San Luis v.

Rojas
Austria-Martinez, J. 03/03/08 G.R. No. 159127
Doctrine
Summary
Facts  Berdex Int'l filed with RTC-Pasig a complaint for sum of money against petitioner; alleging that:
o It's a foreign corp organized and existing under the laws of the USA (San Francisco, California)
o Action's purpose is to enforce an isolated transaction with the petitioner
 received money from it partly as advances or a loan and partly to purchase in Seanet and
Seabest Corps; but not a single share in those transactions was transferred to private
respondent; instead retained by petitioner
 Compromised to treat all advances as loan to petitioner to be paid in 3 years and agrreed upon
that in case of non-payment, the entire amount= due and demandable
 But later refused to sign a contract of loan; he confirmed the loan to the latter's auditors
 Only paid $20,000; nothing more despite demands
o Counter by petitioner (Answer):
 True he got around $141, 944.71 and it was intended to buy 70% of Seanet on the latter's
behalf,
 But in light of subsequent losses incurred by Seanet and petitioner's desire to maintain good
relations, petitioner offered that the amounts he received from private respondent be paid by
Fuegomar Traders, Inc. (Fuegomar), a company which he subsequently put up and which he
substantially owned and engaged in the same line of business as Seanet;
 Fuegomar will purchase at cost the stock investment of private respondent in Seanet;
while the documentation of such agreement was being finalized, petitioner then gave
US$20,000.00 to private respondent on behalf of Fuegomar;
 However, private respondent then claimed that its investment in Seanet was petitioner's
personal loan and the amount of US$20,000.00 paid on behalf of Fuegomar was maliciously
interpreted as petitioner' admission of personal liability
 Pre-Trial!
o private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories)
 Initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002;
 All of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA;
 That one of the witnesses is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be
extremely difficult if not dangerous;
 Perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002
 that written interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few;
that such mode of deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time and will
prevent needless delays in the case.
o Opposition!
 If indeed there was an oral contract and petitioner was liable to private respondent for the
amount he received from the latter, the documents attached to private respondent's complaint
did not support claim, but rather supported his position. Taking the deposition through written
interrogatories would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and
demeanor of witnesses.
 Petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to
cross-interrogatories which will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his
cross-examination. It is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their deposition under
sanction of the penalties prescribed by Philippine law for perjury. It will not necessarily save
precious judicial and government time but may in fact lengthen the trial, as both parties will
have the right to review and to object to interrogatories submitted by the other party.
  The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are all
Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not presented evidence that the US government
has prohibited its citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such
prohibition, it was not binding on our own legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.
 RTC- granted; MR by petitioner= denied
 CA appeal- dismissed
o No affidavit of service= attached
o Annexes H, J are blurred+ pleadings filed before the respondent court NOT attached; MR- non-
familiarity with rules NOT an excuse; subsequent compliance won't warrant a recon!
Ratio/Issues 1. WoN Petition for Certiorari= proper= YES
◦ Donato v. CA- proper recourse of an aggrieved party is normally via R45; but if error = juris or the act
complained was done by a Court with GADALEJ, = R65! (citing Fortich v. Corona)
2. WoN CA's reliance on SC admin circular= misplaced= YES
◦ Failure to attach the affidavit of service= not fatal; shown that copies of the petition were served
personally on the RTC and the Private respondent's counsel (proven by stamps on parties' official
receiving stamps); thus substantial justice= satisfied
▪ +, annexes aren't necessary to adjudicate the issues brought before the CA (Gadalej of the RTC in
granting motion to depose)
◦ No need to attach all the other pleadings filed in the RTC
◦ CA's reliance on Administrative Circular No. 3-96 is misplaced.
▪ Although Circular provides that subsequent compliance with the requirement shall not warrant a
reconsideration, it does not apply to the petition filed by petitioner before the CA.
▪ Subject of the said Circular deals with copies of the judgment or resolution sought to be reviewed
and not to other pleadings filed in the RTC.
▪ The Circular clarified the meaning of duplicate original copy and certified true copy of decisions,
judgments, resolutions or orders and not other documents to be attached.
▪ Jurisprudence dictates a relaxation of the rules of procedure
3. WoN Sec. 1, Rule 23, RoC allows a non-resident foreign corp the privilege of having all its witnesses to
testify via deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an Oral
Contract= YES
◦ Rule 23, Sec. 1- Depositions pending action, when may be taken. -By leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
◦ No distinction as to who can avail
◦ Purpose: a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark .
▪ Dasmarias Garments v. CA- plaintiff- allowed to present evidence via deposition of its witness in a
froeign jurisdiction instead of oral examination before the Court
◦ Situation falls under the exceptions in Rule 23, Sec. 4
▪ (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose
if the court finds:
 (1) that the witness is dead; or
 (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty(50) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;or
 (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or
 (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena; or
 (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;
◦ Other contentions:
 ▪
Dasmarias unapplicable: SC= applicable! Same circumstances (cause of action, same stage)
▪
Infringement on right to cross- NO=, there are limits to rules of discovery1
 Plus, ust because it's admitted, it doesn't follow that it can't be assailed
 RTC won't be allowed to observe the witness
◦ Depositions are legal, as long as it follows the rules, it's fine
◦ +, Rule 23 Sec. 25 allows for a person to cross the one deposed upon compliance
Held Petition granted.
Prepared by: Emil Legacion [CivPro/ Cruz]

Dasmariñas Garments Inc v Reyes

Use of depositions

Facts:

1. American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) filed a complaint in the RTC for a sum of money against Dasmarinas
Garments Inc (Dasmarinas), and attorney’s fees
a. Dasmarinas answered, denying any liability with APL
b. Trial was scheduled and a witness was presented by APL, after which the case was reset on May 3
to receive two more witnesses on APL’s behalf
c. On May 3, instead of presenting its two witnesses, but instead prayed that this court allow the
issuance of “Letters Rogatory” to take depositions of two Taiwan nationals Commented [S1]: A letter rogatory or letter of request
d. Dasmarinas opposed, is a formal request from a court to a foreign court for
i. The issuance of letters rogatory is not needed since the witnesses can be examined by some type of judicial assistance. The most common
Philippine courts. remedies sought by letters rogatory are service of
ii. Rules of Court expressly require that witness testimony must be taken orally in an open process and taking of evidence.
court.
iii. Such motion is fatally defective because it does not seek that a foreign court examine a
person in its jurisdiction
e. RTC resolved the rogatory issue in favor of APL, deposition will be coursed through a private entity,
Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AEC) MR by Dasmarinas denied. RTC’s Ratio:
i. MR filed out of time
ii. In any case, the RTC opined that the private entity which the deposition will be coursed
through is an authorized Phil. Representative and may take testimonies of witnesses but
only in writing so the plaintiff could cross-examine.
2. Dasmarinas appealed to CA, but was denied. MR also denied.
3. Hence, this petition

Issue: W/N foreign depositions may be taken by a private entity.

Held: Yes, but with qualifications.

Ratio:

Court went on to define deposition:

1 Even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.
  Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts
resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
 Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts;
They are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness.
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation,
consul gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.

The Rule 132 says that examinations must be done in an open court. Any depositions offered to prove the facts may
be opposed as hearsay, and any party must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine a witness taking
deposition.

However, depositions may be used without the witness actually called to the witness stand, under certain
conditions and under limited purposes, as seen in R23 S4, and in line with R24 and R132. In R24 S11, depositions
of persons in a foreign state shall be taken before the consul or under letters rogatory.

Since PH doesn’t have a consulate in Taiwan because of PH’s One China Policy, it would have no embassy or
consulate in Taiwan. Foreign depositions may thus be taken under letters rogatory as provided for in R24 S12.
Here, it appears that the letters rogatory will be coursed through the DFA to its proper representative, the private
entity AEC.

Ruling: Petition denied.

FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the
taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An action for
breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served
them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April
22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter
that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent
Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a)
petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the
taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent,
d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during
the trial on the merits.

Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears unwarranted
since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to
testify in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication
on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall
not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that
the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had
earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition
would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question.

With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.

ISSUE:
1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy
in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that
petitioner had already obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done
because there was nothing yet to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen because there was nothing to
reject as nothing was offered.

2. WONthe trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause
therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot
be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent had
earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; and (c)
that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness.

RULING:
The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciary’s
primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation theretofore
performes primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device, along with
the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end ,
the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as
witness to testify orally at trial.

I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably
made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the
authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not
unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with
the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11 This is
because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering
that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the
exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury
throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of
discretion. It is our considered opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be
discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari may be a vailed of to
review the questioned order of the trial court.

II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious
sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as dismissing his action or proceeding
or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of
the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the
matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition
shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement,
however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate
reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to
establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. 16 What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of
protective order that is sought.

The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the deposition,
nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will
be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the
present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that
the deposition shall not be taken.

1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively liberal
view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper case
should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject matter
will not involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by interrogatories." It
is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of
discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the
court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and
depositions in one or the other sequence.

2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his
deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness
may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in
taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation,
our legal system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of
witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of written statements
of the same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And
since their use as evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking
dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double
function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony.
Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the
trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.

3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the
behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition b ecomes
apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all
depositions alike. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the
proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements
are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been
seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent
cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements
are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been
seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.
Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt,
private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to
submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing
an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein petitioner to take the deposition upon oral examination
of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of Civil Case No. SP-3469 pending before it. SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan GR no. 90478

Facts:
PCGG filed a complaint against private respondents Tantoco , Jr. and Santiago together with the Marcoses for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order no. 14 of President Corazon
Aquino before the Sandiganbayan. After the case was set for pre-trial, the defendant filed a pleading denominated “interrogatories to
the plaintiff”, amended interrogatories to plaintiff, as well as “Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents” relevant to the
issue of the case. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the pleading contending that the interrogatories are defective
because they do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being only addressed to the PCGG and are the
same matters…(private respondents) sought to be clarified through their Bill of Particulars. Secondly, it contended that the
interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG’s proof upon trial. As to the “Motion for Production and
Inspections of Documents”, the plaintiff prayed for the nullity of the pleading contending there is no good cause in the production of
the documents sought for. Furthermore, it contended that some of the documents are non-existent. The Court decided in favor of the
defendant’s motion. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the “interrogatories to the plaintiff” and “Motion for the Production and Inspection of Documents” were in
accordance with the Rules of Court as to consider it to be valid
HELD:
YES. The Court ruled in favor of the defendant.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The
evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. The inquiry extends to all facts which are
relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with
interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same sha ll be
"answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."
As to the second contention, the Court opined that as already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litig ation. This is
why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of
evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
As to the Motion for the Production and Inspection of Documents, the court ruled that t, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is
good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the
documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said
complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other
documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed.

MARCELO
G. R. N0. 102390. February 1, 2002
REY LAÑADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.
G. R. No. 102404. February 1, 2002
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Hemedez filed an action for damages against several persons for the death of Dr. ViedVemir Garcia Hemedez which
happened in a dispersal operation during a strike staged by the Union of Filipino Employees on account of alleged unfair labor
practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc.
The Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the
genuiness of each of the documents appended therto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed a verified answer to the
request for admission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is
sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
The provision of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the matrix upon which the resolution of these petitions rests, state:
SEC. 2. Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the
court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or d eny those
matters.
The issue for resolution thus calls for an interpretation of the phrase “the party to whom the request is directed.” This is not the first
time that the Court is faced with the issue of whether a party requested to make admissions may reply or answer through his
counsel. In PSCFC Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
(R.138) SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client..”
Also in Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that “(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure..”
Neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the
respective answers requested of them by private respondents in the latter’s written request for admission. As this Court has said,
there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase “the party to whom the request is directed” to refer solely or personally to the
petitioners themselves.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate
facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have filed their respective answers. Private respondents thus desired the
petitioners to admit once again the very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers. The Court reiterated that ruling in
Briboneria v. Court of Appeals and in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
In the latter case, the Court emphasized that the rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended “to expedite trial and to
relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry.” Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings,
the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

[G.R. No. 153667. August 11, 2005.]

AYALA LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Imus, Branch 20,
ASB REALTY CORP., and E. M. RAMOS & SONS, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

ASB alleged that EMRASON entered into letter-agreement with the former for the conditional sale of a lot. ASB subsequently received
letter from children of EMRASON chairman and president, Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing the former of an existing contract to sell
between EMRASON and herein petitioner, ALI. ASB filed complaint. ALI filed answer with compulsory counterclaim and crossclaim.

Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr.,
citing Section 4(c), Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he
was of sound mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s behalf in the course of the trial on
the merits. In the Omnibus Order of the trial court dated 17 October 1994, plaintiff’s motion was granted. ASB then obtained the
deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. ALI objected on the ground of on the propriety, admissibility and conformity
of the deposition proceedings to the Rules. Specifically, ALI sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the
best-evidence rule, rule on presentation of secondary evidence, incompetence of the deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation
of evidence, and testimonies not forming part of the offer.

The trial court ruled on the objections of ALI sustaining some of its objections, overruling the others and upholding the propriety of
the presentation of evidence made by plaintiff through deposition. In the same Order, the trial court directed the setting of the cross-
examination of the deponent. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order setting the hearing of the case for cross-
examination. The trial court again directed that the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., be scheduled. The same was thus set
on 06 October 1995. Before this date, however, ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the date set be cancelled and re-
scheduled to another date. The trial court reset the hearing.
Thereafter, ALI filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunctio to restrain the public respondent, Judge Lucenito Tagle, from implementing the
Order and to declare null and void and expunging the entire deposition proceedings taken.

CA denied. Ruled:
In the instant case, Atty. Emerito Ramos, Sr. testified on matters of his personal knowledge, even if in the course of his testimony,
he referred to certain documents in court, being the President and Chairman of EMRASON. In that capacity, he carried on
negotiations relative to the sale of the Dasmariñas property. Indeed, "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses" (Sec. 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Sec. 16, Rule 132, as contended by petitioner, is not applicable to the case at bench as Atty. Ramos was not refreshing his memory
on a fact or transaction with the aid of memoranda. Rather, he was freely recollecting and testifying on matters within the ambit of
his own personal competence, and merely referring to the letter that he received from Mr. Fernando Ayala, and another letter written
by a Victor Manarang to his son, Emerito Ramos, Jr., both letters being now in his possession by reason of his duties as Pres ident
and Chairman of EMRASON.

Emerito Ramos, Sr. died at the age of 92. ASB then filed before the trial court a motion to introduce in evidence the deposition of
Emerito Ramos, Sr. and was opposed by ALI.

The trial court issued its Order setting aside the opposition of ALI and admitting in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. ALI
again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review onCertiorari.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS EMERITO M. RAMOS, SR. IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES.

SC:

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

"Deposition" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath. In its more technical and
appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in
advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath
or affirmation, before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross-interlocutory, and
usually subscribed by the witnesses. The purposes of taking depositions are to: 1) Give greater assistance to the parties in
ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2) Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent claims and defenses; 3) Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be
proved except with great difficulty; 4) Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; 5) Expedite litigation; 6) Safeguard against surprise; 7)Prevent delay; 8) Simplify and narrow the issues;
and 9) Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s deposition chiefly because of his advance age which ground
is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court.

It must be noted that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., taken on the dates earlier mentioned, were substantially made in
accordance with the requirements of the Rules. In fact, in its Petition before the Court of Appeals, ALI confirmed the taking of
deposition on said dates and that it was duly represented by its counsel during the proceedings. As to whether the manner by which
the deposition was taken faithfully complied with the requirements under the Rules of Court, it is not disputed that the deposition
was taken inside the courtroom of the trial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer was present, tape recorders and a video
camera were even utilized to record the proceedings, in the presence of all the opposing counsels of record including ALI’s.

On the objection of ALI owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it should be noted that a deposition not signed does not
preclude its use during the trial. A deponent’s signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of
signature goes primarily to the form of deposition. The requirement that the deposition must be examined and signed by the witness
is only to ensure that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy.40
In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time.
The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.

This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every objection of ALI contained in its Motion dated 30
January 1995 and ruled on every single objection in the Order dated 05 May 1995 and these objections were again taken up in the
Order of the trial court dated 07 September 1995. On this point, we find no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at
by the trial court.

It has been repeatedly held that the deposition – discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of
a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the
inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.

CA decision is affirmed.

[G.R. No. 155010. August 16, 2004.]

JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. Spouses SUHARTO MANGUDADATU and MIRIAM
SANGKI MANGUDADATU, respondents.
FACTS:

Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the (RTC) a Complaint for damages against Petitioner
Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). The petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it
filed its Answer. The parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, had led
the trial court to declare it in default. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision. it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and
Change of Venue. This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution but was eventually denied by the trial court. Petitioner received
a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial,
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.

Its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance.

On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution. Petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the
Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. On the same day, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice, regarding the public
auction sale of its properties. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition for
Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. The RTC issued an Order
directing respondents to file their written comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New Trial;
(2) Whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances.

HELD:

(1) First Issue

Appreciation of Facts

It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising factual issues that this Court does not review. While the rule admits of exceptions,
petitioner has not satisfactorily shown any. No compelling reason to disturb the CA s factual findings. It may therefore not insist,
contrary to the finding of the CA, that it did not receive the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New Trial.

Motion for New Trial Improper

The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is unacceptable. It should have also
justified its own absence. Having failed to do so, it had no valid ground to request a new trial. Petitioner also failed to justify the
absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal is granted, lawyers are deemed to be the representatives of their clients.
Atty. Fernandez absence from the pretrial was still not excusable. While he could no longer represent petitioner, his presence would
have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of appearance. An improvident termination of legal services is not an
excuse to justify non-appearance at a pretrial. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be rendered meaningless, as they would be
subject to the counsel’s will.

The Proper Remedy

Under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to be considered "as
in default," but "to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof." To
the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s remedy is a motion for
reconsideration. An affidavit of merit is not required to be attached to such motion, because the defense has already been laid down
in the answer. In the present case, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had allowed respondents’
ex parte presentation of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability of
a motion for reconsideration. But the failure to file the latter motion -- without due cause -- is a factor in determining whether to
apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with
this Court and the lower courts, petitioner did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration. The lapse of time it
shows the negligence of petitioner and its counsels.

Non-Receipt of the Order

Petitioner fails to convince us that it has not received the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial. There is a disputable
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. On this basis, we have ruled that the postmaster’s certification
prevails over the mere denial of a lawyer. This rule is applicable here. Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial
court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial.

(2) Second Issue

The Taking of Depositions

The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23
--the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner
offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s
Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be
properly taken. The RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other
evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite
their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.
[G.R. No. 147143. March 10, 2006.]
HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., and YU HE CHING, petitioners, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

Facts:

Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso
share of a real property in Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDC's full payment of the purchase price of P2,634,000.00; and that
Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC's payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost.

Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel
Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley.

The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.

Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of
depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial
to take place.

Meanwhile, pre-trial proceeded at the RTC as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton
moved to declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC granted.

LCDC moved to suspend pre-trial conference alleging pendency of a petition with the Court of Appeals and made it plain that it
cannot proceed with the pre-trial because the issue on whether or not plaintiff may apply for depositions before the pre-trial
conference is a prejudicial question.

For failure of LCDC to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. Defendants'
counterclaims are likewise dismissed.

LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied however by the trial court. LCDC went to the CA on appeal. CA remanded
LCDC’s case to the court a quo for further hearing and directing the latter to allow the deposition taking without delay.

The CA reasoned that: LCDC complied with Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly sanctions
depositions as a mode of discovery without leave of court after the answer has been served; to unduly restrict the modes of
discovery during trial would defeat the very purpose for which it is intended which is a pre-trial device; that the trial court also erred
in dismissing the complaint as LCDC appeared during the pre-trial conference and notified it of the filing of a petition before the CA;
such is a legitimate justification to stall the pre-trial conference, as the filing of the petition was made in good faith in their belief that
the court a quo erred in canceling the deposition scheduled for no apparent purpose.

Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and ordering the deposition-taking to proceed.

Held:
CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to proceed.

A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from th e
accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and
provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served,
and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal
discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004
which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of
deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of
depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are
likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the
parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said issuance, however, the depositions sought by LCDC
shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony
of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be
taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such
terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take depositions after the
answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling
the previously scheduled depositions.
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as
to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.
The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the scheduled depositions. While speedy disposition of cases is important,
such consideration however should not outweigh a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are
reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases but more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of
the merits of the case. Records also show that the delay of the case is not attributable to the depositions sought by LCDC but was
caused by the many pleadings filed by all the parties including petitioners herein.

The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended deponents shall also be called as
witnesses during trial, is also without merit.
The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals 46 which already settled the matter, explained that:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his
deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness
may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in
taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for
knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for
viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the
facts to the parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.
. . . [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use
on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and
privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the
use of oral testimony wherever practicable.

On this point, it is well to reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan :

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, s uch as the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing
the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.
Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court explained that:
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and
policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of
all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other
words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible
through the deposition- discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been the ample
discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure; it not only
eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the
cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the
pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.

The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in
determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute
its case in the dark — the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make
trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA was correct in remanding the case to the trial court and ordering the
depositions to proceed.

G.R. No. 143561 June 6, 2001

JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and
POWER CO., respondents.

FACTS:
Jonathan Cariaga, herein petitioner, was the assigned driver of Davao Light & Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) Service Truck 'S-143'.
Jonathan has been stealing electrical materials, equipments, and supplies kept in his truck for emergency operations at night.
Respondent, DLPC, hired one Florencio Siton under pseudonym 'Canuto Duran' as its undercover agent to investigate such matter.
Canuto struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, who offered to supply Canuto with electrical materials, saying that he has
a cousin (Jonathan) from whom he can procure the same. Series of transaction took place between Canuto, Ricardo and Jonathan.
Siton's undercover work came to an abrupt when members of SGt. Villlasis' team of the Theft & robbery Section apprehended
Canuto. Canuto confessed in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to likewise come out with the truth. Thus, Ricardo
and a certain Sergio Jimero confessed to teir as fence for Jonathan.
But during the trail the prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served
upon him as he was in Sultan Kudarat four (4) hours drive from Davao City and the date of his return was not certain. As a result,
the prosecution submitted the sworn statement of Ricardo, which was attached to respondent's position paper in the labor case filed
by Jonathan against DLPC for illegal dismissal. The petitioner opposed the admission in evidence of the sworn statement of Ricardo
for failure to present Ricardo as witness hence, inadmissible. The petitioner also argues that the testimony Canuto was not credible
because it is allegedly inconsistent in very material and pivotal details from the sworn statement he made at the police station.
According to petitioner, Canuto's testimony was overhauled and corrected to meet the crisis created by eyewitness Ricardo's non-
appearance in court.
The RTC ruled in favor of DLPC contending that the statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga implicative of the
accused as the source of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton's testimony and the police records are formidable compared to the
mere puny denial of the accused. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, it reasoned out that the sworn statement of
Ricardo who did not testify in open court during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly
considered by the trial court as this was annexed as part of DLPC's position paper submitted to the National Labor Relations
Commission in the labor case, a complaint filed by the accused for illegal dismissal, as an exception to the hearsay rule under
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the sworn statement of Ricardo attached to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan against the
latter for illegal dismissal is admissible to the current case.
(2) Whether or not the material inconsistency between the testimony of Canuto and his sworn statement made at the police station
affects his credibility.

RULING:
The court ruled that the sworn statement of Ricardo is inadmissble to the case. Though ection 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
and Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure allows the admission of the testimony, but the court emphasized that
this rule must be strictly complied with in criminal cases. Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
While Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the prev ious
testimony of unavailable witnesses provides:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony
of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable
to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse
party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him;
Mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The records reveal that witness Ricardo
Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was
not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao
City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable
to testify. The court was inclined to rule in the negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point. In the instant case, no efforts
were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly
subpoenaed fail to appear. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution.
With regards to the second issue, the court ruled that the testimony of Canuto is still credible. The rule has always been that the
contradictions between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always militate against the
witness' credibility because the court have long taken judicial notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often
incomplete and inaccurate. Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in
open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross examination. There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain
particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during
the trial. in addition the trial judge who sees and hears witnesses testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as
to the degree of credit which should be accorded their testimonies.

People vs. Webb

GR 132577 / August 17, 1999

Facts:
• Respondent is one of the accused in a rape with homicide case pending before the RTC.
• During the course of the proceeding of the trial court, respondent filed a motion to take testimony by oral deposition of five
additional witnesses all located in America.
• The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it is not allowed by Sec. 4, Rule 24 and Sec. 4 & 5 of Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
• Respondent assailed the trial court decision which was eventually reversed by the CA.
• Petitioner then elevated the case to the SC hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
• WON the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral deposition of additional
witnesses located outside the country

Ruling:
• A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be
superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of exhibits “218” and “219” readily shows that these are of the same
species of documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court.
• It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable fact that
the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and
in denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous
exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
In this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
"SECTION 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to
be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution."
• Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that
under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense.
• The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking cannot be based
nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of
the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased,
arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner.
• Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides
that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense
evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American public officers and the bicycle store owner can identi fy
respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that
they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present
in the United States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.
• Petition granted.

SYNOPSIS
Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to take the testimonies
of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper Philippine consular authorities. The trial court denied the motion, but
the Court of Appeals allowed the same.
The only reason why respondent was seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses was to foreclose any objection to the
admissibility of two defense exhibits which had already been admitted. Further, the evidence sought to be obtained through the
deposition-taking would be superfluous as there are exhibits of the same species previously introduced and admitted in evidence by
the trial court. Hence, the same would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and will not reasonably add to the
persuasiveness of the evidence already in hand. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Here, the Court found no indication of grave abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.

G.R. No. 133154 December 9, 2005

JOWEL SALES, Petitioner, vs. CYRIL A. SABINO, Respondent.

FACTS:
On February 20, 1995, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Pasig City, Metro Manila, respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended
complaint for damages against, among others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which
ultimately caused the death of respondent’s son, Elbert. Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo,
notified the defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC - Pasig City. On
December 27, 1995 and resumed on January 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the
Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even
lengthily cross-examined the deponent. Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a Formal Offer of
Exhibits; petitioner opposed the admission and even asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that the
jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, were not complied with. The trial court
admitted, among other evidence, and his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the court, petitioner went on certiorari to
the Court of Appeals, but was also denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the
respondent when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to whether or not at
the time his deposition was offered in evidence is in the Philippines
2. Whether or not the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all objections in
connection therewith.
HELD:
1.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions.- At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance
with any of the following provisions:
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the
witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that
the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exception circumstances exist and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court,
to allow the deposition to be used.
While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand.
Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in
open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being
called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5)
exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the
witness is out of the Philippines.
2.
But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the
deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In
participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not
assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he
participated in the taking thereof.

BRIBONERIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages against private respondent Gertrudes
B. Mag-isa. He alleged that he acquired a parcel of land through his hard-earned salaries abroad in which he built a residential
house. And that his wife sold the house to Mag-isa without authority. He was then denied use and enjoyment of his properties which
caused him mental anguish and sleepless nights.
Mag-isa, in due time, filed her answer admitting in part and denying in part of the alleged facts set forth in the complaint.
At some time, petitioner served on the counsel of respondent a request for admission. After more than 10 days, respondents filed
their answer denying in part and admitting in part the request for admission. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the 10 day period fixed in the request
and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts
and documents.
ISSUE:
Is respondent deemed to have impliedly admitted the material and relevant facts?
Was there a valid service of request for admission?
HELD:
The material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which
private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already
admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already
denied in his answer to the complaint.
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be served directly upon the party. The
general rule as provided for under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not
upon party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case
in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform
procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's case. However, the general rule cannot apply
where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service must be made directly
upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid. She, therefore, cannot be deemed to have
admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission

[G.R. No. 125383. July 2, 2002.]

FORTUNATA N. DUQUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ENRICO BONIFACIO and DRA. EDNA BONIFACIO,
respondents.
MARCOSA D. VALENZUELA, assisted by her husband, ABELARDO VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES EDNA BONIFACIO and ENRICO BONIFACIO, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners Duque and Valenzuela separately filed a complaint against respondent spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio alleging that
respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain checks in exchange for cash but upon presentation of the
checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same were dishonored; that notwithstanding repeated demands, respondents
refused and continued to refuse to honor said checks or replace it with cash.

In their Answers, the respondent spouses specifically denied petitioners' allegations in the complaints. Thereafter, petitioners filed a
Request for Admission and furnished to counsel for respondent spouses specifically requesting the admission of three things: (1) that
respondent spouses negotiated with petitioners for valuable consideration certain checks; (2) that respondent Edna Bonifacio
executed promissory notes in favor of petitioners acknowledging therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of P270,000.00 and
P432,000.00; and (3) that petitioners sent demand letters on November 28, 1987 which respondent spouses allegedly received on
December 5, 1987.

For failure of the respondent spouses to respond to the aforementioned request, the Regional Trial Court held that there was an
implied admission by the respondent spouses of the allegations in the request for admission. Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor
of petitioners.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated and set aside the decision of the trial court ruling that the matters of which admission by
the respondent spouses was being sought in the petitioners' separate requests for admission pertained to those already denied by
the former in their respective Answers to the two Complaints filed against them. The appellate court also held that there was no
service of the request for admission on respondent spouses as required by the Rule. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the failure of the private respondents to respond to the request for admission by the petitioners is tantamount to
an implied admission under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
(2) whether or not there was personal service of the request on private respondents.

Held:

First Issue:
The prevailing rule in 1988 at the time when the request for admission was made is Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
"Sec. 1. Request for admission — At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party 20 a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or
of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request
unless copies have already been furnished.
"Sec. 2. Implied admission — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the
court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.

"Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for
resolution."
This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant
matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse side thereby facilitating an
amicable settlement of the case or expediting the trial of the same. However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the
proceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

In the present case, petitioners requested the admission of three things: first, that respondents negotiated with the plaintiffs for
valuable consideration the checks annexed to the respective complaints; second, that defendant Edna N. Bonifacio signed separate
promissory notes, both dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging that she is indebted to plaintiff Fortunata Duque in the sum of Two
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Marcosa Valenzuela in the sum of Four Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00); and third, that the plaintiffs in the two (2) cases sent letters of demand commonly dated November
28, 1987 which the latter received on December 5, 1987. The first matter sought to be admitted by the petitioners pertains to the
checks supposedly negotiated by the respondents to the plaintiffs. As correctly observed by the appellate court, these are the same
checks referred to and annexed in the Complaint, to wit: . . . . The corresponding denial thereof by the respondents in their Answer
reads: . . . Clearly therefrom, to require an admission on this point even though it was already denied in the Answer would be
superfluous.

As expounded by this Court in Po vs. Court of Appeals: "A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted
by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in
his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with
the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, 'pointless, useless' and 'a mere redundancy.'

Second Issue:

On the second matter requested, petitioners sought the admission of respondents that Edna Bonifacio executed promissory notes in
favor of the petitioners acknowledging therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P270,000.00) and Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00). The appellate court held that the allegation of the
private respondents in their Answers that "they do not owe that much" is sufficient and does not necessitate a reply to the
admission. To this we disagree. The request for admission pertains to promissory notes while the allegation quoted by the appellate
court simply refers to the amount allegedly owed by the respondents, not to the promissory notes which in the first place wer e not
mentioned in the Complaint of petitioners.

However, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the observations of the Court of Appeals that the request for admission regarding
the alleged promissory notes is defective for failure of petitioners to attach copies of said notes to the request for admission; and
that private respondents were not previously furnished copies of the same.

Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 1 of Rule 26 which provides that a party may serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request; and that copies of the documents should be delivered with the request unless copies have already been
furnished. Except for the bare allegation of the petitioners that they also furnished private respondents said promissory notes, their
requests do not show that there was indeed such previous or simultaneous service of the said documents on the petitioners.

The petitioners claim that respondents were personally served requests for admission as required by the Rules; and that granting
that they were not, service on the counsel would be sufficient. Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G.
Domingo, Jr. was furnished copies of the requests. This is not sufficient compliance with the Rules. As elucidated by the Court in the
Briboneria case: "The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 ( now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that
all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon the party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party
and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The
purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a
party's case.
 However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such
cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid."
Consequently, the requests for admission made by the petitioners were not validly served and therefore, private respondents cannot
be deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary judgment
rendered by the RTC has no legal basis to support it.

[G.R. No. 172835. December 13, 2007.]

AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PENNSWELL, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. On the other
hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals,
solvents, and special lubricants.

On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner's total
outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of
the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money.

In its Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular, petitioner
alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items. Said items were
misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had
previously purchased from respondent.

Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and
respondent, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However,
petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which
later became the subject of respondent's Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel 10 respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and
chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-
Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound. 11 It appears that petitioner had earlier
requested the Philippine Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent's
goods. RTC granted the petition.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical
components sought because the matter is confidential and would constitute as a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to
divulge. The RTC gave credence to respondent's reasoning, and reversed itself.

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT'S PRODUCTS
ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.

RULING: Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

 The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent's special lubricants are trade secrets within the
contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and selling of,
and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited to
industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar
preparations, among others.

It is clear that the manufacture and production of respondent's products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In
the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its
investments may not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner's defense against a
collection for a sum of money.

By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent's
production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondent's competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple
respondent's business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical compositions of respondent’s lubricants are opened
to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the
probable demise of respondent's business. Respondent's proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and
expended money and effort on is incontrovertible.
Supreme Court’s conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent. Not only
do the SC acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive advantage; they also find that there is clearly a glaring
intent on the part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not available to the prying public.

 Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents or things upon a showing of good
cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its entire provision reads:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. — Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore, the court
in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession
or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object
or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things
that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the
ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or
inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be
received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party's possession, custody or control.

Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between
husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication between physician and patient; (d)
communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters
that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in
tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.

SC ruled against the petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is
substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its
products.

Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, the Court has declared that intellectual and industrial property rights cases are not
simple property cases. Without limiting such industrial property rights to trademarks and trade names, the Supreme Court has ruled
that all agreements concerning intellectual property are intimately connected with economic development. The protection of
industrial property encourages investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human
needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and industrialization, and thereby brings about social and economic progress. Verily, the
protection of industrial secrets is inextricably linked to the advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.

Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a privilege not to disclose one's trade
secrets. Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the
right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.

The privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. However, the SC finds
reason to except respondent's trade secrets from the application of the rule on privilege. The revelation of respondent's trade secrets
serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money.

Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Sps. Mangudadatu

Panganiban; Aug. 16, 2004

Nature

Rule 45- Petition for Review

Facts
-(Respondent) Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for damages against (Petitioner) Jonathan Landoil International
Co., Inc. ("JLI"). Initially, petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer.

-Parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial, had led the trial court to declare it in default.

-Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision dated June 19, 2001. It filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. It was denied.

-Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. Later on counsels of petitioner, Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance. The law firm Ong
Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.

-Petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice regarding the public auction sale of its properties. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA on
January 14, 2002, a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.

-Petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement). Attached to this pleading were two separate
Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of
record. The Certification pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a copy of the Order intended for him. The Certification as
regards Atty. Mario stated that he had personally received his copy on December 21, 2001.

-Petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that
petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.

-RTC Petition for Prohibition denied.

-Motion to Quash denied by RTC.

-CA denied the petition.

The Issues

1. WON the Motion for New Trial should be dismissed due to the failure of the petitioner and their counsel to appear during pre-trial

2. WON their really is a receipt of the order of the court by petitioner’s counsel

3. WON the RTC/CA erred in declaring that the taking of the depositions of petitioner’s witnesses was improper

Held

1. Yes, it should be dismissed.

A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason
of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial; and that, if presented, would probably alter the result.

Grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial (i.e. illness and withdrawal). Counsels are not the only ones required to attend the pretrial. The appearance of the
plaintiff and the defendant is also mandatory (Rule 18.4).

-The rationale for this requirement of compelling the parties to appear personally before the court is to exhaust the possibility of reaching a compromise. While notice of the pretrial is
served on counsels, it is their duty to notify the party they represent.

-The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is therefore unacceptable. It should have also justified its own absence therefrom. Having
failed to do so, it had no valid ground to request a new trial.

-Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal is granted, lawyers are deemed to be the representatives of their clients. As far as the trial
court was concerned, he continued to be petitioner’s counsel of record, since no withdrawal of appearance had yet been granted.

-Under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to be considered "as in default," but "to allow the plaintiff to present
evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof." This procedure was followed in the instant case.

-To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s remedy is a motion for reconsideration. An affidavit of merit is not required to be
attached to such motion, because the defense has already been laid down in the answer. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability
of a motion for reconsideration. But the failure to file the latter motion -- without due cause -- is a factor in determining whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the
ex parte presentation of evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts, petitioner did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration. The
lapse of time -- from the August 8, 2000 pretrial to the September 5, 2000 ex parte presentation of evidence, and until the June 19, 2001 promulgation of the Decision -- shows the
negligence of petitioner and its counsels. Prior to the trial court’s resolution of the case, it had ample opportunity to challenge the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence.
Too late was the challenge that it made after the Decision had already been rendered.

2. Yes, they received the order.

There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. On this basis, we have ruled that the postmaster’s certification prevails over the mere denial of a
lawyer. Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial.

SC notes the trial court’s finding that petitioner received a copy of respondents’ September 24, 2001 Motion for Execution and November 21, 2001 Motion for Early Resolution, as well as
the trial court’s September 28, 2001 Order submitting the Motion for Execution for resolution. Given these unrebutted facts, it is unbelievable that petitioner did not know that a ruling on
the Motion for New Trial had already been issued. At the very least, the Motions filed by respondents should have alerted it of such issuance. Otherwise, it could have opposed their
Motion for Execution by requesting the RTC to resolve the Motion for New Trial; or the trial court could have been informed by petitioner of the latter’s non-receipt of the Order resolving
respondents’ Motion.

3. Yes they erred but the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its February 21, 2001 Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other evidence --
that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial
of receipt.

-A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an
answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh
unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law." Limitations would arise, though, if
the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:

-1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. x x x

-2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.

-3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.

-4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court.

-5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.

-6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial.

-7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we
allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.

Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-
trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and
usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge." Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents
have intended. However, it is well-settled that this discretion is not

unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be
attained.

When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed. This was the
primary concern in Northwest Airlines v. Cruz. In that case, the ends of justice would be better served if the witness was to be brought to the trial court to testify. The locus of the oral
deposition therein was not within the reach of ordinary citizens, as there were time constraints; and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare. In People v.
Webb, the taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already admitted the Exhibits on which the witnesses would have testified.

The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those
for excluding evidence if the witness were present and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. As a rule, depositions should be allowed, absent any
showing that taking them would prejudice any party.

Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances specified under Rule 23 Sec. 4 the case involved a
circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of
hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As
previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DE LOS REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-27263; March 17, 1975
FACTS:
Petitioners Rogelio de los Reyes and Aurelio de los Reyes filed two separate complaints against the herein private
respondents with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Before the trial court set a date for the hearing, petitioners served
notice upon the counsel of respondent Wong Chu King that they would take the deposition of defendant-respondent Wong
Chu King, upon oral examination, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 24 of the revised Rules of Court, on August
8, 1966 at 9:30 a.m., at the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Makati, Rizal, the oral examination to continue from day to
day until completed. Petitioners caused the issuance by the trial court, through its Deputy Clerk of Court, of a subpoena to
defendant-respondent Wong Chu King and a subpoena duces tecum to the President of respondent La Campana Fabrica
de Tabacos, Inc., or his duly authorized representative, commanding them to appear on said date, time, place before the
Notary Public mentioned in the Notice To Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination.
On August 8, 1966, the date set for the taking of the deposition, at around 10:00 a.m. while counsel for the petitioners was
waiting for the prospective deponent in the Office of the Notary Public before whom the deposition would be taken, the
counsel for petitioners received from one of the lawyers for the private respondents an Ex Parte Urgent Motion asking the
trial court to relieve the defendants-respondents from attending the taking of the deposition scheduled on the same date
and for the court to provide safeguards for the immediate return of all documents produced or examined right after any
day's proceeding. Petitioners filed a motion citing defendants-respondents for contempt for their failure to appear during
the scheduled taking of deposition and an Opposition to the ex-parte urgent motion.
While the ex-parte urgent motion and the motion for contempt were still pending resolution by the trial court, private
respondents filed their Motion To Set Civil Cases Nos. 9306 and 9307 for trial. Petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion to set and prayed for the issuance of a judgment by default against the defendants-respondents.
The trial Judge denied the motion to declare the defendants-respondents in default and in contempt of court and at the
same time directed the plaintiffs-petitioners to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court would determine the
date when the deposition could be held and taken.
On October 12, 1966, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against
the Order insofar as it directly the herein petitioners to submit written interrogatories before it could determine the date of
the taking of the deposition of herein respondent Wong Chu King. In a decision promulgated February 8, 1967, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners maintain that under the Rules of Court, a party is authorized to take the testimony of any person, whether a
party to the case or not, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories after the filing of the answer without
need for a leave of court. The choice of whether the deposition be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
the petitioners aver, depends on the party exercising such right. Considering the benefits and advantages of an oral
examination over that of written interrogatories, the petitioners chose the former. Petitioners now claim that the Court of
Appeals erred in not holding that the questioned Order subjects the taking thereof to the leave of court and, therefore, the
petitioners claim, the issuance of said order was without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that although the right of a party to take the deposition of any person, whether a
party or not, upon oral examination or written interrogatories exists in our jurisdiction, the said right is not unfettered or
absolute. The use of this right by any party is subject to sound restriction in the discretion of the court. The respondents
maintain that the taking of deposition for purposes of discovery, being merely one of the remedies that may be availed of
only as a legitimate aid to litigation, should be controlled by the court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or authority when he issued the Order directing the
plaintiffs to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court could definitely determine the date when the deposition
would be held.
RULING:
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' view that the choice as to the mode of taking the testimony of a deponent, whether
upon oral examination or written interrogatories, rests exclusively upon the party exercising such right. If the theory
advanced by the petitioners were to be adopted, the exercise of this right is bound to be abused and utilized for
harassment. It is for this reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24, of the Rules of Court, were incorporated to serve as
safeguards and protection from abuse. A trial Judge must possess certain measure of control over the right of parties in
the taking of depositions in order to prevent abuse. Under Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the court in which the action is
pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently the trial
court exercises a certain degree of discretion in connection with the taking of a deposition.
Therefore, the trial Judge in the present case neither exceeded his jurisdiction nor abused his discretion when he issued the
questioned Order directing that written interrogatories be submitted before determining the date when the deposition would
be taken.

Ayala Land v. Tagle GR No. 153667,

11 August 2005

FACTS:

Civil Case No. 931-94 for nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties, Cancellation of Annotations on
Transfer Certificates of Title and Damages was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite City, by
ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) against Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI),
Emerito B. Ramos, Jr., et al.


In its complaint, ASB alleged that on 21 May 1994, EMRASON, a real estate company which owns real estate
properties in Dasmariñas, Cavite City, with a total area of 372 hectares, whose chairman and president is
Emerito M. Ramos, Sr., with his wife, Susana B. Ramos, and children as stockholders, entered into a Letter-
Agreement with ASB for the conditional sale of sixty-five percent (65%) of the said land for a consideration of
P400,000,000.00 payable in five installments. However, ASB, through its president, Mr. Luke C. Roxas,
received a letter from the children of Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing him that on 18 May 1994, they entered into
a Contract to Sell said real estate properties with ALI. ASB confirmed the contract of the Ramos children with
ALI when it found out that the same was annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title of the real estate
properties in dispute. This prompted ASB to file the Complaint dated 13 June 1994 before the trial court. ALI,
thereafter, filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
 Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a
Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., citing Section
4(c), Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and
although he was of sound mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s
behalf in the course of the trial on the merits. The motion was granted, however this was questioned by ALI
sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the best-evidence rule, rule on presentation
of secondary evidence, incompetence of the deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation of evidence, and
testimonies not forming part of the offer.

ISSUE + RULING

Whether the alleged deposition of the witness Emerito Ramos Sr. is admissible under the rules. YES

In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr’s deposition chiefly because of his
advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court.


This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every objection of ALI contained in its
Motion dated 30 January 1995 and ruled on every single objection in the Order dated 05 May 1995 and these
objections were again taken up in the Order of the trial court dated 07 September 1995. On this point, we find
no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the trial court. It has been repeatedly held that
the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to
make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged,
 and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.

G.R. NO. 152375, Dec. 13, 2011

Republic of the Phils. vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al.

FACTS:
A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed
as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by
Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing him to account for the
alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights. The present respondents were
not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is
plainly not a party thereto.

In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of
the Philippine Embassy in London, England. The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his
affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation
for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A stock.

As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in Civil
Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because
he was not available for cross-examination. The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead
made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the case for the purpose of
introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane
deposition. This was however denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was
filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied for the
reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality and
in refusing to re-open the case.
2. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of judicial notice.

RULING:
1. The court ruled that the SB’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. The SB’s ruling, although an erroneous legal
conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.

The 1998 resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still premature since the rules of court
provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient
in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1 st motion, the
presentation of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1st motion should have been for the
petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane deposition. But
upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners should have already questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively
foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the
petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded
to file its 3rd motion.

However, the court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to
reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition. The Rules of
Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested
its case provided that the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly
discovered evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented
their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s
introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.”

2. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply
with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different
proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing otherwise, the
adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness;
it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be
introduced as evidence provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later
proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity between the opponents
of the two cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, the deposition is admissible only against
him as an ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case No. 0130.

Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion between the two cases. It is
the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the
relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Sps. Afulugencia v. Metrobank (February 5, 2014)

Sps. Afulugencia v Metrobank (2014)

Petition: Review on Certiorari

Petitioner: Sps. Vicente Afulugencia and Leticia Afulugencia

Respondent: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. and Emmanuel Ortega, Clerk of Court- RTC and Ex-officio Sheriff Bulacan

Ponencia: Del Castillo

DOCTRINE:
Section 6, Rule 25: of the Rules of Court provides that "a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision
seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.

FACTS:

1. Sps Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega
(Ortega) before the RTC of Malolos City.
1. METROBANK: is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws
2. ORTEGA: is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
2. After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’
initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the
documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
3. The Motion contained a notice of hearing written as follows:
NOTICE

Metrobank: Says that there was lack of a proper notice of hearing; petitioners failed to set a date and time for the hearing
=Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 Metrobank’s officers – who are considered
adverse parties – cannot be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with
written interrogatories;

Sps Afulugencia: Reply: lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that applying the
principle of liberality; Leave of court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s officers’ depositions;

Subpoena is actually favorable to Metrobank snce the will be able to present testimony/ evidence of its officers and that the
documents are relevant as to prove if their obligations were indeed paid in full- this will settle the issue relative to the validity
or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

4. RTC: issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum: The motion
lacks merit.
1. Motion under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason of its failure to comply with the
requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15
2. Bank and officers are adverse parties- cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are first
served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25
5. Sps Afulugencia: Filed an MR: pleading for leniency in the application of the Rules; defective notice was cured by the
filing of Metrobank’s Opposition which is tantamount to notice. Metrobank’s officers – who are the subject of the
subpoena – are not party-defendants= not adverse party; they are individuals separate and distinct from Metrobank, the
defendant corporation being sued in the case.
6. MR opposed by Metrobank: procedural defect of improper notice of hearing, Rule is MANDATORY AND MUST BE
STRICTLY OBSERVED.
1. Rule 25: none of its officers may be summoned to testify for petitioners unless written interrogatories are first
served upon them. Corporation may act only through its officers and employees, they are to be considered as
adverse parties in a case against the corporation itself.
7. TC: Order April 2007, DENIED petitioners’ MR:
1. Even if the motion is given consideration by relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, NO LAXITY
is allowed to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25: requiring prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties.
2. Persons sought to be subpoenaed are the officers of the bank, in effect the very persons who represent the
interest of the latter and necessarily fall within the coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
8. CA: Sps Afulugencia filed Petition for Certiorari: Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a
litigated motion
1. It does not seek relief but only for the issuance of a mere process
i. Motion then need not be heard
2. Insists on liberality and base the case on its merits and not on technicalities.
 3.Rule 2121 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions
i. Their motion sought is to appear and testify in court and not to obtain their depositions, the
requirement of notice may be dispensed with.
4. Rule 132 Section 10,22: do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
9. CA: DISMISSED petitioners Petition for lack of merit.
1. Petitioner's Motion is a litigated motion, as it seeks to require the adverse party, Metrobank’s officers, to appear
and testify in court as petitioners’ witnesses. A proper notice of hearing, addressed to the parties and specifying
the date and time of the hearing, was required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule 15
2. Motion to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, (Rule 25): Failure to serve written interrogatories
upon the opposing party; latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court or to render a
deposition pending appeal. -Pets foreclosed their right to present the bank’s officers as their witnesses.
3. Section 6: By failing to use the opportunity to inquire upon the facts pets should not be allowed to later on burden
Metrobank with court hearings or other processes.
10. Sps Afulugencia: Filed MR

ISSUE:

1. W/N CA committed reversible errors in requiring notice and hearing (Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 15) for a mere motion for
subpoena of respondent bank’s officers when such requirements apply only to deposition under Sec. 6, Rule 25
2. W/N CA committed (reversible) error in holding that the petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to
respondent bank’s officers before they can be subpoenaed.

Petitioners’ Arguments

1. Court should allow the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, since the Motion is not a litigated
motion. Motion which is subject to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an application for
relief other than a pleading; since no relief is sought, the hearing and notice requirements may be done away with.
2. Adorio v. Hon. Bersamin: Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties
to the action since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents
subpoenaed once they are presented.
3. Rules should be liberally construed in their favor, and that Metrobank’s filing of its Opposition be considered to have
cured whatever defect the Motion suffered from.
4. View that the officers, mere employees, of Metrobank- do not comprise the adverse party covered by the rule and may
be called to testify for them.

Respondents’ Arguments

1. Metrobank in a Comment: Motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum is a litigated motion
a. Directed toward its officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence would affect it as the adverse party.
Lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper.
b. As Officers, they themselves are the adverse parties; cannot be compelled to testify in the absence of prior
written interrogatories; they are not ordinary witnesses

HELD: Petition Denied

PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

1. Metrobank was NOTIFIED of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a
timely Opposition. The filing of the Opposition CURED technical defect of lack of notice.
2. Case of Adorio: CANNOT BE APPLIED.
a. Request for subpoena was sought against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal case.
b. Situation is different here, as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the
calling party’s main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise
the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant consequences that affect the interests of the
adverse party, as will be shown below.
3. In civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served (Rule 25)
 a. Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories: Unless allowed by the court for good cause shown
and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by
the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
4. REASON FOR REQUIRING RULE:
a. If a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or
other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to
weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony,
which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
b. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry
to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it
takes the latter to the stand.
c. It protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment. It also prevents fishing expedition
or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a
dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for
evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases.
5. It is IMPROPER: To call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present
their documents as part of their principal documentary evidence.
a. Metrobank's officers are considered as adverse parties since the corporation acts through them
b. Officers as their main witnesses or to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own is like building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof
and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank;