G.R. No.
84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO,
ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by
Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and
its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course
at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro
(Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after
the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with
the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly
dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition
before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on
the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions
of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old
Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible
(sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule
of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity
to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be
construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should
apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless
they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180
by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be
done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more
recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the
petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of
the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline.
It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a
contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents'
for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231). complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can
make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC,
Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual against the petitioners.
obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These
two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person SO ORDERED.
is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to
such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
(emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to
forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better
right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From
the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith
and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-
mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against
all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in
Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against
an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
G.R. No. 115024, February 07, 1996
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI AND
ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an
action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts
found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident.
Plaintiff’s version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along
Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before
reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been
told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that
car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the
rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled
out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only
some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh
(above knee)." She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph;
considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified
that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of
Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a
car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights." Temporarily blinded,
he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff’s
car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff’s
car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane
towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff’s witness that after
being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was
not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of
the three cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff’s car was "near the sidewalk"; this
witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice if there
was an early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about
100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car and
opened the trunk compartment, defendant’s car came approaching very fast ten meters from the scene;
the car was "zigzagging." The rear left side of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendant’s car; as a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the
sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of defendant’s car, which was destroyed, and landed
under the car. He stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well"
(pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff’s submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of
gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result
of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as
unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of
this judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from
July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney’s fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court’s decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for
Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to
show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties’ cars, appeared
to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants
forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994,
the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court’s
finding that the plaintiff’s car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped
by defendant’s car."[1] Dismissing the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s car was improperly
parked, almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed
to prove that the car was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the
case.[2] The respondent court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Li’s testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was outside his
beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990
when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and
opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters
away from the scene"; defendant’s car was zigzagging, although there were no holes and hazards on
the street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff’ who was thrown against the windshield of defendant’s
car, causing its destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from under
defendant’s car and was able to say "hurting words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was
under the influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991).
He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970’s, but did not know either plaintiff or
defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li’s employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to
P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney’s fees and the other damages. The Court of
Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims.[3]
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court’s decision by filing two separate petitions before
this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages
because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela’s own negligence.
Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to
be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court’s decision
insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard
Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated. It is plainly evident that the
petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts
to have this Court review are factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals
finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the
early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record
or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. [5]
In the first place, Valenzuela’s version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness,
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the
accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed, racing towards
the general direction of Araneta Avenue.[6] Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit
Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street,
noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to
survey the incident.[7] Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk,[8] contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the
center of the right lane. We agree that as between Li’s "self-serving" asseverations and the
observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim personally and who immediately
gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator immediately after the
incident, the latter’s testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript, We are not prepared to
set aside the trial court’s reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant’s assertion that he
was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt was made to question his
competence or the accuracy of his statement that defendant was driving "very fast." This was the same
statement he gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P").
We see no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez’ testimony are not borne out by an examination of the
testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident was across the street where his beerhouse
is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the Lambingan sa
Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that
he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn., June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the
accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was
a streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain
and the rain has stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp.
64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it was no longer raining
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it
was raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn.,
Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in
response to a telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no
substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez’s testimony that would impair the essential integrity of his
testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial court’s acceptance of the
testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li’s testimony was peppered with
so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly
crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability
in the incident. Against Valenzuela’s corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by
other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial. He claimed that he was driving
merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him,
which was (the) plaintiff’s car." He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his
brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.[9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self-
serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the
brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and
the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had
ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert - as every driver should be -
to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight"[10]
mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.[11] Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast"
speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. [12] Either factor
working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police immediately after the incident, he
said that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of
him, which was plaintiffs car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious
of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not, then he could not have missed
noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had
its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the
left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the
plaintiffs car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again,
that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have
easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the
road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only about
55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the
plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is contrary to what he told
the police immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step
on his brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with glaring
headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly
parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the
right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double
lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars,
since her car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its
right lane going to Cubao."[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer,
the next question for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no
parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. [14] Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li,
Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.[15] Under the "emergency rule" adopted by
this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals,[16] an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane
to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[18] that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given
situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule" the court concluded that Koh, in spite
of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not
guilty of negligence.[19]
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in
such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient
for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no
one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because
the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both
a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion
of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and
other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court:
"She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that
she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota
Corona Car."[20] In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the
accident confirmed that Valenzuela’s car was parked very close to the sidewalk. [21] The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela’s car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.[22]
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park
her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of
the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm
to others."[23] It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. [24] We stressed, in Corliss vs.
Manila Railroad Company,[25] that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li
was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery.
There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under
these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were
significantly lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden
appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as
one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his
failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to negligence. [26]
Li’s obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the accident was
clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer. In denying
liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li’s testimony, that the visit was in connection with official
matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work outside the office
as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came
from BF Homes Parañaque he did not have ‘business from the company’ (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23,
1991). The use ofthe company car was partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of
using it for non-official business is a ‘benefit,’ apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his
position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their
respective duties, the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater
familias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held liable
for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred
while an employee was in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School
vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an employer’s liability for the acts done within the
scope of the employee’s assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes any act done by
an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called
for in the performance of any act ‘indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer’ (at p.
645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court’s finding that since defendant Li was
authorized by the company to use the company car ‘either officially or socially or even bring it home,’ he
can be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-
official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his position. But to
impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a
showing that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of the employer or on the
occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of the company’s business or its interests, or at least for its benefit.
The imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore
fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of
respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias,
in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that
our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Li’s employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals[29] upon which respondent court has
placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teacher’s supervision of students during
an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the provision on special parental authority found
in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized school activities, whether
inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in
relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved
on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome. The
question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee
during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability
imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the performance of tasks
either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks. The case at bench presents a
situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles.
These company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
various plans through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of service,
or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial
or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would
not otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point of turnover of
ownership to the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the
employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of
responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued car occurs during private use after normal
office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous
tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company
maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the
company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use
of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the
company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee,
it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of using a
company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in the example of the preceding
paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related to the image of success an
entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or for practical and utilitarian reasons -
to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently.
In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important business transactions
and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision
for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business
use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company’s image, a company owes a responsibility to the
public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a
company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before
the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously
keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. [30] These meetings, clearly, were
not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of
representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related
functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as
well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill
before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and occupational
rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-
adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be
adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels
observed in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her would
not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the
physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of
these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage
because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however
technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor
functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the
amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the
injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving
of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was
coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been
from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the court of Appeals is modified with the
effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.

In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. [31] Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.

Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court, except
as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in
moral damages from an amount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not
justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.

As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower
extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived
of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic
technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required to
undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of
healing.
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo,
Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about
eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan,
seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his
name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind
the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated
beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered
up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan
and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether
or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or
shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side
of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it,
and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court
of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed
the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their
goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also
agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified
to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses,
including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the
bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-
out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus
must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal
and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to
what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers
who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but
for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found
in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is
as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is
burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed
to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver
and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must
have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline
when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come
under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased,
as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory,
moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing
the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the
appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at
EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is
adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of
the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital,
she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him
speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed
immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to
change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that
the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed
to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred.
All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in
the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of
their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was
provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was
banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the
case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified
in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
G.R. No. 175512, May 30 2011
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOCELYN CATUBIG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] dated November 17, 2005 and the
Resolution[2] dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815, which modified
the Decision[3] dated January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City,
in Civil Case No. 11360, an action for recovery of damages based on Article 2180, in relation to Article
2176, of the Civil Code, filed by respondent Jocelyn Catubig against petitioner Vallacar Transit,
Inc. While the RTC dismissed respondent's claim for damages, the Court of Appeals granted the same.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus
with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus driver of
petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from
Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado
(Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59
and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the
opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for
the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the
motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to
the hospital.
On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide in
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-
Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a
Resolution on December 22, 1994, dismissing the criminal charge against Cabanilla. It found that
Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, because there was no
negligence, not even contributory, on Cabanilla's part.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on July 19, 1995 a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the total amount of P484,000.00, for the
death of her husband, Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil
Code. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the latter's employee driver,
Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus which collided with Catubig's motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole negligence of Catubig
when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of the
road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the dismissal of respondent's complaint
for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation that
petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its employee driver.
In the Pre-Trial Order[4] dated June 10, 1997, the parties stipulated that the primary issue for trial was
whether or not petitioner should be held liable for Catubig's death. Trial then ensued.
Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert B. Elnas (Elnas),[5] Emilio Espiritu (Espiritu),[6] Dr. Norberto Baldado, Jr.
(Dr. Baldado),[7] Peter Cadimas (Cadimas),[8] and respondent[9] herself testified in support of
respondent's complaint.
PO2 Elnas conducted an investigation of the collision incident. According to PO2 Elnas, the bus was
running fast, at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, when it collided with the motorcycle which was
trying to overtake a truck. The collision occurred on the lane of the bus. Catubig was flung 21 meters
away, and Emperado, 11 meters away, from the point of impact. The motorcycle was totaled; the
chassis broke into three parts, and the front wheel and the steering wheel with the shock absorbers
were found 26 meters and 38 meters, respectively, from the collision point. In contrast, only the front
bumper of the bus suffered damage.
Cadimas personally witnessed the collision of the bus and the motorcycle. He recalled that he was then
waiting for a ride to Dumaguete City and saw the Ceres Bulilit bus making a turn at a curve. Cadimas
signaled the said bus to halt but it was running fast. Cadimas also recollected that there was a cargo
truck running slow in the opposite direction of the bus. Cadimas next heard a thud and saw that the bus
already collided with a motorcycle.
Espiritu was the photographer who took photographs of the scene of the accident. He identified the five
photographs which he had taken of Catubig lying on the ground, bloodied; broken parts of the
motorcycle; and the truck which Catubig tried to overtake.
Dr. Baldado was the medico-legal doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of Catubig's
body. He reported that Catubig suffered from the following injuries: laceration and fracture of the right
leg; laceration and fracture of the left elbow; multiple abrasions in the abdominal area, left anterior chest
wall, posterior right arm, and at the back of the left scapular area; and contusion-hematoma just above
the neck. Dr. Baldado confirmed that Catubig was already dead when the latter was brought to the
hospital, and that the vehicular accident could have caused Catubig's instantaneous death.
Respondent herself testified to substantiate the amount of damages she was trying to recover from
petitioner for Catubig's death, such as Catubig's earning capacity; expenses incurred for the wake and
burial of Catubig, as well as of Emperado; the cost of the motorcycle; and the costs of the legal services
and fees respondent had incurred.
Respondent's documentary exhibits consisted of her and Catubig's Marriage Contract dated August 21,
1982, their two children's Certificate of Live Births, Catubig's College Diploma dated March 24, 1983,
the list and receipts of the expenses for Catubig's burial, the sketch of the collision site prepared by PO2
Elnas, the excerpts from the police blotter, the photographs of the collision, [10] and the Post Mortem
Report[11] on Catubig's cadaver prepared by Dr. Baldado.
In an Order[12] dated October 6, 1998, the RTC admitted all of respondent's aforementioned evidence.
On the other hand, Rosie C. Amahit (Amahit)[13] and Nunally Maypa (Maypa)[14] took the witness stand
for petitioner.
Amahit was a Court Stenographer at the MCTC who took the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 against Cabanilla. Amahit verified that the document being presented by
the defense in the present case was a true and correct copy of the TSN of the preliminary investigation
held in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 on May 25, 1994, and another document was a duplicate original of
the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994 dismissing Criminal Case No. M-15-94.
Maypa is the Administrative and Personnel Manager at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner. He started
working for petitioner on September 22, 1990 as a clerk at the Human Resources Development
Department at the Central Office of petitioner in Bacolod City. Sometime in November 1993, he
became an Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner; and in August 1995, he was
promoted to his current position at the same branch.
While he was still an Administrative Assistant, Maypa was responsible for the hiring of personnel
including drivers and conductors. Maypa explained that to be hired as a driver, an applicant should be
35 to 45 years old, have at least five years experience in driving big trucks, submit police, court, and
medical clearances, and possess all the necessary requirements for driving a motor vehicle of more
than 4,500 kilograms in gross weight such as a professional driver's license with a restriction code of 3.
The applicant should also pass the initial interview, the actual driving and maintenance skills tests, and
a written psychological examination involving defensive driving techniques. Upon passing these
examinations, the applicant still had to go through a 15-day familiarization of the bus and road
conditions before being deployed for work. Maypa, however, admitted that at the time of his
appointment as Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch, Cabanilla was already an employee
driver of petitioner.
Maypa further explained the investigation and grievance procedure followed by petitioner in cases of
vehicular accidents involving the latter's employee drivers. Maypa related that Cabanilla had been put
on preventive suspension following the vehicular accident on January 27, 1994 involving the bus
Cabanilla was driving and the motorcycle carrying Catubig and Emperado. Following an internal
investigation of said accident conducted by petitioner, Cabanilla was declared not guilty of causing the
same, for he had not been negligent.
Lastly, Maypa recounted the expenses petitioner incurred as a result of the present litigation.
The documentary exhibits of petitioner consisted of the TSN of the preliminary investigation in Criminal
Case No. M-15-94 held on May 25, 1994 before the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the
Province of Negros Oriental; Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC in the same case; and
the Minutes dated February 17, 1994 of the Grievance Proceeding conducted by petitioner involving
Cabanilla.[15]
The RTC, in its Order[16] dated November 12, 1999, admitted all the evidence presented by petitioner.
On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision favoring petitioner. Based on the sketch
prepared by PO2 Elnas, which showed that "the point of impact x x x occurred beyond the center lane
near a curve within the lane of the Ceres bus[;]"[17] plus, the testimonies of PO2 Elnas and Cadimas that
the motorcycle recklessly tried to overtake a truck near a curve and encroached the opposite lane of the
road, the RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle was the
negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig. The RTC, moreover, was convinced through the
testimony of Maypa, the Administrative and Personnel Manager of the Dumaguete branch of petitioner,
that petitioner had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee drivers,
including Cabanilla.
After trial, the RTC concluded:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the [herein petitioner] that the [herein
respondent's] husband is the reckless and negligent driver and not the driver of the [petitioner], the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered dismissed.
[Petitioner's] counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit. [18]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated November 17, 2005, the appellate
court held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles. Catubig,
on one hand, failed to use reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he tried to
overtake a truck at a curve. Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a high speed of 100
kilometers per hour. The Court of Appeals also brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it exercised
the degree of diligence exacted by law in the conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a position to
testify on the procedures followed by petitioner in hiring Cabanilla as an employee driver considering
that Cabanilla was hired a year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner.
Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision of the trial court is modified. We rule that
[herein petitioner] is equally liable for the accident in question which led to the deaths of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado and hereby award to the heirs of Quintin Catubig, Jr. the amount [of]
P250,000.00 as full compensation for the death of the latter.[19]
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution dated
November 16, 2006.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner asserts that respondent's complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latter's failure to
verify the same. The certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by
respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondent's verification that she "has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic
records."[20] Petitioner cited jurisprudence in which the Court ruled that a pleading lacking proper
verification is treated as an unsigned pleading, which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner also denies any vicarious or imputed liability under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of
the Civil Code. According to petitioner, respondent failed to prove the culpability of Cabanilla, the
employee driver of petitioner. There are already two trial court decisions (i.e., the Resolution dated
December 22, 1994 of the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental in
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the Decision dated January 26, 2000 of the RTC in the instant civil suit)
explicitly ruling that the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig's reckless and negligent act. Thus,
without the fault or negligence of its employee driver, no liability at all could be imputed upon petitioner.
Petitioner additionally argues, without conceding any fault or liability, that the award by the Court of
Appeals in respondent's favor of the lump sum amount of P250,000.00 as total death indemnity lacks
factual and legal basis. Respondent's evidence to prove actual or compensatory damages are all self-
serving, which are either inadmissible in evidence or devoid of probative value. The award of moral and
exemplary damages is likewise contrary to the ruling of the appellate court that Catubig should be
equally held liable for his own death.
Respondent maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged petitioner to be liable for Catubig's
death and that the appellate court had already duly passed upon all the issues raised in the petition at
bar.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, we find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondent's complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules
of Court was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 6. Verification.--A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has read
the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge.
Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," shall be
deemed insufficient.
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The foregoing provision was carried on,
with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading."
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which became effective on May 1,
2000. It now reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a
pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect. However, it also just as clearly states that "[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit." No such law or rule
specifically requires that respondent's complaint for damages should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate against forum shopping, the two
are different.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[21] we already pointed out that:
A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party's failure to
sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and
not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional
requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. [22]
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a
law or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all
pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) petition for
review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41,
Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6)
petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7)
complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59,
Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari
against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule 64, Section
2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for
quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15)
petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all
complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment
under the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings
under the Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied
by a certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took
effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed
herein that respondent's complaint for damages was accompanied by such a certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances
warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[23]
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that respondent was unable to prove imputable negligence on
the part of petitioner.
Prefatorily, we restate the time honored principle that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence
already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing only errors of law
that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we
may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants.[24]
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the
appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted
by the evidence on record.[25]
The issue of negligence is basically factual.[26] Evidently, in this case, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals have contradictory factual findings: the former found that Catubig alone was negligent, while
the latter adjudged that both Catubig and petitioner were negligent.
Respondent based her claim for damages on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code,
which read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of the Civil Code - imputing fault or
negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its employee - does not apply to
petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla, which would have made the
latter liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established by
respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that the proximate
cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of
the motorcycle, Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.[27]
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck
ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres
Bus was running very fast. Even if the Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not
have caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo
truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a curve. As the
driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving
his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the
circumstances. Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a
cargo truck while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental. Overtaking is not allowed while approaching a curve in the highway (Section 41(b), Republic
Act [No.] 4136, as amended). Passing another vehicle proceeding on the same direction should only be
resorted to by a driver if the highway is free from incoming vehicle to permit such overtaking to be made
in safety (Section 41(a), Republic Act [No.] 4136). The collision happened because of the
recklessness and carelessness of [herein respondent's] husband who was overtaking a cargo
truck while approaching a curve. Overtaking another vehicle while approaching a curve constitute
reckless driving penalized not only under Section 48 of Republic Act [No.] 4136 but also under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court commiserate with the [respondent] for the untimely death of her husband. However, the
Court as dispenser of justice has to apply the law based on the facts of the case. Not having proved by
preponderance of evidence that the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of the driver of
the Ceres bus, this Court has no other option but to dismiss this case. [28] (Emphases supplied.)
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus at
a reckless speed when the collision occurred lack probative value.
We are unable to establish the actual speed of the bus from Cadimas's testimony for he merely stated
that the bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it was "running very fast." [29]
PO2 Elnas, on the other hand, made inconsistent statements as to the actual speed of the bus at the
time of the collision. During the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the
MCTC, PO2 Elnas refused to give testimony as to the speed of either the bus or the motorcycle at the
time of the collision and an opinion as to who was at fault. [30] But during the trial of the present case
before the RTC, PO2 Elnas claimed that he was told by Cabanilla that the latter was driving the bus at
the speed of around 100 kilometers per hour.[31]
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2 Elnas both pointed out that the motorcycle encroached the lane
of the bus when it tried to overtake, while nearing a curve, a truck ahead of it, consistent with the fact
that the point of impact actually happened within the lane traversed by the bus. It would be more
reasonable to assume then that it was Catubig who was driving his motorcycle at high speed because
to overtake the truck ahead of him, he necessarily had to drive faster than the truck. Catubig should
have also avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead of him as the curvature on the road could have
obstructed his vision of the oncoming vehicles from the opposite lane.

The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along the proper lane,
while the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he was
approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on reckless driving, at the
risk of his life and that of his employee, Emperado.

The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the
negligence of their employees.[32] Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on
Cabanilla's part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla's
employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 17,
2005 and Resolution dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 are
SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of
Dumaguete City, dismissing Civil Case No. 11360 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-65295. March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, Petitioners, v. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, Respondents.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975— at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at
Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio’s car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home
by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to
avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the
other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection
and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered
the latter:
"(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of
the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff
brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the
unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental
anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of
economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family
since the accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the wanton
disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court
for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P4,500.00 due as and for attorney’s fees; and
(6) The cost of suit." (Emphasis supplied).
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476
affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following extent: 1aw
library
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the
only amount that the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced to P100,000.00, basically
because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss
of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive and
unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney’s fees and costs remained
untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner
in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts
drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that
this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio’s injuries. We note, however, that
both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and
proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather
the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck.
The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in
some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio’s negligence and made no
further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis
of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact relating
to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and
Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio’s
recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having
to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put
forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio’s alleged
negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio
had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or
speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his
car’s headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person
of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix’s evidence here
consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati
Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a
nurse took off Dionisio’s clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with
Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the
trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also
offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of
the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said
to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however,
specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that
private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of
the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during
that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it
tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had
indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly
arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid
curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court and
the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of
the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being barely
200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident
told him that Dionisio’s car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other
hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just
crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate
when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not
acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so. Private respondent’s objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather
as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of
excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as
to render in-operative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in
the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno
was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court.
Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it
could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling
just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights
accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court
expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio’s car went off as he crossed the intersection but was
non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners’ contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police
precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners’ theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent
Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights
on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati
Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night.
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. 8
There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of
that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one
shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel’s negligence on the one hand
and the accident and respondent’s injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different
manner, the collision of Dionisio’s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the truck driver’s negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio’s negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and
that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners’ arguments are
drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are
unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note,
firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser
and Keeton make this quite clear:
"Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm
and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so
far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the
very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one
who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward.
"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces
set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which
is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause." 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver’s negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondent’s car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio’s negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver’s negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more
than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver
had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the
chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever
the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Prosser and Keeton: law library
"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be
required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the
defendant’s own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who
leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from
some independent source. . . . In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the
defendant’s conduct to produce the result, and in each case the defendant’s negligence consists in
failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity,
including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even
lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a
vehicle or a train will run into it; . . . .
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.
. . . [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against `that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be
anticipated.’ Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by
a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. ---" 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio’s negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver’s "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines)
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of
petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the
"last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to
take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the
common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart v. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical
function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule — that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff’s negligence was
relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not
believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence
— the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of
the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the
rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act
with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the
truck driver’s own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out
the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners’ proposition must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel’s proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate
court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of
negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his
home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when
away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private
respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we
believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-
80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement
from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by
the respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate
amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.