Examination of Witness

Ricalde vs People

FACTS:
On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up as “he felt
pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31
years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother
that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. CA
affirmed the conviction but lowered the amount of damages.

ISSUES:
Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice fatal.
Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa
disproves penile or object penetration.
Whether or not the invocation of “variance doctrine” is proper.
Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through
sexual assault.

HELD:
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or
object rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”

First issue: NO
The Court held that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital
or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed. In People v.
Soria, the Court ruled that “We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify
the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to identify
the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the
fundamental tenets of due process.”

Second issue: NO
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal
orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal
orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not
contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.
 The Court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and
the possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.

Third issue: NO
Variance doctrine
Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It states:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was
proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the
crime of rape through sexual assault.

Fourth issue: YES

XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest
penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of
rape.
Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by
analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice
consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”

Hearsay

G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO
PUESCA, respondents.

FACTS:
Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in
band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. While Sgt. Bano was testifying as
prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca, he said that
the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged,
revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of
each and every one of them. The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the
names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators.
Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground
that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The
respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection.
The witness was allowed to answer the question and name hisco-conspirators except
those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this
ruling was denied.

ISSUE/HOLDING: Should Sgt. Bano have been allowed to answer the question in full?

HELD:
YES. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish
the truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to
establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who
conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or
the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that
the persons so named really conspired with Puesca.
The question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been
allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be
taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired
with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

Patula v. people G. R. No. 164457 ; April 11, 2012

Facts:
In a Estafa case, witness auditor based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers corresponding to each customer, as
well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.

Issue: Is the testimony hearsay?

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. Witness-lady-auditor witness
bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information

People Vs. Victor P. Padit, GR. No. 202978

FACTS:
In the morning of May 2006, the victim, AAA, went out of their house to buy bread. But
on her way to the store, she was called by the accused, Victor, who is their neighbour and the
uncle of her mother. After allowing her to play inside his house, Victor then brought her
upstairs, caused her to lie down and removed her short pants while he also removed his and
proceeded to rub his penis against AAA’s vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered helpless and
prevented to make any sound as Victor covered her mouth with his hand. Victor then
threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she tells anybody about the incident.
Come lunch time, AAA’s mother went looking for her. Victor told her that AAA is in his
house and brought her outside. Back at their house, AAA told her mother about what Victor did
to her. AAA’s parents filed a complaint and caused AAA to undergo physical and medical
examination on May 8, 2006 where it was found that the child’s vulva showed a slight hymenal
abrasion.
In the Information, the Office of the Public Prosecutor charged Victor of the crime of
Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial ensued, both the RTC
and the CA found Victor guilty of consummated rape on which Victor, through his counsel filed
a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty of rape

HELD:
The court rules in the affirmative. At the outset, the Court notes that in the Information
filed, petitioner is specifically charged with rape under Article 335 of the RPC. Considering that
the crime was committed on May 5, 2006, the applicable law is under the new provisions on
rape now found in Articles 266-A and 266-D of the RPC as amended by RA 8353. Hence, the
prosecution as well as the RTC and the CA committed an error in specifying the provision of the
law which was violated. Nonetheless, it is settled that the failure to designate the offence by
statue or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of
the law violated, does not vitiate the information of the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged.
As to the guilt of the accused, the Court does not agree with the contention that the
prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground that AAA explicitly stated in her
testimony that Victor merely rubbed his penis against her vagina. AAA, who was then 4 years
old, was not expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof.
Rape committed on the victim’s testimony that she felt pain. This kind of pain could not have
been the result of mere superficial rubbing. Furthermore, the testimony of AAA is corroborated
by the findings of the physician who examined her.
Victor also contends that the testimony of AAA’s mother is nothing but hearsay. The
Court does not agree. The term “hearsay” as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence
which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited. The
reason for its exclusion is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony us presented us
deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine and the court is without opportunity to
test its credibility by observing the demeanour of the person who made them. In the instant
case, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the fact testified by her mother. Victor’s counsel
evene cross-examined AAA. Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe AAA’s
manner of testifying. Hence, the testimony of AAA’s mother on the incident related to her
daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.

Admission

People vs. Mondijar, 392 SCRA 356

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the RTC of Masbate, finding appellant Pedro Mondijar guilty
of the murder of Pamfilo Aplacador and imposing upon him the penalty of death. Because
appellant was more than 79 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the
sentence was commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant and the victim were neighbors. Although appellant was the father-in-law of
the victim, there was bad blood between them. In a previous incident, the son-in-law
(Aplacador) had stabbed appellant. Whatever their quarrel, it was never patched up. A month
later, the ill feelings erupted anew with fatal results for Aplacador. At about 6:30pm the
accused stabbed and hacked with the use of a sharp and pointed bolo, one PAMFILO
APLACADOR hitting him at the different parts of his body which was the direct and the logical
cause of his instantaneous death.
Appellant admitted killing the victim, but claimed that he only acted in self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether the accused acted in self-defense.

RULING:
Appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, one of the
elements necessary for self-defense to be sustained. Aplacador’s “gritting of his teeth” hardly
constituted unlawful aggression, adding that appellant’s act of continuously hacking the victim
after the latter fell down and was disarmed is unjustified because the supposed aggression had
already ceased. Appellant exceeded the limits of necessity to suppress an alleged attack, and
the number and location of the hacking wounds sustained by the deceased belied appellant’s
claim of self-defense.
When an accused invokes self-defense, he effectively admits the killing, and the onus
probandi shifts upon him to show clearly and convincingly that the killing is justified and that no
criminal liability is incurred. For self-defense to prosper, the accused must satisfy the following
requisites: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. The accused must rely upon his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution in order to establish self-defense.
Assuming arguendo that the victim, Aplacador, did try to stab appellant, appellant went
beyond reasonable necessity in trying to prevent or repel the assault. The victim was not only
disabled by multiple hack wounds; he was in fact decapitated. The nature and number of
wounds inflicted upon the victim show that appellant’s intentions went beyond trying to
protect his person but sought to deliver serious harm, thus rendering self-defense unavailing in
this case. Appellant’s claim of self-defense is dubious. A plea of self-defense cannot be
appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence but is
extremely doubtful by itself.
Prosecution failed to properly prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and evident premeditation. Appellant could only be declared guilty of
homicide.

Ladiana vs. People, 393 SCRA 419

FACTS:
The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police
(INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his
duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of
his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes
which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P.
Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons
passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has
no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, attacked and shot
Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting
upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. “Kaya
itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt
upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking
pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko
alam na siya ay tinamaan”

ISSUE:
Whether he acted in self-defense is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

HELD:
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually
led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims
he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission,
it is admissible in evidence against him.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they
were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the
admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in
ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such
admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Having admitted that he had fatally
shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the
latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be
weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner argues that
it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be
bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. Therefore, petitioner can no longer
invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. As far as he is
concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its cause were
established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the Medico-Legal
Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by
petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told
by other people that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was
not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a
person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any
complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters
merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the
killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of
sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we
cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner’s penalty.
Petition is DENIED