1
Land Title and Deeds Case Digest
Color Code:
Facts ; Issue ; Ruling
Preliminaries
#9- #10
G.R. No. 83432 May 20, 1991
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. MANUELITO S. PALILEO, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
If the same piece of land was sold to two different purchasers,
to whom shall ownership belong? Article 1544 of the Civil
Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable
property, ownership shall be transferred: (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity regarding the application of the law with
respect to lands registered under the Torrens System. Section
51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (amending Section 50 of
Act No. 496 clearly provides that the act of registration is the
operative act to convey or affect registered lands insofar as
third persons are concerned. Thus, a person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on
the face of the register or certificate of title.1 Following this
principle, this Court has time and again held that a purchaser
in good faith of registered land (covered by a Torrens Title)
acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof
whose right is not recorded in the registry of deeds at the time
of the sale.2
The question that has to be resolved in the instant petition is
whether or not the rule provided in Article 1544 of the Civil
Code as discussed above, is applicable to a parcel of
unregistered land purchased at a judicial sale. To be more
specific, this Court is asked to determine who, as between two
buyers of unregistered land, is the rightful owner—the first
buyer in a prior sale that was unrecorded, or the second buyer
who purchased the land in an execution sale whose transfer
was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On April 13, 1970, defendant spouses Enrique Castro and
Herminia R. Castro sold to plaintiff-appellee Manuelito
Palileo (private respondent herein), a parcel of
unregistered coconut land situated in Candiis, Mansayaw,
Mainit, Surigao del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "E"). The deed was
not registered in the Registry of Property for unregistered
lands in the province of Surigao del Norte. Since the
execution of the deed of sale, appellee Manuelito Palileo
who was then employed at Lianga Surigao del Sur, exercised
acts of ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela
Palileo, as administratrix or overseer. Appellee has
continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land from 1971
until the present (Exhs. "C" to "C-7", inclusive).
On November 29, 1976, a judgment was rendered against
defendant Enrique T. Castro, in Civil Case No. 0103145 by
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, to pay
herein defendant-appellant Radiowealth Finance Company
(petitioner herein), the sum of P22,350.35 with interest thereon
at the rate of 16% per annum from November 2, 1975 until fully
paid, and the further sum of P2,235.03 as attorney's fees, and
to pay the costs. Upon the finality of the judgment, a writ of
execution was issued. Pursuant to said writ, defendant
provincial Sheriff Marietta E. Eviota, through defendant
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Leopoldo Risma, levied upon and
finally sold at public auction the subject land that
defendant Enrique Castro had sold to appellee Manuelito
Palileo on April 13,1970. A certificate of sale was executed by
the Provincial Sheriff in favor of defendant- appellant
Radiowealth Finance Company, being the only bidder. After
the period of redemption has (sic) expired, a deed of final
sale was also executed by the same Provincial Sheriff. Both
the certificate of sale and the deed of final sale were
registered with the Registry of Deeds.3
Learning of what happened to the land, private respondent
Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over
the same. After a trial on the merits, the court a quo
rendered a decision in his favor. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court was affirmed. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
In its petition, Radiowealth Finance Company presents the
following errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXHIBIT
B) ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY ENRIQUE CASTRO IN
FAVOR OF APPELLEE MANUELITO PALILEO, WAS
SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING APPELLEE MANUELITO PALILEO AS
ADMINISTRATOR ONLY OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY;
AND
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RADIOWEALTH
FINANCE COMPANY OWNER OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY BY REASON OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE
AND THE DEED OF FINAL SALE WHICH WERE ALL
REGISTERED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, HENCE,
SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE DEED OF SALE IN
POSSESSION OF MANUELITO PALILEO, FOR BEING NOT
REGISTERED.4
As regards the first and second assigned errors, suffice it to
state that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on this Court and will not be disturbed unless there
is grave abuse of discretion. The finding of the Court of
Appeals that the property in question was already sold to
private respondent by its previous owner before the execution
sale is evidenced by a deed of sale. Said deed of sale is
notarized and is presumed authentic. There is no substantive
proof to support petitioner's allegation that the document is
fictitious or simulated. With this in mind, We see no reason to
reject the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that private
respondent was not a mere administrator of the property. That
he exercised acts of ownership through his mother also
remains undisputed.
Going now to the third assigned error which deals with the
main issue presented in the instant petition, We observe that
the Court of Appeals resolved the same in favor of private
respondent due to the following reason; what the Provincial
Sheriff levied upon and sold to petitioner is a parcel of land that
does not belong to Enrique Castro, the judgment debtor, hence
the execution is contrary to the directive contained in the writ of
execution which commanded that the lands and buildings
belonging to Enrique Castro be sold to satisfy the execution.5
There is no doubt that had the property in question been a
registered land, this case would have been decided in favor of
petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim first recorded
in the Registry of Deeds. For, as already mentioned earlier, it
is the act of registration that operates to convey and affect
registered land. Therefore, a bona fide purchaser of a
registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as
against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.
However, it must be stressed that this case deals with a
parcel of unregistered land and a different set of rules
applies. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a third party
with a better right". The aforequoted phrase has been held
by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in
one's favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the
earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals6 is a case in point.
It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no
application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like
in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the
same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the
original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an
execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
money filed against the said original owners. Applying Section
35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 this Court held
that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to
benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the
latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second
sale was registered. It was explained that this is because
the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution
sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and
merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as
of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals correctly
held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in
favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no

longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of
the said execution sale.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10788 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171535 June 5, 2009
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
vs.SPOUSES EDITO and MERIAN TIROL and SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO and MIRANDA NGO, Respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse, annul and set aside (i) the May 27, 2005 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 72867 entitled
"Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol, et al. v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority," and (ii) its February 17, 2006
Resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The instant case finds its genesis in a complaint for quieting of
title filed on August 8, 1996 by respondents, Spouses Edito
and Merian Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda Ngo,
against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA). The facts were aptly summarized by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
The instant appeal revolves around a certain parcel of land,
Lot No. 4763-D, over which the parties to the above-entitled
case assert ownership and possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol
and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with their respective spouses,
claim to have purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of
land, Lot No. 4763-D, from a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins,
a Filipino citizen married to a certain Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins,
an American citizen, per Deed of Absolute Sale dated
September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees bought the said
property on the strength of the apparent clean title of vendor
Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax Declaration and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs. Elma Jenkins’
name, which bear no annotation of liens, encumbrances, lis
pendens or any adverse claim whatsoever. After the sale
wherein plaintiffs-appellees were purportedly purchasers for
value and in good faith, they succeeded in titling the said lot
under their names per Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044
on September 20, 1993, and further proceeded to pay realty
taxes thereon. It was only in January 1996 that plaintiffs-
appellees discovered a cloud on their title when their
request for a Height Clearance with the Department of
Transportation and Communications was referred to the
defendant-appellant Mactan[-]Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latter’s
ownership of the said lot by way of purchase thereof
dating far back to 1958.
At this point, it becomes imperative to trace the chain of
ownership over Lot No. 4763-D. It is undisputed that the
original owners of said property were the spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who owned the entire Lot No.
4763, of which Lot No. 4763-D is a portion of (sic).
Unfortunately for herein parties, this is where the similarity of
facts end (sic), and the instant controversy begins.
According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot
No. 4763 was decreed in the names of spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act on June 1, 1934. [In] January 1974,
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No.
4763 to Spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug.
The latter spouses thereafter succeeded to secure the
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title of Lot No.
4763, Opon Cadastre as evidenced by Court Order dated
July 3, 1986. Said Court Order subsequently became final and
executory, thus a reconstituted title, OCT No. RO-2754, was
issued in the name of the original owners-spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. On September 12, 1986, the
Deed of Absolute Sale between spouses Julian
Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and spouses Moises
Cuizon/Beatriz Patalinghug was registered and annotated
on OCT No. RO-2754, which was cancelled to give way to the
issuance of TCT No. 16735 in the name of spouses Moises
Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug. Thereafter, the latter sold a
portion, denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs. Elma
Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier discussed,
sold the same lot to herein plaintiffs-appellees on
September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that all
throughout the chain of ownership, the titles – albeit from a
reconstituted one – of the previous owners were absolutely
devoid of any annotations of liens, encumbrances, lis
pendens, adverse claim, or anything that may cause a
reasonable man of ordinary prudence and diligence to
suspect the contrary. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees
have been in actual, uninterrupted and peaceful
possession of the property since 1993, and if the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest be tacked,
plaintiffs-appellees would be in constructive,
uninterrupted and peaceful possession for sixty-two (62)
long years as of the date of filing their Complaint for
Quieting of Title in the court a quo.
According to the defendant-appellant: On March 23, 19863
, the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the government, through the
[then] Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA, for brevity). In
a Certificate dated March 19, 1959, vendor Julian Cuison
confirmed that he was the possessor and actual owner of Lot
No. 4763 which was located within the "Mactan Alternate
International Airport" and that the duplicate copy of the
certificate of title was lost or destroyed during the last war
without him or his predecessor(s)-in-interest having received a
copy thereof. Since then, the government, through
defendant-appellant MCIAA, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of owner. Said lot allegedly
became part of the Clear Zone of Runway 22 for purposes
of required clearance for take-off and landing. Moreover,
defendant-appellant asserts that plaintiffs-appellees are
2
nothing more than trustees of Lot No. 4763-D in favor of
defendant-appellant MCIAA, being merely successors-in-
interest of the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef, who undertook in paragraph 4 of the Deed
of Absolute Sale, to assist in the reconstitution of title so
that the land may be registered in the name of vendee
government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA. In
paragraph 5 of the same Deed of Absolute Sale, the
parties also agreed that the property be registered under
Act 3344 pending the reconstitution and issuance of title.
Purportedly, in gross and evident bad faith and in open
violation of their Deed of Absolute Sale, the spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef again sold the same property to
spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug, who in turn
sold the lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who eventually sold the
same to herein plaintiffs-appellees. Defendant-appellant
MCIAA further imputes bad faith to plaintiffs-appellees
under the rationale that because their title came from a
reconstituted one and that Lot No. 4763 was within the
Clear Zone of Runway 22 of the airport, plaintiffs-
appellees should have exerted effort in researching the
history of ownership and cannot possibly claim to be
innocent of MCIAA’s ownership and possession thereof.4
In its December 4, 2000 Decision,5 the trial court ruled in favor
of petitioner MCIAA in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules in favor
of defendant and thus DISMISSES the complaint of plaintiffs
for want of merit.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the defendant
MCIAA, is adjudged as (sic) the lawful owner of the entire Lot
4763, Opon Cadastre.
The Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot 4763-D in favor of
plaintiffs is hereby declared null and void.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 for Lot 4763-D under the
names of plaintiffs is likewise deemed null and void.
The Register of Deeds is directed to issue to the defendant
MCIAA a transfer certificate of title covering the whole Lot
4763.
The counterclaim of defendant, however, is denied for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that there was a valid transfer of title
from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef to the
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and accordingly,
the respondents did not buy Lot No. 4763-D from a person
who could validly dispose of it. It likewise ruled that the
government (through the CAA, and now respondent MCIAA)
has been in possession of the disputed land since it bought the
same in 1958, when a public deed of absolute sale was
executed in its favor. Lastly, respondents were considered
as having bought Lot No. 4763-D in bad faith since they

ignored circumstances that should have made them
curious enough to investigate beyond the four corners of
the Transfer Certificate of Title. In the trial court’s view, the
facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only about 320 meters from the
center of the runway and therefore part of the clear zone and
(ii) has been vacant for several decades should have alerted
the respondents to the possibility that the lot could be part of
the airport complex and therefore owned by petitioner.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration6 on
January 23, 2001, and a Supplemental (sic) to Motion for
Reconsideration7 on May 17, 2001. Petitioner duly filed its
Opposition8 to the said Motions on April 10, 2001 and June 13,
2001, respectively.
In an Order9 dated August 9, 2001, the trial court did a
complete volte face and reversed its Decision. Holding that
Article 154410 of the New Civil Code – which set forth the
rule on double sales – finds application to the instant
case, the trial court ratiocinated:
In the words of the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Cabana, this
Court finds that in the case of [a] double sale of real property[,]
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code applies. Defendant was
certainly the first buyer and the plaintiffs [were] the subsequent
buyers, to be exact fourth (sic).
But who among the parties herein has a better right to Lot No.
4763-D? To answer this question, it is necessary to determine
first the issue [of] whether or not the plaintiffs were buyers in
good faith.lawphil
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not convinced that indeed the plaintiffs were
buyers in bad faith. xxx The registration of the deed of absolute
sale by the defendant at the Registry of Deeds under Act No.
3344 sometime in 1959 is not the registration being
contemplated under the law. "Registration under Act No. 3344
differs materially from registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law and under the Land Registration Act. In the Spanish
Mortgage Law[,] there is [an] express provision (Article 17) to
the effect that titles recorded thereunder cannot be annulled or
invalidated by prior unrecorded rights, while the Land
Registration Act (No. 496) contains a special disposition that
only transactions noted on the certificate of title and entered in
the registry books can bind the land. On the other hand,
transactions registered under Act No. 3344 cannot defeat a
third person with a better right. Of course[,] the law does not
define exactly what may be considered a better right, leaving
the matter of its construction to the courts. The main reason for
the difference in the operation of Act No. 3344 compared with
the other systems of registration lies obviously in the fact that
recordings under said Act No. 3344 are not preceded by any
investigation, judicial or administrative, as to the validity or
efficacy of the title sought to be recorded." It is undisputed that
Lot No. 4763 was a registered land, only that at the time of
registering defendant’s document of sale there was no copy of
the certificate of title because the same was not available due
to the after effect of the last global war.
Hence, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs when they
contended that "even at the time when OCT No. RO-2754 was
issued[,] there was no document allegedly proving its
(defendant) ownership being annotated on the certificate of
title." At the time when Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16735, 18216 and 27044 were issued to the plaintiffs and their
predecessors-in-interest, there were no annotations of the
alleged claim of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have all the
good reasons to rely on the validity of the titles. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The fact that Lot No. 4763-D was within 320 meters from
the center of the runway and within airport premises, was part
of the clear zone, and had long been vacant are not enough
warning to third persons dealing [with] such land. It was
undisputed that the lot in controversy is outside the perimeter
fence of the defendant. The fact that the said lot was part of
the clear zone is not sufficient justification to warn the plaintiffs
in (sic) buying it. Such fact was merely for the purpose of
construction of buildings, not for realty ownership.11 (italics in
the original)
Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered a Decision12 on May 27, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 9,
2001 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner seasonably moved for its
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its
February 17, 2006 Resolution.13
Hence this appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, where petitioner argues that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AUGUST 9,
2001 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT EVEN IF THE SAME IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.14lavvphi1
Simply stated, the issue may be synthesized as follows:
Between respondents Spouses Tirol and Spouses Ngo, on
the one hand, and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has
the superior right to the subject property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but on grounds different
than those relied upon by the Court of Appeals and the trial
court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is
misplaced. In Cheng v. Genato, et al.,15 we enumerated the
requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply, viz.:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions must constitute
valid sales;
3
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each represent
conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each have bought
from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases
where the sales involved were initiated not by just one
vendor but by several successive vendors.16 In the
instant case, respondents and petitioner had acquired the
subject property from different transferors. Petitioner,
through its predecessor-in-interest (CAA), acquired the
entire Lot No. 4763 from its original owners, spouses
Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, on March 23, 1958. On
the other hand, respondents acquired the subject parcel
of land, a portion of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma Jenkins,
another transferee, some thirty-five years later. The
immediate transferors of Elma Jenkins were the spouses
Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained
the subject property from spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef. Therefore, the instant controversy cannot be
governed by Article 1544 since petitioner and respondents
do not have the same immediate seller.
This notwithstanding, we find that respondents have a better
right to Lot No. 4763-D.
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No. 4763, of which the
property subject of this case is a part, was registered
under Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) even before
the Second World War. Paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute
Sale17 between petitioner and Spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant part:
That since the Original/Transfer Certificate of Title of the
aforementioned property has been lost and/or destroyed, or
since the said lot is covered by Cadastral Case No. 20 and a
decree issued on July 29, 1930, xxx the VENDEE hereby
binds itself to reconstitute said title at its own expense and that
the VENDOR, his heirs, successors and assigns bind
themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said
lot may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in
accordance with law. (italics supplied)
Additionally, in his Certification18 dated March 19, 1959, Julian
Cuison stated that "the duplicate copy of the certificate of title
for [Lot No. 4763] was lost or destroyed during the last war
without having been received by [him] or [his] predecessor-in-
interest."
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of
instruments must be done in the proper registry in order
to effect and bind the land.19 Prior to the Property
Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land
Registration Act) governed the recording of transactions
involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On

the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for
the system of recording of transactions over unregistered
real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better
right.20 Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a
Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act
No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale
is not considered registered21 and the registration of the
deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole
world.22
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to
register its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344 is of
no moment, as the property subject of the sale is
indisputably registered land. Section 50 of Act No. 496 in
fact categorically states that it is the act of registration
that shall operate to convey and affect the land; absent
any such registration, the instrument executed by the
parties remains only as a contract between them and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to
make registration, viz.:
SECTION 50. An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same as
fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like
those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended.
But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land,
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act the
registration shall be made in the office of register of deeds for
the province or provinces or city where the land lies. (italics
supplied)
Hence, respondents may not be characterized as buyers in
bad faith for having bought the property notwithstanding
the registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale under
Act No. 3344. An improper registration is no registration at
all. Likewise, a sale that is not correctly registered is
binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does
not affect innocent third persons.23
Petitioner, however, is of the impression that registration under
Act No. 3344 is permissible because the duplicate copy of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D had been lost or
destroyed. This argument does not persuade. Our
pronouncement in Amodia Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.24 is apropos:
In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject
property was under the operation of the Torrens System even
before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim
Chuan were made. AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as
fact. Yet, despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the sale in
its favor under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of
sale, there was no title on file. We are not persuaded by such a
lame excuse.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate
with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of AZNAR was registered
under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the said
document is deemed not registered. Rather, it was the sale in
favor of Go Kim Chuan which was registered under Act No.
496.
AZNAR insists that since there was no Torrens title on file in
1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and the Register of
Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at
the time. The contention is untenable. The fact that the
certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. This Court agrees with the
petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal
remedy of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of
registration under Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers
Realty Company v. Aying, AZNAR, beset with the similar
problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land,
sought the reconstitution thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the
instant case, despite the sale of the subject property way back
in 1964 and the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at
that time, AZNAR opted to register the same under the
improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie
undisturbed.25 (italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did not bother to have the
lost title covering Lot No. 4763-D reconstituted at any time,
notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in 1958, or more than fifty years ago. Vigilantibus,
non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the
assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.26 As a matter of
fact, this entire controversy may very well have been avoided
had it not been for petitioner’s negligence.
Furthermore, under the established principles of land
registration, a person dealing with registered land may
generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title
and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to
determine the legal status of the property,27 except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry.28 Applying this standard to the
facts of this case, we rule that respondents exercised the
required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of
the title to the subject property as to be considered
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. We quote
with favor the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in this
respect:
Defendant-appellant MCIAA also asseverates that the close
proximity of the property to the runway of the airport (320
meters from the center line of the runway) and the fact that it
has been vacant for a considerable period should have caused
[plaintiffs-appellees] to be dubious of the title of the previous
owners thereof. This was, in Our opinion, satisfactorily
explained by plaintiffs-appellees when witness Mr. Edito Tirol
testified in open court that he never thought it strange that the
land had always been vacant, and that besides, there were
private houses beside the vacant lot, suggesting that the
property must be of private ownership and not that of the
4
airport. Furthermore, he testified that he undertook great care
in verifying the clean title of the said land, [e.g.,] deputizing an
employee to do the necessary research, personally copying
pertinent documents registered in the Registry of Property and
even consulting legal advice on the matter. These, for Us, are
badges of good faith. Besides, being allegedly part of the Clear
Zone, ATO aviation rules proscribe merely the installation of
buildings and other physical structures, except landing
facilities. Aviation rules (which, although repeatedly invoked,
interestingly were not presented before the court by defendant-
appellant MCIAA) do not prohibit realty ownership.29
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May
27, 2005 Decision and the February 17, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Methods of Acquiring Land Ownership
G.R. No. L-20189 October 31, 1923
VALENTINA JOCSON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. ANTERO SORIANO, administrator of the estate of
Silvestre Estacion, deceased, defendant-appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
The only question presented by this appeal is: When the
purchaser from the Government of lots or parcels of land
formerly belonging to the Friar State dies before complete
payment is made, leaving a widow surviving him, do such
lots or parcels belong to the estate of the deceased to be
administered by his administrator, or may the wife have
the inchoate title in such lots or parcels transferred to her
and thus be eliminated or excluded from the state of her
deceased husband?
The facts in the present case may be stated as follows:
(a) that some time prior to November 1, 1918, the said
Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government the
following lots or parcels of land Nos. 1018, 723, 1007, 687,
270, 742, and 386; (b) that said lots had therefore been
purchased by the Government as part of the Hacienda de los
Frailes en el Municipio de Santa Cruz de Malabon; (c) that
Silvestre Estacion and his predecessors had been in
possession, as tenants, of said parcels of land since
before the American occupation of the Philippine Islands;
(d) that he was the occupant, as tenant, of said parcels of land
at the time the said hacienda was purchased; (e) that after he
had purchased said lots he continued to make the partial
payments under his contract, up to the time of his death;
(f) that he left a widow surviving him, who in the present
plaintiff; (g) that after the death of Silvestre Estacion, and
on the 12th day of September, 1919, the said Valentina
Jocson, as the surviving widow of Silvestre Estacion, taking
advantage of the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120,
had said lots transferred to her (see Exhibits A, B, C, D, E,
F, and G); (h) that notwithstanding the fact that the widow,
Valentina Jocson, of Silvestre Estacion had said lots
transferred to her in accordance with said section 16 after
the death of her husband, the administrator of the estate of
Silvestre Estacion took possession of the same, included

them in the inventory of the estate and continued to
administer the same as a part of the estate of the
deceased.
Valentina Jocson, under the foregoing facts, prayed that
said seven lots be excluded from the inventory of the
administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, and that
the same be returned to her immediately. The lower court
denied her petition and decided that said lots were a part
of the estate of Silvestre Estacion and that, as such,
Antero Soriano, as administrator, had a right to include
them in his inventory and to administer them. From that
judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The appellant now contends that the inchoate title to said
lots belongs to her and that she has the sole and
exclusive right to occupy and administer them. Her
contention is based upon the provisions of Act No. 1120,
with special reference to section 16 of the same. Act No.
1120 provides, among other things, that the actual
occupant of any portion of the Friar Lands at the time of
the purchase by the Government should be given a
preference in the right to purchase the land or lot
occupied. Silvestre Estacion was the actual occupant, as
tenant, of the said seven parcels of land at the time of the
purchase by the Government and at the time of his purchase
from the Government, and he continued to be in possession of
the same until his death. Said Act further provides that the
purchaser had a right to make a partial payments until the full
payment purchase price was paid. The Act further provides
that the title to each and every parcel land sold should
remain in the Government until the full payment of all
installments of purchase money and interest by the
purchaser has been made, and that any incumbrance
created by the purchaser against said parcels or lots shall be
invalid as against the Government Section 16 provides that
"in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate (of
purchase of any portion of said land), the issuance of
which is provided for in section 12 hereof, prior to the
execution of a deed by the Government of any purchaser,
his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has
complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of
the same. . . ."
*******Whether Valentina Jocson as the surviving spouse
of Silvestre Estacion acquired the subject property? –
Yes!
At the time of the death of Silvestre Estacion, he had nothing
but an inchoate right in the parcels of land. The title was still in
the Government. The Government being the owner, until full
payment was made, had a perfect right to prescribe how such
property should be disposed of in case of the death of the
husband. The character of the right of Silvestre Estacion
was very analogous to that of a homesteader. At No. 926,
which provides for the granting of homesteads, in its
section 3 contains a very similar provision to that of
section 16 of Act No. 1120, for the disposition of the
homestead in case the applicant dies before title in him is
perfected, leaving surviving him a wife. Said section 3
provides that "in the event of the death of an applicant (for a
homestead) prior to the issuance of a patent (title), his widow
shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue
to her" upon a proper showing, and until a final title or patent is
issued for the land to the applicant the Government remains
the owner.
Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting
homestead rights and special privileges under the laws of
United States and the various states of the Union. The statutes
of the United States as well as of the various states of the
Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of
homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen
of the Government, where his family may shelter and live
beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in
individuals those feelings of independence which are essential
to the maintenance of three institutions. Furthermore, the state
itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a
means of support, and reduced to pauperism. (Cook and
Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee, 70
Am. Dec., 292; Richardson, vs. Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep.,
873; 21 Cyc., 459.) 1awph!l.net
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of
homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster families as
the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The
sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free
citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are
cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives
permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection
and durability. (Waples on Homestead and Exemptions, p. 3.)
Under the statutory and constitutional provisions of the various
states of the Union it has been held that "homestead privilege
does not determine on the husband's death but is transmitted
to his widow and children." (21 Cyc., 562.)
In the case of the Estate of Fath (132 Cal., 609) the Supreme
Court of California held that "a homestead selected by the
husband in his lifetime . . . vests absolutely in his surviving wife
. . . The descent of the homestead to the surviving widow was
governed by the law in force at the death of her husband."
(Dickey vs. Gibson, 54 Am. St. Rep., 321.)
Neither does a widow lose her right in the homestead estate of
her first husband by a second marriage. (Sanders vs. Rusell,
21 Am. St. Rep., 29; Miles vs. Miles, 88 Am. Dec., 208.)
Upon the death of the husband, the wife may continue to
occupy the whole of the homestead. (Nicholas vs. Purczell, 89
Am. Dec., 572.)
The doctrine announced with reference to the right of the
widow in the homestead upon the death of her husband, does
no injustice to the creditors of the deceased, since they have it
always in their power to protect themselves either by refusing
credit or by demanding such security as will protect the from
loss. (Keyes vs. Cyrus, 38 Am. St. Rep., 296.)
Said section 16 (Act No. 1120) provides that in the event of
the death of a holder of a certificate prior to the execution
of a deed by the Government, his widow shall be entitled
to receive a deed of the land upon a showing that she has
complied with the requirements of the law for the
5
purchase of the same. In the present case the widow took
the steps necessary under the law to protect her right, and
had the necessary certificates of transfer made to her
(Exhibits A to H). From that date the inchoate right which
her husband possessed passed to her, and to her alone,
and she had a right to continue making the partial
payments required, and when completed, to secure an
absolute conveyance from the Government. The law
conceded to her the right held by her husband, without
diminution of control, subject only to her completing the
contract with the Government. That being true, we are
fully persuaded that the administrator of the estate of
Silvestre Estacion had no interest nor any control
whatever in the administration of said lots or parcels of
land. Under the law they did not belong to the estate of
Silvestre Estacion. Whatever interest he had, passed
immediately upon his death to his widow. The said lots
constituted no part of the estate of Silvestre Estacion.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
judgment of the lower court be revoked; that the
defendant, as administrator of the estate of Silvestre
Estacion, exclude the said seven parcels of land
immediately from the inventory of said estate, return the
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and that he render to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, within a
period of thirty days, a full and correct account of his
administration of said parcels of land, and that he pay over to
Valentina Jocson whatever sum or sums may be due her. And,
without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. 185757, March 02, 2016
SPOUSES VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, JR. [SUBSTITUTED BY
HIS WIFE, LYDIA S. DE GUZMAN, AND CHILDREN,
NAMELY, RUEL S. DE GUZMAN, ET AL. AND LYDIA S. DE
GUZMAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
MINDANAO STATION, LAMBERTO BAJAO, HEIR OF
SPOUSES LEONCIO* BAJAO AND ANASTACIA Z. BAJAO,
Respondents.
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Spouses
Virgilio de Guzman, Jr.2 and Lydia S. de Guzman (petitioners)
assailing the Decision3 and Resolution4 dated August 27,
2008 and November 19, 2008, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00194-
MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision5 of the
Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 42, Misamis Oriental,
dated October 22, 2004 which granted the action for
reconveyance and damages in favor of petitioners.
The Facts
The property subject of this case (property) is a 480-
square meter lot that formed part of Lot No. 532 located at
North Poblacion, Medina, Misamis Oriental. Lot No. 532,
which has a total area of 25,178 square meters, was acquired
by Lamberto Bajao's (respondent) parent, Leoncio Bajao,6
through Free Patent No. 4000877 issued on May 28, 1968.8

Petitioners acquired the property in two transactions. On
May 24, 1969, Spouses Bajao sold 200 square meters of
Lot No. 532 to them for P1,000.9 On June 18, 1970, Spouses
Bajao sold another 280 square meters of Lot No. 532 to
petitioners for P1,400.10 Both transactions were evidenced
by separate Deeds of Absolute Sale.11 Spouses Bajao
allegedly promised to segregate the property from the
remaining area of Lot No. 53212 and to deliver a separate
title to petitioners covering it.13 However, because the
promise was not forthcoming, petitioner Lydia S. de
Guzman executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim14 on April
21, 1980 covering the property. This was annotated on the title
covering Lot No. 532, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
6903, on April 25, 1980.15
On May 29, 1980, petitioners initiated the segregation of
the property from Lot No. 532 through a survey.16 As a
result of the survey, petitioners acquired Lot 2-A, Psd-10-
002692.17 They allegedly acquired possession over the
land immediately, fenced the area, introduced
improvements, and planted it with fruit-bearing trees.18
On September 26, 1980,19 or after the death of Leoncio
Bajao on February 1, 1972,20 respondent and Anastacia
Bajao executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs21 (Extrajudicial Settlement), which subdivided Lot No.
532 into three parts.22 The property was included in Lot No.
532-C, which was adjudicated in favor of respondent.23 The
Extrajudicial Settlement was registered on December 10,
1980.24
On December 16, 1980, respondent caused the
cancellation of petitioners' annotated adverse claim over
the property and later obtained Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-7133 on February 13 and October 2, 1981.25
Petitioners thereafter requested respondent to deliver TCT
No. T-7133 so they could present it to the Register of
Deeds, together with the two Deeds of Absolute Sale, for
proper annotation.26 Respondent, however, refused to
heed their request.27cralawred
Thus, on January 21, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint
for Reconveyance with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages.28 They alleged that they were
innocent purchasers for value who took possession of the
property after the sale and religiously paid its real
property taxes.29 Petitioners also alleged that respondent
was in bad faith since he knew about the sale of the
property between them and his parents, and the existing
survey and segregation over the area, yet he fraudulently
included the same in his share upon the issuance of TCT
No. T-7133.30
In his Answer with Defenses and Counterclaims,31
respondent argued that the action is time barred and there
is no more trust to speak of.32 He pointed out that more
than 10 years have lapsed from the date of the registration
of the Extrajudicial Settlement on December 10, 1980 and
the registration of TCT No. T-7133 on February and
October 1981, to the date of filing of the Complaint.33
Respondent also countered that there was no mistake or
fraud in including the property in TCT No. T-7133 since his
rights arose from the Extrajudicial Settlement.34
Ruling of the Trial Court
On October 22, 2004, the trial court promulgated its
Decision,35 the decretal portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, by
preponderance of evidence, this Court finds for the plaintiffs
and hereby orders the defendant:
1. to reconvey to the plaintiffs the four hundred eighty square
meter lot in question in accordance with the survey plan made
by Engr. Pedro Q. Gonzales which was approved by Acting
Director of Lands Guillermo C. Ferraris as certified by the
Office of the Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and to surrender TCT No.
7133 to the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental for
appropriate annotation;
2. to pay to plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as moral damages; and
3. to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court found the two Deeds of Absolute Sale free
from infirmities.37 It ruled that their execution was
equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold;38 registration
not being necessary to make the contract of sale valid and
effective as between the parties.39 Citing Sanchez, et al. v.
De la Cruz, et al.,40 and Philippine Suburban Development
Corporation v. Auditor General,41 the trial court held that as
between the parties and their privies, an unrecorded deed
of sale covering land registered under the Torrens system
passes title of ownership once the land is conveyed to the
vendee. Failure of registration does not, at anytime after
the sale, vitiate or annul the right of ownership conferred
to such sale.42
The trial court also found respondent in bad faith.43
Respondent admitted that he was aware of the adverse
claim annotated at the back of the title when he went to
the Register of Deeds to register the Extrajudicial
Settlement.44 The ultimate paragraph of the Extrajudicial
Settlement provides that what was being conveyed to
respondent was the "remaining portion of Lot [No.] 532, Cad-
347, under O.C.T. Bo, P-6903." The trial court construed this
provision to mean the remaining portion of Lot No. 532 after
taking into consideration the 480-square meter lot sold to
petitioners.45
Respondent appealed to the CA.46 In his appellant's brief,47
he argued that: (1) petitioners' Complaint is already barred
by the statute of limitations, estoppel and laches;48 (2) the
"remaining portion" in the Extrajudicial Settlement refers to Lot
No. 532-C with an area of 10,178 square meters;49 and (3) the
petitioners are not entitled to moral damages.50
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
6
The CA granted the appeal of respondent. The decretal
portion of its Decision51 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and as a
consequence, the Complaint for Reconveyance with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA noted that an implied trust between the parties
under Article 1456 of the Civil Code was created at the
time Anastacia Bajao and respondent executed the
Extrajudicial Settlement on September 26, 1980, with
respondent becoming the trustee who holds the property
in trust for the benefit of petitioners.54 The CA held that
an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
prescribes in 10 years from the registration of title in the
Office of the Register of Deeds.55 Thus, petitioners' action
for reconveyance filed in January 2000 has already
prescribed since more than 10 years have lapsed from
October 1981, the date of registration of respondent's
title.56
Further, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove their
actual possession of the property by substantial
evidence.57 It was only in the 1980s that they fenced the
area in a furtive attempt to establish possession.58 The
CA held them guilty of laches for failing to assert their
right to be placed in control and possession of the
property after its sale in 1969 and 1970 and to have it
registered.59
Finally, the CA held that the phrase "remaining portion of Lot
No. 532, Cad-347 under OCT No. P-6903" found in the
Extrajudicial Settlement could also mean restricting
respondent's share to the whole portion of Lot No. 532-C,
which is the remaining portion of Lot No. 532 after subdividing
it into three parcels and giving Lot Nos. 532-A and 532-B to
Anastacia Bajao as her share.60
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration61 of the
Decision. They insisted that prescription and laches do not
apply because respondent was in bad faith.62 They
maintained to be in possession of the property.63 Thus, their
action for reconveyance partakes of a suit to quiet title
which is imprescriptible.64 The CA in its Resolution65 dated
November 19, 2008 denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition, which essentially raises the issue of
whether the CA erred in dismissing the Complaint on the
ground of prescription.
*******Whether the Deed of Sale between the petitioner and
respondents is valid? – NO! The Deed of Sale was
contracted within the 5yr prohibited period under Section
118 of the Public Land Act
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.

It is undisputed that Leoncio Bajao obtained Lot No. 532
through Free Patent No. 40008766 granted and issued on
May 28, 1968. Free Patent No. 400087 was used as basis in
the issuance of OCT No. P-6903 which was transcribed in
the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Misamis
Oriental on August 4, 1970.67 Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of
lands acquired under free patent or homestead within a
period of five years from the date of issuance of the
patent.69 The parties, however, never raised this issue on
prohibition, but this failure will not deter us from resolving the
issue. We have held that:
We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the
law or patently erroneous decisions or resolutions simply
because the parties failed to raise these errors before the
court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the
mistakes of the parties' counsel and condoning reckless and
negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants.
Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication of our
duty to dispense justice to all
parties.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We have explained the rationale behind this prohibition in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
The prohibition against the encumbrance � lease and
mortgage included � of a homestead which, by analogy
applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for
the grant, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed
to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits
the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116)
within five years after the grant of the patent. After that
five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the
homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to
favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides
that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be
subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his
widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public
land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as
we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the
original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it
is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly
deducible from the terms of the
statute."72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, any acquisition,
conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made
or executed in violation of Sections 118 to 123 of the
Public Land Act shall be unlawful and null and void from
its execution. The violation shall also produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed actually or
presumptively. The violation shall also cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
The contract executed in violation of these sections being
void, it is not susceptible of ratification, and the action for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of such a contract is
imprescriptible.73
In this case, portions of Lot No. 532 were conveyed to
petitioners by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed on May 24, 1969 and June 18, 1970, or after the
grant and issuance of Free Patent No. 40008774 on May
28, 1968. Both Deeds of Absolute Sale were executed
within the prohibited period of five years. Consequently,
following Section 124, these Deeds are null and void and
produce no effect. They did not convey any right from
Spouses Bajao to petitioners on the property. The parties
could not have claimed ignorance of the free patent grant. We
held in Beniga v. Bugas:75
Section 118 does not exempt patentees and their
purported transferees who had no knowledge of the
issuance of the patent from the prohibition against
alienation; for the law does not say that the five years are
to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance" of
the patent or grant. The date of the issuance of the patent is
documented and is a matter of government and official record.
As such, it is more reliable and precise than mere knowledge,
with its inherent frailties. Indeed, the policy of the law, which
is to give the patentee a place where to live with his family
so that he may become a happy citizen and a useful
member of our society, would be defeated were ignorance
of the issuance of a patent a ground for the non-
application of the prohibition.76ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, although Section 124 states that a violation
of Section 118 causes the reversion of the property to the
State, we have held that a private individual may not bring
an action for reversion or any action which would have the
effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the
result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain, since only the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead may do so.77 Until then,
respondent, as heir of the vendors, has the better right to
remain in possession of the property.78
The rule of pari delicto will not apply here in view of the nullity
of the contracts of sale between the parties.79 To have it
otherwise would go against the public policy of preserving the
grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.80 In
Binayug v. Ugaddan,81 we returned the properties which were
acquired through a grant of a homestead patent to the heirs of
the original owner after it was proven that the properties were
alienated within the five-year prohibition period under Section
118 of the Public Land Act. Citing De los Santos v. Roman
Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al.,82 we explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, a
homestead patent covering a tract of land in Midsayap,
Cotabato was granted to Julio Sarabillo (Sarabillo) on
7
December 9, 1938. (XT No. RP-269 was issued to Sarabillo on
March 17, 1939. On December 31, 1940, Sarabillo sold two
hectares of land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap
(Church). Upon Sarabillo's death, Catalina de los Santos (De
los Santos) was appointed administratrix of his estate. In the
course of her administration, De los Santos discovered that
Sarabillo's sale of land to the Church was in violation of
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, prompting her to file an
action for the annulment of said sale. The Church raised as
defense Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as well as the
principle of pari delicto. The Court, in affirming the CFI
judgment favoring De los Santos, ratiocinated:
xxx
x x x Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction
which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle
of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-
interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge
of its illegality, but because the subject of the transaction is a
piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be
not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law
to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on
which our homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be
waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter
away what public policy by law seeks to preserve". We are,
therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can
maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this
fundamental aim of our homestead law.
xxx
Jurisprudence, therefore, supports the return of the subject
properties to respondents as Gerardo's heirs following the
declaration that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951
between Gorardo and Juan is void for being in violation of
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended. That the
subject properties should revert to the Slate under Section 124
of the Public Land Act, as amended, is a non-issue, the State
not even being a party herein.83ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With respect to the purchase price of P2,400 which petitioners
paid for the land, respondent should return it with interest.84
We similarly ruled in the recent case of Tingalan v. Spouses
Melliza85 which also involved the void sale of land covered by
the Public Land Act, as amended. We applied the rule that
upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced
to the purchase price and its interest.86
But, even on the assumption that there was no violation of
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the ruling of the CA
that petitioners' action has already prescribed would have
been correct.
Petitioners allege that respondent fraudulently included the
property in TCT No. T-7133, which was issued on February 13
and October 2, 1981.87 Article 145688 of the Civil Code
provides that a person acquiring property through mistake or
fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action
for reconveyance based on an implied trust generally
prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which is the
date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of

the certificate of title over the property.89 Thus,
petitioners had 10 years from 1981 or until 1991 to file
their complaint for reconveyance of property. The
Complaint, however, was filed only on January 21, 2000,90
or more than 10 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-
7133. Hence, the action is already barred by prescription.
The exception to the ten-year rule on prescription is when
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed.91 In such case, the action becomes one for
quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.92 Here,
petitioners allege that they were in juridical possession of
the property from the time they put up a fence on it until
the filing of the Complaint.93 Respondent disputes this
claim, countering that petitioners are not in actual and material
possession of the property.94 Whether petitioners have actual
possession of the lot is a question of fact.95 We have
repeatedly ruled that a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law
and not questions of facts.96 When supported by substantial
evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by us, unless the
case falls under any of the recognized exceptions.97
Petitioners never raised any of these exceptions. Assuming
they did, none of the exceptions would apply.
We affirm the CA's finding that petitioners were not able to
establish their actual possession of the lot except by bare
allegations not substantiated by evidence.98 It is a basic
rule that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence.99 Moreover,
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not
upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.100
During trial, petitioners testified that they do not live on the
property.101 They alleged putting up a fence alter they
purchased the lot but there was no evidence to support their
allegations as to when this fence was constructed.102
Respondent presented pictures showing a fence erected by
petitioners only in 1996 and respondent contested such act
through a letter sent to petitioners asking them to remove the
fence.103 Although there were mango trees and chico trees in
the lot, it was unclear who planted them.104 The tax
declaration of Lot No. 532-C which respondent offered in
evidence also shows that coconut trees were planted in the
lot.105 Petitioners never alleged having planted any coconut
tree.
Further, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that they
have been paying real property taxes religiously from the time
of the sale in 1969. They only formally offered in evidence
official receipts issued for the period 2000 to 2002 showing
payment of real property taxes.106 No tax declaration of the lot
was also formally offered107 in evidence, although petitioners
attached one in their Complaint.108 Under Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, however, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.
Finally, the survey plan commissioned by petitioners does not
prove their actual possession over the property. The survey
plan merely proves the identity of the property. It plots the
location, the area and the boundaries of the property, but it
hardly proves that petitioners actually possessed the
property.109
On the other hand, respondent offered in evidence the tax
declaration110 of Lot No. 532-C under his name, as well as
the tax clearance111 and official receipts for payment of real
property taxes for the period 2000 to 2003.112 We have held
that although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.113
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated August 27, 2008 and the
Resolution dated November 19, 2008 rendered by the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00194-MIN are AFFIRMED, insofar as they
dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages. The Deeds of
Absolute Sale are declared void. Respondent Bajao is
ORDERED to return the purchase price of P2,400 to
petitioners, with legal interest rate at 6% per annum computed
from the time of the filing of the Complaint on January 21, 2000
until finality of judgement, and thereafter, at 6% per annum
until fully paid.114
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195247 June 29, 2015
ANASTACIO TINGALAN, substituted by his heirs, namely:
ROMEO L. TINGALAN, ELPEDIO L. TINGALAN, JOHNNY L.
TINGALAN and LAURETA T. DELA CERNA, Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES RONALDO and WINONA MELLIZA,
Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
******* NEXT DOC *******
G.R. No. 68946 May 22, 1992
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELINA
SARMIENTO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner urges this Court to review and set aside the decision
of 12 October 1984 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1
(now Court of Appeals) in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 which
affirmed the decision of 2 June 1982 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167
granting the registration of a parcel of land with an area of
376,397 square meters, located in San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, in favor of private respondent.
After the filing of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in
its resolution of 27 February 1985, 2 gave due course to the
petition, considered the Comment as the Answer and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The
petitioner moved for leave to adopt the petition as his
Memorandum 3 which this Court noted in its resolution of 17
April 1985. 4 Private respondent filed her Memorandum only
8
on 8 December 1986, 5 after her attorneys were held in
contempt of court and fined in the amount of P300.00.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the following factual
antecedents in this case:
On 13 August 1970, private respondent and the spouses
Placer A. Velasco and Socorro Busuego filed with the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan,
Branch V, at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an application for the
registration of title over Lot No. 1005 of the Cadastral
Survey of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of
376,397 square meters.
On 18 January 1971, private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo
Amador filed their opposition on the ground that the land
belongs to them.
On 19 January 1971, an Order of special default against the
whole world, with the exception of oppositors Angeles and
Cirilo Amador and the municipal mayor of San Jose del Monte,
was issued by the trial court.
Upon the filing of an Opposition by the petitioner and upon
motion by the Provincial Fiscal for the lifting of the order of
special default and for the admission of the Opposition, the trial
court issued an Order on 24 August 1971 granting the motion
and admitting said Opposition. 6 Separate oppositions filed by
Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco Maningas and Simeon Albarico were
also admitted by the court after the lifting of the order of special
default. 7
Subsequently, private respondent moved to drop as co-
applicants spouses Placer Velasco and Socorro Busuego
on the ground that they were made co-applicants because
of a contract of services 8 between her and the spouses
under which the latter agreed to shoulder all the litigation
expenses and the cost of survey and attorney's fees in
this case; the spouses failed to comply with their commitment.
The trial court deemed said agreement validly rescinded by
private respondent and considered her as "the only applicant
in this case." 9
After hearing the application on its merits, the trial court
handed down on 2 June 1982 a decision in favor of private
respondent granting the registration of the lot in question,
together with all the improvements thereon, in her name:
. . . with the exception of the three (3) houses erected therein
owned and possessed by her predecessors-in-interest, who
are claimed (sic) to be tenants of the property, namely:
Macario Cruz, Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo. . . . subject,
however, to the payment of real property taxes in arrears since
1971 as well as to the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos.
65 and 296, with respect to those portions of the perimeter
bounded by the river, barrio and provincial roads, respectively.
The decision is based on the trial court's findings of fact,
to wit:
. . . That the subject parcel of land was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Angelina Sarmiento as

early as 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 8388 (Exhibit J),
with an assessed value of P10,350.00. That the real property
taxes from 1965 to 1970 were paid in full (Exhibit K). That a
small portion of the subject parcel of land consisting of 94,000
sq. m. is devoted to agriculture while the rest is cogonland.
That the subject parcel land was acquired by applicant
Angelina Sarmiento from:
1) Juan Reyes, married to Avelina Emocling, who had
been in possession of a portion of the subject land consisting
of 168,000 sq. m. for 41 years prior to the transfer of their
rights, interests, and participation over the same in favor of
applicant Angelina Sarmiento, which transfer was made
through a deed of absolute sale (Bilihang Lampasan at
Patuluyan — Exhibits G and G-1), executed on April 7, 1969,
for and in consideration of P42,000.00.
2) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who
had been in possession of a portion of the subject land,
consisting of 14 hectares since 1948, until on August 16, 1965
said spouses transferred their rights, interests and participation
over the eastern 1/2 portion of said 14-hectare property, in
favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration
of P1,500.00 (Exhibits I and I-1 — Bilihang Lampasan at
Patuluyan).
3) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who,
by virtue of a deed if (sic) absolute sale executed by them on
November 15, 1965, sold the remaining 7-hectare property
covered by Exhibits I and I-1, to applicant Angelina Sarmiento,
for and in consideration of P21,000.00; which deed of absolute
sale, having been lost, was confirmed by vendor Mariano
Castillo thru a Confirmatory Deed of Sale executed on April 18,
1969 (Exhibits H and H-1).
4) Macario Cruz, married to Antonia Guilalas, who had
been in possession of a portion of the subject land, consisting
of 73,000 sq. m. more or less prior to the transfer of their
rights, interest and participation in favor of applicant Angelina
Sarmiento on March 31, 1969, for and in consideration of
P18,750.00.
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of
land was originally owned and possessed by Macario
Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, the
spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two
latter sets of spouses having been in possession as early
as 1928 and 1948, respectively, during which time they
possessed, occupied and cultivated their respective
portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in the
concept of owners. That by virtue of the aforesaid deeds
of sale (Exhibits G, G-1, H, H-1, I and I-1), possessions over
the same were transferred to the herein applicant. That,
thereafter, said spouses remained in the same property,
maintaining their houses and acting as tenants for the
new owner, applicant Angelina Sarmiento. That applicant
likewise introduced improvements on the property by fencing
the same with barbed wire, planting crops and other fruit trees,
and by constructing there a house of her own. The oral
testimony of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, insofar as location,
possession and ownership over the said parcel of land is
concerned, was corroborated by the testimony (sic) of Victor
Jarvinia and Enrique Buco, both claiming that they were with
the group who conducted the survey of the subject property;
and said Enrique Buco also declaring that he had known the
subject land since 1932, he being the owner of an adjoining
titled property. Witness Enrique Buco likewise claimed that the
subject land is way beyond the perimeter of the titled property
of oppositor 2nd Manila Newtown City Development
Corporation, the latter's land being situated far from the subject
land.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject parcel of land appears not to be within any
military, naval, civil or a government reservation; nor is it
traversed by any road, river or creek, except that it is bounded
on the North and East, along lines 4 to 33 by the Katitinga
River; and on the Southeast, along lines 34 to 40 by Dean
Kabayo Barrio Road; on the South by Igay Provincial Road,
along lines 40 to 44. 10
The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, seasonably appealed from said decision to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the
appeal as A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126. The Director raised
before it the following assignment of error:
The lower court gravely erred in holding that the applicant
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of
owner of the land applied for more than 30 years prior to
the filing of the application. 11
In its decision promulgated on 12 October 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court found no merit in the appeal
and dismissed the same. It held follows:
We find no merit in the appeal. While it may be true that the
vendors of the portion of the land in question to the herein
applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been clearly
established that Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes
and Avelina Sarmiento (sic) and also spouses Mariano
Castillo and Petronila Robes were in possession of the
land in 1928 and 1948, respectively in concept of owners,
without anybody molesting them. They introduced
improvements by planting different kinds of trees and
constructing houses thereon. When a person occupied (sic) a
parcel of land under a claim of ownership making
improvements and generally held (sic) himself out as owner of
the land, it is only upon the most convincing testimony, in the
absence of any competent documentary evidence, that the
courts would be justified in declaring him to be the real owner
thereof.
A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of a certain lands (sic) for
more than thirty years, in the concept of owner, is entitled
to a confirmation of his title to said land. (Molina vs. De
Bacud, L-20195, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956).
9
Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in
concept of owner from her predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, the land in question was surveyed as Lot 1005 for
the herein applicant for the cadastral survey of San Jose del
Monte, without anybody else claiming ownership of said land.
It further appears that the land in question is within the
alienable and disposable land as certified to by the
officials of the Bureau of Forest Development. It is for this
reason that the oppositor Director of Lands did not
introduce any evidence opposition (sic) and merely
submitted the case for decision.
We reiterate what we have said in previous decisions in similar
cases that unless the government has serious grounds of
opposition such as the fact that the land applied for is within a
forest zone or government reservation, registration of
agricultural lands within the alienable or disposable area
should be encouraged to give more value to the land and this
promotes their development rather than remain as idle lands.
12
Undaunted by this second defeat, the Director filed on 5
December 1984 this petition asserting that the respondent
Court had decided a question of substance in a way not in
accord with law and the applicable decisions of this Court. 13
The petition is impressed with merit. This Court will have to
overturn the challenged decision, as well as that of the trial
court.
While the rule is well settled that findings of fact of the
appellate court are conclusive upon this Court, 14 there are
recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the
findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. 15 This exception is present in this case insofar as
the findings of the respondent Court and the trial court on the
character of possession are concerned.
*******Whether private respondent should be granted the
subject property? – NO!
It is not disputed that private respondent seeks
registration of the questioned lot on the basis of
paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act, 16 as
amended by R.A. No. 1942, 17 which reads as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war of force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 18
This section is the law on judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. By its very nature, the
burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he has an
imperfect or incomplete title. Such is the duty of one who
holds the affirmative side of an issue In Heirs of Jose
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 19 this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., held:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942. . . .
Specifically, under paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant
must prove that: (a) he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notirious
possession and occupation of an agricultural land of the
public domain; (b) such possession and occupation must
be for a least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of the
application; and (c) such possession and occupation must
be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession
and occupation." Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the order. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to
qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his
possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this
Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
Lasam vs. The Director of Lands: 20
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by
us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See
also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it
should be observed that the application of the doctrine of
constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among
these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of
the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in
possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of
possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession
as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. . . .
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, 21 this Court
noted:
. . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation
purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was done by
him, does not constitute acts of possession.
In the case of The Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 22 this Court
also stated:
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to
a presumptive grant from the State.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. 23 It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; 24 exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; 25 and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. 26 Use of land is adverse when it is open
and notorious. 27
Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not
affect the continuity of possession is that caused by war
or force majeure.
Private respondent does not pretend to be the original
possessor of the property in question. She relies on the
alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest, namely:
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano
Santos. From Juan Reyes, she acquired a parcel of land
located in Karahumi, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an
area of 168,000 square meters as evidenced in a deed of sale
executed on 7 April 1969. 28 From Mariano Castillo, she first
acquired a portion, consisting of 7 hectares, of a parcel of land
located in Licau-licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, per a
deed of sale executed on 16 August 1965. 29 She purchased
the remaining portion thereof, with an area of 7 hectares,
allegedly on 15 November 1965, but she lost the deed of sale;
however, Mariano Castillo subsequently executed a so-called
Confirmatory Deed of Sale on 8 April 1969. 30 Per the findings
of the trial court, the property purchased from Cruz on 31
March 1969 for P18,750.00 consists of 73,000 square meters.
31 No deed of sale was presented to prove this acquisition.
There is no proof as to the area of the property allegedly
purchased from Santos.
None of private respondent's predecessors-in-interest declared
for taxation purposes their alleged land holdings. Accordingly,
they had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the private
respondent who declared them in one (1) tax declaration, Tax
Declaration No. 8388, on 18 September 1969. 32 Per this tax
declaration, the land covered is located at Gaya-Gaya, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 37.6 hectares, of
10
which 9.4 hectares are ricelands while the remaining 28.2
hectares are cogonal.
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano
Santos were not presented by private respondent as witnesses
during the hearing of her application. There can be no question
that they were the best witnesses to identify the parcel they
sold to the private respondent and prove the character of their
possession thereof. Instead, she presented Victor Jarvina and
Enrique Buco, whose testimonies on direct and cross
examinations are partly summarized by the petitioner as
follows:
Victor Jarvina testified that he knew the applicant (p. 4, tsn,
June 20, 1977) who bought a parcel of land with an area of
more than 37 hectares, located in Licau-Licau, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, from Macario Castillo and Juan Reyes (pp. 5-
6, ibid); that he was with the surveyor when the survey was
done; no person contested the survey; he identified the survey
plan, Exhibit "F", the deed of sale executed by Juan Reyes,
Exhibits "G" and "G-1", the deeds of sale executed by Mariano
Castillo, Exhibits "H" and "H-1" and Exhibits "I" and "I-1" (pp. 7-
11, ibid); the land was declared for taxation purposes by
Angelina Sarmiento and the taxes were paid; he identified
Exhibit "J", the tax declaration, and Exhibit "K", the tax receipt
(pp. 12-13, ibid); after the properties were purchased by the
applicant, her possession was never disturbed by any other
person (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 29, 1977). On cross-examination,
Victor Jarvina stated that he could no longer recall the date
when the survey was made (pp. 14-19, ibid); the land was
bought by the applicant from different persons, including
Mariano Castillo, Juan Reyes, Macario Cruz and Feliciano
Santos; he was present when the sales were made, and the
vendors did not show any written document to prove that they
owned the property, but they claimed to have been in
possession of the same for ten (10) years (pp. 14-16, tsn,
Sept. 16, 1977); the property is hilly and rolling and full of
cogon, but a portion was planted with camote, corn and
seasonal crops by the vendors; he came to know the (sic)
property three (3) years before Angelina Sarmiento bought it in
1969 (pp. 20-22, ibid); Castillo had a house on the land but it
was wrecked by a storn (sic), so that there was no more house
existing on the land (p. 25, ibid).
Enrique Buco testified that he had known the land subject of
the case since 1932 because he owned a parcel of land
adjoining it; he had known Angelina Sarmiento since 1950;
since 1932, the land was in the possession of the parents of
Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos,
Mariano Castillo, and a certain Arsenio, whose family name he
did not know; the possession by the parents of Mariano
Castillo and Juan Reyes was never disturbed by anyone;
Mariano Castillo and his parents planted bananas, mango
trees, palay and sweet potatoes, but he did not know how
many hectares were cultivated (pp. 2-7, tsn, October 24,
1977); Juan Reyes and his parents planted two (2) hectares
with palay, and the rest of the area with mango, caimito,
avocado and langka trees, some of which were already fruit
bearing; Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes sold their rights over
the land to Angelina Sarmiento; the land was surveyed by the
cadastral team, and Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were
present during the survey; and Castillo and Reyes remained in

possession of the land as tenants of Angelina Sarmiento (pp.
7-13, ibid). On cross-examination, he admitted that in 1932, he
and the parents of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were just
starting to clear up the area, and that only around three (3)
hectares were cleared up by the parents of Castillo and Reyes
(pp. 13-16, ibid); that Feliciano Santos was still in possession
of a small portion of the land in question; they were not able to
take possession of the land in question because it was already
occupied by the Japanese forces; they returned to the land
only after liberation (pp. 16-18, ibid); that his land adjoined the
land in question on the east, adjoining the property of Isidro
Cabacang and Roman Reyes, who were the ones appearing
as adjoining owners in Exhibit "F", the plan of lot 1005; that he
left his land and stayed in Quezon City in 1973 because the
security men of Puyat Enterprises were mauling many persons
in the community; to avoid trouble he transferred his family to
Quezon City (pp. 19-23, ibid); that the parents of Juan Reyes
and Mariano Castillo cleared up a portion of the wooded area
in 1932 and that was how they came into possession of their
respective portions of the property; that he did not know the
extent, in terms of square meters, of the land possessed by
Castillo and Reyes; that the subject land was no longer
occupied since two years ago because the people ran away
(pp. 27-30, ibid). On redirect examination, Enrique Buco stated
that at present only Mariano Castillo is staying on the land in
question as an overseer of Angelina Sarmiento; and that the
last time he went there was in April, 1978 (pp. 3-5, tsn, August
18, 1978). On re-cross-examination, he admitted that when he
went to the land in question in April, 1978, he did not see
anyone cultivating the property, and that Puyat Enterprises had
built a factory near the property (pp. 6-7, ibid). 33
It was further established that from the Land Classification
Report dated 8 August 1971, 34 only one-half (.5) of a hectare
is planted with banana and fruit trees, while 36 hectares are
"grass land."
From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim
of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondent. As earlier stated, none of them even thought of
declaring their respective areas for taxation purposes.
While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. 35 The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. Added to this, as certified to by Jarvina, who
claimed to have been present when the sales were made to
private respondent, none of the vendors could show any
written document to prove their ownership of land; they
merely alleged that they have been possession of the
same for ten (10) years. In the case of the 73,000 square
meters (7.3 hectares) purportedly purchased from Macario
Cruz, no deed of sale from the latter was presented.
Interestingly enough, without this acquisition, private
respondent would only have more or less 308,000 square
meters, or 30.8 hectares, which she acquired from Juan Reyes
and Mariano Castillo, and not the 376,397 square meters, or
37.6 hectares which she applied for. No plausible explanation
was offered as to why Macario Cruz did not or could not
execute a deed of sale. There is as well no evidence
concerning the area of the property purchased from Feliciano
Santos and no explanation why no deed of sale was executed
by him. Then too, there is absolutely no credible testimony
describing the boundaries and extent of the areas each vendor
had allegedly occupied before the sale to the private
respondent. On the contrary, the testimony of Enrique Buco
throws more doubts thereon. He claims that the land applied
for was, since 1932, in the possession of the parents of Juan
Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano
Castillo and a certain Arsenio. If that be so, then the parents of
Luis Pascual and Arsenio have a claim on portions of the
property applied for. Private respondent miserably failed to
show that she also acquired such portions or that they were
earlier sold to any of her vendors.
Respondent Court considered the year 1932 as the starting
point of the possession of the predecessors-in-interest of
private respondent. In the light of the aforesaid testimony of
Enrique Buco, such a conclusion has no basis. As a matter of
fact, the trial court itself found and so held as follows:
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land
was originally owned and possessed by Macario Cruz,
spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, and spouses
Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets
spouses having been in possession as early as 1928 and
1948, respectively, during which time they possessed,
occupied and cultivated their respective portions unmolested,
openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. . . . 36
If the Castillo spouses' possession actually commenced in
1948, as found by the trial court, it goes without saying
that their possession of the 14-hectare portion was only for
seventeen (17) years since they sold the same to the
private respondent in 1965. Tacking this possession to
that of the latter as of the time the application was filed on
13 August 1970, it is obvious that the 30-year possession
required by paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land
Act was not satisfied.
Further, if indeed private respondent has a genuine claim of
possession over the property in question, We find no reason
why, as reflected in the Land Classification Report dated 8
August 1971, 37 or barely a year after the filing of the
application, only one-half (1/2) hectare of the vast area applied
for was in fact planted with nothing but banana and fruit trees
while thirty-six (36) hectares thereof are "grass land". These
fruit trees are not identified. If the testimony of private
respondent to be believed, these could be kamias, santol and
mangoes which, according to her, were existing at the time she
bought the property. Also, if the testimony of Enrique Buco is
to be believed, these fruit trees could be mango trees allegedly
planted by Mariano Castillo and his parents or, mango,
kaimito, avocado and langka trees planted by Juan Reyes and
his parents. This Court can not accept these testimonies at
face value. The respondent court and the trial court should not
have been credulous enough to have given them full faith and
11
credit. In her own Tax Declaration No. 8388 dated 18
September 1966 and which she secured sometime after she
allegedly purchased the property and almost a year before she
filed the application, private respondent merely declared that
the property is comprised of riceland with an area of 9.4
hectares and cogonal land with an area of 28.2 hectares. the
existence of this 9.4-hectare riceland is even doubtful. Private
respondent herself admitted that the land is not conducive to
the planting of palay, 38 the portions cultivated by her vendors
Castillo, Reyes and Cruz were scattered in different places and
the area each cultivated could not be more than one (1)
hectare. 39 Upon the other hand, as earlier mentioned,
Enrique Buco only mentioned two (2) hectares planted to palay
by Juan Reyes and his parents.
Another factor which impairs the bona fides of private
respondent is her failure to pay the real estate taxes after
the filing of the application. She made a payment on 26
September 1969 40 after declaring the property for taxation
purposes on 18 September 1969, 41 and only for the taxable
years 1965 to 1969. Evidently, such payment was made only
for purposes of the application. A picayune amount was
involved annually. For the period beginning in 1965 and ending
in 1969, she paid P517.50 only. She did not want to part with
any sum thereafter until it would become certain that the court
would award the property to her. Such an attitude is an
execration of good faith.
One last point which bears heavily against the claim of private
respondent is the fact that she had the temerity to make it
appear in the application that she and the spouses Placer
Velasco and Socorro Busuego are co-owners of the
property who have registerable title thereto and who must,
therefore, be awarded the property. This claim is of course
deliberate falsehood for, as private respondent later
revealed when she decided to drop the spouses as co-
applicants, the latter do not have any claim of either
possession or ownership over the property. They were
made co-applicants only because they agree to shoulder
all the expenses of litigation, including the cost of survey
and attorney's fees. Even granting, for the sake of argument,
that such an agreement was in fact made with the spouses, it
was not necessary that they be made co-applicants. The
interest of the spouses could still be effectively protected
without sacrificing the truth. To this Court's mind, there was a
clear attempt on the part of the private respondent and the
spouses to deceive the trial court. Unfortunately, the trial court
glossed over this point and impliedly declared as validly
rescinded the contract with the said spouses.
The foregoing disquisitions sufficiently prove that private
respondent is a smart land speculator who saw in the land
applied for not just the blades of cogon grass, the color of
which changes from green during the rainy season to brown
during summer, but huge profits as business, industry and the
general population move outward from the metropolitan area. It
is incumbent upon land registration courts to exercise extreme
caution and prudent care in deciding so-called applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles over lands of the public
domain; if they are lax in these proceedings, they may,
wittingly or unwittingly, be used by unscrupulous land
speculators in their raid of the public domain.

More deserving citizens should be given priority in the
acquisition of idle lands of the public domain. These could
serve as relocation sites for the urban poor. They may be
disturbed to landless farm workers. In so doing, the ends of
social justice, appropriately the centerpiece of the 1987
Constitution, could be further enhanced.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of
the respondent Court of 12 October 1984 in A.C.-G.R. CV No.
00126 is hereby REVERSED. The decision of the trial court of
2 June 1982 in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC
Record No. N-39192 is likewise REVERSED and said case it
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37435 November 28, 1934
NUMERIANO PADILLA, applicant-appellee,
vs. PABLO REYES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
oppositors-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellee applied for the registration in his name of a
parcel of land containing a little over 161 hectares located
in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija. The application was opposed
by the Director of Lands and by nine homesteaders, on
the ground that the property sought to be registered was
public land. One Pablo Reyes, who claimed to be the
exclusive owner of the land, also filed an opposition. After due
hearing, the court below dismissed all the oppositions and
decreed the registration of the land in the name of the
appellee. From this judgment all the parties who opposed
the application appealed, although Pablo Reyes' appeal was
dismissed for failure to file his brief on time.
In support of this appeal the following errors have been
assigned: (1) That the lower court erred in holding that the
appellee has established his title to the property sought to
be registered, and (2) that the lower court erred in decreeing
the registration of the property in the name of the appellee.
Appellee presented no valid and sufficient title deed
showing his ownership of the land in question. He,
however, tried to prove that he inherited the same from his
ancestors, who had been in possession of the land for
many years dating back to the Spanish regime; that he as
well as his predecessors in interest had party cultivated
the land and partly used it as a pasture; that various
improvements had been made on the land ever since the
Spanish regime; and that upon the death of their father,
Pablo Padilla, he and his sister Alejandra took possession
of the land. On the other hand, the appellants introduced
evidence tending to show that the land in question was
never occupied by Pablo Padilla during the Spanish
regime; that when the several homesteaders settled upon
the land during the 1912 to 1918, the same was
unoccupied, unclaimed, and without any sign of previous
cultivation or occupation; that the homesteaders were not
molested in their possession of portions of the land in
question until 1927, after they had cleared their holdings
and put the same in cultivation.
*******Whether Appellee can register the subject property
under his name? – NO!
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal
(38 Phil., 367, 376), this court said: " . . . In order, however,
that the petitioner for registration of his land under the
Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same
registered and to have the benefit resulting from the
certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to
show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple,
of the lands which he is attempting to have registered. The
petitioner is not entitled to have his lands registered under the
torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his
title and to oppose the registration of his lands. In order that
land may be registered under the torrens system, the
petitioner must show, even though there is no opposition,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. . .
."1awphil.net
On the other hand, it is well-settled that no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government. A grant is conclusively
presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through
his predecessors in interest, has occupied the land
openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of
title since July 26, 1894, or prior thereto. (Ongsiaco vs.
Magsilang, 50 Phil., 380.) In the case before us, appellee
has failed to prove any express grant from the
government; neither has he succeeded in proving
possession from which a constructive grant can be
predicated.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be
reversed, and it is hereby decreed and adjudged that the
property sought to be registered in this case is public
land. Without any special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance. So ordered.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration
in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an
12
area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal
age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of

possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal
in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February
23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title
under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that
the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of
the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June
12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering
that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact
found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of
the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private
property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without
regard to whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land
with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by
Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor;
and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
*******Whether Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act? – NO!
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such
character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.16
13
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest,
and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted
the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21
The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands
of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless
they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department
exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or
until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for
the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine
is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed
of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use
of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable"
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in
mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that
the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof
that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes
the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification
required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June
12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945
could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted
that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated
with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the
law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration
should have been classified as agricultural since June 12,
1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that
the character of the property subject of the application as
14
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29
In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as
a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession
prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that
the property subject of the application of Malabanan need
not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is
necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
by the Government, because it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land
Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor
of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32
will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that
such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands,
subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial
or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
 15

Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run land as no longer intended for public service or for the
against the State. development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
the disposition of public land or lands of the public Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
domain, namely: Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all SO ORDERED.
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may
not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered

alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to
be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or

declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to
the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present

sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot
be considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable
and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the