feature of these parties lies in
the fact that most of them lack an ideological basis. Instead, they are iden-
tified based on race, religion, language, caste, and so on.
There are three main alliances in India:

• National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a center-right coalition led by


the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which won the election in 2014.
• United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a center-left coalition led by the
Indian National Congress (INC), which has been in power for the
longest time since India’s independence.
• Third Front, a coalition of parties which do not belong to either of
the other alliances.

Domestic Scenario
The win of the Hindu nationalist party BJP led by Narendra Modi in the
2014 election marked a significant change in the Indian political land-
scape. Although against a history of religious manipulation by the BJP, the
government, led by Modi, made promises to shift the focus of Indian poli-
tics to economic growth.

1
 M. Laxmikanth, Public Administration (India: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2011), 389–390.
2
 Wikipedia, “Indian politics,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_India.
194   J. G. MCGANN

This first time that the BJP as a single, strong right-wing party took
control at a federal level without forming a coalition is remarkable con-
cerning the fragmentation of Indian politics due to its social structure. In
India there exists a great diversity of races, religions, and castes. It is argued
by some that people from poor backgrounds and lower castes in India,
instead of adopting socialism, would instead like to attain a higher posi-
tion under the religious and caste structure. This leads to the creation of
numerous local and national parties representing different religious and
social groups, which made it very difficult for the INC to promote a uni-
fied and coherent leftward mobilization and has caused Indian politics to
remain fragmented since 1989. However, with the election victory of the
BJP and Modi in 2014, many believed that a unified, strong single party
would be more helpful in achieving certain concrete developmental and
nationalist reforms.
During the first few months after Modi was elected President, the
developmental agenda substantially slowed down. Some commentators
were concerned about the BJP’s shift from pro-development to the reli-
gious issue. Some BJP members were trying to push a hard-right religious
agenda. Since BJP attained its position on the basis of its pro-development
and liberal economic vision, its potential shift of focus towards religious
issues (e.g., mass conversion to Hinduism) added uncertainty about
India’s future politics. The country’s ruling party has to deal with a series
of challenges, the first of which concerns the tax scheme. There have been
taxes levied at state borders which are regarded as hindering economic
growth, and a national goods and services tax has been proposed to create
a nationwide common market.3
The manufacturing–services dual development model also presents
some issues. More specifically, since China’s initial economic takeoff highly
depends on export-led, labor-intensive manufacturing industry, this could
hardly be mimicked by India due to the trend of technology advancement
that makes manufacturing industry less labor intensive. However, with a
world-class information technology (IT) industry, India is probably able
to create a dual path in both manufacturing and service industries to boost
its economy, though the huge number of insufficiently educated youngsters
(between 90 million and 110 million) remains a problem to be tackled.

3
 The Economist, “A Chance to Fly,” The Economist, February 21, 2015, http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21644145-india-has-rare-opportunity-become-worlds-
most-dynamic-big-economy-chance-fly.
  INDIA: AN OVERVIEW    195

Thirdly, establishing a more efficient infrastructure is essential to India,


especially the power system, when numerous industries have suffered from
sporadic power cuts.
Finally, labor law reform is crucial to stabilize a sufficient labor base for
the growth of the Indian economy. Currently, less than 15% of Indian work-
ers have legal labor security due to enterprises’ reaction to straying beyond
the old labor law, dating back to the 1940s. A liberalization from heavy
government intervention and creating a freer and flexible labor market
should be put on the agenda to fuel an economic boost for the country.

Economic Scenario
The economy of India is the tenth largest in the world by nominal GDP
and the third largest by purchasing power parity (PPP).4 The country is
one of the G20 major economies, a member of BRICS (the other mem-
bers of which are Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa), and a develop-
ing economy among the top twenty global traders according to the World
Trade Organization.5
The Indian Finance Ministry projected the growth of the Indian econ-
omy to accelerate to 7.4% in fiscal year 2014–2015, compared with 6.9%
in the previous year. In an annual report, the International Monetary
Fund forecast that the Indian economy would grow by 7.5% in the
2015–2016 fiscal year, up from 7.2% in the previous year.6
India was the nineteenth-largest merchandise and the sixth largest ser-
vices exporter in the world in 2013; it imported a total of US $616.7
billion worth of merchandise and services in 2013, as the twelfth-largest
merchandise and seventh largest services importer.7 The agriculture
sector is the largest employer in India’s economy, but contributes a

4
 International Monetary Fund, “India: Economy Stabilizes, but High Inflation, Slow
Growth Key Concerns,” IMF Survey, February 20, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car022014a.htm.
5
 World Trade Organization, “World Trade Report 2013,” World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr13_e.htm.
6
 Asit Ranjan Misra, “Economic Growth Slows to 7%, Sets Stage for RBI Rate Cut,” Live-
mint, September 1, 2015, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/LIC6WUEiLIG5feOewYC
4nL/Indias-Q1-GDP-growth-at-7.html.
7
 World Trade Organization, “Modest Trade Growth Anticipated 2014 and 2015
Following Two Year Slump,” WTO Press Release, April 14, 2014, https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres14_e/pr721_e.htm.
196   J. G. MCGANN

Table 11.2  Overview of Indian think tanks

Number of universities: 677


Number of think tanks: 192
% of think tanks out of regional total: 192/1106, 17.36%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2014):
 2012: 269
 2013: 268
 2014: 192
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2012): 2

declining share of its GDP (13.7% in 2012–2013).8 Its manufacturing


industry has held a constant share of economic contribution, while the
fastest-growing part of the economy has been its services sector, which
includes construction, telecoms, software and information technologies,
infrastructure, tourism, education, health care, travel, trade, banking,
and other components.9,10
Among China’s slowing growth, Brazil’s stagflation, Russia’s recession,
and South Africa’s inefficiency and corruption,11 India’s market stands
out. Moreover, the political dynamics featured by Modi’s pro-­development
promise on economic liberalization are also expected to provide a favor-
able political environment for an economic boost.

International Relations
India–China relations could be best described as “competition and coop-
eration.” The cooperation side mainly lies in the burgeoning economic
relations, counter-terrorism, and the Middle East issue based on more
frequent dialogue, while certain conflicting factors exist such as the long-­
standing border dispute, the Tibetan problem, and, most significantly,
each nation’s relation with a third party, which has created considerable
anxiety for the other. For instance, China is highly concerned about India’s

8
 The Economic Times, “Agriculture’s Share in GDP Declines to 13.7% in 2012–13,” The
Economic Times, August 30, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-
08-30/news/41618996_1_gdp-foodgrains-allied-sectors.
9
 Government of India, “India’s Fiscal Budget 2012–2013,” Government of India.
10
 Wikipedia, “Economy of India,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy_of_India.
11
 The Economist, “A Chance to Fly.”
  INDIA: AN OVERVIEW    197

relation with Japan and the United States, while the China–Pakistan rela-
tion has been closely monitored by India. Moreover, the shrinking bilat-
eral trade (from 74 billion in 2011 to 65 billion in 2013) and India’s 31
billion trade deficit to China have incurred further uncertainties in the
bilateral economic cooperation outlook.
The US–India–China relation is a complex, dynamic triangle. On the
one hand, the United States would like to see a stable China–India rela-
tionship, especially given other tensions in Asia and the world. Furthermore,
it will not necessarily mind if Chinese investment in India leads to a better
Indian economy and, in particular, infrastructure that can rebound to the
benefit of American business as well. On the other hand, the United States
would not like to see China and India grow too close, China dominate the
Indian economy, or for the two countries to form a tag team—with Russia
possibly in tow as well—in multilateral fora (Table 11.2).12

12
 Tanvi Madan, “The Modi-Xi Summit and China-India Relations,” The Brookings Insti-
tute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/09/16-modi-xi-summit-and-
china-india-relations.
CHAPTER 12

India’s Strategic Think Tank: The Institute


for Defense Studies and Analyses

Arvind Gupta

Introduction
India has a long tradition of strategic thinking dating back several millennia.
One of the greatest Indian thinkers of all time, Chanakya, also known as
Kautilya, wrote his magnum opus Arthashastra way back in 321 BC on
the art of governance. This important treatise, which is being revived
today as part of global heritage along with other Indian ancient texts on
statecraft, continues to inform Indian strategic thinking. However, centu-
ries of colonization affected the process of natural evolution of strategic
thinking in India. Most of the ancient knowledge was either lost in obliv-
ion or fell into disuse, allowing some of the colonial masters to claim that
India did not have a tradition of strategic thinking. This view was popular
even in the 1990s, when George Tanham alleged that Indian elites showed
(in the past) “little evidence of having thought coherently and systemati-
cally about national strategy.”1
1
 George K Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 1992).

A. Gupta (*)
Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s) 2019 199


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_12
200   A. GUPTA

However, this assessment of India’s strategic thinking is not quite


true. The fact remains that Indian elites had started wrestling with ideas
related to national strategy even before the country became independent.
The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) had been set up as a think
tank in 1943. It organized the famous Asian Relations Conference in
March 1947, even before India became independent. The importance of
strategic thinking had thus been underlined in independent India since
the beginning. However, the lack of resources, the preoccupation with
urgent regional and global issues, and the predominance of an active
political leadership setting the strategic agenda for an independent India
led to shift of focus away from think tanks until the debacle of the 1962
Sino-­Indian war, which forced the Indian government to think about
setting up an independent think tank on strategic affairs issues.2 That is
how the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) was born.
Since then, IDSA has emerged as a premier think tank in the country on
strategic affairs.
The decision of the government to set up IDSA indicated the impor-
tance that policy-makers attached to the role of strategic thinking in
policy-­making. IDSA was initially perceived as a think tank that would not
only provide inputs to the government on strategic issues, but also train
the officials dealing with security and defense matters. The Institute has
grown enormously since then. Its research activities have expanded beyond
the training of defense officials.
Indian foreign and security policy has undergone a dramatic transfor-
mation in the post–Cold War years. This has been occasioned by a chang-
ing geopolitical environment, the liberalization of the Indian economy
and unlocking of the country’s economic potential, and the gradual rec-
ognition of India as a responsible democracy. Its acceptability as a rising
power on the world stage has also grown substantially.
Policy-makers in India have understood the implications and conse-
quences of such changes and struggled to adapt to them in innovative
ways. There is a growing inclination among policy-makers to get out of
the command model and liberalize the processes of policy-making, creat-
ing an opportunity for think tanks and other relevant non-governmental
agencies to assume critical importance in policy-making circles. In the

2
 For a brilliant institutional biography of IDSA and the circumstances leading to its birth
and growth as a think tank of repute in the Indian setting, see K. Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in
Retrospect,” Strategic Analysis, Vol 35, No 4, July 2011, 719–738.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    201

post–Cold War period there has also been a mushrooming of think tanks
in India, some of them sponsored by business houses, engaged in the busi-
ness of analyzing, influencing, and shaping public policy.
In an impressive essay in 2009, an American scholar, Daniel Markey,
acknowledged the growing salience of think tanks in India’s foreign pol-
icy, despite the challenges they face.3 Some of these challenges are in
attracting and retaining talent, in accessing critical information to conduct
relevant policy research, and in combating initial suspicion of the foreign
policy-making establishment about possible leaking of official secrets if
think tanks are allowed to play a larger role in such a critical area. In
Markey’s article, special mention was made of the Ministry of External
Affairs outsourcing discrete analytical tasks to IDSA, which showed that
the compulsion to harness the potential of think-tanks, as well as their
relevance in governmental circles, is growing. Against this setting, it is use-
ful to analyze the role played by IDSA as a think tank in the country’s
overall processes of foreign and security policy-making.

Coping with the Larger Eco-System: Tracing


IDSA’s Evolution
IDSA was registered as a society on November 11, 1965. The initiative for
setting up a non-partisan, autonomous research institute dedicated to
national security came from the then Defence Minister Shri Yeshwantrao
Chavan, who was one of the Institute’s founding members. In the after-
math of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, which India lost, a need was felt to
establish a research outfit aligned to the government, both to educate
policy-makers about the larger security environment and to provide policy
alternatives for use by the government. The RAND Corporation of the
United States and the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) of the United
Kingdom were considered as possible models. During his visit to the
United States in May 1964, shortly before the death of India’s first Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Shri Chavan was greatly impressed by the way
researchers in RAND approached issues pertaining to defense and national
security. He was particularly impressed by the analytical methods they
used to develop their research and analysis, and thought to replicate the

3
 Daniel Markey, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software,’” Asia Policy 8 (2009):
73–96, restricted access at http://www.nbr.org/Publications/Asia_policy/AP8/
AP8_Markey_India.pdf.
202   A. GUPTA

same modes of analysis in Indian conditions. Subsequently, the then chief


of army staff recommended the ISS model as a better option and more
suited to the Indian system, and his view was finally accepted. If one were
to study IDSA’s evolution, the comparison with ISS and RAND stopped
once it came into being. Depending on the socio-cultural and political
setting in which it is embedded, IDSA acquired a dynamic all of its own
and negotiated the changing socio-economic and political environment at
home, and the evolving global geopolitical milieu, on its own terms to
establish itself as a think tank of consequence in India.

Initial Phase
It is a truism that an institution aiming at informing and shaping public
policy will have to constantly navigate its way through challenges emanat-
ing from the prevailing socio-political and economic ecosystem in which it
operates. During the initial days after independence, when India had
opted for a democratic polity with socialist leanings, the system of admin-
istration exhibited the same old reflexes of the British imperial system—
emphasis on secrecy, unwillingness to interact with anybody outside the
system, and an inertial distaste for transparency. It was natural, therefore,
for IDSA to struggle its way through in order to carve out a respectable
space for itself in the teeth of bureaucratic/systemic stiffness, indifference,
and non-cooperation.
Anecdotal recollections of those associated with the IDSA during the
1970s and 1980s would suggest that after setting up the Institute, the
armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy did not cooperate with IDSA to
harness, let alone enhance, its research potential. The armed forces refused
to send their officers to serve in the Institute for fear of contaminating
them with civilian ideas through their interactions with non-servicemen.
There was a similar attitude prevailing in the Foreign Office. More impor-
tantly, the overall environment at the military-bureaucratic level, a func-
tion of the wider socio-political condition which emphasized secrecy and
inflexibility, discouraged sharing of information and ideas between gov-
ernment officials and researchers outside the system. The inertial resis-
tance to sharing official records with researchers for any worthwhile study
of governmental action in the past still persists in the Indian bureaucratic
system today, with lesser intensity, as will be discussed later. Interestingly,
all this happened when the leadership of IDSA was being drawn from the
ranks of civilian bureaucracy, either serving or retired.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    203

As a former director of IDSA, K. Subrahmanyam, regarded as the father


of strategic thinking in India, reminisced: “the idea of independent studies
by researchers outside the government was not acceptable. Those within
the government could hardly spare the time to carry out any research. The
result is that the Government of India—unlike other governments—func-
tions with a very short memory and has no institutionalised learning
process.”
It goes to the credit of the leadership as well as the research staff that
they sustained IDSA’s relevance and capacity as an institution devoted to
strategic research over time. The Institute carved out a place for itself as a
think tank with a difference largely because it was led in its most formative
phase by a bureaucrat (K. Subrahmanyam) with intimate knowledge of the
intricacies of the decision-making apparatus of the government and with a
known passion for strategic studies. This is not to say that the Institute
blindly defended governmental policies and propagated such views among
the larger domestic audience. On the contrary, in many cases the views of
the Institute ran foul of government policies and provoked sharp reactions
from powerful sections of the establishment.4 In such instances, the then
leadership of IDSA counted on the help and support of a small but power-
ful section in the bureaucracy, as well as the political circle, to avert direct
confrontation, which could have led to withdrawal of fiscal support,
stricter control, operational hardship, and probably premature death of
the Institute. Y. V. Chavan, the founder president of IDSA, and the defense
secretaries of the time in the government understood the need to encour-
age independent research. During Shri Chavan’s long tenure as president,
from IDSA’s inception in 1965 till 1978, he played a big role in absorbing
adverse criticism of the functioning as well as the approach taken by IDSA
during the early years.
On issues of strategic importance like defense management, China’s
defense policy, nuclear deterrence, and the assessment of government pol-
icies in crisis situations (especially in the wake of the crisis in East Pakistan
in 1971), IDSA circulated its views in the media and through its publica-
tions in a fearless manner. It earned the ire of the government and services
4
 For example, the criticism of government policies leading to the 1962 war with China,
and later in early 1971 the Institute’s analyses of the situation in East Pakistan, its implica-
tions for India, and recommendations to the government for conclusive action, were not
received well in the corridors of power. Similarly, the scholars of the Institute had dissenting
views on defense management, nuclear issues, and India’s relationship with the United
States, which was not always in tune with the position of the government of the time.
204   A. GUPTA

at times, but stuck to its prime responsibility of disseminating information


relating to national security issues, and critically analyzed the domestic,
regional, and global security environment for wider consumption. In fact,
in its early years the Institute had raised the issue of setting up a national
security council, which did not evoke much sympathy with the decision-­
makers then, as the Institute was too young to make an impression. At one
level, IDSA passed through a phase of credibility crisis during the early
years. Those in the decision-making structure considered IDSA too
removed from the governmental system to be of any use for them; those
outside government looked on the Institute as an extension of the govern-
ment, hence incapable of independent thinking.

Post-1990s
The situation began to turn for the better as the overall political situation
at the domestic and external levels changed over time. Once the Institute
weathered the opposition from bureaucracy and services in the 1970s and
established its reputation as an independent and useful resource, it inspired
the healthy respect of governmental agencies. There was a favorable
response to its offer of providing training to government servants and
officers from the armed forces on strategic issues of relevance to public
policy-making, especially in matters concerning defense and national secu-
rity. As interactions grew between policy-makers at various levels, in
bureaucracy and services, and researchers at the Institute, there was greater
mutual appreciation of each other’s efforts, leading to greater acceptability
of the Institute in governmental circles. At the same time, IDSA’s inter-
face with academia and the media gradually dispelled negative notions
about it as a mere appendage of the government.
As the pall of the command economy began to lift following the end of
the Cold War and India opened up its economy, there was an overall empha-
sis on openness in Indian society and polity. The revival of the democratic
spirit, after the brief unpleasant interlude of the emergency years (exactly
21 months, between June 25, 1975 and March 21, 1977), also provided
the right ambience for profound changes in Indian society.5 The effect of

5
 The emergency years (1975–1977) had a constricting impact on the functioning of the
Institute and led to divisions within its executive council (EC). There was a move to encour-
age one of the EC members, a reputed academic and a vocal opponent of the emergency, to
resign from the EC, apparently under pressure from certain quarters in the government,
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    205

globalization and technological innovations leading to revolution in


communication greatly enhanced the capacity of think tanks to reach out to
wider constituencies and carry out their roles more effectively.
The years following the 1990s witnessed the establishment of several
think tanks in India, some of which were privately funded. Buffeted by
overall liberalization in the economic and political sphere, the think tank
culture grew appreciably in the country. The government began to invest
in policy research and interaction between policy-makers and think tanks
grew substantially. Since then, think tanks are being made to function in a
highly competitive environment. Against this setting, as the regional and
global political and security environment has changed, the leadership as
well as research staff at IDSA effectively adapted themselves to change and
kept up their professional honesty and integrity, to further strengthen
IDSA’s position in India and abroad.

Objective and Mission
Designed as a think tank funded by the government, IDSA had a humble
and modest beginning. Its mandated mission was to provide objective
assessments of issues relating to national and international security. As per
its memorandum, the objective of the organization is “to initiate study,
discussion and research on problems of National Security and impact of
Defence measures on economic, social and political processes,” and to
promote research and exchange of information on “defence studies and
analyses, strategy, disarmament and international relations.”6 Over the
years, the ambit of research and analysis at IDSA has expanded. In tune
with the times, along with traditional hard security issues, it has added
non-traditional security issues as an important area of research.
The vision statement of the Institute adopted in 2007 brought further
clarity to its activities and emphasized policy-oriented research, training
and capacity-building, and public education. IDSA has played a crucial
role in shaping India’s foreign and security policies. Its contribution has
been particularly visible in areas related to nuclear weapons, military expen-
diture, and conventional and non-conventional threats to the country.

which was resented by IDSA members. Ultimately, the concerned member, even though he
was asked to continue, did resign, taking exception to that very move. This incident was the
only one where an aborted attempt was made to influence IDSA’s EC. However, this was an
exception and in no way affected the independence and autonomy of the Institute.
6
 As per Art 3 (i) and (ii), Memorandum of Association Rules and Regulations, IDSA, New
Delhi.
206   A. GUPTA

IDSA’s larger mission is to promote national and international security


through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defense and
security issues among the larger strategic community in India and the
world. It has also served as a forum to debate various issues related to
national and international security. Through regular seminars, confer-
ences, roundtables, and workshops participated in by practitioners, aca-
demics, journalists, and strategic analysts, the Institute helps generate
ideas, analyses, and policy inputs relevant for use by the country’s
decision-makers.

Structure
IDSA is funded entirely by India’s Ministry of Defence. However, this in
no way affects its independence. It is governed by a neutral and non-­
partisan Executive Council (EC), whose members include distinguished
personalities from all walks of life. The EC consists of both elected mem-
bers, including the president, usually a senior minister in the government,
and a few ex officio members from the government (conventionally serv-
ing secretaries from foreign and defense ministries), the director general,
the deputy director general, and a representative of the research staff.
The elected members of the EC are chosen for two-year terms at the
Annual General Body Meeting (AGBM), consisting of life and “ordinary”
members of the Institute. There are 271 voting members in the AGBM
today; they come from all walks of life, including academics, journalists,
serving or retired bureaucrats, and servicemen, all of them distinguished
for their contribution to strategic affairs. The EC, so chosen, is not answer-
able to the government and plays a critical role in ensuring the smooth
functioning of the Institute in an independent manner. It is fully empow-
ered to take decisions pertaining to personnel, establishment, administra-
tion, and so on. Its activities are supported by committees covering
different aspects of the Institute’s work, including the Human Resources
and Finance Committee, Research Committee, Membership Committee,
and Campus Development Committee. In case any of the EC members
dies, resigns, or is found to be unsuitable, the EC has the power to nomi-
nate somebody to fill the post till an election is held. The independence
and autonomy enjoyed by the Institute are a function of the unencum-
bered freedom the EC enjoys in charting out the research agenda, as well
as the overall functioning of the Institute.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    207

The Institute’s director general is usually chosen from of a list of persons


with interest and expertise in strategic affairs. The list is prepared by a
search committee appointed by the EC, and finally it chooses one candi-
date from the list. The director general manages the day-to-day affairs of
the Institute with the help of the EC. IDSA has a well-qualified multidis-
ciplinary research faculty chosen by an open and transparent selection pro-
cess based on merit. Its members are usually drawn from academia, the
defense forces, and the civil service, representing a diversity of views. This
helps in cross-fertilization of ideas and strengthens the quality of research.
Apart from a dedicated research faculty, the Institute encourages serving
officials from government, military services, academics, and the media to
join as faculty from time to time. Some of them move on subsequently to
assume higher positions in the government, strengthening the linkages
between the Institute and the government.
IDSA also offers an internship program for budding scholars from
India and abroad for a limited period. It has a visiting fellowship program
for scholars from South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) countries too. These arrangements prove quite helpful in pro-
moting diversity and intercultural learning at the Institute.

Autonomy
Although IDSA is funded by India’s Ministry of Defence, it has since its
inception protected and maintained its autonomy. The government does
not interfere with the setting up of the Institute’s research agenda, nor
does it censor its content. IDSA, in fact, does not hold a single view. Its
scholars are encouraged to express their views freely. The structure of the
Institute helps it to maintain its autonomy. The EC, as has been noted,
is fully empowered to take decisions pertaining to personnel, establish-
ment, administration, and so on. The IDSA director decides the research
agenda. Working with the government has been a challenging experi-
ence for the Institute; however, there has been a conscious effort to
strike a balance between maintaining institutional autonomy and respect-
ing the genuine concerns of the government in matters concerning
national security. The system has functioned well and is a model for
other government-funded institutes as to how best to maintain their
autonomy.
208   A. GUPTA

Respect for Diversity
The issue of autonomy is best illustrated by the diversity of the views
obtaining at IDSA on any theme of research undertaken by its scholars at
any point in time. The Institute neither encourages uniformity of thinking
not has a singular view on any issue. It has never sought to toe any particu-
lar line, least of all the official line, on any issue, in a bid to retain its finan-
cial grant from the government. On the contrary, thanks to the democratic
culture nourished zealously by the country’s leadership, despite objections
from sections within the government, the founding members of IDSA—
some of them in high positions in the decision-making structure—cham-
pioned the cause of independent thinking, respected differences of
opinion, and encouraged constructive criticism of governmental policies.
The first evaluation committee’s report within five years of the Institute’s
establishment acknowledged the fact that IDSA, through its independent
stance on sensitive issues, had caused embarrassment to the government.
It went on to mention the following:

It is, however, necessary to distinguish between the autonomous function-


ing of the Institute, the need to reinforce its image of autonomy and the
utilization of the Institute’s resources and facilities by various governmental
agencies and the interaction between such agencies and the Institute. These
are not mutually exclusive propositions. Our aim should be to promote both
the autonomous character of the Institute and its increasing utility, not only
to the public, but also to the governmental agencies.7

It can be further gleaned from the deliberations of one of India’s defense


ministers in Parliament way back in 1970 that the political leadership val-
ued alternative points of view and supported their espousal, even if they
contradicted the official line. After informing the house that institutes like
IDSA had been established with the aim of educating public opinion on
defense-related issues and taking note of divergence in viewpoints between
institutes and the government, he argued forcefully: “But I encourage that
because it is better to have two viewpoints, better to have discussion, and
thereafter we can evolve something which is broadly acceptable to the
country.”8 Such an approach by the principal stakeholder of the Institute,
the Ministry of Defence, ensured IDSA’s blossoming into a truly “autono-
mous body,” as was envisioned by its founders.

7
 Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 727.
8
 Ibid.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    209

As a measure of the Institute’s growing relevance and autonomy, there


is a conscious effort by governmental agencies today to leverage the
research base at IDSA and enhance their understanding of various complex
national and international security issues. There is a new trend of late to
fund research activities by various ministries, other than the Ministry of
Defence, on particular issues pertaining to neighborhood, internal secu-
rity, and environment.

Research Centers and Output


IDSA’s research activities are conducted by thirteen different centers
focusing on different areas. These centers are arranged on the basis of area
studies as well as critical themes pertaining to internal and external secu-
rity, and are as follows:

1. East Asia
2. West Asia
3. South Asia
4. South East Asia and Oceania
5. North America
6. Europe and Eurasia
7. Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, and United Nations
8. Nuclear Arms and Arms Control
9. Internal Security
10. Military Affairs
11. Non-traditional Security
12. Strategic Technologies
13. Defence Economics and Industry

These research centers work independently of each other and focus on


specialized themes, but share their outputs with each other in seminars,
roundtables, and focus group discussions from time to time. Such exer-
cises ensure quality and the productive involvement of researchers in the
activities of these centers. The research output is subjected to scrutiny by
experts within and outside the country and then published by the Institute
for wider circulation.
IDSA has several publications to its credit. It publishes journals, books,
monographs, occasional papers, policy briefs, issue briefs, and news digests.
All its publications are subjected to multiple reviews to ensure quality.
Strategic Analysis, the flagship journal of the Institute, is published by a
210   A. GUPTA

renowned publishing house, Routledge, based in London.9 The journal is


read and appreciated all over the world. Apart from this journal, the
Institute has a very active website which provides a forum for debate on
contemporary issues. The commentaries published on the website are
widely followed and commented on. Most of IDSA’s publications are
freely available on its website.

Strategy
There is a continuing effort at the Institute to adopt the right strategies to
stay relevant in an increasingly competitive matrix, where many private
think tanks are conducting themselves with a great deal of enthusiasm, zeal,
and flexibility to make their presence felt in a highly dynamic strategic envi-
ronment. Both in terms of redefining the foci of research at the Institute in
response to the changing strategic milieu and adopting new methods to
disseminate the output among the larger strategic community, IDSA has
displayed a remarkable capacity to adapt to change. Whether it is through
regular interface with policy-makers, think tanks, or interaction with influ-
ential members of the strategic community, the Institute has always sought
to keep itself abreast of the requirements of decision-makers and tried its
best to furnish them with an unbiased and objective assessment of the chal-
lenges they are facing and the alternatives they may consider. As regards its
mandate to disseminate its research findings, IDSA has made a continuous
effort to take advantage of the latest technology to reach out to the widest
possible audience.10 Some of its strategies are outlined in what follows.

Emphasis on Policy-Relevant Research


The Institute focuses on research on critical areas of interest to policy-­
makers and strategic analysts. In order to make its research policy relevant,
IDSA organizes regular interfaces with policy-makers, analysts, the media,
and academics. Such interaction helps the faculty identify research areas of

9

The journal can be accessed at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20#.
UrgZUfQW3sE or http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis.
10
 As a measure of success of the Institute’s electronic outreach strategy, IDSA’s website
drew more than 1 million visitors, 2.2 million page views, and more than 80 million hits in
2013. As per the leading web analytics service provider Alexa’s traffic estimates, based on
data from its global traffic panel, IDSA has even overtaken some of the leading think tanks
like Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    211

critical import, establish contact and communication with the larger


strategic community, and enrich their understanding of issues affecting the
wider security environment.

Emphasis on Dissemination
For the dissemination of research outcomes, IDSA organizes regular
workshops and seminars where scholars present their findings in an open
forum subject to critical scrutiny by peers and experts. It has the help of its
publications, which are circulated widely to disseminate the final outcomes
of research. The faculty members also write regularly in vernacular and
English-language print media, and appear in audio-visual media as well to
debate issues relating to their areas of research.

Sensitization of the Strategic Community


IDSA organizes regular training programs for civil servants, servicemen,
and paramilitary personnel on security and international affairs. The train-
ing modules are carefully prepared to inform trainees about the changing
security environment and international perspectives on different issues of
import like human rights, non-traditional security, strategic technologies,
and so on. Such programs also ensure interaction of scholars with security
personnel, and acquaint them with the concerns, anxieties, and expecta-
tions of the people managing security at the ground level.

Building Networks
The Institute has signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with more
than thirty think tanks around the world engaged in research on security
and international affairs. Some of them are affiliated to governments in
different countries. This helps IDSA to engage in track-two and track-1.5
dialogues with these partner organizations. Inputs from such bilateral
conversations are fed into track one on a regular basis. These interactions
enable linkages among strategic communities and provide an opportunity
for researchers of these institutes to strengthen their understanding of
bilateral and international issues. At the internal level, within India, IDSA
has also tried to build linkages with other think tanks engaged in strategic
research. It is beginning to collaborate with Indian universities.
212   A. GUPTA

Regular Interaction with the Government


The Institute benefits greatly from regular interaction with government
officials working in areas related to security and foreign policy, providing
a useful platform to policy-makers to explain their perspectives and take
critical inputs from the analysts. Several taskforces at IDSA work in close
cooperation with the government to provide policy-makers with fresh per-
spectives on relevant issues. Reports of these taskforces have also been
published for wider circulation in the public domain. The public diplo-
macy division of the Ministry of External Affairs works closely with the
Institute to regularly acquaint the strategic community with policy mea-
sures adopted by the government from time to time. IDSA hosts senior
officials, serving diplomats, think tankers, and academics from other coun-
tries regularly as well. The directors of the Institute have also played an
important role in sustaining the momentum of research at IDSA and nur-
turing linkages with various stakeholders.

Impact Assessment
It is not always easy to assess the impact or influence of a think tank on
public policy. The accomplishments of think tanks are often measured in
terms of actual changes in public policy that have been occasioned by an
institute’s inputs. However, as noted by some observers, “such output
measures are also much more elusive and difficult to develop” and “there
is no equivalent of a DNA test to declare the parentage with a comparable
degree of certainty!”11
In fact, determining the extent to which a think tank or group of think
tanks influences a particular policy decision is a daunting methodological
task. Sometimes, sections within the government and particular think
tanks share similar policy perspectives and their support to each other
helps shape public policy in one way or another. In some other cases, think
tanks are effectively used by policy-makers to leverage and promote a cer-
tain policy line. During such a process of surrogacy, think tanks bring in
unmistakable influence in the way policies are framed and articulated.
For organizations like IDSA, which is constantly reviewing governmen-
tal policies and helping the process of policy-making, it is difficult and
counterproductive to claim its influence in emphatic terms. Therefore, it
11
 Murray Weidenbaum, “Measuring the Influence of Think Tanks,” Society 47 (2010):
135, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12115-009-9292-8#page-1.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    213

is useful to focus on particular instances where IDSA’s contribution was


clearly evident. However, the successes of IDSA’s activities are in no way
limited to these examples.

Examples of Influence on Strategic Thinking in 1971


In an important article, “IDSA—In Retrospect,” the former director of
IDSA, K. Subrahmanyam, reminisced in detail about the role IDSA played
during the critical months between July and December 1971, when India
was facing aggression from Pakistan.12 He reports how IDSA scholars
wrote about 150 articles in the media and appeared in over 50 audio-­
visual programs urging the government to try out all options, including
conventional war. He clearly mentions how he held fast to the autonomy
principle, in spite of acute pressure from some sections within the govern-
ment for so vocally supporting the idea of a military confrontation with
Pakistan, primarily because all other options had failed.
In spite of all this, Subrahmanyam was allowed to voice his dissenting
opinion, which ultimately guided the government’s approach to Pakistan
by December 1971. The then president of IDSA, Defence Minister Y. V.
Chavan, did not interfere with the issue, and a culture of autonomy was
allowed to grow as far as IDSA’s interaction with the government was
concerned. It is true that as an officer of the Indian Administrative Service
(IAS), in close contact with influential policy-makers, Subrahmanyam
played a stellar role in using the autonomy granted to IDSA and enhanced
the Institute’s impact in policy-making circles. He retained his association
with IDSA until his demise in 2011. This momentum was retained in sub-
sequent years by the leadership at the Institute.

Steering Debates in New Areas and Influencing Public Policy


The very first items of research which the Institute undertook in the initial
years pertained to maritime affairs and defense management. Its initial
publications began to look at India’s options in the global strategic envi-
ronment. Relations with Pakistan and China were natural items of research
for its scholars. India faced multiple security challenges in the 1970s and
1980s, which were studied in great detail at IDSA.  The liberation of

12
 Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 719–738.
214   A. GUPTA

Bangladesh occupied the attention of its scholars. Some of the papers


prepared by the Institute on national security issues were critical of
governmental policy, yet IDSA maintained its autonomy.
In the wake of the Kargil war, the leadership of the Institute partici-
pated in the process of review of national security and defense and played
its role in framing the Kargil Committee report, which provided the blue-
print for security-sector reforms to enhance defense preparedness. IDSA’s
leadership also participated in drafting the Report of the Informal Group
on carrying forward the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP) on disarma-
ment, unveiled in 1988. The Institute has succeeded in steering debates
on important issues like neighborhood relations, nuclear engagement with
the wider world, and defense economics.

New Areas of Research


Over the years, the research agenda of the Institute has expanded to
include topical issues of importance for public policy. These include higher
defense management reforms, India’s nuclear policies, relations with great
powers, relations with neighbors, and so on. A large number of thematic
issues have also been taken up for research, including relationships with
neighboring countries, terrorism, cyber security, India’s strategic thinking,
maritime security, energy security, resource scarcity, and internal security.
An important area of research on which IDSA has focused is defense
economics. In 2006, the Defence Economics & Industry research center
was created to promote research in the area. Within a short time, through
objective research and outreach activities, the center was at the forefront
of the national debate on issues related to defense spending, arms procure-
ment procedure, offset policy, and the defense industry. Several sugges-
tions emanating from the center has found acceptance at the Indian
Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The center was tasked by the MoD with preparing a Detailed Project
Report (DPR) on “Acquisition Training.” The DPR, presently under con-
sideration by the MoD, provides a thorough roadmap for providing pro-
fessional training to the acquisition workforce. The Defence Economics &
Industry research center plays a vital role in the recently created IDSA
Forum for MoD–Industry Dialogue. This forum has proven highly suc-
cessful in engaging the key functionaries of the MoD and the defense
industry, and in finding a solution to problems affecting the domestic
defense industry.
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    215

Similarly, the centers covering South Asia and West Asia were tasked
with the job of looking at foreign policy issues in India’s immediate as well
as extended neighborhoods. The researchers at IDSA looked at the prob-
lems affecting India’s relationship with different countries and suggested
measures to address them through an open critique of governmental poli-
cies. It has been the endeavor at the Institute to enrich research activities
through arranging regular interface with policy-makers, encouraging
researchers to undertake field trips and defend their findings and analyses
in open seminars.
IDSA has been an open institution encouraging multidisciplinary
research. Its research faculty includes academics, diplomats, military per-
sonnel, media persons, economists, and social scientists. There is a healthy
turnover of research staff. In addition, the Institute hosts scores of interns
and visiting fellows from within and outside India every year. It is open to
fresh ideas. IDSA’s research output goes through strict peer review to
maintain high standards. Over the years, it has nurtured the Indian strate-
gic community. Many of its faculty have gone on to head new think tanks.
Many others have taken teaching assignments in India and abroad. IDSA
is also well regarded by students at Indian universities. The Institute’s
website has emerged as a major resource for information and analysis on
Indian positions on key issues.

Constraints
IDSA faces a number of constraints in its work. Some of the constraints or
challenges have already been discussed, particularly the challenge of work-
ing with the Indian government, which funds the Institute’s activities. As
previously mentioned, IDSA has kept pace with the changing times. In the
case of disagreement with the government, it has stuck zealously to its
autonomous agenda and, through its effective communication strategy,
emphasized the need for a think tank to be neutral and mindful of its
responsibility to provide objective analyses of national security issues. The
approach of the government, as a stakeholder, has changed over time, and
there is a greater willingness to work with think tanks like IDSA through
increased interaction and sponsorship of research in critical areas of inter-
est for policy-makers.
Nevertheless, despite such a positive shift in the government’s approach
to think tanks, there are several issues of concern. Among these, the most
important is the inability of the government in India to share its historical
216   A. GUPTA

records with researchers. Unlike in Western countries, where official records


are made available after a stipulated time, the mindset in India is rather
conservative, and there is a tendency to hide information from the public
about perceived failures of the government in crisis situations in the past.
Yet, this situation seems to be changing for the better. In 2005, the
government, largely under public pressure, passed the Right to Information
(RTI) Act to provide a “timely response to citizen’s requests for govern-
ment information.” In some cases, researchers in India are making good
use of RTI for their research. Similarly, in 2012, the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs acknowledged that fact that “old files of the Ministry of
External Affairs are an important source of material for research and refer-
ence purposes,” and declassified 70,000 files, transferring them to the
National Archives of India. This act was widely welcomed by researchers
in India and abroad. However, there is a need to push for a time-bound
declassification of official records, rather than keeping them out of the
public eye under the pretext of security sensitivity. IDSA has advocated
openness in this matter through its research over the years and, while it is
operating under such constraints, its interface with the government pro-
vides it access to official thinking, which helps its researchers to get
acquainted with the requirements of policy-makers and to produce policy-­
friendly research.
Another constraint faced by the Institute is the dearth of resources.
Although the government has been generous with IDSA and provided
funds as well as built world-class facilities, the growing agenda of the
Institute requires more resources. A more serious constraint is human
resources. It takes time to nurture scholarship. Since most of the positions
in the Institute are on a contract basis, IDSA loses experienced and knowl-
edgeable scholars from time to time. Sometimes it is difficult to find
younger scholars with adequate specialization in key areas. Within these
constraints, which are natural for any think tank, IDSA has been able to
manage its affairs well.

Conclusion
India’s growing profile as an emerging power has helped IDSA raise its
own profile nationally and internationally. From the 1990s, ever since
India liberalized its economy and clocked up around 8% GDP growth for
almost a decade, there have been significant changes in Indian society and
polity. Growth in the economy has led to business houses taking an inter-
  INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINK TANK: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES…    217

est in strategic affairs, and some of them have established their own think
tanks engaged in risk analysis and the overall study of the global economic
and security environment. The media has also become more influential
and its interest in matters related to defense and security has grown sub-
stantially. With a demand for greater transparency in the public sphere,
and the passing of the RTI, there has been a greater appreciation of the
value of openness in the way policies are being formulated and imple-
mented. Therefore, policy-makers are also gradually shedding their inhibi-
tions and beginning to deal with think tanks. There is a great deal of
hunger in the media and general public to know more about Indian posi-
tions on strategic issues. Moreover, the evolving global geostrategic situa-
tion, with greater strategic uncertainties surrounding developments in
East and Southeast Asia, as well as ongoing turmoil in the energy-rich
West Asian and North African regions, the governmental interest in inde-
pendent research is likely to grow.
Although the rate of India’s economic growth has declined in recent
years, the long-term forecast for the country is pretty optimistic. Therefore,
the positive changes taking place in the society and polity are unlikely to
be reversed. There is thus a greater opportunity today for think tanks to
increase their relevance through focused research and networking with
business, media, non-governmental organizations, and governmental
agencies. As an autonomous body, funded by the government, IDSA has
a unique advantage to sustain its importance as a leading think tank in
India.
Against this setting, IDSA has positioned itself well, and played a key
role in interacting with policy-makers and raising awareness about strate-
gic issues among the public. The Institute has been able to do so success-
fully despite the fact that it is fully funded by the government and it has
taken a conscious decision not to accept non-public funding. The
­objectivity of IDSA publications as well as their quality have ensured that
the Institute is seen as a respectable think tank within India and abroad.
The Institute will continue to play its due role in line with its mandate in
the years to come.
CHAPTER 13

Singapore: An Overview

James G. McGann

Singapore has grown to be one of the world’s most prosperous countries,


with very high economic freedom and export rates (Table 13.1). However,
it faces various challenges in the international domain, with concerns
about Southeast Asian security as well as regional diplomacy. The
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies is a leading think tank and
graduate teaching institution specializing in strategic and international
affairs. It tackles a wide range of issues, from traditional security to eco-
nomic multilateralism. Most recently, it has provided the Singaporean
government with specific recommendations on the future of the ASEAN
community, aiding the country’s track-one diplomacy.

Overview
Singapore, officially the Republic of Singapore, is an island country which
became independent from the United Kingdom in 1963. Singapore pro-
gressively turned into one of the world’s most prosperous countries, with

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 219


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_13
220   J. G. MCGANN

Table 13.1  Singapore at a glance

Country name Republic of Singapore


Capital Singapore
Population 5,674,472 (2015 est.)
Location Asia (southeastern Asia)
(continent)
Ethnic groups Chinese (74.2%), Malay (13.3%), Indian (9.2%), other 3.3%
Language Mandarin (official), English (official), Hokkien, Tamil (official),
Cantonese, Teochew
Currency (name Singapore dollar, 1 SGD = 0.74 US dollar
and exchange
rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Parliamentary republic
Chief of state President Tony Tan Keng Yam
Head of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
government
Cabinet Appointed by President, responsible to Parliament
Elections The President is elected by popular vote for a six-year term.
Following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or
of a majority coalition is usually appointed Prime Minister by the
President. The President also appoints the Deputy Prime Minister.
Legislative branch Unicameral Parliament
Judicial branch Supreme Court (consists of the president or chief justice and 16
justices and is organized into an upper-tier Appeal Court and a
lower-tier High Court)
Political parties National Solidarity Party (NSP), People’s Action Party (PAP),
Reform Party, Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA), Singapore
Democratic Party (SDP), Singapore People’s Party (SPP), Workers’
Party (WP)

Some economic facts


GDP: US $468.9 billion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $85,700 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 0%, industry 23.8%, services 76.2%

strong international economic links in terms of having the fourth-biggest


financial center and fifth-busiest port.1
The economy depends heavily on exports, particularly on consumer
electronics, information technology products, pharmaceuticals, and on a
growing financial services sector. As a long-term plan, Singapore has
1
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Singapore,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html.
  SINGAPORE: AN OVERVIEW    221

attracted major investments in pharmaceuticals and medical technology


production, so that it can be established as Southeast Asia’s financial and
high-tech hub.2
Lee Kuan Yew was the founding father and first Prime Minister from
1959, when Singapore became independent, to 1990. He died on March
23, 2015. During his term, Singapore became an admired international
business and financial center. He set the “Singapore model,” which
implied centralized power, clean government, and economic liberalism.
However, it was also criticized because of suppressing political opposition
and imposing strict limits on free speech.3

Economic Situation
Singapore has achieved great economic success for four reasons: its strate-
gic location, a natural harbor, being open to foreign trade and investment,
and having a small and efficient government.4
However, Singapore has one of the highest income inequalities among
developed countries, since it has the world’s highest percentage of mil-
lionaires, with one out of every six households having at least US $1 mil-
lion in disposable wealth.5 The country has no minimum wage, since it is
believed that would negatively affect its competitiveness. Singapore also
rejected the need for a generous welfare system.6

2
 World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Singapore,” World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s267_sum_e.pdf.
3
 Seth Mydans, “Lee Kuan Yew, Founding Father and First Premier of Singapore, Dies at
91,” The New  York Times, March 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/
world/asia/lee-kuan-yew-founding-father-and-first-premier-of-singapore-dies-at-91.html?
module=Notification&version=BreakingNews&region=FixedTop&action=Click&contentC
ollection=BreakingNews&contentID=31462333&pgtype=Homepage.
4
 The Economist, “Why Singapore Became an Economic Success,” The Economist,
March 26, 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/
economist-explains-23.
5
 Shibani Mahtani. “Singapore No.1 For Millionaires-Again”. Wall Street Journal Southeast
Asia blog. June 1, 2012. http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2012/06/01/sin-
gapore-no-1-for-millionaires-again/?mg=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.
wsj.com%252Fsearealtime%252F2012%252F06%252F01%252Fsingap
ore-no-1-for-millionaires-again%252F.
6
 The Economist, “The Stingy Nanny,” The Economist, February 13, 2010. http://www.
economist.com/node/15524092.
222   J. G. MCGANN

The Monetary Authority of Singapore is the central bank and financial


regulatory authority. It manages the Singapore dollar exchange rate
against a trade-weighted basket of currencies of the country’s major trad-
ing partners. This trade-weighted exchange rate is maintained within a
target band, which is undisclosed. Also, the currency is allowed to appreci-
ate or depreciate depending on factors such as the level of world inflation
and domestic price pressures. The Monetary Authority of Singapore
­intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent excessive fluctua-
tions in the Singapore dollar exchange rate.7
Malaysia is Singapore’s largest trading partner; China and the United
States come second and third.8
According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Singapore is
ranked as the second freest economy in the world. It is the fourteenth
largest exporter and the fifteenth largest importer in the world. Also, it is
currently the only Asian country to receive AAA credit ratings from all
three major credit rating agencies. Singapore has a network of eighteen
regional and bilateral agreements covering twenty-four trading partners,
mostly within the Asia-Pacific region. It is also participating in the Trans-­
Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.9

Foreign Relations
Singapore’s foreign policy is focused on security in Southeast Asia and its
surrounding territories. It is the one of the founding members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since the economy of
Singapore is closely linked to the Southeast Asian region, it is a supporter
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area.10
One of the most controversial issues concerns a sovereignty dispute
between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca, a small island located
8 miles off the eastern coast of Johor and 28 miles off the eastern coast of
Singapore. On May 23, 2008, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

7
 Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Monetary Policy,” Singapore Government Securities,
http://www.sgs.gov.sg/The-SGS-Market/Monetary-Policy.aspx.
8
 US Library of Congress, “Singapore Trade,” Country Studies, http://countrystudies.
us/singapore/36.htm.
9
 Jon C. Ogg, “Remaining Countries with AAA Credit Ratings,” NBC News, August 8,
2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44020687/ns/business-world_business/t/remain-
ing-countries-aaa-credit-ratings/#.VSQ2-PnF9rM.
10
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, “ASEAN,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://
www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/asean.html.
  SINGAPORE: AN OVERVIEW    223

Table 13.2  Think tanks in Singapore

Number of universities: 32
Number of think tanks: 6
% of think tanks out of regional total (Southeast Asia): 6/126, 4.76%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2010–2014):
 2010: 46
 2011: 46
 2012: 46
 2013: 51
 2014: 46
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide, including US (2014):
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (78)
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (80)
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (92)
Number of top think tanks by area of research;
Top 80 domestic economic policy think tanks: 1
Top 30 energy and resource policy think tanks: 1
Top 65 environment think tanks: 1
Top 85 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 3
Top 80 international development think tanks: 1
Top 50 social policy think tanks: 1
Top transparency and good governance think tanks: 1
Case studies
Top think tank: Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is consistently one of
the top-ranked think tanks in Asia, and among the 150 best in the world. In 2014, SIIA
was ranked the 78th best think tank in the world, climbing up two ranks from 2013.
It is an independent organization dedicated to research, analysis, and discussion of
regional and international issues. The institution aims to make Singapore a more
cosmopolitan and global society through research, policy work, and public education on
international affairs. SIIA is a founding member of the influential ASEAN Institutes of
Strategic and International Studies Network, and works with other think tanks to advise
government and decision-makers.
Alternative think tank: The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is an institute
within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). IDSS’s research covers
mainly maritime security, military studies, military transformations, the regional security
architecture program, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Asia, and the United States.

decided that Singapore has sovereignty over Pedra Branca. This decision
resolved the determination of the maritime boundary between the two
countries.11

11
 Rusdi Omar, “Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Issues and Strategies,” Universiti Utara
Malaysia/Adelaide University, http://www.academia.edu/1412271/MALAYSIA-SINGA-
PORE_RELATIONS_ISSUES_AND_STRATEGIES.
224   J. G. MCGANN

Recently, the controlled politics in Singapore have been slowly changing.


Even though public protests are rare in the country, complaining about
and criticizing the controlled politics on social media are increasingly com-
mon. This phenomenon applies to the most recent general election, where
the People’s Action Party (PAP) won just over 60% of the popular vote, its
worst ever performance. In recent years, the PAP has started to expand its
social program to the elderly and poorer Singaporeans (Table 13.2).12

12
 The Economist, “After the Patriarch,” The Economist, March 28, 2015, http://
www.economist.com/news/asia/21647333-island-state-mourns-its-founding-father-its-
politics-changing-after-patriarch.
CHAPTER 14

The Role of Think Tanks in Shaping Policy


Debates in Asia: S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies

Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, Theresa Robles,


and Sarah Teo

Introduction
The role of non-state actors in international politics has become more
prominent with the emergence of a number of organizations, think tanks,
and track-two networks that are able to influence policies and interna-
tional relations. Increasingly these actors, through their knowledge and
advocacy, have been able to affect policies and help shape the nature of
interstate relations. The influence that these new actors exert reflects the
salience of regarding them as independent variables in international

M. Caballero-Anthony (*) • R. Emmers • S. Teo


Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
T. Robles
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

© The Author(s) 2019 225


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_14
226   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

relations. Think tanks, academics, and members of the “unofficial” policy


community make up many of these non-state actors. This chapter
­specifically looks at the role of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) as a premier think tank in Asia that works on political,
security, and economic issues. RSIS was established in January 2007 as an
autonomous school within the Nanyang Technological University in
Singapore. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
(IDSS) when it originated in July 1996, RSIS’s mission is to be a leading
research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international
affairs in the Asia Pacific. It has over the years gained considerable atten-
tion through its involvement and work in both track-one and track-two
diplomacy.
The term “track-two diplomacy” is used broadly to refer to a network
of academics, experts, members of civil society, and government officials
acting in their private capacities.1 Track-two diplomacy refers to unofficial
contact and interaction aimed at resolving conflicts, both internationally
and within states.2 A key feature of this diplomatic process has been the
emergence of a plethora of meetings and/or other forms of dialogue
mechanisms geared towards pluralist discussions and agenda-setting on
regional security and economic issues, via the involvement of expert net-
works and non-official institutions. Through these meetings and exchanges
of ideas, policy initiatives and recommendations are generated and are
usually sent to track-one/official channels for consideration. In short,
track-two diplomacy complements track one in that it provides policy
inputs and alternatives for officials who are too busy to consider various
policy implications, and are oftentimes unable to get adequate informa-
tion on a number of new and complex security and economic issues.
The linkages established by think tanks and track-two communities
with track one through the transmission of ideas approximate the work of
epistemic communities. Peter Haas described epistemic communities as “a
network of professionals with an authoritative claim to policy relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue area.” While members of the

1
 Peter M.  Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35.
2
 The term “track two” was coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville, who was a US diplomat.
He used the term in contrast to track-one diplomacy, which referred to diplomatic efforts to
resolve conflicts through the official channels of government. See James Notter and John
McDonald, “Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace,” USIA
Electronic Journals 1, no. 19 (1996): 32–36.
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    227

epistemic community are professionals from a variety of disciplines and


backgrounds, they share the following characteristics: “(1) shared set of
normative and principled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs; (3) shared
notions of validity; and (4) a common policy enterprise.”3
The evolution of an epistemic community, and RSIS’s influence in this
community, is affected by the historical and socio-political environment in
which it operates. Early think tanks in the region were closely associated
with the state and largely functioned as part of a strong bureaucracy.
During the 1950s and 1960s, many Asian governments were focused on
state-building and reconstruction. Think tanks, such as the China Institutes
of Contemporary International Relations and South Korea’s Research
Institute of Foreign Affairs, were created to support government priorities
and to lend legitimacy to nascent regimes. National economic develop-
ment was also high on the agenda, and think tanks served an important
role by bringing the technical expertise needed in policy planning.
Changing political conditions in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated the entry
of relatively more independent private or non-governmental think tanks.
The range of issues covered also expanded to reflect the concerns of a
growing civil society. If early think tanks largely functioned as “policy
defenders,” newer organizations also worked as “policy catalysts” to intro-
duce new ideas and be catalysts for change.4 Democratic transitions in
several countries across the region led to increased plurality in the policy
process as power, expertise, and resources were shared (in varying degrees)
among state, private-sector, and civil society actors. This network operated
within a larger web consisting of overlapping local, regional, and global
spheres. While the number of actors and their influence in the policy pro-
cess have increased, think tanks in Asia today still have to work with gov-
ernments, which highly value their sovereignty and domestic interests, and
regional organizations, which struggle with reconciling these with a grow-
ing list of shared concerns and a subsequent need for joint action.
Within this environment, RSIS employs two strategies to ensure that its
work not only meets the needs of regional policy-makers, but also adds
value to the ongoing discussions at track-one and track-two levels. Firstly,
RSIS has since its inception built up its resource and knowledge base by

 Haas, “Epistemic Communities.”


3

 Karthik Nachiappan, Enrique Mendizabal and Ajoy Datta, “Think Tanks in East and
4

Southeast Asia: Bringing Politics Back into the Picture,” ODI Research and Policy in
Development Paper (2010): 22.
228   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

drawing its staff from a diverse range of backgrounds, including former


policy-makers, up-and-coming academics, and visiting researchers. This
facilitates the exchange of ideas and encourages new insights into regional
and global issues. The organizational structure of RSIS additionally reflects
its alignment with regional policy concerns. Its six main research centers—
IDSS, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
Centre of Excellence for National Security, Centre for Non-Traditional
Security Studies, Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade and Negotiations,
and Centre for Multilateralism Studies—are subdivided into specific pro-
grams which best utilize the expertise of its staff. Secondly, RSIS is actively
involved in networking within its epistemic community, involving other
research institutes and think tanks, policy-makers and practitioners, as well
as private businesses. At the regional Asia Pacific level, RSIS is an active
member of track-two networks such as the Network of Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence and Security Institutions
(NADI), in which it serves as the Secretariat, as well as the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The interaction and
information-sharing within these networks enrich RSIS’s understanding
of the various stakeholders’ interests in regional issues, which is useful
given the ASEAN way of diplomacy that emphasizes consensus-building.
Through building up its own expertise and cultivating networks in its
epistemic community, RSIS plays a significant role in both track-one and
track-two diplomacy.
This chapter relies on two concrete examples of policy debates where
RSIS was able to assist track-one diplomacy and influence the process of
policy-making in Asia. The case studies focus on the preventive diplomacy
agenda in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)5 and the policy debates
around the future of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) beyond
2015. They illustrate the depth and breadth of research conducted at
RSIS, ranging from traditional security to economic multilateralism. The
discussion examines how RSIS succeeded in achieving policy influence in
these two specific cases and analyzes how its own attributes and practices
may have contributed in the process.
5
 Established in 1967, the current members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Current participants in the ARF include the ten ASEAN members, as well as Australia,
Bangladesh, Canada, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, European Union,
India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea,
Russia, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and United States.
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    229

Joint Study on Best Practices and Lessons Learned


in Preventive Diplomacy

Created in 1994, the ARF remains the first and only inclusive security
arrangement serving more or less the entire Asia Pacific. It provides a dip-
lomatic avenue to hold multilateral discussions on regional problems,
share information, promote confidence-building, and enhance the prac-
tice of transparency. Preventive diplomacy has been a controversial subject
within the ARF from its inception as the second stage of a three-stage
process whereby it would move from confidence-building to preventive
diplomacy measures to becoming a force for conflict resolution. In the
ASEAN context, preventive diplomacy is defined as “consensual diplo-
matic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all
directly involved parties:

• To help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States


that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability;
• To help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into
armed confrontation;
• To help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the
region.”6

The divergence among member countries has centered on concerns


over the erosion of sovereignty, as well as how preventive diplomacy would
affect their security interests. Regardless, the ARF has made some progress
in and laid the groundwork to form the basis for implementing preventive
diplomacy as a mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention. For exam-
ple, the establishment of an Expert and Eminent Persons Group (EEPG),
Friends of ARF Chair, and the ARF Unit provide the basis for a capability
to engage in mediational activities and independent assessments. As part
of its efforts to move towards the institutionalization of preventive diplo-
macy, the ARF commissioned a study on the best practices and lessons
learned from other multilateral organizations in institutionalizing preven-
tive diplomacy.
The study jointly completed by RSIS and the Pacific Forum Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Honolulu reviewed the
­concept and practice of preventive diplomacy as defined and deployed in

6
 ASEAN, “ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” ASEAN, May 17–18,
2001, http://www.asean.org/archive/arf/8ARF/SOM-Vietnam/Doc-6.pdf.
230   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

various parts of the world, followed by a critical assessment of the evolution


of preventive diplomacy within the ARF. It examined in detail the practice
of preventive diplomacy in eight international organizations, namely the
United Nations, Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe,
Organization of American States, Pacific Island Forum, African Union,
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, and European Union. Sources of information included offi-
cial documents, secondary literature, as well as interviews with experts and
officials representing these organizations.
Based on the examination of the practice of preventive diplomacy in
these organizations and the assessment of the evolution of preventive
diplomacy in the ARF, the study concluded that the most difficult part of
institutionalizing preventive diplomacy was creating the political will to
act. Other key elements of preventive diplomacy common across all the
organizations included respect for the principle of non-interference, the
voluntary nature of participation by all parties, and a common desire to
avoid conflict or to prevent tensions from escalating. The study also found
that an institutionalized approach to preventive diplomacy would require
a significant investment in human and financial resources to create a cred-
ible response capability. Additionally, most organizations prioritized the
institutionalization of norms designed to discourage a resort to military
means, building of crisis-response capacities (both diplomatic and institu-
tional), and early warning/early intervention to prevent crisis escalation.
Following the findings, the researchers made specific recommendations to
advance the implementation of a successful preventive diplomacy program
within the ARF.
The policy-making community responded extremely positively to the
joint study. It received a special mention in the Chairman’s Statement of
the 15th ARF in 2008, with the Senior Officials of the ARF being assigned
to examine the recommendations. A “Matrix of Relevant Recommendations
for Follow-Up from the ARF Study on Preventive Diplomacy” was subse-
quently submitted to the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Seoul in April 2009, and
noted by the Ministers during the 16th ARF. At the Fourth Meeting of
the ARF EEPs in December 2009, the study served as the basis for the
discussions that considered “Draft Elements of a Work Plan on Preventive
Diplomacy.” These deliberations, based on the findings of the joint study,
eventually led to the endorsement of the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work
Plan in July 2011.
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    231

Vision Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community


beyond 2015

Singapore first proposed the establishment of an AEC in 2003, with the


objective of seeing its completion by 2015. The AEC was born out of a
shared vision to transform ASEAN into (a) a single market and production
base; (b) a highly competitive economic region; (c) a region of equitable
economic development; and (d) a region fully integrated into the global
economy. ASEAN economic cooperation and integration have come a
long way and the AEC 2015 will be yet another historic milestone. While
the general assessment is that ASEAN is making progress towards achiev-
ing the AEC 2015, work on forming a prosperous, competitive, and inclu-
sive regional economic community will take time and will have to be
continued beyond 2015. Furthermore, ASEAN leaders also realize that
the AEC will need to address emerging challenges resulting from current
and anticipated changes in the regional and global economic landscape.
In July 2013, the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic
Integration (HLTF-EI) commissioned RSIS and the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS) to prepare a “Vision Paper on the ASEAN Economic
Community beyond 2015.” The HLTF-EI is composed of high-ranking
economic officials from the ten ASEAN member states and functioned as
an advisory body to the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting on issues
related to the realization of the AEC.
The “Vision Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community beyond
2015” aimed to (a) assess progress in the AEC 2015; (b) identify and ana-
lyze the regional and global challenges confronting the region; and (c)
recommend policies for the AEC beyond 2015. The study was drawn from
recently completed and/or ongoing research by RSIS and ISEAS and an
in-depth survey of key studies on the subject. As the progress and pros-
pects of the AEC had garnered wide interest from academic and policy
circles alike, a plethora of studies on the topic had been carried out. One
value-added element of the vision paper was the synthesis and collation of
the ideas, findings, and conclusions of the key studies in one place for easy
review by policy-makers. Another was its emphasis on close coordination
and consultation with the broader ASEAN community. A ­consultation
workshop was conducted in October 2013 to solicit the views and com-
ments of key stakeholders, including academics, representatives of think
tanks, policy practitioners, and business communities across ASEAN coun-
tries. RSIS took the lead in organizing the workshop and identifying and
232   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

liaising with the participants. The attendance and active participation of


key members of the ASEAN policy community in the workshop reflected
their support for the project and trust in RSIS as one of the leading institu-
tions in the area of regional economic multilateralism.
In view of the unfinished agenda from the old vision and several other
emerging issues that had become more timely and important due to
changes in the regional and global economic landscape, the new vision did
not propose to redefine the AEC. Instead, the study recommended that
the measures as listed in the AEC Blueprint be refocused and developed to
(a) better support deeper participation of ASEAN member states in
regional and global production networks and supply chains; (b) allow
ASEAN member states to move up the development ladder in an inclusive
and sustainable manner; and (c) enhance ASEAN’s centrality in the
regional architecture and strengthen its voice on global platforms.
As the project only started in the second half of 2013, much still needs
to be done before the recommendations in the vision paper are translated
into concrete action. Nonetheless, developing a vision for the AEC beyond
2015 is a top priority for ASEAN in the coming months. RSIS and ISEAS
presented the final paper at the 25th Meeting of the ASEAN HLTF-EI,
held at Yangon in February 2014, where it was well received by members
of the HLTF-EI. Shortly after the Yangon meeting, a working group was
formed to draft a framework for enhanced ASEAN economic integration
for AEC 2016–2025.7 ASEAN leaders also stressed that the “future vision
of the ASEAN Community must take into consideration both the present
and emerging issues facing our region, as well as those facing the globe”
at the 24th ASEAN Summit in May 2014.8

Assessment of RSIS’s Strengths and Policy Impact


Among think tanks in Southeast Asia, RSIS is one of the few with staff
dedicated to the study of regionalism and multilateralism and with a
strong background in dealing with ASEAN affairs. This means that the

7
 ASEAN, “Joint Media Statement of the 20th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Retreat,”
ASEAN, February 26–27, 2014, http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_
releases/agencies/mti/press_release/P-20140227-1/AttachmentPar/0/file/MTI_press-
release.pdf.
8
 Nay Pyi Taw, “Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit: Moving Forward in
Unity to a Peaceful and Prosperous Community,” ASEAN, May 11, 2014, http://www.
asean.org/images/documents/24thASEANSummit/24th%20ASEAN%20Summit%20
Chairman’s%20Statement.pdf.
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    233

institution is, internally, well equipped to undertake studies that dealt


with the development of preventive diplomacy in ASEAN and other
international organizations, as well as the AEC post-2015 agenda. The
selection of RSIS as one of the two institutions (with the Pacific Forum
CSIS as co-­partner) conducting the joint study on preventive diplomacy
was particularly fitting due to the institution’s focus and work through its
Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme. This program is commit-
ted to advancing and influencing policy debate on security multilateral-
ism in the region. Prior to the ARF commission, staff members had
researched and written extensively on regional community-building and
institutionalism, as well as security cooperation in Southeast Asia and
ASEAN. Likewise, the choice of RSIS as one of the two institutions (with
ISEAS as the co-partner) leading to the “Vision Paper on the ASEAN
Economic Community beyond 2015” was clear, considering its contri-
butions to academic and policy dialogue on regional and multilateral
economic cooperation through its International Political Economy
Programme and its Centre for Multilateralism Studies. The latter con-
ducts research on trade, monetary, and financial integration in ASEAN
and the wider Asian region, as well as on developments in the global
economic architecture. Both projects benefited from RSIS’s strong famil-
iarity with the ASEAN process, enabling the teams to blend independent
analysis with knowledge of the Association’s resources, capabilities, and
procedures.
The strong networks cultivated by RSIS in its epistemic community
also helped to enhance the relevance of its work to track one. As the
regional security and economic architectures involve many stakeholders
with varying interests, RSIS had to tap on its extensive regional network
of experts within and beyond ASEAN to ensure that the different perspec-
tives were taken into consideration. The joint study on preventive diplo-
macy benefited from RSIS’s (and Pacific Forum CSIS’s) participation in
global networks. Without these links, access to interviewees from the eight
international organizations would likely have posed a bigger challenge.
Meanwhile, the consultation workshop held in October 2013 for the
vision paper on the AEC post-2015 agenda reflected how RSIS (along
with ISEAS) provided a platform for neutral discussion, given the
sensitivities among ASEAN governments stemming from the unequal
­
benefits of economic integration across the region. Great effort was put
into making sure that consultation was done with think tanks representing
234   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

each ASEAN member country.9 Additionally, since senior officials in


ASEAN often move around, institutional memory on the evolving work
on the AEC and preventive diplomacy is difficult to maintain. As a think
tank, RSIS has been following the progress of both issues since their
beginnings. The two studies benefited greatly from this approach, as the
teams could draw on past discussions of the respective issues. With regard
to the post-2015 AEC study, a number of experts who played instrumen-
tal roles in the original AEC vision paper were consulted in the process. In
this regard, RSIS emerges as a source of ideas, innovations, and solutions
that would be more difficult to achieve through the usual bureaucratic
process.
As a result of RSIS’s organizational and networking strengths, both
studies were positively received by the policy-making community
(Table 14.1). The recommendations made in the joint study on preventive
diplomacy were not only acknowledged by the ARF, but also formed the
basis for discussions that eventually led to the adoption of the ARF
Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan. The joint study helped ASEAN officials
to better understand the mechanisms of preventive diplomacy, as well as
formulate preventive diplomacy objectives that would be relevant and
effective for the Asia Pacific. Table 14.1 lists some of the recommenda-
tions made in the joint study that were subsequently adapted and put
forth in the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan:
Meanwhile, the “Vision Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community
beyond 2015” also seemed to influence the discussions at track one.
Recommendations in the draft vision paper were refined in consideration
of the feedback received during consultations, not just during the formal
workshop, but also through frequent review of the draft by senior ASEAN
officials involved in trade and industry, and through close coordination
with the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Established at the Third East Asia Summit in 2007, the ERIA operates as
an official ASEAN think tank (with the ASEAN Secretary-General a

9
 These think tanks were Institute of Policy Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam;
Cambodia Development Research Institute; Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(Indonesia); National Economic Research Institute (Lao PDR); Institute of Malaysian and
International Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia; National ASEAN Free Trade Unit,
Myanmar Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development (representative’s for-
mer affiliation, now retired); Philippine Institute for Development Studies; Singapore
Institute of International Affairs; Thailand Development Research Institute; and Institute for
East Sea Studies, The Development Academy of Vietnam.
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    235

Table 14.1  ARF Preventive Diplomacy (PD) Work Plan


RSIS-Pacific Forum CSIS Joint Study (2008)a ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan
(2011)b

“Create an organizational vision statement that “The objectives of the Preventive


articulates its goals and aspirations for Diplomacy Work Plan are as follows:
promoting peace and serving as an institution  To establish appropriate preventive
for preventing, mitigating, and resolving diplomacy measures/mechanisms for
conflict in the region. Specific PD-related the ARF;
objectives should be included in this  To move the ARF process forward
document.” from Stage I—Confidence Building
Measures to Stage II—Preventive
Diplomacy, on the basis of consensus
through action-­oriented cooperation
and activities, while continuing
confidence building measures,
mindful of ARF’s intention ultimately
to move to Stage III and;
 To increase the capacity and
capabilities of the ARF and its
participants in the area of preventive
diplomacy.”
“The production of voluntary Annual Security “Encourage ARF participants to
Outlooks can also help in the identification of contribute to the ARF Annual Security
potential crises and thus serve an early warning Outlook with review and analysis of it
function if it is focused in such a direction. conducted when practical to identify
This will require standardization of its content possible areas of ARF PD work.”
and some sort of examination process, either
by a track two institution such as CSCAP or by
the EEPG.”
“The EEPG could become involved in helping “As appropriate, utilise the ARF EEPs,
to draft the ARF 2020 Vision Statement and CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS as expert
could also provide an ‘early warning’ function consultative bodies for monitoring and
while serving in an advisory capacity.” identifying potential flashpoints.”
“Effective PD requires effective early warning, “In the longer term, consider the
which could be accomplished through the establishment of a regional risk
establishment of a Regional Risk Reduction reduction centre to monitor regional
Centre or RRRC (as envisioned in the ARF trends.”
Concept Paper).”

a
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Pacific Forum CSIS, “Joint Study on Best Practices
and Lessons Learned in Preventive Diplomacy,” undertaken for the benefit of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, funding provided by the ASEAN Secretariat (2008)
b
ASEAN Regional Forum, “Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan,” ASEAN, June 10, 2011, http://aseanre-
gionalforum.asean.org/files/library/ARF%20Chairman’s%20Statements%20and%20Reports/The%20
Eighteenth%20ASEAN%20Regional%20Forum,%202010-2011/2%20-20ARF%20Work%20Plan%20
on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf
236   M. CABALLERO-ANTHONY ET AL.

member of the Governing Board) that specifically looks at economic


integration in ASEAN. It conducts research and provides policy inputs to
support ASEAN and related meetings in initiatives related to economic
growth and deeper regional integration.
Moreover, the direction taken since the Yangon meeting in February
2014 suggests that the HLTF-EI will follow the project’s key recommen-
dations. Recent official documents have picked up certain points high-
lighted in the vision paper which were not mentioned in the previous
official discussion on AEC post-2015. While admittedly still preliminary,
specific examples include the chosen timeframe for the post-2015 frame-
work and the emphasis on addressing existing and emerging challenges,
both regional and global, which will confront ASEAN in the next ten
years. While there are a number of political (e.g., ratification of domestic
legislation to support regional agreements) and institutional (e.g., resource
and capability constraints at the ASEAN Secretariat) constraints in imple-
menting the recommendations, the vision paper has already played an
important role in shaping the AEC post-2015 agenda, as it has contrib-
uted to both official thinking and regional discourse through the close
consultation process that has taken place among key stakeholders.

Conclusion
The chapter has discussed two specific attempts by RSIS to influence
regional policy debates, by drawing on its organizational strength and
utilizing its extensive networks. The first involved the work of RSIS to
influence the development of preventive diplomacy within the ARF. This
was done through a joint study that RSIS undertook with the Pacific
Forum CSIS, on behalf of the ARF, to evaluate how selected interna-
tional and regional organizations incorporate preventive diplomacy into
their institutional framework. Based on the findings, the team made spe-
cific recommendations for the institutionalization of preventive diplo-
macy in the ARF.
The second case study examined how RSIS shaped policy debates
around the completion and implementation of the AEC 2015.
Commissioned by the HLTF-EI, RSIS worked with ISEAS to produce a
vision paper, which assessed the progress in the AEC 2015, analyzed the
regional and global challenges confronting the region, as well as recom-
mended policies for the AEC beyond 2015. The policy relevance and
  THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN SHAPING POLICY DEBATES IN ASIA…    237

impact of both studies at the track-one level were also discussed. The
choice of RSIS as one of the two institutions involved in both projects
derived from its contributions to academic and policy dialogue on regional
and multilateral cooperation, as well as from RSIS’s strong familiarity with
the cooperative process within ASEAN.
This discussion should be tied to the broader theme of how think tanks
can shape states’ policies, and raises the question of how one should assess
the policy work of track two or think tanks. Sheldon W.  Simon, in his
study on the role of CSCAP, the premier track-two network on security
cooperation in the region, has argued that epistemic communities “are
successful if they:

) Produce some new concepts and proposals;


1
2) Gain the attention of decision-makers in member governments [in
this case ASEAN government representatives];
3) Spark interest in an international attentive public through media
treatment, thus kindling some public debate; and
4) Demonstrate enough shelf-life that some of the principal concepts
and proposals remain part of the international dialogue over several
years.”10

Going by these criteria, one can assess the work of RSIS as a think tank
and a part of the epistemic community in the region in three ways. The
first is by looking at the research activities that RSIS has conducted over
the years and their impact on track-one and track-two diplomacy. The
second is by analyzing whether in these activities new concepts and pro-
posals have been produced and brought to the attention of policy-makers
at the domestic and regional levels. And finally, it should be assessed
whether the proposals generated by RSIS have sparked international inter-
est, as well as had considerable impact to become part of the discourses
found within and outside the region. This three-step process can help to
clarify and focus on key questions that would arise when we assess further
the nature of the think tank work undertaken by RSIS.

10
 Sheldon W. Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific: The CSCAP Experience,” The Pacific Review 15, no. 2 (2002): 167–200. In listing
the four criteria, Simon cites Edward C.  Luck, “Blue Ribbon Power: Independent
Commissions and UN Reform,” International Studies Perspectives 1, no. 1 (2000): 89–104.
CHAPTER 15

South Korea: An Overview

James G. McGann

Described as the “Miracle of the Han River,” South Korea has grown into
a high-income advanced economy, and plays an important role in the
global economy. However, it also faces many challenges, especially with
North Korea on its northern border, in issues involving security and
regional politics. Think tanks, mostly government affiliated, serve to pro-
vide policy recommendations in the face of such security concerns. This
chapter sheds light on two distinct think tank models that have both con-
tributed to shaping the South Korean policy agenda. In the first case study,
Sook-Jong Lee demonstrates how independent non-profit think tanks
such as the East Asia Institute, despite having limited financial resources,
have produced quality policy recommendations to the South Korean gov-
ernment, proposing “complex diplomacy,” “co-evolutionary strategy,”
and “middle power diplomacy” in the face of Chinese and US influence.
In contrast, the second case study examines how the Institute of Foreign
Affairs and National Security (IFANS), a government-affiliated and top-­
ranking foreign policy and security think tank, shaped the development of
a new policy agenda and influenced the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security
Summit, offering various policy initiatives in nuclear disarmament in the
Korean peninsula (Table 15.1).

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 239


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_15
240   J. G. MCGANN

Table 15.1  South Korea at a glance

Country name Republic of Korea


Capital Seoul
Population 49,115,196 (2015 est.)
Location Eastern Asia, southern half of the Korean peninsula, bordering the Sea
(continent) of Japan and the Yellow Sea
Ethnic groups Homogeneous (except for about 20,000 Chinese)
Language Korean, English (widely taught in junior high and high school)
Currency South Korean won (KRW), 1 KRW = 0.000891 US dollar
(name and
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government Republic
type
Chief of state President Park Geun-hye
Head of Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn; Deputy Prime Ministers Hwang
government Woo-yea and Choi Kyung-hwan
Cabinet State Council appointed by the President on the Prime Minister’s
recommendation
Elections President elected by popular vote for a single five-year term; election
last held on 19 December 2012 (next to be held in December 2017);
Prime Minister appointed by President with consent of National
Assembly
Legislative Unicameral National Assembly or Kuk Koe
branch
Judicial branch Supreme court of South Korea (consists of a chief justice and thirteen
justices); Constitutional Court (consists of a court head and eight
justices)
Political parties Justice Party; Liberty Forward Party, LFP (merged with NFP in
October 2012); New Frontier Party, NFP, or Saenuri (formerly Grand
National Party); New Politics Alliance for Democracy, NPAD (merger
of Democratic Party and New Political Vision Party); Unified
Progressive Party, UPP (disbanded in December 2014)

Some economic facts


GDP: US $1.849 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $36,700 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 2.3%, industry 38%, services 59.7% (2015 est.)

Overview
Following Japan’s surrender to the United States in 1945, South Korea
regained its independence. After World War II, a democratic-based
government for the Republic of Korea (ROK) was installed in the south-
ern part of the Korean peninsula. At the same time, a communist-style
  SOUTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW    241

government (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) was


established in the northern half of the Korean peninsula. The years from
1962 to 1994 were called the “Miracle on the Han River” because the
economy of South Korea successfully transformed into a high-income
advanced economy. South Korea is currently the world’s seventh largest
importer and eighth largest exporter. It is a member of the G20 (together
with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
European Union) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s Development Assistance Committee.1

Economic Situation
The Bank of Korea (BOK) is the central bank of South Korea and issuer of
South Korean won. Its primary purpose is price stability. After the 1997
financial crisis (known as the Asian financial crisis), the capital account in
South Korea was widely liberalized to a degree compared to advanced
economies in developed countries. Since then, South Korean monetary
policy has been increasingly dependent on the influence of capital flows on
market liquidity and the exchange rate.2
In March 2015, the Bank of Korea unexpectedly cut the policy rate by
25 basis points to 1.75%. The effect of this measure was to spur domestic
demand, avoid deflation, and put downward pressure on the South Korean
currency.3 Government spending in South Korea had constantly increased,
reaching KRW51889.40 billion in the fourth quarter of 2014. As a conse-
quence of economic policy by the South Korean government, household
debt has grown rapidly on the back of low borrowing costs and easier
mortgage rules that are intended to spur the property market and the
national economy.4

1
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, South,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html.
2
 The Bank of Korea. http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=792.
3
 Lee Minji and Kim You Jin, “BOK Cuts Base Rate to Record Low 1.75 pct in Surprise
Move,” Yonhap News, March 12, 2015, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2015/
03/12/82/0503000000AEN20150312001454320F.html.
4
 Kwanwoo Jun, “South Koreans Are on a Debt Binge,” The Wall Street Journal, February
25, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-are-on-a-debt-binge-1424920718.
242   J. G. MCGANN

South Korea joined the World Trade Organization in 1995 and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1996. Its
main economic partners are China, the European Union (EU), Japan,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States.5 South Korea is a highly export-­
driven economy. In terms of trade structure, it has changed greatly.
Compared to 1971, in 2011 South Korea traded much more with emerg-
ing and developing countries. Its trade share with emerging economies
rose from 17.5% to 67%.6
South Korea is aggressively connecting its trade network by free trade
agreements (FTA). There are ten FTAs in effect with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chile, China, European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), EU, India, Peru, Singapore, Turkey, and the United
States.7

Foreign Relations
South Korea maintains diplomatic relations with more than 188 countries.
It is a member of the G20 and hosted the G20 Summit in Seoul in 2010.
South Korea is also a member of ASEAN, and has close connections with
China, EU, Japan, and the United States. Concerning international
disputes, it is worth remembering the following:

• A military demarcation line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized


Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953.8
• Periodic incidents take place with North Korea in the Yellow Sea
over the Northern Limit Line, which South Korea claims as a mari-
time boundary.9
• South Korea and Japan claim Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-­
shima), which have been occupied by South Korea since 1954.10
5
 The World Bank, “Korea Overview,” The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/korea/overview#1.
6
 Lee Junkyu, “The Future of Korean Trade Policy,” Korea Economic Institution of
America, http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_koreaseconomy_sec-
tion02.pdf.
7
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “FTA Status of ROK,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/fta/status/overview/index.jsp?menu=
m_20_80_10.
8
 Indexmundi, “South Korea Disputes – International,” Indexmundi, http://www.index-
mundi.com/south_korea/disputes_international.html.
9
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Disputes – International,” The World Factbook, https://
www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2070.html.
10
 Ibid.
  SOUTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW    243

Table 15.2  Think tanks in South Korea

Number of think tanks: 35


% of think tanks out of regional total: 35/1262, 2.77%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2015):
 2012: 35
 2013: 35
 2014: 35
 2015: 35
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2014):
 Korean Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) (45)
 Korea Development Institute (KDI) (48)
 East Asia Institute (EAI) (62)
 Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) (68)
 Center for Free Enterprise (CFE) (107)
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
 Top 70 security and international affairs think tanks: 3
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 1
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 1
 Top 80 domestic economics think tanks: 1
 Top 50 social policy think tanks: 1
 Think tanks with outstanding policy-oriented research programs: 2
Case studies
Top think tank: The Korean Development Institute (KDI) is the top-ranked think tank
in China, India, Japan, and the ROK. In 2014, it was ranked 49th in the world’s
top 150 institutions from a pool of over 6600 think tanks. As an autonomous institute,
KDI strives to make substantive contribution to the government and society as well as
to the public and private sectors by providing research and analysis of economic policy
decisions. With its eyes on the economic horizon, KDI concentrates its research on key
current issues and produces independent analysis that can provide vision and direction
for greater prosperity.
Alternative think tank: The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
is listed as one of the top five think tanks in China, India, Japan, and the ROK. It was
ranked as one of the top fifteen international economic policy think tanks in 2014. As a
leading institute concerning the international economy and its relationship with Korea,
KIEP advises the government on all major international economic policy issues and
serves as a warehouse of information on Korea’s international economic policies. It also
maintains a wide network of prominent local and international economists and business
people who contribute to individual projects. Through its research and outreach
activities, KIEP strives to promote greater cooperation and sharing of resources and
facilities in the region.
244   J. G. MCGANN

Recently, South Korea accepted an offer to join the Asian Infrastructure


Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution proposed
by the government of China. It is an apparent Chinese challenge to US
global economic leadership. During the decision-making process over the
AIIB case, the question was raised of whether South Korea’s middle power
diplomacy would reinforce or conflict with the US–ROK alliance.11 This
decision-making implies that South Korea’s economy is closely tied to
China’s economy these days.
The latest issue for the US–ROK alliance is the deployment of THAAD
(Terminal High Altitude Air Defense), which is an anti-ballistic missile
system designed to shoot down ballistic missiles using a hit-to-kill
approach. The Commander of US Forces in South Korea, General Curtis
Scaparrotti, recommended that Seoul deploy THAAD to protect itself
from the threat of North Korean missiles. Since China publicly expressed
its concerns over America’s proposal to deploy THAAD, South Korea has
maintained its strategic ambiguity between its economic and security
interests. Currently, China is the largest exporter and importer for South
Korea. Even though South Korea is aware of the national security benefits
of a US military presence, it is reluctant to accept the American proposal,
but equally hesitant to reject it (Table 15.2).12

11
 Scott A.  Snyder, “South Korean Middle Power Diplomacy and the U.S.  Rebalance,”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/03/24/
south-korean-middle-power-diplomacy-and-the-u-s-rebalance.
12
 David Eunpyoung Jee, “Solving the THAAD Puzzle in Korea,” The Diplomat, April 7,
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/solving-the-thaad-puzzle-in-korea.
CHAPTER 16

Pushing Korea to Think in a World


of Complexity: The East Asia Institute

Sook-Jong Lee

Introduction
While think tanks existed as vehicles for policy research throughout the
twentieth century, they only began to proliferate in the past few decades.
There are now almost 7000 think tanks in the world in more than 182
countries, a 26-fold increase since 1950.1 South Korea in particular has
experienced a rapid rise in the number of think tanks since the first few
institutes were established by the Park Chung-hee administration in the
1960s to support the national development program. After the democra-
tization of South Korea in 1987, the number of think tanks exploded
under the subsequent fairly elected governments. While sources vary on

1
 James G.  McGann, 2013 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia: Think
Tanks and Civil Societies Program, 2014), http://gotothinktank.com/
the-2013-global-go-to-think-tank-index-ggtti/

S.-J. Lee (*)


East Asia Institute, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s) 2019 245


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_16
246   S.-J. LEE

the exact number of think tanks in South Korea today, it is estimated that
more than 400 organizations are actively engaged in policy studies.2
The global think tank boom originated from the increasingly complex
changes in world politics which have arisen since the end of the Cold War.
Triggered by the three megatrends of globalization, democratization, and
the information technology (IT) revolution, power is increasingly diffuse
and issues more diverse.3 Now, world governments must cope not only
with their counterparts in other countries, but also with numerous other
non-state actors. Terrorism, climate change, human rights, cyber security,
and other emerging issues have been added to the traditional tasks of
national security and economic growth. This overwhelming challenge has
caused policy-makers around the world to turn to think tanks, the “bridge
between the knowledge and power,”4 a “vehicle for broader questions
about the policy process,”5 and the principal agent of “opinion mobiliza-
tion and unofficial diplomacy.”6 Providing relevant policy knowledge
“through collaboration with diverse public and private actors,” think tanks
can act as “filters and synthesizers that facilitate the identification of policy
issues, the design of policy solutions, and the implementation of and feed-
back on policy decisions,” and save state authorities from an “avalanche of
information.”7
As the role of autonomous think tanks has become more vital in post–
Cold War global politics, Seoul should have witnessed major growth in the
number of independent think tanks in South Korea. The modern phe-

2
 Seon-Bin Kim, Policy Knowledge Ecology of South Korea [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung
Economic Research Institute, 2007); Won-taek Kang, In-hwi Park, and Hoon Jiang,
Possibilities of Korean Think Tanks [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research
Institute, 2006).
3
 Lester M Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994.
4
 James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, (New
York: The Free Press, 1991).
5
 Diane Stone, “Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance,” in Think
Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew
Denham, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
6
 Inderjeet Parmar, “Institutes of International Affairs: Their Roles in Foreign Policy-
Making, Opinion Mobilization and Unofficial Diplomacy,” in Think Tank Traditions: Policy
Research and the Politics of Ideas. ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2004).
7
 James McGann, “Think Tanks: The Global, Regional and National Dimensions,” in
Think Tanks in Policy Making – Do They Matter?, ed. Andrew Rich, (Shanghai: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, 2011).
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    247

nomenon of power diffusion has required countries to more actively


engage in global society, beyond just government-to-government rela-
tions, in order to realize meaningful policy results. In addition, the success
of a policy in the democratic era will not be guaranteed without securing
the major support of civil society in matters related to foreign affairs, such
as the overseas dispatch of armed forces, defense cost-sharing with an alli-
ance partner, or official development aid. Digitalization also brings enor-
mous opportunities for relatively small, independent think tanks to
maximize their impact through the use of the internet and social network
media.
Yet, Seoul does not seem to follow the global trend of mushrooming
growth in independent think tanks. In South Korea, the government is
spearheading, if not monopolizing, policy research. According to a prior
study, five out of eight major publishers of policy research outcomes are
governmental think tanks.8 In a 2012 survey, Hankyung magazine’s “Top
100 South Korean Think Tanks” project selected the one hundred most
influential think tanks in South Korea, which consisted of forty-one gov-
ernmental think tanks, thirteen political advocacy think tanks, eleven
profit-seeking think tanks, and twenty-seven non-profit think tanks.9,10 As
these numbers show, the salience of public think tanks established and
funded by the government overshadows all other types of think tanks in
South Korea.11 The Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Korea
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the two most globally
recognized Korean think tanks, were also established by the government
to support its economic policy planning from the early 1970s to the late
1980s. The legacy of the developmental state model, in which the govern-
ment takes the lead on economic growth, still exerts a crucial influence on
the South Korean think tank ecology.

8
 Seon-Bin Kim, Policy Knowledge Ecology of South Korea [in Korean], (Seoul: Samsung
Economic Research Institute, 2007).
9
 See Weaver and McGann (2002) for the typology of think tanks.
10
 Hankyung Magazine, “Top 100 South Korean Think Tanks” [in Korean], Hankyung
Magazine, December 10, 2012. http://magazine.hankyung.com/business/apps/news?po
pup=0&nid=01&nkey=2012121300889000021&mode=sub_view.
11
 Sook-Jong Lee, “Translating Research into Policy: The Experience of South Korea’s
East Asia Institute (EAI),” in Network of Democracy Research Institutes, Democracy Think
Tanks in Action: National Endowment for Democracy, Translating Research into Policy in
Young and Emerging Democracies (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy,
2013), 88–91, http://www.ned.org/docs/DemocracyThinkTanksinAction-full.pdf.
248   S.-J. LEE

Besides those gargantuan governmental think tanks and some well-­


funded profit-seeking organizations supported by corporations, most
non-profit think tanks in South Korea are in a desperate struggle for fund-
ing. Government foundations such as the National Research Foundation
mainly support academic organizations, while private donors prefer phil-
anthropic activities or student scholarship programs. The scarcity of finan-
cial support for independent policy research creates serious budget
challenges for non-profit think tanks, which may eventually end in failure.
This has led to asymmetric growth in the think tank landscape of South
Korea, in which government-supported organizations flourish and exer-
cise a major influence on society. Meanwhile, non-profit, independent
think tanks are rarely noticed by the public and eventually fade away.
The think tank environment in South Korea makes the case of the East
Asia Institute (EAI) unique. As an independent and non-profit think tank
not affiliated with the government, political parties, conglomerates, uni-
versities, or a single influential donor, EAI has vigorously conducted com-
prehensive policy studies on security and foreign affairs, governance, and
public opinion for more than fifteen years, since its inception in 2002.
EAI’s policy ideas, such as the coevolutionary North Korea strategy, com-
plex diplomacy, and middle-power diplomacy, are frequently embraced by
the Korean government as key policy principles that ignite follow-up stud-
ies among the academic community. What makes this possible? Which
components have led to the success of this small institute that has one-­
fortieth of the annual expenditure and one-twentieth the number of
researchers compared to KDI?
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two will outline the
major security and foreign policy challenges facing South Korea and EAI’s
proposals for meeting them. The third section sketches EAI’s policy
impact thus far. Finally, the focus turns to EAI’s research model and its
best practices. These are EAI’s backbone and have contributed greatly to
its success. Building on that success, EAI’s experience has crucial implica-
tions for Korean policy research at home and abroad.

South Korea’s Security Challenges and Rising


Multilateral Diplomacy
Although South Korean bureaucrats are well known for their competence
and discipline, they are preoccupied by ongoing matters and are hardly
able to invest their time and energy in long-term planning (Oh 2010).
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    249

Governmental think tanks also share this limitation, as they are consis-
tently consumed by “quick-response policy research” requested by the
government (Abelson 2014, 137). Only independent, non-profit think
tanks that are not swayed by the influence of certain political factions,
government, or particular interest groups are able to assume the role of a
navigator who chooses a desirable direction for the good of the people.
South Korea definitely requires more robust and reliable non-profit think
tanks in response to mid- and long-term challenges that the country is
facing.
Demands for innovative long-term foreign policy research cannot be
higher than today, as the Northeast Asian region undergoes significant
changes in the security environment. The divided Korean peninsula has
been a geopolitically important strategic place, where the great land pow-
ers of China and Russia and the strong sea powers of Japan and the United
States try to increase or maintain their influence. China, as an emerging
great power in the region, is increasing its competition and rivalry with the
United States. While Japan–China relations become aggravated, Japan is
particularly alarmed with its tensions with China over the Senkakku Islands,
and it has changed its constitutional interpretation to acquire the right of
collective security. The nuclear threat from North Korea, which started
with its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in
1993 and escalated with three nuclear tests so far, has remained an immense
threat for more than two decades to South Korea and the region. South
Korea used to be anchored in the strong bilateral relationship with the
United States to deter the threat from North Korea. Now, however, the
alliance faces the increasing need to harmonize with regional peace and
stability beyond the peninsula. While the changing regional security envi-
ronment presses South Korea to think hard and innovatively in order to
manage these complex security challenges, the international society also
demands that it make a global contribution and take more responsibilities.
This external demand has been reciprocated by South Korea’s internal
aspiration to play a constructive role in international society. As an exem-
plary country that has successfully achieved rapid industrialization and
subsequent democratization, South Korea attracts many developing coun-
tries as a model to emulate. Accordingly, it is emerging as a new donor to
the OECD Development Assistance Committee. In the diverse venues of
multilateral diplomacy, South Korea is expanding its presence.
250   S.-J. LEE

North Korean Threat and Reunification Challenges


The key security challenge for South Korea has been deterring North
Korea from initiating military conflict on the Korean peninsula. Although
the Korean War ended more than sixty years ago, the two Koreas are still
in a state of war, since only an armistice has ever been signed—not a peace
treaty. During the more than half-century of the Cold War, inter-Korean
relations followed the classic patterns of a “security dilemma,” threatening
each other’s security by increasingly improving their military capabilities.12
In the 1980s, the North Korean economy finally became unable to sup-
port the upgrades to its military program necessary to keep pace with the
steady increase in the quality of South Korean forces, causing Pyongyang
to expedite its nuclear weapons program.13 Since then, the increasing
power gap between the South and the North has forced the latter to turn
to asymmetric measures to preserve its security. Now South Korea has to
cope with such varied security challenges as the sinking of the Cheonan
and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. In addition to these dire
threats, there is the possibility of a sudden regime collapse, which raises
the potential risk for nuclear proliferation, social disorder, and possibly
war. Even if Pyongyang takes a desirable path and the two Koreas finally
settle the reunification issues, the creation of a united Korea would bring
considerable change to the power distribution of the region, and thus
Seoul would be called on to engage in dexterous diplomacy throughout
the reunification process.

Strengthening the Alliance with the United States and Expanding


the Strategic Partnership with China
The threat from North Korea is one aspect of South Korea’s national secu-
rity, but the most prominent foreign policy challenge for South Korea
today is harmonizing the increasing need to forge closer political ties with
China, while maintaining, and even strengthening, its alliance relationship
with the United States. As most scholars would agree, power is shifting
from the once-dominant United States to the rising China. For two

12
 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2
(1978): 167–214.
13
 Dong-Joon Jo, “The Oxymoron of Defense Self-Reliance in the Inter-Korean
Relationship,” [in Korean] The Korean Journal of International Relationship 44, no. 3
(2004): 25–49.
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    251

r­ easons, no emerging country shares the strategic dilemma related to this


power shift quite to the extent that South Korea is currently facing. On
the one hand, South Korea needs the US security commitment in order to
respond to increasing threats from North Korea. The sixty-five-year-old
ROK–US alliance has now been expanded from a peninsula-based military
alliance to a comprehensive global partnership, which encompasses a bilat-
eral free trade agreement and joint efforts in peacekeeping operations,
such as in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Chinese influence on South
Korea has been increasing due to China’s position as the number one
trade partner to the trade-dependent South Korean economy. In addition,
China exerts considerable political leverage over North Korea as its sole
ally. Accordingly, South Korea needs to pursue a sophisticated policy to
maintain a close relationship with both powers, while avoiding the dilemma
of choosing one side at the expense of the other. The recent case of strate-
gic competition over the Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
however, revealed that it is hard to exclude the possibility of a clash
between the two great powers. If US–China relations become consumed
by a strategic zero-sum game in which Washington rebalances and Beijing
pushes it away, then a major conflict between the two titans would cause
South Korea to face a tremendously difficult choice, with negative conse-
quences on both sides.

Growing Expectations for Global Korea


Apart from this difficult challenge, South Korea has been building up its
regional and global influence through active membership and contribu-
tion in the Group of Twenty (G20) and other multilateral institutions.
South Korea’s multilateral diplomacy is focusing on a softer agenda con-
sisting of development assistance and environmental issues. Seoul’s prior-
ity to deter North Korean provocations, however, has impeded its active
participation in global security challenges, including peacekeeping mis-
sions, responsibility to protect (R2P), and maritime disputes.
East Asian countries and, especially, the United States expect South
Korea to go beyond the Korean peninsula and take a greater role in secu-
rity issues around the world.14 Enhancing South Korean cooperation with
other countries, or more likely with Washington, on global peacekeeping

14
 Scott A.  Snyder, Global Korea: South Korea’s Contributions to International Security,
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2012); Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh and
252   S.-J. LEE

endeavors and human security issues might lead Beijing to become suspi-
cious that Seoul is interested in joining a US-led encirclement of China.15
South Korea is facing the difficult task of upgrading its role in global secu-
rity problems while harmonizing its good relationships with both the
United States and China.

EAI’s Policy Ideas for Major Security Challenges


To deal with the immediate and long-term challenges posed by North
Korea, the rise of China, and global security issues, EAI and its network of
experts have crafted three distinct strategies for the South Korean govern-
ment to pursue in mitigating the related security concerns. First, EAI’s
formulation of “complex diplomacy,” which has been officially adopted by
the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, presents a blue-
print for South Korea to fuse the local, regional, and global levels of its
diplomacy into a unified, long-term national strategy that can deal flexibly
with the multitude of challenges confronting the country. Secondly, EAI’s
panel of North Korea experts created the “coevolutionary strategy” to
offer an alternative to the current morass of North Korea relations, pro-
posing that both South and North Korea should reciprocate each other’s
positive changes in order to encourage Pyongyang to make a strategic
choice to pursue an economy-first—rather than a military-first—policy.
Lastly, EAI has embarked on a project to explore the potential for “middle-­
power diplomacy” to serve as a viable option for South Korea to play a
greater role in regional and global issues. All three policy doctrines have
helped EAI to differentiate itself from other South Korean security think
tanks through the creation of detailed action plans for South Korea’s
future that aspire to action-oriented results.

Complex Diplomacy
EAI’s National Security Panel, the signature research panel of the Institute,
advocated the concept of “complex diplomacy” to address the changed

See Seng Tan, South Korea’s Middle-Power Engagement Initiatives: Perspectives from Southeast
Asia, (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013).
15
 Sook-Jong Lee, South Korea as New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, (Seoul:
East Asia Institute, 2012), 23.
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    253

security challenges of the twenty-first century.16 The concept was born


from the complexity of the post–Cold War global order. Power is no lon-
ger centered solely in nation-states, but has become diffused among
numerous actors spread across multiple layers (national, subnational, and
transnational). The traditional issues of security and economy have been
joined by a number of diversified and interlinked challenges in the areas of
environment, culture, and technology. The end of the Cold War also
brought the end of direct ideological conflict among the major powers,
making it harder in the post–Cold War system to easily differentiate
between friend and foe.
To date, however, nation-state actors have not excelled at dealing with
this complex system, leading many commentators to criticize and question
their mediocre performance. For these reasons, EAI formulated complex
diplomacy to deal with the nuances of a global order that can no longer be
described in black and white.
Complex diplomacy laid the foundation for EAI policy ideas such as the
“coevolutionary North Korea strategy” and “middle-power diplomacy.”
Complex diplomacy links the North Korea policy, the ROK–US alliance,
and the regional policy spearheaded by China. It mobilizes all sources of
national capabilities such as hard power, soft power, and network power, as
well as various actors, including transnational and non-state entities, which
are related to target states and issues. Advocates of complex diplomacy
argue that Korea’s strategic vision in East Asia is to establish a “symbiotic
complex network” and secure a peaceful power transition in the region by
maintaining systematic flexibility to buffer the impact of transition in the
coming decade. In building this network, the key task is widening and
deepening the scope and intensity of the ROK–US alliance, along with
upgrading the strategic cooperative partnership with China. While the two
great powers prefer to engage with each other and avoid direct conflict,
South Korea has a chance to formulate this complex network in East Asia
for the time being. This is why the recent “coopetition” (­ cooperation plus

16
 Sook-Jong Lee, South Korea as New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, (Seoul:
East Asia Institute, 2012), 23; Young-Sun Ha, Korea’s Grand Strategy for a New Century:
Weaving a Network State, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2006); Young-Sun Ha, The Emergence
of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2010); Young-Sun Ha,
Crisis and Complexity: Changing World Order after the Financial Crisis, (Seoul: East Asia
Institute, 2011); Young-Sun Ha, Toward 2020: Ten Agendas for South Korea’s Foreign Policy,
(Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012).
254   S.-J. LEE

competition) phase of US–China relations is crucial.17 EAI emphasized


that it is essential to prevent US–China relations from deteriorating over
conflicts involving each other’s “core interests” in order to continue the
favorable strategic environment for South Korea. The ROK–Japan rela-
tionship is also of importance when considering the ongoing structural
shift in the balance of power in East Asia. In the short term, South Korea
should prevent bilateral cooperation with Japan from being impeded by
broaching historical and territorial issues at the political table. In the long
term, Korea should resolve clashes pertaining to nationalism by institu-
tionalizing regional cooperation and establishing a shared regional identity
among the citizens of the two countries.

Coevolutionary Strategy
In response to the security challenges originating from North Korea,
EAI’s Future of North Korea Research Panel argued that future South
Korean strategies should start from understanding the strategic environ-
ment facing Pyongyang.18 Pyongyang is currently facing a trilemma of
failing security, economy, and politics due to Songun or “military-first
politics” and its pursuit of a strengthened nuclear weapons program.
North Korea is locked into a vicious circle of economic sanctions and
nuclear tests, a chronic downturn of its autarkic system, and a legitimacy-­
building period for the stable succession of the Kim Jong-un regime. For
Pyongyang, it is impossible to secure both regime survival as well as eco-
nomic prosperity if it sticks to Songun principles. EAI’s research team
emphasized that North Korea should make a strategic shift and evolve into
an “economy-first” system. It is an illusion to believe, however, that neigh-
boring states can make North Korea change, either through a “sunshine
policy” or sanctions. After all, the evolution should start from inside the
regime. South Korea and the international community should focus on
forging a favorable environment that helps Pyongyang be willing to pay
certain political costs for change and take the path of transformation and
advancement.
In this context, EAI proposed an alternative North Korea policy beyond
the existing conventional policy options of containment and engagement.

17
 David Shambaugh, Tangled Titans: The United States and China, (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2012).
18
 Dongho Jo and Young-Sun Ha, Future of North Korea 2032: Coevolutionary Strategy for
the Advancement, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012).
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    255

The coevolutionary strategy offers a roadmap for the sustainability of the


North Korean regime that puts an emphasis on Pyongyang-initiated
actions. The strategy seeks to strengthen the incentives (i.e., a complex
peace system on the peninsula) for North Korea to denuclearize and trans-
form, while simultaneously increasing the disincentives (i.e., stronger
sanctions, increased ROK–US deterrence capabilities) for Pyongyang to
pursue aggressive behavior.19 By doing so, South Korea and the interna-
tional community could signal to North Korea that its neighbors are not
pursuing a hostile policy towards it, but will not tolerate Pyongyang’s
provocation-driven adventurism. EAI recommended that South Korea
should match changes within North Korea step by step, but North Korea
must take the first step. It would be desirable to synchronize positive inter-
nal developments with support or aid from South Korea. The coevolu-
tionary strategy urges simultaneous evolution from both sides. With no
institutional contact with any North Korean organization, taking an
“instigator” role towards North Korea would be almost impossible.
Nevertheless, EAI’s new ideas are disseminated internationally, including
in China, and domestic media coverage of related activities would reach
North Korea’s capital.

Middle-Power Diplomacy
Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye stressed responsible
middle-­power diplomacy as one of her three pillars of foreign policy.
Conscious positioning of South Korea as a “middle power” had started
from the Lee Myung-bak administration under the slogan of “Global
Korea.” A middle power can be defined as a significant state taking a mid-
dle ranking in the international hierarchy of national power, which is usu-
ally measured by economic and military capabilities, or exercising
diplomatic influence despite the lack of these capabilities. Most middle
powers qualified by their resource power tend to have diplomatic influence
in international politics, but resource power does not necessarily make a
middle-ranking state play a middle-power role regionally or globally.
South Korea has been a middle power since the late 1990s, with its econ-
omy ranking from the world’s top twelfth to top fifteenth largest and a

19
 Young-Sun Ha, Chaesung Chun, Won Gon Park, and Dongho Jo, Beyond Trustpolitik
on the Korean Peninsula, (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2013), http://eai.or.kr/type_k/
panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=&code=kor_report&idx=12535&page=1
256   S.-J. LEE

strong military. Foreign policy take-up of this middle-power role, how-


ever, only started in the late 2000s. Aiming at becoming a more vigorous
player in multilateral diplomacy, South Korea hosted major international
events such as the G20 and Nuclear Summits. Through these events, it
sought to be a constructive bridge between developing and developed
nations, using its experience on both sides of the economic divide. Then,
the South Korean government took the next step on its path to middle
power by helping to construct a middle-power network—the MIKTA
informal grouping of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia—
that can exert power for global good that is beyond the means of any
single nation. By working together, middle powers can display effective
leadership in areas like East Asia where it is crucial to avoid conflict.
EAI has been a pioneering research organization promoting this idea
of middle-power diplomacy as a new pillar of South Korea’s foreign
policy. EAI network scholars consulted the Korean government from
the stage of articulating the concept of middle-power diplomacy in
minilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings. As a concrete research
project, EAI launched the Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative (MPDI)
in 2013. Through MPDI, EAI is searching for middle-power strategies
that can mitigate the strategic distrust that hampers US–China relations,
in addition to ways to strengthen liberal norms and values in issue areas
across the globe. MPDI argues that moving beyond narrowly defined
national interests and encompassing efforts to promote universal norms
and values will be beneficial for South Korea in the long run to dilute
tensions that derive from US–China rivalry, especially when a like-
minded middle-power network is aligned for this purpose. However, it
also points out the limitations of the current government’s roundabout
approach, which focuses on increasing cooperation over less conflicting
issues and expects their spillover effect to benefit traditional security
challenges. Rather, conflicts over territorial or historical issues have fre-
quently resulted in a withdrawal from cooperation on softer issues in
East Asia.20 Thus Seoul’s middle-power diplomacy should not only tar-
get less contradictory issues, but also directly tackle contested security
challenges in the region, such as maritime disputes. More relevant policy

20
 Sook-Jong Lee, “Future Direction of Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative:
Maritime Disputes and South Korea’s Trustpolitik,” EAI Commentary, November 20, 2013,
http://eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=&code=eng_report&idx=
12616&page=1.
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    257

recommendations on how middle-power diplomacy should deal with


these core security challenges will be produced on the completion of
EAI’s MPDI in 2015.

Engaging and Impacting Korea and the World


Measuring the impact of think tanks on foreign policy decision-making
processes is always tremendously difficult, if not impossible. The indica-
tors of policy influence often cited by think tanks±number of media men-
tions, frequency of testimony at congressional hearings, number of
publications/downloads, and number of Twitter and Facebook follow-
ers—are irrelevant when compared to the core concern: “How much
impact do institutions have on influencing policy outcomes?” As Abelson
emphasizes, it is far more important to rely on context rather than mere
numbers.21 In the case of EAI, the most effective way of impacting the
government has been through interpersonal networks. EAI recruits the
most able scholars and experts when carrying out research, and these peo-
ple are equally sought by government ministries and presidential offices as
their consulting professionals. Naturally, EAI research agendas often over-
lap with those of the government. Oriented to longer-term policy options
and innovative ideas, EAI’s research has been able to guide the govern-
ment’s policy directions when it is looking for alternatives in particular.
This chapter provides a comprehensive picture of how EAI’s policy ideas
of coevolution, complex diplomacy, and middle-power diplomacy have
resonated not only in the policy community, but also among the domestic
and international publics.

Impacting the South Korean Government


The EAI National Security Panel’s “complex diplomacy” approach was
adopted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sung-hwan Kim in 2010. In his
inaugural speech, Kim stressed that “in step with the shifting diplomatic
environment, ‘complex diplomacy’ must be pursued.”22 This led EAI

21
 Donald E. Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign
Affairs Think-Tanks,” International Affairs 90, 1 (2014): 141–142.
22
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan’s
Inaugural Address,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.kr/
ENG/press/speeches/minister/former/index.jsp?menu=m_10_40_10&tabmenu=t_2
258   S.-J. LEE

experts, such as EAI chairman Young-sun Ha and research center chairs


Chaesung Chun and Yul Sohn, to give a series of lectures to ministry offi-
cials, including Kim, in the Complex Diplomacy Research Group Meeting
of 2011. Complex diplomacy became an integral part of South Korea’s
foreign policy under the Lee Myung-bak administration. During the Park
Geun-hye administration, EAI’s two major research outcomes were
embraced by the government. First, the “coevolutionary” approach was
taken up by Minister of Unification Kihl-jae Ryoo and formed the basis of
the Park administration’s Trustpolitik. Second, EAI’s research outcomes on
middle-power diplomacy directly impacted the responsible middle-­power
diplomacy pillar laid out by Park, one of three foreign policy pillars. Before
South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its focus on middle-
power diplomacy, it commissioned two EAI experts, Yul Sohn and Chaesung
Chun, to write classified reports on complex diplomacy and middle-power
diplomacy for the country’s mid- to long-term diplomatic strategy.
Not only has EAI been disseminating its ideas to the policy community,
but EAI experts have been invited to serve on the government to directly
impact the decision-making process. Chairman Young-Sun Ha and EAI
president Sook-Jong Lee were named to Park Geun-hye’s civilian National
Security Advisory Panel in 2013. Byung-Kook Kim, the founder and for-
mer president of EAI, served as the presidential senior secretary for
Foreign Affairs and National Security in 2008. Sang Hyun Lee, who is a
member of the EAI National Security Panel, was appointed in 2011 as
director-general for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Kihl-jae Ryoo, a member of EAI’s North Korea research team, was named
the Minister of Unification in 2013. In addition to these official appoint-
ments, EAI experts, such as Yul Sohn, Chaesung Chun, and Dongho Jo,
have served on advisory committees to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Unification, providing policy recommendations in classified reports or
laying out mid- to long-term foreign policy agendas for the ministries.

Raising Public Awareness


In order to have a significant policy impact, think tanks must be able to
disseminate their ideas and communicate with stakeholders effectively.
With that in mind, EAI has striven to educate and disseminate its research
outcomes among the South Korean public.

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Initiated by leading journalists, who sought insightful analysis and eval-


uation of current issues facing South Korea from EAI experts, the EAI-­
Press Forum allowed EAI to forge a channel of communication with
which it was able to impact a wider section of the South Korean public.
The Forum allowed direct and personal dialogue between EAI experts
and the journalists who shape public opinion, helping EAI to achieve sub-
stantial access to the South Korean public. Once a month, EAI experts
convene a small seminar with journalists to discuss current policy issues,
which has contributed to an increase in the quality of South Korean
reporting on foreign policy affairs.
EAI produces video content in addition to its online publications in
order to deliver cutting-edge policy ideas in a more public-friendly way.
EAI’s signature multimedia product, “Smart Q&A,” is a regularly pro-
duced, in-depth interview with scholars on current security, political, and
economic issues of public interest. Video clips of the interview are dissemi-
nated not only through the EAI website but also on YouTube, Facebook,
and Twitter to maximize public exposure. “Smart Q&A” content creates
more hits and downloads than all other online EAI reports and papers,
and is also featured in print and broadcast media.

Reaching Out to the International Policy Community


As part of the MPDI, EAI held a roundtable series conducted with the
ambassadors to South Korea from five middle-power countries in 2013.23
The ambassadors who attended the EAI roundtables sent reports back to
their home governments detailing the middle-power ideas that EAI was
disseminating. The ambassador roundtable series enabled EAI to spread

23
 East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Canada and Its Implications for South
Korea’s Foreign Policy,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 1, May 3, 2013;
East Asia Institute, “Strategic Partnerships between India and East Asia with Advent of Asian
Century,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 2, August 2, 2013; East Asia
Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Brazil and Policy Recommendations for South
Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 3, August 29,
2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Australia and Policy Recommendations
for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 4,
October 1, 2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of Australia and Policy
Recommendations for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable Discussion for Middle
Power Diplomacy 4, October 1, 2013; East Asia Institute, “Middle Power Diplomacy of
Mexico and Policy Recommendations for South Korea’s Middle Power,” Roundtable
Discussion for Middle Power Diplomacy 5, December 2, 2013.
260   S.-J. LEE

South Korean perceptions of middle-power diplomacy to fellow middle-­


power governments.
EAI also reaches out to a global audience by forging and strengthening
a transnational think tank network with an eye to the role of a middle
power in global issues. In directing effective policy responses to global
challenges, the Council on Foreign Relations created the Council of
Councils, in which EAI is a founding member and the sole representative
think tank from South Korea. By presenting its own ideas on some of the
global issues, such as economic regional cooperation, G20, or security and
diplomatic cooperation in Asia, EAI contributes to shaping the opinions
of high-level foreign policy circles. It also pursues widespread impact
through dissemination channels such as the International Relations and
Security Network (ISN). ISN has featured EAI’s English research out-
comes on its website for wider access to the international audience.
In promoting liberal norms and values, EAI has played a convener role
in bringing together the Asia Democracy Network and Asia Democracy
Research Network. By collaborating with think tanks from Asian countries
of varied levels of democratization, EAI has worked to support and expand
the role of civil society in the region. On a global level, it is a South Korean
representative democracy-related research institute within the National
Endowment for Democracy’s Network of Democracy Research Institutes.
EAI spreads its policy ideas on liberal norms and values via interviews and
active networking with like-minded organizations abroad.
Another way for EAI to effectively disseminate its ideas to the interna-
tional community is by inviting scholars and experts from abroad to partici-
pate in its EAI Fellows Program and Smart Talk Forums. Both programs
invite leading scholars with expertise in peace, governance, security, and
development in the region to engage in an active exchange of ideas with
fellow scholars and publish research publications based on the discussions.

The EAI Model


The impact of EAI’s policy ideas on Korean and international society has
been significant when considering the unforgiving nature of the South
Korean think tank landscape towards organizations that are not directly
supported by government or corporate donors. In the process of doubling
its expenditures and increasing its endowment sevenfold during its fifteen-­
year existence, EAI’s strategy is a typical blue ocean strategy that creates
new market space, taps into unsatisfied consumer demand, and finds
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    261

uncontested market space based on the efforts of “differentiation” and


“cost advantage.”24 The characteristics of a blue ocean strategy have been
frequently explained in comparison with Porter’s “competitive-based
strategy,” focused on a “red ocean strategy.”25,26
EAI has relied on four specific strategies based on a blue ocean strategy
in terms of targeting, organization, financing, and delivery, to overcome
the financial and structural challenges that force many independent South
Korean think tanks to close their doors before pursuing any significant
research.27

Targeting: Searching for a Niche Think Tank Market


As a latecomer in a saturated domestic ideas market that was compartmen-
talized between agent think tanks and their funding principles, EAI’s early
strategy was to find a niche market that had been addressed poorly or not
at all by other established think tanks in Korea. This market segmentation
strategy allowed it to capture the needs and wants of global audiences who
sought to know South Korean views on a variety of regional and interna-
tional issues. Based on its core competencies, EAI pursued its catch-up
strategies by focusing on international partnerships through its publica-
tions, joint studies, and exchange programs with individual experts and
overseas think tanks and institutions. It worked hard to incubate a net-
work of international scholars through the Social Sciences Citation Index–
accredited Journal of East Asian Studies and the EAI Fellows Program, in

24
 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested
Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press,
2005).
25
 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage, (New York: Free Press, 1985).
26
 First, a competitive-based strategy focuses on competing in the existing market space, a
red ocean, while a blue ocean strategy seeks to create new market space—a blue ocean that
reconstructs the market boundaries. Second, a red ocean strategy focuses on beating the
competition, while a blue ocean strategy does not focus on competition but on creating dif-
ferent strategic offerings and making the competition irrelevant. Third, a red ocean strategy
focuses on the existing demand, while a blue ocean strategy seeks to create new demand by
addressing unexplored customers. Finally, a red ocean strategy chooses an option, either a
differentiation advantage—the process of distinguishing the differences of a product from
others to make it more attractive to a particular target market—or a cost advantage—similar
products at lower cost (P. Kotler, Marketing Management. 10th ed., (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000)), while a blue ocean strategy pursues both differentiation and cost
advantage (Kim and Mauborgne 2005).
27
 The initial idea of these four strategies was introduced in Lee (2013).
262   S.-J. LEE

order to develop a transnational epistemic community of East Asian spe-


cialists. In addition, EAI regularly conducted cross-national opinion sur-
veys with leading international institutions such as the BBC and Chicago
Council on Global Affairs. The end result has been a significant increase in
EAI’s global reputation, which has successively positioned it as a stronger
brand in the global market than in Korea.
EAI’s niche market strategy has been part of its blue ocean strategy.
The basic idea is not to beat the competition in the existing market, but to
create uncontested market space, targeting unexplored customers. The
reputation that EAI has obtained in the global market has subsequently
aided the Institute’s impact on the Korean policy community, which tends
to focus on organizations that attract significant amounts of international
attention. This has created new demand in the domestic market, because
EAI has changed the preferences and rules of the ideas market in Korea. It
has not only captured the demands of the existing niche market—the
needs of the global audience—but has also reshaped the wants of the
domestic market as well. Instead of continuing a segmentation strategy
which results in a niche or small market, EAI has de-segmented the whole
market again and expanded the market size.

Organization: Flexible and Efficient Network-based Research


EAI has also broken the value–cost trade-off in a red ocean and realigned
the whole system of an institute’s activities in pursuit of differentiation
and low cost. A network-based research system is a suitable tool for EAI
to maximize both cost and differentiation advantages in terms of a blue
ocean strategy. First, EAI has structured itself around a network-based
research system in which the Institute assembles teams of non-resident
experts from leading South Korean and international universities and
research institutes for specific research issue areas within a limited budget.
The system allows EAI to pursue a greater number of research projects per
year with little additional strain on its finances. Each year, it manages ten
to twelve research teams focused on various research topics with only a
small amount of expenditure. Second, network-based research also con-
tributes to the differentiation strategy. The system grants EAI flexibility to
carefully select the most distinguished experts for each specific issue,
thereby increasing the quality of its research outcomes. Research products
that are targeted to the global market by leading experts in their fields
have helped EAI to become world recognized in a short time, especially
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    263

when compared to other think tanks’ research conducted for the domestic
needs of the government or conglomerates.
A network-based research system thrives on the incentives for experts
to work closely with other leading experts in their field on issue-driven
projects. Project participation is based on personal ties and mutual respect
among the experts. The research teams have proven to be sustainable,
maintaining group coherence over several years or more. Personal ties
strengthened by strong networks among experts, effective leadership
demonstrated by senior scholars, and academic incentives have contrib-
uted to the exceptional success of EAI’s model of network-based research.

Financing: Proactive External Project Financing


In order to avoid the fate of other independent domestic organizations
which have long struggled in the saturated market focused on government
research projects, based on its differentiation strategy, EAI has pursued
two-pronged, proactive external financing to meet its annual expendi-
tures. First, it has searched extensively for overseas foundations that seek
to support security and foreign policy research in East Asia, securing large
grants from the MacArthur Foundation to conduct significant parts of its
research on East Asian security. To fund its annual scholar exchange pro-
gram (the EAI Fellows Program), EAI has relied on a combination of
overseas foundations to empower academic links between West and East.
One of EAI’s signature publications, the Journal of East Asian Studies, is
also funded by international organizations. Secondly, the Institute uses
domestic donors and organizations to supplement the grants it has received
from overseas organizations, utilizing an individual donor network that
mainly consists of entrepreneurs who seek an opportunity to keep abreast
of worldwide political trends. EAI holds monthly meetings to provide
them with cutting-edge knowledge on changing dynamics in global,
regional, and peninsular-level politics, which helps the private donors to
maintain their incentive for participating in EAI activities. These activities
have helped the Institute to stabilize its financial situation. The point of
EAI’s financing strategy is to create an incentive structure of active and
stable donations from individual donors, rather than depending on philan-
thropic donations. It has been immensely successful in its proactive strat-
egy, covering roughly 70% of its expenditures with research funding from
outside institutions or individuals for the past several years.
264   S.-J. LEE

Dissemination: Active Use of Multilanguage Platforms


EAI considers innovative dissemination to be one of its core strategies for
success in South Korea and abroad. To that end, it chose from its outset
to develop and cultivate multilanguage platforms, seeking to differentiate
itself from governmental think tanks which have targeted the domestic
market in Korea. It was one of the first think tanks in South Korea to cre-
ate an English-language website, launching it simultaneously with its
Korean-language sibling in 2002. EAI’s English-language site was bench-
marked against the world’s leading institutions in order to attract a wider
international audience than its South Korean peers. This has contributed
to the success of the institute’s international outreach strategy, creating
synergy between dissemination and increasing EAI’s reputation globally
and domestically. EAI has also led the field in South Korea by establishing
a Chinese-language website, which has contributed to the Institute’s
growing stature in China. EAI understands that, in today’s globalized
market, ideas jump continents and oceans in a matter of minutes. For that
reason, the Institute has placed emphasis on the speed with which it pub-
lishes content on its sites, adding timeliness to its reputation for quality.

Conclusion: Looking to the Future


The EAI model can be characterized as a network model seeking “excel-
lence, efficiency, and effectiveness.” By tapping into outstanding scholars
and experts from outside, EAI could pursue excellence in research quality.
To maintain internal efficiency, it has relied on the integrated roles of pro-
gram officers assisting research planning and managing research cycles to
the end. EAI’s flexible governance structure, which allows research teams
to operate freely, and its bottom-up research topic selection also have con-
tributed to organizational efficiency. Effectiveness has been more difficult
to achieve than the other two goals. To translate research into policy
­outcomes at the planning stage, EAI’s leadership has carefully weighed the
priority of research issues and also tried to nurture networks with govern-
ment and major think tanks abroad. For domestic effectiveness, it has
sought to collaborate with the Korean media for wider dissemination
when launching opinion surveys and big conferences.
South Korea is currently facing unprecedented security and foreign
affairs challenges emanating from its failing and increasingly dangerous
neighbor to the north. It also must contend with an Asia-Pacific region
  PUSHING KOREA TO THINK IN A WORLD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EAST ASIA…    265

where two titans—one rising, the other rebalancing—face each other, and
a world community that urges greater contributions from “Global Korea.”
It is evident that South Korea requires more robust and reliable non-profit
think tanks, not only to fill the void left by myopic policy groups in the
government and governmental think tanks, but also to enhance a demo-
cratic and creative policy environment inside the country. As a small
network-­based organization with a limited budget and few personnel, EAI
has gained a reputation for innovation and influence with fresh, bold, and
practical ideas. Its products have enabled government decision-makers to
rethink and reformulate their foreign policies. The EAI model has deeper
implications for the future course of South Korea as an emerging middle
power, as well as for the development of the global policy community in
terms of productivity and democracy. Benchmarking the EAI network
model requires certain conditions. Networks of able scholars need a larger
pool of academics and policy experts and close interactions among them.
Fortunately, South Korea has a relatively large pool of intellectuals who
work in higher education and research institutions. If there is no such a
pool of idea-makers or brokers, this model is not a good one to emulate.
The second condition is a welcoming social atmosphere in which both
government and society recognize the input of intellectuals to public poli-
cies. Compared to businesspeople or journalists, South Korean academics
and experts enjoy better access to the consultation or even decision-­making
processes on public policies. If this condition is not met, the impact of EAI
based on knowledge networks on public policies would not be possible.
Although the EAI model has so far been successful, it faces several chal-
lenges which are closely related to the success factors in its rapid growth
period. Firstly, EAI’s network-based research strategy has been successful
in overcoming its limited budget, but it has also limited the Institute’s
influence to some extent. Since EAI is unable to host a large number of
experts, it has utilized research networks of non-resident scholars, most of
whom teach at leading universities in South Korea. Many experts affiliated
with its research networks advise the government as policy committee
members or participate in media outlets. Therefore, it is difficult to dis-
cern whether they are representing EAI or other organizations. In addi-
tion, available experts in the EAI network have started to overlap with
other think tank networks in this market as time passes. It is not surprising
that the number of experts on relevant policy research topics is relatively
limited, but the network-based research strategy has been benchmarked
by latecomers. For it to grow further, EAI needs to develop research
266   S.-J. LEE

capacities consisting of an appropriate mixture of its own resident experts


and external networks.
Secondly, in order to achieve the goal of elevating its in-house research
capabilities, EAI cannot ignore the problem of funding. Retaining highly
qualified resident experts and staff requires considerable funding. Despite
its previously mentioned success on the financial front so far, EAI needs
to diversify its financing structure and lower the risks caused by continu-
ing global economic volatility. In fact, American foundations, one of the
main sources of EAI research grants for the past several years, adjusted
their grant procedures in the aftermath of the swirling worldwide financial
crisis of 2008. Through self-help efforts to deal with financial instability,
EAI seeks to increase the size of its endowment in order to overcome the
financial insecurity that is inherent in relying solely on annual donations
and grants.
Thirdly, the scope of an independent think tank’s role in supporting the
formulation of foreign policy is yet another challenge that EAI must con-
tinuously face. It has long been highly esteemed in the policy community
of South Korea for responding to mid- and long-term challenges by for-
mulating visions for Korean diplomacy. Due to the fundamentally myopic
nature of bureaucracy planning and the “quick-response policy research”
of governmental think tanks, the long-term vision and grand strategy of
EAI are worthy of being appreciated. However, think tanks have been
increasingly requested to engage in current and emergent issues and pro-
vide policy-driven recommendations that can be applied directly by the
policy community. Research such as Beyond Trustpolitik on the Korean
Peninsula (2013), FTA 2.0: A New Trade Strategy for South Korea (2013),
and more has partly reflected EAI’s efforts to incorporate these new
demands. EAI needs to extend its role in producing more discrete and
tractable policy recommendations to meet increasing expectations, while
continuing to suggest relevant, long-term strategies for South Korea.
CHAPTER 17

IFANS and the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security


Summit: The Institute of Foreign Affairs
and National Security

Bong-Geun Jun

This chapter discusses the roles and contributions of the Institute of


Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear
Security Summit. IFANS, a government-affiliated think tank, belongs to

Dr. Jun Bong-Geun is a Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National
Security (IFANS) in the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). Professor
Jun has held several governmental and non-governmental positions: Policy Advisor
to the Minister of Unification; Visiting Scholar at Keio University in Tokyo and
Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation Academic Fellow; Secretary to the President for
international security affairs at the Presidential Office; professional staffer at the
KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) New York
headquarters; and a visiting scholar at the Asia Foundation Center for US–Korea
Policy in Washington, DC. His research area covers the North Korean nuclear
issue, inter-Korean relations, non-proliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear
energy policies. He received a BA and an MA in political science from Seoul
National University and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Oregon.

B.-G. Jun (*)


Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), Seoul, Korea

© The Author(s) 2019 267


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_17
268   B.-G. JUN

the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), the Republic of Korea


(ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ education and training facility.
IFANS was the first foreign policy research think tank in South Korea,
established in 1963, originally as the Educational Institute of Foreign
Service Officers, with help from the Asia Foundation, a United States–
based foreign development assistance foundation. Since its inception,
IFANS, expanded and renamed KNDA in 2012, has performed two key
functions of research and education. IFANS now has about twenty full-­
time professors, while KNDA has over one hundred research assistants and
administration staff. IFANS is probably the most well-known and influen-
tial foreign policy think tank in Korea, having ranked as the top foreign
policy and security think tank for six years in a row in a survey conducted
by an independent rating organization.1
Though IFANS is one of the bigger foreign policy research institutions
in Korea, its areas of research focus had primarily been the Korean penin-
sula and Northeast Asia, as the country is faced with daunting challenges
such as North Korean nuclear and military threats, the rise of China, and
territorial and historical disputes with Japan. Therefore, unlike most other
foreign policy think tanks in other states, IFANS did not pay much atten-
tion to global affairs, but rather concentrated on regional issues. Nuclear
and non-proliferation issues were part of IFANS’ research agenda only
when they were related to North Korea.
The news that South Korea had been selected as the host of the 2012
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) at the Washington NSS in April 2010 was
received with mixed emotions. Most Koreans welcomed the 2012 Seoul
NSS, the biggest ever summit held in Korea, with over fifty world leaders
attending. This diplomatic mega-event was seen as a great opportunity
not only to promote South Korea to the world, but also to contribute to
world peace. The Korean government and public were in a self-­
congratulatory mood because the hosting of the Summit itself symbolized
Korea’s entry into the group of “middle powers” or “emerging powers.”
On the other hand, some Koreans had a lukewarm response to the
hosting of the 2012 NSS. Some Korean media and experts were critical of
the government’s decision to host the event, when they learned that the
NSS was not about the North Korean nuclear problem and peaceful use of
nuclear energy, but about nuclear terrorism and nuclear material security
in the world. Most Korean foreign affairs experts and public were

1
 Han-Kyung, “2014 Top 100 Think Tanks in Korea,” Business Weekly June 1, 2014.
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    269

­ nfamiliar with the concepts of nuclear security and nuclear terrorism.2


u
Still worse, there were few experts versed in nuclear security in Korea,
while experts on North Korean nuclear issues and nuclear engineers in
“physical protection” were many. This situation demonstrated a gap
between Korea’s desire to become an emerging middle power, as well as
its knowledge of and devotion to global causes, and its physical conditions
for being an emerging middle power.
Against this backdrop, IFANS took initiatives, both voluntarily and at
the request of the Korean government, to help its government and the
public prepare for the 2012 Seoul NSS.  More importantly, IFANS also
had to motivate the policy community in Seoul to pay attention to nuclear
security and to become involved in preparation for the Seoul NSS.
The following sections first show how the Korean government and
IFANS prepared for the 2012 NSS and its accompanying expert sympo-
sium, and worked to contribute to the cause of nuclear security and world
peace. Next, IFANS’ roles and contributions to the NSS are categorized
into four groups and explained in detail: capacity-building and network-
ing, policy research and consulting, public diplomacy and awareness cam-
paign, and implementation and follow-up measures. Finally, lessons from
IFANS’ experiences and further challenges are discussed.

Background and Challenges

Nuclear Security and the Nuclear Security Summit


Nuclear security was a somewhat new and lesser-known nuclear issue until
former US President Barack Obama raised it in his landmark Prague
speech on April 5, 2009, to pursue his vision of “a world without nuclear
weapons.” Warning that “nuclear terrorism was the most immediate and
extreme threat to global security,” Obama proposed to hold a global
nuclear security summit in 2010 to initiate “new international efforts to
secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years.”

2
 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines “nuclear security” as “the pre-
vention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal trans-
fer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their
associated facilities.” At the NSS, “nuclear security” was simply defined as all measures to
secure nuclear bomb material, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, to
prevent “nuclear terrorism” by non-state actors.
270   B.-G. JUN

In fact, since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, preventing


nuclear weapons and nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands
had been one of the main international security objectives of the United
States. At the time, however, the focus was to prevent the acquisition of
nuclear weapons, materials, and technology by rogue states, not by non-­
state actors such as terrorist groups and individuals.
Then, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 made nuclear terrorism by
non-state actors a real security danger. All of a sudden, preventing the
danger of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors became one of the highest
priorities on the international security agenda. The United Nations (UN)
Security Council also adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004, as it was “gravely
concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state actors may
acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and their means of delivery.”
Recognizing the imminent danger of exposure of nuclear material to
unauthorized uses or terrorist attacks, international efforts were made
intermittently to secure and protect nuclear material. However, due to the
lack of strong political will and consensus among the leading and stake-
holder states, efforts were never strong, fast, or sufficient enough to keep
the world secure and safe from the dangers of nuclear and radiological
terrorism.
Then, Obama took an unusual and dramatic initiative, proposing a
summit among all stakeholder states. The Washington Nuclear Security
Summit was held on April 12 and 13, 2010, with leaders from forty-seven
states and representatives from the UN, International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and European Union (EU).

Preparations for the Seoul 2012 Summit


Seoul’s decision to host the 2012 NSS coincided with South Korea’s grad-
ual recognition that it should play a bigger political and diplomatic role in
global affairs, which corresponds to its rising status as the tenth-largest
economy in the world. Around 2010, Korea also began recognizing its
status as a newly emerging “middle power.” Reflecting these trends, the
Lee Myung-bak government proposed “Global Korea” as one of its
national policy goals. In this regard, Seoul’s successful hosting of a G20
summit in November 2010 as the first non-G8 hosting state was a notable
diplomatic accomplishment. The 2012 NSS in Seoul was considered
another excellent opportunity to contribute to world peace, as well as to
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    271

demonstrate Korea’s middle-power status to international society.


Therefore, President Lee willingly accepted President Obama’s request to
be the host of the second summit in 2012.
At the beginning, the public and the media cheered at the news about
hosting the summit as if they had won the bid to host the Olympics. When
they soon learned that the NSS had nothing to do with the North Korean
nuclear problem and nuclear energy, they mostly became indifferent.
Some experts and the media were critical that Korea was representing US
interests at the expense of its own.
Despite the desire of the Korean government to promote such ideas of
“Global Korea” and being a “responsible middle power,” the public was
not yet prepared to bear such a responsibility and burden. What was worse
was that there were almost no foreign affairs experts who could explain to
the public why nuclear security mattered, and how Korea could benefit
from the Summit and stronger nuclear security. Therefore, after consult-
ing with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IFANS decided to take a few
initial steps to promote the significance of both nuclear security and the
nuclear security summit.
In order to fulfill this mission, IFANS launched the following three
tasks: first, to mobilize and educate a small group of international security
and nuclear experts to become experts in nuclear security; second, to
establish an ad hoc “center for nuclear security studies” within IFANS;
and third, to launch public and media campaigns on the NSS. These activ-
ities will be explained in detail later in this chapter.
While promoting the Seoul Summit, the Korean government experi-
enced difficulties in acquiring public attention to and support for it. The
Korean people were disappointed to learn that the Summit did not deal
with three nuclear issues that were familiar to them: the North Korean
nuclear program, nuclear safety, and radiological terrorism.3 Especially as
South Koreans were suffering consistently from North Korean nuclear
threats, some were even critical of the Summit for its narrow focus on
nuclear terrorism by non-state actors only. Therefore, IFANS had to make
greater efforts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through numerous

3
 According to a public opinion poll in mid-2011, 36% of the Korean public answered that
the North Korean nuclear issue should be a key agenda of the Seoul Summit, 21% were for
non-proliferation issues, 15% for nuclear safety, and only 10% for nuclear security. Jung-yeop
Woo, “Public Understanding of Nuclear Security Summit,” Korea Herald Editorial,
September 8, 2011.
272   B.-G. JUN

seminars and media appearances, to explain to both experts and the public
what nuclear security is and why it matters. In this regard, IFANS helped
the government to publish booklets and brochures for outreach
activities.
After learning that many other countries were also interested in “nuclear
safety and nuclear security interface” and “radiological security” against
dirty bomb terrorism, the Korean government wanted to add these two
new issues to the agenda. IFANS again held dialogues with many foreign
nuclear security experts, and helped the Korean government successfully
add the two new topics to the Seoul Communiqué, the final document of
the Seoul Summit. Keeping in pace with governmental processes to for-
mulate new nuclear security policies, IFANS worked with numerous for-
eign experts to formulate the best policy ideas. It also collaborated with
international partners to encourage foreign governments to become inter-
ested in more innovative nuclear security ideas, such as nuclear safety and
the security interface, global nuclear security governance, and radiological
security.

Preparations for the 2012 Seoul Symposium


Following the 2010 Washington NSS, two official side events to the
Summit were organized in Seoul. The Nuclear Security Symposium was
attended by nuclear security policy experts, and the Nuclear Industry
Summit mostly by corporations dealing with nuclear materials. These two
events demonstrated that both civilian experts and corporations were
accepted by governments as key partners in their fight against nuclear
terrorism.
In this context, IFANS volunteered to co-host the 2012 Nuclear
Security Symposium with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Control (KINAC), a government-affiliated nuclear security center
under the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.
While preparing for the Symposium, IFANS worked and partnered
with the US-based Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), the orga-
nizer of the first nuclear security conference in Washington, to learn from
its experiences.4 IFANS chose “Innovating Global Nuclear Security
Governance” as the subtitle of the Symposium, in order to emphasize the

4
 The Fissile Materials Working Group is a non-governmental coalition of over 40  US
experts representing many of the top non-proliferation and nuclear security organizations in
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    273

comprehensive and innovative thinking that can strengthen the interna-


tional nuclear security regime.
While planning the Symposium, the organizers set the following four
objectives. Firstly, the Seoul Symposium would present a vision of global
nuclear security governance and its roadmap, as there was a need to look
ahead to fight the impending threats of nuclear terrorism that may increase
with time. If the vision of a future nuclear security framework could be
agreed, there could also be agreement on what could be done then.
Secondly, the Symposium would be a venue for non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), individuals, and the media to network with each other
and develop their own capabilities. Thirdly, throughout the preparations
for the Symposium, there was the aim of building a corporate-academic-­
state-international partnership against nuclear terrorism. Fourth and
finally, the Symposium would provide participants with the best opportu-
nity to share information, values, and visions on nuclear security.
In retrospect, most of these goals were achieved. The Seoul Symposium
was attended by over 250 participants, including approximately 150
foreign experts, from 50 participating states and 4 international
­
organizations.

Working with the Government and the Public


IFANS took several initiatives to help the government and the public pre-
pare for the Seoul NSS and Symposium. It focused on the following three
activities: capacity-building and networking, policy research and consult-
ing, and a public diplomacy and awareness campaign.

Capacity-Building and Networking
While preparing for the Seoul Summit, the first task that IFANS encoun-
tered was capacity-building, as there were almost no nuclear security pol-
icy experts either inside or outside the Institute. Therefore, it had to
mobilize both in-house and external experts from other related fields,
such as international security, nuclear technology, and nuclear non-­
proliferation. IFANS also had to build and maintain a network of experts.

the country and also includes many international partner organizations. http://www.fissile-
materialsworkinggroup.org/.
274   B.-G. JUN

Beginning in mid-2011, it started to hold monthly experts’ seminars to


build knowledge on nuclear security and track global debates on the issue.
These nuclear security seminars were attended by both policy and tech-
nical experts and were well received by the participants because, even
though South Korea suffered from many nuclear-related issues, including
North Korea’s nuclear program, the domestic debate over nuclear sover-
eignty, the spent-fuel storage shortage problem, and nuclear safety, such
events were rarely held. Therefore, even after the Summit, IFANS contin-
ues to hold “nuclear experts’ network seminars” on a quarterly basis, and
provides advice to the Korean government on various nuclear policy issues.
These newly trained Korean nuclear security experts played critical roles
in the success of the Seoul NSS: advancing the knowledge of nuclear secu-
rity, developing new ideas on nuclear security, promoting the value and
significance of the NSS to the Korean public, briefing foreign reporters on
the Seoul NSS, and making appearances on television and other media.
IFANS also operated a temporary Center for Nuclear Security to help
organize many national and international expert seminars, public aware-
ness campaigns, and the Symposium. The Korean government was an
essential partner in this process. After successfully implementing its mis-
sion for the Summit, this center was disbanded. Although IFANS wanted
to keep it, the Institute failed to overcome strict administrative regulations
restricting the expansion of government organizations.
Finally, IFANS engaged actively with international NGOs and experts
from early on and cooperated with them effectively. In this process, the
FMWG willingly provided IFANS with its policy knowledge and know-­
how on event organization. This international partnership and collabora-
tion with nuclear security NGOs and individuals were instrumental in
making the Symposium a successful knowledge-sharing and networking
event.

Policy Research and Consulting


How could the Seoul Summit make an additional contribution to a stron-
ger nuclear security regime, surpassing the outcomes of the 2010
Washington Summit? How could Korea benefit from a strong nuclear
security regime? The Korean government, as well as IFANS and other
experts, was under pressure to answer these questions. Both the Korean
government and IFANS also wanted to leave their footprints in the global
nuclear security regime through the Seoul Summit.
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    275

While talking to foreign governments and experts, IFANS learned that


most countries besides the United States were more concerned about
“radiological terrorism” by dirty bombs or radiological dispersal devices
(RDD) than nuclear terrorism by nuclear bombs or improvised nuclear
devices (IND). Most countries thought that radiological terrorism had a
much higher chance of occurrence than nuclear bomb terrorism.
Traditionally, nuclear terrorism is considered as a low-probability, high-­
consequence event, while radiological terrorism is considered as a high-­
probability, low-consequence one. Especially after the March 2011
Fukushima nuclear accident, people were worried that Fukushima-like
radiological terrorism could become a high-probability incident.
The Korean government also learned that, since the Fukushima nuclear
accident, many states were expressing concerns about the effects of
“nuclear safety” accidents on nuclear security, or the interface between
nuclear safety and security. Previously nuclear security and nuclear safety
were two distinct issue areas with different sets of principles and approaches.
One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident was that
both nuclear safety and security experts had to collaborate to effectively
manage crisis situations, and minimize the damage resulting from them.
Therefore, the Korean government and IFANS worked together to
post these two issues on the Summit agenda, raising and promoting these
concerns in international seminars and conferences. These efforts were
well received by many states, even though there was some criticism that
such widening of the agenda could dilute the NSS’s original singular focus
on nuclear terrorism. Consequently, the Seoul Summit was successful in
adding these two issues—radiological terrorism and the interface between
nuclear safety and security—to the original agenda.
Without joint efforts with IFANS and its experts, the Korean govern-
ment might not have inserted these two new subjects into the Seoul NSS
Communiqué. Again, IFANS could not have helped the Korean govern-
ment sufficiently if it had not maintained networks of domestic and for-
eign nuclear security experts with a strong commitment to a safer and
securer world.

Public Diplomacy and Awareness Campaign


As the host of the Seoul NSS, the Korean government had two practical
concerns before the Summit: firstly, how many heads of states would show
up at the Summit, of which the host was not President Obama, but
276   B.-G. JUN

President Lee Myung-bak; secondly, whether the Korean public would


welcome and support the Summit, even though nuclear terrorism had
never been a serious security concern to them.
The Korean government and IFANS concluded that the answer to these
questions was public diplomacy, directed at both domestic and interna-
tional audiences. Especially for the domestic audience, both general public
and experts, an awareness campaign was required to explain the signifi-
cance of nuclear security to both the country’s security and world peace.
Since mid-2011, Korea had started to conduct active outreach activities
for the participating states and international organizations. Korean diplo-
matic missions abroad held numerous briefings and seminars for foreign
government officials, diplomatic corps, NGOs, think tanks, and the media
to attract their interest in the Seoul Summit. IFANS and other Korean
experts regularly participated in these governmental outreach activities.
In addition, IFANS and its experts made an effort to promote the value
of nuclear security and the significance of the Seoul NSS to the indifferent
Korean public. To most Koreans, nuclear security was regarded as an
important issue only for the United States or a handful of nations with
nuclear bomb materials and threats of terrorism. Therefore, a series of
media campaigns were held claiming that no one is safe from nuclear ter-
rorism in a globalized and networked world. They also emphasized the
participation and cooperation of “all” states and citizens in preventing
nuclear terrorism, quoting the saying that “a chain is only as strong as its
weakest link.”
IFANS refined another major theme for media and public campaigns:
that Korea, as a newly “rising middle power,” carried a special “global
responsibility” for world peace and prosperity. South Korea, which lacks
natural and energy resources, is basically a trading nation whose survival
relies on the uninterrupted trade of goods and resources, and also on
peace in a world that is free from nuclear and radiological terrorism. In
fact, the Seoul Summit turned out to be an excellent first opportunity for
Korea to think over its global responsibility for world peace and nuclear
security, as a new middle power.

Lessons and Success Factors of the IFANS Case


Assisting the Korean government in preparation for the Seoul Summit and
hosting the Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium were great experiences for
all nuclear and international security experts in Korea, as well as IFANS
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    277

staff. It was also a rare and precious opportunity for Koreans to review
Korea’s responsibility for and contributions to world peace.
However, to most people, not only in Korea but across the world,
nuclear terrorism by non-state actors was such a remote issue that it had a
low possibility of occurrence. To most Koreans, North Korean nuclear
threats and nuclear safety were more direct and serious nuclear issues.
Despite such low public attention to the issue, IFANS was fortunate to
have dedicated staff, excellent experts from related fields, and governmen-
tal support.
During the preparation period for the Summit, as already mentioned,
IFANS launched and successfully executed three types of tasks: capacity-­
building and networking, policy research and consulting, and public
diplomacy and awareness campaigns. What are a few of the notable success
factors that helped IFANS fulfill its missions before and during the Seoul
NSS, and the lessons that can be learned from its experiences?
Firstly, IFANS had a few dedicated scholars who were willing to delve
into new international security issues, such as nuclear security. Recognizing
the historical significance of the Seoul NSS not only for Korea’s global
status, but also for the advancement of the international nuclear security
regime, the staff members approached the Korean government to request
funds for further research and additional recruitment. They also persuaded
the IFANS leadership to establish a new Center for Nuclear Security that
could focus on developing a new nuclear security agenda and assisting the
Korean government. The Center was moreover a core hub of domestic
and international networks of experts.
Secondly, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained a close
and collaborative partnership with IFANS and policy communities from
the beginning, a somewhat unusual phenomenon in Korea. With limited
knowledge of nuclear security within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this
partnership was a smart measure. The Korean Sous-Sherpas for the sum-
mit, responsible for nuclear security policy formulation, appeared fre-
quently at IFANS seminars to brief and seek advice on various policy
issues. This openness of the Korean government was welcomed and appre-
ciated by both Korean and foreign experts. Through this cooperative
­relationship between the government and policy communities, the Korean
government was able to develop new policy initiatives for the Seoul
NSS. Policy communities were also pleased to give advice to the Korean
government and exert influence on nuclear security policy.
278   B.-G. JUN

Thirdly, the utilization of foreign experts and think tanks was instru-
mental both to the development of a new policy agenda, and to the suc-
cess of the Seoul Symposium. Fortunately, there was a well-organized
international nuclear security policy community, networked around the
FMWG, which was willing to help IFANS and Korean experts. During the
preparation period for the Summit, IFANS maintained an excellent work-
ing relationship with its foreign partners.
Lastly, IFANS staff ran effective media campaigns by appearing on tele-
vision, contributing articles to newspapers, publishing brochures, making
public speeches to general audiences, and so on. They and other experts
held numerous meetings to discuss how to make the general public pay
attention to nuclear security and the NSS. One of the major themes in the
media campaigns was Korea’s global responsibility for world peace and
nuclear security, as a newly rising middle power. As a new exporter of
nuclear power plants, another theme was Korea’s responsibility for nuclear
security.
IFANS believes that its roles and contributions before and during the
Seoul NSS were well coordinated and instrumental to the successful host-
ing of the summit. Later, a few IFANS staff were recognized for their
contributions with awards from the Korean government. In retrospect,
such choreographed teamwork among IFANS, the government of Korea,
and expert groups in preparation for the NSS was exceptional. Hence it is
reasonable to expect that the NSS case could serve as a suitable model in
launching another summit for global issues. In fact, the current adminis-
tration of Korea intends to include non-traditional security issues, which
are also not a well-known topic to the Korean public and officials, as part
of its diplomatic initiatives with neighboring countries in Asia and with
Europe. At this moment, the NSS case is expected to serve as an excellent
precedent from which we can learn a great lesson.
However, IFANS regrets that its ad hoc Center for Nuclear Security
was disbanded after the summit, despite all the demands for its continua-
tion, due to lack of budget and personnel. Nevertheless, the Institute con-
tinues to hold nuclear experts’ seminars regularly and advise the Korean
government on various nuclear-related issues. IFANS is now better pre-
pared to work with the Korean government, domestic and foreign policy
communities, and the general public. Its experiences of preparing for and
hosting the Seoul NSS are well kept and remembered for global diplo-
matic events in the future.
  IFANS AND THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT…    279

Epilogue: After the Seoul Summit


IFANS continued to work with both the Korean government and policy
communities to conduct research on and promote nuclear security and
other nuclear issues. It was proud to see that some of its nuclear security
efforts were inherited by other organizations. For example, at the sugges-
tion of IFANS, the Asian Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul established
its Nuclear Policy and Technology Center in 2012. From 2013 to 2014,
the IFANS nuclear study team also assisted with the establishment of
nuclear non-proliferation and security research and education centers in
the Korea Institute of Nuclear Proliferation and Control and the Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and continued to provide
policy advice to them. IFANS also took the initiative in launching the
Korea Nuclear Policy Society in 2013, a registered academic association
that has over one hundred experts in nuclear engineering and foreign
affairs as its members.
Since continued contributions from IFANS and the Korean policy
community were well appreciated, the members of IFANS were invited to
the 2014 Nuclear Knowledge Summit, an official experts’ event during
the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit. In anticipation of the fourth
Nuclear Security Summit in early 2016  in Washington, IFANS and its
nuclear security experts network continued to lead Korea’s preparations
for the event and made an effort to strengthen global nuclear security
governance.
Recently, IFANS began assisting the Korean government in formulat-
ing and planning a nuclear component for the Northeast Asia Peace and
Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), one of the key foreign policy platforms
of the Park Geun-hye administration. Considering that Northeast Asia,
unlike Europe, lacks any regional cooperative mechanisms, NAPCI sug-
gests first building a common practice and culture of cooperation, begin-
ning from non-sensitive and non-political issues, such as nuclear safety and
security. Therefore, IFANS has been using its domestic and regional net-
works to help the government fulfill its goals.
All these accomplishments and contributions were possible due to a
unique characteristic and strength of IFANS’ interdisciplinary nuclear
policy program that accommodates both fields of foreign affairs and
nuclear technology. IFANS continues to be a hub of nuclear policy studies
in South Korea, and it still runs regular nuclear policy experts’ seminars on
a quarterly basis.
280   B.-G. JUN

In summary, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was probably the most
significant political event in which Korea was seen as a capable emerging
middle power willing to contribute to and share responsibility for world
peace and prosperity. The Summit was also a great opportunity for the
Korean public to recognize Korea’s global responsibility that is part of its
new status as a middle power. IFANS was glad to have played a critical role
in this transformative era of Korean diplomacy and Korea’s view of the
world.
CHAPTER 18

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam:


An Overview

James G. McGann

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has recently emerged as a regional power


through efforts at economic renovation and modernization. By joining vari-
ous international and multilateral organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it has also developed its diplomatic ties.
However, with no think tanks in the top 150, there is a lack of policy research
and academic approaches to growing diplomatic demands, although certain
think tanks, such as the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), serve to
advocate policies pertaining to emerging issues. The DAV specifically pro-
vides policies to tackle water security issues; it has elevated both national and
regional awareness and influenced government decision-making through
proactive initiatives for water security in the region (Table 18.1).

Overview
The policy agenda of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is defined by a
single-party socialist republic framework, where the President is the head
of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government, in a one-party
system led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 281


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_18
282   J. G. MCGANN

Table 18.1  Vietnam at a glance

Country name Socialist Republic of Vietnam


Capital Hanoi
Population 93,348,835 (July 2015 est.)
Location (continent) Southeastern Asia, bordering the Gulf of Thailand, Gulf
of Tonkin, and South China Sea, as well as China, Laos,
and Cambodia
Ethnic groups Kinh (Viet) 85.7%, Tay 1.9%, Thai 1.8%, Muong 1.5%,
Khmer 1.5%, Mong 1%, Nung 1.1%, others 5.3% (CIA
World Factbook)
Language Vietnamese (official), English (increasingly favored as a
second language), some French, Chinese, and Khmer,
mountain-area
languages (Mon-Khmer and Malayo—Polynesian)
Currency (name and Vietnamese Dong (VND), 1 VND = 0.000046 US dollar
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Communist state
Chief of state President Truong Tan Sang; Vice President Nguyen Thi
Doan
Head of government Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung; Deputy Prime
Ministers Vu Duc Dam, Hoang Trung Hai, Pham Binh
Minh, Vu Van Ninh, and Nguyen Xuan Phuc
Cabinet Cabinet proposed by the Prime Minister, appointed by
the President, and confirmed by the National Assembly
Elections President elected by the National Assembly from among
its members for a five-year term; last election held July
25, 2011 (next to be held in July 2016); Prime Minister
appointed by the President from among members of the
National Assembly; Deputy Prime Ministers appointed by
the Prime Minister; appointment of Prime Minister and
Deputy Prime Ministers confirmed by the National
Assembly
Legislative branch Unicameral National Assembly or Quoc Hoi
Judicial branch Supreme People’s Court (consists of the chief justice and
thirteen judges)
Political parties Communist Party of Vietnam, CPV
Other parties proscribed

Some economic facts


GDP: US $551.3 billion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $6100 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 17.4%, industry 38.8%, services 43.7% (2015 est.)
  THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: AN OVERVIEW    283

Executive power is exercised by the government and the President.


Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly of Vietnam
(Vietnamese: Quôć hội). The judiciary is independent of the executive.
The Parliament adopted the current Constitution of Vietnam, its fourth,
on April 15, 1992, and it has been amended once since then.1
In 1991, Hồ Chí Minh Thought, which adapts Marxism–Leninism to
the specific social, political, and economic conditions of the Vietnamese
people, by Ho Chi Minh, the then leader of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, became the official ideology of the CPV and the state. Some
claim that Hồ Chí Minh Thought is used as a veil for a party leadership
which has stopped believing in communism, but others rule this out on
the basis that Hồ Chí Minh was an avid supporter of Vladimir Lenin and
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Still others see Hồ Chí Minh Thought
as a political umbrella term whose main function is to introduce non-­
socialist ideas and policies without challenging socialist legality.2

Economic Scenario
Vietnam initiated economic reform in 1986, shifting from the centrally
planned economy with state subsidies to a socialist-oriented market econ-
omy in implementation of industrialization, modernization of the coun-
try, diversification, and multilateral development of economic external
relations for an open-door, world integration policy.3 The macroeconomic
condition of Vietnam has been stable, with recovered growth and a single-­
digit inflation rate, further aided by the drastic decrease of the global oil
price. Other indicators like domestic demand, exports, exchange rate, cur-
rent account balance, and foreign direct investment all have been stable
and robust.4
1
 The Wikipedia contributors, “Politics of Vietnam,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Politics_of_Vietnam.
2
 John Gillespie. Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’ in
Vietnam. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.
3
 Overview of Vietnam’s Economy, Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency, http://www.viet-
rade.gov.vn/en/index.php?option=com_content&id=759&Itemid=76.
4
 Khanh, Vu, Trong and Nguyen, Anh Thu, “Vietnam Economy: Q&A with IMF
SanjayKalra”, Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/04/
vietnam-economy-qa-with-the-imfs-sanjay-kalra/.
284   J. G. MCGANN

Table 18.2  Think tanks in Vietnam

Number of universities: 168


Number of think tanks: 10
% of think tanks out of regional total: 10/1106, 0.904%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2014):
 2012: 9
 2013: 10
 2014: 10
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2014):
 None
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy
 Top 70 security and international affairs think tanks: 0
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 0
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 0
 Top 80 domestic economics think tanks: 1
 Top 50 social policy think tanks: 0
 Think tanks with outstanding policy-oriented research programs: 0
Case studies
 Top think tank: The Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) is the top-­
ranked think tank in Vietnam. In 2014, it was ranked 32nd in the top 60 think tanks in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As a government-affiliated research center, IWEP
provides scientific assessments and recommendations to the government of Vietnam in
designing guidelines, policies, and strategies for sustainable development. To date,
IWEP has initiated a series of recommendations and programs that are embodied in
Vietnam’s strategies for socio-economic development.
 Alternative think tank: The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) was ranked as one
of the top 60 think tanks in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 2014. Established under
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DAV concentrates its research on strategic studies in
international relations and foreign policies. In addition to scientific research, the
institute provides substantial training and education to people at undergraduate and
postgraduate levels in international relations, as well as mid-career officials working in
external relations departments.

Despite the macroeconomic achievements, the increase in public and


publicly guaranteed debt levels has drawn particular attention, partially
due to the higher budget deficits and guarantees for the borrowing of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This reflects the lack of deeper reform in
the SOEs and banking sector.5

5
 Ibid.
  THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: AN OVERVIEW    285

Foreign Relations
Vietnam did not begin to emerge from international isolation until it
withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. Within months of the 1991
Paris Agreements, Vietnam established diplomatic and economic relations
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states
and also with most countries of Western Europe and Asia’s Far East. China
reestablished full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991. The two nations
concluded a land border demarcation agreement in 1999.6 Since the early
1990s, the development of Vietnam’s foreign relations has been exempli-
fied by its joining different international or multilateral organizations
(e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, ASEAN, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, and World Trade Organization).
The tension over boundary disputes between Vietnam and its neigh-
bors has emerged in recent times. More specifically, the maritime bound-
ary with Cambodia still has to be defined; in addition, Vietnam is involved
in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), Malaysia, Philippines, and possibly Brunei. The issue of
the maritime boundary with Thailand was resolved in August 1997, while
the dispute with the PRC in the Gulf of Tonkin was resolved in 2000.
Another unresolved issue concerns the Paracel Islands, which were occu-
pied by the PRC, and the offshore islands and sections of the boundary
with Cambodia are also in dispute. With regard to land borders, an agree-
ment between Vietnam and the PRC was signed in December 1999
(Table 18.2).7

6
 Wikipedia contributors, “Foreign relations of Vietnam,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Foreign_relations_of_Vietnam.
7
 Ibid.
CHAPTER 19

Shaping the Security and Foreign Policy


of Vietnam: The Diplomatic Academy
of Vietnam

Thi Lan Anh Nguyen and Hung Son Nguyen

Introduction
Vietnam, like many other countries in Asia, has a long tradition of paying
high respect to the knowledgeable and intellectuals. In every feudal regime
of Vietnam, the Court regularly organized examinations to select the most
knowledgeable to serve and advise the king. Names of people with high
intellectual capabilities were often carved in stones placed in sacred places,
which still exist and are visible today in the stone turtles in Van Mieu

Research fellows work at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. However, the


views expressed in this chapter are their own, which may differ from the views of
the Academy.

T. L. A. Nguyen (*)
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam
H. S. Nguyen
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Institute for the South China Sea,
Hanoi, Vietnam

© The Author(s) 2019 287


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_19
288   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

Temple, the first university of Vietnam established in the eleventh century.


Given that tradition, the modern state of Vietnam also pays great atten-
tion to the role of thinkers and think tanks since the early stages, right after
the country gained independence from France in 1945. The think tanks in
Vietnam, similar to the trend observed in other Asian countries, have
strong links with the state and carry out their tasks as an arm of its bureau-
cracy.1 Under most ministries of the Vietnamese government, there usu-
ally is a think tank in charge of providing strategic research and policy
advice for that ministry. In addition to ministerial think tanks, two other
think tanks were also established and placed directly under the Vietnamese
cabinet. The first focuses on social sciences and the second on science and
technology. For about thirty  years from the 1950s to the 1980s, the
Vietnamese think tanks were strongly influenced by the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries, following similar research methodologies and
resources. With the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s and the
reform policy of Vietnam in 1986, known as the “doi moi,” Vietnamese
think tanks faced new challenges of assisting the government in the man-
agement of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a more
market-oriented one, while opening up, regionalizing, and diversifying
the country’s foreign relations.
Nowadays, many think tanks have been created in Vietnam, reflecting
the ever-increasing demand for independent research and policy advice, as
well as the professionalization of advisory businesses. Some think tanks are
non-governmental institutions, and are therefore more independent from
the government.
The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), as a think tank in charge
of strategic issues and the foreign policy of Vietnam, had both opportuni-
ties and challenges in order to make a greater contribution to the formula-
tion and conduct of the country’s foreign policy. This chapter will first
briefly describe the history of DAV, and its current structure and func-
tions. The chapter will then describe the areas in which DAV has been
taking the lead, by providing advisory opinions and making certain
achievements in influencing policies. The chapter will further analyze a
concrete case study to illustrate the role of DAV in advocating for policies
on how to curb an emerging non-traditional security threat, namely water
security.

1
 Karthik Nachiappan, Enrique Mendizabal and Ajoy Datta, Think Tanks in East and
Southeast Asia, Overseas Development Institute (2010): 3, 12.
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    289

History of the DAV: Structure and Mandate


Initially called the Institute for International Relations (IIR), the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam changed its name in 2008 after an
upgrade in its mandate and the corresponding reorganization of its struc-
ture. The IIR was founded in 1987 as a result of the merger between the
Diplomatic School (established in 1959) and the Institute for Foreign
Affairs (established in 1977).
DAV has two main sections, one in charge of training and the other in
charge of research. The training section consists of nine faculties and one
center for continuing education, whose aim is to provide undergraduate,
postgraduate, and mid-career training. The research section has two insti-
tutes: Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies and Institute for
East Sea (South China Sea) Studies.
The Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies was established in
2008 and is organized into four centers: Centre for Regional and Foreign
Policy studies, Centre for Development and International Integration,
Centre for Political and Security Studies, and Centre for Diplomatic
History Studies. The Institute for East Sea (South China Sea) Studies was
established in 2012 to meet the increasing domestic and regional demand
for solutions to disputes in the South China Sea. Its structure also consists
of four centers, including Centre for Policies, Centre for Legal Studies,
Centre for International Cooperation, and Information Centre. DAV’s
structure is summarized in Fig. 19.1.
The overall mandate of DAV was decided by the Vietnamese Prime
Minister in its founding Decision. Accordingly, DAV has served as a think
tank for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Communist Party, and the
state in the formulation and planning of Vietnam’s foreign policy. Besides
its training tasks, DAV has the mission to carry out strategic research and
forecasts on world affairs, international relations, political and economic
affairs, security, national defense, law, culture, and foreign policies of dif-
ferent nations and regions. It also conducts research and develops foreign
policy doctrines based on past Vietnamese foreign relations experiences
and theories of international relations. DAV acts as a focal point in coop-
erating with universities, academies, research centers, think tanks, and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations within the coun-
try and abroad in the field of international and foreign policies.
DAV therefore is considered as the hub for track-two diplomacy in
Vietnam, representing Vietnam’s regional track-two processes such as the
290   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

PRESIDENT BOARD
(PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENTS)!

COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY COUNCILS!
AFFAIRS AND TRAINING!

ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAINNING SECTION! RESEARCH SECTION!
SECTION!

INSTITUTE INSTITUTE
FOR FOREIGN POLICY FOR EAST SEA
AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (SOUTH CHINA SEA) STUDIES

CENTRE FOR REGIONAL


AND FOREIGN POLICY CENTRE FOR POLICIES!
STUDIES!

CENTRE FOR
CENTRE FOR
DEVELOPMENT & INTL
INTEGRATION! LEGAL STUDIES!

CENTRE FOR
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL
AND SECURITY STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION!

CENTRE FOR
INFORMATION
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY STUDIES CENTRE!

Fig. 19.1  Structure of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Institute for Strategic and


International Studies network (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for
Cooperation of the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). DAV also serves as publisher;
the Academy edits and publishes scientific works, studies, textbooks, teach-
ing materials, and other publications on external affairs, diplomatic history
of Vietnam and the world, international relations, and other related fields.2

2
 Prime Minister Decision No. 82/2008/QĐ-Ttg dated on 23 June 2008
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    291

In the organizational set-up of the Academy, the Institute for Foreign


Policy and Strategic Studies covers international and regional issues of
interest to Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Institute for East Sea (South China
Sea) Studies, as the name suggests, focuses on strategic as well as topical
issues directly relating to the South China Sea.

The Role of DAV in Security Analysis and Foreign


Policy: A General Assessment
Vietnam is a coastal country in the Pacific Rim, located along one of the
most important sea lines of communications of the South China Sea, and
it belongs to one of the most economically dynamic regions of the world—
Southeast Asia. After a long period of war and isolation, Vietnam has cho-
sen to open up, diversify, and strengthen its multilateral relations in order
to help the country integrate with regional economic development and
better protect its security, while firmly maintaining its sovereignty and
independence. As a think tank that deals with strategic and foreign policy,
DAV developed in three main directions.
Firstly, DAV played an active role in track-two and -1.5 discussions.
Since it is much easier to have frank discussions to generate ideas and build
consensus at track two, especially regarding strategic and sensitive security
issues, DAV usually initiates such discussions and debate before the issue
is brought to track one. This approach is adopted in Asia, and ASEAN in
particular. For example, the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC) was discussed in the series of Managing the
Potential Conflicts Workshops initiated by Indonesia and Canada, a track-­
two process, long before its conclusion by ASEAN and China in 2002.
Given the importance of track-two discussions, the Academy maintains
relations with more than eighty research institutes and world-class univer-
sities. DAV is currently an active member of international and regional
research networks, such as ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International
Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), ASEAN Political and International Studies
Association (APISA), North East Asia (NEAS), Network of East Asian
Think-Tanks (NEAT), Council for Security Cooperation in Asia – Pacific
Region (CSCAP), Asia Regional Forum (ARF), and so on. DAV also
holds annual bilateral strategic dialogues with other regional think tanks,
such as China Institute for Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR), Shanghai Institute of International Relations, China Institute of
292   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

International Studies (CIIS), Taiwan’s Institute of International Relations,


Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Institute of Foreign Affairs
and National Security of South Korea (IFANS), Lowy Institute (Australia),
Asia New Zealand Foundation, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs
(NUPI), Royal United Services Institute (United Kingdom), Vivekananda
International Foundation (India), and so on. DAV is also taking the lead
in organizing track-two international conferences on many strategic and
security-related issues. Among them, the International Workshop on the
South China Sea has been held for 5 years with approximately 200 inter-
national participants each year.
Secondly, DAV is frequently visited by research fellows, scholars, and
diplomatic corps in Hanoi to discuss new agendas in regional and interna-
tional relations, as well as to become updated on the foreign policy of
Vietnam. In these meetings, the Academy not only provides its scholarly
analysis from the perspective of a Vietnamese think tank, but also gathers
feedback from the visitors and transmits it to responsible agencies.
Thirdly, DAV conducts independent studies in the field of strategic and
international studies. As the coordinator in the management of research
projects and activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DAV has carried
out hundreds of academic and policy studies in international relations,
some of them at national level. Its members frequently participate in for-
eign policy-making groups, most notably the drafting committees of stra-
tegic policy guidelines of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The Role of DAV in Security Analysis and Foreign


Policy: A Case Study in Regional Water Security
The issue of water security provides a useful example to describe the role
of DAV in influencing the foreign policy agenda of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. More specifically, this case study illustrates how DAV elevated
national and regional awareness on an emerging non-traditional security
issue, and how it influenced its policy-makers on the issue.

DAV’s Recognition of the Emerging Problem


In 2009, Vietnam faced concurrently two water security problems in its
two major river systems: the Red River in the northern part of the country
and the Mekong River in the southern part. The Red River experienced
the worst drought in years and, at the same time, its water source was
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    293

contaminated by unidentifiable sources from China. A year earlier, in


2008, the Mekong River also faced a severe drought. Some considered the
drought in the Mekong to be the worst in recent history. The record low
water level in the Mekong in 2008 followed recurring reports in the fol-
lowing years of seawater intrusion into farmable land along the southern
Vietnamese coastline, steadily eroding and destroying habitable land and
pushing communities further inward. These new phenomena rang alarm
bells among environmentalists, the media, and scholars, and raised wider
public debate on the environment and climate change among various gov-
ernment agencies and policy-makers.
Initially, natural factors and climate change were thought to be the
major causes of the problems. Flood and drought were natural phenom-
ena that humankind, including the ancient Vietnamese, has dealt with
since time immemorial. Vietnamese rituals were full of stories about how
ancient Vietnamese sought to cope with the forces of God. But even the
long history of Vietnamese agricultural practices did not record such a
severe and worsening drought, coupled with an unprecedented level of
water contamination. Attention quickly turned to human activities in the
upper stream of the rivers for more direct causes, and the numerous dam
construction projects could not escape scrutiny. Public opinion started to
protest against these dams, particularly the mega-dam project in the upper
stream of the Mekong, called the “Lan Thuong” River in Vietnamese,
because it was considered to be the potential cause of the severe droughts.
Dam construction projects in other upstream countries, such as the
Xayabury in Laos, also caused heightened alert in Vietnam.
Public pressure on the government to do something about these proj-
ects and to save the waters of the Mekong adds to the complexity of Sino-­
Vietnamese bilateral relations. The relations between Hanoi and Beijing,
already experiencing tensions due to the South China Sea, became even
more complicated due to the Mekong issue. Additionally, Vietnam–Laos
relations, traditionally seen as being free of major conflicts of interest, are
now under a looming new major test. Facing increasing public demand,
Vietnam’s government must find solutions to a non-traditional security
problem that it did not have to deal with before.
Water security is becoming a new security issue that is going to critically
affect Vietnam’s relations with its two most important neighbors, with the
potential of becoming a truly regional issue that will also have a profound
impact on the stable and peaceful environment of the all-too-important
Mekong Delta. For this reason, DAV decided to assist the government by
294   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

exploring the possibility of promoting dialogue and cooperation between


the different regional actors. Being a non-expert in the issue of water secu-
rity itself, DAV’s objectives were to draw the attention of regional security
experts to an emerging security issue in the region, and to seek the advice
and wisdom of its regional colleagues on how the region should approach
and promote cooperation in dealing with the issue.

DAV’s Proposal to the Council for Security Cooperation


in the Asia Pacific to Form a Study Group on Water Security
At the 33rd CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia in June 2009, Vietnam circulated a Study Group Proposal which
called for the establishment of a study group on “Water Resource Security
in the Asia-Pacific.” Vietnam’s initial proposal did not convince some
CSCAP members, particularly China. Aware of the rising Vietnamese pro-
tests against dam construction projects in China, the Chinese delegation
to the CSCAP meeting might have had the impression that Vietnam was
trying to regionalize or internationalize the issue as a diplomatic tactic to
put pressure on China, albeit through a track-two channel. The impres-
sion probably originated from the list of purposes of the Study Group in
the Vietnamese proposal, which reads as follows:

• To identify issues and problems in protecting water resource in main-


land Southeast Asia, where Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and
Cambodia have been facing increased threats to their water resource,
particularly their rivers and lakes.
• To recommend ways and means to enhance cooperation among
China and downstream countries.

The fact that the original Vietnamese proposal singled out China versus
the other downstream countries might have raised China’s suspicion. It
was due to this initial suspicion that Ambassador Ma Zhengang, head of
China’s CSCAP, attending the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, did not imme-
diately vote for the project. However, after further clarification from the
Vietnamese delegation on specific questions that Vietnam proposed to the
Study Group, and the readiness of the Vietnamese delegation to rename
the study group “Water Resource Security in Mainland South East Asia,”
Vietnam finally received the approval of all members of the Steering
Committee. The proposed questions to be answered were:
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    295

• What is the definition of water resource security and its


components?
• What is the current state of water resources in mainland Southeast
Asia? How insecure are they?
• What actions have the regional countries taken to secure this
resource?
• What are the major obstacles to regional cooperation on water
resource security?
• What and how can regional countries cooperate to tackle water
resource issues?

Three other countries co-chaired the Study Group with Vietnam, the
CSCAP’s way of expressing co-sponsorship or shared responsibility in
steering the projects. The countries were Cambodia and Thailand—two
very important Mekong downstream countries—and Japan, a very impor-
tant stakeholder and investor on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).
The CSCAP Study Group planned four meetings, which were to take
place in all of the respective co-chairs’ countries, within a timeframe of 2
years.
What needs to be noted was that although it looked like the Study
Group would focus on the Mekong, and indeed the Mekong later served
as the context of many of the studies and discussions, it was not Vietnam’s
intentions to focus only on the Mekong. Vietnam wanted region-wide
studies of how water resources were being managed and used, and to draw
in the experiences and best practices of all other countries in the
Asia-Pacific.

DAV Leading the Study Group within CSCAP


After the initial Study Group, Vietnam had to work out the Study Group’s
work plan and initiate the first meeting. A master work plan was proposed,
using each of the four planned meetings as milestones towards the end
goal of producing a Memorandum summarizing the findings and recom-
mendations of the Study Group.
The first meeting was proposed to be held in Vietnam between March
22 and 23, 2011 in Hanoi. The aim of the meeting was to assess the cur-
rent state of water resources in the region, to review the usage and man-
agement of water resources in the region, and to identify the security risks
to the region from the usage and management of water resources. The
296   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

first meeting was also supposed to investigate all regional and international
mechanisms and agreements in relation to the usage and management of
water resources. The second meeting was proposed to be held in mid-July
or August 2011, focusing on finding possible ways to promote regional
cooperation. The Study Group also aimed to identify potential partners,
regional and international organizations to be involved in the cooperative
process, and to start discussing possible policy recommendations. The
third and fourth meetings, which were to be held in 2012, would focus on
making practical proposals for cooperation and, as is required for every
Study Group, to draft the Study Group’s Memorandum. Two meetings
were reserved for making recommendations and drafting the Memorandum,
in anticipation that diverse viewpoints might lengthen or defer the
process.
DAV scheduled the first meeting of the Study Group on March 22,
2011 in Hanoi. It purposefully chose March 22 because it is World Water
Day and DAV thought of it as a meaningful way to celebrate both this day
and to attract the most attention and participation from relevant people to
the event.
In preparing for the first meeting, DAV’s first step was to network and
draw in expertise from the rather well-established and institutionalized
agencies that dealt with the various aspects of water security in Vietnam.
The Academy then proposed a national meeting of all stakeholders in
water usage and management in Vietnam: the Vietnam National Mekong
Committee, which is under the Mekong River Commission, various agen-
cies such as the Directorate on Dykes, the Centre for Water Resources
Management, the Vietnam River Network Association, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and so on. These organizations had a brainstorming ses-
sion in January 2011 to suggest topics for discussions and the agenda for
the first meeting.
DAV did not receive initial or outright support from the participants of
the meeting. They felt strange that a “political” entity like DAV would
take the lead on such a highly “technical” issue such as water manage-
ment. However, after listening to DAV’s explanation that its only interest
was to promote regional and international cooperation and to have a bet-
ter understanding of and cooperation on those “technical” issues, then the
participants began to cooperate and give their full support. It was during
this national meeting on water management that DAV gained more under-
standing of the breadth of the issue and the roles, views, and interests of
the various agencies and their respective experts. Based on the suggestions
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    297

and the network built during the first meeting, the Academy was able to
identify local and international experts that could make valuable contribu-
tions to the first meeting of the Study Group.
The first meeting went on as scheduled. More than forty participants
took part in the event from different organizations, such as CSCAP mem-
ber committees and other institutions, United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) Hanoi, United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) based in Thailand,
International Centre for Water Management, International Association
for Water Law, and local audiences. CSCAP China sent the largest delega-
tion, showing China’s full support. Four people from the two leading
Chinese think tanks and from the state-run hydropower cooperative par-
ticipated. Hence, the CSCAP Study Group on Water Security became the
only mechanism with full participation and cooperation from China on
water management issues. The first meeting was very useful in conceptual-
izing water security and its management from the various perspectives of
the involved stakeholders. While international relations experts debated
the notion of “absolute sovereignty” over rivers, legal experts discussed
international norms concerning the sharing and management of cross-­
boundary rivers; development specialists focused on the social and eco-
nomic impacts and of water mismanagement. A historical perspective on
the issue also came from an expert who was involved in drafting the 1995
Mekong Agreement.
The second meeting of the Study Group was held in Siem Reap,
Cambodia on July 14–15, 2011 and it focused on how to tackle the issues.
The meeting benefited from reports written by several Cambodian stake-
holders that depended on the Mekong rivers, and further benefited from
a field trip to the Tonle Sap, the Cambodian sea lake in the middle of the
Mekong. Among other things, the most important part of the meeting
was the debate on and, thus, the understanding of the roles of various
stakeholders in water security and management (e.g., the riparian states,
international organizations, private sector organizations, non-­
governmental organizations (NGOs), the military, the media, etc.). DAV
also benefited from having a better knowledge of the pluralistic nature of
water security and management, perspectives not easily seen from within
Vietnam, where most stakeholders are either governmental or have links
with the government.
The third and fourth meetings in Japan and Thailand, respectively,
spent a large portion of time discussing specific recommendations and
298   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

drafting the Memorandum of the Study Group. DAV once again played
the leading role in both drafting the Memorandum and moderating the
discussions, taking into account viewpoints and suggestions of all partici-
pants and redrafting the papers. A draft was finally agreed at the final
meeting of the Study Group in Chiang Rai, Thailand, where the Mekong
Agreement was signed in 1995. Minor revisions to the text continued to
follow, and further clarifications of viewpoints were made at the CSCAP
Steering Committee, the higher body of CSCAP that approves and autho-
rizes all CSCAP Memorandums. The final draft of the Memorandum was
approved in June 2014.

How DAV Shared What Vietnam Learned from the CSCAP


Process and Influenced Policy and Decision-Making
The meetings and the resulting learning process provided a huge amount
of knowledge to DAV, which in turn made informed interventions and
contributions to decision-making circles. DAV did so first by sharing the
reports from the meetings to enhance the perspectives and awareness of
the most relevant agencies, and secondly by helping to conduct a more
informed analysis.
DAV also shared its knowledge and experiences through its network
and contacts of experts country-wide, thus contributing to the consensus-­
building process. It also disseminated its knowledge through various local
and regional seminars, and through articles published in the popular
media. The two most important channels through which DAV influenced
policies were direct participation in policy formulation discussions and tai-
lored special reports with recommendations to the Foreign Ministry on
the water security issue.
A typical case was Vietnam’s policy towards Laos, the government of
which was planning to build a hydropower plant by damming the Mekong
at Xayabury province in Laos. Vietnam’s initial response was to ask Laos
to stop the dam construction due to the huge potential impacts it might
cause to downstream countries, including Vietnam. Hydropower-rich
Laos, however, saw the project as one of its few options to boost its under-
developed economy and considered the plant a national priority and “key
interest.” Vietnam faced the dilemma of choosing between its most trusted
neighbor and the security of its most important rice basket, the Mekong
Delta. DAV, however, believed that Vietnam actually had more policy
options than just asking Laos to stop the Xayabury project. It knew that
  SHAPING THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF VIETNAM…    299

there could be a way to meet the interests of Laos and still secure Vietnam’s
water security interests. Technology in dam construction and operations
had developed to the point that it might be possible to limit the environ-
mental impact of dam construction (although there will still be some neg-
ative impact). The key is that dams need to be built and operated in an
expensive but environmentally friendly way, which also means a reduction
in operating profit for Laos. Therefore, DAV tried to convince Hanoi’s
government that instead of pursuing a reactive and negative path, Vietnam
should choose to convince Laos to accept the higher cost and assure a
certain standard for dam construction. Vietnam could proactively assist its
neighbor in acquiring the necessary expertise, most likely from interna-
tional cooperation and assistance from more technologically advanced
partners, for such construction and during future operations.
The new approach advocated by DAV seemed to receive the attention
of certain audiences in policy-making circles, as the Vietnamese govern-
ment became more ready to accept continuation of the projects under the
condition that Laos ensured an environmentally friendly design standard.
Generally, DAV has helped policy-makers on water security in the fol-
lowing ways:

• Raising awareness of the bigger picture surrounding water security,


most notably the possible environmental impacts of dam construc-
tion; the interests of relevant stakeholders and parties in water secu-
rity; the legal foundation of water security management; other
regional countries’ expertise on water security and management; and
how to tap into such expertise, applying best practices from other
regions to Southeast Asia, and possible inter-regional linkages and
cooperation on water security issues.
• Creating a network of scholars and domestic think tanks on water
security. This network was useful in building consensus on the
importance of researching this issue, debating policy options, and
testing new policy ideas. DAV gradually established itself as a key
player in domestic debates on the water security issue, similar to its
role in the maritime issue.
• As explained in this chapter, DAV contributed to policy formulation
towards specific issues such as the Xayabury dam project, and also to
Vietnam’s policy towards Laos in general.
• DAV also successfully proposed to policy-makers to “securitize”
water resources management in regional discussions, since the issue
300   T. L. A. NGUYEN AND H. S. NGUYEN

is no longer a developmental issue, as reflected only in the ASEAN


Social Cultural Community Blue Print. Vietnam was among the first
to call for water resource management to be seen as a key non-­
traditional security issue with the potential to destabilize the domes-
tic politics of a state, or even to create interstate conflicts in the next
decades. Vietnam subsequently was able to raise concerns about
water resource management within ASEAN’s security mechanism,
such as the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting.
• DAV also helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with ideas on how
to promote water security cooperation in other multilateral fora,
such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). DAV has always pro-
moted inter-regional cooperation to share best practices and experi-
ences between riparian states of major river systems in both regions.
Today, water security cooperation has become an emerging new pri-
ority for ASEM and it requires many fruitful cooperation projects.

Conclusion
The evolution of the leading Vietnamese think tank on foreign policy,
from the Diplomatic School to the Institute for International Relations to
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, reflects the rising importance and
professionalization of independent research and analysis in Vietnam’s
policy-­making process. This was the joint product of the Vietnamese tradi-
tion of highly valuing intellectual power and authority, and the deeper
interactions and integration of the country into the dynamic regional and
international community that required Hanoi to have a more dynamic and
nuanced foreign policy.
DAV greatly benefited from being both an independent academic insti-
tution and a government think tank. As a consequence, it could draw the
most benefit from both worlds: enjoying academic freedom while remain-
ing highly relevant and up to date on day-to-day policy issues.
The Academy has clearly capitalized on this strength to insert itself as
an influential policy advisor to the Vietnamese government, and an increas-
ingly respected government-affiliated think tank, rising to be among the
top thirty-five think tanks in the Asia Pacific in 2013. The academic and
practical experiences perhaps represent DAV’s greatest strength, contrib-
uting to its achievements and success.
PART IV

Latin America
CHAPTER 20

Argentina: An Overview

James G. McGann

Argentina has experienced both economic crises and instable political break-
downs. One of the challenges that security and international affairs think
tanks grapple with is the Malvinas islands issue. The Center for Strategic
Affairs “Manuel Belgrano” of the Ministry of Defense, the government-­
affiliated think tank, suggests dividing the Argentine Sea into geopolitical
sets, one of which would be the Malvinas. The Argentine Council for
International Relations created a subcommittee to provide academic con-
ferences and research on this issue. The Argentine Center of International
Studies founded the “Peoples for Malvinas” initiative to address the poten-
tial of these territories for implementing the advocacy strategy (Table 20.1).

Overview
Stretching 4000  km from the subtropical north to the sub-Antarctic
south, Argentina is the fourth-largest economy in South America—after
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—with a GDP of more than US $777.9 bil-
lion.1 According to the US Energy Information Administration, Argentina
is ranked second and fourth worldwide in terms of deposits of recoverable

1
 Argentina Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/argentina.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 303


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
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304   J. G. MCGANN

Table 20.1  Argentina at a glance

Country name Argentine Republic


Capital Buenos Aires
Population 43,431,886 (2015 est.)
Location (continent) South America’s southern cone, eastern coastline with the
southern Atlantic Ocean. Western border shared with Chile;
Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay to the north and
northeast. Disputed territory of the Malvinas islands, South
Georgia and the south Sandwich Islands, and part of Antarctica
Ethnic groups White (mostly Spanish and Italian) 97%, mestizo (mixed white
and American ancestry), Amerindian, or other non-white
groups 3%
Language Spanish (official), Italian, English, German, French, indigenous
(Mapudungan, Qeucha)
Currency (name and Argentine Peso (ARS), 9.2 pesos = 1 USD (2015 est.)
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Republic
Chief of state President Mauricio Macri
Head of government President Mauricio Macri
Cabinet Appointed by the President
Elections President and Vice-President elected on the same ballot by
popular vote for a four-year term, eligible for a second
consecutive term
Legislative branch Bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) consists of
the senate (72 seats) and chamber of deputies (257 seats)
Judicial branch Supreme Court (Corte Suprema) consists of the court
president, vice-president, and five judges; federal-level
appellate, district, and territorial courts; provincial-level
supreme, appellate, and first-instance courts
Political parties Cambiemos, a coalition composed of CC, PRO, and UCR
(Mauricio Macri); Civic Coalition, CC (a coalition loosely
affiliated with Elisa Carrio); Dissident Peronists, PJ Disidente
or Federal Peronism; Front for Victory, FpV; Peronist Party, PJ
or Justicialist Party; Popular Path, PP; Progresistas; Radical
Civic Union, UCR; Republican Proposal, PRO (Mauricio
Macri); Socialist Party, PS; Renewal Front, Frente Renovador
or FR; numerous provincial parties

Some economic facts


GDP: US $964.3 billion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $22,400 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 10.5%, industry 29.1%, services 60.4% (2015 est.)
  ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW    305

shale gas and oil, respectively, and if exploited these reserves could make
the country a net energy exporter.2
In the last few decades, the country has faced severe economic d
­ ifficulties
which foreshadowed its financial collapse in 2001. Since then, Argentina
had to deal with record debt defaults (about 150% of GDP3) and currency
devaluation.
The progressive deterioration of the country’s economic situation has
affected its posture both regionally and internationally. Within a rapidly
changing regional scenario, Argentina’s third spot among Latin American
economies was overtaken in 2014 by Colombia which, in contrast, boasts
a stable currency and a low inflation rate.4 In the international arena,
cooled relations with the United States and the main financial institutions
have been counterbalanced by stronger ties with leading emerging powers
such as China and Russia.
On top of the economic and financial uncertainties, Argentina is also
facing increasing civil turmoil due to growing corruption, and dramatic
social unrest after the death of Alberto Nisman, the prosecutor investigat-
ing the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, who
had publicly accused President Fernández de Kirchner of conspiracy.5

Economic Situation
Argentina’s economy has been through a 100-year cycle of ups and downs.
In the early 1920s, the country was one of the world’s richest thanks to
cattle and farm goods. Its workforce was educated and mostly made up of
European immigrants and their descendants.6 However, starting from the
1930s, Argentina’s crises have been constant.

2
 Keith Johnson. “Argentina’s Brilliant, Terrible, Very Unclear Energy Future” (2014) http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/13/argentinas-brilliant-terrible-very-unclear-energy-future/.
3
 Guillermo Vuletin. “Argentina in Default: Why 2014 Is Different from 2001.” The
Brookings Institution (2014) http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/
08/05-argentina-default-vuletin.
4
 Patricia Rey Mallén. “Colombia Surpasses Argentina as Latin America’s Third-Largest
Economy Due to Inflation, Currency Changes, GDP Growth”, The International Business
Times. (2014) http://www.ibtimes.com/colombia-surpasses-argentina-latin-americas-
third-largest-economy-due-inflation-currency-changes-gdp.
5
 Karen Zraick. “The Mysterious Death of Alberto Nisman” The New York Times, February
20, 2015.
6
 “Chronology: Argentina’s Turbulent History of Economic Crises.” Reuters. (2014)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/us-argentina-debt-chronology doi
USKBN0FZ23N20140730.
306   J. G. MCGANN

The most recent and dramatic financial crash occurred between 2001
and 2002. However, its origins are much older and, precisely, go back to
the 1990s boom years.7 Under Menem’s presidency, Argentina’s eco-
nomic policy focused on busting foreign investments, reducing import
tariffs, and privatizing inefficient state enterprises. These reforms, which
opened up its market, helped Argentina to drop inflation.
However, by the end of Menem’s term (1999), corruption had begun
afflicting the country, driving away investors. Furthermore, contagion
from Russia and from East Asian countries at the end of 1990s caused
capital outflows. At the beginning of the Twenty-First century, Argentina
was about to experience the biggest sovereign debt default that had ever
happened.
In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a loan
which allowed Argentina to restructure its public debt and provide credi-
tors with new bonds to replace the defaulted ones. However, with half of
the population living in poverty and one of the highest unemployment
rates in the world, Argentinians scarcely benefited from the economic
recovery of the early 2000s.
For the second time in 13 years, Argentina defaulted again in the sum-
mer of 2014 as a consequence of a failed agreement with holdout inves-
tors. Following the decision of US Judge Thomas Griesa, Argentina was
required to pay US $1.5 billion8 to NML Capital and Aurelius Capital
Management—the hedge funds which had not accepted previous restruc-
turing offers.
Despite the 2014 crisis being modest if compared to previous ones, the
default on sovereign debt still impacted the country’s economy. A signifi-
cant decline in GDP, a serious currency devaluation, and a high rate of
inflation technically put Argentina into an exacerbated recession.
According to recent figures (Ernst and Young 2014), during last year,
moderate policy changes were enacted: the peso was devaluated, interest
rates increased, and data reporting was upgraded.9 However, forecasts for
this year (2015) expect a contraction of GDP by 1.5% due to the govern-
ment’s rigid controls and ineffective macroeconomic policies.

7
 Timothy Geithner. “Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina” p.6. International Monetary
Fund, October 8, 2003.
8
 Jon Hartley. “Argentina’s Default: Lessons Learned, What Happens Next” Forbes
Magazine. (2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/08/04/argentinas-
default-lessons-learned-and-what-happens-next/.
9
 Emerging Markets Center. http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/worldmap/argentina/.
  ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW    307

Such a prognosis is also a result of the country’s political instability,


which holds back markets and hinders economic progress.
Another major issue is represented by the interference of the govern-
ment in the financial sector and through public controls on a large major-
ity of goods and services.10 This situation contributes to the decrease in
formal economic growth and the increase in informal economic activi-
ties.11 The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 2015 Index states,
indeed, that Argentina’s economic freedom score is 44.1 and it ranks 27th
out of 29 countries in the South and Central America/Caribbean region.12
During the period 2010–2015, the country’s economic freedom score has
decreased by over 7 points and in 2015 it registered its lowest score ever,
now belonging to the “repressed” category.13

Political Scenario
Argentina’s foreign policy in the last few decades seems to have been
largely driven by national interest and influenced by its domestic vulnera-
bilities. This situation has progressively eroded Buenos Aires leadership
both regionally and internationally, especially within important fora such
as the G20.
The two-year period of 1982 (the Falklands war) and 1983 (the return
to democracy) signed an important moment in the history of Argentina’s
foreign policy. The issue of the Malvinas Islands on the one hand, and the
improved relations with the international community on the other, became
the two axes of Buenos Aires international relations.
In the late 1980s, and above all during Menem’s presidency
(1989–1999), the country left the non-aligned movement to draw up
closer relations with a former competitor: the United States. This approach
took the label of a “carnal relation,” the definition given by Guido di Tella
to the newly established alliance between Argentina and the United
States.14

10
 Argentina Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/argentina.
11
 Ibid.
12
 Ibid.
13
 Ibid.
14
 “Relaciones Carnales: el vínculo con Estados Unidos en la década del 90,” December 5,
2013 http://www.argentina.ar/temas/democracia-30-anos/24129-relaciones-carnales-el-
vinculo-con-estados-unidos-en-los-90.
308   J. G. MCGANN

In the post–Cold War scenario, Argentina became a strategic partner of


the Western powers. It was the only Latin American country to take part
in the Gulf War and contributed to several peacekeeping operations,
including those in Kosovo and Bosnia. In addition, Argentina abandoned
the nuclear project in 1976 and became a strong proponent of non-­
proliferation efforts. This new foreign policy was the result of a long-term
strategy which sought to secure domestic stability.15 Broadly speaking,
between the 1980s and 1990s, Argentina’s foreign policy was oriented
towards a deeper engagement in the international community, with the
final aim of being considered as a stable and reliable stakeholder.
In those years, Argentina’s role was also particularly significant with
regard to the regional equilibrium. The relations with Brazil were revital-
ized and Buenos Aires mediated in the Ecuador–Peru peace progress and
peacefully resolved the border quarrels with Chile.
After the 2001–2002 default, the leadership of Argentina was taken on
by Nestor Kirchner, who radically changed the country’s foreign policy
approach. Again, Argentina’s international relations were a manifestation
of its internal changes. Kirchner decided to suspend the alignment with
Washington and with its institutions (IMF and World Bank) and to
strengthen ties with other Latin American countries, in particular with
Brazil and Venezuela. Argentina became an active player in the
MERCOSUR forum—also supporting the candidacy of Venezuela—and
it was strongly opposed to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
In 2007, Nestor Kirchner’s wife, Cristina, won the elections and was
elected President for the first time.
Once again, under the new leader, Argentina’s foreign policy experi-
enced a transformation. Besides slogans and symbolic gestures, President
Kirchner’s international agenda embraced new, controversial partners
such as Russia and China. Behind this new approach there was the crucial
issue of natural resources. Even though Argentina is rich in oil and natural
gas, it imports fuel, causing repercussions for the country’s inflation and
unemployment rates.16 For this reason, Argentina is trying to gather inves-

15
 Frederico Merke. “Argentina’s Foreign Policy in Kirchner’s Second Term.” International
Affairs at LSE. (2012) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/03/argentinas-foreign-policy-
in-kirchners-second-term/.
16
 Johnson, Keith. “Argentina’s Brilliant, Terrible, Very Unclear Energy Future”, Foreign
Policy, (2014) http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/13/argentinas-brilliant-terrible-very-
unclear-energy-future.
  ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW    309

tors to develop the Vaca Muerta shale field, estimated to be the largest oil
field in the western hemisphere and one of the biggest in the world.17
Since 2012, when its national oil company YPF was renationalized from
Spain’s Repsol, Buenos Aires has been seeking partners. Russian’s
Gazprom and China’s Sinopec have been the main targets of Kirchner’s
action. However, there is a risk that the Vaca Muerta site—in which the
United States also has an interest—will turn into a new challenge for the
Southern Cone nation.
In the last decade, Argentina has also tightened its ties with Beijing. At
the beginning of 2015, Argentina received US $400 million from the
Bank of China as the fourth installment of a US $11 billion currency swap
agreement between Beijing and Buenos Aires,18 according to which
Argentina would pay for Chinese imports with the yuan.19 According to
some analysts, Buenos Aires might use the currency swap with China in
order to avoid isolation from the international financial system, and above
all to stabilize the exchange rate until the end of Fernández de Kirchner’s
term in December 2015.20
Many factors support stronger ties between Argentina and China,
whose partnership was officially endorsed on the occasion of the first
China–Argentina intergovernmental standing committee.21 Politics, trade,
and migration represent the principal areas of collaboration between the
two parties. Furthermore, China is a crucial economic partner for invest-
ments in infrastructure, the construction of hydroelectric power plants,
the reorganization of the national railroad network, and the management
of energy resources.22 In fact, in July 2014, then President Fernández de
Kirchner and her counterpart President Xi Jinping signed a deal for
Argentina to borrow US $7.5 billion from China, escaping the interna-
tional pressure over the unpaid debt issue.
17
 Spencer Abraham. “Keeping Putin’s Hands off Argentina’s Oil”, Foreign Policy, (2014)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/25/keeping-putins-hands-off-argentinas-oil/.
18
 The Editors, “With Currency Swap, Argentina Becomes Dependent on China”, World
Politics Review. (2015) http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14966/
with-currency-swap-argentina-becomes-dependent-on-china.
19
 Eliana Raszewski.“China Lends Argentina $7.5 Billion for Power, Rail Projects” Reuters (2014)
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/19/argentina-china-idUKL2N0PT2N220140719.
20
 The Editors, “With Currency Swap, Argentina Becomes Dependent on China”, January
29, 2015 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14966/with-currency-swap-
argentina-becomes-dependent-on-china.
21
 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1235611.shtml.
22
 Ibid.
310   J. G. MCGANN

The Argentinian-Chinese partnership is also useful as far as foreign pol-


icy challenges are concerned. Mutual support has been declared with
regard to the issue of Taiwan and the dispute over the Malvinas/Falkland
Islands,23 which still constitutes one of the most significant foreign policy
problems for Buenos Aires.24
The future of Argentina’s foreign policy presents a set of problems.
The country has alienated allies such as the United States, reorienting
its strategy towards outliers such as Venezuela or Iran and powerful part-
ners like China and Russia.
The economic and financial issues both nationally and internationally
weaken its prospects for development. Failed compliance with the IMF
would risk the country suffering new sanctions and lead to its credibility
plummeting.
The energy problem also represents a urgent matter because of its geo-
political implications.
At the same time, even though since 1983 Argentina has made positive
steps towards democracy (with regard to human rights, non-proliferation,
peacekeeping operations, and regional cooperation), the country still has
to deal with a series of domestic issues.25 In this sense, the Nisman case26
was considered an example of so-called intermestic politics,27 which indi-
cates the complex intertwined connection between international and
domestic scenarios.
Nisman’s case highlighted that the country’s judicial system is plagued
with corruption and misconduct. Furthermore, Argentina’s intelligence

23
 Ibid.
24
 Argentina still has not settled its quarrel with the United Kingdom over sovereignty of
the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, which London governs as a British overseas territory and
Buenos Aires claims as part of the national territory, despite a vote by the residents in favor
of British rule.
25
 Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. “Nisman’s Death and Argentinian Politics”, International Policy
Digest, (2015) http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/02/15/nismans-death-
argentinian-politics/.
26
 Alberto Nisman was investigating a 1994 bombing attack which killed 85 people in a
Jewish center. His death, which occurred only few hours before his report to Congress, is still
questioned and there has been speculation about the President’s involvement.
27
 Tokatlian, “Nisman’s Death and Argentinian Politics.”
  ARGENTINA: AN OVERVIEW    311

Table 20.2  Think tanks in Argentina

Number of universities: 124


Number of think tanks: 288
% of think tanks out of regional total: 137/674, 20.3%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2011–2014), as found in
corresponding Global Go To Think Tank Indexes:
 2011: 137
 2012: 137
 2013: 137
 2014: 288
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2014):
 Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI) (38)
 Fundación Libertad (108)
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
 Top 85 defense and national security think tanks: 1
 Top 80 domestic economic think tanks: 1
 Top 50 international economics think tanks: 1
 Top 85 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 1
 Top 80 international development think tanks: 1
Case studies
 Top think tank: Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI)

system is becoming increasingly politicized and autonomous. Thirdly, the


police forces—which have been truly restructured since the advent of
democracy—are still colluding with criminal activities, mainly drug traf-
ficking. These three challenging domestic problems prove that Argentina
has to take a deeper commitment in the fight against corruption and
­scandals, which debilitate the country both at the national and at the
international level (Table 20.2).
CHAPTER 21

Dealing with Argentina’s Foreign Policy


in the Emerging Multipolar
World—a Comparative Analysis of Think
Tank Responses to the Malvinas Issue:
The Argentine Center of International Studies

Ariel Gonzàlez Levaggi

Introduction
Argentina is the third-largest economy in Latin America, after Brazil and
Mexico, and a member of the Group of 20 (G20), which is the most
important arena that fosters international cooperation on global economic
and financial issues. and an important forum which promotes dialogue
between traditional and emerging powers. However, neither academia,
international consulting firms, nor the press consider this key South
American country as an emerging, or even a middle, power.1 At the

1
 An exception to this trend could be the proposal of the VISTA Group as the second ring
of emerging countries, see Cardozo, G.; Gonzalez Levaggi, A. & Escudero, E. (2013), “Los
nuevos países emergentes: el grupo VISTA y las oportunidades para Argentina”, Policy Brief

A. G. Levaggi (*)
Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

© The Author(s) 2019 313


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_21
314   A. G. LEVAGGI

moment, there are many reasons why it is important to discuss the role
played by Argentina in the current international system.
From a realistic point of view, Argentina has an important role in South
America simply due to its diplomatic relevance and economic weight.
Throughout the twentieth century, until the Malvinas War in 1982,
Argentina competed in a quest with Brazil for political, economic, and
military hegemony in the region. During the second half of the century,
Brazil increased its material power while Argentina entered an era of polit-
ical instability and decline in its relative position compared with its com-
petitor. The Malvinas War broke the peaceful tradition of Argentine
diplomacy, which was used to solve controversies (as in the case of the
border disputes with Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia) and to resort to
peaceful solutions like mediations and treaties.
The last Military Process (1976–1983) changed the attitude of
Argentina towards internal and external threats. The country was respon-
sible for threatening the use of force (Beagle Conflict with Chile in 1978),
for perpetuating human rights abuses, and for using military violence
(i.e., the Malvinas War). With the end of the Military Regime in 1983,
the return of democracy favored a return to the former diplomatic peace-
ful behavior, and greater participation of civil society and of public opin-
ion in international affairs. During the last three decades, the growth of
the third sector coexisted with the most dramatic economic and political
crises that affected the country in the late 1980s and in 2001/2002.
Fortunately, Argentina’s economy has now recovered from the
2001/2002 crisis. Nevertheless, some crucial issues, such as those related
to the international financial sector, infrastructure, and foreign invest-
ments, still need a solution.
When it comes to the political sphere, the country focuses on its inter-
nal problems without seizing the opportunities of globalization. The lack
of long-term planning, the economic crisis, and the sudden changes in
national objectives by different governments, even during the same period
of governance, have generated a series of pendulum effects in Argentina’s
foreign policy around its general orientation (alliance with the “West” vs.
deepening partnerships with “The Rest”), its modus operandi (high
­profile vs. low profile), and its relation with the global economy (eco-
nomic liberalism vs. nationalizations).

N° 3, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales, available at http://www.caei.com.ar/


sites/default/files/pb3.pdf.
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    315

During the Cold War, Argentina promoted the creation of new think
tanks that were usually influenced by the economic and political sectors,
which did not guarantee generalized representation and hindered the
think tanks’ chances to play an active role. Even though some issues per-
sist, the country is one of the most important regional players and has a
serious interest in multipolarism. This chapter presents a national focus
and considers Argentina as an emerging middle power in the contempo-
rary “interpolar world.”2
During the last ten years, the debate regarding Argentina’s foreign pol-
icy has focused on whether a foreign policy strategic program exists. The
main question is: “Is there a plan?” Three answers have been provided:
yes, perhaps, and no.
Regarding the first answer, “yes,” there is a strategy foreign policy pro-
gram, the main supporters emphasize identitarian variables. In brief,
Kirchner’s era changed the traditional alignment with the United States—
and more generally with the West—by promoting regional integration
with Latin America, through deeper relations with non-Western countries.
This new approach produced tensions with international economic orga-
nizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of their
“progressist” political identity.3 The second answer, “perhaps,” is a hybrid
solution that claims the governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner
developed an “original” foreign policy, juxtaposing two peripheral variants
of realism and two of idealism: naive geopolitical realism and pragmatic
realism, Wilsonian-peripheral idealism and Grotian-peripheral idealism.4
The second answer argues that Kirchner’s foreign policy had different
approaches, but not a specific plan. The third answer, “no,” claims that
foreign policy in the Kirchner era did not exist because of the absence5 or

2
 We choose this concept from Giovanni Grevi to define the current international system,
see Grevi, Giovanni (2009). “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper N° 79.
3
 Pedro Brieger. “La política exterior de la era Kirchner” (2010), Consenso Progresista,
Buenos Aires, Vol. 1, 35–62 & Alejandro Simonoff. “Regularidades de la Política Exterior de
Néstor Kirchner”, (2009) CONfines de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política, Vol.5,
Monterrey, 71–86.
4
 Francisco Corigliano. “Híbridos teóricos y su impacto en la política exterior: El caso de
los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner”, (2008) 8–10. Boletín del Instituto de Seguridad
Internacional y Asuntos Estratégicos (ISIAE), Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
Internacionales (CARI), Buenos Aires, No. 47.
5
 Cardenas, E. (2006) “Argentina pierde imagen, por ausencia de Política Exterior”,
Agenda Internacional N°8, Buenos Aires, pp. 13–18.
316   A. G. LEVAGGI

the dropping-out of foreign policy.6 This last framework cannot help us to


evaluate correctly Argentine’s foreign policy towards the region or towards
relations with China, Russia, and the United States. The first argument is
too centered on identity and leaves aside material elements. The second
answer, the “hybrid hypothesis,” is the most satisfactory conceptual
approach to the global foreign policy in Kirchner’s era and the specific
foreign policy towards the Islas Malvinas.
The Malvinas islands form one of the axes of Argentine foreign policy
and the main unofficial military conflict scenario. For Argentina, the
“question of the Malvinas islands” is considered a sovereignty dispute
between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas, South
Georgias, South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime areas.
Argentina has always sought the support of international organizations
such as the Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations
(UN), MERCOSUR, and lately Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC). The most important diplomatic achievement was the General
Assembly Resolution 2065 of December 1965, which recognized the exis-
tence of a sovereignty dispute and invited both countries to negotiate in
order to find a peaceful solution.7 Argentina considers this issue as a colo-
nial case. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the
United Kingdom usurped the territory following its occupation in 1833.
Thus, Argentina, which considers this a permanent and unrelinquished
goal, has repeatedly claimed its sovereignty over the islands and affirmed
their recovery in accordance with international law.
After the war, relations between Buenos Aires and London remained
cold until the Madrid Joint Statements (1989–1990), where both coun-
tries adopted a formula safeguarding sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
territories. During the 1990s, Argentina and the United Kingdom signed
a series of agreements about mutual trust-building measures in military
matters, fishing resource conservation, hydrocarbons, air and sea commu-
nications, as well as the construction of a memorial to the Argentines who
fell in the islands in 1982.The foreign policy of Carlos Menem also
boosted some public diplomacy called a “charm offensive” towards the

6
 Petrella, F. (2013) “La política exterior de la automarginación”, La Nación, Buenos
Aires, 23 de Agosto.
7
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship (2012), The Question of the Malvinas Islands: A
History of Colonialism. A United Nations Cause, Buenos Aires, 5.
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    317

inhabitants of the Malvinas, but without including them in the solution of


the Falklands sovereignty dispute. After the 2001/2002 crisis, Nestor
Kirchner’s government changed the guidance of this policy-setting.
Again, sovereignty was at the core of the dispute and the United Kingdom
was pressed to discharge agreements on issues such as hydrocarbons
exploration, denouncing the militarization of the South Atlantic, and
gaining the support of international and regional organizations. Argentine
foreign policy, in the period between 2003 and 2013, developed a pro-
gressive confinement of the British and “Kelpers” interests in the Malvinas
islands, trying to isolate them geopolitically and strategically. Argentina
made proactive efforts to obtain support from global and regional organi-
zations like the UN, OAS, UNASUR, and the South Atlantic Peace and
Cooperation Zone.
This chapter focuses on the responses of the main security and interna-
tional affairs (SIA) Argentine think tanks towards the Islas Malvinas issue,
a traditional agenda topic related to military security, and their responses
in the Kirchner period (2003–2013). More specifically, we compare four
SIA think tanks considering different variables: Navy Office of the Center
for Strategic Affairs “Manuel Belgrano” of the Ministry of Defense
(CEEPADE), Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI),
Argentine Center of International Studies (CAEI), and Institute of
International Relations at the National University of La Plata (IRI-­
UNLP). Based on the experience and the trajectory of these SIA think
tanks, we develop comparative research based on three variables: strategy,
programs, and impact on civil society and government agenda.

A Comparative Assessment of SIA Argentine Think


Tanks’ Strategies, Practices, and Impacts
Since 2003, the SIA think tanks in Argentina have reflected the post-
crisis environment, changes in the priorities on the international agenda,
and the place of international affairs on the government agenda. Although
the number of SIA think tanks has increased, their overall influence has
decreased when compared to the 1990s. After the country’s default, the
main concern of its leaders was to achieve social, economic, and political
stability. Thus, foreign affairs became a secondary matter, and usually
these issues were badly considered because of the relation with the
United States and international finance organizations such as the IMF
318   A. G. LEVAGGI

and the World Bank. The end of the neoliberal experience also affected
the way society perceived international affairs, especially related to eco-
nomics. From 2003, the decision-making process in international
affairs—and of course in the Malvinas issue—was managed by govern-
mental agencies and by an important segment of civil society that had an
active role in the Malvinas, the ex-combatants. Academic institutions,
think tanks, and other civil society organizations, on the other hand,
played a marginal role.
New research centers were established during these years, but the real
influence on policy-making decreased due to different reasons: the per-
sonality of the key decision-makers, the orientation of foreign policy, and
the characteristics of the major SIA think tanks. The Malvinas issue is still
one of the most important foreign policy and security challenges for
Argentina. SIA Argentine think tanks responded in different ways in sup-
porting the country’s official diplomatic position. In the following sec-
tions, we describe the main features of each institute and examine their
strategies, practices, and impact related to the Malvinas issue.

Navy Office, Center for Strategic Affairs “Manuel Belgrano”


of the Ministry of Defense (CEEPADE)
CEEPADE was created on May 28, 2008 to promote, coordinate, and
develop studies and research on national defense and international secu-
rity. It was designed as a government-affiliated think tank, directly related
to the Ministry of Defense, and it is in charge of developing research on
defense and military issues in coordination with the Ministry’s needs. The
Ministry of Defense regulates the organization, functions, and objectives
of CEEPADE. This SIA think tank coordinates and evaluates five other
Centers of Strategic Affairs (CSS): of the National Defense University, of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of each of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy,
and Air Force; see Fig. 21.1).
For the purposes of this chapter, we selected the Navy Office of
CEEPADE, called the Research and Strategic Studies Office of the Naval
University Institute (INUN), because its main area of study is the South
Atlantic region, which includes the Malvinas islands. The Navy Office is
located in one of the venues of the INUN in Buenos Aires. The aims of
CEEPADE Navy Office are (a) to generate knowledge on defense and
international security in the naval and maritime areas, especially around
the South Atlantic region, the Malvinas islands, and Antarctica; and (b) to
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    319

CHAIR OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC


AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE
“GENERAL MANUEL BELGRANO”
ADVISORY
COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ACADEMIC COUNCIL

RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AND


STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC STUDIES STRATEGIC STUDIES
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
MILITARY AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE JOIN
STAFF DEFENCE SCHOOL NETWORK

RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AND


STRATEGIC STRATEGIC STRATEGIC
STUDIES OFFICE STUDIES OFFICE STUDIES OFFICE OF
OF IESE (ARMY) OF IUA INUN (NAVY)
(AIR FORCE)

Fig. 21.1  Organization of the CEEPADE “Manuel Belgrano”

recommend and advise on policies to the Ministry of Defense (through its


functional relationship) and the Argentinean Navy (given its organic affili-
ation) based on research results. Normally, it has six to eight full-time
scholars plus ad-hoc and part-time academics.
Regarding the Malvinas issue, the institute follows an academic
approach. Its programs are based on research and academic publications
and they are usually presented to decision-makers.
The current topics of research in the South Atlantic area are natural
resources (oil, minerals, fishing), the pollution hazard due to the exploita-
tion of these resources, and the protected marine areas in the region. Even
though these areas of study have a direct connection with the Malvinas
issue, CEEPADE Navy Office has an additional permanent program called
“Observatorio Malvinas” (Malvinas Report), which follows the evolution
of the Malvinas issue from a defense and security perspective. The institute
makes policy recommendations given its official association to the authori-
ties of the Argentine Navy and the Ministry of Defense. One of the most
important accomplishments, in terms of impact and influence, was the
inclusion of its recommendations in the “Plan Estratégico Territorial
Avance II: Planificación Estratégica Territorial” (Territorial Strategic Plan
320   A. G. LEVAGGI

Progress II: Strategic Territorial Planning), published by the Ministry of


Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services. This plan recommends
dividing the Argentine Sea into geopolitical sets, one of which would be
the Malvinas, Georgias, and South Sandwich islands.

Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)


CARI was founded in 1978 as a private, non-profit, academic institution
with the aim of promoting the study and discussion of international issues
from a national perspective. It describes itself as an independent think tank
and publisher in the field of foreign relations. However, considering the
SIA methodology and definitions, it could be considered a quasi-­
independent think tank, since during its early years it had a strong rela-
tionship with, shared a common agenda with, and received funding from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. In more recent years, the
government withdrew CARI’s political support and funding, which could
be interpreted as a change from a quasi-independent think tank to an
autonomous and independent one. Nevertheless, its status is not very
clear at the moment.
The institute conducts two kinds of activities. It holds academic ses-
sions in the form of conferences, seminars, and roundtables. It also orga-
nizes private meetings, in the form of committee meetings, and holds
bilateral dialogue forums with representatives of various sectors of the
country that are involved in bilateral relations. CARI provides a forum for
informal and constructive dialogue and works to enhance relationships at
the official level. From a structural point of view, it is organized by insti-
tutes, committees, and working groups, whose members have a high pro-
file. For example, the current president is Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini,
who was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the De La
Rua government (1999–2001). Among the four SIA think tanks, CARI’s
staff has the most experienced profile and it is closely related to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. CARI was chosen as the top
think tank in Latin America and the Caribbean by the Think Tanks Index
of Pennsylvania University in 2008.
CARI has a double strategy: it performs academic activities and lobby-
ing activities, especially to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship.
Almost all the events see the participation of high-level speakers with
important backgrounds and experience, such as prime ministers, ministers,
representatives of international agencies, international consultants, or aca-
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    321

demics. The main programs of action are publications and events, espe-
cially the closed summits that allow open and frank discussion on strategic
issues. In terms of impact, CARI used to be very influential in Argentina’s
foreign policy until the last few years, when the relation between the gov-
ernment and the institute deteriorated.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship used to fund CARI from
1994 until 2012, when the government decided to halt its institutional
and financial support.8 One of the most important committees is the
“Malvinas Question, South Georgia and South Sandwich Committee,”
which was created in 1982, and since 1996 has been under the direction
of Lilian del Castillo de Laborde. The main objective of the committee is
to conduct research about this issue, analyzing its legal and historical
development, in order to propose solutions for a peaceful settlement of
the dispute with the United Kingdom. It has developed multiple activities,
including conferences, meetings, and seminars. For example, in the last
few years the committee organized the publication, and then presentation,
of the books Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur: Diplomacia Argentina
en Naciones Unidas 2000–2007 and Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur:
Diplomacia Argentina en Naciones Unidas 1991/1999. Another impor-
tant branch of CARI related to the Malvinas issue and the South Atlantic
is the Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs (ISIAE),
which organized the seminars “Argentina in the Atlantic South at the XXI
Century” (2011) and “Rethinking Malvinas” (2013); it also publishes a
regular bulletin that has been circulated from 1998 onwards.

Argentine Center of International Studies (CAEI)


CAEI launched its website and began its first activities on September
2005, but its legal recognition as a non-profit organization came in 2008.
It is an independent, non-partisan and non-profit think tank, based in
Buenos Aires. It was created as an association of young professionals and
graduates in international studies and was chosen as one of the Best New
Think Tanks by the Think Tank Index of Pennsylvania University in 2010.
CAEI conducts studies on a wide range of international issues such as
regional integration in South and Latin America, trends in regional inte-

8
 Natasha Niebieskikwiat. “Un prestigioso centro de política exterior, sin fondos oficiales”,
(2012) Clarin. http://www.clarin.com/politica/prestigioso-centro-politica-exterior-oficia-
les_0_768523213.html
322   A. G. LEVAGGI

gration, defense and security, as well as on Argentina’s foreign policy. The


Center’s goal is to improve the international understanding of current and
emerging issues in the Latin American region. CAEI’s programs include
two areas of research. The Program of Political Phenomenology (PFP) is
an experimental academic project which aims to generate innovative con-
tributions to international relations theory and methodology. The focus of
the PFP is to develop regular reports on issues concerning all Latin
American countries, the Caribbean, Malvinas islands, South Africa, and
the Middle East, among others. The second is the Academic Program,
which produces analyses, policy briefs and working papers about emerging
issues in different areas of international studies, focusing on the region. In
its academic section, CAEI has developed a number of research studies
and publications about the Malvinas, such as the Observatorio Malvinense
(Malvinas Report), working papers, e-books, and policy briefs, designed
to influence decision-makers. Furthermore, in the last two years CAEI has
increased its contribution to the foreign policy debate by undertaking
advocacy with the “Iniciativa Pueblos por Malvinas” (Peoples for Malvinas
Initiative); the definition of a common slogan, “Argentina as a Austral,
South American and Emerging Country”; and the publication of its first
printed journal, Argentina en Asuntos Estratégicos (Argentina in Strategic
Affairs). This analysis focuses on the Peoples for Malvinas Initiative that
changed the path of this SIA think tank.
This initiative was created in 2012 with the aim of increasing awareness
of the Malvinas issue among Argentine and South American citizens, in
order to define a new agenda in global public opinion. The agenda of
Peoples for Malvinas focuses on activities that change the classic percep-
tion of the Malvinas issue, normally related to the 1982 war, towards a
new vision that addresses the potential of these territories as an opportu-
nity for prosperity for Argentina and South America. The target of its
activities is primarily the broader society, but it has found support from
national, provincial, and municipal executive bodies, provincial legisla-
tures, and organizations of ex-combatants.
One of these initiatives, the Campaña del Millón de Firmas (“Campaign
for a Million Signatures”), supported by the Committee on Foreign
Relations and Worship of the National Deputies Chamber, tries to achieve
social support as a sample of the social strength of people who want the
resumption of bilateral negotiations between Argentina and the United
Kingdom over the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands. Other social activi-
ties are the organization of marathons called “Malvinas: Hearth of my
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    323

Country” (in 2013 they were performed in six different provinces of


Argentina) and the diffusion of the new bi-continental map of Argentina,
released by the government in 2010.
Since its creation, CAEI has followed an academic approach, but in the
last two years, thanks to a new definition of its agenda and the “Peoples
for Malvinas” initiative, it has developed an advocacy strategy to gain
social and political support. In the first stage, the main projects included
research and publications. The second stage was instead dedicated to press
campaigns and social activities. The changing pattern of CAEI’s identity,
from an independent academic think tank into an advocacy-based one, has
allowed greater visibility and a greater impact on both civil society and the
governmental agenda, but it has lost some of its legitimacy in the academic
field. However, CAEI continues to be an autonomous and independent
think tank with a high level of independence from interest groups and
donors, as well as autonomous in its operation and funding from govern-
ment. CAEI’s staff numbers more than one hundred, but the budget and
the experience of its members are still limited.

Institute of International Relations at the National University


of La Plata (IRI-UNLP)
IRI-UNLP launched its activities on September 28, 1990 within the
Faculty of Legal and Social Sciences in the city of La Plata (50 km from the
capital of Buenos Aires). It began under the leadership of Dr. Norberto
Consani, currently President of the Latin American Federation of
International Studies and the Federal Council for International Studies
(CoFEI). IRI-UNLP is a university-affiliated think tank because its activi-
ties and budget rely on the National University of La Plata. Its aims are to
teach, research, and establish ties with national and international institu-
tions. IRI-UNLP offers a Master’s and PhD program in international
studies, has published the journal Relaciones Internacionales (International
Relations) since 1991, and organizes an international congress every two
years. The structure of the Institute is organized in geographic and the-
matic departments, for example the Eurasia Department or the History
Department.
The activities related to the Malvinas issue were developed by the
Malvinas, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands Department, created in
1993 and managed by Carlos Biangardi (Coordinator) and Federico
Martín Gomez (Secretary). The aim of the department is to study the
324   A. G. LEVAGGI

issues related to the South Atlantic region from the perspective of


Argentina’s national interests, including the area which goes from the
Malvinas islands to the Antarctica, and combining Argentina’s historical
claims with maritime law. To achieve these aims the department’s work is
organized into research, organization of events, and publications.
Among the most important achievements in the period 2003–2013 was
the agreement with CECIM La Plata (Malvinas Islands Former Combatants
of La Plata). The research project “British Neocolonial Presence in South
Atlantic—the Military Base of Mount Pleasant,” and participation in other
activities, such as the Conference for the National Commission for Marine
Platform, the Parliamentary Observatory Islas Malvinas of the Chamber of
Deputies, creating the Malvinas Studies Federal Network in 2013, and
Federico Gomez’s academic visit to the Malvinas Islands in 2011 along
with members of CECIM, all of these commissions and inquirers had a big
impact on the press and the public.281
Publications are also important for the department and usually they are
presented at the IRI-UNLP Congress, at other academic congresses, or at
conferences on international studies. Finally, since 2007 IRI-UNLP has
published a regular report with news of interest and the activities of the
department. Despite all these actions, its impact is high on civil society but
very limited on the governmental agenda, because IRI-UNLP is located
outside Buenos Aires and does not have a specific strategy towards the
government’s foreign policy, except for good ties with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Worship.

SIA Think Tanks in Argentina: A Comparative Assessment


None of the selected SIA think tanks, except CARI and only until 2012,
has a determining impact on Argentina’s foreign policy with regard to the
issue of the Malvinas islands. In Table 21.1, we compare the different SIA
think tanks.
The four Argentine SIA think tanks considered in this chapter share a
common academic approach. However, CARI and CAEI also carry out
lobbying and advisory activities. In a majority of each think tank’s academ-
ics publications, it is stated that the Malvinas islands and the surrounding
territory and maritime areas are an integral part of Argentina’s national
territory. Despite this common position, each think tank has its own per-
spective: liberal (CARI), realistic (CEEPADE Navy Office), anti-colonial-
ist (IRI-UNLP), or constructivist (CAEI). The programs are normally
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    325

Table 21.1  Strategies, programs, and impact of the Argentine security and inter-
national affairs think tanks
CARI CEEPADENavy CAEI IRI-UNLP
Office

Strategy –Academic –Academic –Academic –Academic


–Lobby –Advocacy
Programs –Research –Research –Research –Research
–Publications –Publications –Publications –Publications
–Events –Press –Events
campaigns
–Social
activities
Impact Government –Medium–High –Medium –Medium– –Medium
Low
Civil society –Medium –Medium–Low –High –Medium

focused on research and publishing, but they also organize events (e.g.,
CARI and IRI-UNLP).
The unusual case is the press campaign and social activities conducted
by CAEI, which moved away from its academic profile to an advocacy
effort. Normally, these topics are chosen because of independent research
(IRI-UNLP and CAEI); however, in the case of CARI, the requests came
informally from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in the case of CEEPADE
Navy Office, the requests were officially from the Ministry of Defense.
Among the selected SIA think tanks, cooperation is limited to partici-
pation in events, interchange of publications, and sometimes exchanges of
researchers or members. CARI and IRI-UNLP have historically good rela-
tions and normally the members of one institution invite members of the
second and vice versa. For example, at the seminar “Rethink Malvinas” in
2013, CARI invited Federico Martín Gómez, the Secretary of the
Malvinas, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands Department at IRI-­UNLP.
Another example is the biannual Congress of International Relations
organized by IRI-UNLP in which normally all of the SIA think tanks
participate.
In terms of impact, each institution has its own indicators to evaluate its
impacts on the governmental agenda, the press, or civil society. However,
Argentina’s foreign policy towards the Malvinas has been scarcely affected
by the SIA think tanks’ work, neither at the bilateral nor at the multilateral
level. This lack of change in policy is due to two basic reasons. Firstly, from
326   A. G. LEVAGGI

an agential bureaucratic perspective, throughout the Kirchner era


Argentina’s foreign policy—and obviously the Malvinas issue—focused on
state actors. There was little space for individual or collective initiatives to
modify this structural question. Argentina’s foreign policy towards the
Malvinas could be defined as a pentagon formed by the Presidency, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Congress
(Deputies and Senate), and the Organizations of Ex-Combatants repre-
sented in the National Committee on Former Combatants of Malvinas.
The SIA think tanks did not have a direct impact on these actors, which
are mainly focused on their personal interests. The impact on civil society
is different. Building awareness through events and publications, organiz-
ing social events and media campaigns, and researching specific issues have
had a certain impact on the public agenda and changing priorities of
decision-­makers. Finally, the Malvinas issue leaves little space for new pro-
posals, because it is very limited due to the sovereignty dispute with the
United Kingdom.
Argentina’s position towards the Malvinas is one of the pillars of the
country’s foreign policy and it is neither convenient nor rational to go
beyond the limits. Beyond the overall impact of their research and activi-
ties, some SIA think tanks have succeeded in their institutional aims, while
others have not. In general terms, CEEPADE Navy Office and IRI-UNLP
have very good results because they fulfill academic and institutional aims.
In contrast, CARI has lost a significant portion of its influence on key
decision-makers, despite its successful activities. Finally, CAEI achieved
greater recognition in civil society because of the “Pueblos por Malvinas”
initiative, but has lost legitimacy in the academic field because of its close
relations with official positions.

Conclusions
Although not all Argentine SIA think tanks discuss Argentina’s position in
the international system explicitly, we infer that they all identify the coun-
try as an emerging middle power, in light of their activities and publica-
tions. One of the foreign policy and security challenges that Argentina is
now facing—and surely will in the coming decades—is the Malvinas islands
issue. This chapter has compared the responses of four different Argentine
think tanks towards a traditional security issue inherited from the n
­ ineteenth
century, by trying to identify and examine these think tanks’ positions on
the Malvinas issue from Argentina’s foreign policy perspective.
  DEALING WITH ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGING…    327

The four Argentine SIA think tanks discussed have different structural
orientations (independent, quasi-independent, university, and govern-
mental), but they share similar strategies and programs based on an aca-
demic approach to government and the civil society agenda. They have
undertaken numerous investigations, publications, and events, but the
impact is still low compared to the influence of think tanks in Western
countries like the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom.
A number of lessons can be learned from Argentina’s case. Argentina
has the seventh largest number of think tanks in the world and ranks first
in the region according to the 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Index
Report. However, only a few think tanks are specifically focused on secu-
rity and international affairs. Each of the selected SIA think tanks has
taken action to legitimatize Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas,
South Georgias, and South Sandwich islands. Even though they are not
directly related to the government, with the exception of CEEPADE
Navy Office, the SIA think tanks have supported the official position
despite their ideological differences. It is important to note that Argentine
SIA think tanks have had very few chances to successfully recommend
policies to the government, due to the inattention of the political leader-
ship that has handled the Malvinas issue and defined Argentina’s foreign
policy during the last 10 years.
These considerations can be extended to think tanks in other emerging
countries. The end of the neoliberal period with the 2001/2002 crisis and
the return of statism left little space for civil society and private initiatives.
Another important element is that the old foreign policy elites were
pushed aside and new groups without experience and without much
power emerged. The former elites were not replaced but rather eroded.
Despite the SIA think tanks’ growth, their impact and influence on gov-
ernmental policies towards the Malvinas issue have not increased as fast.
CHAPTER 22

Brazil: An Overview

James G. McGann

As one of the BRICS countries, Brazil has witnessed prosperous economic


growth and political prominence during the last two decades (Table 22.1).
It has actively engaged in polishing its foreign policy strategy by reinforc-
ing its stance via Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) and UNASUR
(Unión de Naciones Suramericanas), and in establishing regional
leadership.
Think tanks in Brazil contributed to promoting the localized view of
power dynamics, for example the BRICS Policy Center (BPC). BPC
addresses maritime security in the South Atlantic, the “strategic backwa-
ter,” by reframing geopolitical understanding and reducing bias. It got the
chance to play a role in Brazil’s first foreign policy white paper and acts as
the liaison among several government divisions, but it also faces several
challenges such as fundraising and maintaining communication with gov-
ernmental agencies.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 329


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_22
330   J. G. MCGANN

Table 22.1  Brazil at a glance

Country name Federative Republic of Brazil


Capital Brasilia
Population 202,768,562 (2014 est.)
Location South America
(continent)
Ethnic groups White (47.7%), mulatto (43.1%), black (7.6%), Asian (1.1%),
indigenous (0.4%)
Language Portuguese (official)
Currency Real (BRL), 3.419 reals = 1 US dollar
(name and
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government Federal republic
type
Chief of state President Dilma Rousseff
Head of President Dilma Rousseff
government
Cabinet Appointed by President
Elections President and Vice-President elected on the same ticket by popular
vote for a single four-year term.
Legislative Bicameral National Congress
branch
Judicial branch Supreme Federal Court consisting of eleven justices
Political parties Brazilian Communist Party, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party,
Brazilian Labor Party, Brazilian Renewal Labor Party, Brazilian
Republican Party, Brazilian Social Democracy, Brazilian Socialist
Party, Christian Labor Party, Christian Social Democratic Party,
Communist Party of Brazil, Democratic Labor Party, The Democrats,
Free Homeland Party, Green Party, Humanist Party of Solidarity,
Labor Party of Brazil, National Ecologic Party, National Labor Party,
National Mobilization Party, Party of the Republic, Popular Socialist
Party, Progressive Party, Progressive Republican Party, Social
Christian Party, Social Democratic Party, Social Liberal Party,
Socialism and Freedom Party, United Socialist Workers’ Party ,
Workers’ Cause Party, Workers’ Party

Some economic facts


GDP: US $3.166 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $15,800,200 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 5.9%, industry 22.2%, services 71.9%
  BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW    331

Overview
Brazil’s geographic, economic, and political dimensions are impressive.
Militarily, it cannot be considered a great power since it is not a nuclear
power and it does not possess a strong conventional arsenal. Nonetheless,
it is prominent from other perspectives.1
It is the fifth-largest country in terms of territorial extension; the fifth
most populous country; the seventh-largest economy after the United
States, China, India, Japan, Germany, and Russia in terms of value added
to its economic output adjusted for differentials in purchasing power;2 and
also one of the world’s biggest democracies.
Brazil is also the “B” in the acronym BRICS, which refers to the five
emerging countries (the others are Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
that since the beginning of the twenty-first century have been considered
as soon-to-be superpowers.3
In the last two decades, Brazil has achieved global prominence both
politically and economically. In 2011, the US Council on Foreign Relations
stated that Brazil was in the “short list of countries that will most shape
the twenty-first century.”4 However, as many scholars have pointed out,
Brazil’s growth model seems to have reached its limits.
After the 2008 financial crisis, Brazil’s economy kept on growing.
However, between 2010 and 2012, annual growth in GDP went from
7.5% (2010) to 2.5% (2011) to 1% (2012).5 Internal issues such as income
inequality, weak institutions, and widespread corruption—the last scandal

1
 Hart, Andrew F. and Jones, Bruce D. “How Do Rising Powers Rise?”, Survival, vol. 52,
no. 6 (2010).
In the last two decades, Brazil has steadily increased its defense spending. However, this
has not translated into concrete capabilities that would allow the country to conduct signifi-
cant operations beyond its borders.
2
 Porzecanski, Arturo C “Brazil’s Place in the Global Economy”, Forthcoming in Brazil on
the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the Liberal International Order, ed. by Oliver Stuenkel
and Matthew Taylor (London and New  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)., School of
International Service Research Paper No. 2014–1, 3.
3
 Jim O’Neill. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs,
2001; Foreign Policy Association. Great Decisions 2015 Topics.
http://www.fpa.org/news/index.cfm?act=show_announcement&announcement.
Samuel Bodman, Julia Sweig, and James Wolfensohn. “Global Brazil and US–Brazil
Relations” Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations.
4
 Samuel Bodman, Julia Sweig, and James Wolfensohn. “Global Brazil and US–Brazil
Relations” Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations.
5
 The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
332   J. G. MCGANN

concerned the state-run oil company Petrobras—might hold back its


international credibility. In addition, its domestic vulnerabilities cannot be
compensated with an export drive. Its export market share is under pres-
sure due to the stalling of the Doha Development Round, the Latin
America Alianza del Pacífico, and the multilateral or bilateral projects for
trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific or the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnerships.6
The recent protests have underlined citizens’ dissatisfaction with the
government, whose political economy has undermined public finance
through a combination of macroeconomic laxity and microeconomic
intervention.7
In the aftermath of Dilma Rousseff’s second term and on the eve of the
2016 Olympic Games which Rio de Janeiro will host, Brazil’s national
reforms and foreign policy will be under the close scrutiny of the interna-
tional community.

Economic Situation
Brazil’s exponential growth during the last decade has allowed impressive
development gains. Between 2002 and 2010, the number of poor people
in the country fell by 51%. Throughout the 2000s, the per capita income
of 50% of the poorest class rose by 68%.8 GDP per person (adjusted for
inflation) grew at an annual rate of 2.5% between 2003 and 2014. The
past decade also experienced new trends with regard to the reduction of
poverty and inequality, as a result of income and employment growth as
well as of increased government social spending and programs.9 For exam-
ple, in 2003 the government launched the Bolsa Familia, a social welfare
program based on a cash-transfer system for low-income households.

6
 Alfredo Valladão. “Emergent Brazil and the Curse of the ‘Hen’s Flight’” (2013). CEPS
Working Document No. 379.
7
 The Economist, “Rough Weather Ahead. The Mistakes Dilma Rousseff Made during her
First Presidential Term Mean Her Second Will Be Stormy”, Jan 3, 2015 http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/americas/21637436-mistakes-dilma-rousseff-made-during-her-first-presi-
dential-term-mean-her-second-will-be.
8
 Translated from Neri, M “A Evolucao dos indicadores sociais baseados em Renda—
Desigualdade de Renda na Decada”, Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Getulio Vargas—Centro de
Polıticas Sociais, 2011.
9
 Jake Jonhson, Stephan Lefebre, and Mark Weisbrot. “The Brazilian Economy in
Transition” (2014) page 1, Center for Economic and Policy Research.
  BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW    333

Some scholars have observed that Brazil’s macroeconomic policy in the


2000s was based on three main principles: Central Bank inflation targets,
a floating exchange rate regime, and a target for a significant primary bud-
get surplus.10 After 2004, the Central Bank was able to make its inflation
target consistent by allowing the exchange rate to appreciate as needed,
determining lower import and export prices.11 In the same period, given
favorable external conditions, the monetary authorities also decided on a
reduction in short-term foreign debt relative to foreign exchange reserves.
Brazil’s economic growth halted between 2010 and 2011 as a conse-
quence of the global financial crisis. The decrease in the export growth
rate (from 11.5 in 2010 to 0.2 in 2011) had a severe impact on the coun-
try’s economic growth. In the same years, government macroeconomic
policy slowed down the economy with interest rates hikes and the institu-
tion of macroprudential measures which reduced the growth of credit.12
Since 2011, the country has been running a fiscal stimulus to counterbal-
ance the fallout from the crisis in the euro area, the end of the commodi-
ties cycle, and the slow growth in China.13 The stimulus was implemented
by the government through ad-hoc tax cuts and subsidized credit from
state banks. However, this intervention has deterred investment and
undermined Brazil’s budget, which was one of the best managed of the
developing world.
In the second half of 2014, Brazil was able to recover from the period
of recession (two or more consecutive quarters of shrinking GDP14) which
had affected the country in the last few years. Nevertheless, as pointed out
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
growth remains modest due to tighter monetary and fiscal policies, weak
external demand, low investments, and poor infrastructure.15

10
 Franklin Serrano and Ricardo Summa. “Macroeconomic Policy, Growth and Income
Distribution in the Brazilian Economy in the 2000s.” (2011) Washington, DC: Center for
Economic and Policy Research. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/brazil-
­2011-06.pdf.
11
 Weisbrot, Jonhson and Lefebre,“The Brazilian Economy in Transition,” 11.
12
 Ibid., 2.
13
 Joe Leahy. “Dilma Rousseff Puts Brazil Back on Path to Economic Orthodoxy”, The
Financial Times, (2014) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b75aaf9e-6a40-11e4-bfb4-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XxbPFUHP.
14
 Phil Izzo and Sudeep Reddy, “Most Economists in Survey Say Recession Is Here,” Wall
Street Journal, March 13, 2008, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120534519452630845.
15
 Brazil: Economic Forecast Summary http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/brazil-eco-
nomic-forecast-summary.htm.
334   J. G. MCGANN

As a matter of fact, Brazil is facing a series of issues and economists


argue that, unlike in 2008, the problems of the Brazilian economy are now
mainly homegrown.16 Analysts point out that its development model
based on domestic consumption and commodity exports has reached its
limit, while the real is overvalued, undermining the competitiveness of
non-commodity-based export sectors.17
Recently, Brazil’s authorities have decided to increase taxes and freeze
spending, with the aim of reducing a budget deficit that tripled during the
first Rousseff administration. In addition, the Central Bank has boosted
the interest rate to 12.25% to control inflation.18 Economists have under-
lined that such measures have worsened the short-term outlook for the
country.
In addition, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which
was once the platform where Brazil showed its regional leadership, is link-
ing Brazil’s economy to two of the most unstable countries in Latin
America, namely Argentina and Venezuela. Furthermore, Brazil is not a
negotiating party to the two most important trade agreements of the last
decade: the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership.19

Foreign Policy
Analyzing Brazil’s role in the international arena is particularly important
when considering its double identity:20 as a Latin American country and as
a member of the BRICS bloc. In this sense, its regional and international
foreign policies are deeply interconnected.
Since 2003, Brazil’s government has been actively engaged in a foreign
policy strategy. The aim of its leadership has been to give the country a
new role in the international scenario: namely, to make Brazil an influential
16
 George Jelmayer and Paul Kiernan. “Brazil’s Economy Clouds out of Recession”, The
Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2014 http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-economy-
claws-out-of-recession-gdp-up-0-1-on-quarter-1417174556.
17
 Harold Trinkunas. “Brazil’s Global Ambitions”, (2015) The Brookings Institute, origi-
nally published on Americas Quarterly, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
articles/2015/02/04-brazil-global-ambitions-trinkunas.
18
 Denise Godoy and Filipe Pacheco. “Brazil’s Fiscal Policy to Help Lift Economic
Growth” (2015) Bloomberg Business. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
03-03/brazil-s-fiscal-policy-to-help-lift-economic-growth-anbima-says.
19
 Ibid.
20
 Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s
Prominent Role in the Americas” (2013), CEPS Working Document no. 374.
  BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW    335

and respected global player. This strategy, known as “autonomy for diver-
sification,” aimed to release the country from the traditional patterns of
dependency and to create a dense network of relations compatible with a
more flexible foreign policy.21
Brasilia also made efforts to assume a stronger regional role and to fos-
ter the creation of a South American space based on MERCOSUR
(Mercado Común del Sur) and UNASUR (Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas) as its main axes. Regionalism is crucial to Brazil not only
per se, but also to counterbalance the United States on the global
chessboard.
Literature on the topic presents different views as far as Brazil’s foreign
policy orientation is concerned. To some commentators, Brazil’s relations
have been quite balanced between South–South cooperation and relations
with developed countries.22 On the contrary, according to another per-
spective, Brazil’s foreign policy approach after 2003 has been mainly look-
ing towards developing countries, similar to the country’s foreign policy
tradition before the authoritarian regime of 1964.23 In addition, authors
underlined that, differently from China or Russia, Brazil’s foreign policy
features a clear reliance on non-military power. In this sense, the use of soft
power is likely to reinforce its capacity to influence international affairs.24
Many sources highlight that Brazil’s agenda has been focusing on
strengthening South–South cooperation, both regionally with other Latin
American countries, and internationally with other regions such as Africa
or the Middle East.25 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (2003–2010)
project was to overcome the timid approach towards the country’s neigh-
bors and turn Brazil into the leader of the developing and emerging econ-
omies.26 The was apparent in the form of the so-called Technical

21
 Stella Ladi and Elena Lazarou, “Think Tanks and Policy Transformation: The Case of
Brazil,” 19.
22
 Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo. “A política externa do Brasil no século XXI: os eixos”
(2008) Revista Brasileira de Relaciones Internacionales, 51, no. 2.
23
 Paulo Roberto de Almeida. “O Brasil como ator regional e como emergente global:
extrategia de politica externa e impact ona nova ordem internacional” (2007) Cena
Internacional, Vol. 9, No.1.
24
 Peter Daurvegne and Deborah Farias. “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5, (2012): 903.
25
 Steen Fryba Christensen. “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 34, No.2, 2013, p. 274.
26
 Zanini, Fabio “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate”, October 23, 2014 http://
hir.harvard.edu/archives/7486.
336   J. G. MCGANN

Cooperation agreements, which deal with the exchange of knowledge and


practices instead of money transfers. Above all, they do not place any
conditionality on the receiver. Through these Technical Cooperation
agreements—whose main area of exchange is agriculture—Brazil was able
to strengthen its relations with the Global South.27
Even though this strategy was widely criticized due to the connections
with ambiguous African or Arab leaders, Lula was able to balance stronger
ties with countries such as Venezuela and Cuba without weakening rela-
tions with the United States.28 The creation of the South American Defense
Council and the Brazilian command of the United Nations peacekeeping
operation in Haiti, which included troops from various Latin American
countries, have been interpreted as Brasilia’s strategy to create a stronger
regional bloc in order to reach a global projection, ultimately a permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council.29 Internationally, the IBSA
forum also represents an interesting example of Brazil’s foreign policy. This
was established in 2003 between India, Brazil, and South Africa; three
emerging economies which did not share a previous strategic partnership
came together to strengthen trilateral relations and cooperation, as well as
to create a platform for the development of South–South cooperation.30
Lula’s successor Rousseff kept most of the previous foreign policy axes.
However, the domestic economic issues have lessened Brazil’s stance as an
emerging power, despite the fact that the regional context encourages
Brasilia’s major role in Latin America.31 As has been pointed out, during
Rousseff’s government the global projection overcame the regional
dimension. In addition, the BRICS group acquired a meaningful role. In
Fortaleza, the five countries agreed on the creation of a bank with US
$100 billion in assets and on the establishment of a mechanism, as an

27
 Daurvegne, Peter and Farias, Deborah BL “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third Wordl Quarterly, vol. 33, n.5, 2012, p. 909.
28
 Fabio Zanini. “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate” (2014) http://hir.har-
vard.edu/archives/7486.
29
 Gratius, Susanne and Gomes Saraiva, Miriam “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s
Prominent Role in the Americas”, CEPS Working Document, no. 374, (February 2013): 4.
30
 Daurvegne, Peter and Farias, Deborah BL “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development
Power”, Third World Quarterly, 33, no 0.5, (2012): 910.
31
 Venezuela is unstable, Argentina is suffering from the consequences of the last default,
Colombia is still dealing with the problem of terrorism, while Bolivia and Peru are experienc-
ing chronic social unrest.
Zanini, Fabio “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate”, October 23, 2014 http://
hir.harvard.edu/archives/7486.
  BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW    337

Table 22.2  Think tanks in Brazil

Number of universities: 965


Number of think tanks: 122
% of think tanks out of regional total (Southeast Asia): 122/548, 22.3%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2010–2014):
 2010: 46
 2011: 46
 2012: 46
 2013: 51
 2014: 46
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide, including US (2014):
Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV) (Brazil) (15)
Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais (CEBRI) (Brazil) (35)
Number of top think tanks by area of research:
Top 85 defense and national security think tanks: 4
Top 80 domestic economic policy think tanks: 3
Top 55 education policy think tanks: 2
Top 85 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 1
Top 80 international development think tanks: 1
Top 50 international economic policy think tanks: 2
Top 45 science and technology think tanks: 1
Top 50 social policy think tanks: 3
Top 40 transparency and good governance think tanks: 2
Case study
Fundação Getulio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation, often abbreviated as FGV or
simply GV) is a leading think tank in Brazil and Latin America. Like Brookings it was
established as a higher education institution on December 20, 1944. It offers regular
courses on economics, business administration, law, social sciences and information
technology management. Its original goal was to train people for the country’s public and
private-sector management. Other courses began to be offered as the institution grew. It
is considered by Foreign Policy magazine to be among the top-5 “policymaker think-
tank” worldwide. [1]
FGV produces a large amount of academic research. The subjects cover macro and
microeconomics, finance, business, decision making, law, health, welfare, poverty and
unemployment, pollution, and sustainable development. The foundation also maintains
research programs in the fields of history, social sciences, education, justice, citizenship,
and politics. FGV also executes projects at the request of the public sector, private
enterprise, and international agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank. Notable examples of such work include assistance for the success of
Rio de Janeiro’s bids for the 2007 Pan American Games and the 2016 Summer Olympics
338   J. G. MCGANN

alternative to the International Monetary Fund, to aid countries with fiscal


imbalance problems.32
Observers note that Brazil’s main foreign policy challenge concerns the
efficacy of its soft power in the global order. The country’s ambition to
rise to a major power rests on two opportunities. The first element
­concerns its ascendancy in South America. Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, Argentina and Brazil competed to become the economic and politi-
cal leaders of South America. This rivalry is no longer realistic due to
diminished military competition as well as the result of a mutual agree-
ment on nuclear non-proliferation, which has consolidated Latin America’s
status as a nuclear-free zone.33 The reduction of tensions in the area was
also facilitated by increasing diplomatic cooperation and economic inte-
gration between the regional actors. The MERCOSUR, UNASUR, and
more recently CELAC34 initiatives have contributed to reinforcing Brazil’s
stance also towards Washington, which was excluded from all these new
intergovernmental institutions.
The second aspect is related to the end of the fading hegemony of
Washington and the subsequent development of a multipolar world. Brazil
joined other countries considered to be emerging powers, such as Russia,
India, and South Africa. Since Brazil is not a regional rival of these countries,
its policy has been oriented to strengthening relations in the new blocs.
However, Brazil seems not to have fully exploited these opportunities.
Its regional leadership is facing several challenges, such as the establish-
ment of a free trade agreement between the United States, Peru, Chile,
and Colombia, and the Alianza del Pacífico—a trade bloc established by
the Declaration of Lima in 2011—made by these three Latin American
countries and Mexico.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Brazil’s aspiration to be recognized
as having major power status also involves the country’s ambition to become
a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. However,
since the global security order is still dominated by the West, it is unlikely
that Brazil will gain a permanent position on the Security Council, espe-
cially since it cannot rely on the support of China or Russia (Table 22.2).
32
 Ibid.
33
 Harold Trinkunas. “Brazil’s Global Ambitions” (2015) The Brookings Institute, originally
published in Americas Quarterly, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/02/04-
brazil-global-ambitions-trinkunas.
34
 Comunidad de Estados de Latinoamérica y el Caribe (CELAC) includes South American,
Central American, and Caribbean states, but neither the United States nor Canada.
CHAPTER 23

Beyond “Backwater” and “Backyard”—


Reframing Security in the South Atlantic:
The BRICS Policy Center

Adriana Erthal Abdenur

Introduction
International relations (IR) scholars often highlight that this field is char-
acterized by an overwhelming predominance of Western approaches.
Acharya and Busan (2010) explain the ideational phenomena that feed
into “both Gramscian hegemonies, ethnocentrism and the politics of
exclusion,” and they try to fill this theoretical gap by supporting and call-
ing attention to Asian perspectives of IR. This dilemma concerning IR has
long set the tone for some important debates at the Institute of
International Relations (IRI) at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio

Adriana Erthal Abdenur (PhD Princeton, AB Harvard) is a Professor of


International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
(PUC-RIO). From 2011 to 2013, she was General Coordinator of the BRICS
Policy Center, where she remains as a researcher working on international
security and development issues.

A. E. Abdenur (*)
Instituto Igarapé, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

© The Author(s) 2019 339


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_23
340   A. E. ABDENUR

de Janeiro, known as PUC-Rio. In 2010, IRI partnered with the ­municipal


government to establish a think tank dedicated to the study of interna-
tional relations and development, with a specific focus on rising powers.
Its aim is to combine the realm of theory with that of policy by promoting
alternative views of the developing world, rather than focusing solely on
those proposed by the West.
How and to what extent could the result of the partnership between
the municipal government and IRI, the BRICS Policy Center (BPC),
bring fresh perspectives on various policy issues by taking into account
local views, rather than “Northern” perspectives?
This chapter will recount how BPC researchers, working on the topic
of maritime security in the South Atlantic (frequently described as a “stra-
tegic backwater” by analysts from the United States and Europe), worked
to produce more localized understandings of the region’s changing power
dynamics. The chapter shows how the team—consisting not only of BPC
researchers but also IRI students, some of whom worked on the project
on a volunteer basis—encountered some issues due to reframing the
theme of security in the South Atlantic from a local perspective, and, on
the other hand, the need to adopt a policy language that makes research
both relevant and accessible to audiences at home and abroad.
Developing innovative approaches in the region is becoming even more
important since the BPC, which is an intellectually autonomous institu-
tion, is part of a larger international network of think tanks, mostly from
the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). These
think tanks seek to present new perspectives with regard to old policy
issues. More specifically, they share the assumption that the current con-
figuration of the international system gives rising powers greater leeway
not only to boost concrete South–South cooperation ties, but also to con-
test the existing global governance structures and norms.
Since its formal launch in 2011, BPC has grown into a research and
teaching center with a staff of thirty-five people, who are both faculty
members and students affiliated with IRI. The staff work part time at the
Center’s headquarters, located in a historic building (the former home of
Brazilian External Relations Minister Affonso Arinos de Melo Franco) in
the neighborhood of Botafogo. This partisan, intellectually autonomous
institution is funded by both Brazilian and foreign sources, and is working
to promote dialogue among different political environments within and
outside of Brazil. The Center has several lines of research, from economic
relations to multilateralism, as well as a department specifically dedicated
  BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY…    341

to international conflict mediation and prevention (the Global South


Mediation Unit). The line of research on maritime security is focused on
the South Atlantic, but BPC also carries out cross-regional comparisons,
especially with the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Maritime spaces are becom-
ing increasingly important to a large number of states due to the intensifi-
cation of global trade, enhanced competition over maritime resources, and
the growing importance of the United Nations Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS). The project, developed by BPC through a partnership
between IRI and Rio de Janeiro’s municipal government, seeks to foster
knowledge creation and exchange ideas with research centers in other
BRICS countries.
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of how the research
team began a new study on the South Atlantic. Next, it explains the orga-
nizational efforts (both within BPC and through its partnerships with
Brazilian government divisions and research institutions abroad) to rethink
existing literature on the South Atlantic and to analyze this “moving tar-
get.” Finally, it explores some of the challenges that exist when trying to
frame security issues in the South Atlantic region in a way that heeds
Acharya and Buzan’s thesis, as well as some of the strategies adopted to
deal with those hurdles.

Diversifying Perspectives on the South Atlantic


In the past decade, under Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010)
and Dilma Rousseff (2011–present), Brazil’s Workers Party–led adminis-
trations have established relations with Africa, one of the country’s main
foreign policy axes. Attempts to deepen ties across the South Atlantic were
not a novelty; during the 1960s when the Brazilian government sought to
distance itself from the East–West cleavages, its foreign policy agenda
stressed South–South cooperation, including with African countries. Even
after the 1964 coup, which led to 21 years of a military regime, Brazil
ended up adopting a pragmatic outlook abroad, including the creation of
ties with other developing countries. However, these links weakened dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, since Brazil focused on overcoming soaring
foreign debt, high inflation, and economic stagnation.
After the turn of the millennium, Brazil once again looked towards
Africa. One aspect particularly intrigued the BPC team: new perspectives
on the South Atlantic as a distinct geopolitical space were highlighted by
both its South American and its African fringe. In Brazil’s new defense
342   A. E. ABDENUR

policy, for instance, the South Atlantic region acquired the same level of
importance previously granted to the Amazon. The new policy framework
included not only naval buildup (focused on the development, through
cooperation with France, of a nuclear propulsion attack submarine), but
also efforts to intensify military cooperation with the littoral states of
Africa (Ministry of Defense 2012). The government justified this shift by
stressing the need to protect Brazil’s maritime resources, including the
substantial pre-salt oil reserves, whose discovery had been announced in
2007.
Within defense policy discussions, there was also growing interest as
well as an increasing concern regarding the flow of illicit goods and peo-
ple, and the expansion of piracy off the coast of West Africa. At the same
time, the Brazilian government’s distance from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alliance seemed to have particular salience within
the context of the South Atlantic. Brazilian foreign policy has long stressed
the principle of respect for national sovereignty. Even recently, this posi-
tion generated discomfort in American and European policy circles when
Brazil refrained from supporting proposals for military intervention in
Libya and Syria. Although the NATO alliance does not have significant
interests in the South Atlantic region, Brazilian foreign and defense poli-
cies stress that the region’s security issues should be addressed primarily by
local actions rather than by external interventions. The South Atlantic, in
other words, is a space in which Brazilian opposition to interventionism
has become particularly pronounced, even if in a pre-emptory way.
In order to deepen understanding of these positions, their ensuing ini-
tiatives, and the resulting reactions, at the end of 2011 the BPC research
team began to study this topic more systematically, mapping and analyzing
the changing landscape and working to identify the opportunities and
challenges it poses to Brazilian foreign and defense policy. While investi-
gating the rather scarce literature on the South Atlantic by scholars from
the United States and Europe, we encountered, and admittedly at first
adopted, a rather uncritical perception that the South Atlantic represents
a “strategic backwater” (see, for instance, Lesser 2010). As the team
researched the history of the region, conducting archival research and
interviews with key stakeholders, we began to unearth and incorporate
into our analysis different perspectives, primarily from Brazil. We quickly
realized that the language of “backwater” reflected the mainstream,
American and Eurocentric geographic biases and cognitive maps of power.
We also began to question the practice of transposing certain analogies to
  BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY…    343

the region. For instance, we found analyses by American scholars that


referred to the South Atlantic as a “backyard,” a term that connotes a
zero-sum, highly territorialist conception of space and regional hegemony
that failed to adequately capture the conceptions of the South Atlantic
promoted by Brazilian ruling elites. We also noticed that the state-centric
approach of these previous works was inadequate to explain the increas-
ingly important pull of private-sector actors and civil society entities in
shaping the politics of the South Atlantic.
Although our research did uncover power disparities and frictions
among local stakeholders, including resurging tensions between Argentina
and the United Kingdom regarding the Malvinas/Falklands, the idea that
local states vied to turn the South Atlantic into their “backyard” underem-
phasized more complex, partly cooperative perceptions of this space, as
reflected by the institutions resurfacing in the South Atlantic. For exam-
ple, Brazil has sought to revitalize the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation
Zone (ZOPACAS), created in 1986 through a United Nations (UN)
resolution, and whose effectiveness was undermined after the end of the
Cold War. The initiative was modeled not on a rigid NATO-style alliance,
but rather on strengthening security and development ties among South
American and African states along the South Atlantic. At the same time,
UNCLOS became of greater importance to the region, since Brazil and
other countries technically cooperated and eventually filed and revised
proposals to extend their legal waters based on surveys of their continental
shelves.
At BPC, these research and discussions were undertaken through a
variety of channels.
Data collected on-site and from electronic archives yielded more
nuanced yet localized historical narratives of the South Atlantic, which
helped the team to grasp how these views have changed over time.
Fieldwork undertaken in Brazil and in Africa helped us realize the vari-
ability in local meanings and strategic conceptions of the South Atlantic.
It became clear that the ruling elites in Cape Verde, Angola, and South
Africa did not share Brazil’s vision of the South Atlantic, especially with
respect to security threats. In addition, not all states in the region were
adamantly opposed to NATO playing a role in the South Atlantic, a point
that became particularly clear in debates about piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, in which several policy-makers stressed that local naval and intel-
ligence capacity was insufficient to tackle the problem without external
assistance.
344   A. E. ABDENUR

Some of our team’s findings are included in academic papers that have
been published both nationally and internationally. Some of these journals
are Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, Polar Journal, and Revista CIDOC d’Afers Internacionals.
Another essay was included in a book jointly edited by the Instituto de
Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada (IPEA), a government think tank whose
portfolio includes international security topics, and the Ministry of
Defense. In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed the book to
all of its embassies, to the diplomatic delegations of the states along the
South Atlantic, as well as to the delegation of Brazil at the UN agencies.
Other aspects of the research were investigated in policy briefs, through
executive summaries or bulleted recommendations, in order to facilitate
their reading by policy circles. These studies were published not only by
the BRICS Policy Center, but also by partner institutions in other South
Atlantic states, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs.
At the same time, debate with external actors was encouraged through
participation in a variety of workshops and presentations, held in Brazil
and in Africa. BPC’s network of partner institutions, especially in South
Africa and Angola, was essential to gain access to key information and to
audiences on the African side of the South Atlantic. When requested, we
also released interviews to the media, such as the Folha de São Paulo or the
BBC, for reports on Brazil–Africa relations.
Particularly remarkable is BPC’s effort to involve undergraduate and
graduate students (some of them were taking a class on the South Atlantic,
while others were interns or research assistants) on the research team. Far
from being passive participants, the students actively contributed to the
project. They scrutinized the minutiae of maritime law in order to figure
out how UNCLOS enables or constrains the actions of states and of other
international actors within the South Atlantic. They also drafted a policy
brief (forthcoming) describing the role of the BRICS countries in the
Commission of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
While working on the project, we realized that we had to strike a bal-
ance between offering a new perspective on the South Atlantic that was
not limited by “Northern” perspectives and IR frameworks, and making
research relevant to the national as well as international audiences.
Breaking too abruptly with the established theories of security and IR
would mean restricting our chance to rapidly influence the ongoing debate
on the South Atlantic and on Brazil’s approach within the region. Since
policy-makers often favor brief and direct forms of communication, we
  BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY…    345

decided to take a two-pronged approach in communicating our research


through texts and presentations that yield concrete and to-the-point
recommendations.
One the one hand, we worked on developing the theoretical and ana-
lytical basis for the project in the way of academic publications.
Furthermore, we adapted key ideas to the language of policy. We made
publications available in print and online for those inclined to engage
more directly with academic research. We also took printed copies of the
publications to interviews and to meetings, and mailed issues of the jour-
nals and books to our key interlocutors in government and other
institutions.
Since policy-making in foreign relations and defense is driven by mul-
tiple interests and filters a variety of discourses, the exact impact of these
activities is hard to measure. However, we believe that BPC’s ongoing
research on the South Atlantic has begun to change the language and the
framing of the region in national (and, to some extent, international)
debates on security issues. For instance, we promoted a language of
region-building and cooperative identity. The call for papers for the 2014
annual meeting of the Brazilian Defense Studies Association (ABED),
organized in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense’s in-house think
tank, was dedicated to the topic of the South Atlantic and began with the
question of whether it is possible to speak of a “South Atlantic identity.”
The background reading list for participants included a 2013 policy brief
that we published through the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
(NOREF). The research also helped to enhance the visibility of the South
Atlantic security and cooperation theme beyond narrow defense circles, as
shown by the number of requests for conversations about the topic com-
ing from civil society entities.
Finally, team members have participated in a series of panels organized
by American and European research centers. On such occasions it was
possible to clarify positions, suggest alternatives, and describe paths for
dialogue on regional security issues, in a way that incorporates, rather than
marginalizes, local perspectives and interpretations. We saw some signs
that policy-makers in Brazil, including those in charge of defense, are
becoming more receptive to the team’s approach and efforts. In 2013, for
instance, BPC researchers and their IRI colleagues collaborated on a mul-
tiyear research project for a competitive call for proposals from the Ministry
of Defense. The proposal was one of the only two in the field of interna-
tional relations to receive funding. Through this ongoing project, BPC
346   A. E. ABDENUR

has partnered with the Naval War College in Rio de Janeiro and the
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul to conduct more fieldwork and
expand the project.
In 2014, as part of efforts to promote dialogue with academics and
non-state sectors, the Ministry of External Relations held a series of pan-
els discussions meant to provide input to Brazil’s first foreign policy
white paper, and BPC participated in some of the sessions, describing the
research we are conducting on the South Atlantic. More recently, we
have embarked on a series of case studies concerning Brazil’s security
interests in, and defense ties to, a number of states and territories along
the South Atlantic. As part of the research, we have participated in closed
meetings with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of External
Relations and carried out interviews with their representatives. The first
two publications resulting from this project were published in 2014: an
article on Brazil’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau (Journal of
Peacebuilding and Development) and an article on Brazilian interests in
Antarctica (Polar Journal). In order to promote this research in Brazil
and in other Lusophone countries, we are currently translating the texts
into Portuguese.
Although direct effects on policy are difficult to identify, diplomats
have confirmed that the project’s publications have helped in the decision-­
making process and in priority-setting discussions regarding the South
Atlantic. The research also had some impact on how Brazil is resuming
cooperation with Guinea-Bissau—which had been suspended after the
coup d’état which occurred in Bissau in April 2012—by calling the atten-
tion of Brazilian and UN policy-makers to the need to better intertwine
the reforms of the security sector with development initiatives, particularly
those geared at creating new income-generating activities.

Channels and Challenges
To research the debate about the security situation in the South Atlantic,
the team drew on BPC’s internal assets as well as other connections. The
think tank has a dynamic agenda of events and publications that helped to
move the discussion along through workshops and colloquia. Because
BPC is a university-affiliated think tank, we built up links to curricular and
extracurricular activities at PUC, designing a research-based course for
students and encouraging the direct participation of undergraduate and
graduate students as interns and researchers.
  BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY…    347

With regard to its external links, BPC has established channels of dia-
logue with several government divisions, including the Ministry of Defense
and its newly established in-house think tank, the Instituto Pandiá
Calógeras, which aims to actively contribute to the discussion and research
of Brazil’s security and defense concerns. Conversations with researchers
and officials from the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, helped BPC
researchers to understand some of the military tactical concerns and strat-
egies in the South Atlantic, as well as the technological demands of the
region’s security challenges. Ongoing dialogue with colleagues from the
state-affiliated Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada (IPEA), also
based in Brasília, has kept BPC researchers abreast of the government’s
research agenda in international security, and has provided another outlet
for our team’s publications.
A multiyear grant from the Ministry of Defense and the Brazilian
Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES),
won by the Institute of International Relations in partnership with the
Nava War College and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, envi-
sioned a series of joint workshops, fieldwork trips, and publications in
2015 and 2016. Also in Brasília, regular conversations with the Ministry
of Foreign Relations and other government divisions helped to contextu-
alize Brazil’s initiatives regarding the South Atlantic, as well as other
domestic priorities within the broader framework of Brazilian foreign
policy.
Through contacts at the UN and other institutions focused on mari-
time law, the BPC team was able to learn more about the role of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). At the same
time, ties with non-state actors, including major companies operating in
African and Brazilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with
activities related to foreign policy and security (such as the São Paulo–
based Conectas), helped to move the analysis beyond a narrowly state-­
centric perspective, particularly with regard to relations with Africa.
The BPC team has also drawn on the Center’s vast network of think
tanks abroad. Since its establishment, the BPC has participated in the
think tank network associated with the BRICS Academic Forum, which
belongs to a series of civil society initiatives that take place simultaneously
with the BRICS summits.
The BPC has signed Memoranda of Understanding with dozens of
partner institutions, including other think tanks, research centers, univer-
sities, and policy institutions located in developing countries (within and
348   A. E. ABDENUR

outside the BRICS states). These connections have been essential to its
work on the South Atlantic, both in terms of advancing the research and
with respect to disseminating the results. For instance, through a series of
workshops organized in Johannesburg and in Rio de Janeiro with the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), BPC has been
able to include African perspectives on region-building and maritime
power in the South Atlantic, and learned about comparable security issues
in the Indian Ocean.
BPC’s network of scholars and institutions is not restricted to other
developing countries. In the area of maritime issues, recent collaborations
include the Brookings Institution and the Naval Postgraduate School in
the United States, as well as the German Marshall Fund of the United
States in Brussels. Likewise, participation in events about NATO and mili-
tary intervention, some of which were convened by European think tanks,
has been crucial for refining understanding of how the Brazilian govern-
ment’s perspective on the organization has changed across time, as well as
external reactions to these viewpoints.
Through these events, BPC was able to present ongoing research and
publications related to its projects, in both English and Portuguese.
In addition to these institutional ties, until 2013 the BPC also had a
visiting scholars program, the BRICS Policy Center Fellows, which
brought researchers and experts from other BRICS countries to Rio de
Janeiro for residencies varying between one and three months. Fellows
from India and China, collaborating with our research team, noted that
rising powers are increasingly engaged in region-building, including their
maritime spaces. Presentations by, and conversations with, Haibin Niu of
the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) helped us to under-
stand how the growing importance of sea lines of communication (SLOCS)
and maritime natural resources have contributed to a shift in Chinese naval
policy. Indian colleagues shed light on changing dynamics of competition
and cooperation in the Indian Ocean. We found some similarities with
Brazil’s experience in the South Atlantic, despite the vast differences in
geopolitical context, eventually yielding some comparative studies.
Interviews in Pretoria and London helped to shed light on the surge in
piracy, as well as on the efforts to combat the phenomenon off the coast of
Somalia. This type of comparative perspective contributed to shaping our
perceptions of South Atlantic dynamics, and allowed a cross-­regional com-
parative analysis that helped to situate the power dynamics of the South
Atlantic in light of the broader changes affecting the international system.
  BEYOND “BACKWATER” AND “BACKYARD”—REFRAMING SECURITY…    349

Throughout these initiatives, the BPC team has dealt with a number of
challenges. At a practical level, the relative scarcity of funding available in
Brazil for research, particularly for research on international affairs, has
limited the number of countries in South America and Africa that the
team could visit for interviews and other data collection, as well as the
amount of time we could spend in each place. Team members have tried
to handle this scarcity by undertaking some field research, especially inter-
views, when participating as guests at events organized by other South
Atlantic states, such as Argentina and South Africa. In addition, BPC’s
location outside of Brasília makes it difficult to establish and maintain
lines of communication with the government and diplomatic delegations
in Brazil. This requires not only ensuring that these relations are main-
tained through emails, but also making an effort to set up meetings when-
ever in town for other commitments, or when government interlocutors
come to Rio de Janeiro for events. Finally, in order to strengthen relations
among think tanks within the South Atlantic, we are replying on the
emerging platform of the Pró-Defesa research partnership to strengthen
ties with think tanks in Argentina as well as across the South Atlantic, with
already established contacts with other institutions in South Africa,
Angola, Nigeria, and Cape Verde.

Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of how the BPC research team is con-
tributing to security policy debates on the South Atlantic by “reframing”
the geopolitical understanding of the region in the light of local interests
and perspectives, and considering a broad range of actors. The project
found intellectual inspiration in Acharya and Busan’s argument about the
need to diversify international relations approaches beyond Western per-
spectives and focus on policy issues, with an attempt to propose an innova-
tive viewpoint. Thereby, it balanced the aim to provide alternative views
on South Atlantic security with content that would be relevant and intel-
ligible to policy interlocutors in Brazil and abroad.
It is important to highlight and summarize these efforts within the
broader context of the think tank landscape in Brazil. First, the case ana-
lyzed illustrates some of the advantages of a newly founded institution: in
particular, the possibility of considering “moving targets” and of
­developing a new perspective on traditional topics, as well as some of the
main challenges in establishing a credible voice and, as a consequence,
350   A. E. ABDENUR

obtaining the funds necessary to do so sustainably. While researching the


South Atlantic, our team has learned to work fast and to incorporate new
voices into the debate, without slipping into narrow partisanship, which
would close many doors and impoverish the debates we have helped to
animate. Like many other developing countries, Brazil still has few research
institutions, no matter the definition of think tank used. In addition, links
between government and think tanks are still somehow weak, depending
on the efforts sustained by researchers to raise awareness of their center’s
resources (or, at times, its existence). While in many advanced economies,
including the United States, think tanks act also as “holding pens” for
experts waiting to fill political and technical appointments within the gov-
ernment, in Brazil this is seldom the case. As a result, except for a few key
ministries, awareness of the capacities and usefulness of think tanks in the
policy-making process is still somewhat limited, and Brazilian think tanks
have to create demand for their policy work.
BPC’s experience with respect to this demand creation has been rea-
sonably successful, judging from its participation in debates, events, and
initiatives organized by the government as well as by non-government
entities. Furthermore, the weak linkages between Brazilian think tanks
(whose institutional networks are sometimes stronger internationally than
at home) creates hurdles in terms of attaining a critical mass of think tanks
that could constitute a robust ecology of institutions. This fragmentation
is partly the result of a scarcity of sources, which heightens competition
among institutions working on similar or overlapping topics. While com-
petition can be a positive factor, since it creates incentives to improve qual-
ity and increase output, it can also hamper cross-institutional dialogue.
This situation is being overcome through new collaboration initiatives
that foster inter–think tank cooperation across Brazilian institutions. These
initiatives represent the first steps in making think tanks, like BPC, relevant
long-term actors in Brazilian security policy debates, including about the
South Atlantic region.
CHAPTER 24

Mexico: An Overview

James G. McGann

Mexico, as the chair of the Group of 20 (G20) Summit in 2011, provided


the opportunity for thinks tanks to interact with the G20 presidency.
During the conference, topics such as economic development, green
growth, and the mechanism of the G20 Summit itself were all discussed.
The Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) and the Mexican
Ministry of Foreign Affairs created Think 20, a think tank meeting, which
initiated a forum for think tanks to debate the leaders’ agenda and make
proposals. It was suggested that the role of the G20 should be shifted
towards being a global steering group instead of a pure crisis committee.
The creation of the G20 exemplifies how think tanks can be involved in
foreign policymaking procedures. For Mexico, it has more say in the inter-
national distribution of power (Tables 24.1 and 24.2).

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 351


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_24
352   J. G. MCGANN

Table 24.1  Mexico at a glance

Capital Mexico City


Population 122 million
Location (continent) North America, bordering the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf
of Mexico, between Belize and the United States, and
bordering the North Pacific Ocean, between Guatemala
and the United States
Ethnic groups Mestizo (Amerindian-Spanish) 62%, predominantly
Amerindian 21%, Amerindian 7%, other 10% (most
European)
Language Spanish only 92.7%, Spanish and indigenous languages
5.7%, indigenous only 0.8%, unspecified 0.8%
Currency (name and Mexican peso
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Federal republic
Chief of state President Enrique Peña Nieto
Head of government President Enrique Peña Nieto
Cabinet Appointed by the President
Elections President elected by popular vote for a single six-year term;
elections last held on July 1, 2012 (next to be held in July
2018)
Legislative branch Bicameral National Congress (Congreso de la Union)
consisting of the Senate (Camara de Senadores)
Judicial branch Supreme Court of Justice
Political parties Citizen’s Movement; Institutional Revolutionary Party;
Labor Party; Mexican Green Ecological Party; Movement
for National Regeneration; National Action Party; New
Alliance Party; Party of the Democratic Revolution

Some economic facts


GDP: US $1.61 trillion
GDP per capita: US $18,500
GDP Ranking: 12
  MEXICO: AN OVERVIEW    353

Table 24.2  Think tanks in Mexico

Number of think tanks: 61


% of think tanks out of regional total: 61/1931= 3%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2014):
 2012: 60
 2013: 60
 2014: 60
 2015: 61
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2014): 0
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
 Top defense and national security think tanks: 0
 Top foreign policy and international affairs think tanks: 0
 Top international development think tanks: 0
 Top international economic think tanks: 0
 Top domestic economic think tanks: 1
 Top social policy think tanks: 0
Case study
Fundacion Mexicana para la Salud (FUNSALUD; Mexican Foundation for Health) ranks
fourteenth out of the top thirty domestic health policy think tanks.
CHAPTER 25

Think 20: An Innovative Proposal


for the G20 Summit

Claudia Calvin Venero

Presentation
In 2012, Mexico held the Presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) Summit.
Different groups and forums, labeled “Partners,”1 had traditionally gath-
ered, such as the business community through the Business 20 (B20),
Civil society (C20), Labour (L20), and Youth (Y20), plus other groups
like the Young Girls (Girls202). Groups of think tank specialists who had
never gathered before within the framework of the meeting, nor had been
invited to participate in the process, were included for the first time. Think
tanks met at the highest governmental level in Mexico to debate, analyze,
and make proposals that were presented to the Mexican Sherpa and
Summit Coordinator, Ambassador Lourdes Aranda, and addressed to the
1
 “Working with Partners,” G20 2014, http://www.g20australia.org/g20_priorities/
working_partners.
2
 “G(irls)20 Summit: G(irls)20,” http://www.girls20.org/programs/girls20-summit/.

C. C. Venero (*)
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI), Mexico City, Mexico

© The Author(s) 2019 355


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_25
356   C. C. VENERO

Leaders’ Sherpas, who met in Los Cabos, Baja California, Mexico that
year. The Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) co-hosted
the meeting with the Mexican Foreign Ministry and presented the debate
to the Mexican Sherpa and head of the Summit.
How could this change happen? What was debated? What was the
impact and further consequences? What can be expected in future
Summits?
The underpinning of this analysis is based in epistemic community the-
ory.3 In this theory, the role of ideas is considered an independent variable
in the policy-making process and portrayers of ideas have an important
role. In this case, the “portrayers of ideas” and their capacity to link ideas
to policies, their characteristics, their ability to operate, act, and impact, as
well as their understanding of the institutional and political framework
within which they can participate, are key factors.

Mexico as Chair of the 2011 G20 Summit


and the Think 20

The Mexican Presidency of the G20, in collaboration with COMEXI,


invited and gathered think tank representatives from across the world in
Mexico City for February 27 and 28, 2012. Some of the most important
and influential regional think tanks were invited to participate in this ini-
tiative, called the “Think 20.”
It was the first time think tank researchers interacted directly with a G20
Presidency to debate relevant issues. This gathering was an open recogni-
tion of the value that think tanks added to relevant international topics.
The issues discussed were the Mexican G20 Presidency’s priorities at
that moment: economic stabilization and structural reforms for economic
growth and employment; strengthening of the financial system and finan-
cial inclusion for economic growth; improvement of the financial architec-
ture in an interconnected world; food security and volatility of commodities;
and the promotion of green growth.
These discussions were of critical importance considering the changes
that had taken place in Mexico and in the world in recent decades:
3

Peter M.  Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” International Organization, 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35. This article is
one of the best introductions to epistemic community analysis.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    357

• The strong economic relationship between Mexico and the United


States has continued to increase since both countries and Canada
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.
As Mexico’s largest export partner (80%), economic fluctuations in
the United States have an impact on Mexico and vice versa. The last
two decades in particular have seen closer economic bonds between
Mexico and the United States and the two countries have come
together on a wide range of mutual interest issues, including security
and environmental concerns, as was clearly seen in the agenda when
President Felipe Calderón met with President Barack Obama in 2010.

• According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the 1990s


the countries included in the Group of 7 (G7) concentrated more than
half of the world’s income, but in 2011 these countries represented
only 35%. Emerging and underdeveloped economies represented in
the same year more than 50% of the world’s GDP.4 This was due to
different factors, such as the participation of China and India in inter-
national trade as well as the increasing role of Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia,
South Africa, Australia, and Turkey in the international economy. It is
important to remember the impact that the Tequila Effect, the Samba
Effect, and the Tango and Dragon Effects had in the 1990s. In 2012,
Mexico was the tenth major exporter in the world, one of the most
open economies on the planet, and represented one of the most stable
economies. It was the first Latin American country to chair the Think
20 and the second emerging one to preside over it.
In other words, international governance has changed in the last
decade and Mexico has played a role in these changes. In this con-
text, the G20 has become the natural space to negotiate the new
challenges of global governance.

• As the leader of the G20 presidency in 2011–2012, Mexico took on


the challenge of pushing forward the Action Plan on Food Price
Volatility and Agriculture and its short-term strategies and long-term
priorities for the agricultural and fisheries agenda. Throughout the
G20 recommendations there was a strong commitment to sustain-
able and inclusive food production that takes environmental needs
into consideration.
4
 Loudres Aranda, “México Y El G-20,” Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica 12, no. 2 (2012),
3, http://revistafal.com/numeros-anteriores/fal-12-2/.
358   C. C. VENERO

• Green growth has received considerable attention in Mexico since


the administration of Presidente Calderón (2006–2012) and contin-
ues to be important. Since hosting the climate change talks in Cancun
in 2009, Mexico has consistently helped move climate change and
green growth forward on the international agenda. In October
2012, the Mexican Senate formally committed to strive for a 30%
greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2020 under the Climate
Change Law. If this goal is achieved, it will be a significant catalyst
for Mexico’s renewable energy sector, moving it from 3 to 35% total
power generation by 2024.5 However, actual attainment will require
different variables to happen in the short term: foreign investment
from other countries, national laws and reforms to consolidate, a
direct fight against corruption, and the active participation of local
governments in the green and energy agendas.
Mexico highlighted green growth throughout its G20 Presidency.
The central idea was to promote productivity, innovation, job cre-
ation, and business opportunities in the context of sustainability. In
order to do so, it was necessary to include in the conversation new
actors with new ideas, and this is one of the reasons, as Ambassador
Aranda, Mexico’s Sherpa, mentioned, why intellectuals and think
tanks were invited to participate and bring with them a critical and
analytical perspective to the G20.6

The results of the two-day discussions were practical and specific pro-
posals that were presented directly to the Sherpas who gathered in the
preparation meetings that took place in Los Cabos later that year.

Participants
The participants were from twenty-one institutions from sixteen coun-
tries.7 Here is the list with their names, institutional affiliation, and coun-
try of origin:
5
 Thomas Kerr and Brindusa Fidanza, “Mexico’s ‘Green Growth’ Revolution Gathers
Pace,” World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2012/10/
mexicos-green-growth-revolution-gathers-pace/.
6
 Aranda, “México Y El G-20,” 5.
7
 “Think 20—Cobertura del Think 20 por COMEXI,” http://think20.consejomexicano.
org/.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    359

• Australia
Mark Thirlwell, Lowy Institute for International Policy

• Brazil
Rogério Sobreira, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)

• Canada
Paul Martin, Council of the Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA)
Barry Carin, Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI)
Thomas Bernes, Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI)

• China
Liwei Qian, China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR)

• Germany
Nancy Alexander, Heinrich Boell Foundation of North America
Thomas Fues, German Development Institute (DIE)

• India
Parthasarathi Shome, Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations (ICRIER)
Rakesh Mohan, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University

• Indonesia
Maria Monica Wihardja, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)

• Japan
Shinichi Kitajima, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

• Mexico
Andrés Rozental, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Enrique Berruga, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Carlos A.  Heredia, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
(COMEXI)
360   C. C. VENERO

• Russia
Vladislav Inozemtsev, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies

• Rwanda
Antonia Mutoro, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
(IPAR-Rwanda)

• Singapore
Barry Desker, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

• South Korea
Wonhyuk Lim, Korea Development Institute (KDI)

• Spain
Giovanni Grevi, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)

• Turkey
Sarp Kalkan, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
(TEPAV)

• United States
Stewart Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
David Shorr, The Stanley Foundation
Colin Bradford, Brookings Institution
Stephen John, Stedman Spogli Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University

These institutions were invited because they are experts in think tanks
with areas of interest related to the topics discussed at the G20; namely,
the fact that they could have the capacity to influence the world’s “premier
forum for global economic coordination.”8 These think tanks have ana-
lyzed, studied, and debated the G20’s impact, role, and agenda.

8
 Reuters, “Analyst View – G20 Ends Reign of G7 in Pittsburgh,” http://in.reuters.com/
article/idINIndia-42720920090926.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    361

Topics Discussed
The two-day meeting revolved around five core sessions with the follow-
ing topics:9

• The Mexican Presidency of the G20. The session aimed to discuss


concrete deliverables of the Mexican Presidency, taking into account
the state of the world economy and the importance of addressing
other issues within a short period of time.
• Food security and commodity price volatility. The aim of the ses-
sion was to discuss concrete deliverables to enhance food security
and address commodity price volatility. As cross-cutting issues, food
security and commodity price volatility need the joint attention of
G20, because they cannot be solved solely within national frame-
works. The G20 has recognized that food market transparency and
coordination of policy action in response to market uncertainty are
needed to secure food outputs and price stability. In 2011, the
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) was created as per
the G20’s request to deal with these issues in a collaborative way.10
• The G20 and green growth. The aim was to promote a thorough
discussion on some specific proposals the Mexican Presidency could
push forward to “green” the G20 agenda without adding new topics
to the discussion, such as green jobs and green growth as a cross-­
cutting issue on the G20 agenda, and finally a greener G20
Development Working Group. Green growth can help put economic
recovery on a more sustainable path, which was and is a shared con-
cern for all G20 countries. It is therefore very much an integral part
of the G20 structural reform agenda.
• How to increase the effectiveness and productivity of G20
Summits. The aim of this session was to make participants discuss
ideas on how to promote a fluent and open dialogue among G20
leaders in order to achieve concerted agreement on the substantial
issues to build greater credibility as a vital hub of leadership and

9
 This information was taken from the working materials that COMEXI prepared for the
Think Tank Summit (Think 20). It is public and can be found on the G20’ website as well as
in COMEXI’s “Think-20 Meeting: Report to G20 Sherpas” (Mexico, March 2012), http://
think20.consejomexicano.org/?page_id=69.
10
 “Agricultural Market Information System: About,” http://www.amis-outlook.org/
amis-about/en/.
362   C. C. VENERO

action. The idea also was to explore the type of measures and actions
that Mexico could undertake, at the time, to better communicate
key G20 messages to the general public. Issues to be considered
would range from the format and methodology of the G20 Summit
to the preparatory process and the Summit itself. This session also
tried to address the possibility of transiting from a crisis management
to a global steering committee, considering the financial crisis the
world was going through at that moment (2011).
• The role of think tanks in the G20. The session aimed to promote
and exchange ideas among the participants regarding the contribu-
tions and role that think tanks play in the design and decision-­making
of public policy, specifically in the G20. Among the guiding ques-
tions were: How can think tanks be sources of information and new
ideas? How can they participate in the follow-up of the process, com-
mitments, and results (accountability) of the G20? The think tank
international network was also considered and the question raised:
What would happen after Mexico in Russia, Australia, and Turkey?

The Process and Going Public


Throughout the meeting, the participants had the chance to talk and
exchange points of view with relevant actors. Ambassador Lourdes Aranda,
Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico and G20 Sherpa, devoted the two full
days to talking, exchanging ideas, and listening to all the participants.
Aranda took notes in each session and was open to the dialogue and ideas
that were presented in the panels and discussions.
Alejandro Ramírez, head of the Mexican Business Committee (B20),
also held a dialogue with the attendees. José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, at
that time Minister of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico (from 2012
until 2015, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Peña Nieto adminis-
tration) also met with them. It is important to say that his Ministry played
an important role throughout the G20 preparation process in the financial
area and discussions.
It was a unique window of opportunity for the experts to exchange
points of view with the policy-makers, and also for the latter to listen to
the experts on the topics they were discussing officially in the preparation
process.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    363

The sessions took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and every-
thing was discussed following Chatham House Rules. Throughout the
process, the Ministry informed the public about the meeting with press
releases.11
An important aspect of the Think Tank Summit was the public working
breakfast that was hosted by COMEXI on 29 February. This was a public
event with the media, COMEXI’s associates, and embassy officials, with a
panel discussion on Think 20 and the future of the G20. The aim of the
event was to publicize the general debate that took place and present it to
the media and Mexican experts in international relations, as well as foreign
diplomatic officials who worked in Mexico and also participated in the
Council.
Going public was crucial to the debate for Mexican public opinion to
get involved. Traditional and mainstream media were invited, but an inno-
vation for the whole process at that time was the creation of a social media
hub for the event and for the Summit, and a specific webpage: http://
think20.consejomexicano.org.
COMEXI made an alliance with the Mexico Chapter of the Social
Media Club12 and CISCO supported the initiative, providing the techno-
logical infrastructure to broadcast the meeting. The whole public event
was tweeted, transmitted, and blogged. Special one-on-one interviews
were organized for the media with the participants.
The webpage embedded in COMEXI’s website included all the rele-
vant information surrounding Think 20:

• General information about the Summit and Think 20


• Media and social media coverage
• The information presented to the Sherpas in Spanish and English
• Notes presented by the participants
• Information for the media

11
 “La reunión Think-20 concluye exitosamente,” http://think20.consejomexicano.
org/?page_id=30.
12
 “Social Media Club,” https://socialmediaclub.org/chapters/chapter-directory?fwp_
country=Mexico. At that moment, the only chapter on Mexico was about Mexico City and
the others were in the process of being constituted.
364   C. C. VENERO

In 2012, COMEXI was setting a precedent not only among its think
tank colleagues worldwide, but also in terms of communication for an
international event.

Conclusions and Recommendations Presented to the Sherpas13


The participants presented a final document to Ambassador Aranda, who
shared it with her colleagues at the Sherpas’ meeting later that year at Los
Cabos. The following were their conclusions as presented in the final
document.

 hink 20 Conclusions and Recommendations14


T
The challenge for the G20, given the multitude of issues and diverse inter-
ests, is to demonstrate collective leadership on key global economic chal-
lenges and restore growth and employment. On February 27–29, the
Think 20, a network of research institutions from around the world, met
in Mexico City to discuss the Los Cabos G20 Summit agenda. We asked
how to “green” the G20 agenda without adding new topics, how to make
the G20 summit meeting format most productive, and how to build
greater G20 credibility. The recommendations below are the meeting’s
priorities, suggesting realistic, concrete initiatives likely to produce
deliverables.

Stabilize and Reform the Global Economic and Financial System


• While the main responsibility of dealing with the Eurozone crisis
must rest with the Eurozone economies themselves, the G20 still has
a critical role to play. For example, G20 peer review should play an
important role in assuring the quality of the Eurozone policy
response. A priority is to insulate the rest of the world from spillovers
from the Eurozone crisis by increasing the resources of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creating global financial
safety nets. The G20 must continue peer pressure and insist that
Eurozone members increase their own war chest to deal with risks of
sovereign default. The responsibility lies with the EU.
13
 Besides the final document presented, each participant developed and elaborated notes
to  be  discussed in  the  meeting: “Participant Notes,” http://think20.consejomexicano.
org/?page_id=74.
14
 “Think-20 Meeting: Report to G20 Sherpas” (Mexico, March 2012), http://think20.
consejomexicano.org/?page_id=69.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    365

• Begin discussion of a systematic sovereign debt restructuring process


to deal with future challenges.
• Accelerate promised governance reforms in international financial
institutions, specifically the weighted voting, leadership selection,
and executive board composition at the World Bank (WB) and IMF.
• In balancing short term and long term priorities, emphasize growth
in jobs & livelihoods—correct the mistaken policy of “expansionary
contraction”.
• Deliver on past commitments on global financial regulation, in par-
ticular to harmonize standards and resolve authority to deal with
“too big to fail” and the shadow banking sector. Strengthen the
powers, governance and resources of the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) so that it may provide stronger surveillance, and broaden its
inclusiveness.
• Establish working groups to address (a) inadequacies of international
financial regulatory reform and (b) management of capital flows,
involving the IMF and FSB.

Promote “Green Growth” and Food Security


• Agree on an integrated vision of “Global Green Growth” to be
embedded in the Pittsburgh Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth, giving primacy to economic policy measures lead-
ing to investment-led and innovation driven growth, transforming
energy production and use in advanced and developing countries by
mobilizing a range of constituencies and instruments in support of
synergistic strategies at the community, corporate, national, regional
and global levels, that are not just wish lists.
• Mainstream “green growth”. The current G20 agendas for growth,
development, energy and food security should emphasize the need
to create green jobs and promote investment in greening infrastruc-
ture and sustainability. The G20 can maintain a strong focus on the
existing agendas and, at the same time, produce a Los Cabos legacy
of “Green Growth”.
• Follow through on the commitment to eliminate inefficient fuel sub-
sidies by 2020.
• Feature “Livable Cities” in the G20 Infrastructure Action Plan with
an emphasis on mass transit.
• Promote growth in jobs and livelihoods, including in advanced
economies, by focusing on “no regrets investments”. To promote
366   C. C. VENERO

efficient, appropriate-scale, low-carbon energy, commission reports


on opportunities for “smart grid” measures and international coop-
eration on open source technology development and transfer.
• Commission an assessment of economic options to reduce green-
house gas emissions.
• Encourage leaders at Rio +20 to (a) elevate the status of UNEP and
streamline the “family” of environmental and food agencies; and (b)
develop a consensus on the “Sustainable Energy for All” initiative.
• To ensure food security, phase out agricultural subsidies (e.g., with
leadership from advanced countries, such as the U.S.), and ensure
access to inputs (credit, land, seeds, fertilizer, water) by smallholders,
especially women.
• Expand pre-placement of emergency food stocks, and increase trans-
parency in commodity markets through the development of price
discovery mechanisms. Productivity is a long-term challenge; the
world needs to double agricultural productivity within the next 40
years in a sustainable way.
• Treat food security, research and development (R&D) and commod-
ity price volatility as cross-cutting issues that require leadership which
agricultural ministers alone cannot provide. Leaders must lead in this
area, including by appointing a food security “Czar(s)” to focus on
policy coherence among WB, OECD, and UN agencies and within
national governments.

Improve the G20’s Performance


• The role of the G20 should shift from a crisis committee to a global
steering group. Ideas were suggested to improve the effectiveness of
the preparatory process and to increase the value of Leaders
meetings.

a. Preparatory Process

• Reassess the Troika. At present, it is not working, despite the Cannes


decision. Consider a “Bureau” to support the Troika.
• Continue G20 foreign ministers’ meetings, so the G20 can evolve
into a more general-purpose global steering body. The need that
applies to financial issues—bring the world’s most important
developed and developing countries at the table—also applies to a
wide array of issues, from transnational organized crime to gover-
nance to nuclear proliferation.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    367

• Strengthen the links between the G20 and other international


bodies, such as the UN. Provide recommendations (not mandates)
to their executive bodies. Ensure transparency and consultative pro-
cesses with regard to new initiatives and delegation of work.
• Institutionalize the Think-20 to serve as idea “banks,” monitoring
and accountability mechanisms, and help deliver feedback and buy-
­in from skeptical publics to accept correct, but painful, policies. The
Think-20 can also be asked to craft assessments of potential agenda
items.
• Reinforce the Presidency with an informal “non-secretariat” of tem-
porary secondments.

b. Leaders’ Summits

• Lengthen summits to allow for more time for informal unscripted


exchanges among leaders.
• Promote informality by setting new norms against prepared state-
ments, limiting the number of people in the room, and providing
expert, simultaneous translation.

The text is precise, concrete, and addresses the major concerns for the
participant economies at the G20  in 2012. It is a critical and assertive
document that reflects the major challenges of the time and has specific
proposals for the topics that were addressed during the Summit.
Highlighting the importance of creating financial stability and of limiting
the negative effect of the Eurozone crisis, it implied a shared responsibility
of all countries and non-governmental actors, as well as the necessity to
find new solutions and include new participants in the conversation.
The relevance of green growth and food stability must be emphasized;
the fact that the issue is considered as a central area of international gov-
ernance for the years to come is vital. Financial and economic policies
should be addressed simultaneously with “green” and agricultural ones.
Finally, the recommendations show a generalized consensus that there is a
demand for adequate G20 organizational and procedural aspects to repre-
sent the actual needs and threats with a very concrete proposal: the need
to have an “idea bank” should be represented by the “Think 20,” which
was taking place and could help the leaders analyze and debate the rele-
vant aspects of their meetings from that Summit onward.
368   C. C. VENERO

Challenges and Impact of the First Think 20 Summit


The creation of Think 20 is exemplar of how think tanks participate in
international policy-making and the relevance of ideas and their portrayers
in the international sphere. A complex world with governmental and non-­
governmental actors sharing common challenges and threats should be
seen from a different and innovative perspective, and in order to do so, not
only new ideas but new participants should be included in the governance
ecosystem.
This recognition of needing new and diverse participants had implica-
tions at different levels:

For Mexico
Mexico has gone through a major shift in the orientation of its foreign
policy in the last decades. Since the signing of NAFTA, a radical change
had taken place. From having as a guideline for its international participa-
tion a set of basic principles, it became more pragmatic and recognized de
facto that the country also had interests to achieve. Self-determination,
non-intervention, pacific solutions to international controversies, non-­
acceptance of threats or use of force to solve problems, judicial equality of
states, international cooperation for development, and a permanent aim of
international peace and security, among others, have been present in the
country’s international actions and policies, but now national economic
interests have been recognized and the impact of the international sce-
nario is considered. Since 1994, the international political and economic
agenda has gone through a similar path, implying the need for adequate
participation by Mexico in the new world reality. As an emerging power,
new paths of leadership should be taken.
Apart from bilateral relations with the United States, which undoubt-
edly are key for Mexico and have defined historically major actions in
political and economic terms, and bilateral relations with other countries,
essentially Spain and Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico has a long
tradition of multilateral participation.15 The Mexican Presidency of the
G20 represented the modernization of that tradition and posed a new
momentum in Mexico’s international presence.

15
 Curzio, Leonardo. México: ¿Cómo fortalecer su tradición multilateral?, COMEXI,
México, 2010.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    369

In what sense did the Mexican G20 Presidency make a difference?


Mexico invited—the presiding country can invite five others—Colombia,
Chile, Cambodia. Benin, and Spain, which is a permanent guest of the
G20. The Latin American region thus had a major presence and two
countries from the developing world were included.
Aranda states that the G20 became a plural forum showing the world’s
multipolarity and the new international distribution of power.16 It also
meant that the agenda of underdeveloped countries was included in a
forum where the developed ones participated actively and needed to find
together solutions to the threats and problems shared by all. The incorpo-
ration of financial inclusion and food security is a good example. Green
growth, with the central idea of promoting productivity, innovation, job
creation, and business opportunities in the context of sustainability, was
central to the G20 Mexican Presidency, as previously mentioned.
Mexico has worldwide recognized experience in international coopera-
tion and in economic recovery. Its own history of previous economic crises
has made the country a mandatory reference in policies and actions to
overcome the challenges. In 2012, Mexico had lessons to teach and best
practices to share with European countries and the rest of the world.

For Think Tanks


As mentioned before, the 2012 G20 Summit was the first time in the his-
tory of G20 Summits where thinks tanks were included as participants in
the general process. For COMEXI, co-host during the Mexican Presidency,
this represented an invaluable opportunity to mobilize its international
network to invite other think tanks as relevant actors. International alli-
ances are a good way for think tanks to influence.
For the institutions that participated, CIGI17 being the first with whom
the idea of creating a Think 20 was shared months before, it represented
an excellent opportunity to act directly in the debate over the agenda of an
international forum that would eventually affect their own countries. It
would also become a shared best practice for influencing an international
agenda.

16
 Aranda, “México Y El G-20.”
17
 Ambassador Andrés Rozental had been exploring this possibility months before with
other think tanks and experts, mainly CIGI from Canada, and the window of opportunity
was set up in Mexico that year as the country held the G20 Presidency.
370   C. C. VENERO

For COMEXI Specifically, Lessons Were Learned


Structure  COMEXI, at the moment of the G20 Summit in 2011, was a
young think tank, founded only 10 years earlier. The first stage of institu-
tional consolidation had finished and it had the capacity to engage in wider
projects. As a lecture-intensive think tank, it has allowed the free flow of
ideas on global events and on the effects on Mexico’s national foreign
policy concerns. COMEXI members also publish many opinion articles
that run in Mexican media outlets. These articles can be seen as tools to
push forward ideas related to international affairs in a country traditionally
inward oriented, and can also be considered as elements of domestic pres-
sure on decision-makers. COMEXI also utilizes Twitter and Facebook to
share information about Mexico with the international media and publish
analyses of events. Its YouTube channel has become a reference to hear
relevant personalities and analysis, both from Mexico and abroad, about
foreign affairs. With its internal structure, though small and in a revision
process at the moment, the correct alliances and vision could start pro-
moting wider projects. In this case, the leadership of Ambassador Enrique
Berruga, elected President of COMEXI in 2011, and Ambassador Andrés
Rozental, the first President and COMEXI’s Founder, were crucial to
push Think 20 forward.

Policy Network  COMEXI was, and is up to this moment, the only think
tank in Mexico devoted to the analysis of international affairs and the
impact of the international agenda on Mexican politics. It organizes meet-
ings and roundtables in which policy-makers, analysts, and diverse leaders
gather in off-the-record or Chatham House Rules meetings to debate rel-
evant international issues.

Its membership, on the other hand, includes key policy-makers, ana-


lysts, and experts in international affairs: former Mexican Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, such as Rosario Green, Fernando Solana (second
COMEXI President), and Jorge Castañeda; key international trade
­negotiators such as Jaime Zabludovsky (COMEXI President 2013–2016),
Herminio Blanco, and Jaime Serra; key opinion leaders such as Leonardo
Curzio, José Carreño, and Ana Paula Ordorica, just to mention a few;
distinguished academics from different fields, social and political leaders
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    371

pertaining to different parties and ideological frameworks, as well as public


officials.18 This gives the institution a unique capacity to gather Mexican
and international leaders and strong credibility in doing so.
In other words, its membership and network are one of its most impor-
tant assets. They help it mobilize, reach, and impact different areas of the
policy-making chain and process as well as public opinion.

Window of Opportunity  Impact and results can be achieved through asser-


tive planning, undoubtedly, but without a good time frame sometimes
results cannot be achieved. In this case, many factors were favorable to
make Think 20 a win–win proposal.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, through its Minister Patricia Espinosa


and the Deputy Minister and G20 Sherpa Lourdes Aranda, were familiar
with COMEXI (Ambassador Aranda had been a member for many years),
and knew its outreach and mission to push forward the international
Mexican agenda and its capacity to gather international leaders, and also
knew about its international think tank network. When Ambassadors
Berruga and Rozental proposed the Think 20 meeting, there was receptiv-
ity and Ambassador Aranda was familiar with the idea. There was also the
political will to make this happen. The result was the meeting, the pres-
ence of the Mexican Sherpa throughout it, and the presentation of the
results to her Sherpa colleagues and leaders at Los Cabos.
On the other hand, there was an international financial crisis that had
experts from different think tanks and fields studying it, and the G20
Summit was key in the possible outcomes that could solve it or not. This
is one of the reasons for the great participation, interest. and attendance of
diverse think tanks from different regions of the world.
The meeting could be considered a success in terms of its outreach,
impact, and permanence in further meetings. The possibility of not only
creating a document that was public and widespread, but also going p ­ ublic
with it in the first place, was unique. The Mexican Presidency of the G20
gave information about the meeting, something that was important in
order to make the process transparent and lead to the information being

18
 A general overview of its membership can be consulted here: “Asociados Ordinarios,”
Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, http://consejomexicano.org/es/comexi-en/
associados/amigos.
372   C. C. VENERO

accessible. The meetings were closed, but the results were made public,
and the open event COMEXI organized was key in socializing the think
tanks’ work and the issues that were debated and presented.
It was also the first time that an international issue had been presented
in Mexico through a social media hub, and COMEXI was the first think
tank to do it in that framework. Today, it is unthinkable to plan a meeting
without a social media strategy. Back in 2011, COMEXI was an innovator
in planning and incorporating a social media strategy for the Summit.
#Think20 was a trending topic and there was an interesting conversation
going on in social media. The alliance with CISCO was key to reaching
international audiences interested in what was being debated and
presented.
After the Mexican Think 20, all the Summits have included a Think 20:
Russia, Australia, Turkey, and China.19 It is important to highlight that the
Think 20 Summits are independent of the G20 Presidency, but they work
as partners and are considered in the Summits.

Final Considerations
In a complex world, where policy-makers are involved in everyday issues
and sometimes do not have the time—though they are supposed to work
for that—to think about the medium- or long-term impact of their actions
and policies, think tanks are aimed at playing a key role. How? Think tanks
are independent analysts of policies and their impact in the world and the
international arena, as “ideas banks.” Their added value is that they are
specialists and not isolated academics, they understand the everyday pres-
sures of policy-makers, opinion leaders, and civil society and try to act in
accordance with them. This type of knowledge, among other things, is
what makes them valuable.
The example presented here of how COMEXI was able to push for-
ward the idea of a Think 20 Summit to the Mexican Presidency of the
G20  in 2012 is an excellent example of how timing, policy networks,
­alliances, and outreach are needed more than ever in a world of intercon-
nected complexity.
Alliances and connections among think tanks are vital in this context.
The exchange of information, best practices, innovation, and communica-
19
 “Working with Partners,” G20 2014, http://www.g20australia.org/g20_priorities/
working_partners.
  THINK 20: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE G20 SUMMIT    373

tion are needed in today’s world for key international actors with local
roots, and this is necessary to better understand the national meaning of
international challenges and vice versa.
A context overloaded with information requires credible sources. Think
tanks are becoming reliable ones, something that poses a challenge to
them and their objectives: Should they keep on doing long-term analysis
and research or become new media outlets? How should their structure
(financial and organizational) adapt to this; or should they not adapt to it
at all? Should they respond to immediate questions or not lose the focus
on long-term policies? Can they work on both fronts?
Think tanks devoted to international affairs have the challenge of mak-
ing international issues interesting to local audiences, which most of the
time are focused on criticizing particular and national issues and do not
care or seem to understand the connection of world relations and prob-
lems to their local matters.
These are questions that most think tanks are facing and that need to
be solved in the short term. Sharing experiences and challenges is impor-
tant in the think tank global network in order to maximize results and find
new ways of becoming not only influential, but also relevant nationally
and internationally.
PART V

Middle East
CHAPTER 26

Qatar: An Overview

James G. McGann

The abundant oil reserves allow Qatar to enjoy booming economic pros-
perity, while the political system is a monarchy dominated by the Al Thani
family. One feature of the modern Qatari state highlighted is that Qatar
plays a role as a mediator in several regional and international issues. The
understanding of the geopolitical challenges in the Gulf region and its
openness increased Qatar’s impact gradually, from soft power to a combi-
nation of soft and hard power. Research and study centers are involved
directly in policy formulation and providing guidelines. Al Jazeera Centre
for Studies (AJSC) highly emphasizes its scientific research methodology
on issues and phenomena addressed by other media. The main challenges
that research centers in Qatar are currently facing include funding, meth-
odology problems, and political bias (Table 26.1).

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 377


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_26
378   J. G. MCGANN

Table 26.1  Qatar at a glance

Country name State of Qatar (Dawlat Qatar)


Capital Doha
Population 2,194,187 (July 2015 est.)
Location (continent) Middle East, peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf and Saudi
Arabia
Ethnic groups Arab 40%, Pakistani 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%
Language Arabic (official), English (widely used second language)
Currency (name and Qatari riyal (QAR), 1 QAR: 0.27 US dollars (2015 est.)
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government type Emirate
Chief of state Emir Sheikh Tamim ibn Hamad Al Thani
Head of government Prime Minister Sheikh Abullah ibn Nasser ibn Khalifah Al
Thani
Cabinet Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister
Elections The monarchy is hereditary. The first ever legislative elections,
with a new format of thirty popularly elected seats and fifteen
Emir-­appointed seats, were expected in 2013 but were delayed
by the Emir.
Legislative branch Unicameral Advisory Council, or Majlis al-Shura, consisting of
thirty members; has limited authority in legal drafting and
approving
Judicial branch Supreme Court/Court of Cassation (court president and
several judges nominated by Supreme Judiciary Council);
Supreme Constitutional Court (six members, one chief
justice); subordinate courts: Courts of Appeal; Courts of First
Instance; Sharia Courts; Courts of Justice; Qatar International
Courts; and Dispute Resolution Center
Political parties None

Some economic facts


GDP: US $324.2 billion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $145,000 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: household consumption 18.8%, government consumption 17.8%,
investment in fixed capital 44.6%
  QATAR: AN OVERVIEW    379

Overview
Qatar is located in the Middle East, a peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf
and Saudi Arabia.1 According to 2015 figures, 88% of the population is
non-Qatari, and only 12% of the population is Qatari. Indians form the
largest expatriate community.2 Most Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims.3
Islam is the dominant religion. Arabic is the official language, and English
is commonly used as a second language.4
Qatar is an absolute monarchy and has been ruled by the Al-Thani family
since independence from Great Britain in 1971. Since 2013, Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad Al-Thani has been in power. It is estimated that the country has
25 billion barrels of oil reserves and has the third largest natural gas reserves
in the world. With these oil and gas reserves, it enjoys the world’s highest
standard of living.5 Qatar is going to host the FIFA World Cup in soccer in
2022, and will be the first Arab country to host this tournament.6

Economic Situation
Qatar has the highest GDP per capita, driven largely by the oil and gas
sector.7 It is the smallest member country of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in terms of both area and population.8 The
unemployment rate is almost zero. In Qatar, health, housing, low-interest
loans, and education are all provided to citizens. Al Jazeera, a world-class
television network, is located in Doha.9

1
 Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook: Qatar”. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
2
 Jure Snoj. “Population of Qatar by Nationality”. Last modified July 12, 2014. http://
www.bqdoha.com/2013/12/population-qatar.
3
 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “International Religious Freedom
Report”. U.S. Department of State. http://m.state.gov/md14011.htm.
4
 Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
5
 Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/qatar.
6
 CNN. “Qatar World Cup: Final on December 18, 2022”. March 19, 2015. http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2015/03/19/football/world-cup-qatar/.
7
 Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
8
 OPEC. “Qatar Facts and Figures”. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_
us/168.htm.
9
 Ron Nordland. “New Hope for Democracy in a Dynastic Land”. June 25, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/world/middleeast/emir-of-qatar-abdicates-handing-
power-to-his-son.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
380   J. G. MCGANN

The oil reserves in Qatar are expected to run dry by 2023, from the
estimates of its current rate of production. The government has altered its
economic focus to the production of natural gas, since it has the third-­
largest proven natural gas reserves in the world.10 In addition to this, the
country attracts foreign investment in its non-energy sectors, especially
financial services and tourism, by liberalizing the economy.11
Construction and financial services are the largest industries that
contribute to non-hydrocarbon growth. There are many ongoing major
projects in the construction industry, especially in the transport and real
estate sectors. Qatar Rail is building 260  km of rail for the new Doha
Metro, a US $45 billion project. Lusail is another large project, a water-
front development to the north of Doha costing US $40 billion.12
From a demographic perspective, it is important to underline that the
population is made up of more foreigners than Qatari nationals. Foreign
nationals constituted 94.1% of the labor force in the private sector in 2013;
jobs in the private sector account for 74.5% of total jobs in Qatar.
Construction is the sector which employs the vast majority of the foreign
population living in the country. Almost 40% of foreign nationals, mostly
low-skilled manual laborers, work in the construction industry. The second-­
largest industry for foreign nationals in Qatar is wholesale and retail trade
(about 13.3%). On the other hand, most Qatari nationals hold jobs in the
public sector (nearly 80%) because of higher pay and better benefits.

Political Scenario
The political system in Qatar is a monarchy, the Al Thani family, which has
ruled Qatar since 1825. Under Qatari law, political bodies are not allowed
to be established. There are no civil society–related organizations for
human rights, nor any institutions for public affairs. Therefore, there is no
transparency on major public policy decisions.13 Qatar is a member of

10
 Economywatch. “Qatar Economy”. June 29, 2010. http://www.economywatch.com/
world_economy/qatar
11
 Gulfbase. “State of Qatar”. http://www.gulfbase.com/GCC/Index/6.
12
 Qatar National Bank (QNB). “Qatar Economic Insight”. September 2014. http://
www.qnb.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id
&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355505319193&ssbinary=true.
13
 Ali Khalifa al-Kuwari. “The People Want Reform… in Qatar, Too”. Jadaliyya.
December 10, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8880/the-people-want-
reform%E2%80%A6-in-qatar-too.
  QATAR: AN OVERVIEW    381

Table 26.2  Think tanks in Qatar

Number of universities: 2 universities, 10 campuses of foreign institutions


Number of think tanks: 7
% of think tanks out of regional total: 7/398, 1.7%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2012–2015):
 2012: 6
 2013: 10
 2014: 9
 2015: 7
Number of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2012): 0
Top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
Ranking of top 55 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) think tanks:
 Al Jazeera Centre for Studies: 5
 Arab Center for Policy and Research: 30
Number of think tanks in top 75 advocacy campaign think tanks: 22

OPEC and a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).


It is also a member of Arab League. Qatar has not accepted International
Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction.14
In the regional scenario, Qatar tries to pursue Saudi Arabia’s model by
expanding its influence. It supported the mission of GCC, to quell the
rebellion. Qatar also supported the trajectory of transition in Yemen, lead-
ing to a negotiated transition from Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. This was
also in line with the mission of GCC. Saudi Arabia still has prevailing polit-
ical power in the Arabian peninsula, and Qatar does not have the capacity
to play the leading role in the region.
Even though Doha has not been responsive to the democratic demands
of Qatari citizens and the demand for individual freedoms and human
rights, Qatar sided with pro-democracy forces during the Arab Spring. For
example, it supported the anti-Gaddafi and anti-Assad rebel forces for
Libya and Syria. Qatar used its military directly in Libya and indirectly in
Syria, providing financial support for the Syrian rebel fighters. The Arab
Spring allowed Qatar new opportunities to flex its political muscle and
develop good relationships with its neighbors (Table 26.2).

14
 Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook”. https://www.cia.gov/library/pub-
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.
CHAPTER 27

Research Centers and the Challenges


of Formulating State Security and Foreign
Policies in Emerging States: The Case
of Qatar

Jamal Abdullah

Introduction
Research centers and think tanks have assumed a prominent and increas-
ingly influential role in decision-making processes related to security and
foreign policy in various countries, and especially in the more advanced
states. Several emerging countries have also seen the need to establish
research centers to support decision-makers as they attempt to address the
considerable political, security, economic, social, and cultural challenges
they face, both internally and externally.
In this chapter, the role of research centers in the formulation of for-
eign and security policies in emerging countries is discussed. The case of
Qatar is investigated since it has an active foreign policy. A specific focus
will be dedicated to the role that certain research centers based in Qatar

Dr. Jamal Abdullah is a specialist in Gulf affairs and Qatari foreign policy.

J. Abdullah (*)
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJCS), Doha, Qatar

© The Author(s) 2019 383


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_27
384   J. ABDULLAH

play in assisting decision-makers as they draft state policies. According to


international rankings, these research institutions are among the most
active not only inside Qatar, but also in the Middle East and North Africa.
Qatar’s geographic location (sandwiched between two influential
regional powers, Iran to the north and Saudi Arabia to the south), com-
bined with its international economic importance (related to its huge
assets of oil and natural gas) and the changing geopolitics of the Middle
East and North Africa since the so-called Arab Spring, makes the country
an appropriate area of focus. All these factors have also helped to highlight
the role that research centers can play as part of the overall fiber of the
state, especially when it comes to drawing up and orienting foreign and
security policies.
In this chapter, a multifaceted methodology is employed to highlight
the interlocking nature of international relations. In order to describe
Qatar’s foreign policy and various Qatar-based research centers, it follows
a comparative approach to the literature on modern international rela-
tions. In this process various perspectives are used, from systems analysis
to inductive analysis and the geopolitical approach devised by French geo-
political theorist François Thual, summarized by the following questions:
who wants what, with who, how, and why?1 At the same time, a prospec-
tive approach will be followed to study the phenomenon under study and
to forecast its future development.
Based on that approach, the chapter is divided into two sections. In the
first, the main features of the modern Qatari state are highlighted. A spe-
cific focus is given to the milestones it has achieved since Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al Thani, now also known as the “Father Emir,” assumed his
responsibilities in June 1995. Since Sheikh Hamad came to power, Qatari
foreign policy has been characterized by neutrality, and the country has
played an active role as a mediator in several regional and international
issues. The beginnings of the Arab Spring revolts in late 2010 and early
2011 will then be traced. In these years, the course of Qatar’s foreign
policy changed from one of neutral mediation to one of influence and
power, through the roles assumed by Qatari diplomats at the regional,
Arab, and international levels. In an unprecedented development, not
only for Qatar but also for the entire Gulf region, Sheikh Hamad abdi-
cated on June 25, 2013, and handed power to his son, Sheikh Tamim bin

1
 François Thual, Méthode de la géopolitique: Apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité, Paris:
Ellipses, 1996.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    385

Hamad Al Thani, who had been the deputy emir and crown prince since
2003. Finally, the shifts that have been evident since Sheihk Tamim
assumed power are investigated.
In the second part of the chapter, the major tasks carried out by research
centers are considered. The geopolitical issues in the Arab world, particu-
larly in Qatar, are the object of study. The main challenges that face these
centers and hinder them from fulfilling their missions are taken into
account. Finally, some recommendations are proposed, which, in light of
the Qatari experience, might help to further enhance and activate the role
of similar research centers in the region.

Main Features of Qatar’s Foreign Policy, 1995–2014

Evolution of the Modern Democratic State of Qatar


On April 29, 2003, Qatari voters took part in a referendum and endorsed
a draft constitution put forward by the emir at the time, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al Thani. The referendum occurred in the context of signifi-
cant moves towards liberalization launched by the emir. After assuming
power in June 1995, he brought an end to media censorship and canceled
the information ministry. In November 1996, he launched Al Jazeera, the
satellite television network whose margin of freedom has rattled the media
landscape in the Middle East and changed political discourse throughout
the Arab world. In March 1999, the first municipal elections were con-
ducted in Qatar and women were allowed both to vote and to stand for
election, thus setting a new historical precedent. At the same time, this
kind of political openness began to be increasingly evident in the country’s
foreign policy.2

2
 Jamal Abdullah, ‘As-siyasa al-kharijiya al-qatariya: at-tahawwulat wal-aafaq’ [Qatar’s
Foreign Policy: Transformations and Prospects] Diplomat Magazine 10, June 2014.; Jamal
Abdullah, As-siyasa al-kharijiya li-dawlat Qatar, 1995–2013: rawafi’uha wa-strateejiyyatuha
[Qatar’s Foreign Policy, 1995–2013: Leverages and Strategies]. Beirut: Al Jazeera Center
for Studies and Arab Scientific Publishers. 2014; Jamal Abdullah and Nabil Al-Nasseri.
‘Siyasat qatar al-kharijiya: istimrariya am i’aadatu tawjeeh?’ [Qatar’s Foreign Policy:
Continuation or Re-orientation?], AJSC report, June 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/
reports/2014/06/201462411230518576.htm; Nabil Al-Nasseri, ‘Siyasat qatar al-khari-
jiya: qati’aa am istimrariya’ [Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Halt or Continuation], AJSC report,
July 2013. http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2013/07/201371195759610610.htm;
Nazem Abdul-Wahid Atheer, ‘Dawr as-siyasa al-kharijiya al-qatariya fi thil al-azmat al-ara-
386   J. ABDULLAH

Determinants of Foreign Policy in Modern Qatar


Qatari foreign policy is based on a set of values and determinants, the most
important of which are to achieve world peace and security, resolving con-
flict via peaceful means, supporting people’s right to self-determination,
non-interference in other countries’ affairs, and cooperation with peace-­
loving nations. An array of developments at the local, regional, and inter-
national levels has fundamentally changed the nature of state action
internally and externally. These developments include:

• Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing Kuwait


liberation war in January and February 1991.
• The change in Qatar’s political leadership and the rise to power of
Sheikh Hamad in 1995.
• The eruption of the so-called Arab Spring revolts in late 2010, and
the emergence of a new landscape of regional and international
interactions.
• Finally, the assumption of power by Sheikh Tamim after his father’s
abdication.

One way or another, each of these has dictated a shift in Qatar’s foreign
policy, especially in relation to “openness”—the underlying approach that
can be seen as the “secret of Qatar’s foreign policy success.”
As previously noted, the rise of Sheikh Hamad to power in June 1995
signaled the starting point of this openness. It has also gradually pushed
Qatar to the center of the world stage, as it constituted a drastic transfor-
mation in Qatari policy, especially in relation to foreign affairs. While
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, the sixth emir of Qatar who ruled
between 1972 and 1995, had maintained a conservative international rela-
tions policy, his son has carried out a set of internal reforms and estab-
lished a more active and pre-emptive approach to diplomacy.

Qatar’s Foreign Policy Strategies


Qatar’s foreign policy is based on a number of strategies, namely creating
alliances with super and medium powers, maintaining good ties with

biya wal-iqlimiya’ [The Role of Qatar’s Foreign Policy in Light of the Arab and Regional
Crisis], Journal of International Studies, 43: 137. 2010.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    387

neighboring countries and other nations active in the region, and enhanc-
ing the image of Qatar abroad.
Qatar’s strategy of building alliances stems from its policy of active
diplomacy, which is based on a realistic and pragmatic understanding of
the geopolitical challenges facing the Gulf region. After the openness pol-
icy was adopted in the mid-1990s, the first alliance to be built with the
official approval of Sheikh Hamad was with the United States. An invita-
tion extended to US forces to set up military bases on the Qatari peninsula
was a milestone in this alliance, and Al Udeid Air Base is now one of the
largest US Air Force bases outside American territory. As part of its alli-
ance with international superpowers, Qatar also concluded defense agree-
ments with France in August 1994 and in October 1998. No doubt, this
strategic alignment with the United States and other superpowers was
dictated by the need to protect national security.
At the level of good neighborliness, no fundamental changes occurred
after Sheikh Hamad took power. However, the country’s foreign policy
was perhaps more systematically implemented. Thus, while it is true that
the openness policy embraced by Sheikh Hamad is more evident in alli-
ances built with superpowers and medium-sized powers, the policy was
also characterized by a keenness to preserve and develop good ties with
neighboring Gulf countries. In the first decade of the new millennium,
Doha moved to settle border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
and to mend its fences with other neighbors.
Generally speaking, Qatar’s foreign policy had to respond to particular
geographic and political contexts. Accordingly, Qatar tried to secure itself
through ensuring regional balance, and by establishing bilateral and mul-
tilateral ties at the international level. Since the policy of “good neighbor-
liness” is a basic element of Qatar’s foreign policy, it seems unlikely to
change in the near future. Rather, it will remain a key foreign policy strat-
egy. The diplomatic crisis that shook Qatar’s relations with some of its
neighbors in March 2014, leading Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
and Bahrain to recall their ambassadors from Doha, appears to be merely
a passing cloud and is unlikely to taint the ties between Gulf states. The
Riyadh Document, signed by the six states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in April 2014, and under which all members committed
themselves to ending the crisis, was testimony to this neighborly position.3

3
 For more on this see, Jamal Abdullah, ‘Azmat sahb as-sufaraa min ad-Doha: Al-bawa’eth
wat-tada’iyaat’ [The Crisis of Withdrawing Ambassadors from Doha: Motives and
388   J. ABDULLAH

Besides, Qatar’s policy on the central cause of the Arab and Islamic nation,
the Palestinian issue, has remained constant and is supported by the good
ties Qatar maintains with all Palestinian parties.
Regarding its “image,” Qatar has adopted a “branding” strategy which
has, to a large extent, succeeded in changing perceptions of the country in
various arenas, including sport, the socio-political and economic fields, the
educational-cultural and media world, as well as in diplomatic circles.
Thanks to this strategy, Qatar has become a key player in the international
community within the space of just a few years.

Qatar’s Foreign Policy since the Arab Spring: From Mediation


and Neutrality to Influence and Power
The so-called Arab Spring revolts, combined with Qatar’s stand on them
from the start, created the right climate to launch a qualitatively new phase
in the general framework of Qatar’s foreign policy, as envisioned by the
state’s political leadership. It became apparent that Qatar’s position on the
Arab Spring revolts differed from that of the rest of the GCC countries.
This was true at the level of statements made by senior officials as well as
in political and diplomatic actions taken, and even in relation to humani-
tarian, logistical, and economic support.4
In general, it can be said that Qatar moved ahead with formulating a
new foreign policy, which can be termed one of “firm stands and commit-
ment” or of “influence and power.” Driven by the emerging political land-
scape, the policy arose out of the fracturing of the regional geopolitical
situation that occurred as a result of the Arab Spring revolts.

From Soft Power to Smart Power


As noted previously, Sheikh Tamim’s ascendance to power in 2013 sig-
naled a change in the management of the country’s diplomatic efforts as
the country’s leaders adapted to changes in the region, especially in Egypt

Consequences], AJSC report, March 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/repo


rts/2014/03/201432413826345572.htm.
4
 Jamal Abdullah, ‘Al-mawqif al Qatari min thawrat al- rabie al-arabi: as-siyasa al-kharijiya
al-qatariya min al-hiyad ila at-ta’theer’, [The Qatari Position on the Arab Spring Revolts:
Qatar’s Foreign Policy from Neutrality to Influence], in Badri Eid Mohammed and Jamal
Abdullah (eds) Alkhaleej fi siyaq istrateeji mutaghayyer [The Gulf in a changing strategic
context]. Beirut: Al Jazeera Center for Studies and Arab Scientific Publishers. 2014.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    389

and Syria. Qatar’s foreign policy shifted from the exercise of soft power to
that of smart power. A term often attributed to Joseph Nye (Assistant US
Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, who has written
several books on the topic), “smart power” refers to a combination of soft
power and hard power, while maintaining the principles and values of a
country’s foreign policy.5
Observers of Qatar’s diplomatic activities have noted that such activities
have become more deliberate than they were before June 2013, a change
that can be attributed to the new emir’s inclination to adopt a new foreign
policy, as stipulated in Article VII of Qatar’s Constitution, which came into
force in 2005.6 This relatively quiet activity does not constitute a retreat of
Qatari diplomacy, but rather a shift in the country’s model of diplomatic
action and an enhancement of the tools of soft diplomacy—including launch-
ing new satellite channels and investing strategically both internally and
externally. Some of these investments are concerned with building the
knowledge and educational capacity of the nation, and sponsoring high-
profile international events in various fields of culture, art, and sports. Such
activities will be key elements of the external activities of the state in the com-
ing years, especially as Qatar prepares to host various international sporting
and cultural events, including the FIFA World Cup in soccer in 2022.
Moreover, the deliberation that has characterized Qatar’s foreign activ-
ities since 2013 is paralleled by the state’s focus on its internal affairs. In
May 2014, for example, a draft bill was announced that, if passed, would
cancel the guardianship system implicit in Qatari labor law and replace it
with a system based on employment contracts. This bill puts into effect
the policy guidelines that Sheikh Tamim outlined in his first speech after
assuming power, in which he focused on plans for state reform and
development.

5
 Yahya Al-Yahyawi, ‘Obama wa-otrohat al-quowwa al-thakiya’ [Obama and the Notion of
“Smart Power”], Al Jazeera.net, November 18 2013, http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/
pages/a87a6bd8-1515-4106-8917-774fede68303; Mehdi Lazar, ‘Qatar 2008–2014: Du
soft au smart power’, Diploweb: La Revue Geopolitique, March 23 2014. http://www.
diploweb.com/Qatar-2008-2014-du-soft-au-smart.html.
6
 An English translation of The Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar is available
at www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/.../qatar_constitution.doc. Article VII
reads as follows: “The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening
international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international
disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere
in the domestic affairs of states; and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations.”
390   J. ABDULLAH

Thus it can be argued that these slight changes in Qatari policy reflect,
to a degree, the constant interplay between foreign and internal policies—
a phenomenon known in both the advanced and developing worlds. The
aim of these policy shifts is to entrench state rule and popularity in the
aftermath of the rise of a new leader to power; they do not denote a
declining interest in external affairs.

Effective Mechanisms of Qatar’s Foreign Policy


Qatari foreign policy employs a set of effective mechanisms as it endeavors
to translate its values and goals into realities on the ground. Such mecha-
nisms combine traditional and modern diplomatic tools that take acceler-
ating globalization and advancements in media and communications
technologies into consideration. In other words, contemporary Qatari
foreign policy has multiple engines and is therefore multifaceted. One of
these engines comprises national institutions such as the Qatar Foundation,
which play a significant role in the international arena and can be consid-
ered an aspect of “soft power.” However, the most important, effective,
and unconventional mechanism is the Al Jazeera Network. Since its estab-
lishment in November 1996, Al Jazeera has evolved into one of Qatar’s
most influential foreign policy tools.

Research Centers in Qatar

Research and Study Centers in the Arab World


Generally speaking, research centers and think tanks study society and the
state, seeking to identify reasons for the emergence of issues, and formu-
lating scenarios and recommendations to address these based on scientific
research. Research institutions have become increasingly prevalent inter-
nationally since the 1980s, and they have become a key indicator of coun-
tries’ progress and development, as well as a measure of interest in scientific
research and futuristic studies, which seems to accord with the cognitive
development of societies in general.
In fact, research institutions derive their importance and raison d’être
from the fact that they have become an indispensable part of debates and
policy formulation related to politics, economics, the media, academia,
and many other fields of social and scientific development. Internationally,
research centers play a significant role because they carry out vital research
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    391

that is of concern to the state, the individual, and society. They have
become a means through which all matters related to societal issues and
challenges may be scientifically examined and assessed. Such organizations
are therefore vital national institutions that should represent the interests
of both citizens and governments in relation to science, knowledge, cul-
tural advancement, and futuristic studies.
Research institutions also contribute directly and indirectly to formu-
lating general state policies, including on security and foreign relations.
They have therefore become an integral part of the political landscape in
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, among others. These centers have carved out a niche that has
made them influential in devising political, social, economic, and educa-
tional guidelines for their countries; they are seen as participants in the
search for solutions to societal problems. To achieve this, they harness
scientific research to address problems, and sketch out possible options
that support higher-level decision-making and policy formulation.7
In the Arab world, interest in research organizations began in the early
2000s. As the scope of their activities has expanded, so have their contri-
butions. The private sector took the initiative to establish specialized
research centers, making a qualitative change in a number of Arab coun-
tries. The phenomenon has since grown rapidly. While hosting an increas-
ing number of international conferences, symposiums, seminars, and
scientific publications, research centers have focused on various social,
economic, and political issues at local, regional, and international levels,
amid successive changes in the Middle East and the world at large.
Nevertheless, in several Arab countries research centers remain rela-
tively inactive. This is not because such organizations do not have the
capacity to play a role, but due to the obstacles they face. In some cases,
the nature of the Arab political model, and ruling regimes that shun
­institutional models applied in Western countries, means that research
centers are assigned no meaningful tasks.8

7
 Xavier Bertrand, “Le nouveau think tank” Observatoire des think tanks. http://oftt.eu/
think-tanks/generalites/article/le-nouveau-think-tank?lang=it; Marie-Anne Kraft, ‘Quel
rôle jouent les “think tanks” dans la vie politique?’ Blogpost at Mediapart, November 2009.
http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/marie-anne-kraft/111109/quel-role-jouent-les-think-
tanks-dans-la-vie-politique; Leptit, Pierre (n.d.). Le rôle des think tanks. http://www.notre-
europe.eu/media/noteple-thinktanks.pdf?pdf=ok.
8
 Khalid Walid Mahmoud, “Dawr marakiz al-abhath fil-watan al-arabi: al-waqi’ al-rahin wa
shorout al-intiqal ila fai’liya akbar [The Role of Research Centers in the Arab World: The
392   J. ABDULLAH

Roles and Tasks of Research Centres in Qatar


From 2000 to 2010, several research organizations were established in
Qatar. Some are shared by universities and government institutions, while
others are independent and specialize in various fields. All publish their
scientific and intellectual outputs. Although the number of such centers is
limited in Qatar, they are highly visible thanks to the conferences and
seminars they hold in fields such as economics, politics, social media strat-
egies, and so on. They are also renowned for their publications, including
books, research reports, and analytical papers.
The growing interest in research centers in Qatar is attributable to fac-
tors that have imposed themselves on modern life and society, foremost
among which are:

• The growing trend of specialization in modern society, due to bur-


geoning fields of science and knowledge, combined with the expan-
sion of education and growing competition in various fields.
• The increasing complexity of relationships between the political,
social, and economic components of society, and between societies
both regionally and internationally.
• Rapid advancements in information systems and technology, increas-
ing economic competition, and the key role of technology in politi-
cal hegemony (which cannot be achieved without sound scientific
study).

In this context, serious thinking about how to maximize the effective-


ness of research centers and their products has been necessary. It has been
important to develop mechanisms to ensure that decision-making institu-
tions derive optimal benefit from research centers, and that research cen-
ters, in turn, develop a more in-depth and accurate understanding of the
developments and challenges facing the state. This can be achieved when
research organizations attempt to understand the regional and interna-
tional environment, and contribute to public awareness of strategic trans-
formations witnessed in the region.
There is no doubt that the extent to which research institutions in
Qatar assist decision-makers, and contribute to the development of poli-

Status Quo and What They Require to Become More Effective],” Arab Center for Research
and Policy Studies, January 2013. http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/3c6dea13-7bd7-
4ea8-83af-f95b9cefb574.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    393

cies on state security and foreign relations, is an issue that needs in-depth
scientific study. It would also be interesting to compare Qatar-based
research centers with their peers in other countries in terms of the roles
they play in relation to policy formulation, informing and advising
decision-­makers, and contributing to the expansion of scientific research
and knowledge.
In general, the role played by Qatar-based research and study centers
can be summed up as follows:

• Publishing books, refereed journal articles, research, and analytical


papers concerned with issues of interest to Arab public opinion, and
to decision-makers in particular.
• Organizing research projects, workshops, seminars, and conferences
on various issues with local and international researchers and experts,
and then publishing the findings of research studies and providing
appropriate recommendations.
• Liaising with media outlets, especially Al Jazeera’s various channels
(in Arabic, English, Turkish, etc.), to encourage them to interview
visiting experts on issues and events, and to analyze matters in depth.
The opinions, arguments, and analyses of such experts help to inform
and lobby decision-makers, and may offer them a wider range of
options in relation to decisions they have to take.
• Conducting public opinion polls or surveys on issues of interest to
decision-makers.

The specific focus areas of research centers often vary according to the
interests of their funders or sponsoring institutions. Some focus, for exam-
ple, on women’s issues, political reform, governance, democracy, or
human rights. When compared to their European and US counterparts,
however, the roles played by Qatari research centers are still relatively lim-
ited when it comes to influencing decision-making and public policy.

Case Study: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies


The Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJSC) is one of the most prominent,
active, and distinguished research centers, not only in Qatar and the Gulf
region, but also in the Middle East and North Africa. The decision to
establish AJSC was made in 2006. Its aim was to act as the dedicated
research and academic arm of the Al Jazeera Network, giving AJSC special
394   J. ABDULLAH

importance, as it is very rare to find a media institution in the Arab world


with its own research center.
AJSC is concerned with deepening and embedding scientific research in
knowledge disseminated through the media, using various technologies as
a means of enriching the intellectual and cultural landscape, and enhanc-
ing strategic thinking in the Arab world. Within a few years of its incep-
tion, AJSC was ranked sixth among research centers in the Middle East
and North African region by the US-based Think Tanks and Civil Societies
Program at the University of Pennsylvania. AJSC has thus surpassed many
institutions that were established years, and even decades, before it.
Among the features that distinguish AJSC from its peers in Doha and
in the wider Arab world, and ensure that it remains at the cutting edge of
the research world, are the following:

• The adoption of strict scientific standards when it conducts studies


to diagnose and analyze political, social, economic, cultural, and
security phenomena or issues addressed by other media.
• The ability to connect and balance the requirements of scientific
study with the issues, problems, and facts on the ground.
• Including futuristic outlooks and likely consequences of events and
issues researched.
• Ensuring the availability of a pool of prominent experts and research-
ers; AJSC attracts highly qualified researchers who enrich its prod-
ucts, and ensure that decision-makers have a range of realistic options
to consider.
• Applying the values of independence and freedom when selecting
and analyzing issues of interest.
• Adhering to the principle of academic specialization and ensuring
diversity in the backgrounds of experts and researchers who conduct
research and contribute to the intellectual output.
• Being able to keep up with the latest local, regional, and global
developments.
• Publishing a large amount of diverse material timed for release
throughout the year.
• Facilitating teamwork among all staff members and freelancers.
• Allowing enough time for each publication and activity carried out
by the center, thus ensuring efficiency, effectiveness, and accuracy,
and that quantity does not come before quality and the necessary
scientific standards.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    395

Despite its young age, AJSC has become a destination for Arab and
foreign researchers that aspire to contribute to its publications and intel-
lectual products, and who cite the center as a credible scientific authority
when analyzing Arab, regional, and international phenomena and affairs.
It is therefore hoped that AJSC will continue with its pioneering role as a
respectable research institution that provides decision-makers with scien-
tifically based research and recommendations that contribute to decision-­
making processes at various levels in the state of Qatar.

Challenges Facing Research Centers in the Arab World


Generally speaking, research centers are mushrooming in the Arab world,
although they are relatively young and need support to overcome the
obstacles they face. Researchers examining such centers may conclude that
they are “weak,” both in terms of their research products and the roles
they are supposed to play, especially when compared to their counterparts
in the United States or the European Union. Such weaknesses are attrib-
utable to numerous loopholes in the performance of these centers and to
the formidable impediments and challenges facing them. That is, the
effectiveness of research centers is hampered by the absence of state-­
funded research institutions, limited funding in general, the lack of a clear
identity, and weak links with policy- and decision-makers. Moreover, some
centers play roles that contradict the nature of their work on the ground.
In other words, there is confusion in some Arab countries, including
Qatar, between researchers and consultants, and the lack of a legal frame-
work to regulate the sector does not help.
Despite the importance of scientific research in decision-making pro-
cesses and in working out solutions to the key issues in Western countries,
this does not seem to apply to the same extent in Arab countries. One
factor is that no solid ties exist between decision-makers and research cen-
ters. There are several reasons for this, including the failure of the majority
of research centers to prepare sound scientific papers for decision-makers,
and the fact that some Arab governments tend to be suspicious of research
centers. Moreover, some decision-makers find the papers prepared by
Western centers more reliable, and prefer to contract international research
centers to conduct studies on local affairs, instead of assigning this work to
local researchers.
396   J. ABDULLAH

The main challenges facing research centers, and restricting their activi-
ties in emerging countries generally (and in the Arab world in particular),
are summed up as follows:

1. Financing is the key challenge facing private research institutions.


The lack of independent financing adversely affects the work and
sustainability of these centers. Without funding, institutions cannot
pay staff, much less equip themselves adequately in terms of furni-
ture, appliances, communications equipment, and libraries; the
organizing of conferences and workshops, as well as the publication
and distribution of books and journals, becomes impossible. Thus
the key tools of scientific research are out of reach, and without suf-
ficient resources research centers cannot set research agendas or
recruit researchers of the necessary caliber.
2. Lack of objectivity and independence is another challenge. Undoubtedly,
the value of research papers and studies conducted by research institu-
tions lies in their objectivity, independence, and professionalism. Yet,
this cannot be achieved unless research centers are granted a wide
margin of freedom when setting their priorities and research agendas.
This can only be achieved through unconditional financing that
does  not affect research priorities, methodologies, or results and
recommendations.
3. Weak data and a lack of accessible, reliable, and up-to-date databases
lie at the core of weaknesses in the research process.
4. Environments that discourage innovation and creativity are rife.
Systems that would attract well-qualified and highly experienced
staff to join research centers are absent, and incentives offered to
researchers to conduct creative work are small. Opportunities for
further training courses are few, and research centers in the Arab
world seldom have the capacity to publish and/or disseminate
books, periodicals, or reports.
5. Politicization and ideological bias are evident in some research cen-
ters. While nothing can prevent research centers from having their
own ideological and political preferences or priorities, these become
­problematic when they compromise the objectivity of research or
lead centers to collect data selectively in order to serve a pre-estab-
lished point of view.
6. Lack of standard measures and data to evaluate research institutions
makes it impossible to effectively compare and evaluate their profes-
sional performance.
  RESEARCH CENTERS AND THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING STATE…    397

Ways to Support and Activate Research Centers in the Arab World


In light of the above, it seems clear that many research centers would ben-
efit from revisiting their administrative and organizational structures and
refocusing their roles in relation to the development and analysis of policy,
as well as addressing key issues in society. It is crucial that centers keep up
with the rapid changes in their fields of interest. It is therefore recom-
mended that they identify the problems and issues that affect them the
most, and draft clear strategies to address these. Such strategies could
include the following:

• Securing the necessary financing through grants from the state trea-
sury. The task of delegating funds could be vested in state planning
ministries. Alternatively, an independent body could be established
to oversee research centers and to serve as the authority in charge of
securing moral and financial support for scientific research centers
from both the private and public sectors, and for coordinating
research their fields of interest and specialization.
• Committing themselves to “scientific principles and objectivity.”
This would help to build the trustworthiness of research centers in
the eyes of both the public sector and ordinary citizens. In this con-
text, states would see the value of drawing on the expertise of
research centers when undertaking strategic planning and attempt-
ing to address the various problems of society, as is the case in
advanced countries.
• Enhancing coordination between research centers in ways that
improve the quality of their outputs and allow them to attain the
status they deserve. A mainstream culture needs to be created that
believes that no decision or policy should be made until all related
issues have been thoroughly researched, analyzed, and assessed, and
alternatives considered. An annual exchange of planned research
activities could help to create real integration between research
­centers, allowing each center to support others in its own field of
specialization.
• Securing a wider margin of freedom and independence, as well as
access to information, and to the scientific and intellectual products
of other research institutions.
• Recruiting the most highly qualified and experienced researchers,
and then supporting them to further develop their skills.
398   J. ABDULLAH

• Building genuine partnerships between research centers and various


media outlets, so that research centers can make their research activi-
ties and findings known to the wider public.
• Opening up communication between research institutions and gov-
ernment agencies, so that the needs of decision-makers within state
structures can be accurately identified and appropriately responded
to.
• Seeking to specialize in order to excel and compete effectively.

Conclusion
Despite the increasing number and diffusion of research centers in the
Arab world since the early 2000s, few have earned the status they deserve
due to the many factors outlined in this chapter. It is high time that these
research centers assumed a more pioneering role in serving the societies in
which they are located. In order to work to the benefit of society and the
state, many will need to consider adopting the necessary options outlined
in this chapter to address the obstacles they face that prevent them from
playing an optimum role.
In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge that I have not been able to
fully address all aspects of the situation facing research centers in emerging
countries—such a study would require more time as well as a variety of
resources and documents that are not easily accessible.
CHAPTER 28

Turkey: An Overview

James G. McGann

Situated in the Middle East, Turkey has taken off both economically and
politically since a decade ago (Table 28.1). Though the think tank indus-
try is relatively new and is limited to centralized bureaucracy, an increase
in the number of civil organizations has led to more involvement in policy
areas. The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
(SETA), a foreign policy think tank in Turkey, works on a variety of issues,
including Turkey–European Union relations, the Kurdish issue, and inter-
action with neighbors, so that Turkey’s foreign policy can be implemented
more strategically. It is also aimed at diversifying research in foreign policy
and informing the public. The challenges facing think tanks in Turkey
include political polarization and human resources management.

Overview
Turkey is a transcontinental country and is located in southeastern Europe
and southwestern Asia, bordering the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the
Mediterranean Sea.1 It shares borders with eight countries: Armenia,

1
 “Turkey.” The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tu.html.

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 399


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_28
400   J. G. MCGANN

Table 28.1  Turkey at a glance

Country name Republic of Turkey


Capital Ankara
Population 79,414,269 (July 2015 est.)
Location Southeastern Europe and western Asia; bordering the Black Sea,
(continent) between Bulgaria and Georgia, and the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas,
between Greece and Syria.
Ethnic groups Turkish 70–75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7–12%.
Language Turkish (official), Kurdish, other minority languages
Currency Turkish lira (TRY), 1 TRY: 0.36 US dollars (2015 est.)
(name and
exchange rate)
Government information (leaders, parties)
Government Republican parliamentary democracy
type
Chief of state President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Head of Council of Ministers appointed by the president upon the nomination
government of the prime minister
Cabinet Council of Ministers appointed by the President on the nomination of
the Prime Minister.
Elections President elected directly for a five-year term (eligible for a second
term); Prime Minister appointed by the President from among
Members of Parliament
Legislative Unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey (550 seats; members
branch directly elected in multiseat constituencies by proportional
representation vote to serve four-year terms).
Judicial branch Constitutional Court (consists of 17 members); Supreme Court of
Appeals (about 390 judges, organized into 15 divisions with 23 civil
and 15 criminal chambers); Council of State (15 divisions, 14 judicial
and 1 consultative)
Political parties Anatolia Party, AnaParti; Center Party; Democratic Left Party, DSP;
Democratic Party, DP; Democratic Regions Party, DBP; Electronic
Democracy Party, e-Parti; Felicity Party, SP; Freedom and Solidarity
Party, ODP; Grand Unity Party, BBP; Independent Turkey Party, BTP;
Justice and Development Party, AKP; Nation and Justice Party,
MILAD; Nationalist Movement Party, MHP; People’s Democratic
Party, HDP; Republican People’s Party, CHP

Some economic facts


GDP: US $1.576 trillion (2015 est.)
GDP per capita: US $19,900 (2015 est.)
GDP composition: agriculture 8.1%, industry 27.7%, services 64.2%
  TURKEY: AN OVERVIEW    401

Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.2 Modern


Turkey was founded in 1923. Its official language is Turkish, but Kurdish
is common as well; 99.8% of the Turkish population is Muslim, and only
0.2% of Turkish are Christians or Jews.3
Turkey is one of the largest partners among the middle-income
­countries in the World Bank group. In a less than a decade, per capita
income in the country has tripled and now exceeds US $10,000. The
European Union (EU) is Turkey’s largest economic partner. In addition,
the country is becoming an increasingly important donor to bilateral
Official Development Assistance (ODA).4
In 2005, Turkey had an immigrant population of 1.328 million. The
country has traditionally been a destination for many displaced Muslim
people, and for economic reasons migrants from Armenia, Pakistan,
Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran largely relocate to Turkey.5

Economic Situation
Turkey has the seventeenth-largest GDP in the world and is one of the
founding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Also, it is a Group of 20 (G20) major economy.
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), established in 1930,
has as its main objective to achieve price and financial stability in the coun-
try. CBRT also determines the exchange rate jointly with the Turkish gov-
ernment and is responsible for managing the gold and foreign exchange
reserves.6
According to observers, Turkey appears to be stuck in the “middle-­
income trap.” The instability in its neighborhood has affected its export
markets and capital inflows in a negative way. For example, exports to Iran
decreased by 61% between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, Turkey’s exports to
Russia and Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 dropped by 15 and 21%,
respectively. Therefore, many economists suggest that Turkey needs to

2
 “Turkey: A Country Overview.” Angloinfo. http://turkey.angloinfo.com/moving/
country-file/country-overview/.
3
 “Turkey.” The World Factbook.
4
 “Turkey.” The World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/
overview.
5
 “Turkey: A Country Overview,” Angloinfo.
6
 “Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Head Office.” http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/
wcm/connect/tcmb+en/tcmb+en/bottom+menu/about+the+bank.
402   J. G. MCGANN

develop and enhance its economic relations with traditional transatlantic


community partners to overcome the structural problems.7
The customs union (CU) between Turkey and the EU was implemented
in 1995. It liberated tariff rates extensively. Also, it formed one of the most
important components of Turkey’s foreign trade policy. The CU with
Turkey was remarkable, since it was the EU’s first substantial CU with a
non-member state and was one of the earliest instances of sharing its legal
system with another country.8 By participating in a CU with the EU,
Turkey accepted the EU’s common external tariff (CET) for industrial
products and industrial components of agricultural products. Under the
CU, both the EU and Turkey agreed to remove all customs duties, quan-
titative restrictions, and charges, with an equivalent effect on their trade.9
Turkey’s investments in infrastructure played an important role in its
growing economy because good logistics are essential for an effective
global value chain. Turkey’s logistical performance is comparable with
many high-income countries, since its public and private sectors have
invested substantially in roads, airports, seaports, and customs facilities.
Therefore, Turkey is ranked thirty-first in the world, which is ahead of its
competitors such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Romania, and
Brazil.10

Political Scenario
Turkey is located in one of the most important intersections of different
foreign policy dynamics. It is situated on the Afro-Eurasian chessboard,
where such challenges and risks interact in the most intensive way. In par-
allel, Turkey’s negotiation process for accession to the EU is still
pending.11
7
 Kirisci, Kemal “Getting Out of the ‘Middle-Income Trap,” Hurriyet Daily News. February 18,
2015.http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/18-getting-out-middle-income-
trap-turkey-kirisci.
8
 World Bank “Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union”. March 28, 2014. http://
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/turkey/tr-eu-customs-
union-eng.pdf.
9
 Ibid.
10
 Martin Raiser “European Economic Integration Is the Key to Turkey’s Past and Future”.
March 11, 2015 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/03/
11-europe-turkey-raiser.
11
 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa.
  TURKEY: AN OVERVIEW    403

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President in August


2014. He needs to reset Turkish foreign policy for the beginning of a new
chapter in Turkey’s history. The ruling Justice and Development Party has
built an ambitious foreign policy, called “Zero Problems with Neighbors,”
targeting every country in the Middle East. Turkey is trying to improve its
relations with these countries by acting as a mediator. In addition, Turkey
is considered a model within the Islamic world due to the balance between
an Islamic cultural background, a strong economy, and an ambitious for-
eign policy.12
Turkey’s relations with its Arab neighbors blossomed until 2010. It
expanded its economic ties with these countries in terms of trade and
foreign direct investment, as well as increasing social interactions in terms
of tourism and the export of Turkish soap operas. During the socio-polit-
ical transformation in the Middle East—the so-called Arab Spring—
Turkey had the opportunity to act as a regional player, given its posture

Table 28.2  Think tanks in Turkey

Number of universities: 175


Number of think tanks: 32
% of think tanks out of regional total: 32/398, 8%
Chronological change in number of think tanks (2011–2014):
  2011: 27
  2012: 27
  2013: 27
  2014: 31
  2015: 32
Ranking of think tanks listed in top 150 worldwide (US included; 2015):
  Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (74)
  Association for Liberal Thinking (88)
Number of top think tanks in security, economics, and policy:
  Top 85 defense and national security think tanks: 2
  Top 80 domestic economic think tanks: 1
  Best managed think tanks: 1
  Best think tank conference: 1
  Think tanks to watch: 2
Case study
  Top think tank:   Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

12
 Bayram Balci “A New Turkish Foreign Policy?”. August 27, 2014. http://www.world-
policy.org/blog/2014/08/27/new-turkish-foreign-policy.
404   J. G. MCGANN

as a democratic and secular country with a predominantly Muslim society.


However, its own democratic consolidation problems showed the limits
of its foreign policy in the region. The domestic situation represents a
vulnerability in Ankara’s foreign policy agenda.13
From a geopolitical point of view, one of the biggest transnational dis-
putes Turkey is facing is the Aegean dispute between Athens and Ankara.
This has had a large effect on Greek–Turkish relations since the 1970s.
The issues in the Aegean fall into several categories: the demilitarized sta-
tus of the eastern Aegean islands; the delimitation of the territorial sea
areas and continental shelf; sovereignty over certain islands, islets, and
rocks; the extent of Greek air space and air traffic services; and command
and control within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This
dispute remains unresolved in the International Court of Justice. Both
parties, Turkey and Greece, have tried to establish durable solutions to the
dispute, since their fundamental interests lie in peace and cooperation
(Table 28.2).14

13
 Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times,” January 25, 2015,
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/25/turkish-foreign-policy-in-turbulent-times/.
14
 Yuksel Inan-Yucel Acer, “The Agean Disputes” http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/docu-
ments/251202.pdf.
CHAPTER 29

Shaping Foreign Policy Debates in Turkey:


The SETA Foundation for Political,
Economic, and Social Studies

Kadir Ustun and Kilic Kanat

Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the think tank environment in Turkey
and explains the kinds of instances in which think tanks such as the
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) can have
an impact on policy decisions and public opinion.
Since think tanks are a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey, many of
the issues they deal with are parallel to the weaknesses and strengths of the
country’s policy-making community in general. As Turkey has virtually
taken off economically and politically over the past decade, the country’s
foreign policy has also broadened its scope and intensity within the broader

Dr. Kadir Ustun is Research Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington


DC.
Dr. Kilic B. Kanat is Non-Resident Research Fellow at the SETA Foundation at
Washington DC.

K. Ustun (*) • K. Kanat


SETA Foundation, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 405


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_29
406   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

policy debates and started to be intertwined with domestic policy as well.


As part of the momentous changes taking place in all areas of life in Turkey,
foreign policy research has changed dramatically as well. No longer con-
fined to the traditional posture of the country’s foreign policy, institutions
such as SETA seek to help guide and impact foreign policy decisions and
public opinion.

Think Tank Environment in Turkey


The think tank industry in Turkey is a relatively new one, with most of the
policy research institutions having flourished over the past decade. The
development of think tanks in the country should be considered within
the context of the growth of non-governmental institutions (NGOs).
Traditionally, the impact of NGOs on government policy remained weak
in Turkey prior to the 2000s, for a variety of reasons. One of the most
important is the highly centralized bureaucratic structure of Turkish state
institutions and their minimal interaction with civil society organizations
in general. The military, which was extremely influential in Turkish foreign
and security policy during this period, was also unwilling for civilians to
have the initiative in these fields. For a long time, civil society organiza-
tions served as the voice of political dissent and societal discontent. The
bureaucratic institutions were not necessarily open to civil society input,
nor were the NGOs interested in providing input for government policy.
As such, civil society initiatives and government policy remained in clearly
delineated spheres. Foreign and security policy in the country was consid-
ered the realm of the state establishment, which was composed of military
and foreign policy bureaucracy. More significantly, they had determined
the main agenda for foreign and security policy and threat perception for
the nation. The issues of Cyprus, Armenia, and the territorial waters of the
Aegean Sea and the Kurdish problem are considered as the most signifi-
cant foreign policy problems of the Turkish state.
Another problem was the highly ideological outlook of civil society
organizations, with little interest in reaching out to other organizations on
the opposite side of the spectrum. The state’s security-oriented posture in
the 1990s created an environment that was not conducive to the emer-
gence of strong civil society initiatives. Interactions between the state and
NGOs remained tense and adversarial at times, with a high level of suspi-
cion about each other on both sides. Most of the initiatives by civil society
groups and platforms in regard to “traditional” Turkish foreign policy
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    407

issues were not taken into account by the state establishment. These issue
areas are considered too critical to allow civilians to engage in them. In the
early 2000s, there was a strong demand from society for further democra-
tization of the country at all levels. This environment welcomed the start
of the European Union (EU) membership negotiation process, which led
to the explosion of civil society organizations, thanks partly to the inflow
of EU funds for a diverse set of civil society projects. Estimates show that
the number of NGOs in Turkey has quadrupled since the early 2000s.
An increase in the number of civil society organizations led to the enlarge-
ment of civilian initiatives in all policy areas. Think tanks benefited from
these developments, and several of them focused on specific policy areas
emerged. The state institutions were subjected to a reform process demanded
by the EU and they became much more open to outside opinion and analy-
ses. During this period, different civil initiatives were established that aimed
to influence the country’s foreign policy. Groups of scholars formed their
own campaigns and platforms in order to promote their views. They were
less institutional and more informal gatherings of experts in the field. In
particular, these different groups emerged during the EU integration pro-
cess. Especially during the EU’s negotiations with Turkey, civil society plat-
forms tried to intervene in the process and expedite political reform in
Turkey. To be sure, the Turkish bureaucratic institutions remain highly cen-
tralized and somewhat close to outside influences, but in comparison to the
rigidity of separation between the state and society in the 1980s and 1990s,
in the 2000s there was a much higher level of interaction and give-and-take
between civil society organizations and state institutions.
As the Turkish economy has been successful in continued growth over
the past decade, the Turkish private sector—with the help of legal changes
favorable to private donations to civil society organizations—has grown to
be much more supportive of NGOs in general. As a result of the EU nego-
tiation process, unprecedented levels of funding became available to uni-
versities and civil society projects. Much of this funding created a high
degree of focus on “EU studies” in Turkish universities and EU-oriented
policy studies. The Turkish public became much more informed about
EU-related policy issues, but think tanks focused on other policy areas
remained in the minority. The main focus of the newly emerging think
tanks during this period was EU-–Turkey relations. Both Euro-skeptics
and pro-EU circles formed small think tanks and institutes in order to sup-
port their positions in regard to Turkey’s European integration process.
Despite the fact that there was arguably an overemphasis on the ­institutional
408   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

study of the EU, many undergraduate and graduate students were able to
travel to the EU at much higher rates than in previous decades. This led to
a much more realistic assessment of what the EU was about and what
Turkey’s expectations from becoming a member should have been. The
debate over the EU following the emergence of these think tanks and
studies has also become more sophisticated, based on accurate informa-
tion and influenced by Euro-skeptic and integrationist positions within
the EU.
Complex policy concerns, such as the Kurdish issue, were always diffi-
cult to discuss in Turkey. The main locus of such discussions were their
security dimension, and thus most of the experts and go-to people in these
fields were former generals or mayors. The development of NGOs in the
2000s contributed to a much freer environment for debate and exchange
of ideas on this issue. Some public opinion polls (an important one was
published by SETA) challenged some of the conventional wisdom in this
regard. For instance, the support for independence among the Kurdish-­
speaking public was actually much lower than it was thought to be.
Similarly, workshops and conferences on matters such as the Alevi and
Armenian issues allowed for public recognition of previously unacknowl-
edged ethnic and sectarian problems lying beneath the surface. Of course,
the political reform packages that were adopted during the first years of
the AK Party government, in order to launch accession negotiations with
the EU, greatly helped the emergence of these platforms. Intellectuals,
journalists, and academics for the first time started to discuss these issues
in workshops without any fear of possible persecution. Although during
these years the think tank industry in Turkey was far from being estab-
lished and mature, it had helped in strengthening public awareness and
recognition of policy issues. A new generation of civilian experts emerged
in areas that were deemed as being within the monopoly of the state and
its bureaucracy.
Turkish foreign policy has long been considered part of the national
security outlook, but it was rarely part of the public debate. It remained
within the purview of the ruling civilian and military bureaucratic institu-
tions. As a major NATO partner, Turkey aligned its policies with the West
during the Cold War and there was not much room or the need for it to
develop a cohesive foreign policy of its own. In the post–Cold War era,
Turkish ruling elites saw “opportunities” in the crumbling of the Soviet
empire and made some overtures to Central Asia in the hopes of extend-
ing Turkish influence in the region. This was not a very successful strategy,
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    409

largely because Turkey lacked the capacity to be a major player there.


Perhaps equally important was the lack of a cohesive vision of foreign
policy among Turkish policy-makers within the state apparatus. While
Turkey was responsive to humanitarian tragedies, such as the one in Bosnia
in the 1990s, it remained focused on its immediate security problems on
its southern border and designed its foreign policy based on these security
considerations. Accordingly, during this period a very limited number of
institutions aimed to play the role of traditional think tanks and served to
explain government policies rather than analyze issues and provide recom-
mendations. Instead of trying to shape and impact the government’s pol-
icy in critical domestic and foreign policy realms, the opinions and
arguments of think tanks in Turkey were influenced by the country’s offi-
cial positions. The researchers in think tanks were extremely cautious not
to contradict or challenge the government’s position in these areas.

SETA as a Foreign Policy Think Tank


Ever since the Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow US troops into its ter-
ritory in 2003, Turkish foreign policy has redefined itself in many ways.
No longer simply aligning itself with the Western alliance or being bogged
down in narrow security concerns, Turkey set out to engage all its neigh-
bors in a positive fashion. SETA was founded within this policy context as
a foreign policy think tank, and it has broadly supported Turkey’s new
proactive foreign policy. As an aspiring regional power, Turkey became
involved in regional affairs in the Middle East in a sustained manner, with
a clear vision for regional integration and engagement. SETA sought to
contribute to this new vision through policy research and publications. It
also wanted to challenge the dominant EU-centered paradigm in Turkish
foreign policy. Furthermore, there was space for debate on Middle East–
related issues, as much emphasis was placed on the EU membership pro-
cess and EU adaptation-related issues. SETA became one of the think
tanks that helped diversified the foreign policy agenda in Turkey.
Since the Middle East has been a traditionally neglected area in terms
of academic research (and to some extent in terms of policy debate), one
of the main challenges has been to build human capacity. Policy-oriented
academic research was not always readily available—in many cases it was
simply absent—and current affairs debates took place in newspaper col-
umns, with limited space and outreach to the general public. With the
emergence of foreign policy-oriented think tanks, in-depth reports and
410   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

publications allowed for deepening and diversification of the foreign pol-


icy conversation in Turkey. In the last ten years, a new group of area
experts has emerged in the country in the previously neglected area of
traditional Turkish foreign policy. As the governmental and economic
interactions with these regions started to grow, these experts had a better
chance of traveling to such areas and conducting more policy-oriented
research. Think tanks provided a forum for them and the availability of job
opportunities for policy-oriented researchers increased the demand among
young scholars.
In addition to the diversification of fields in foreign policy, think tanks
in Turkey, and particularly SETA, have played an important role in inform-
ing the public with regard to foreign policy issues and problems. For
Turkish foreign policy-making in general, public opinion has taken a much
more central role over the past decade. Turkish bureaucracy has tradition-
ally been somewhat closed to the input of the general public and this
tendency manifested itself in the Foreign Ministry as well. Long consid-
ered an elite business, foreign policy mattered to the institutions that had
the central role in determining national security and foreign policy. As
such, the Turkish public was deeply concerned about the security issues in
the country’s immediate neighborhood, but the role of the civilian gov-
ernments in designing a foreign policy outlook has been limited until
recently. With the opening of political system in Turkey and the emer-
gence of a newly attentive public, the role of public opinion over foreign
policy has changed dramatically. Civilian governments have had to take
public opinion much more into consideration, especially given the chang-
ing international context in an increasingly globalized world.
As the sources for information diversified, the public came to be
informed through different sources and this had a bearing on how public
opinion affected foreign policy. An important example of this was in 2003,
when public opinion was strongly against the invasion of Iraq by the
United States, whereas the traditional posture of the Turkish security
establishment would be expected to help the Americans despite public
opinion. Under strong pressure from the public, the Turkish national
Parliament voted against allowing US forces through Turkish territory.
This was also a moment when the civilian government assumed the lead in
determining the outcome of a national security issue that many would
have expected to be determined by the foreign policy establishment. Ever
since 2003, Turkish public opinion has been much more central to foreign
policy-making in the country. In this vein, the role of the think tanks,
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    411

including SETA, has continued to increase, as experts and researchers have


been invited onto talk shows and news programs focused on Turkish for-
eign policy to an unprecedented degree.
The demand for expertise and knowledge about current affairs has con-
tinued to increase with changes in Turkish foreign policy. Increasing inter-
action of Turkey with neighbors in the Middle East, including Syria and
Iraq, exposed a very serious weakness of the country’s foreign policy.
Despite its geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and mutual security con-
cerns, Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy had little information in regard
to these countries and the politics of the Middle East. As the political rela-
tions between Turkey and neighboring countries improved, the demand
for knowledge among the public also increased. Especially in relation to
some serious disputes among the Middle Eastern countries, for the first
time there was a genuine effort within different segments of the Turkish
public and intellectual world to understand and discuss the causes of these
conflicts and their impact on Turkey. Moreover, with the involvement of
Turkey in the conflict-resolution processes in this region, a new debate
emerged with regard to the possible resolution of conflicts. SETA was one
of the first think tanks during this period that tried to fill the information
gap by publishing timely and concise analysis of the conflicts in the region.
The workshops that were organized at this time not only focused on
Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, but also tried to respond to questions
about the region as a whole. The interactions between Turkish experts and
their Middle Eastern counterparts also started through these workshops.
For the first time there was a meaningful conversation and dialogue among
Turkish and Middle Eastern experts about the region and its future.
With the onset of the Arab Spring, both the extent of Turkish foreign
policy and the role that think tanks played in this period increased dra-
matically. First of all, the start of the Arab Spring and its diffusion to other
countries brought many foreign policy and security issues very close to
home. The Turkish economy has been deeply intertwined with its neigh-
bors in the past decade and the Turkish public have become connected to
their neighborhood, including the Middle East. What happened in Libya,
Egypt, or Syria truly mattered to the entrepreneurs and businesspeople as
well as the public in Turkey, who had developed close relations with the
people of the region. This brought about some not-so-traditional expecta-
tions of the think tank industry as well. Partly owing to the fact that think
tanks are a relatively new and underdeveloped phenomenon in Turkey,
various business groups or segments of the general public expected think
412   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

tanks to provide answers for questions that were not necessarily within the
scope of their areas of research or interest. For example, whenever there
arose a foreign policy issue, media organizations and news shows turned
to think tanks without necessarily worrying about the particular issues on
which these think tanks worked. Even if a think tank did not have a spe-
cialist on, say, Iran, the expectation was there for the think tank to respond.
This perception of think tanks at times led to overstretching of resources
and a push by the media on think tanks towards focusing on more day-to-­
day developments, rather than long-term concerns and projects. To a large
extent, think tanks have to worry about both short-term and long-term
issues, but it is safe to say that there has been more of a focus on the short
term in Turkey because of the fast pace of developments in recent years
and the demand by the general public for quick and easy expertise.
Similarly, sometimes various segments of the business community expected
think tanks to provide business risk analysis, which was outside their exper-
tise and focus. Moreover, the domestic political developments in Turkey
have also made it more difficult for think tanks and experts on foreign
policy to meet rising expectations, as the public expected responses to
their questions on domestic politics, too. This has also distracted the
attention of foreign policy think tanks from their expertise towards domes-
tic politics. Both of these developments have raised issues in regard to the
need for the institutionalization of the think tank industry.

Political Polarization Hampers Foreign


Policy Debate
Political developments in Turkey over the course of 2013 hampered, at least
to some extent, healthy foreign policy debate. In the context of an election
year, Turkey experienced two major political crises with the Gezi Park pro-
tests and the politically motivated December 2013 graft probe. These devel-
opments created an ever more polarized political environment, where
politicians, as well as think tanks, focused on domestic issues more than
foreign policy issues. Syria continued to be very important given the heavy
burden of the refugee crisis and the humanitarian aspects of the war.
However, the domestic polarization dominated the debate and the govern-
ment and the opposition took diametrically opposed views on just about any
foreign policy issue. This tension made the foreign policy debate typically
toxic and there did not appear to be much room for informed analysis.
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    413

When think tank experts spoke about foreign policy issues, they were
often judged by their stance on domestic issues. As the foreign policy
issues were treated within a framework of failures and successes only, the
opposition rushed to present the virtually failed states in Syria or Iraq as
the natural consequence of the ruling party’s policies towards the region.
The political polarization hampered specialists’ and academics’ efforts to
arrive at a deeper understanding of the regional developments and their
impact on Turkey. As any fallout or political problem emanating from the
Arab Spring was considered a failure of the ruling party in Turkey, under-
taking a healthy debate became increasingly difficult. The general percep-
tion that SETA is close to the current government in Turkey made it
difficult to provide objective analysis, as most analyses produced by the
organization were perceived to be endorsing the government’s policy in
one way or another.

Example of Partial Success in Influencing


Foreign Policy
The intense focus on the Arab Spring over the past several years has
brought much scrutiny to foreign policy as well. With monumental
regional changes taking place at a dizzying pace, Turkey was at the fore-
front of developments and tried to adjust to the rapid transformations in
its relations with Arab Spring countries. Foreign policy think tanks had to
not only keep up with developments. but also advise the government on
how to balance its interests with democratic ideals. Turkey took a princi-
pled stance in most cases while trying not to damage its economic and
strategic interests. SETA, during this period, organized several different
workshops in Arab Spring countries. During these workshops, there were
debates regarding democratization and civil and political rights in the
transitioning Middle East. Turkish experts who were affiliated with SETA
and other think tanks had a chance to interact and engage with scholars
and intellectuals from the region. Following these workshops, SETA pro-
vided a more realistic picture of the Middle East for observers of Middle
Eastern politics. In the meantime, through foreign policy workshops
within Turkey, it was trying to prepare civil society organizations and
scholars of foreign policy for the possible outcomes of the revolutionary
processes in the Middle East.
414   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

For instance, in Libya, Turkish think tanks were confronted with the
question of how to secure the lives of some 20,000 Turkish citizens, to
protect trade relations, and at the same time be part of the Western alli-
ance that was on the side of the rebels. Turkey’s initial hesitation to
endorse Western intervention drew criticism at home and abroad that
Turkish foreign policy-makers were for democratic ideals only when it
served the country’s national interests. Ensuring the safety of its citizens
was the main priority for the country, but it was a delicate task for think
tanks to come up with ideas about how to convince the Qaddafi regime to
give up power while preventing an impending civil war that would result
in the division of Libya.
Turkish think tanks such as SETA endorsed a policy of dialogue with
the Qaddafi regime until the end, with the idea that negotiations could
yield a last-minute deal and prevent further militarization of the situation.
Especially given the dismal legacy of Western interventions in the region,
Turkey was reluctant about an intervention in Libya. This view was pro-
moted by foreign policy think tanks and the general public were very
attentive to the issue, given the large number of Turkish citizens living in
Libya as well as the long-standing economic relationship between the two
countries. When this policy was undercut by the efforts of France at the
time, Turkey readjusted its Libya policy and agreed to bring the issue to
the NATO platform, instead of a “coalition of the willing” under the lead-
ership of France. Turkey supported the humanitarian aspects of the NATO
intervention and realigned its position once all efforts to convince Qaddafi
had failed. SETA, alongside some other think tanks, was instrumental in
advising that Turkey should find a way to strike a deal between the rebels
and the Qaddafi regime in order to prevent a civil war and potential divi-
sion of the country, while securing Turkish citizens and Turkey’s interests.
A negotiation was not possible, but Turkey was able to secure its citizens
and, to a large degree, its economic interests. Turkey remains a critical
actor in Libya, but the country continues to have serious security chal-
lenges, which SETA had foreseen and warned the government and the
Turkish public about. In this way, some of SETA’s policy recommenda-
tions were adopted, but the developments on the ground as well as the
international dynamics prevented a de facto partition of Libya.
This case demonstrated the difficulty of balancing long-term policy
research goals and short-term policy recommendations, which needed to
be produced urgently. SETA as a whole has had considerable expertise on
the Middle East, but its expertise on Libya was rather limited. There was
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    415

little readily available literature on Libya and it did not deal with policy
issues. The think tanks had to very quickly acquaint themselves with the
current dynamics in an environment with fast-moving developments on
the ground. They also had to gauge international attitudes towards the
issue in order to make recommendations on how the country should posi-
tion itself vis-à-vis other international actors and allies. This was a rather
difficult task, especially in the context of the Arab Spring, which shook the
whole region to its core and brought to the fore deep-seated structural
problems. The unfolding of events at such a rapid pace required very quick
answers and did not leave much time even for short-term projects, let
along long-term research. Nevertheless, think tanks like SETA were able
to identify the broader regional dynamics and warn against impending
civil war and disintegration.

SETA’s Impact on the Perception of the Kurdish


Issue
Another major issue area to which SETA actively contributed was the
Kurdish question. This had long been a taboo in Turkey, especially in the
1990s. There were many stereotypes and misperceptions about each other
between the Turkish public and the Kurdish public. Especially in the
1990s, when there was a low-intensity conflict between the state and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), many believed that the Kurdish problem
was one of the most intractable problems of the Turkish republic. This
understanding started to change in the early 2000s, with an initiative that
the Turkish government launched. Before this, SETA had partnered with
Pollmark (a public opinion polling company) and set out to conduct the
most comprehensive public opinion report on the Kurdish issue. This
report challenged most of the existing arguments. It showed, for example,
that an overwhelming majority of the Kurdish people did not want an
independent Kurdish state, while most Turks thought that the contrary
was true. This perception fed an already toxic political environment
around this issue. Public perception feeds political considerations, which
can be debilitating when taking serious steps in public policy. By debunk-
ing some of the myths and misperceptions, SETA’s work allowed for the
bridging of gaps between public perceptions and provided policy-makers
with a clearer idea of what kind of steps could be taken in resolving the
Kurdish issue. The public opinion poll and the articles and op-eds written
416   K. USTUN AND K. KANAT

about it launched an extensive debate in the public realm. The tone and
content of this debate were different than previous discussions that had
taken place on this topic. Adding to the analysis of the conflict, the poten-
tial ways to resolve the conflict also started to be discussed among scholars
and experts in Turkey. This started to be discussed with a different dis-
course that focused on the resolution of ethnic conflicts and the role of
democratization in resolving these issues, instead of the previously uti-
lized security and military discourse.
In addition, SETA convened workshops on this issue to include expert
opinion to guide research and recommendations. It also researched and
catalogued specific demands of Kurdish political actors. Think tank
research combined with up-to-date data on public opinion can clear the
way for bolder reform. In this example, SETA was instrumental in helping
better understand the specific demands of the Kurdish public and gauging
the Turkish public’s sensitivities. Finally, its approach to the Kurdish prob-
lem not only influenced the domestic perception of this question and the
government’s attitude, but also created an impact on the foreign policy
dimension. For instance, SETA’s reports and work on the Kurdish issue
promoted a policy of engagement with the Kurdish Regional Government
in Iraq (KRG) in order to help redefine Turkey’s threat perception. For
many years, Turkish foreign policy had been skeptical of the role of the
Kurdish political parties and organizations in northern Iraq. SETA, in its
workshops and in the works of its experts, promoted the idea of engaging
with northern Iraq in order to create a win–win situation for both Turkey
and the KRG that would help Turkey deal with the threat of the PKK and
t provide economic benefit for both countries. This viewpoint contributed
to helping to change the perception that any Kurdish political actor was a
potential threat to Turkey.

Human Resources
One of the main challenges with which organizations like SETA have to
deal has to do with human resources. Think tanks usually attract academ-
ics with policy-oriented research to bridge the gap between academia and
the government, and previous practitioners of foreign and domestic policy
who will inform the public about the real practice of these policies. In the
case of Turkey, until very recently, academia has traditionally been quite
closed to interaction with the government in terms of researching and
providing policy solutions. The government bureaucracy, for its part, is
  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN TURKEY: THE SETA FOUNDATION…    417

also closed to input from outside expertise. This level of weak interaction
between the universities and the bureaucracy has prevented the produc-
tion of policy experts with academic credentials to enter the policy realm
and inform and influence government policy. Very often, researchers and
assistants applying for jobs in think tanks assume that these institutions are
essentially academic. They assume that they would be conducting research
essentially in the same way as academics do. This means that the human
resource pool on which think tanks draw tends to have little exposure to
policy research, which should entail engaging policy-makers as well as
political actors from different ideological backgrounds.
Think tanks such as SETA find themselves having to orient their experts,
researchers, and assistants towards policy research and, to some extent,
away from pure academic research. Thus, part of the understated mission
of think tanks like SETA is to train experts who can connect theory and
practice and conduct more policy-oriented research. The same problems
arise in regard to the linkage between bureaucracy and think tanks. Because
of the lack of political and civil appointees, there has been a lack of con-
nection between the two worlds. Even the interest among retired former
bureaucrats in think tanks was so low that the think tanks had difficulty in
recruiting former bureaucrats and learning from their experiences. Because
of this situation, think tanks in most instances failed to close the gap in
information about the functioning and decision-making of the govern-
ment and bureaucracy.

Conclusions
As the Turkey-based think tanks grapple with policy questions, they have
benefited from the country’s increased economic success and profile. They
exert much greater influence today than they have in the past thanks to the
civilianization of politics in general. At the same time, they suffer from the
detrimental effects of political polarization and lack of sufficient human
capacity in policy research, among other difficulties. Nevertheless, the
think tank industry continues to grow and mature, and to prove, by at
least partial successes, its ability to influence foreign policy in specific
instances. In the next few years and beyond, Turkey would greatly benefit
from further proliferation of think tanks with niche areas of policy research.
Greater involvement of both the private and public sector in funding this
kind of research would also be a boon to the industry, and ultimately to
the refinement of policy-making in Turkey.
PART VI

Conclusion
CHAPTER 30

Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and National,


Regional, and Global Politics

James G. McGann

The emergence of new powers in the past decade has opened up a number
of new fields of academic and policy inquiry regarding the role of these
newly empowered state actors in the international environment, in the
management of the global order, and in the recalibration of international
relations. Similarly, it has brought about new, challenging conditions for
these emerging powers themselves to assert their position and voice within
international institutions and, more generally, an ever more complex
global setting. The challenge, as many of the chapters in this book have
demonstrated, is rendered even harder by the simultaneous need to claim
a more active international role while at the same time dealing with the
numerous internal political and social transformations that most of these
countries are witnessing, and with the regional dynamics in which these
emerging powers are involved as stakeholders.
This edited volume has aimed to look at rising powers and the impact
that their emergence has had on their foreign and security policy through
the viewpoint of their national think tanks. A key question throughout the

J. G. McGann (*)
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019 421


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_30
422   J. G. MCGANN

book has been whether and in what way the transformation of foreign
policies has opened up relatively more space for policy advice, and thus
given impetus for the emergence of a new think tank culture in these
countries. As all of the chapters demonstrate, foreign and security policy
think tanks have undoubtedly grown in importance in emerging powers,
and the nature and relevance of their role in the evolution of these coun-
tries’ foreign policy cannot be neglected. In much of the formulation and
secondary diplomacy of these countries, think tanks have become actors in
their own right.
As McGann points out in the introduction, think tanks have come a
long way from their initial definition and have assumed varying—at times
hybrid—forms. While loosely based on the archetypal US model, when
compared to Anglo-American and Western European think tanks
emerging-­ power think tanks have a different history, which not only
begins later in time, but is also formulated by legal, political, social, and
financial conditions that differ substantially from the former. As most
scholars concur, non-US think tanks (which now exceed US think tanks in
number) can assume varying and very diverse characteristics, including
with regard to their degree of independence, partisanship, funding, and
administration.
The term “emerging powers” itself remains one which can refer to a
very diverse set of countries. While by and large it is used to describe the
set of countries with substantial projected economic power in the foresee-
able future (as in Jim O’Neill’s initial predictions regarding the BRICS), it
describes nations characterized by varying degrees of democracy, social
equality, market liberalization, populations, and military expenditures, and
certainly with diverging foreign and security policy concerns. To take the
BRICS group—a popular subcategory of the “emerging power” set—as
an example, two of the members are permanent members of the UN
Security Council, while the rest are not. This in itself provides for a very
different foreign and security policy tradition and doctrine. Military
expenditure in Brazil and South Africa is a little over 1% of GDP, while in
the Russian Federation it reaches up to 4.2% of GDP.
These differences become even more acute when one considers larger
groups of emerging countries such as the BRICSAM, referred to in the
introduction to this book, and the G20, which is the group that has been
used as the pool for the case studies included here. At the same time, how-
ever, the simultaneous development of the need for a more active and
far-reaching foreign policy which has accompanied the “emerging power”
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL…    423

label has led to a common trend for more visibility of foreign and security
policy think tanks in these countries. This fundamental shift in global role
and the impact it has had on the demand for think tank activity have been,
in one way or another, a cross-cutting trend in these chapters.
Beyond this general conclusion, a comparison between the case studies
illustrates several other observations regarding the ongoing trends and
challenges for emerging-power foreign policy think tanks in terms of their
activities, networks, functions, and obstacles. The aim of this conclusion is
to bring together these aspects and provide food for thought regarding
future research agendas in this area.

Agendas
As has been mentioned, the process of transformation of the global order
that has been set in motion by the emergence of new powers has necessi-
tated a stronger involvement of these same countries in issues of global
and collective governance. In fact, a common characteristic of emerging
powers has been the collective demand for a reform of the institutional
architecture of global governance, particularly of the Bretton-Woods insti-
tutions which—emerging economies argue—do not reflect the current
distribution of economic power. As maintained in the introduction, the
empowering of the G20, viewed as a more representative mechanism, has
been a key priority on emerging powers’ agendas. It thus comes as little
surprise that the global aspects of the agendas of the foreign policy think
tanks of these countries are strongly linked to issues of multilateral coop-
eration and the reform of global governance.
Yet, it would seem that global issues in general assume a secondary
position on think tanks’ agendas, while regional ones take a much more
prominent role. Indeed, traditionally most of these states’ foreign policy
has been concerned with their immediate region. While the “emerging”
label has brought with it a greater demand and responsibility to be involved
in global issues, the regional dimension remains strong. It is telling that
most Asian think tanks have research strands on regional organizations on
the continent, while the Latin American counterparts focus on their own
region, including the South Atlantic, which assumes great importance in
both the Brazilian and Argentinian cases. Indeed, prior to the past decade
and to the significant upgrading of their weight in international affairs, a
number of the countries studied maintained explicit foreign policy goals
only with regard to their neighborhoods and to major trading partners
424   J. G. MCGANN

such as the United States and the European Union. At the same time,
emerging-power think tanks are situated in critical regions in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America and their local expertise provides in-depth and expert
analyses of regional events with a global impact. The example of the Arab
Spring on the agenda of the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (Qatar) is one
where the think tank serves as a gateway for the world.
Emerging-power foreign policy is also traditionally linked inextricably
with domestic issues. The spillover onto the agenda of think tanks is evi-
denced in most case studies, most characteristically in that on South Africa,
which highlights this by pointing out that development and racial issues
constitute primary items on the foreign policy agenda. Similarly, the
IFANS case study (South Korea) illustrates how an issue of national
pride—the successful hosting of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security
Summit—became a key project for the think tank. Argentinian think
tanks’ engagement with the Malvinas issue is once again illustrative of the
“close to home” approach of think tank agenda-setting.
Another discernible trend is the development of new area studies
research lines. This can be partially explained by the need for knowledge
to support the more assertive and wide-ranging foreign policies adopted
by their governments. At the same time, as Abdenur points out in the
chapter on Brazil, the development of expertise on other developing
regions is a result and a necessary condition for the expansion of new types
of regionalisms and minilateralisms among emerging powers and develop-
ing regions (BRICS, South–South cooperation, IBSA, G20). These for-
mats bring together nations previously little known to each other. The
case, thus, seems to be that in this scenario think tanks assume the task of
providing knowledge that bridges the gap between these emerging “new
partners.”
Finally, in terms of agenda again, as has been posited already, foreign
and security policies and the challenges from which they derive differ sig-
nificantly across emerging powers. The issue of defense, for example, is
more pronounced in some countries, such as China, and much less so in
others, like Singapore. The trend among emerging-power think tanks
would suggest that non-traditional security issues assume a more promi-
nent role compared to traditional ones, constituting a significant differ-
ence from archetypal think tanks of the Western world. International
economic relations also figure prominently on the agenda.
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL…    425

Roles
As was pointed out in the introduction, a question that permeates most of
the literature on think tanks is the role that these institutions play in the
policy process and the public sphere. Various typologies have been devel-
oped to this effect, a number of which are included in earlier chapters.
Importantly, the defining features of the polity in which they operate
(more or less democratic, more or less centralized bureaucracy, more or
less economic prosperity) constitute critical facilitators or constraints for
the way think tanks operate and the roles that they assume.
The overview of foreign and security policy think tanks in emerging
powers suggests significant variations in terms of their role as direct pro-
viders of policy advice and policy ideas to government. While this is the
case with a number of government-sponsored think tanks (e.g., IFANS,
CIIS, IDSA), the accounts of think tanks which are based on non-­
governmental financing and leadership often display difficulty in having
direct access to policy-makers and direct input in the policy-formulation
process. The compact nature of government in a number of these coun-
tries could serve to explain this point.
This has led these think tanks to expand their agenda and idea-­
promoting roles through other means, most of which are common across
the case studies. We notice, for instance, an emphasis on the networking
and public outreach functions. The networking aspect is particularly
important: think tanks in emerging powers engage heavily in interaction
with like institutions in their own countries and with their counterparts in
the United States and the EU, but also notably in other emerging powers
and—where applicable—other Southern partners. In so doing, they mir-
ror the transforming international relations of the states themselves, which
are rapidly engaging in multilateral cooperation in formats such as the
BRICS, the G20, and South–South cooperation. This trend is facilitated
by the increasing relevance of track-two diplomacy, in which most of our
case study think tanks are involved, and which consists of meetings of
think tank representatives in formats that mirror high-level state meetings.
The BRICS Think Tank Council and the Think 20 format of the G20 are
examples of this phenomenon. This activity gives think tanks the opportu-
nity to collectively communicate policy ideas to policy-makers on the mul-
tilateral level, but also to interact with the ideas formulated in other
emerging powers, thus giving them direct access to the knowledge of their
partners.
426   J. G. MCGANN

Another role that the group of think tanks studied here assume is that
of public diplomacy, referring here to the function of communicating to
the domestic and foreign public the foreign and security policy and issues
on the state agenda. All of the case studies point to the necessity of that
function and to the strategies developed to foster the communication and
dissemination of ideas. Events and conferences feature highly on the list of
activities, not least as a result of demand for information on and under-
standing of emerging powers and their foreign policy goals by foreign
partners and actors who are keen to supply the funding for such events.
Media awareness and engagement form another key feature of the pub-
lic educator role that think tanks assume. Open access publishing is also
common, and the use of social media for dissemination very popular as a
means to ensure that research reaches its intended audience. Finally, there
are important ongoing efforts to overcome the language barrier that
restricts accessibility to publications. The East Asia Institute’s (Korea) use
of multilanguage platforms is an exemplary case which has helped the
Institute achieve global recognition and outreach, but most of the think
tanks are pursuing publication in English in order to increase their audi-
ence and demand.
The lack of sufficient knowledge about emerging powers, their societ-
ies, economies, and politics, has also led to their think tanks assuming a
role of communicator of the state brand. A number of the authors in this
volume (the cases of Qatar, Korea, South Africa, and Brazil) refer to their
function as promoters of information regarding the transformation of the
country (what is termed “emergence”) and its potential to be a significant
actor in the region or in specific policy areas. In a similar light, these think
tanks act as carriers of the country’s power—hard but also soft power.
Finally, a large number of the case study think tanks are either university
based (such as the BRICS Policy Centre in Brazil or the S.  Rajaratnam
School of International Studies in Singapore) or act as “non-degree-­
granting” universities, to repeat Orlan’s notion mentioned in the intro-
duction. The pursuit of publications in high-ranking international journals,
based on sound in-depth research, is a common goal among think tanks in
rising powers. This could be explained by the need for recognition and
respect from their US and EU peers, who operate to a large degree within
a system where journal rankings define research performance. A second
explanation could be the relatively recent culture of think tanks in these
countries, as opposed to a more established university culture which links
prestige and serious research to academic publication. In fact, a great
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL…    427

c­ hallenge for emerging-power think tanks is how to reconcile this tradi-


tion with more operational and policy-oriented briefings that act as the
medium for more consultation and contact with foreign and defense pol-
icy officials.

Challenges
Perhaps more than anything else, foreign and security policy think tanks in
emerging powers share similar challenges and obstacles in the promotion
of their work and the sustainability of their enterprises. Funding, relations
with government, scarcity of human resources, and managerial/leadership
challenges are of shared concern among the authors of this volume, albeit
to different degrees.
Engagement with the official policy process is perhaps the most variable
of these challenges. As some think tanks, such as the Chinese CIIS or the
Indian IDSA, are government funded and affiliated, actual inclusion in
consultations and access to the policy process are made easier. For others,
which are independently funded, the opening of the official apparatus to
think tank ideas is characterized as slow, but gradually improving as the
demands of foreign policy and relevant expertise grow. Often, the bureau-
cratic structures of these countries are highly centralized and difficult to
permeate as a result of historical developments, and think tanks have to
fight their way into the policy consultation process. While there are clear
signs of think tank discourse and concepts being incorporated into official
policy, the impact of interventions is on the whole only observable in the
very long run and difficult to attribute directly to the think tanks them-
selves. At the same time, governments in these rapidly transforming coun-
tries often operate at a fast pace with quick responses to new challenges, a
fact which renders the long-term, research-based approach of several of
the think tanks unattractive to officials. The East Asia Institute’s experi-
ence is a case in point.
For the non-government-financed think tanks, funding is a critical
problem. Research and project agendas are—to an extent—defined by the
demands of potential funders, and the challenge to balance that with intel-
lectual freedom and independence is a constant one. Proactive external
project financing is being pursued and most think tanks are in the process
of creating incentives in order to gather more regular donations. Yet, since
the culture of philanthropy mentioned in the introduction is very limited
in these nations, donations often come in the form of contractual relations
428   J. G. MCGANN

or agenda-setting. Be that as it may, some institutes, such as the East Asia


Institute, have managed to cover over 50% of their expenditure with fund-
ing from outside institutions.
Organization and structure also constitute shared preoccupations.
While their much older US and European counterparts have throughout
time developed organograms, divisions of labor, and leadership strategies
that are fully operational, a number of the emerging-power think tanks are
still experimenting with the best way to organize their work. Their aim is
to achieve the maximum coverage of a growing array of areas that are
becoming relevant for their countries’ developing foreign and security
policies, and to respond to the increasing external demand for expertise.
This explains the growing number of research strands, units, and centers
within the think tanks. The aim is to enhance coordination between the
various units, while also promoting specialization.
The task becomes more difficult due to a fundamental problem that all
authors attest to sharing: the scarcity of human resources, and more spe-
cifically the limited number of experts and specialists in the new areas
covered by the transforming, more assertive foreign policies of these coun-
tries. Various strategies are employed to face the lack of researchers, such
as the operation of network-based research models where non-resident
staff act as fellows or work on a contract basis. The creation of attractive
visiting fellow programs for foreigners is a solution proposed by the
Brazilian BRICS Policy Centre.

Final Thoughts and Areas for Future Research


The advent of emerging powers, numerous international organizations,
and new security threats have generated tectonic shifts in the global eco-
nomic and political power balance. This book has demonstrated how think
tanks in a variety of political and economic contexts provide the necessary
research and policy analysis to their respective countries to help them
understand and respond to the new dynamics and the political, economic,
and social challenges of a multipolar world. In the changing political sys-
tems of emerging powers progressively liberalizing and transitioning to an
increasingly globalized policy outlook, think tanks hold a pivotal role in
shaping real policy discourse by speaking with an objective, informed
voice, contributing to the development of a potent and effective foreign
policy that better reflects a nation’s growing influence and status globally,
and facilitating discussion, contestation, and collaboration between both
  THINK TANKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND NATIONAL, REGIONAL…    429

state and non-state global actors. As shown in the case of China, think
tanks like the CIIS have played a key role in offering innovative research
and policy solutions to advance Chinese interests in the country’s rising
and influential global position (through foreign policy proposals such as
“Responsible Protection”) and in facilitating international exchanges and
dialogue. The global landscape is constantly in motion and is altered by
political and economic developments; as a result, the focus on emerging
powers has begun to shift away from the BRICS framework towards alter-
native groupings like CIVETS and MINTS. Consequently, as more and
more states press for a greater role at the global high table, think tanks
provide much-needed support in the face of complex policy demands and
transition periods through agenda-setting, legitimating processes, or pol-
icy formulation. In contrast, in terms of states that might take the opposite
stance and resort to illiberalism, think tanks may seek to counterbalance
their restrictive environment by serving as potential critics of the policies
of national governments and international organizations.
While emerging powers have become an essential part of international
relations and global governance today, it was not until recently that many
of these countries developed an assertive foreign policy. Moreover, as the
concepts of democracy and policy consultation contain different meanings
in emerging powers compared to those in their US and European coun-
terparts, the tradition of engagement of non-governmental actors such as
research institutes in policy-making is scarce. Together, these two factors
explain why think tanks are a new phenomenon in many of these rising
powers. This is particularly true in the area of foreign and security policy
which lies at the heart of national sovereignty and territoriality, concepts
which are particularly important to these countries, many of which carry
with them the legacy of colonialism.
Yet, as the case studies in this volume have demonstrated, emergence
and the transformation it has brought about in terms of demand for a
more sophisticated and expertise-based foreign policy have inevitably
pushed think tanks to the surface. Changing social and political dynamics
have also led to more public and international interest in foreign affairs. As
the case studies on Qatar, Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea—among oth-
ers—demonstrate, outsiders too have become very interested in the
domestic developments of countries and regions that have grown signifi-
cantly in economic and political relevance.
All of the above formulate the conditions for the current status of for-
eign and security think tanks in emerging powers. Whether the trend will
430   J. G. MCGANN

continue and how it will evolve will depend on the sustainability of the
economic and political rise of these countries, but also on the ability of the
think tanks themselves to deal with the internal and external challenges
they face. The degree to which democracy evolves in many of these coun-
tries and whether that will open up official policies to consultation, criti-
cism, and analysis will also be vital to the course of think tanks and their
work.
All of these trends should continue to be monitored and analyzed on a
consistent basis, since the speed and nature of transformation of the global
order are such that even the term “emerging power” may refer to a differ-
ent set of countries some years from now. In this task, think tanks will be
not only a subject of research, but also part of the intellectual community
that continues to investigate the phenomenon of rising powers and their
evolving foreign and security policies.
Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms

Human Rights and Development


These think tanks are mainly responsible for dealing with poverty, dis-
crimination, gender, sexuality, basic needs, decent living standards, and
empowerment such as enhancing working skills to help the lower levels of
society climb the ladder.

Economic Policy and Business Empowerment


These think tanks are involved in providing assistance on economic issues
(monetary and fiscal among various others) as well as overall economic
development. They are concerned with promoting international trade as
well as the country’s global economic activities. Business development is
mainly of the private sector. It involves assistance in setting up small to
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), providing better management, and
incorporating technology and other more efficient tools into everyday
business activities.

Security and International Affairs


These think tanks deal with military and defense issues, as well as the
country’s international relations. These institutions also provide policy
advice on border conflicts between countries.

© The Author(s) 2019 431


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4
432   APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Health and Environment
These think tanks are involved in shaping health-care policies, as well as
providing assistance and guidance to deal with severe diseases such as
AIDS and Ebola. Some of them are also involved in the protection of the
environment and water resources, as well as reducing global warming/
climate change.

Education, Science, and Technology


These think tanks engage in enhancing educational methodologies,
schools, and other institutions, as well as providing better access to educa-
tion. Think tanks involved in the development of science and technology
are also under this category.

Agriculture
These think tanks are involved in promoting farming and enhancing farm-
ing and agricultural techniques, as well as fostering rural development
with a focus on agriculture.

Cultural
These think tanks are involved in the study of societal history and tradi-
tions, as well as media communications.

Disaster Management
These think tanks are engaged in dealing with natural disasters such as
earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, and so on. They are involved in both antic-
ipation as well reaction plans.

Energy
These think tanks are dedicated to mineral extraction, power supply, and
the oil industry.

Good Governance
These think tanks promote democracy, civil rights, anti-corruption, and
fair elections.
Appendix 2: History and Evolution
of Think Tanks in Selected
Emerging Powers

Note: the purpose of these graphs is to demonstrate the correlation of


events with the category of think tanks established.

Nigeria Analysis

Explanation of Nigeria Charts

1995–1999
The end of military rule led to a new type of governance in Nigeria.
Human rights and good governance think tanks were the leading category
in the number of new think tanks established, followed by economic pol-
icy. This demonstrates that whenever a new government system is set up,
or a particular regime comes to an end, the services of think tanks dealing
with good governance, human rights, and economic policy are in high
demand, leading to the establishment of such policy research institutes by
the government or private entities.

© The Author(s) 2019 433


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4
434   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Graph A.1  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Nigeria)

Graph A.2  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Nigeria)

2005–2009
The oil price collapse coincided with another surge in economic policy-­
related think tanks. Oil exports are heavily weighted in Nigeria’s GDP and
overall economic performance. A steep drop in the price of commodities
such as oil has severe impacts on oil export-dependent economies. Such
events often require the help of economic consultants in order to adjust or
recommend new economic policies for the government to adopt in order
to avoid further damage to the economy.
  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   435

South Africa Analysis

Explanation of South Africa Chart

1985–1989: End of Apartheid and First Non-Racial Election Held


Heavy restructuring in society led to the emergence of several categories
of think tanks, with no significantly dominating category.

1985–1989: Joins the Southern African Development Community


and the Creation of the South African National Defence Force
Joining the Southern African Development Community (SADC) led to a
significant rise in think tanks focused heavily on economic policy, both at
the domestic and international levels. SADC is committed to regional inte-
gration and poverty eradication within Southern Africa through economic
development and ensuring peace and security. It should be noted that set-
ting up the Southern African National Defence Force also led to an increase
in security and international affairs thinks tanks.

Joins SADC and creation of south


End of Apartheid and African National Defence Force
20
first Non Racial Election
18 held
Number of New Think Tanks Established

16 High and consistent


GDP expansion
14
Civil Unrest
12 Resettlement in
Black ‘Homelands’
10

8 Declared Republic
6

0
1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014
Time Period (5 Years interval)

Graph A.3  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (South Africa)


436   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Graph A.4  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (South Africa)

China Analysis

Explanation of the China Charts

1985–1989: Opens Economy to the Rest of the World


This major event in China’s economic history led to a surge in security and
international affairs (SIA) think tanks. Some of these were oriented
towards economic policy as well. An open economy is closely related to
the management of a country’s international relations, thereby leading to
the emergence of more SIA think tanks, whose services become highly
demanded.

1990–1994: Ranked Third-Largest Economy in the World


SIA think tanks dominated the growth of think tanks in China as it became
a more significant global economic player.

2000–2004: Joins World Trade Organization


As would be expected, this event led to a surge in economic policy-­oriented
think tanks, as their services in the field of international trade became
more and more relevant.
  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   437

Graph A.5  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (China)

Graph A.6  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (China)


438   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

India Analysis

Explanation of the India Charts

1965–1969: War with Pakistan


Such border conflicts led to the emergence of a larger number of SIA
think tanks compared to other categories.

Graph A.7  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (India)

Graph A.8  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (India)


  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   439

1980–1984: Bhopal Incident


The Bhopal incident is considered one of the world’s worst and deadliest
industrial disasters, claiming the lives of almost 3900 people. This event led
to a steep increase in human rights and good governance think tanks, with
a major focus on human rights, workers’ rights, and rural protection.

2000–2004: Conflict with Pakistan


Once more, the border conflict led to an large increase in SIA think tanks.

2005–2009: Nuclear Agreement


Harnessing nuclear energy is more of an international issue rather than a
domestic one. During the era of the nuclear agreement in India, more SIA
think tanks emerged in order to assist the Indian government in interna-
tional negotiations and managing its international relations.

2005–2009: First BRIC Summit


It should be noted that the high number of SIA think tanks established
during this time was not only driven by the nuclear agreement, but by the
BRIC summit as well. They became actors in helping India manage its
international relations and agenda with the other BRIC nations.

Singapore Analysis

Graph A.9  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Singapore)


440   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Graph A.10  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Singapore)

Explanation of the Singapore Charts


There is no direct correlation for Singapore think tanks, given that the
country is rather small and there are only twelve think tanks in the whole
country. It is hard to track one event that led to the rise of a particular
category of think tank.

Vietnam Analysis

Explanation of the Vietnam Charts

1995–1999: Vietnam and the United States Restore Full Diplomatic


Relations
Vietnam does not have many think tanks, but the restoration of ties with
the United States led to the emergence of foreign policy think tanks that
contributed to managing Vietnam’s international relations.
  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   441

Graph A.11  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Vietnam)

Graph A.12  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Vietnam)

South Korea Analysis

Explanation of the South Korea Charts

1985–1989: Change in Constitution


The change in the constitution during that time period led to an impor-
tant rise in think tanks dealing with human rights and especially good
governance compared to other categories, as the governing structure was
likely to be altered and policy consulting became a need.
442   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Graph A.13  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (South Korea)

Graph A.14  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (South Korea)

2000–2004: South/North Korea Naval Battle


Additional security and international think tanks emerged during this
period of border conflict, which still prevails.
  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   443

Indonesia Analysis

Explanation of the Indonesia Charts

1975–1979: Indonesia Invades East Timor


The emergence of SIA think tanks coincided with that event and that time
period.

2000–2004: Ethnic Violence


There was the establishment of more human rights and development think
tanks during this time period as well as the preceding one (1995–1999).

Graph A.15  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Indonesia)

Graph A.16  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Indonesia)


444   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Argentina Analysis

Explanation of the Argentina Charts

1965–1969: Unstable Civilian Government


Think tanks dedicated to human rights and good governance, as well as
economic policy, emerged during that time period, since they were the
most likely to handle the instability caused by the civilian government.

1990–1994: Peso Introduced


The introduction of a new currency is a very important economic policy
to any country, which affects both its domestic economy as well as its
international trade. This economic move coincided with the establishment
of large numbers of economic policy-oriented think tanks.

1995–1999: Recession
Recessions in Argentina have been an ongoing theme that not only requires
assistance on economic policy, but also governance, as often Argentinian
government decisions have been blamed for these recessions. This particu-
lar recession coincided with the emergence of more human rights and
good governance, as well as economic policy-oriented, think tanks.

Graph A.17  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Argentina)


  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   445

Graph A.18  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Argentina)

Brazil Analysis

Explanation of the Brazil Charts

1985–1989: Cruzado Plan Introduced


The aim of the Cruzado plan was to eliminate inflation, creating opportu-
nities for economic policy-oriented think tanks. During this time period,
the establishment of this particular category of think tanks dominated the
others.

2000–2004: Application for Permanent United Nations Seat


Since Brazil wanted to push for a more active presence in global gover-
nance, it can be seen that the establishment of a significant number of SIA
think tanks preceded this time period, while human rights and good gov-
ernance think tanks became more evident in the Brazilian environment.

2005–2009: First BRIC Summit


This event led to the establishment of more SIA think tanks, with a major
focus on international affairs and relations.
446   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

Graph A.19  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Brazil)

Graph A.20  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Brazil)


  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   447

Mexico Analysis

Explanation of the Mexico Charts


Mexico has been characterized by a high rate of establishment of human
rights and good governance–oriented think tanks, most likely due to the
country’s political history as well as population dynamics. This can be seen

Graph A.21  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Mexico)

Graph A.22  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Mexico)


448   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

through the yellow bars. The one event that really matched the establish-
ment of a specific category of think tanks is the discovery of an offshore oil
reserve, which coincided with the establishment of newer economic policy
and business development–oriented think tanks during 1975–1979.

Qatar Analysis

Graph A.23  Number of new think tanks established (Qatar)

Graph A.24  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Qatar)


  APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED… 
   449

Explanation of the Qatar Charts

1995–1999: Political Coup


The political coup coincided with the establishment of a think tank related to
good governance issues, as Qatar implemented a new political environment.

2005–2009
Qatar became more and more present in the rest of the world, whether it
was concerning sports or foreign aid. This time period demonstrates a
high establishment of foreign policy-oriented think tanks.

Turkey Analysis

Explanation of the Turkey Charts

1975–1979: US Trade Embargo Lifted


The introduction of a new economic policy and business development
think tank coincided with the removal of the US trade embargo, which
was likely to change Turkey’s international trade patterns as well as influ-
ence its economic policy.

Graph A.25  Rate of establishment of new think tanks (Turkey)


450   APPENDIX 2: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THINK TANKS IN SELECTED…

1995–1999 and 2000–2004
Both of these periods were heavily dominated by the establishment of SIA
thinks, especially following the start of the war with Kurdish insurgent
groups in 1990–1994.

Graph A.26  Fields of operation of newly established think tanks (Turkey)


Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS B


2008 global financial crisis, 66 Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa (BRICS)
Goldman Sachs, 83, 87–89, 88n34,
A 89n38, 91, 93, 99
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJSC), Russia, 9, 52, 69, 70, 88, 90, 91,
377, 393–395 93, 101, 144, 331
Apartheid, 110, 120–122, 128,
129, 135–137, 140, 145,
146, 148, 435 C
Argentina China, 9, 74, 84, 105n1, 117, 142,
Argentinian-Chinese partnership, 310 144, 173, 191, 203, 222, 227,
“Peoples for Malvinas” initiative, 323 242, 249, 268, 285, 291, 305,
Argentine Center of International 316, 333, 348, 424, 436
Studies (CAEI), responsibility to protect (R2P),
303, 313–327 163, 182
Argentine Council for International China Institute of International
Relations (CARI), 303, 317, Studies (CIIS), 53, 55, 163, 169,
320–321, 324–326 173–189, 292, 425, 427, 429
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Civil society, 34, 36, 38, 39, 49–51,
(ASEAN), 3, 168, 219, 222, 228, 54, 55, 58, 146–149, 151, 154,
229, 231–234, 236, 242, 281, 226, 227, 247, 260, 314, 317,
285, 289, 291, 300 318, 323–327, 343, 345, 347,
Authoritarian state, 49 355, 372, 406, 407, 413

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.


1

© The Author(s) 2019 451


J. G. McGann (ed.), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4
452   INDEX

COMEXI, see Mexican Council on 87–89, 89n36, 91n48, 92n49,


Foreign Relations 92n50, 94–96, 98, 100, 144,
Corruption, 37, 46, 48, 70, 72, 99, 152–155, 195, 331, 334,
100, 112, 135, 138, 166, 196, 336, 339–350, 422,
305, 306, 310, 311, 331, 358 424–426, 428, 429
BRICSAM/B(R)ICSAM, 89–91
China, 9, 10, 12n20, 14, 48, 52–54,
D 61, 63, 64, 66, 69–77, 83, 87,
DAV, see Diplomatic Academy of 88, 91, 93, 163–171, 243,
Vietnam 249–252, 297, 316, 331,
Democratization, 117, 245, 246, 249, 338, 340, 357
260, 407, 413, 416 emerging market, 72, 79, 80,
Developed countries, 88, 155, 221, 91, 99
241, 335 IBSA, 94–96, 336, 424
Developing world, 5, 12, 36, 46, 62, India, 9, 12n20, 14, 52, 61, 63,
63, 144, 158–160, 333, 340, 68–70, 72–76, 83, 87, 88, 93,
369, 390 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 117,
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 155, 182, 191–196, 199–217,
(DAV), 281, 284, 287–300 331, 336, 357
regional water security, 292–300 Mexico, 12n20, 14, 64, 68, 83, 87,
89–91, 89n38, 93, 96, 99–102,
144, 241, 256, 313, 338,
E 351–353, 356–370, 372,
East Asia Institute (EAI), 239, 243, 402, 447–448
245–266 middle power, 68, 69, 74, 75,
Emerging economies, 9, 63, 69, 87, 78–80, 88, 239, 244, 248, 252,
89, 89n38, 98, 99, 139, 242, 253, 255–258, 268–271, 276,
335, 336, 423 278, 280, 313, 315, 326
Emerging powers MINT, 83, 99–101, 429
Argentina, 14, 83, 95, 96, 102, 144, Nigeria, 14, 83
241, 303–311, 313–327, 343, power dynamics, 329, 340, 348
349, 444 Qatar, 14, 83, 101
Brazil, 9, 10, 12, 14, 52, 58, 59, 61, regional power, 79, 144, 281, 384
63, 68–70, 73–76, 83, 87, 88, Russia, 10, 83, 88
93–97, 99, 101, 102, 144, 182, Singapore, 14
241, 303, 304, 308, 313, 314, South Africa, 10, 14, 83
331–338, 340–346, 348–350, South Korea, 14, 89n38, 102, 424
357, 402, 422, 424, 426, Turkey, 9, 10, 14, 73, 83, 102, 155
429, 445 Vietnam, 14, 83, 102
BRIC, 70, 83, 86n23, 87n27, 88n34, Expertise, 6, 41, 118, 150, 175, 207,
89–91, 89n36, 99–101, 445 227, 228, 260, 296, 299, 397,
BRICS, 9, 9n7, 51, 52, 52n117, 58, 411, 412, 414, 417, 424,
59, 62–64, 68–75, 77, 83, 84, 427–429
 INDEX 
   453

F 256, 260, 270, 313, 355–373,


Financial services firms, 65 401, 422–425
First Think 20 Summit, 368–372 G20 Foreign Policy Think Tanks
Foreign policy, 3–59, 76, 77, 91, Summit, 12, 13, 366
109–126, 130–133, 142–160,
168–171, 174, 175, 177, 180,
186, 187, 201, 212, 215, 222, H
223, 239, 250, 253, 255–260, Haass, Richard N., 11n16, 13n23, 16
263, 265, 266, 268, 278, 279,
284, 287–300, 307, 308, 310,
311, 313–327, 329, 332, I
334–338, 341, 342, 346, IDSA, see Institute for Defense Studies
347, 351, 353, 368, 370, and Analyses
383–399, 402–417, IFANS, see Institute of Foreign Affairs
421–430, 440, 449 and National Security
information, 4, 7, 19, 20, 33–35, IMF, see International Monetary Fund
52, 56, 58, 92, 114, 117, India, 9, 12n20, 14, 52, 61–63, 67,
122, 134, 158, 201, 202, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77,
204, 205, 215, 216, 273, 83, 87, 88, 88n34, 93, 94, 96,
408, 410, 426 97, 101, 102, 105n1, 117, 144,
Foundation for Political, Economic 155, 182, 191–197, 199–217,
and Social Research (SETA), 220, 228n5, 241, 242, 243,
401, 405–417 259n23, 292, 331, 336, 338,
Freedom, 5, 21, 23–25, 30, 31, 340, 348, 357, 359, 438–440
36–39, 43, 44, 46–48, 46n115, post-1990s, 204–205
50, 53, 55, 78, 131, 206, Institute for Defense Studies and
219, 300, 307, 381, 385, Analyses (IDSA), 191, 199–217,
394, 396, 397, 427 425, 427
Institute of Foreign Affairs and
National Security (IFANS), 239,
G 243, 267–280, 292, 424, 425
G7, see Group of 7 Institute of International Relations at
G20, see Group of Twenty the National University of La
Globalization, 3, 6, 32, 50, 65n10, Plata (IRI-UNLP), 317, 323–325
117, 169, 186, 205, 246, International community, 6, 42, 52,
314, 390 78, 110, 114, 115, 125, 127,
Government bureaucracies, 7, 35, 416 180, 181, 182n16, 254, 255,
Group of 7 (G7), 87, 88n34, 90, 91, 260, 300, 307, 308, 332, 388
93, 96–97, 357 International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Group of Twenty (G20), 11, 12, 63n4, 64, 70, 70n23, 72, 75,
12n20, 84, 96–97, 96n75, 77, 97, 107, 123, 195,
96n78, 96n79, 97n82, 97n85, 195n4, 283n4, 306, 306n7,
97n87, 144, 150–152, 154, 308, 310, 315, 317, 338,
155, 195, 241, 242, 251, 357, 364, 365
454   INDEX

International relations (IR), 3, 9, 11, soft power, 10, 10n11, 10n12,


51, 55, 56, 59, 80, 82–84, 121, 10n13, 10n14, 11, 42, 75, 79,
124, 125, 129, 132, 146, 149, 82, 90, 102, 144, 253, 335,
156, 176, 180, 181, 183, 188, 338, 377, 388–390, 426
196–197, 205, 225, 227, 260,
284, 289, 290, 292, 297, 307,
323, 325, 339, 340, 345, 347, N
349, 363, 384, 386, 421, 425, Navy Office of the Center for Strategic
429, 431, 436, 439, 440 Affairs “Manuel Belgrano” of the
Ministry of Defense, 303,
317–320
K Nigeria, 9, 64, 74, 83, 89n38,
Knowledge, 5, 6, 13, 34, 35, 40, 132, 99–102, 105, 105n1, 110n21,
150, 151, 153, 154, 157–159, 113–115, 115n3, 116n6,
199, 203, 206, 225–227, 233, 117–131, 121n11, 123n12,
246, 263, 265, 269, 274, 277, 124n13, 125n17, 127n20, 134,
297, 298, 318, 336, 341, 372, 139, 144, 349, 433–434
389, 391–394, 411, 424–426 Obasanjo, 124, 126
Korean Institute for International Nigerian Institute of International
Economic Policy (KIEP), 243, 247 Affairs (NIIA), 105, 111,
Korean National Diplomatic Academy 113–134, 114n1, 115n3, 118n10,
(KNDA), 268 123n12, 128n22, 130n23

L P
Liberalization, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57, Political repression, 149
195, 196, 200, 205, 385, 422 Pontifical Catholic University of Rio
de Janeiro (PUC-RIO), 340
Post-Cold War, 61, 66, 200, 201, 246,
M 253, 408
McGann, James, 7n4, 13, 13n23, Power balance, 9, 428
15–17, 19n10, 38n88, 117n8, Public policy organizations, 6
245n1, 246n7 PUC-RIO, see Pontifical Catholic
MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del University of Rio de Janeiro
Sur), 308, 316
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
(COMEXI), 351, 356, 363, R
364, 369–372 Regions
Military power Africa, 6, 14
China’s military expenditures, 10 Central Asia, 6
hard power, 10, 10n11, 75, 75n36, Eastern Europe, 6, 14
79, 253, 377, 389 Southeast Asia, 6
 INDEX 
   455

Research, 4, 18, 92, 111, 142, 148, 163, American Enterprise Institute, 20
175, 191, 200, 223, 227, 243, 247, America’s Progressive Era, 6
268, 281, 288, 303, 317, 340, 377, Anglo-American, 5, 32, 33, 37–41,
383, 399, 405, 423, 433 45, 46, 48, 50, 422
Tanks But No Tanks, 23, 23n25 autonomous institutions, 7, 340
RSIS, see S. Rajaratnam School of autonomy, 5, 7, 8, 19, 25, 30, 32,
International Studies 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 75,
76, 130, 148, 217, 226, 246,
320, 323
S bias, 44
SAIIA, see South African Institute of Campbell, John L. and Pederson,
International Affairs Ove K., 4, 4n1
Seoul 2012 Summit, Dickson, Paul, 5, 19n6, 20n11, 22,
239, 267–280, 424 22n19, 22n21, 23, 27, 38
SIA think tanks, 14, 15, 317–327, first era, the, 19
436, 438, 439, 443, 445 government-affiliated, 7, 177, 178,
South African Institute of 239, 272, 284, 303, 318
International Affairs (SAIIA), Medvetz, Thomas, 17, 17n1, 18n4,
133, 135, 144, 145, 148–152, 28, 28n55, 31, 42, 42n97,
149n5, 154–160, 348 42n99, 82n15
S. Rajaratnam School of International National Origins of Policy Ideas,
Studies (RSIS), 219, 223, the, 4
225–237, 426 non-partisan, 4, 5, 19, 29–31, 36,
preventive diplomacy, 228–230, 37, 43, 58, 201, 206
229n6, 233–237 non-partisanship, 5
Stone, Diane, 13, 13n23, 16, 17n2, Nye, Joseph, 42
17–18n3, 18n4, 18n5, 27, policy creation, 7, 35
27n50, 28n51, 28n52, 29–32, policy formulation, 13, 15,
29n63, 30n65, 30n67, 30n69, 117, 277, 298, 390,
32n77, 32n79, 32n80, 32n81, 425, 429
34, 34n83, 36n86, 43–45, policy making process, 3, 6, 9, 13,
43n102, 43n104, 43–44n105, 14, 18, 52, 55, 117, 145, 300,
44n111, 46n114, 51, 51n116, 350, 356
84n18, 246n5, 246n6 present era, the, 27–40
RAND Corporation, 20, 39, 201
second era, the, 20
T third era, the, 20–26
Tectonic shifts, 9, 428 university affiliated, 7, 53, 54,
Think tanks 323, 346
academic freedom, 5, 26, 30, 31, Weaver, R. Kent, 17n3, 20n12,
38, 40, 43, 44 21n15, 24, 24n34, 25, 25n36,
agenda-setting, 13, 150, 226, 26n46, 27, 41, 41n91,
424, 429 117n8, 247n9
456   INDEX

Think Tanks and Civil Societies United Nations (UN), 74, 97, 105n1,
Program (TTCSP), 6n3, 7, 12, 109, 112, 122, 128, 180, 230,
14, 394 270, 316, 336, 343
Transnational issues, 6 US leadership, 61, 68, 69, 73, 78,
93, 244

U
UNASUR (Unión de Naciones W
Suramericanas), 316, 317, 329, World Bank (WB), 71, 74n34, 75, 123,
335, 338 124, 139, 285, 308, 318, 365, 401

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