Umali vs. Bacani, et al.

, 69 SCRA 263

G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976

TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.

Julia M. Armas for petitioner.

Antonio de los Reyes for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan Branch IX, in Civil Case No.
U2412, entitled, "Fidel H. Saynes, plaintiff-appellee versus Teodoro C. Umali, defendant-appellant", which found the
death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months, as "due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant (Umali) as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability of defendant is mitigated
by the contributory negligence of the parents of the boy "in not providing for the proper and delegate supervision and
control over their son The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

Wherefore, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff by ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the death of his son, Manuel Saynes; the sum of One Thousand
Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) for actual expenses for and in connection with the burial of said deceased child, and
the further sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for moral damages and Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as
reasonable attorney's fee, or a total of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P9,700.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of
this suit. It Is So Ordered.

Undisputed facts appearing of record are:

On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan, which started from 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon and lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an
elevated ground along the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of
which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.

On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Iii who was passing by
saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt.
He also saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and
there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he
was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months
old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where
the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning
by the lineman of the electric plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and manager of the
Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any
negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the
electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have
the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during
that time.

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in
the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the
defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which
were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the
employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds
the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala
Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have caused their
electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been
cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was
already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life
and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live
wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line,
obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.

On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the parents' negligence
in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily see that because of the
aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on the
premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily
an innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found out,
that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to
leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the house
(where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we
cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim's
death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that
morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could
have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was
allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning where it
not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is
well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is
supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct
(Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the employer
to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to
prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to
deviate from its finding.

Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired any reversible error committed by the trial Court in this case, either in
its appreciation of the evidence on questions of facts or on the interpretation and application of laws government
quasi-delicts and liabilities emanating therefrom. The inevitable conclusion is that no error amounting to grave abuse
of discretion was committed and the decision must be left untouched.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court dated June 27, 1974 is affirmed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Picart vs. Smith 37 Phil 809

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.

Alejo Mabanag for appellant.

G. E. Campbell for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as
damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan
Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of
4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony
had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently
to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced
in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile
and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above
described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of
the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse
and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late
for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power
of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was,
we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known
nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse
and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which
he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in
this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not
constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have
been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer,
to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails
were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in
consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the
accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found
that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff
was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being
in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having
failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of
the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an
omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a
case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order
to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the
defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence
of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the
effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In
this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings
to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones
graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were
dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the
offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point
upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal
proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep.,
564.)

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the
loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The
other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So
ordered.

Lilius et al., vs. The Manila Railroad Company 59 Phil 758

G.R. No. 42551 September 4, 1935

ALEKO E. LILIUS, for himself and as guardian ad litem of his minor child, Brita Marianne Lilius, and SONJA MARIA
LILIUS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant.
LAURA LINDLEY SHUMAN, MANILA WINE MERCHANTS, LTD., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND
MANILA MOTOR CO., INC., intervenors-appellants, and
W.H. WATEROUS, M. MARFORI, JOHN R. MCFIE, JR., ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC., PHILIPPINE EDUCATION
CO., INC., HAMILTON BROWN SHOE CO., ESTRELLA DEL NORTE and EASTERN & PHILIPPINE SHIPPING
AGENCIES, LTD., intervenors-appellees.

J.W. Ferrier for intervenor-appellant Shuman.

Franco and Reinoso for intervenor-appellant Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd.
Feria and La O for intervenor-appellant Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Gibbs and McDonough for intervenor-appellant Manila Motor Co.
Harvey and O'Brien for plaintiffs-appellees.
John R. Mcfie, Jr., in his behalf and for the intervenors-appellees.

GODDARD, J.:

In this case Laura Lindley Shuman, the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the
Manila Motor Co., Inc., have appealed from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila fixing the degree of
preference of the claimants and distributing the proceeds of the judgment of this court in the case of Lilius vs. Manila
Railroad Co. (59 Phil., 758), the amount of which judgment in the sum of P33,525.03, including interest and costs,
was deposited by the railroad company with the clerk of the lower court in that case. After deducting the
attorneys' fees in the sum of P8,016.88, which is not questioned, the net amount in the hands of the
clerk of the lower court pertaining to each of the plaintiffs in the original action is follows:

Aleko E. Lilius P13,181.33

Sonja Maria Lilius 8,218.54

Brita Marianne Lilius 4,109.28

There was a total of twenty-eight claimants to these funds, whose claims were presented and decided without
objection in the original case in the lower court.

The trial court in its order from which these appeals are taken, allowed:

(a) As against the sum of P8,218.54, separately awarded to the plaintiff Sonja Lilius, the following
claims or portions thereof in the order stated:

One-half of the claim of Dr. W.H. Waterous by virtue of a written P1,500.00

assignment of March 9, 1933, by the said Sonja Maria Lilius to
him

One-third of the claim of the appellant Laura Lindley 661.13

Shuman by virtue of a joint judgement obtained by her on August
 10, 1933, in the Case No. 44254 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, against the said Sonja Maria Lilius, Aleko E. Lilius and
Brita Marianne Lilius

One-third of the claim of the St. Paul's Hospital by 518.19

virtue of a joint written assignment of September 21, 1933, by the
said Sonja Maria Lilius, Aleko E. Lilius and Brita Marianne Lilius
to it

and the balance of the award was ordered paid to the said Brita Marianne Lilius, and

(b) As against the sum of P4,109.28, separately awarded to the plaintiff Brita Marriane Lilius, the following claims or
portions thereof in the order stated:

One-third of the claim of Laura Lindley Shuman by virtue of a joint P661.13

judgment obtained by her on August 10, 1933, in Case No. 44254
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, against the said Brita
Marianne Lilius, Sonja Maria Lilius and Aleko E. Lilius

One-third of the claim of St. Paul's Hospital by virtue 518.18

of a joint written assignment of September 21, 1933, by the
said Brita Marianne Lilius, Sonia Maria Lilius and Aleko
E. Lilius

and the balance of the award was ordered paid to the said Brita Marianne Lilius, and

(c) As against the sum of P13,181.33, awarded to the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius, the following claims or
portions thereof in the order stated:

The other half of the claim of Dr. W.H. Waterous by virtue of the
final judgement in the original case, G.R. No. 39587 P1,500.00

The claim of Dr. M. Marfori, by virtue of the final judgment in the

original case, G.R. No. 39587 250.00

The claim of John R. McFie, Jr., by virtue of a written assignment

to him by the said Aleko E. Lilius of November 13, 1931 500.00

The balance of P10, 931.33 of the judgment pertaining to the said

Aleko E. Lilius was allowed and distributed by the lower court
proportionately among the following claimants by virtue of their
written assignment of January 27, 1932:

Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. 3,374.50

Philippine Education Co., Inc., 3,394.94

Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. 1,878.98

 Estrella del Norte 1,850.76

Eastern & Philippine Shipping Agencies, Ltd. 432.15

APPEAL OF LAURA LINDLEY SHUMAN

First assignments of error: "The lower court erred in holding that Dr. W.H. Waterous and Dr. M. Marfori had a claim
against the plaintiff, Aleko E. Lilius superior to the claim of the appellant, Laura Lindley Shuman, against him."

One of the contentions of this appellant under this assignment of error is that her claim, having been made the basis
of the plaintiffs' action and of the award for damages, as shown in the original decision herein, should constitute, and
does constitute a superior lien against the funds awarded said plaintiffs, to those of any other claimants, except the
two doctors, the hospital and the other nurse, and that as to the claims of the two doctors, the hospital and the other
nurse the claim of this appellant has equal preference with their claims.

The following items were made the basis of a part of the judgment for damages awarded to the plaintiffs
in the original action against the Manila Railroad Company:

Por honorarios del Dr. Waterous (Exhibit N-2) P3,000.00

Por la primera cura hecha en el Hospital de Calauang (Exhibit N-5) 250.00

Por el alquiler de la ambulancia del Hospital General (Exhibit N-4) 10.00

Por la estancia en el Hospital Saint Paul (Exhibit N-3) 3,355.00

Por los servicios prestados por la enfermera Laura Shuman (Exhibit

N-6) 2,156.00

Por los servisios prestados por la enfermera Alejandra Alcayaga

(Exhibit N-9) 1,450.00

Porlos servicios prestados por la enfermera Carmen Villanueva

(Exhibit N-11) 240.00

Por la perdida de la camara fotografica, pluma fuente y lapiz (Exhibit

N-1) 43.00

Por trajes dañados en el choque 131.00

Total 10,635.00

The trial court in that case directed the defendant Railroad Company to pay P3,000 to Dr. Waterous and to pay to Dr.
Marfori P250, but failed to direct the defendant to pay the corresponding sums to the other persons and entities
mentioned in the portion of the decision copied above.

It must be admitted that the amounts due Dr. Waterous and the others mentioned is the original decision, including
the appellant Shuman, were all used as a basis for a part of the judgment which plaintiffs secured against the
defendants Railroad Company.
From the foregoing it is clear that the claim of this appellant rests upon the same ground as those of Doctors
Waterous and Marfori. She was also among those who rendered services to plaintiffs in aid of their recover from the
injuries received by them in the accident for which damages were awarded them in the case against the Railroad
Company. The fact that the trial court did not direct the defendant Railroad Company to pay directly to this appellant
the amount of her claim does not modify or do away with her equitable right to the same status as that given to the
two doctors mentioned above. The inevitable conclusion is that the claims of Waterous and Marfori have no
preference over her claim for her services as a nurse. This assignment of error should be and is hereby sustained.

This appellant in her second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in failing to allow her claim in the
sum of P61.94 as costs in the case in which judgment was rendered in her favor against the herein plaintiffs-
appellees. The record shows that the reason for the disallowance of this item was because no proof was offered as to
the amount of such costs. The only thing appearing in the transcript on this point is the statement of counsel that the
amount of costs in case No. 44254, as shown by the bill of costs, was P6l.94. Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Courts
of First Instance requires that ". . . costs shall be taxed by the clerk on five days' written notice given by the prevailing
party to the adverse party, with which notice given by the prevailing party, verified by his oath or that of his attorney,
shall be served. . . ." The proper evidence, therefore, of the costs in that case would have been the bill of costs and
the taxation of such costs by the clerk. In order to recover such costs in a separate proceeding, such as this,
evidence must be presented as to the amount of the same. As there was no evidence offered in this case as to the
amount of said costs, the lower court was correct in disallowing that item. This assignment of error is overruled.

Under her third assignment of error this appellant contends (1) that the funds separately awarded the wife, Sonja
Maria Lilius, partake of the nature of conjugal property, at least to the extent of the sum of P800 awarded to her as
interest on the principal award of P10,000 made in her favor by the trial court, and as such should respond for the
support of the family, including medical expenses and (2) that even assuming that the sums awarded separately to
Sonja Maria Lilius are not conjugal property, but her own paraphernal property, still under the provisions of the Civil
Code payment may be required out of said funds, her husband being insolvent, under her liability for the medical
expenses incurred by her husband, one of the obligations imposed by law upon the wife.

The second contention under this assignment of error can be disposed of by calling attention to the fact that there is
no proof in this case that her husband is insolvent. It has not been proved that Aleko E. Lilius had no other property
outside of the sum awarded to him in the case against the Railroad Company.

APPEAL OF THE MANILA WINE MERCHANTS, LTD., AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The appellants, the Manila Wine Merchants. Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine islands also contend that the sum
separately awarded Sonja Maria Lilius is conjugal property and therefore liable for the payment of the private debts of
her husband, Aleko E. Lilius, contracted during her marriage.

it is contended that the damages awarded for personal injury are not classified as separate property of each of the
spouses in article 1396 of the Civil Code and they should therefore be resumed conjugal. In answer to this, article
1401 of the same Code, in enumerating the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, does not mention
damages for personal injury.

The question raised by these appellants is one of first impression in this jurisdiction and apparently has never been
passed upon by the Supreme Court of Spain.

The following comment is found in Colin y Capitant, Vol. 6, pages 217 and 218:

"No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislacion espa_¤_ola la cuestion de si las indemnizaciones debidas por
accidentes del trabajo tienen la consideracion de gananciales o son bienes particulares de los conyuges.
"Inclinan a la solucion de que estas indemnizaciones deben ser consideradas como gananciales, el hecho de que la
sociedad pierde la capacidad de trabajo con el accidente, que a ella le pertenece, puesto que de la sociedad son los
frutos de ese trabajo; en cambio, la consideracion de que de igual manera que los bienes que sustituyen a los que
cada conyuge lleva al matrimonio como propios tienen el caracter de propios, hace pensar que las indemnizaciones
que vengan a suplir la capacidad de trabajo aportada por cada conyuge a la sociedad, deben ser juridicamente
reputadas como bienes propios del conyuge que haya sufrido el accidente. Asi se Ilega a la misma solucion aportada
por la jurisprudencia francesa.".

From the above it appears that there are two distinct theories as to whether damages rising from an injury suffered by
one of the spouses should be considered conjugal or separate property of the injured spouse. The theory holding that
such damages should form part of the conjugal partnership property is based wholly on the proposition, also
advanced by the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., that by the injury the earning capacity of the injured spouse is
diminished to the consequent prejudice of the conjugal partnership.

Assuming the correctness of this theory, a reading of the decision of this court in G. R. No. 39587 will show that the
sum of P10,000 was awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius "by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages." The
pertinent part of that decision on this point reads:

"Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius is-in the
language of the court, which saw her at the trial "young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her
forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture
of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk', and taking into further
consideration her social standing, neither is the sum of P10,000, adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way, of
indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.".

It should be added that the interest on that sum is part of the damages "patrimonial and moral" awarded to Sonja
Maria Lilius.

Furthermore it appears in the decision of the trial court in G. R. No. 39587 that Aleko E. Lilius claimed the sum of
P10,000 as damages on account of the loss of the services of Sonja Maria Lilius as secretary and translator, her
particular work as a member of the conjugal partnership. The trial court disallowed this claim and neither of the
plaintiffs in that case appealed to this court.

In view of the foregoing it is held that the sum of P10,000 with interest thereon awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius as
damages is paraphernal property.

The third assignment of error of the appellant Shuman, the second assignment of error of the appellant Bank of the
Philippine Islands and the sole assignment of error of the appellant Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., are overruled.

In its first assignment of error it is contended by the Bank of the Philippines Islands that by virtue of its writ of
garnishment served on the Manila Railroad Company of February 8, 1933, it acquired a lilen superior to the
preference granted by article 1924 of the Civil Code to prior judgments. This error, if at all, is however non-prejudicial
as the record shows that all the creditors declared by the court as having a right to participate in the proceeds of the
judgment in favor of Aleko E. Lilius were so held by virtue of deeds of assignment executed prior to the date of the
service of notice of the bank's writ of garnishment on the Manila Railroad Company. These creditors are John R.
McFie, jr., whose claim is based on a deed of assignment dated November 13, 1931, and Erlanger & Galinger,
Philippine Education Co., Inc., Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., Estrella del Norte and Eastern & Philippine Shipping
Agencies, Ltd., whose claims are based on a deed of assignment dated November 17, 1931. As the record shows
that whatever was left of the judgment in favor of Aleko E. Lilius is not sufficient to pay in full the credits of the above
mentioned creditors and furthermore, in view of the fact that strictly speaking, there was no existing credit in favor of
Aleko E. Lilius to be garnished on February 3, 1933, as it had been assigned, before that date, to his creditors, this
assignment of error, therefore, must be overruled.

APPEAL OF THE THE MANILA MOTOR CO., INC.

The two error assigned by this appellant read as follows:

"I. The lower court erred in considering the date of the date judgment, Exhibit A, Manila Motor Co., Inc., instead of the
date of the public document upon which it was based in determining the preference among the several claims filed
and litigated in this proceeding.

"ll. The lower court erred in not holding the claim of the claimant-appellant, Manila Motor Co., Inc., preferred over all
other claims against Aleko E. Lilius evidenced by public instruments and final judgments.".

The claimant has not proven that its credit is evidenced by a public document within the meaning of article 1924 of
the Civil Code. The only evidence offered by the Manila Motor Co., Inc., in support of its claim of preference against
the fund of Aleko E. Lilius was a certified copy of its judgment against him in civil case No. 41159 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, together with a certified copy of the writ of execution and the garnishment issued by virtue of said
judgment. These documents appear in the record as Exhibits A, B and C. The alleged public document evidencing its
claim was not offered in evidence and counsel of the Manila Motor Co., Inc., merely stated at the hearing in the lower
court that its judgment was based on a public document dated May 10, 1931. There is no explanation as to why it
was not presented as evidence along with Exhibits A, B, and C. In their brief in this court, counsel for the Motor Co.,
Inc., merely assume that its credit is evidenced by a public document dated may 10, 1931, because the court, in its
judgment in said civil case No. 41159, refers to a mortgage appearing in the evidence as Exhibit A, as the basis of its
judgment, without mentioning the date of the execution of the exhibit. This reference in said judgment to a mortgage
is not competent or satisfactory evidence as against third persons upon which to base a finding that the Manila Motor
Company's credit evidenced by a public document within the meaning of article 1924 of the Civil Code. This court is
not authorized to make use of that judgment as a basis for its findings of fact in this proceeding. This is shown by the
decision of this court in the case of Martinez vs. Diza 920 Phil., 498). In that syllabus of that decision it is stated:

"1. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; JUDGMENT IN FORMER CIVIL ACTION AS BASIC FOR FINDINGS OF FACT;
ERROR.-A person who was not a party to a former civil action, or who did not acquire his rights from one of the
parties thereto after the entry of judgment therein, is not bound by such judgment; nor can it be used against him as a
basis for the findings of fact in a judgment rendered in a subsequent action.".

But even if the court is authorized to accept the statement in that judgment as a basis for its finding of fact in relation
to this claim, still it would not establish the claim of preference of the Manila Motor Co., Inc. Granting that a mortgage
existed between the Manila Motor Co., Inc., and Aleko E. Lilius, this does not warrant the conclusion that the
instrument evidencing that mortgage is a public document entitled to preference under article 1924 of the Civil Code.
Under section 5 of Act No. 1507 as amended by Act No. 2496, a chattel does not have to be acknowledge before a
notary public. As against creditors and subsequent encumbrances, the law does require an affidavit of good faith
appended to the mortgage and recorded with it. (See Giberson vs. A. N. Jureidini Bros., 44 Phil., 216, and Betita vs.
Ganzon, 49 Phil., 87.) A chattel mortgage may, however, be valid as between the parties without such an affidavit of
good faith. In 11 Corpus Juris, 482, the rule is expressly stated that as between the parties and as to third persons
who have no rights against the mortgagor, no affidavit of good faith is necessary. It will thus be seen that under the
law, a valid mortgage may exist between the parties without its being evidenced by a public document. This court
would not be justified, merely from the reference by the lower court in that case to a mortgage, in assuming that its
date appears in a public document. if the Manila motor Co., Inc., desired to rely upon a public document in the form
of a mortgagor as establishing its preference in this case, it should have offered that document in evidence, so that
the court might satisfy itself as to its nature and unquestionably fix the date of its execution. There is nothing either in
the judgment relied upon or in the evidence to show the date of said mortgage. The burden was upon the claimant to
prove that it actually had a public Code. It is essential that the nature and the date of the document be established by
competent evidence before the court can allow a preference as against the other parties to this proceeding.
Inasmuch as the claimant failed to establish its preference, based on a public document, the lower court properly
held that its claim against the said Aleko E. Lilius was based on the final judgment in civil case No. 41159 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila of May 3, 1932. The court, therefore, committed no error in holding that the claim of the
Manila Motor Co., Inc., was inferior in preference to those of the appellees in this case.

This appellant's assignments of error are overulled.

In view of the foregoing the following portion of the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

"Por estas consideraciones, se ordena y se decreta (a) que del saldo de P8,219.54, que pertenece a Sonja Maria
LIllius y que se halla depositado en la Escribana del Juzgado, se pague po el Escribano al Dr. W. H. Waterous la
suma de mil quinientos pesos (P1,500), a Laura L. Shuman, seiscientos sesenta y un pesos con trece centavos
(P661.13, y al St. Paul's Hospital, quinientos diez y ocho pesos con diez y ocho centavos (P518.18), y el remanente
de cinco mil cuatrocientos setenta y siete pesos con veinticuatro centavos (P5,477.24), a Sonja Maria Lililus, o su
apoderado; (b) que del saldo de P4,109.28 que pretence a Brita Marianne Lilius y que se halla deposito en la
Escribania del Juzgado, se pague por el Escribano a Laura Shuman, la suma de seicientos sesenta y un pesos con
trece centavos (P661.13); y al St. Paul's Hospital, quinientos diez y ocho pesos con diez y ocho centavos
(P518.18)y, y el sado de dos mil ochocientos sesenta y siete pesos con noventa y siete centavos (P2,867.97), a Brita
Marianne Lilius, por conducto de su tutor;".

The remaining portion of the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court is modified as follows:

"That from the sum of P13,181.33 pertaining to Aleko E. Lilius, which is deposited with the clerk of the
trial court, the following claims shall first be paid:

Dr. W.H. Waterous P1,500.00

Dr. M. Marfori 250.00

Laura Lindley Shuman 661.13

John R. McFie, Jr. 500.00

and the balance of the sum pertaining to Aleko E. Lilius shall be divided among the following entities in
proportion to their respective claims:

Amount of claim

Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. P3,672.76

Philippine Education Co., Inc. 3,695.20

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. 2045.00

Estrella del Norte 2,014.45

 Eastern and Philippine Shipping Agencies, Ltd. 470.38

So ordered without special pronouncement as to costs.

Corliss et al., vs. The Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674

G.R. No. L-21291 March 28, 1969

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellant.

Moises C. Nicomedes for plaintiff-appellant.

The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

Youth, the threshold of life, is invariably accompanied by that euphoric sense of well-being, and with reason. The future, bright with promise, looms ahead. One's powers are
still to be tested, but one feels ready for whatever challenge may come his way. There is that heady atmosphere of self-confidence, at times carried to excess. The temptation to
take risks is there, ever so often, difficult, if not impossible, to resist. There could be then a lessening of prudence and foresight, qualities usually associated with age. For death
seems so remote and contingent an event. Such is not always the case though, and a slip may be attended with consequences at times unfortunate, even fatal.

Some such thought apparently was in the mind of the lower court when it dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss
whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of
defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark
Air Force Base. In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the
oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation." 1

The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to
us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40. An examination of the evidence of record fails to yield a basis for a reversal of the decision
appealed from. We affirm.

According to the decision appealed from, there is no dispute as to the following: "In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of age, ...;
that Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep, together with a
P.C. soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns." 2

Then came a summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his
deposition, ..., that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while
there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop — dead stop.
Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train
coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident." 3 Also: "Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of
the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of
Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated
that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him." 4

After which reference was made to the testimony of the main witness for defendant-appellee, Teodorico Capili, "who was at the engine at the time of the mishap," and who
"testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew
the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an
hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks." 5

1. The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company comes to us encased in the armor of what admittedly
appears to be a careful judicial appraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of record. It is thus proof against any attack unless sustained and overwhelming. Not that it is invulnerable,
but it is likely to stand firm in the face of even the most formidable barrage.

In the more traditional terminology, the lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After all, the lower court had the
opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not neglect it. There is no affront to justice then if its finding be accorded acceptance subject of course
the contingency of reversal if error or errors, substantial in character, be shown in the conclusion thus arrived at. It is a fair statement of the governing, principle to say that the
appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court.

As was held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled, that when the credibility of witnesses is the one at issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence
deserves serious consideration by this Court." 6 An earlier expression of the same view is found in Jai-Alai Corporation v. Ching Kiat: "After going over the record, we find no
reason for rejecting the findings of the court below. The questions raised hinge on credibility and it is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its determination is
best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand." 7

In a 1964 opinion, we adhered to such an approach. Thus: "'Nothing in the record suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct on the part of the trial judge in the formulation of
the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, consonant to the
time honored tradition of the Tribunal to hold trial judges better situated to make conclusions on questions of fact'." 8 On this ground alone we can rest the affirmance of the
judgment appealed from. lâwphi1.ñet

2. Nor is the result different even if no such presumption were indulged in and the matter examined as if we were exercising original and not appellate jurisdiction. The sad and
deplorable situation in which plaintiff-appellant now finds herself, to the contrary notwithstanding we find no reason for reversing the judgment of the lower court.

This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to
pay for the damage done. 9 Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial
question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code of Spain, formerly applicable in this jurisdiction, 10 had been interpreted in earlier decisions.
Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 11Manresa was cited to the following effect "'Among the questions most frequently raised and upon which the majority of
cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are those referring to the determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the
person responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although
this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some person's fault or negligence'."

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo 12 and United States v. Barias. 13Cooley' formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo
and Barias decisions. Thus: "Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v.
Oregon Telephone Co. 14 Thus: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."

To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-appellee must necessary fail. The facts being what they are, compel
the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.

3. Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment appealed from on the ground that there was a failure to appreciate the true situation. Thus the
first three assigned errors are factual in character. The third assigned error could be summarily disposed of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view that the
whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing.

The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-
house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of
the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance. Considered separately, neither of the two above
errors assigned would call for a judgment different in character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the result. The quantum of
proof required still not been met. The alleged errors fail of their said effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it had not been improved. There is no justification for
reversing the judgment of the lower court.

It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too dependent in the lid analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it
presented itself to the parties for us to be able to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown. The factors that enter the judgment are too many and
diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of itself to yield the correct answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses. Every case must be
dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the objective standard
of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to impute negligence to defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do not
call for that conclusion.

4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment. Plaintiff-appellant apparently had in mind this portion of the opinion of the lower court: "The weight of
authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such
warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and
trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place." 15

Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above excerpt from the decision appealed from but what to her is the apparent reliance of the lower court
on Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. 16 and United States v. Manlabat & Pasibi. 17 In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court follows: "A person in
control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the
same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the purposes and the
general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of
seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do
before he attempts to cross the track." The Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: "It may be
said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily
adjust himself to the exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has a right to presume that such duty will be performed."

It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now allege that there has been a drift away from the apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above cases evidenced
by Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 18 the controlling facts of which, however, are easily distinguishable from what had been correctly ascertained in the present case. Such a
deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this jurisdiction but also of the United States.

This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice Holmes, he had the following to say: "Especially noteworthy in this respect is the attempt Mr. Justice
Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Goodman, to 'lay down a standard once for all,' which would require an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an
obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure otherwise that no train is coming to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is sound enough: it is by no
means proper care to cross a railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against a train, and normally such precautions will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at
least slow speed, where the view is obstructed." 19

Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pakora v. Wabash Railway, 20 where, according to Prosser, it being shown that "the only effective stop must be made upon the
railway tracks themselves, in a position of obligation danger, the court disregarded any such uniform rule, rejecting the 'get out of the car' requirement as 'an uncommon
precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous,' and saying that the driver need not always stop. 'Illustrations such as these,' said Mr. Justice Cardozo 'bear
witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.... Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or
regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal." 21
 What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with
the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.

What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the
deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was
heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident —
and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this
manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do." 22

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co., Inc. Vs. Phil. Motors Corp., 55 Phil 129

G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and McDonough for appellant.

Benj. S. Ohnick for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co., Inc., for the
purpose of recovering from the Philippine Motors Corporation the sum of P11,350, with interest and costs. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850,
with interest at 6 per centum per annum from March 24,1927, the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction
of the judgment, with costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the incident with which we are here
concerned, H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of Manila. At the same time the plaintiff
was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine
Islands. In January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the boat. He
therefore made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors, and was told by Mc Kellar, of said
company, that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street,
in the City of Manila. Cranston accordingly repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a
conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be
made upon completion of the work.

The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under its
charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell
the same and the equipment therof. Quest, as general manager, had full charge of the corporations in all its
branches.

As a result of the aforesaid interview, Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at anchor
in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under the
supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. In this work Quest had the
assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves
under Quest's directions.
Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing necessary to
accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one most
adapted to the purpose. After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel, supplied
from the tank already in use. The result of this experiment was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into
the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. For this purpose a temporary tank
to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine.
This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point
where it was connected with the tank. Owing to this fact the fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into
the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so
fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. The purpose of this arrangement was to
enable the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments,
to switch to the new fuel supply. lawphil.net

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor
was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor.
This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter and said that, when the engine
had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.

After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run at
about 5 p.m. or a little later, on the evening of January 30,1925. The first part of the course was covered without any
untoward development, other than he fact that the engine stopped a few times, owing no doubt to the use of an
improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied
himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results
in the engine.

As the boat was coming in from this run, at about 7:30 p.m. and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, and
connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or
engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were
covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore
compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was
reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000.

A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the negligence and
lack of skill of Quest. The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation
from the carburetor, with the result that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was
greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the cause of the flooding of the
carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already
saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable
material near-by. Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak
along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic,
versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to
the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily
skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing
the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work
on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that
particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him to take
greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have
been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the
part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning
of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in
effecting the changes which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to the exact
manner in which the accident occurred might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin of the fire in not
so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus fortuitus.

The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during
the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the
burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due
to the fault of Quest. We are unable to accede to this point of view. Certainly, Quest was not in charge of the
navigation of the boat on this trial run. His employment contemplated the installation of new parts in the engine only,
and it seems rather strained to hold that the defendant corporation had thereby become bailee of the boat. As a rule
workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his
shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract.
The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a
consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas
seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. But though defendant cannot be held liable in
the supposition that the burden of proof had not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, we
are nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline
and the damages resulting therefrom are chargeable to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest.

This action was instituted about two years after the accident in question had occured, and after Quest had ceased to
be manager of the defendant corporation and had gone back to the United States. Upon these facts, the defendant
bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was
brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches
can be properly invoked.

It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P9,850, with interest,
must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Vergara vs. CA 154 SCRA 564

G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987

VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent against
petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when
Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the
private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.

In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo
truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of
a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private
respondent) and that the said accident was an act of God for which he cannot be held liable." 1

Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said
cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant
insurance company. Petitioner asked that the latter be ordered to pay him whatever amount he may be ordered by
the court to pay to the private respondent.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers
Insurance and Surety Corporation, to the private, respondent the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees and the costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the
following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00
for and as attorney's fees.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is not tenable. It was
established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These
requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
the damages.

It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of
whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon by the trial
court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show
that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the
testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances
thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila
and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then
another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."2

According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on
his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.

Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner, the
petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FGU Insurance vs. CA, 287 SCRA 718

G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company
and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?

This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt
Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The
car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by
Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc.
(FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon
approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car
of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license. 1

As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the
latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent
Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.

Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address; in fact,
upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.

On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.3
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on another
ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR.4
In other words, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.

In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons
although the vehicle is leased to another.

We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The
pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . "

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault
or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.6

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established,
not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is
plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other
vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.7 Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen.
As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any
way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable."
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.

Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In

that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several
persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at
the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was
not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged
lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and
responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the
corporation with its driver.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995
sustaining the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Singson vs. 132 Phil 597

G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the said Bank,
defendants.

Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.

Aviado and Aranda for defendants.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.

It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in
which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had
seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly,
became final and executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the
Philippine Islands — in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank
were concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we quote:

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution and
garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party
defendants, without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment
was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and
Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson
of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the
said President of the Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of P383 in favor of B. M.
Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in
favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers with the said
bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his
deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. After the first
check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated
April 19, 1963, advising him that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the
reason that his account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated in the said
letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson
wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution
and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said
bank took steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C.
Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that
the action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. A similar letter was written by the said official
of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said
Special Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff
Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed,
resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.

xxx xxx xxx

On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Santiago Freixas,
for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.1äwphï1.ñët

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the
relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil
Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of damages allegedly
sustained by them.

The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with
the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery
of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air
France vs. Carrascoso,3 involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the
wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his
subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages — the amount of which
need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to
vindicate plaintiff's rights.5

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and P500,
as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.

City of Manila vs. Meralco 52 Phil 586

G.R. No. L-29356 December 29, 1928

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for appellant.
City Fiscal Guevara and Assistant City Fiscal Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The Manila Electric Company appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which condemns it to
pay to the City of Manila the sum of P1,788.27, with legal interest from September 10, 1927, and with costs. While
the case in its fundamentals the cause suggested important questions which possibly the parties have not entirely
grasped. By way of preliminary statement, it also remains to be said that the numerous deliberations of the court on
the case have disclosed conflicting views which it is difficult to reconcile. The present decision, therefore, will aim to
present as best it may, the principles for which a majority of the court stand, leaving it to the individual member to
dissent or other wise explain his vote as to him seems fit and proper.

On June 8, 1925, in the City of Manila, there occurred a collision between a street car of the Manila Electric
Company, of which Sixto Eustaquio was the motorman, and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. As a result of the
collision, the truck was damaged in the sum of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio was prosecuted for the crime of damage
to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was convicted by final judgment and was sentenced
to pay a fine P900, to indemnify the offended party, the City of Manila, in the sum of P1,788.27, with subsidary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not being able to collect the indemnity from the accused,
the City of Manila began an action to obtained payment from the Manila Electric Company. An allegation of the
complaint was "That the defendant Manila Electric Company as master of the said agent and servant, Sixto
Eustaquio, by virtue of its relation with the latter and by express provisions of law, is subsidiarily liable to the herein
plaintiff for the sum of P1,788.27, representing the damages caused by its agent and servant, the said Sixto
Eustaquio, in the discharge of his duties as motorman of the defendant's electric car." The principal special defense
set up in the answer to the complaint was that the defendant had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage suffered by plaintiff. At the trial, the parties agreed on certain stipulations and admissions. The
Assistant City Fiscal also offered to present two witnesses, but the trial judge thought this unnecessary and so took
judicial cognizance of the decision and the record in the criminal case which convicted the motorman, all against the
protest of counsel for the Manila Electric Company who noted his exceptions. The adverse judgment is now
contested on the ground that the trial court committed two errors, the first in admitting in evidence the documents
marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F, constituting the record in the case of the People of the Philippine Islands vs.
Sixto Eustaquio; and the second in not absolving the appellant from the complaint.

I. The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in
evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is that
the parties and the issues in a criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that due process
must be followed in the trial of all causes. No man or entity may be condemmed without a day in court. (Almeida
Chantangco and Lete vs. Abaroa [1910], 218 U. s., 476; 40 Phil., 1056; Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs. Ellerman & Bucknall
Steamship Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 514.)

It needs to be repeated that the Manila Electric Company was not a party at the trial of the criminal case. There is
extant in the record no indication that the Manila Electric Company had any control over the proceedings in the
criminal case. All that the record in the criminal case showed was that the "abogado defensor" (Attorney for the
defense) was Antonio Carrascoso. All that the record in the civil case showed was "Comparecieron: . . . Por la
entidad demandada The Manila Electric Co., los abogados senores Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., y Guillermo Cabrera"
(Appearances: . . . For the defendant Manila Electric Company attorneys Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., and Guillermo
Cabrera). By a coincidence, Attorney Carrascoso was both counsel for the defendant in the civil action. But there is
lacking any proof showing that the Manila Electric Company supplied the lawyer for the accused in the criminal action
and so is concluded by the judgment there rendered. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements just made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our discussion to the effect that the court
should treat the interests of the Manila Electric Company as involved in both litigations and should thus consider the
company as a real party without right now to protest against the judgment.)

It is our ruling that prejudicial error was committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits A to F, but that since
the plaintiff made the proper offer to present its witnesses, the case should be remanded for a new trial.

II. It has been suggested that having passed on the first error that would be sufficient. Theoretically, that is
true. Practically, it is a fallacious argument. A new trial left unguided would immediately raise questions which would
need to be passed upon eventually by this court. Also if the customary defense in civil actions for damages is to be
held sufficient, the new trial would be fruitless and the appeal might just as well be dismissed now as later, in view of
the stipulations appearing in the record.

We desire to pay our respect to the second error assigned and to the point of whether or not a case of this character
should be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code or by the provisions of the Civil Code.

The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary liability in default of the persons criminally liable. Article 20 of
the Penal Code provides that this subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under this provision that the City of Manila is
attempting to collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. If the Philippines still lay beneath the dominion of
Spain, the pronouncement of primary and subsidiary liability would be takenn much as a matter of course. (See
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 10, 1884, January 3, 1887, June 15, 1989, March 6, 1897,
December 14, 1894, February 19, 1902; 2 Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5th ed., pp. 487-497; 1 Hidalgo Codigo
Penal, pp. 331-334; 1 Groizard Codigo Penal, pp. 736-738; Opinion of the Fiscal of the Supreme Court of Justice of
Spain of January 17, 1865, 22 Revista de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, p.412; Codigo Penal of Spain of 1928, art.
78.) The Penal Code then takes cognizance of the Civil Code when in article 133 it is provided: "Civil liability arising
from felonies or misdemeanors shall be extiguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the
rules of civil law."

In connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken into view certain provisions of the Civil Code. Book IV, Title
XVI, Chapter II, of the Civil Code concerns obligations which arise from fault or negligence. It is provided in article
1903 that the obligation imposed for the damage to another caused by fault or negligence is enforcible against those
persons for whom another is responsible. But it is added that "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case
the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage." Found prior to these articles of the Civil Code in the Chapter of Title I, Book IV, pertaining to general
provisions of obligations, are articles 1092 and 1093. The first provides: "Civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code." The last mentioned provides: "Those arising
from wrongful or negligent acts or ommissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter
second of Title sixteen of this book." — that is among others to the provisions of article 1903 above-mentioned.

Manresa, speaking of article 1092 of the Civil Code, offers the following comment:

The Penal Code treats of this matter, first, in Chapter II, Title 2, of Book I, determining therein who are civilly liable for
crimes or misdemeanors and in what manner, and stating in Title 4 of the same Book the extent and purposes of said
obligations. Said Book I ends with article 135, which makes express references to the civil legislation, which
reference, as may be seen, is also made in other provisions.

In those mutual references of one legislation to another, there is no doubt as to the application of one or the other,
nor can they be criticized, since they are well grounded.

The Civil Code refers to the Penal Code as the rule applicable in the first place, since the latter determines and
punishes the acts giving rise to said obligations, or creates said obligations, thereby determining their existence and
is, therefore, for that reason of preferential application. But, then, as the Penal Code is concerned with, and is
interested only in determining how the civil obligation it creates comes into existence and develops under the
influence of the illicit character, it lays down only those rules inspired by those motives; and once the connection of
that obligation with the criminal liability is established in its provisions, with the consequences that may be inferred
from the fact that the former is based on the latter; and after an effort has been made, within the sphere of that civil
responsibility, toward making the indemnification coextensive with the effects of the crime, and a special necessity,
which is characteristic of punishment and is the subject matter of the Penal Code, has been shown in the provisions
regulating said liability, the Penal Code, could not, without going beyond its one sphere, give all the rules relative to
said obligations, nor did it have any necessity for doing so, because once the peculiar nature of said obligations is
saved by its provisions, the essence thereof common to the other obligations must, as in the latter, be defined by the
civil law, which will thus become an important source, although suppletory, of those derived from crime.

The peculiar rules of the Penal Code, as may be seen, are inspired by those motives which, as we have stated, might
make them necessary for said Code to establish, as distinguished from the criterion of the civil law with regard to
obligations in general. Thus, the fundamental declaration of article 18 gives the connection of civil obligation with
criminal liability and explains the origin of the former: article 19 solves the doubt which that connection, among
certain liabilities, may create, and determining its limits in the nature and consequences of the act, it mentions those
which are of a civil nature, basing the civil liability upon principle of justice, and rather upon casualty than upon
liability of a criminal character. The intention to make indemnification proportionate to the nature and effects of the
act, from which the obligation arises, inspires the provisions contained in articles 121 to 124, both inclusive; the
necessity to distiguish, in order to give the consequences which the crime may produce within the sphere of civil law,
whether or not the persons thereby bound are guilty, prevails in article 128 and partly in article 122; article 125 gives
the essential difference between the civil obligation and the personal criminal liability, and dissipates a doubt which,
due to the latter's instranmissibility, might arise as to the former by reason of its accessory character in connection
with the other, and by the intimate connection between both which the crime or misdemeanor creates and the
criminal law declares; the influence of the severity on the punishment is noted in articles 20 and 21, even though the
latter coincide with the criterion followed in analogous cases by the Civil Code, and already deviating from the latter's
criterion by reason of that severity founded on the illicit origin of the obligations which it declares, it provides for the
latter a necessary solidarity in article 127; and abandoning also the criterion of the civil law in article 126, it
establishes within that solidarity, not the presumption of equal division which the latter provides in such a case, but a
prudent division which may, and generally must be, unequal, in order that the influence of the different participation in
the crime or misdemeanor which is the origin of the former may also reach the Civil obligation.

In all other respects, and even in some of those same features, either by the express reference of the articles which
provide for them, or by the latter's influence, the civil obligation shall be subject to the Civil Code, which even in some
of those peculiar rules has supposed a modification in so far as it does not establish the benefit of exemption to the
extent needed for support, as provided for in the Penal Code.

While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt that by this
reference it means those rules of a general nature which regulate the civil liability arising from the particular crimes or
misdemeanors therein mentioned, and that, in connection therewith, they shall have the preferential application which
this article recognizes in favor of the Penal Code. (8 Manresa Codigo Civil Espanol, 3d ed., pp. 28-32.)

The case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), is one of the widest known authorities on
the subject of damages. But that was strickly a civil action not predicated on or related to a criminal action. It was
said: "Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing out of the accident in question, the provisions
of the Penal Code cannot affect this action. This construction renders it necessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines." That such subsidiary civil liability in penal
actions has not been abrogated by later laws, seems fairly well established. Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure recognizes the rights of persons injured by the offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to
recover damages. It is there provided that "the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him
for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act." Authoritative decisions have also leaned in the direction of taking it
for granted that civil liability could be fixed in the criminal action. While the law of criminal procedure is silent on the
subject of subsidiary liability, so far as we can see, there could exist no good reason for not permitting the action to
eb carried forward to the second stage and there to fix subsidiary liability.

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code
govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or ommision not
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil
Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Almeida Chantangco and Lete vs. Abaroa, supra,
should be read in connection both with the discussion of the first assignment of error and the question now before us.
In that decision, Mr. Justice Lurton, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

The case is, however, one which we conceive must be governed by the local law of the Philippine Islands, and the
single question to which we need address ourselves is as to whether that law was right applied by the local tribunals.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code in force in the Philippine Islands reads thus: "A person who, by an act or omission,
causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." By
articles 1092 and 1093 of the same Code provision is made for the enforcement of civil liability, varying in character
according to the origin of the liability. Thus, article 1092 provides that civil obligations arising from crimes and
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. On the other hand, article 1093 provides that
"those arising from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence, not punished by law, occurs, shall be subject to
the provisions of chapter second of title sixteen of this book." The action here involved comes directly under article
1092, above set out, and is not an action arising from "fault or negligence, not punished by law." The complaint
alleges that the act of burning was "malicious and unlawful," and not that it was the result of any "fault or negligence."
This was the construction placed upon the complaint by both the courts below, and is a construction not challenged
here. It follows that he must turn to the Penal Code to discover when a civil action arises out of a crime or
misdemeanor, and the procedure of the enforcement of such civil liability. Article 17 of the Penal Code reads as
follows: "Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable." May this civil liability be
enforced without a prior legal determination of the fact of the defendant's guilt of crime? Does civil liability exist at all if
the defendant has been found not guilty of the acts out of which the civil liability arises? The opinion of the Court
below was that a judgment of conviction was essential to an action for indemnification under the applicable local law.
To this conclusion we assent, upon the following considerations:

First, by the positive legislation of the Philippine Codes, civil and criminal, a distinction is drawn between a civil
liability which results from the mere negligence of the defendant and a liability for the civil consequences of a crime
by which another has sustained loss or injury.

Second, the plain inference from article 17, above set out, is that civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon
facts which, if true, would constitute a crime or misdemeanor.

Third, the Philippine Code of Procedure plainly contemplates that the civil liability of the defendant shall be
ascertained and declared in the criminal proceedings.1awphi1.net

Thus, section 742 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after requiring that, in the criminal proceeding, all of the minor
or incidental offenses included in the principal crime shall be decided, adds: "All questions relating to the civil liability
which may have been the subject-matter of the charge shall be decided in the sentence.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing considerations eliminate any question of the effect of such a judgment of acquittal undere the
principles of the common law and require an affirmance of the judgment of the court below as properly based upon
the applicable substantive law of the Philippine Islands, which has not been superseded by legislation since the
establishment of the present Philippine Government.

The facts here are distinguishable from those in Chaves and Garcia vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
([1915], 31 Phil., 47). In the cited case, while the motorman was prosecuted and convicted, his sentence included no
imposition of civil liability. So the court correctly held, although without discussion, that the employer was not liable in
damages resulting from the criminal negligence of his employee, when he has exercised the care of a good father of
a family in selecting said employee.

In the later decision of this court in Francisco vs. Onrubia ([1924], 46 Phil., 327), the court gave attention to a similar
question. Speaking through Mr. Justice Villamor, the court reached the following conclusions:

Article 1902 of the Civil Code has no application in the instant case, first, because said article presupposes the
existence of fault or negligence upon which the action is based, and second, it refers to a fault or negligence not
punishable by law, because if the fault or negligence is punished by law, it ceases to be the quasi crime of negligence
having purely civil effects, and becomes a crime or misdemeanor, according to the gravity of the penalty imposed by
the law, and in that case it comes within the purview of article 1092 of the Civil Code. Under the facts set forth in the
complaint, if there was any fault or negligence on the part of the defendant, it must necessarily be a fault punishable
by law (arts. 586, 590, and 604 of the Penal Code), for through said fault he caused the death of the plaintiff's son.
Homicide through reckless imprudence is punished as a crime, and therefore the provisions applicable would be
those of the Penal Code and the Law of Criminal Procedure above cited.
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out
by the trial judge, any different ruling would premit the master to escape scot-free by allging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be
good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action or misdemeanor. (By way of
parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during
our deliberations to the effect that article 1092 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and
1903 applied.)

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be set aside, and the record remanded to the
lower court for a new trial. Without special finding as to costs in this instance, it will be so ordered.

United States vs. Barias 23 Phil 586

G.R. No. L-7567 November 12, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, defendant-appellant.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

This is an appeal from a sentence imposed by the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, for homicide resulting from reckless negligence. The information charges:

That on or about November 2, 1911, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Segundo Barias was a
motorman on street car No. 9, run 7 of the Pasay-Cervantes lines of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company,
a corporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands; as a such motorman he was
controlling and operating said street car along Rizal Avenue, formerly Calle Cervantes, of this city, and as such
motorman of the said street car he was under obligation to run the same with due care and diligence to avoid any
accident that might occur to vehicles and pedestrians who were travelling on said Rizal Avenue; said accused, at said
time and place, did willfully, with reckless imprudence and inexcusable negligence and in violation of the regulations
promulgated to that effect, control and operate said street car, without heeding the pedestrians crossing Rizal Avenue
from one side to the other, thus knocking down and causing by his carelessness and imprudent negligence that said
street car No. 9, operated and controlled by said accused, as hereinbefore stated, should knock down and pass over
the body and head of one Fermina Jose, a girl 2 years old, who at said time and place was crossing the said Rizal
Avenue, the body of said girl being dragged along street-car on said Rizal Avenue for a long distance, thus crushing
and destroying her head and causing her sudden death as a result of the injury received; that if the acts executed by
the accused had been done with malice, he would be guilty of the serious crime of homicide.

The defendant was a motorman for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company. At about 6 o'clock on the
morning of November 2, 1911, he was driving his car along Rizal avenue and stopped it near the intersection of that
street with Calle Requesen to take on some passengers. When the car stopped, the defendant looked backward,
presumably to note whether all the passengers were aboard, and then started his car. At that moment Fermina Jose,
a child about 3 years old, walked or ran in front of he car. She was knocked down and dragged some little distance
underneath the car, and was left dead upon the track. The motorman proceeded with his car to the end of the track,
some distance from the place of the accident, and apparently knew nothing of it until his return, when he was
informed of what happened.
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts. It is true that one witness testified that the defendant started the car
without turning his head, and while he was still looking backwards and that this testimony was directly contradicted by
that of another witness. But we do not deem it necessary to make an express finding as to the precise direction in
which the defendant's head was turned at the moment when he started his car. It is sufficient for the purpose of our
decision to hold, as we do, that the evidence clearly discloses that he started his car from a standstill without looking
over the track immediately in front of the car to satisfy himself that it was clear. he did not see the child until after he
had run his car over it, and after he had return to the place where it was found dead, and we think we are justified in
saying that whenever he was looking at the moment when he started his car, he was not looking at the track
immediately in front of the car, and that he had not satisfied himself that this portion of the tract was clear immediately
before putting the car in the motion.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of imprudencia temeraria (reckless negligence) as charged in the
information, and sentenced him to over one year and one month of imprisonment in the Bilibid Prison, and to pay the
cause of the action.

The sole question raised by this appeal is whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care
on the part of the defendant as to amount to reckless negligence (imprudencia temeraria).

Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed., 1324) defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe, for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other persons suffers injury."

In the case of U. S. vs. Nava, (1 Phil. Rep., 580), we held that: "Reckless negligence consists of the failure to take
such precautions or advance measures in the performance of an act as the most prudence would suggest whereby
injury is caused to persons or to property."

Silvela says in his "Derecho Penal," in speaking of reckless imprudence (imprudencia temeraria):

The word "negligencia" used in the code, and the term "imprudencia" with which this punishable act is defined,
express this idea in such a clear manner that it is not necessary to enlarge upon it. He who has done everything on
his part to prevent his actions from causing damage to another, although he has not succeeded in doing so,
notwithstanding his efforts, is the victim of an accident and can not be considered responsible for the same. (Vol. 2,
p. 127 [153].)

Temerario is, in our opinion, one who omits, with regard to this actions, which are liable to cause injury to another,
that care and diligence, that attention, which can be required of the least careful, attentive, or diligent. If a moment's
attention and reflection would have shown a person that the act which he was about to perform was liable to have the
harmful consequence which it had, such person acted with temerity and may be guilty of "imprudencia temeraria." It
may be that in practice this idea has been given a greater scope and the acts of imprudence which did not show
carelessness as carried to such high degree, might have been punished as "imprudencia temeraria;" but in our
opinion, the proper meaning of the word does not authorize another interpretation. (Id., p. 133 [161].)

Groizard, commenting upon "imprudencia temeraria," on page 389, volume 8, of his work on the Penal Code, says:

Prudence is that cardinal virtue which teaches us to discern and distinguish the good from bad, in order to adopt or
flee from it. It also means good judgment, temperance, and moderation in one's actions. `Temerario is one who
exposes himself to danger or rushes into it without reflection and without examining the same. Consequently, he who
from lack of good judgment, temperance, or moderation in his actions, exposes himself without reflection and
examination to the danger of committing a crime, must be held responsible under the provision of law
aforementioned.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term
and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone Co., 24 Oreg., 276, 294;
35 Pac., 549.)

Ordinary care, if the danger is great, may arise to the grade of a very exact and unchangeable attention. (Parry Mfg.
Co. vs. Eaton, 41 Ind. App., 81, 1908; 83 N. E., 510.)

In the case of U. S. vs. Reyes (1 Phil. Rep., 375-377), we held that: "The diligence with which the law requires the
individual at all the time to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and with
the importance of the act which he is to perform.lawph!l.net

The question to be determined then, is whether, under all the circumstances, and having in mind the situation of the
defendant when he put his car in motion and ran it over the child, he was guilty of a failure to take such precautions
or advance measures as common prudence would suggest.

The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely populated
section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets begin to
move about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high degree of
diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in
observing the track over which he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume that
the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do
everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy street cars on
public thoroughfares in populous sections of the city.

Did he exercise the degree of diligence required of him? We think this question must be answered in the negative.
We do not go so far as to say that having brought his car to a standstill it was his bounden duty to keep his eyes
directed to the front. Indeed, in the absence of some regulation of his employers, we can well understand that, at
times, it might be highly proper and prudent for him to glance back before again setting his car in motion, to satisfy
himself that he understood correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had safely alighted or gotten on
board. But we do insist that before setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy himself that the track was
clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the defendant did not do, and the
result of his negligence was the death of the child.

In the case of Smith vs. St. Paul City Ry. Co., (32 Minn., p. 1), the supreme court of Minnesota, in discussing the
diligence required of street railway companies in the conduct of their business observed that: "The defendant was a
carrier of passengers for hire, owing and controlling the tracks and cars operated thereon. It is therefore subject to
the rules applicable to passenger carriers. (Thompson's Carriers, 442; Barrett vs. Third Ave. R. Co., 1 Sweeny, 568; 8
Abb. Pr. (N.S.), 205.) As respects hazards and dangers incident to the business or employment, the law enjoins upon
such carrier the highest degree of care consistent with its undertaking, and it is responsible for the slightest
negligence. (Wilson vs. Northern Pacific R. Co., 26 Minn., 278; Warren vs. Fitchburg R. Co., 8 Allen, 233; 43 Am.
Dec. 354, 356, notes and cases.) . . . The severe ruled which enjoins upon the carrier such extraordinary care and
diligence, is intended, for reasons of public policy, to secure the safe carriage of passengers, in so far as human skill
and foresight can affect such result." The case just cited was a civil case, and the doctrine therein announced had
special reference to the care which should be exercised in securing the safety of passengers. But we hold that the
reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their employees the duty of exercising the
utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding the
infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public streets and thoroughfares over which these companies
are authorized to run their cars. And while, in a criminal case, the courts will require proof of the guilt of the company
or its employees beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or diligence required of the company and its
employees is the same in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether the proofs shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the failure to exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and that the
defendant was guilty thereof.

Counsel for the defendant insist that the accident might have happened despite the exercise of the utmost care by
the defendant, and they have introduced photographs into the record for the purpose of proving that while the
motorman was standing in his proper place on the front platform of the car, a child might have walked up immediately
in front of he car without coming within the line of his vision. Examining the photographs, we think that this contention
may have some foundation in fact; but only to this extent, that standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily
assume while the car is in motion, the eye of the average motorman might just miss seeing the top of the head of a
child, about three years old, standing or walking close up to the front of the car. But it is also very evident that by
inclining the head and shoulders forward very slightly, and glancing in front of the car, a person in the position of a
motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately in front of his car; and we hold that it is the manifest
duty of a motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare in a thickly-settled district, to satisfy himself
that the track is clear immediately in front of his car, and to incline his body slightly forward, if that be necessary, in
order to bring the whole track within his line of vision. Of course, this may not be, and usually is not necessary when
the car is in motion, but we think that it is required by the dictates of the most ordinary prudence in starting from a
standstill.

We are not unmindful of our remarks in the case of U. S. vs. Bacho (10 Phil. Rep., 577), to which our attention is
directed by counsel for appellant. In that case we said that:

. . . In the general experience of mankind, accidents apparently avoidable and often inexplicable are unfortunately too
frequent to permit us to conclude that some one must be criminally liable for negligence in every case where an
accident occurs. It is the duty of the prosecution in each case to prove by competent evidence not only the existence
of criminal negligence, but that the accused was guilty thereof.

Nor do we overlook the ruling in the case of U. S. vs. Barnes (12 Phil. Rep., 93), to which our attention is also invited,
wherein we held that the defendant was not guilty of reckless negligence, where it appeared that he killed another by
the discharge of his gun under such circumstances that he might have been held guilty of criminally reckless
negligence had he had knowledge at that moment that another person was in such position as to be in danger if the
gun should be discharged. In this latter case the defendant had no reason to anticipate that the person who was
injured was in the line of fire, or that there was any probability that he or anyone else would place himself in the line
of fire. In the case at bar, however, it was, as we have seen, the manifest duty of the motorman to take reasonable
precautions in starting his car to see that in doing so he was not endangering the life of any pedestrian, old or young;
and to this end it was further his duty to guard against the reasonable possibility that some one might be on the track
immediately in front of the car. We think that the evidence showing, as it does, that the child was killed at the moment
when the car was set in motion, we are justified in holding that, had the motorman seen the child, he could have
avoided the accident; the accident was not, therefore, "unavailable or inexplicable," and it appearing that the
motorman, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, might have seen the child before he set the car in motion, his failure
to satisfy himself that the track was clear before doing so was reckless negligence, of which he was properly
convicted in the court below.

We think, however, that the penalty should be reduced to that of six months and one day of prision correccional.
Modified by substituting for so much thereof as imposes the penalty of one year and one month of imprisonment, the
penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, the judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing
the appellant is affirmed, with costs of both instances against him. So ordered.

GAN vs. CA 165 SCRA 378

G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988

HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201
of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On
appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of
the judgment below.

The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:

In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck
and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As
the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming
from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby
encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the
defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man
who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The
force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The
pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front
paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later
Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced)
dead on arrival.2

An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above incident. She
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.

Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal
moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The
grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as
evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.

The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of-
offense charged.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide thru
simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of
Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3

Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she should
have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the
brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00.4

We reverse.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. 5

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 6

Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.

The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:

The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed by
another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was
driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the
pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such
suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it
is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.

Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances
of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did
have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without
stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement
to the police 8 stating::

And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na aking
kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglang pagtawid ng tao o victim
at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente.9
(Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have been
admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too
much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly
could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting
petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only
enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.

We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due
them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the
heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED.

People vs. De Los Santos 355 SCRA 415

G.R. No. 131588 March 27, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City, reported over print and
broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were
undergoing an "endurance run" as part of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much effort
was spared for the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos
(hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to cal authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple
Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as follows:

That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay Puerto,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from … behind
in a sudden and unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle … members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black
short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a
column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic] three
lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to defend
themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP
joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon
Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and
Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving
their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a
distance of 100 meters away from the jogger’s rear portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed;
instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the
joggers, thus forcing the rear hitting, bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be
thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that
bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to
travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on
said 1st line, as a result thereof the following were killed on the spot:

1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco

2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas

3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren

4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez

5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo

6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito

While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while the following eleven (11)
other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause other
than said accused’s spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
on the following victims which prevented their death, to wit:

1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo

2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit

3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala

4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo

5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glade Polboroza

6. Arman Neri Hernaiz

While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:

1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera

2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano

3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang

4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion

5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro

After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-
enumerated helpless.

Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training held at Camp
Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last
phase of the training was the "endurance run" from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5
October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns; the first and second of which
had 22 trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green
and black combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they reached
Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in Carmen
Hill. Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were assigned
to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other
vehicles to take the left lane.1
Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were assigned as rear guards of the
first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles
passed them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.2

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards them. The
vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands
for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals
and coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told their co-trainees
to "retract." The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by
the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle.
The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The guards then stopped
oncoming vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again.3

The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted an ocular inspection of
the place where the incident happened. They then proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City
Prosecutor manifested, thus:

The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which [was] involved in
the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue with strips painting along the side
colored orange and yellow as well as in front. We further manifest that … the windshield was totally
damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just below the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the
impact. The lower portion was likewise damaged more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said
vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut of the plastic used as a bumper; that the right
side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal light, right side was likewise damaged.
The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from the ground to the lower portion of
the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front level is 5 ft.4

PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro City,
and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members of the PNP came to their station and reported that they had
been bumped by a certain vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to
the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle
remained on the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to conclude that the
brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft.
long.5

GLENN’s version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:

At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latter’s fellow band
members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu Forward, that would bring their band instruments,
band utilities and band members from Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there,
they were supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored "Sabado Nights"
of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from
him.6 Since the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN
immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back to his
house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go to Bukidnon to get his aunt’s Isuzu Forward
truck because the twenty band members and nine utilities and band instruments could not be accommodated in the
Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Peña, and a certain Akut.7

After leaving GLENN’s house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant. GLENN saw his "kumpare"
Danilo Cosin and the latter’s wife, and joined them at the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer.
When the Cosin spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight
for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them sometime looking for the
Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had
mechanical problems. Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use
the Isuzu Elf truck instead.8

GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no moon or star; neither were
there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his companions used the national highway, traversing the right lane
going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve going
slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of the national
highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to dim.
GLENN switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It was
only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other car’s headlights were
switched from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to sudden
darkness.9

It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after passing the oncoming vehicle,
that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right
foot on the brake pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and
could not see what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to pump the brake, nor
did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions woke
up and said to him: "Gard, it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die." Due to its momentum,
the Elf continued on its track and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next curve.10

GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right headlights of the truck had
been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did
not report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only
when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side mirror and round mirror,
missing; and the windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred,
and he realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor Emano.11

The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA Office, Cagayan de
Oro City. The former testified that when he went to GLENN’s house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was
heavy rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate. He corroborated GLENN’s testimony that he (Cerscente)
went to GLENN’s house that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring the band instruments, band utilities and
band members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.12 Almazan, on the other hand, testified
that based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain from 8:00 p.m. of
October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of
5 October 1995. What she meant by "overcast" is that there was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and
stars could not be seen.13

The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100 meters away from the place
where the incident occurred. He testified that he was awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds.
Thereafter, a man came to his house and asked for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo
further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not muddy.14

In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each of the victims of
attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.

Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in finding that he caused the
Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in
finding that he caused the truck to run even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still
have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the oncoming
vehicle.

In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that "the accused out of mischief and dare-devilness [sic], in the
exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the
rear guard[s] and see them scamper away as they saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them down."15

Likewise, the OSG posits that "the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging trainees was probably brought
by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident."16

Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., "the possibility that [GLENN] could have
fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in the early morning, and thus was not able to stop his
Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping thuds were occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up upon
hearing the shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already occurred."17

Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in weighing the
evidence. It we are to subscribe to the trial court’s finding that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear
guards, then intent to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional
felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be indulged.18

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of
reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN’s part.

First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very dark," as there
was no moon. And according to PAG-ASA’s observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City
covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely
no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars to be
seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.1âwphi1.nêt

Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and
green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither
reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees were
occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENN’s vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same
direction as GLENN’s truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.

Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN’s testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by
the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He
must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into
the group of police trainees.

Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one ‘to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow,
dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one on the road is a
person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and
three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.

The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was
premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of
applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene.

For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENN’s vehicle to the confluence of the following
factors:

1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would
have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would have
stopped only after a certain distance.

2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine and smooth asphalt,
free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little
bit downward, more particularly from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and faster
to traverse a distance "20 to 25 meters which was the approximate aggregate distance" from the first
elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.

3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only) could hardly make
an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour.

4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and the under chassis was
elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat on the ground without its rubber tires running
over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires.

5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding, the forward
movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum of the forward-moving truck such that there was
even much lesser force resisting the said ongoing momentum.

It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations – one consistent with
the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver
responsibility – the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused.19

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured,
was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN
had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.

Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is positively identified,
such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to
be true.20 Thus, in People v. Godinez,21 this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of the accused
becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely accidental.

Neither is there any showing of "a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements disguised in a
vehicular accident."22 Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a
rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the case, the proper charge would be
rebellion, and not murder.23
GLENN’s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement
he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.

We have once said:

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.24

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person
or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.25

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition;
and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or
swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By
his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place
of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a
reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it
would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite
direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the
speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at
the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law"
committed either by means of deceit {dolo) or fault (culpa).26 In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,27 we ruled that if a
reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,28 the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties
imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,29 the accused was convicted of the complex crime of
"multiple homicide with damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize,
thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should
be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity
of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such
defect.30Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph
thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim,
therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one
degree.31Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise
its sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through
imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.32

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the
scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims,
the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said
penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period.

Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca33 and of GLENN that the
latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered
pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose
maximum is that which could properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period,
as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law
will not apply.

As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same. Conformably with current
jurisprudence,34 we reduce the trial court’s award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of
heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of those who
suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and
another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2) months
of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees killed are
reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-
appellant.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Phoenix Construction vs. Carbonel 148 SCRA 353

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.

FELICIANO, J:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken
"a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General
Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's
car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in
such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor
any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had
earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As
a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the
legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had
exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of the lost
dentures of plaintiff;

(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff
brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the defendants;

(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected and
sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious
anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in controversy up to the present time;

(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of
defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.

(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; and

(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)

Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the
decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following extent:

1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the only
amount that the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;

2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced to P100,000.00, basically because
Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not
solely attributable to the accident in question;" and

3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive and
unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.

The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs remained untouched.

This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.

Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner in which the
dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts drew the inference that there
was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by
Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump
truck had been parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed
into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was
"in some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's negligence and made no further
mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we
find that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the
appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in which
Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the
manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that
private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident
and the injuries he sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without
having to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put
forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which
must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.

There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew
pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the
collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with
the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether
Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio
immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment
immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them
along with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to
produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his
curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N.
Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said
to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that
private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial
number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession
of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding
home and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection
and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid
curfew pass.

On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court and the
appellate court were completely silent.

The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident
almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being barely 200 meters away.
Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was
"moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a
moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General
Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3

Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did not fag within any of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official
information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection
fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records
exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to
the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling
in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of
night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who
happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res
gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to
such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity
at winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.

A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally
malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the
headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is
the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so
as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far
away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.

A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The evidence here
consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the
time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7
This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio
was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of
that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of
hard liquor may affect different people differently.

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and
thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship
between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other
hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's
negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various
jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for
our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which
the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make
this quite clear:

Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made
the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the
sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the
defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the
type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety,
and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition"
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening
cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In
other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to
impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor and
Keeton:

Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to
be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant
may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent
only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind
arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that
event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk
of fire from some independent source. ... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the
defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect
the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of
the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces
are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.

Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all
ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an
obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...

The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. ... [The
standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence
which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks
the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks
an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives
into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is
that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding
the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith
11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article
2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's —
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or
physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence
which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission.
To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16
in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our
opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the
dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part
of Phoenix.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio
on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00
as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid
by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by
the respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of
compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by
20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil 329

G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907

M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

A. D. Gibbs for appellant.

F. G. Waite, & Thimas Kepner for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that
the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or
near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the
plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant.
The detailed description by the defendant's witnesses of the construction and quality of the track proves that if was
up to the general stranded of tramways of that character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces
of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon which at a right angle
rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with
the blocks were the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks or
crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending from one side to the other. The tracks were each
about 2 feet wide and the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was admitted that there were
no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the
stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the
joints between the rails were immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.

The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of the accident,
is not clear in the evidence, but is found by the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the argument to have
been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon.
The superintendent of the company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort was made to
repair the injury at the time of the occurrence. According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of the track, varying
from one half inch to one inch and a half, was therafter apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the plaintiff
swears that the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply
straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the
very same timbers as before. It has not proven that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any
proper system of inspection.

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing
either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in
proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is
upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below
based his judgment.

This case presents many important matters for our decision, and first among them is the standard of duty which we
shall establish in our jurisprudence on the part of employees toward employees.

The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led many countries to enact designed to put these
relations on a fair basis in the form of compensation or liability laws or the institution of insurance. In the absence of
special legislation we find no difficulty in so applying the general principles of our law as to work out a just result.

Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:

Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.

And article 568 of the latter code provides:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice would constitute a grave crime,
shall be punished.

And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:

4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any infraction of regulations, shall
cause an injury which, had malice intervened, would have constituted a crime or misdemeanor.

And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults of their servants and
representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character.

It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the necessary conclusion from these collated
laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the
plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the tract,
and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his
employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.

SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our
general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these
scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out
litigants their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though n ever in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be
prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article
112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced by only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the
same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citations of these articles suffices to show that the
civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided by law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the inured
party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are process of prosecution, or in so far as they determinate
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement
in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal in question,
the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have
arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of
an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from
negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1092 and 1093. More than this, however, it can not be
said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are regulated by articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those and growing
out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But were relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104,
of the same code. A typical application of the distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due
to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage. while that to that injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article
1093.

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two difference senses;
either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two
persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as
already existed, which can not be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from
the already exiting obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a real source of
an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to presume
that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not extend to those provisions relating to
the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)

And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of negligence may be somewhat
inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and
not entailing so strict an obligation as the former. This terminology is unreservedly accepted by Sanchez-Roman
(Derecho Civil, fourth section, Chapter XI, Article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported be decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, among them those of November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27,
1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not one of mandate. (March 10, 1897, 81
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 107.)

Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of the Working Men's Accident Law of January 30, 1900, throws
uncertain light on the relation between master and workman. Moved by the quick industrial development of their
people, the courts of France early applied to the subject the principles common to the law of both countries, which
are lucidly discussed by the leading French commentators.

The original French theory, resting the responsibility of owners of industrial enterprises upon articles 1382, 1383, and
1384 of the Code Napoleon, corresponding in scope to articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Code, soon yielded to
the principle that the true basis is the contractual obligation of the employer and employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196, Title
Travail, 331.)

Later the hardships resulting from special exemptions inserted in contracts for employment led to the discovery of a
third basis for liability in an article of he French Code making the possessor of any object answerable for damage
done by it while in his charge. Our law having no counterpart of this article, applicable to every kind of object, we
need consider neither the theory growing out of it nor that of "professional risk" more recently imposed by express
legislation, but rather adopting the interpretation of our Civil Code above given, find a rule for this case in the
contractual obligation. This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so inherent in its nature to be
invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely
corresponding to English and American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain
that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the
negligence of the defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and,
as such, one assumed by him. It is evident that this can not be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to
repair the track or to duly inspect, it for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might
neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of
a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the
defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or omission not
his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant, rule," we are not disposed to introduce
into our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case of Prescott vs. Fowler (3 Meeson & Welsby,
1) in 1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by "the Employers' Liability Acts" and the "Compensation Law."
The American States which applied it appear to be gradually getting rid of it; for instance, the New York State
legislature of 1906 did away with it in respect to railroad companies, and had in hand a scheme for its total abolition.
It has never found place in the civil law of continental Europe. (Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858, Title Responsibilite, 630, and
vol. 15, 1895, same title, 804. Also more recent instances in Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)

The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down the contrary principle in its judgment of June 28, 1841, in the case of
Reygasse, and has since adhered to it.

The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:

First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and

Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or
behind it.

As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in
the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. The claim that he
must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable condition of things not
before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony. While the method of construction may have been known to
the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two
days. A man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The
foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and that it was then in good condition,
and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant, working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression
in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was
reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing
at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence,
barring his recovery under the severe American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who
found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being lower than then other" and "it does not
appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same
place."

Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would, nevertheless, be binding upon us, because not
"plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence," as those words of section 497, paragraph 3 of the Code of
Civil Procedure were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the De la Rama case (201 U. S., 303).

In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so specific. While the
judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to
the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons
necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for
the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given
by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself
upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the conduct
of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our
inquiry.

While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were
expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of
proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order
being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. This conclusion presents sharply the
question, What effect is to be given such an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to
the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction of damages?

While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent the doctrine of comparative negligence,
allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury, provided his negligence was slight as
compared with that of the defendant, and some others have accepted the theory of proportional damages, reducing
the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication
establishes the principle in American jurisprudence that any negligence, however slight, on the part of the person
injured which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery. (English and American
Encyclopedia of law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and Contributory Negligence.")

In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme Court of the United States thus
authoritatively states the present rule of law:

Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for
such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of
ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years
(having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence.

There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was exonerated, but when analyzed they
prove to have been decided either upon the point that he was not negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff was
the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to casus fortuitus. Of the first class in the decision
of January 26, 1887 (38 Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a railway employee, standing on a car, was
thrown therefrom and killed by the shock following the backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of
the train and engine being in conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on its part.

Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated
in Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th of June, 1888 (64 Jurisprudencia Civil,
No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of the defendant impelled against it by the Tajo River,
was held due to a freshet as a fortuitous cause.

The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two bases, one, that the defendant
was not negligent, because expressly relieved by royal order from the common obligation imposed by the police law
of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the other, because the act of the deceased in driving over level ground
with unobstructed view in front of a train running at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining cause
of the accident. It is plain that the train was doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the only fault lay with
the injured man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of such an efficient nature that without it
no catastrophe could have happened.
On the other hand, there are many cases reported in which it seems plain that the plaintiff sustaining damages was
not free from contributory negligence; for instance, the decision of the 14th of December, 1894 (76 Jurisprudencia
Civil, No. 134), in which the owner of a building was held liable for not furnishing protection to workmen engaged in
hanging out flags, when the latter must have perceived beforehand the danger attending the work.

None of those cases define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff which contributed to his injury as one of
its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other
countries.

In France in the case of Marquant, August 20, 1879, the cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the victim
did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the contributory
negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the damages. The same principle was applied in the
case of Recullet, November 10, 1888. and that of Laugier of the 11th of November, 1896. (Fuzier-Herman, Title
Responsibilite Cirile, 411, 412.) Of like tenor are citations in Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail, 363, 364, and vol. 15,
1895, Title Responsibilite, 193, 198).

In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has retained for the most part the French Civil Law, now embodied in a
code following the Code Napoleon, a practice in accord with that of France is laid down in many cases collected in
the annotations to article 1053 of the code edited by Beauchamps, 1904. One of these is Luttrell vs. Trottier, reported
in La Revue de Jurisprudence, volume 6, page 90, in which the court of Kings bench, otherwise known as the court
of appeals, the highest authority in the Dominion of Canada on points of French law, held that contributory negligence
did not exonerate the defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the accident, but entitled him to a
reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts have been overruled by appellate tribunals made
up of common law judges drawn from other provinces, who have preferred to impose uniformally throughout the
Dominion the English theory of contributory negligence. Such decisions throw no light upon the doctrines of the civil
law. Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in legislation; for instance, section 2 of article 2398 of the Code of
Portugal reads as follows:

If in the case of damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the person injured or in the part of some one
else, the indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in the second case it shall be appropriated in
proportion to such fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 2372.

And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly changeable with the accident shall
stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he shall share
the liability equally with the person principally responsible. The principle of proportional damages appears to be also
adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code. Even in the United States in admirality jurisdictions, whose principles are
derived from the civil law, common fault in cases of collision have been disposed of not on the ground of contradictor
negligence, but on that of equal loss, the fault of the one part being offset against that of the other. (Ralli vs. Troop,
157 U. S. 386; 97.)

The damage of both being added together and the sum equally divided, a decree is entered in favor of the vessel
sustaining the greater loss against the other for the excess of her damages over one-half of the aggregate sum. (The
Manitoba, 122 U. S., 97)

Exceptional practice appears to prevail in maritime law in other jurisdictions. The Spanish Code of Commerce, article
827, makes each vessel for its own damage when both are the fault; this provision restricted to a single class of the
maritime accidents, falls for short of a recognition of the principle of contributory negligence as understood in
American Law, with which, indeed, it has little in common. This is a plain from other articles of the same code; for
instance, article 829, referring to articles 826, 827, and 828, which provides: "In the cases above mentioned the civil
action of the owner against the person liable for the damage is reserved, as well as the criminal liability which may
appear."

The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one, not adjustable with respects of the faults of the parties, appears to
have grown out the original method of trial by jury, which rendered difficult a nice balancing of responsibilities and
which demanded an inflexible standard as a safeguard against too ready symphaty for the injured. It was assumed
that an exact measure of several concurring faults was unattainable.

The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the other, is,
not the wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the other; it that the law can not measure how much of the
damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault. If he were allowed to recover, it might be that he would
obtain from the other party compensation for hiss own misconduct. (Heil vs. Glanding, 42 Penn. St. Rep., 493, 499.)

The parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law has no scales to determine in
such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief. (Railroad vs. Norton, 24
Penn. St. 565, 469.)

Experience with jury trials in negligence cases has brought American courts to review to relax the vigor of the rule by
freely exercising the power of setting aside verdicts deemed excessive, through the device of granting new trials,
unless reduced damages are stipulated for, amounting to a partial revision of damages by the courts. It appears to us
that the control by the court of the subject matter may be secured on a moral logical basis and its judgment adjusted
with greater nicety to the merits of the litigants through the practice of offsetting their respective responsibilities. In the
civil law system the desirable end is not deemed beyond the capacity of its tribunals.

Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally adopted in Spain or in other countries under the stress and counter
stress of novel schemers of legislation, we find the theory of damages laid down in the judgment the most consistent
with the history and the principals of our law in these Islands and with its logical development.

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the
event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event,
the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the
last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at
5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount
fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of
2,500 pesos, with cost of both instances, and ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for
proper action. So ordered.

Alba vs. Bulaong 101 Phil 434, 437

G.R. Nos. L-10308 and L-10385-8 April 30, 1957

MARIA PAZ S. ALBA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
RACIO BULAONG, ET AL., ETC., respondents.

Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioners.

Antonio C. Masaquel and Adaucto P. Ocampo for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

This is a petition to reverse the decision of the Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in five
cases denying the claims for compensation, against Dr. Horacio Bulaong, of herein petitioners, who were his
employees and dependents of his employees.

On March 12, 1955, petitioners Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifico Bulaong were employees of Dr.
Horacio Bulaong in his business of threshing palay. Other employees were Engracio Alba (husband of petitioner
Maria Paz S. Alba) and Vicente A. Sebastian (husband of petitioner Elisea S. Sebastian). Early in the morning of that
day said five employees were, upon specific orders of Dr. Bulaong, on their way to Barrio Baringan, Malolos,
Bulacan, to thresh palay, riding on a tractor which was pulling a threshing machine. Suddenly a speeding bus of the
Victory Liner Inc. collided with the thresher which in turn hit the tractor, and as a result those on board were violently
thrown out. Engracio Alba and Vicente Sebastian died; Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifica Bulaong
sustained physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, five separate claims were filed before the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the
employer Dr. Bulaong. Three defenses were set up by him: (a) claimants were not his employees, but industrial
partners, (b) the injuries were not sustained in the course of employment and (c) the claims, if any, had been
extinguished by virtue of the monetary settlements which petitioners had concluded with the Victory Liner Inc.

The referee overruled the defenses, having found the five men to be employees who had died or were injured in the
course of employment. Consequently he required the employer to make compensation in the amounts specified in
his award. However on appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr. Bulaong from all liability,
because he found that the claimants had received, after the mishap, various amounts of money from the owner of the
colliding bus, the Victory Liner Inc., each of them having executed a written release or waiver in favor of said Liner,
the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

And I likewise freely and completely cede and transfer into said Company (Victory Liner Inc.) any right given to me by
law against any person or company that should be liable for the said accident except my right to claim against Dr.
Horacio Bulaong in accordance with and under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rep. Act 772).

Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to hold the Liner responsible for the accident, and could not
thereafter turn around to recover their employer. He cited section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which for
convenience is quoted:

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this
Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages in accordance with law; and
in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation
or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person
what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid
or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto,
after deduction of at the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings .The sum paid by the employer
for compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled of this Act, shall not be admissible as
evidence in any damage suit or action. (As amended.)

Naturally the argument before this Court dwelt mostly on the interpretation of the above section and its application to
the circumstances of record. There was no election, petitioners contend, to recover from the Liner to the exclusion of
Dr. Bulaong, because the document itself signed by petitioners reserved their right to claim against Dr. Horacio
Bulaong under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Such reservation, counter the respondents, besides being void and against the law, cannot bind Dr. Bulaong who
was not a party to the instrument.

There is no question that the Liner was a "third party" within the meaning of section 6. There is also no question that
petitioner have not sued the Liner for damages. Wherefore they are not deemed to have made the election specified
in section 6. However, the plain intent of the law is that they shall not receive payment twice for the same injuries
(from the third party and from the employer). Hence if without suing they receive full damages from the third party,
they should be deemed to have practically made the election under the law, and should be prevented from thereafter
suing the employer. Full damages means, of course what they would have demanded in a suit against the third party
or what they would receive in a compensation as complete settlement. Needless to say, where the injured employee
is offered, by the third party, compensation which he deems insufficient, he may reject it and thereafter litigate with
such third party. Or choose instead to complain against his employer.

Nevertheless there is nothing in the law to prevent him from accepting such insufficient compensation but expressly
reserving at the same time his right to recover additional damages from his employer. If the third party agrees to the
reservation, such partial payment may legally be made and accepted. We say "if", because the reservation
necessarily entails some disadvantage to the third party, inasmuch as pursuant to legal principles when the employer
subsequently pays, he may in turn recover from the third party (See sec. 6). The employer can not validly object to
such reservation by the employee, because in effect the settlement helps to reduce the amount he will afterwards
have to disgorge.

As we see it, the five employees' acceptance of the Victory Liner's offer of compensation, under the circumstances
disclosed by this record, especially the written acknowledgments, showed they were not content with the amount
received — they did not consider it sufficient — so they reserved their right to require additional compensation from
their employer. Hence their action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by section 6. He may in turn demand
reimbursement from Victory Liner Inc.

The implied reservation of Dr. Bulaong's right against Victory Liner Inc. is not unprecedented in the roam of
jurisprudence. When a promissory note is dishonored for non-payment, the holder may recover its value either from
the maker or from the indorser. If he sues the indorser and recovers, the latter may in turn recoup from the maker.
The statute expressly permits him to renounce his right against the maker and reserve his right to recover from the
indorser (Sec. 120 (e) Negotiable Instruments Law). When that happens, the courts say the indorser's right to recover
from the maker is also reserved. (Bootman's Sav. vs. Johnson, 24 Mo. App. 317; Tolentino Commercial Laws Vol. I
(7th Ed.)p. 361.1)

In the situation resulting after the collision, we could regard the five employees, the Victory Liner and Dr. Bulaong in
the same juridical position, respectively, of holder, maker and indorser. The release with express reservation
produced the implied reservation already stated.

What then, it may be asked, was the advantage accruing to the Liner from the settlement it had worked to
accomplish? For one thing its driver would not be prosecuted by petitioners; besides earning such driver's gratitude,
the Liner thereby avoided losses in time and services. For another, even if it be liable to the employer for whatever
the latter might have to satisfy, the Liner could expect the settlement between employer and employees to be
reasonable considering their relationship, more reasonable perhaps than a settlement between itself and the injured
employees.

It is therefore our view that the moneys received from Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of
releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were his employees, and they were injured by reason of and in the
course of their employment, he must pay compensation to be fixed in accordance with law. Bearing in mind, however,
the law's intention not to give double compensation, the amounts they have received from the Victory Liner shall be
deducted from the sums so determined.

In this connection we notice that the referee who has investigated the matter has made some calculations of
monetary award. However they were not passed upon by the Commissioner.

Wherefore, for the purpose of ascertaining and awarding such compensation to petitioners, the record will be
remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for further action in accordance with this opinion. No costs.
So ordered.

Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

Calalas vs. CA 332 SCRA 356

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the
contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated
at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under
sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and
would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:

(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

(5) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier
an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
supported by evidence.

The petition has no merit.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck
liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second,
breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena
liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of
the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755
and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became
the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.

Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do
not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:

Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede
the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct
the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:

Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more
freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to
an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.

Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law. We
find this contention well taken.

In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the
Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling, because
she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has
a defect already."

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her
injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the
fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left
leg . . . has a defect already."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for
it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation
to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in
Art. 2220.6

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate
court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital
cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely
implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11,
1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

PCIB vs CA 350 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 121413 January 29, 2001

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA),
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A., respondents.

G.R. No. 121479 January 29, 2001

FORD PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-plaintiff,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CITIBANK, N.A. and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondents.

G.R. No. 128604 January 29, 2001

FORD PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

These consolidated petitions involve several fraudulently negotiated checks.

The original actions a quo were instituted by Ford Philippines to recover from the drawee bank, CITIBANK, N.A.
(Citibank) and collecting bank, Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) [formerly Insular Bank of Asia
and America], the value of several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which were embezzled
allegedly by an organized syndicate.1âwphi1.nêt

G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 are twin petitions for review of the March 27, 1995 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 25017, entitled "Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A. and Insular Bank of Asia and America
(now Philipppine Commercial International Bank), and the August 8, 1995 Resolution,2 ordering the collecting bank,
Philippine Commercial International Bank, to pay the amount of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.

In G.R. No. 128604, petitioner Ford Philippines assails the October 15, 1996 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals and
its March 5, 1997 Resolution4 in CA-G.R. No. 28430 entitled "Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A. and Philippine
Commercial International Bank," affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court holding the defendant drawee bank,
Citibank, N.A., solely liable to pay the amount of P12,163,298.10 as damages for the misapplied proceeds of the
plaintiff's Citibanl Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508.

I. G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

The stipulated facts submitted by the parties as accepted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"On October 19, 1977, the plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of
P4,746,114.41, in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payment of plaintiff;s percentage or
manufacturer's sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977.

The aforesaid check was deposited with the degendant IBAA (now PCIBank) and was subsequently cleared at the
Central Bank. Upon presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to IBAA as
collecting or depository bank.

The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff was never paid to or received by the payee thereof, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

As a consequence, upon demand of the Bureau and/or Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the plaintiff was
compelled to make a second payment to the Bureau of Internal Revenue of its percentage/manufacturers' sales
taxes for the third quarter of 1977 and that said second payment of plaintiff in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was duly
received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

It is further admitted by defendant Citibank that during the time of the transactions in question, plaintiff had been
maintaining a checking account with defendant Citibank; that Citibank Check No. SN-04867 which was drawn and
issued by the plaintiff in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was a crossed check in that, on its face were
two parallel lines and written in between said lines was the phrase "Payee's Account Only"; and that defendant
Citibank paid the full face value of the check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 to the defendant IBAA.

It has been duly established that for the payment of plaintiff's percentage tax for the last quarter of 1977, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, dated October 20, 1977, designating therein in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, as the authorized agent bank of Metrobanl, Alabang branch to receive the tax payment of
the plaintiff.

On December 19, 1977, plaintiff's Citibank Check No. SN-04867, together with the Revenue Tax Receipt No.
18747002, was deposited with defendant IBAA, through its Ermita Branch. The latter accepted the check and sent it
to the Central Clearing House for clearing on the samd day, with the indorsement at the back "all prior indorsements
and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." Thereafter, defendant IBAA presented the check for payment to defendant
Citibank on same date, December 19, 1977, and the latter paid the face value of the check in the amount of
P4,746,114.41. Consequently, the amount of P4,746,114.41 was debited in plaintiff's account with the defendant
Citibank and the check was returned to the plaintiff.

Upon verification, plaintiff discovered that its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was not
paid to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Hence, in separate letters dated October 26, 1979, addressed to the
defendants, the plaintiff notified the latter that in case it will be re-assessed by the BIR for the payment of the taxes
covered by the said checks, then plaintiff shall hold the defendants liable for reimbursement of the face value of the
same. Both defendants denied liability and refused to pay.

In a letter dated February 28, 1980 by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue addressed to the plaintiff -
supposed to be Exhibit "D", the latter was officially informed, among others, that its check in the amount of P4,
746,114.41 was not paid to the government or its authorized agent and instead encashed by unauthorized persons,
hence, plaintiff has to pay the said amount within fifteen days from receipt of the letter. Upon advice of the plaintiff's
lawyers, plaintiff on March 11, 1982, paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the amount of P4,746,114.41,
representing payment of plaintiff's percentage tax for the third quarter of 1977.

As a consequence of defendant's refusal to reimburse plaintiff of the payment it had made for the second time to the
BIR of its percentage taxes, plaintiff filed on January 20, 1983 its original complaint before this Court.
On December 24, 1985, defendant IBAA was merged with the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank)
with the latter as the surviving entity.

Defendant Citibank maintains that; the payment it made of plaintiff's Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of
P4,746,114.41 "was in due course"; it merely relied on the clearing stamp of the depository/collecting bank, the
defendant IBAA that "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed"; and the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury is the gross negligence of defendant IBAA in indorsing the plaintiff's Citibank check in question.

It is admitted that on December 19, 1977 when the proceeds of plaintiff's Citibank Check No. SN-048867 was paid to
defendant IBAA as collecting bank, plaintiff was maintaining a checking account with defendant Citibank."5

Although it was not among the stipulated facts, an investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
revealed that Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General Ledger Accountant of
Ford. He purportedly needed to hold back the check because there was an error in the computation of the tax due to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). With Rivera's instruction, PCIBank replaced the check with two of its own
Manager's Checks (MCs). Alleged members of a syndicate later deposited the two MCs with the Pacific Banking
Corporation.

Ford, with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint before the trial court impleading Pacific Banking Corporation
(PBC) and Godofredo Rivera, as third party defendants. But the court dismissed the complaint against PBC for lack
of cause of action. The course likewise dismissed the third-party complaint against Godofredo Rivera because he
could not be served with summons as the NBI declared him as a "fugitive from justice".

On June 15, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, as follows:

"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"1. Ordering the defendants Citibank and IBAA (now PCI Bank), jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P4,746,114.41 representing the face value of plaintiff's Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the
legal rate starting January 20, 1983, the date when the original complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid, plus
costs;

"2. On defendant Citibank's cross-claim: ordering the cross-defendant IBAA (now PCI Bank) to reimburse defendant
Citibank for whatever amount the latter has paid or may pay to the plaintiff in accordance with next preceding
paragraph;

"3. The counterclaims asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff, as well as that asserted by the cross-
defendant against the cross-claimant are dismissed, for lack of merits; and

"4. With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED."6

Not satisfied with the said decision, both defendants, Citibank and PCIBank, elevated their respective petitions for
review on certiorari to the Courts of Appeals. On March 27, 1995, the appellate court issued its judgment as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court AFFIRMS the appealed decision with modifications.

The court hereby renderes judgment:

1. Dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 49287 insofar as defendant Citibank N.A. is concerned;
2. Ordering the defendant IBAA now PCI Bank to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41 representing the face
value of plaintiff's Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the legal rate starting January 20, 1983, the
date when the original complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid;

3. Dismissing the counterclaims asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff as well as that asserted by the cross-
defendant against the cross-claimant, for lack of merits.

Costs against the defendant IBAA (now PCI Bank).

IT IS SO ORDERED."7

PCI Bank moved to reconsider the above-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals, while Ford filed a "Motion for
Partial Reconsideration." Both motions were denied for lack of merit.

Separately, PCIBank and Ford filed before this Court, petitions for review by certiorari under Rule 45.

In G.R. No. 121413, PCIBank seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Twelfth Division of the Court of
Appeals contending that it merely acted on the instruction of Ford and such casue of action had already prescribed.

PCIBank sets forth the following issues for consideration:

I. Did the respondent court err when, after finding that the petitioner acted on the check drawn by respondent Ford on
the said respondent's instructions, it nevertheless found the petitioner liable to the said respondent for the full amount
of the said check.

II. Did the respondent court err when it did not find prescription in favor of the petitioner.8

In a counter move, Ford filed its petition docketed as G.R. No. 121479, questioning the same decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals, and praying for the reinstatement in toto of the decision of the trial court which found both
PCIBank and Citibank jointly and severally liable for the loss.

In G.R. No. 121479, appellant Ford presents the following propositions for consideration:

I. Respondent Citibank is liable to petitioner Ford considering that:

1. As drawee bank, respondent Citibank owes to petitioner Ford, as the drawer of the subject check and a depositor
of respondent Citibank, an absolute and contractual duty to pay the proceeds of the subject check only to the payee
thereof, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

2. Respondent Citibank failed to observe its duty as banker with respect to the subject check, which was crossed and
payable to "Payee's Account Only."

3. Respondent Citibank raises an issue for the first time on appeal; thus the same should not be considered by the
Honorable Court.

4. As correctly held by the trial court, there is no evidence of gross negligence on the part of petitioner Ford.9

II. PCI Bank is liable to petitioner Ford considering that:

1. There were no instructions from petitioner Ford to deliver the proceeds of the subject check to a person other than
the payee named therein, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; thus, PCIBank's only obligation is to
deliver the proceeds to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.10

2. PCIBank which affixed its indorsement on the subject check ("All prior indorsement and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed"), is liable as collecting bank.11

3. PCIBank is barred from raising issues of fact in the instant proceedings.12

4. Petitioner Ford's cause of action had not prescribed.13

II. G.R. No. 128604

The same sysndicate apparently embezzled the proceeds of checks intended, this time, to settle Ford's percentage
taxes appertaining to the second quarter of 1978 and the first quarter of 1979.

The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Ford drew Citibank Check No. SN-10597 on July 19, 1978 in the amount of P5,851,706.37 representing the
percentage tax due for the second quarter of 1978 payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A BIR Revenue
Tax Receipt No. 28645385 was issued for the said purpose.

On April 20, 1979, Ford drew another Citibank Check No. SN-16508 in the amount of P6,311,591.73, representing
the payment of percentage tax for the first quarter of 1979 and payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Again a BIR Revenue Tax Receipt No. A-1697160 was issued for the said purpose.

Both checks were "crossed checks" and contain two diagonal lines on its upper corner between, which were written
the words "payable to the payee's account only."

The checks never reached the payee, CIR. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 1980, the BIR, Region 4-B,
demanded for the said tax payments the corresponding periods above-mentioned.

As far as the BIR is concernced, the said two BIR Revenue Tax Receipts were considered "fake and spurious". This
anomaly was confirmed by the NBI upon the initiative of the BIR. The findings forced Ford to pay the BIR a new,
while an action was filed against Citibank and PCIBank for the recovery of the amount of Citibank Check Numbers
SN-10597 and 16508.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, which tried the case, made its findings on the modus operandi of the
syndicate, as follows:

"A certain Mr. Godofredo Rivera was employed by the plaintiff FORD as its General Ledger Accountant. As such, he
prepared the plaintiff's check marked Ex. 'A' [Citibank Check No. Sn-10597] for payment to the BIR. Instead,
however, fo delivering the same of the payee, he passed on the check to a co-conspirator named Remberto Castro
who was a pro-manager of the San Andres Branch of PCIB.* In connivance with one Winston Dulay, Castro himself
subsequently opened a Checking Account in the name of a fictitious person denominated as 'Reynaldo reyes' in the
Meralco Branch of PCIBank where Dulay works as Assistant Manager.

After an initial deposit of P100.00 to validate the account, Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in
exactly the same amount as the first FORD check (Exh. "A", P5,851,706.37) while this worthless check was coursed
through PCIB's main office enroute to the Central Bank for clearing, replaced this worthless check with FORD's
Exhibit 'A' and accordingly tampered the accompanying documents to cover the replacement. As a result, Exhibit 'A'
was cleared by defendant CITIBANK, and the fictitious deposit account of 'Reynaldo Reyes' was credited at the PCIB
Meralco Branch with the total amount of the FORD check Exhibit 'A'. The same method was again utilized by the
syndicate in profiting from Exh. 'B' [Citibank Check No. SN-16508] which was subsequently pilfered by Alexis
Marindo, Rivera's Assistant at FORD.

From this 'Reynaldo Reyes' account, Castro drew various checks distributing the sahres of the other participating
conspirators namely (1) CRISANTO BERNABE, the mastermind who formulated the method for the embezzlement;
(2) RODOLFO R. DE LEON a customs broker who negotiated the initial contact between Bernabe, FORD's
Godofredo Rivera and PCIB's Remberto Castro; (3) JUAN VASTILLO who assisted de Leon in the initial
arrangements; (4) GODOFREDO RIVERA, FORD's accountant who passed on the first check (Exhibit "A") to Castro;
(5) REMERTO CASTRO, PCIB's pro-manager at San Andres who performed the switching of checks in the clearing
process and opened the fictitious Reynaldo Reyes account at the PCIB Meralco Branch; (6) WINSTON DULAY,
PCIB's Assistant Manager at its Meralco Branch, who assisted Castro in switching the checks in the clearing process
and facilitated the opening of the fictitious Reynaldo Reyes' bank account; (7) ALEXIS MARINDO, Rivera's Assistant
at FORD, who gave the second check (Exh. "B") to Castro; (8) ELEUTERIO JIMENEZ, BIR Collection Agent who
provided the fake and spurious revenue tax receipts to make it appear that the BIR had received FORD's tax
payments.

Several other persons and entities were utilized by the syndicate as conduits in the disbursements of the proceeds of
the two checks, but like the aforementioned participants in the conspiracy, have not been impleaded in the present
case. The manner by which the said funds were distributed among them are traceable from the record of checks
drawn against the original "Reynaldo Reyes" account and indubitably identify the parties who illegally benefited
therefrom and readily indicate in what amounts they did so."14

On December 9, 1988, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, held drawee-bank, Citibank, liable for the value of
the two checks while adsolving PCIBank from any liability, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant CITIBANK to reimburse plaintiff FORD the total
amount of P12,163,298.10 prayed for in its complaint, with 6% interest thereon from date of first written demand until
full payment, plus P300,000.00 attorney's fees and expenses litigation, and to pay the defendant, PCIB (on its
counterclaim to crossclaim) the sum of P300,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of litigation, and pay the costs.

SO ORDERED."15

Both Ford and Citibank appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed, in toto, the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioner Ford prays that judgment be rendered setting aside the portion of the Court of Appeals decision and its
resolution dated March 5, 1997, with respect to the dismissal of the complaint against PCIBank and holding Citibank
solely responsible for the proceeds of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508 for P5,851,706.73 and
P6,311,591.73 respectively.

Ford avers that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint against defendant PCIBank considering that:

I. Defendant PCIBank was clearly negligent when it failed to exercise the diligence required to be exercised by it as a
banking insitution.

II. Defendant PCIBank clearly failed to observe the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its officers
and employees.
III. Defendant PCIBank was, due to its negligence, clearly liable for the loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff Ford
as a consequence of the substitution of the check consistent with Section 5 of Central Bank Circular No. 580 series
of 1977.

IV. Assuming arguedo that defedant PCIBank did not accept, endorse or negotiate in due course the subject checks,
it is liable, under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, to return the money which it admits having received, and which was
credited to it its Central bank account.16

The main issue presented for our consideration by these petitions could be simplified as follows: Has petitioner Ford
the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks
intended as payment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Or has Ford's cause of action already prescribed?

Note that in these cases, the checks were drawn against the drawee bank, but the title of the person negotiating the
same was allegedly defective because the instrument was obtained by fraud and unlawful means, and the proceeds
of the checks were not remitted to the payee. It was established that instead of paying the checks to the CIR, for the
settlement of the approprite quarterly percentage taxes of Ford, the checks were diverted and encashed for the
eventual distribution among the mmbers of the syndicate. As to the unlawful negotiation of the check the applicable
law is Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), which provides:

"When title defective -- The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this Act
when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or fore and fear, or other unlawful
means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith or under such circumstances as
amount to a fraud."

Pursuant to this provision, it is vital to show that the negotiation is made by the perpetator in breach of faith
amounting to fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone beyond the authority given by his principal. If
the principal could prove that there was no negligence in the performance of his duties, he may set up the personal
defense to escape liability and recover from other parties who. Though their own negligence, alowed the commission
of the crime.

In this case, we note that the direct perpetrators of the offense, namely the embezzlers belonging to a syndicate, are
now fugitives from justice. They have, even if temporarily, escaped liability for the embezzlement of millions of pesos.
We are thus left only with the task of determining who of the present parties before us must bear the burden of loss of
these millions. It all boils down to thequestion of liability based on the degree of negligence among the parties
concerned.

Foremost, we must resolve whether the injured party, Ford, is guilty of the "imputed contributory negligence" that
would defeat its claim for reimbursement, bearing ing mind that its employees, Godofredo Rivera and Alexis Marindo,
were among the members of the syndicate.

Citibank points out that Ford allowed its very own employee, Godofredo Rivera, to negotiate the checks to his co-
conspirators, instead of delivering them to the designated authorized collecting bank (Metrobank-Alabang) of the
payee, CIR. Citibank bewails the fact that Ford was remiss in the supervision and control of its own employees,
inasmuch as it only discovered the syndicate's activities through the information given by the payee of the checks
after an unreasonable period of time.

PCIBank also blames Ford of negligence when it allegedly authorized Godofredo Rivera to divert the proceeds of
Citibank Check No. SN-04867, instead of using it to pay the BIR. As to the subsequent run-around of unds of
Citibank Check Nos. SN-10597 and 16508, PCIBank claims that the proximate cause of the damge to Ford lies in its
own officers and employees who carried out the fradulent schemes and the transactions. These circumstances were
not checked by other officers of the company including its comptroller or internal auditor. PCIBank contends that the
inaction of Ford despite the enormity of the amount involved was a sheer negligence and stated that, as between two
innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible, by
his act of negligence, must bear the loss.

For its part, Ford denies any negligence in the performance of its duties. It avers that there was no evidence
presented before the trial court showing lack of diligence on the part of Ford. And, citing the case of Gempesaw vs.
Court of Appeals,17 Ford argues that even if there was a finding therein that the drawer was negligent, the drawee
bank was still ordered to pay damages.

Furthermore, Ford contends the Godofredo rivera was not authorized to make any representation in its behalf,
specifically, to divert the proceeds of the checks. It adds that Citibank raised the issue of imputed negligence against
Ford for the first time on appeal. Thus, it should not be considered by this Court.

On this point, jurisprudence regarding the imputed negligence of employer in a master-servant relationship is
instructive. Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the
servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or
wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable.18 The general rule is that
if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concuring contributory negligence of his own
servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the
third person, asuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which
complaint is made.19

Accordingly, we need to determine whether or not the action of Godofredo Rivera, Ford's General Ledger Accountant,
and/or Alexis Marindo, his assistant, was the proximate cause of the loss or damage. AS defined, proximate cause is
that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury
and without the result would not have occurred.20

It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our
view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's
negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.

The Board of Directors of Ford, we note, did not confirm the request of Godofredo Rivera to recall Citibank Check No.
SN-04867. Rivera's instruction to replace the said check with PCIBank's Manager's Check was not in theordinary
course of business which could have prompted PCIBank to validate the same.

As to the preparation of Citibank Checks Nos. SN-10597 and 16508, it was established that these checks were made
payable to the CIR. Both were crossed checks. These checks were apparently turned around by Ford's emploees,
who were acting on their own personal capacity.

Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor's confidential employee
or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpertrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper
upon the bank, does notentitle the bank toshift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance
raising estoppel against the drawer.21 This rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by
the confidential employees who hold them in their possession.

With respect to the negligence of PCIBank in the payment of the three checks involved, separately, the trial courts
found variations between the negotiation of Citibank Check No. SN-04867 and the misapplication of total proceeds of
Checks SN-10597 and 16508. Therefore, we have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's share of negligence when the
syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.

G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was deposited at PCIBank through its Ermita Branch. It was coursed through the
ordinary banking transaction, sent to Central Clearing with the indorsement at the back "all prior indorsements and/or
lack of indorsements guaranteed," and was presented to Citibank for payment. Thereafter PCIBank, instead of
remitting the proceeds to the CIR, prepared two of its Manager's checks and enabled the syndicate to encash the
same.

On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank
employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was duly
authorized, showed lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances.

Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As
an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the
payor or its agent. As aptly stated by the trial court, to wit:

"xxx. Since the questioned crossed check was deposited with IBAA [now PCIBank], which claimed to be a
depository/collecting bank of BIR, it has the responsibility to make sure that the check in question is deposited in
Payee's account only.

xxx xxx xxx

As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive instructions only from its principal BIR
and not from any other person especially so when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very imprudent on
the part of the defendant IBAA to just rely on the alleged telephone call of the one Godofredo Rivera and in his
signature considering that the plaintiff is not a client of the defendant IBAA."

It is a well-settled rule that the relationship between the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it
is sent for collection is, in the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of principal and agent.22 A bank which
receives such paper for collection is the agent of the payee or holder.23

Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a check payable to the collecting bank in behalf of the
designated payee may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly authorized by the payor. Otherwise stated,
the diversion can be justified only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that the drawer has clothed his agent with
apparent authority to receive the proceeds of such check.

Citibank further argues that PCI Bank's clearing stamp appearing at the back of the questioned checks stating that
ALL PRIOR INDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF INDORSEMENTS GURANTEED should render PCIBank liable
because it made it pass through the clearing house and therefore Citibank had no other option but to pay it. Thus,
Citibank had no other option but to pay it. Thus, Citibank assets that the proximate cause of Ford's injury is the gross
negligence of PCIBank. Since the questione dcrossed check was deposited with PCIBank, which claimed to be a
depository/collecting bank of the BIR, it had the responsibility to make sure that the check in questions is deposited in
Payee's account only.

Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be
deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the
check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to
scruninize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements
and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".

In Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Equitable Banking Corporation,24 we ruled:
"Anent petitioner's liability on said instruments, this court is in full accord with the ruling of the PCHC's Board of
Directors that:

'In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an express guarantee on the validity of
"all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the defedant's clear warranty: ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, plaintiff would not
have paid on the checks.'

No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's warranty. As the warranty has proven to be
false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation."25

Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the check must take some
percautions to learn whether or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing the check through indifference or othe
circumstance assists the forger in committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the
check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of the person
negotiating the instrument before paying the check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check drawn upon
another bank, without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries with regard to
them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the
hands of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the collecting
bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus,
one who encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the
drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee
bank. The latter may recover from the holder the money paid on the check.26

Having established that the collecting bank's negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, we conclude that
PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.

G.R. No. 128604

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that PCIBank had no official act in the ordinary course of business that
would attribute to it the case of the embezzlement of Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508, because
PCIBank did not actually receive nor hold the two Ford checks at all. The trial court held, thus:

"Neither is there any proof that defendant PCIBank contributed any official or conscious participation in the process of
the embezzlement. This Court is convinced that the switching operation (involving the checks while in transit for
"clearing") were the clandestine or hidden actuations performed by the members of the syndicate in their own
personl, covert and private capacity and done without the knowledge of the defendant PCIBank…"27

In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious particiapation of PCIBank in the
embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment.28 A bank will be held liable for
the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable
for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is an essential element. In this
case, we find a situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme hatched by a syndicate in
which its own management employees had particiapted.

The pro-manager of San Andres Branch of PCIBank, Remberto Castro, received Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597
and 16508. He passed the checks to a co-conspirator, an Assistant Manager of PCIBank's Meralco Branch, who
helped Castro open a Checking account of a fictitious person named "Reynaldo Reyes." Castro deposited a
worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same amount of Ford checks. The syndicate tampered with the
checks and succeeded in replacing the worthless checks and the eventual encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN
10597 and 16508. The PCIBank Ptro-manager, Castro, and his co-conspirator Assistant Manager apparently
performed their activities using facilities in their official capacity or authority but for their personal and private gain or
benefit.

A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these
officers or agents were enabled to perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will t be permitted to
shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule
is that a bank is liable for the fraudulent acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and
apparent scope of his employment or authority.29 And if an officer or employee of a bank, in his official capacity,
receives money to satisfy an evidence of indebetedness lodged with his bank for collection, the bank is liable for his
misappropriation of such sum.30

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by Ford, Section 531 of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides
that any theft affecting items in transit for clearing, shall be for the account of sending bank, which in this case is
PCIBank.

But in this case, responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBank's shoulders alone.

The evidence on record shows that Citibank as drawee bank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties.
Citibank failed to establish that its payment of Ford's checjs were made in due course and legally in order. In its
defense, Citibank claims the genuineness and due execution of said checks, considering that Citibank (1) has no
knowledge of any informity in the issuance of the checks in question (2) coupled by the fact that said checks were
sufficiently funded and (3) the endorsement of the Payee or lack thereof was guaranteed by PCI Bank (formerly
IBAA), thus, it has the obligation to honor and pay the same.

For its part, Ford contends that Citibank as the drawee bank owes to Ford an absolute and contractual duty to pay
the proceeds of the subject check only to the payee thereof, the CIR. Citing Section 6232 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, Ford argues that by accepting the instrument, the acceptro which is Citibank engages that it will pay
according to the tenor of its acceptance, and that it will pay only to the payee, (the CIR), considering the fact that
here the check was crossed with annotation "Payees Account Only."

As ruled by the Court of Appeals, Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank
Checks Numbers SN 10597 and 16508, because of the contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank,
as the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the
damage caused to the latter. On this score, we agree with the respondent court's ruling.

Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508 before paying the amount of the
proceeds thereof to the collecting bank of the BIR. One thing is clear from the record: the clearing stamps at the back
of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508 do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence
of the clearing stamps. Had this been duly examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Check Nos.
10597 and 16508 would have been discovered in time. For this reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what
was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee.
The fact that the drawee bank did not discover the irregularity seasonably, in our view, consitutes negligence in
carrying out the bank's duty to its depositors. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because
of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.33

Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in
their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in
the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable
for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
Time and again, we have stressed that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and
confidence of the public in general is of paramount umportance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must
be very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence.34 A bank's liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary,
wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no
moment.35

Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos.36 By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary
clerks and employees.37 Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.38

On the issue of prescription, PCIBank claims that the action of Ford had prescribed because of its inability to seek
judicial relief seasonably, considering that the alleged negligent act took place prior to December 19, 1977 but the
relief was sought only in 1983, or seven years thereafter.

The statute of limitations begins to run when the bank gives the depositor notice of the payment, which is ordinarily
when the check is returned to the alleged drawer as a voucher with a statement of his account,39 and an action upon
a check is ordinarily governed by the statutory period applicable to instruments in writing.40

Our laws on the matter provide that the action upon a written contract must be brought within ten year from the time
the right of action accrues.41 hence, the reckoning time for the prescriptive period begins when the instrument was
issued and the corresponding check was returned by the bank to its depositor (normally a month thereafter). Applying
the same rule, the cause of action for the recovery of the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN 04867 would normally
be a month after December 19, 1977, when Citibank paid the face value of the check in the amount of
P4,746,114.41. Since the original complaint for the cause of action was filed on January 20, 1984, barely six years
had lapsed. Thus, we conclude that Ford's cause of action to recover the amount of Citibank Check No. SN 04867
was seasonably filed within the period provided by law.

Finally, we also find thet Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the
depositor to examine its passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a
reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the exercise of due care and diligence
find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) to six
percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, respondibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce
the damages that he may recover.42

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25017 are
AFFIRMED. PCIBank, know formerly as Insular Bank of Asia and America, id declared solely responsible for the loss
of the proceeds of Citibank Check No SN 04867 in the amount P4,746,114.41, which shall be paid together with six
percent (6%) interest thereon to Ford Philippines Inc. from the date when the original complaint was filed until said
amount is fully paid.

However, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28430 are MODIFIED as follows:
PCIBank and Citibank are adjudged liable for and must share the loss, (concerning the proceeds of Citibank Check
Numbers SN 10597 and 16508 totalling P12,163,298.10) on a fifty-fifty ratio, and each bank is ORDERED to pay
Ford Philippines Inc. P6,081,649.05, with six percent (6%) interest thereon, from the date the complaint was filed until
full payment of said amount.1âwphi1.nêt

Costs against Philippine Commercial International Bank and Citibank N.A.

SO ORDERED.

Picart vs. Smith 37 Phil 809

Del Prado vs. Meralco 52 Phil 901

G.R. No. L-29462 March 7, 1929

IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, jr., for appellant.
Vicente Sotto for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recover damages in the
amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of te defendant, the Manila
Electric Company, in the operation of one of its street cars in the City of Manila. Upon hearing the cause the trial
court awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit, and the defendant appealed.

The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance of
passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in
charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near
the intersection of said street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and
letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of
the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran
across the street to catch the car, his approach being made from the left. The car was of the kind having entrance
and exist at either end, and the movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car
at the moment when the car was passing.

The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that the plaintiff, upon
approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in response to
which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this the plaintiff seized, with his hand, the front
perpendicular handspot, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform. However, before the plaintiff's
position had become secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached the flatform, the motorman applied
the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car caused the plaintiff's
foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, He therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot was
caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness,
Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as the plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on either side with
both right and left hand. The latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the
plaintiff, but we are of the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman slowed up slightly
as the plaintiff was boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at
the moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed
by us.

The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car; that he did not accelerate
the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses; and that he in fact knew nothing of the incident until after
the plaintiff had been hurt and some one called to him to stop. We are not convinced of the complete candor of this
statement, for we are unable to see how a motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding
the car under the circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered that the front handpost which, as all
witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in attempting to board the car, was immediately on the left side of the
motorman.

With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a
street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for
stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if a company engage in this business were
required to stop any and everywhere to take on people who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in
too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car
was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a
breach of this duty.

The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure on the
part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contructual) under
articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of this duty with respect to a passenger who was
getting off of a train. In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing down in a station, and
at the time when it was too dark for him to see clearly where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company
had carelessly left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the result that his feet
slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm badly injured. This court held that the railroad company was
liable for breach positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of P2,500 for
the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising
from breach of contructual duty and that arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).

The distiction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the reason that where liability
arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, or master, may
exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, by providing that he had exercised due
degligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a
breach of contrauctual duty (culpa contractual). In the case bfore us the company pleaded as a special defense that it
had used all the deligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to
establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and
instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability
involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. Manila
Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710.)

Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902 of the Civil Code and liability arising
from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of the Civil Code, is
that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is given a discretion to mitigate liability according to the
circumstances of the case (art 1103). No such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising
under article 1902; although possibly the same end is reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability
because of the latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.

As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it should be treated, as in Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil Code. It is
obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury.
The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely.
A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the
conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in
view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform. Again, the
situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the
plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here
applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the
last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872;
171 N. W., 167). The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as
a mitigating circumstance.

With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we note that, although he lost his foot, he is
able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning capacity has probably not been reduced
by more than 30 per centum. In view of the precedents found in our decisions with respect to the damages that ought
to be awarded for the loss of limb, and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359);
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil.,
165), and in view of all the circumstances connected with the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff will be
adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.

It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by reducing the recovery to the sum of P2,500,
the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil 8

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.

W. L. Wright, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his
father, his nearest relative.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the
city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of
Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge,
impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters,
the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have
taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday
afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had
asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately
of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of
which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the
caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end,
and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old,
and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a
stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife,
and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to
run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the
face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor
how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the
accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found
by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also
appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an
extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who
picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to
have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering
and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's
brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may
add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the
caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant
company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact that
they not infrequently did so.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month
after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six
months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and
more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence of
record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are
plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property
of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its
employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of
law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists
that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord
with his allegations in this regard.

It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley
extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's
premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has
a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of
electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company
as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances,
and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the
place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant
company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think
also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the
company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of
the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective;
and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or
some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the
general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or
ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.

Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these conclusions
are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley
extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in
blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well
directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no
proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only
one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by
contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged
contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that
detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work done by the defendant company's directions and
on its behalf, we think that the company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it
wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and
that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had
been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If
the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it
was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in
the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the
caps found on its premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.

Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of
article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those
in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial
do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree
with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of
action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which
would, perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United
States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point
where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is
equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered
upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any
wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps
exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which
occasioned the injuries sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in
the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an
infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad
company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would
be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees,
one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the
premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in
playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing
with such machine.

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the
principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in
regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not
exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that
"the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is
the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."

The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several
state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated
and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a
very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to
trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this
rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that
no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults
as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.

Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts in
Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been
questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.

On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the doctrine
laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases
in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and
reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review
of many of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles
announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."

In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12
years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without
defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack
pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any
fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the
interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere
trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to,
the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.

We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the facts in that
case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's
contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case
could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case now before us, they
require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the
vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of
curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine,
and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit,
close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that
children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of
the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger from
being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass
of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the
railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the
vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation
to make provisions.

In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his own
ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his
neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his
neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he can
not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there
between an express license to the children of this village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack
pile, and an implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to
do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson,
in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that
would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog
attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the
consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child
attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for
life."

Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Harlow (53
Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are
chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If
they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their
immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty
to be taken.

And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the premises of
another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it
would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be
likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one
were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)

The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this
jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and
impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be
found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the
magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore,
whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "
must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be
heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser
to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least
equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to
take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its
part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold
otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim
of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do
what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in
the United States all private property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910),
and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is
that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein
they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child
the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in such
cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or
permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other
fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all
the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not
the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to
the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and
the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is
because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases,
that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages
for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not
the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have
shown, under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would
relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-
grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express
permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault
when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he
undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the
particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct
aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been
directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender
years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive instruments
which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself.
The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was
present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be
any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that
the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which
he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise
due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of
the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be
said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a
minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety
of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in
these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are
conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can
not be said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as
they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying
circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to
be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than
eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At
10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse
to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil
Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred
by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.

The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit.
17 rule 203.)

The Patidas contain the following provisions:

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can not
demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)

And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against himself
and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against
himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)

And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching
contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme
court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly
deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the
injuries sustained by him.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in
point. In that case the court said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of obligation
when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced
should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although
such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence is not
sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil
(1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise
to an obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage
caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the
latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown that the
immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party himself.

And again —

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it
is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18,
July, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary
points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability,
and the production of the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or omission and the
damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is
necessary that the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully;
"necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil,
vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)

(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this court in the
maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are
many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the
immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902,
stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to
be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law
in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application
of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of
the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent
of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for damages—that
is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of
the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been
out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes
of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay
for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which
resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."

We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's premises
the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent
act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an
infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the
well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age
and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances
of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without
costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it
originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the
complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

NAPOCOR vs. CA 161 SCRA 334

G.R. No. L-47379 May 16, 1988

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-47481 May 16, 1988

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COUTRT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondent in L-47379.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These consolidated petitions seek to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which adjudged the
National Power Corporation liable for damages against Engineering Construction, Inc. The appellate court, however,
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. Hence, both parties filed their respective petitions: the
National Power Corporation (NPC) in G.R. No. 47379, questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals for holding it
liable for damages and the Engineering Construction, Inc. (ECI) in G.R. No. 47481, questioning the same decision for
reducing the consequential damages and attorney's fees and for eliminating the exemplary damages.

The facts are succinctly summarized by the respondent Court of Appeals, as follows:

On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction, Inc., being a successful bidder, executed a contract in Manila
with the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to furnish all tools,
labor, equipment, and materials (not furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake
and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to
complete said works within eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date the Contractor receives the formal notice
to proceed (Exh. A).

The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising, the tunnel work covering a distance of seven
(7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo Dam of
the defendant National Power Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the outworks at both ends
of the tunnel.

By September 1967, the plaintiff corporation already had completed the first major phase of the work, namely, the
tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the outworks at the Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the
plaintiff corporation had finished the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment no longer needed there
were transferred to the Ipo site where some projects were yet to be completed.

The record shows that on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon, passing through defendant's
Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy
rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising perilously
at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level had
reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the defendant corporation caused the opening of the
spillway gates." (pp. 45-46, L-47379, Rollo)

The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that the evidence preponlderantly established the fact that
due to the negligent manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large
volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo site with
terrific impact, as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp facilities and permanent
structures and accessories either washed away, lost or destroyed.

The appellate court further found that:

It cannot be pretended that there was no negligence or that the appellant exercised extraordinary care in the opening
of the spillway gates of the Angat Dam. Maintainers of the dam knew very well that it was far more safe to open them
gradually. But the spillway gates were opened only when typhoon Welming was already at its height, in a vain effort
to race against time and prevent the overflow of water from the dam as it 'was rising dangerously at the rate of sixty
centimeters per hour. 'Action could have been taken as early as November 3, 1967, when the water in the reservoir
was still low. At that time, the gates of the dam could have been opened in a regulated manner. Let it be stressed that
the appellant knew of the coming of the typhoon four days before it actually hit the project area. (p. 53, L-47379,
Rollo)

As to the award of damages, the appellate court held:

We come now to the award of damages. The appellee submitted a list of estimated losses and damages to the tunnel
project (Ipo side) caused by the instant flooding of the Angat River (Exh. J-1). The damages were itemized in four
categories, to wit: Camp Facilities P55,700.00; Equipment, Parts and Plant — P375,659.51; Materials P107,175.80;
and Permanent Structures and accessories — P137,250.00, with an aggregate total amount of P675,785.31. The list
is supported by several vouchers which were all submitted as Exhibits K to M-38 a, N to O, P to U-2 and V to X- 60-a
(Vide: Folders Nos. 1 to 4). The appellant did not submit proofs to traverse the aforementioned documentary
evidence. We hold that the lower court did not commit any error in awarding P 675,785.31 as actual or compensatory
damages.

However, We cannot sustain the award of P333,200.00 as consequential damages. This amount is broken down as
follows: P213,200.00 as and for the rentals of a crane to temporarily replace the one "destroyed beyond repair," and
P120,000.00 as one month bonus which the appellee failed to realize in accordance with the contract which the
appellee had with NAWASA. Said rental of the crane allegedly covered the period of one year at the rate of P40.00
an hour for 16 hours a day. The evidence, however, shows that the appellee bought a crane also a crawler type, on
November 10, 1967, six (6) days after the incident in question (Exh N) And according to the lower court, which finding
was never assailed, the appellee resumed its normal construction work on the Ipo- Bicti Project after a stoppage of
only one month. There is no evidence when the appellee received the crane from the seller, Asian Enterprise Limited.
But there was an agreement that the shipment of the goods would be effected within 60 days from the opening of the
letter of credit (Exh. N).<äre||anº•1àw> It appearing that the contract of sale was consummated, We must conclude or
at least assume that the crane was delivered to the appellee within 60 days as stipulated. The appellee then could
have availed of the services of another crane for a period of only one month (after a work stoppage of one month) at
the rate of P 40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day or a total of P 19,200.00 as rental.

But the value of the new crane cannot be included as part of actual damages because the old was reactivated after it
was repaired. The cost of the repair was P 77,000.00 as shown in item No. 1 under the Equipment, Parts and Plants
category (Exh. J-1), which amount of repair was already included in the actual or compensatory damages. (pp. 54-
56, L-47379, Rollo)

The appellate court likewise rejected the award of unrealized bonus from NAWASA in the amount of P120,000.00
(computed at P4,000.00 a day in case construction is finished before the specified time, i.e., within 800 calendar
days), considering that the incident occurred after more than three (3) years or one thousand one hundred seventy
(1,170) days. The court also eliminated the award of exemplary damages as there was no gross negligence on the
part of NPC and reduced the amount of attorney's fees from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.

In these consolidated petitions, NPC assails the appellate court's decision as being erroneous on the ground that the
destruction and loss of the ECI's equipment and facilities were due to force majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of
the water level in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to heavy rains brought about by the typhoon was an
extraordinary occurrence that could not have been foreseen, and thus, the subsequent release of water through the
spillway gates and its resultant effect, if any, on ECI's equipment and facilities may rightly be attributed to force
majeure.

On the other hand, ECI assails the reduction of the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,000.00 on the
grounds that the appellate court had no basis in concluding that ECI acquired a new Crawler-type crane and
therefore, it only can claim rentals for the temporary use of the leased crane for a period of one month; and that the
award of P4,000.00 a day or P120,000.00 a month bonus is justified since the period limitation on ECI's contract with
NAWASA had dual effects, i.e., bonus for earlier completion and liquidated damages for delayed performance; and in
either case at the rate of P4,000.00 daily. Thus, since NPC's negligence compelled work stoppage for a period of one
month, the said award of P120,000.00 is justified. ECI further assailes the reduction of attorney's fees and the total
elimination of exemplary damages.

Both petitions are without merit.

It is clear from the appellate court's decision that based on its findings of fact and that of the trial court's, petitioner
NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon
"Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also
undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And even though the
typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals,
(144 SCRA 596, 606-607):

Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.

The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation
of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).

Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such
person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct
by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v.
Milan 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC is a question of fact which
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is
clearly unfounded. Thus, in Tolentino v. Court of appeals, (150 SCRA 26, 36) we ruled:

Moreover, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
(Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890 [1983]. In fact it is settled that the Supreme Court is not supposed to
weigh evidence but only to determine its substantially (Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 100 SCRA 433 [1982] and will
generally not disturb said findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence (Aytona v. Court of Appeals, 113
SCRA 575 [1985]; Collector of Customs of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3 [1985]. On the other
hand substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (Philippine Metal Products, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 135 [1979]; Police
Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 [1984]; Canete v. WCC, 136 SCRA 302 [1985])

Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in holding the NPC liable for damages.

Likewise, it did not err in reducing the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,000.00. As shown by the
records, while there was no categorical statement or admission on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to
replace the damaged one, a sales contract was presented to the effect that the new crane would be delivered to it by
Asian Enterprises within 60 days from the opening of the letter of credit at the cost of P106,336.75. The offer was
made by Asian Enterprises a few days after the flood. As compared to the amount of P106,336.75 for a brand new
crane and paying the alleged amount of P4,000.00 a day as rental for the use of a temporary crane, which use
petitioner ECI alleged to have lasted for a period of one year, thus, totalling P120,000.00, plus the fact that there was
already a sales contract between it and Asian Enterprises, there is no reason why ECI should opt to rent a temporary
crane for a period of one year. The appellate court also found that the damaged crane was subsequently repaired
and reactivated and the cost of repair was P77,000.00. Therefore, it included the said amount in the award of of
compensatory damages, but not the value of the new crane. We do not find anything erroneous in the decision of the
appellate court that the consequential damages should represent only the service of the temporary crane for one
month. A contrary ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of ECI.
The P120,000.00 bonus was also properly eliminated as the same was granted by the trial court on the premise that
it represented ECI's lost opportunity "to earn the one month bonus from NAWASA ... ." As stated earlier, the loss or
damage to ECI's equipment and facilities occurred long after the stipulated deadline to finish the construction. No
bonus, therefore, could have been possibly earned by ECI at that point in time. The supposed liquidated damages for
failure to finish the project within the stipulated period or the opposite of the claim for bonus is not clearly presented in
the records of these petitions. It is not shown that NAWASA imposed them.

As to the question of exemplary damages, we sustain the appellate court in eliminating the same since it found that
there was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither can the latter's negligence be considered gross. In Dee
Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, (145 SCRA 713, 719) we ruled:

Neither may private respondent recover exemplary damages since he is not entitled to moral or compensatory
damages, and again because the petitioner is not shown to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or
oppressive manner (Art. 2234, Civil Code; Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., 2 SCRA 377; Francisco v. Government
Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577; Gutierrez v. Villegas, 8 SCRA 527; Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155;
Pan Pacific (Phil.) v. Phil. Advertising Corp., 23 SCRA 977; Marchan v. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 888).

We also affirm the reduction of attorney's fees from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. There are no compelling reasons why
we should set aside the appellate court's finding that the latter amount suffices for the services rendered by ECI's
counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 47379 and G.R. No. 47481 are both DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LBC Air Cargo vs. CA 241 SCRA 619

G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995

LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON, represented by
PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

In this petition for review, the application of the doctrines of "proximate cause" and "last clear chance" is, once again,
being put to test. The petition questions the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 18 July 1991, which has reversed
that of the trial court.

The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November 1987.
Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right
lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig
Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside
Tano. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing
against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to
pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started
to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the
motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the
LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.

A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted by
the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the
recovery of damages. The two cases were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, of Surigao del Sur.

On 29 July 1990, the trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was
the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola.

Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. On 18 July 1991, the appellate
court reversed the court a quo. It held:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED, and another one is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants Jaime Tano and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff Patrocinia Monterola the
following amounts:

To SHERWIN MONTEROLA:

1. Indemnity for the death of

Rogelio Monterola P50,000.00

2. For Moral damages P20,000.00

To PATROCINIA GRONDIANO Y MONTEROLA:

3. Actual Damages P7,361.00

4. Hospitals & Burial Expenses 15,000.00

5. Attorneys' Fees and expenses

of Litigation 10,000.00

Plus the costs.

Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should however be reduced to twenty (20%) percent.1

In the instant petition for review, petitioners contend that —

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Jaime Tano, Jr. was negligent in the driving of his vehicle and in
failing to give a signal to approaching vehicles of his intention to make a left turn.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim's
negligence in the driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van.2

The issues raised are thus essentially factual. The intrinsic merit of, as well as cogency in, the detailed analyses
made by the Court of Appeals in arriving at its findings is at once apparent. Said the appellate court:

That visibility was poor when Jaime Tano made a left turn was admitted by the latter.
Q When these two vehicles passed by your parked vehicle, as you said, there were clouds of dust, did I get
you right?

A Yes sir, the road was dusty.

Q So much so that you could no longer see the vehicles from the opposite direction following these vehicles?

A It is not clear, sir, so I even turned on my left signal and the headlight.

Q What do you mean by it was not clear, you could not see the incoming vehicles?

A I could not see because of the cloud of dust.

Q And it was at this juncture, when you were to follow your theory, when you started your LBC van again and
swerved to the left leading to the Bislig airport?

A I did not enter immediately the airport, I waited the dust to clear a little before I drove.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words when you said that it was slightly clear, you would like to tell the Honorable Court that you
could only clearly see big vehicles . . . but not small vehicles like a motorcycle?

A I could see clearly big vehicles but not small vehicles like a motorcycle.

Q Like the motorcycle of Rogelio Monterola?

A Yes, sir. I could not see clearly. (Tano, tsn, April 18, 1989, pp. 26-30) (p. 15, Appellant's brief).

Tano should not have made a left turn under the conditions admitted by him. Under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is called
upon to first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle
approaching may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicles
of the intention to make such movement (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136, as amended). This means that before a driver turns
from a direct line, in this case to the left, the driver must first see to it that there are no approaching vehicles and, if
there are, to make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the very least give a signal that is plainly visible to
the driver of such other vehicle. Tano did neither in this case, for he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was
still very poor, and thus failed to see the approaching motorcycle and warn the latter, of his intention to make a left
turn. This is plain and simple negligence.

In thus making the left turn, he placed his vehicle directly at the path of the motorcycle which, unaware of Tano's
intention to make a left turn, smashed at Tano's vehicle. It was Tano's negligence that created the risk or the condition
of danger that set into operation the event that led to the smashedup and untimely death of Rogelio Monterola.

Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle would not have hit the cargo van had Tano, in operating it, not recklessly turned left
when visibility was still poor, and instead observed the direct line of the Land Transportation Code that before doing
so, he should first see to it that such movement can be made in safety, and that whenever any other vehicle
approaching may be affected by such movement, should give a signal plainly visible to the driver of such other
vehicle of the intention to make such movement.
That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poor visibility as evidenced by the magnitude of the damage to the
vehicles is no defense. His negligence would at most be contributory (Article 2179, N.C.C.). Having negligently
created the condition of danger, defendants may not avoid liability by pointing to the negligence of the former.

xxx xxx xxx

Tano's proven negligence created a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, the LBC Air Cargo
Corporation, in supervising its employees properly and adequately (Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra), which may only be destroyed by proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees to prevent the damage (Article 2180, N.C.C.). No such defense was interposed by defendants in their
answer.

We, however, fail to see Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC-Mangagoy Branch Office, there being no
employer-employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano who is a driver of the LBC Air Cargo Inc. It was held in
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. et al. vs. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231, that the term "Manager" in
Article 2180 is used in the sense of "employer." Hence, no tortuous or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on
Fernando Yu as branch manager of LBC Air Cargo Inc.

Now for the amount of damages. Aside from the indemnity for death which has been pegged at P50,000.00
(Resolution En Banc, August 30, 1990, cited in People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700), the evidence disclose that as a
result of the accident, Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle was damaged, the repair cost of which amounted to P7,361.00
(Exh. E-1), for hospitalization, wake and burial expenses, plaintiff spent P15,000.00. There is likewise no question
that by reason of Rogelio Monterola's untimely death, his only child 14 years old Sherwin Monterola, suffered mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock that entitles him to moral damages which we
hereby fix at P20,000.00. Because of defendants' refusal to indemnify the plaintiff for his father's death, the latter was
compelled to litigate and engage the services of counsel. He is therefore entitled to an additional amount of
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Considering, however, the contributory negligence of Rogelio Monterola in driving at a fast clip despite the fact that
the road was dusty, we reduce the aggregate amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled by twenty per cent
(Phoenix Construction Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Supra). 3

From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor
visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to
settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle
coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence
required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming
vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "supervening negligence" or
as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809).
Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability sought by, another if the
latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence
(Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and Hardware vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 173 SCRA 464).
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident
occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual
impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind
the vehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributory
negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

China Airlines vs. CA G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990

G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990

CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO ESPIRITU, respondents.

G.R. No. 46036 May 18, 1990

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO ESPIRITU, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN and CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., respondents.

Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioner China Air Lines, Ltd.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners in G.R. No. 46036.

Syquia Law Offices for Jose Pagsibigan.

REGALADO, J.:

These consolidated petitions seek the review of the decision of respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 53023-R entitled
"Jose E. Pagsibigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and Roberto Espiritu, Defendants-Appellants;
China Air Lines, Ltd., Defendant-Appellee," 1 the dispositive portion of which declares:

WHEREFORE, except for a modification of the judgment in the sense that the award of P20,000.00 in favor of the
plaintiff shall be in the concept of nominal damages instead of exemplary damages, and that defendant China Air
Lines, Ltd. shall likewise be liable with its two co-defendants in a joint and solidary capacity, the judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, without costs. 2

The challenged decision of respondent court contains a synthesis of the facts that spawned these cases and the
judgment of the court a quo which it affirmed with modifications, thus:

On June 4, 1968, plaintiff Jose E. Pagsibigan, then Vice-President and General Manager of Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., a
local firm dealing in insecticides, pesticides and related services appurtenant thereto, purchased a plane ticket for a
Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from the Transaire Travel Agency. The said agency, through its Cecille Baron,
contacted the Manila Hotel branch of defendant Philippine Air Lines which at that time was a sales and ticketing
agent of defendant China Air lines. On June 6, 1968, PAL, through its ticketing clerk defendant Roberto Espiritu, cut
and issued PAL Ticket No. 01 7991 for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight. According to the plane ticket, the
plaintiff was booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 17:20 hours (5:20
p.m.), Exhibit A.

On June 10, 1968, one hour before the scheduled time of the flight as stated in his ticket, the plaintiff arrived at the
airport to check in for CI Flight No. 812. Upon arriving at the airport, the plaintiff was informed that the plane he was
supposed to take for Taipei had left at 10:20 in the morning of that day. The PAL employees at the airport made
appropriate arrangements for the plaintiff to take PAL's flight to Taipei the following day, June 11, 1968. The plaintiff
took said flight and arrived in Taipei around noontime of the said date.

On July 8, 1968, the plaintiff, through counsel, made formal demand on defendant PAL, for moral damages in not
less than P125,000.00 for what the plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of his failure to take the flight as stated in his
plane ticket. (Exhibit E) After a series of negotiations among the plaintiff, PAL and CAL failed to reach an amicable
settlement, the plaintiff instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on September 22, 1969. In his
complaint, plaintiff prays for the recovery of P125,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees. The moral damages allegedly arose from the gross negligence of defendant Roberto Espiritu in stating on the
plane ticket that the time of departure was 17:20 hours, instead of 10:20 hours which was the correct time of
departure in the revised summer schedule of CAL. Plaintiff claims that by reason of his failure to take the plane, he
suffered besmirched reputation, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded feelings and sleepless nights, inasmuch
as when he went to the airport, he was accompanied by his business associates, close friends and relatives. He
further averred that his trip to Taipei was for the purpose of conferring with a certain Peng Siong Lim, President of the
Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation, scheduled at 9:00 a.m. on June 11, 1968.

Defendant Philippine Air Lines alleged in its answer that the departure time indicated by Espiritu in the ticket was
furnished and confirmed by the reservation office of defendant China Air Lines. It further averred that CAL had not
informed PAL's Manila Hotel Branch of the revised schedule of its flight, nor provided it with revised timetable; that
when the travel agency sought to purchase the ticket for the plaintiff on CAL CI Flight No. 812 for June 10, 1968,
Espiritu who was then the ticketing clerk on duty, checked with the reservation office of CAL on the availability of
space, the date and the time of said flight; that CAL's Dory Chan informed Espiritu that the departure time of Flight
No. 812 on June 10, 1968 was at 5:20 in the afternoon of said date. PAL asserted a cross-claim against CAL for
attorney's fees and for reimbursement of whatever amount the court may adjudge PAL to be liable to the plaintiff.
Defendant Espiritu adopted the defenses of his co-defendant PAL.

Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims liability for the negligence and incompetence of the employees of
PAL. It avers that it had revised its schedule since April 1, 1968, the same to be effective on April 20, 1968, and the
said revised schedule was adopted only after proper petition with and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board of
which all airlines, including defendant PAL, were notified; that both printed copies of the international timetable and of
the mimeographed notices of the official schedule and flight departure schedules were distributed to all its sales
agents, including PAL, that after the effectivity of the new time schedules, PAL's Manila Hotel office had been issuing
and selling tickets based on the revised time schedule; and that, assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages, the liability is on PAL and not on CAL. A cross-claim was likewise asserted by CAL against its co-defendant
PAL.

After due trial, the Court a quo rendered judgment laying the blame for the erroneous entry in the ticket as to the time
of departure to defendant Roberto Espiritu, ticketing agent of defendant PAL, and that no employee of CAL
contributed to such erroneous entry. It was further ruled that the plaintiff had no reason to claim moral damages but
may be entitled to recover exemplary damages. The dispositive portion of the decision makes the following
adjudication:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants Philippine Air Lines,
Inc. and Roberto Espiritu, to pay to plaintiff Jose Pagsibigan jointly and severally, by way of exemplary damages, the
sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) plus Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as reimbursement for
attorney's fees and the costs.

The complaint is dismissed with respect to the defendant China Air Lines, Ltd. The cross-claim filed by defendant
PAL and Espiritu against defendant CAL as well as the cross-claim filed by the defendant CAL against defendant PAL
and Espiritu are also hereby dismissed. 3

From said decision of the court below, all the parties, except China Air Lines, Ltd. appealed to respondent court
which, however, sustained the ruling of the trial court denying Pagsibigan's claim for moral damages. It concluded
that Roberto Espiritu did not act with malice or in bad faith in making a wrong entry of the time of departure on the
ticket, and that the mistake committed by Espiritu appears to be an honest one done in good faith.

Respondent court also ruled out the claim for exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. Nonetheless, as earlier
noted, it awarded Pagsibigan P20,000.00 as nominal damages, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, for the
vindication of a legal wrong committed against him. As regards the liability of the parties, respondent court held:

There can be little question as to the liability of PAL and Espiritu for the damage caused to the plaintiff due to the
erroneous entry in the plane ticket made by the latter. They seek to justify the erroneous statement as to the time of
departure on the ground that such was the time given by Dory Chan to Espiritu when the latter called up for the
reservation in favor of plaintiff. Aside from the fact that Dory Chan had vigorously disclaimed having given such
information to Espiritu, We are convinced that, as the trial court had found, CAL had no share in the error committed
by Espiritu in indicating the time of departure of Flight No. 812. PAL had shown through the testimony of Carmen
Ibazeta Gallaga, ticket representative of PAL at the Manila Hotel Office, that they received circulars and timetables of
airlines in the PAL main office. It further appears that on two occasions, defendant PAL cut and issued tickets for CAL
based on the new schedule even before June 10, 1968. As a matter of fact, the other entries of time departures in the
ticket issued to the plaintiff are in accordance with the revised schedule, and that the only error therein was with
respect to the departure from Manila on June 10, 1968.

However, in proving that the fault lied with Espiritu, defendant CAL derives no solace nor gains an advantage. It may
not claim exemption from liability by reason thereof. Espiritu was an employee of PAL and whatever negligence was
committed by him is attributable to PAL. It is an admitted fact that PAL is an authorized agent of CAL. In this
relationship, the responsibility of defendant PAL for the tortious act of its agent or representative is inescapable. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A similar principle is recognized in our Civil Code in its Art. 2180 . . . . Unlike in the doctrine of respondeat superior,
however, the Civil Code permits the employer to escape this liability upon proof of having observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. We find the evidence of defendant CAL to be insufficient to
overcome the presumption of negligence on its part for the act done by defendant Roberto Espiritu. (Emphasis
supplied)

The liability for the damage sustained by the plaintiff should, therefore, be borne by all of the defendants in a joint and
solidary capacity (Art. 2194). The liability of an employer under Art. 2180 is primary and direct. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It appearing that defendant CAL, as employer or principal, did not contribute to the negligence committed by
defendants PAL and Roberto Espiritu, its liability to the plaintiff could be passed on to said defendants. Defendant
CAL, however, did not take an appeal and did not, therefore, take exception to the dismissal of its cross-claim against
defendants PAL and Espiritu. This serves as an obstacle for a rendition of judgment favorable to CAL on its said
counterclaim. 4

In its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. L-45985, petitioner China Air Lines, Ltd. (CAL) relied on the following
grounds:

1. A principal cannot be held liable, much less solidarily, for the negligence of the sub-agent, where the former
never participated in, ratified or authorized the latter's act or omission.

2. Dismissal of the cross-claim of petitioner against the private respondents Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and
Roberto Espiritu will not prevent the release of the petitioner from liability to the private respondent
Pagsibigan.

3. The award of damages was unwarranted both legally and factually. 5

On their part, petitioners Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) and Roberto Espiritu made the following submissions in G.R.
No. L-46036, to wit:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that respondent China Air Lines, Ltd., being the
principal, is solely liable to respondent Pagsibigan.

2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding respondent Pagsibigan the sum of P20,000.00 as nominal
damages. 6

In G.R. No. L-45985, respondent Pagsibigan contends, by way of refutation, that CAL's liability is based on breach of
contract of transportation which was the proximate result of the negligence and/or error committed by PAL and
Espiritu; that even assuming that CAL has no share in the negligence of PAL and Espiritu, the liability of CAL does
not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Traversing such contentions, CAL argues that it can not be made liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code because of the absence of employer-employee relationship between it and PAL.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. L-46036, respondent Pagsibigan claims that PAL is liable under Article 1909 of the
said code which holds an agent responsible not only for fraud but also for negligence which shall be judged with
more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation. PAL, however,
maintains that for lack of privity with Pagsibigan, the suit for breach of contract should have been directed against
CAL.

What surfaces as a procedural maneuver taken by respondent Pagsibigan in the course of the proceedings in these
cases has confused the real issues in the controversy subject of both petitions before us.

Respondent Pagsibigan has opted to seek redress by pursuing two remedies at the same time, that is, to enforce the
civil liability of CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to recover from PAL and Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana.
What he has overlooked is the proscription against double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code which, while
not preventing recourse to any appropriate remedy, prevents double relief for a single wrong.

To avoid inequitable effects under such confluence of remedies, the true nature of the action instituted by respondent
Pagsibigan must be determined. A careful perusal of the complaint of respondent Pagsibigan will readily disclose that
the allegations thereof clearly and unmistakably make out a case for a quasi-delict in this wise:

4. That at all pertinent times particularly in June of 1968, defendant China Air Lines Ltd. has been operating
regular scheduled flights to and from Manila, and has offered accommodations thereon through, among others,
defendant PAL as its authorized sales agent and/or ticketing agent, such that China Airlines Ltd. is here impleaded as
being the principal of defendant PAL;

5. That at all pertinent times, particularly in June of 1968, defendant Roberto Espiritu has been in the employ
of defendant PAL at its sales counter at the PAL Manila Hotel branch office and is here impleaded as defendant as
being the proximate malfeasor in this cause of action;

xxx xxx xxx

12. That plaintiff missed the initial Manila-Taipei leg (CI Flight 812) on June 10, 1968, as set forth in his ticket
(Annex "A") solely and exclusively by reason of gross incompetence and inexcusable negligence amounting to bad
faith of defendant PAL — acting, through its sales representative, the defendant Roberto Espiritu, of its Manila Hotel
branch office — in the discharge of its duties as sales agent and/or ticketing agent for defendant China Airlines Ltd.
as principal.

13. That as a direct result of culpable incompetence and negligence of defendant Roberto Espiritu as sales
representative of defendant PAL, plaintiff was unable to attend to previously scheduled business commitments in
Taipei . . . resulting in direct and indirect prejudice to plaintiff that has yet to be fully assessed; (Emphasis supplied) 7

xxx xxx xxx

Had the intention of respondent Pagsibigan been to maintain an action based on breach of contract of carriage, he
could have sued CAL alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the contract. Moreover, in cases of such
nature, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All he has
to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. 8

The records disclose that the trial court delved much into the issues of who was at fault, and its decision is primarily
anchored on its factual findings regarding the civil liability arising from culpa aquiliana of the erring party, to this effect:

Plaintiff said that the erroneous entry in his ticket which made it appear that his CAL flight of June 10, 1968 was to be
at 5:20 in the afternoon was due to the fault or negligence of PAL's Roberto Espiritu, a co-defendant herein, as well
as the employees of the defendant CAL. In making CAL co-responsible, plaintiff appears to rely on the doctrine that
the principal is responsible for the act of an agent done within the scope of the agency.

There is no proof extant that any of the employees of PAL had contributed to the erroneous entry in plaintiffs PAL
ticket for Taipei which placed his time of departure to 5:20 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 1968. Only defendant
Roberto Espiritu appears to be solely and exclusively responsible for such error and therefor the conclusion becomes
inevitable that CAL must be absolved from any blame because defendant Roberto Espiritu who committed the error
is not an employee or agent of the defendant CAL. 9

It, therefore, becomes evident that respondent Pagsibigan, having sensed that he can not hold CAL liable on a quasi-
delict, decided on appeal to instead make a sinistral detour, so to speak, by claiming that his action against CAL is
based on a breach of contract of carriage.

We can not permit respondent Pagsibigan to change his theory at this stage; it would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no more opportunity to present further evidence, material to the new theory, which it could have
done had it been aware earlier of the new theory at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 10

There is indeed no basis whatsoever to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. As hereinbefore stated,
the court a quo absolved CAL of any liability for fault or negligence. This finding was shared by respondent court
when it concluded that defendant CAL did not contribute to the negligence committed by therein defendants-
appellants PAL and Roberto Espiritu.

Respondent Pagsibigan insists that CAL was barred from proving that it observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. This argument is obviously misplaced. CAL is not the employer of PAL or Espiritu. In
Duavit vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 we have stressed the need of first establishing the existence of an
employer-employee relationship before an employer may be vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

With respect to PAL and Espiritu, they disclaim any liability on the theory that the former is merely an agent of CAL
and that the suit should have been directed against CAL alone. There is no question that the contractual relation
between both airlines is one of agency. Suffice it to say, however, that in an action premised on the employee's
negligence, whereby respondent Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the resulting damages from both PAL and Espiritu
without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employer under said
Article 2180.

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 12

Hence, to escape solidary liability for the quasi-delict committed by Espiritu, it is imperative that PAL must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. PAL failed to overcome the presumption. As found by
respondent court, CAL had revised its schedule of flights since April 1, 1968; that after the Civil Aeronautics Board
had approved the revised schedule of flights, PAL was duly informed thereof and, in fact, PAL's Manila Hotel branch
office had been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time schedule before June 10, 1968.

PAL's main defense is that it is only an agent. As a general proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is not
personally liable to third persons. However, there are admitted exceptions, as in this case where the agent is being
sued for damages arising from a tort committed by his employee.

The respondent court found that the mistake committed by Espiritu was done in good faith. While there is no
evidence that he acted with malice, we can not entirely condone his actuations. As an employee of PAL, the nature of
his functions requires him to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. He committed a clear neglect of duty.

Ergo, for his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable to respondent Pagsibigan under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. For
the failure of PAL to rebut the legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, it is
also primarily liable under Article 2180 of the same code which explicitly provides that employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Under the aforesaid provision, all that is required is that the employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi-delict
which caused damage to another, and this suffices to hold the employer primarily and solidarity responsible for the
tortious act of the employee. PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of the amount which it will
have to pay the offended party's claim. 13

On the issue of damages, we agree, except as to the amount, that nominal damages may be awarded to respondent
Pagsibigan to vindicate the legal wrong committed against him. It appearing that the wrong committed was
immediately rectified when PAL promptly booked him for the next morning's flight to Taipei where he arrived before
noon of June 11, 1968 and was able to attend his scheduled conference, and considering the concept and purpose of
nominal damages, the award of P20,000.00 must accordingly be reduced to an amount equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED accordingly. China Air Lines, Ltd. is hereby
absolved from liability. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and Roberto Espiritu are declared jointly and severally liable to pay
the sum of P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages, without prejudice to the right of Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to
recover from Roberto Espiritu reimbursement of the damages that it may pay respondent Jose Pagsibigan.

SO ORDERED.

Exconde vs. Capuno G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957

G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

Magno T. Bueser for appellant.

Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of
Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No.
15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he
committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only
convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other
students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver
sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son
at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son
Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father
is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law,
1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a
jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither
the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because
he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante
Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgement relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound
reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do not
commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision
over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903
of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptors y artesanos" used in the Italian and French
Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the
parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the City School
Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. His father could not properly refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance of
the school authorities. The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other
children, the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or scout master was
present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do
so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the pupils, the school authorities are the
ones answerable for that negligence, and not the father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and
which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the
custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the
presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the
parent in order to render him liable.

First Malayan vs. CA G.R. No. 91378, June 9 1992

G. R. No. 91378 June 9, 1992

FIRST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO B. VITUG and ESTATE OF VICENTE TRINIDAD, Represented by
Widow GLORIA D. TRINIDAD, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO. J.:

This case brings to the fore the importance of motor vehicle registration in determining who should be liable for the
death or injuries suffered by passengers or third persons as a consequence of the operation of a motor vehicle.

On June 26, 1984, Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case No. 84-25186 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Branch
XLIII, against the defendant. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC for short), to recover damages
for physical injuries, loss of personal effects, and the wreck of his car as a result of a three-vehicle collision on
December 14, 1983. involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of FMLFC and
driven by one Crispin Sicat.

The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and Epifanio delos
Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City, northward-bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a Ford
Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing its roof. The
cargo truck thereafter struck Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze.

Stunned by the impact. Vitug was fortunately extricated from his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss.

When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued
at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses. a gold
Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck and back. Upon
his physician's advice, he received further medical treatment in the United States which cost him US$2,373.64 for his
first trip, and US$5,596.64 for the second.

At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the Isuzu cargo truck was registered in the name of the First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC).

However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck. neither the employer of the driver
Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24. 1980, after the latter had paid all his
monthly amortizations under the financing lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad.

On FMLFC's motion, the lower court granted FMLFC's leave to file a third-party complaint against Trinidad and
admitted the third-party complaint filed therewith.

Answering the third-party complaint the Estate of Vicente Trinidad admitted that the truck was operated by the
deceased during his lifetime. Nevertheless it raised the defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad was no longer
existing because the same had long been settled and partitioned extra judicially by his heirs.

On August 25, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision sentencing FMLFC to pay Vitug the sum of P133,950 with
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus the sum of P10,000 as attorneys fees and
costs.

FMLFC appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on November 27, 1989 modifying
the appealed judgment by ordering the third-party defendant-appellee (Estate of Vicente Trinidad) to indemnify the
appellant, FMLFC, for whatever amount the latter may pay Vitug under the judgment. In all other respects, the trial
court's decision was affirmed.

FMLFC has filed this petition for review on certiorari praying that the decision of the appellate court be reversed and
set aside.

On February 14, 1990, the Court dismissed the petition for insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to
comply with the Rules of Court and Circular 1-88 requiring the submission of (1) proof of service of the petition on the
adverse party, and (2) a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the petition was filed
late on February 1, 1990, the due date being January 27, 1990.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On April 16, 1990. we granted the same and reinstated the petition.
Without giving it due course, we required the respondents to comment.

After deliberating on the petition, the comments of the private respondents and the petitioner's reply thereto, we find
the petition to be bereft of merit, hence, resolved to deny it.
In the first place, the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the Isuzu vehicle which figured in
the mishap was still registered in the name of FMLFC at the time of the accident is not reviewable by this Court in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of Court.

This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered
owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10. citing Vargas vs. Langcay. 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aquino. 105 Phil.
949).

We believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record. It is even
not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of the driver is. Granting that, in this
case, the father of the driver is the actual owner and that he is the actual employer, following the well-settled principle
that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public
and third persons, and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation we must hold and
consider such owner-operator of record as the employer, in contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect to
this policy of law as enunciated in the above cited decisions of this Court, we must now extend the same and
consider the actual operator and employer as the agent of the operator of record." (Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 178;
citing Montoya vs. Ignacio, G.R. No. L-5868, Dec. 29, 1953; Timbol vs. Osias, G.R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955; Vda.
de Medina vs. Cresencia, G.R. No. L-8194, July 11, 1956; Necesito vs. Paras, G.R. No. L10605, June 30, 1955.)

. . . Were the registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an
indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury
done (Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil 103.)

. . . The registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any
alleged sale or lease made thereon." (MYC-Agro- Industrial Corp. vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 11.)

In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the
Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely on
the public registration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner and
operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by its operation due to the fault or
negligence of the driver thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SRCA 388

G.R. No. L-30212 September 30, 1987

BIENVENIDO GELISAN, petitioner,

vs.
BENITO ALDAY, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the judgment * rendered by the Court of Appeals, dated 11 October 1968, as amended by its
resolution, dated 11 February 1969, in CA-G.R. No. 32670-R, entitled: "Benito Alday, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Roberto
Espiritu and Bienvenido Gelisan, defendants-appellees," which ordered the herein petitioner Bienvenido Gelisan to
pay, jointly and severally, with Roberto Espiritu, the respondent Benito Alday the amount of P5,397.30, with. legal
interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, and the costs of suit; and for the said Roberto Espiritu to pay or
refund the petitioner Bienvenido Gelisan whatever amount the latter may have paid to the respondent Benito Alday
by virtue of the judgment.

The uncontroverted facts of the case are, as follows:

Defendant Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck bearing plate No. TH-2377. On January 31, 1962,
defendant Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract marked Exhibit 3-Gelisan under which
Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer at an agreed
price of P18.00 per trip within the limits of the City of Manila provided the loads shall not exceed 200 sacks. It is also
agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by
him. The truck was taken by a driver of Roberto Espiritu on February 1, 1962. Plaintiff Benito Alday, a trucking
operator, and who owns about 15 freight trucks, had known the defendant Roberto Espiritu since 1948 as a truck
operator. Plaintiff had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to
its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with
the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed his
checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per
trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and
B. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertolizer bodega at Mandaluyong. The signatures
appearing in the way bill receipts Exhibits A and B of the Alday Transportation admittedly not the signature of any
representative or employee of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation. Roberto Espiritu could not be found, and plaintiff
reported the loss to the Manila Police Department. Roberto Espiritu was later arrested and booked for theft. ...

Subsequently, plaintiff Aiday saw the truck in question on Sto. Cristo St. and he notified the Manila Police
Department, and it was impounded by the police. It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan from the Police Department
after he had been notified by his employees that the truck had been impounded by the police; but as he could not
produce at the time the registration papers, the police would not release the truck to Gelisan. As a result of the
impounding of the truck according to Gelisan, ... and that for the release of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to
the surety company. 1

Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas
Fertilizer Corporation so that, on 12 February 1962, he (Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and
Bienvenido Gelisan with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 49603, for the
recovery of damages suffered by him thru the criminal acts committed by the defendants.

The defendant, Roberto Espiritu failed to file an answer and was, accordingly, declared in default.

The defendant, Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other hand, disowned responsibility. He claimed that he had no
contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday as regards the hauling and/or delivery of the 400 bags of fertilizer
mentioned in the complaint; that the alleged misappropriation or nondelivery by defendant Roberto Espiritu of
plaintiff's 400 bags of fertilizer, was entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge, and which fact became
known to him, for the first time, on 8 February 1962 when his freight truck, with plate No. TH-2377, was impounded
by the Manila Police Department, at the instance of the plaintiff; and that in his written contract of hire with Roberto
Espiritu, it was expressly provided that the latter will bear and pay all loss and damages attending the carriage of
goods to be hauled by said Roberto Espiritu.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that Roberto Espiritu alone was liable to Benito Alday, since
Bienvenido Gelisan was not privy to the contract between Espiritu and Alday. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Roberto Espiritu for
the sum of P6,000 with interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint, and the costs of the suit.
Plantiff's complaint is dismissed with respect to defendant Bienvenido Gelisan, and judgment is rendered in favor of
defendant Bienvenido Gelisan and against the plaintiff for the sum of P350. 2

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, citing the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 3 found that Bienvenido Gelisan is
likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck; and that the lease contract, executed by and between
Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu, is not binding upon Benito Alday for not having been previously approved
by the Public Service Commission. Accordingly, it sentenced Bienvenido Gelisan to pay, jointly and severally with
Roberto Espiritu, Benito Alday the amount of P5,397.30, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint;
and to pay the costs. Roberto Espiritu, in turn, was ordered to pay or refund Bienvenido Gelisan whatever amount the
latter may have paid to Benito Alday by virtue of the judgment. 4

Hence, the present recourse by Bienvenido Gelisan.

The petition is without merit. The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals, which is sought to be reviewed, is in
accord with the facts and the law on the case and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. The Court has
invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages
that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. 5
The claim of the petitioner that he is not hable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and
Roberto Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that the
lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled in our
jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the
requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons. 6

We also find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the rule requiring the previous approval by the Public Service
Commission, of the transfer or lease of the motor vehicle, may be applied only in cases where there is no positive
Identification of the owner or driver, or where there are very scant means of Identification, but not in those instances
where the person responsible for damages has been fixed or determined beforehand, as in the case at bar. The
reason for the rule we reiterate in the present case, was explained by the Court in Montoya vs. Ignacio, 7 thus:

There is merit in this contention. The law really requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that
a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the
grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be
notified to the Public Service Commission so that the latter mav take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the
public. In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is granted, there should be a public hearing, with notice to all
interested parties, in order that the Commission may determine if there are good and reasonable grounds justifying
the transfer or lease of the property covered by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to public interest.
Such being the reason and philosophy behind this requirement, it follows that if the property covered by the franchise
is transferred, or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the
Public Service Commission and in contemplation of law the grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise
in relation to the Commission and to the Public. Since the lease of the jeepney in question was made without such
approval the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Marcelino Ignacio still continues to be its operator in
contemplation of law, and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, one of them being
the collision under consideration.
Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by
Roberto Espiritu for the amount titat he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday,
since the lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the
Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties. 8

We also find no merit in the petitioner's contention that his liability is only subsidiary. The Court has consistently
considered the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be jointly and severally liable with the driver
for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. Thus, in the case of Vargas vs. Langcay, 9 the Court said:

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering appellant-petitioner Diwata Vargas only subsidiarily liable
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This court, in previous decisions, has always considered the registered
owner/operator of a passenger vehicle, jointly and severally liable with the driver, for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries (or death) sustained in the operation of said vehicles.
(Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182; Timbol vs. Osias, G.R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955; Vda. de Medina vs.
Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil., 103; Tamayo vs. Aquino and
Rayos vs Tamayo, 105 Phil., 949; 56 Off. Gaz. [36] 5617.) In the case of Erezo vs. Jepte, Supra, We held:

* * * In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the
damage caused * * * (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Tamayo vs. Aquino, supra, We said:

* * * As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibffity to the public or to any passenger riding in the
vehicle or truck must be direct * * * (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.