MANAOIS, Glynez M.

Criminal Procedure

CANCERAN V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015

FACTS: In the information for frustrated theft, on or about October 6, 2002,

Canceran conspiring with Vequizo and Diaz allegedly take, steal and carry away
14 cartons of beauty products belonging to Orama Mega Center. Canceran
denied that he was pushing two boxes of Magic Flakes, which actually contained
14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream upon inspection of the guard. He
posed that he was in the store to buy medicine for his wife and a man asked him
to purchase the items, which he did out of his conscience. He further alleged
that an earlier Information or theft was already filed on October 9, 2002 which
was eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information was filed for
the same offense over the same incident and became the subject of the present
case.

RTC ruled that Canceran was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for consummated
theft because there was no “Frustrated Theft” (Valenzuela v. People). The
dismissal invoked by Canceran was merely a release order because he had
posted bail.

CA denied Canceran’s appeal and his motion for reconsideration. He raised the
issue of double jeopardy for the first time but because he never entered a valid
plea and so the first jeopardy never attached.

ISSUE: Whether CA is correct in deciding that there was no double jeopardy.

RULING: YES. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the
same offense. The rule of double jeopardy has a settled meaning in this
jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.

Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double
jeopardy before the RTC. Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of
double jeopardy earlier, the same must still fail because legal jeopardy did not
attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he was just
about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was able
to do so. Second, there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The
case was not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply
because he posted bail. Absent these two elements, there can be no double
jeopardy.

DOCTRINE LEARNED:
Requisites of double jeopardy shall always be present for it to be invoked. The
case points out the lacking requisites of valid arraignment in the first case and
that the first case was terminated. There was no dismissal of the first case since
he posted bail, hence there is no valid arraignment for the first case.
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

CHIOK V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015

FACTS:
Chua entrusted to Chiok P 9,563,900 for him to buy Chua shares of stocks. Chiok
was unable to present any documents of any transactions and had been
avoiding Chua’s calls. He reassured Chua by giving her two interbank checks
which were dishonored upon presentment. No return of money was made
prompting Chua to write a demand letter through her counsel. In his letter-reply,
the money was Chua’s investment in their unregistered partnership. Chiok was
charged with estafa whereby he pleaded not guilty.

Chua filed a complaint-affidavit against Chiok, where the latter later on denied
that he enticed Chua to stock investment. RTC convicted Chiok for estafa. In an
omnibus order, RTC denied his motion for reconsideration and cancelled his bail
for being a flight risk. Chiok filed a notice of appeal with the CA. RTC issued an
order of arrest but was returned because he cannot be located. The appeal in CA
was reinstated and reversed the decision of RTC and acquitted Chiok for failure
of prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Chua filed a motion
for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether there is double jeopardy.

RULING: NONE. The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees

the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of the
1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for
double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements
must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal
proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or
the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation. This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule (People v.
Velasco).

DOCTRINE LEARNED:
The case law provides the guidelines on the fourth requisite that the accused
was, in this case, acquitted. This acquittal should be final, unappelable and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, under the principle of finality of
acquittal based on Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

MORILLO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015

FACTS:
Natividad, Malong and Nanquil were contractors from Pampanga under RB
Custodio Construction, who purchased construction materials from Morillo,
owner of Amasea General Mechandize and Construction Supplies. As agreed
upon, 20% of the purchases shall be paid within 7 days after the first delivery
and the remaining 80% to be paid within 35 days after the last delivery, all of
which shall be via postdated checks. Two postdated checks were issued for the
80% of purchase but was dishonored twice in Equitable PCIBank in Makati
Branch because of insufficiency in funds (for the first dishonored checks) and
the account was closed (for the second dishonored checks). 2 informations were
filed against respondents in OCP Makati City.

MeTC found Natividad guilty and acquitted Malong. Respondent appealed with
RTC where it affirmed the decision of MeTC. However, CA reversed the decision
of RTC because elements of BP 22 transpired in Pampanga, thus, Makati has no
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether dismissal of the case is the same as acquittal of respondent. If

yes, is there double jeopardy.

RULING:NO. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but
also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment
null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved
party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy, in
violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal
case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory,
and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy be violated.

More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be
considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that
his constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated.

A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the
foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the
MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for the
dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with
respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal
herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration of the merits. Third, the
question raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In view
therefore of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's
appeal of the appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.

Doctrine Learned: The case reiterated that acquittal is not the same as
dismissal of the case. Appeal on the same case is not a barred by double
jeopardy because there was lack of requisites to invoke the constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE V. LACSON
400 SCRA 27
GR. NO. 149453 April 1, 2003

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners of the Resolution of remanding
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, a multiple murder case against
respondent and his co-accused for the shooting and killing of eleven persons
bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the
express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional
dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given
retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements
for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the
following:

... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of
the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether
there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5)
whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of
respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were
affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims;
(7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first
determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various
offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the
Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be
given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It
emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State
is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of
cases beyond the two-year bar.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a)
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said
rule should not be applied retroactively.

ISSUE: Whether Section 8, Rule 117 of the revised rules of criminal procedure is
not applicable to criminal cases.

RULING: YES. Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding

six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1)
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before
the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional

dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the
requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of
a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an
offense necessarily included therein.

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case
having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order
of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing.

It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication
to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor
for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of
the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal
does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express

consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to
oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardyor that such revival or refiling
is barred by the statute of limitations.

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling
of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new

preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of
them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer
be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from
the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint
for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to
submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the
Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute
but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing
that justice.

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years
under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-
bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial
of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of
the time-bar.

DOCTRINE LEARNED:
It was tackled in this case the correct interpretation and application of the new
provision of the Rules of Court on whether the provisional dismissal become
permanent after the lapse of the periods set in the Rule 117, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court. Par. 1 of the said provision provides the conditions that the
provisional dismissal was with express consent of the accused and that due
notice was sent to the offended parties. The records show that there was no
consent of the accused. All what the lawyers of the accused prayed for was a
judicial determination of a probable cause for warrants of arrest to be issued
against the accused. The only prayer of the accused was to withhold the
warrants of arrest. No due notice was served to the heirs of the deceased for the
hearing of the motion. The motion of the accused was set for hearing and there
was no proof that separate notices were served on the heirs of the victims who
are residing in distant towns of Zamboanga and Leyte.
 MANAOIS, Glynez M.
Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE V. LACSON
413 SCRA 20
GR. NO. 149453 October 7, 2003

FACTS:
Respondent filed an omnibus motion, motion for reconsideration, supplement to
motion for reconsideration, and a motion to set for oral arguments. He alleged
that the time bar rule should apply retroactively favoring him.

ISSUE/ RULING:
1. Whether the time bar rule should be applied retroactively.
- No. The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply
because it is favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was
approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule
was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
the accused only.

2. whether the judicial admission of respondent’s counsel be judicially admitted.

- YES. When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to
the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the
essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.

While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal
case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to
such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a
revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public
prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination
of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondent’s motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause will show that it contained no allegation
that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the
respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent
was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for
equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize
the court to grant such relief. A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it
power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings.
Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.

DOCTRINE LEARNED:
The court had cleared it out requisites needed to apply the provisional dismissal.
Sec. 8. Rule 117 expressly provides that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. Respondent’s counsel judicially admitted that respondent had
not consented the provisional dismissal. And the time bar rule should not
retroactively apply to respondent since he only asked or prayed for the
determination of probable cause of arrest.