COMELEC

[G.R. No. 162731-32. April 13, 2004]

CHAVEZ vs. COMELEC

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 13 2004.

G.R. No. 162731-32 (Melchor Chavez vs. Commission on Elections, REPORMA, represented by its Chairman,
Renato S. de Villa, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, represented by its President, Raul S. Roco; REPORMA,
represented by its Chairman, Renato S. de Villa, and PROMDI, represented by its President, Lito Osmeña and
Atty. Francisco Chavez.)

In the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Melchor
Chavez assails the Joint Resolution dated 18 February 2004 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
First Division in SPA Nos. 03-0321 and 03-033,2 declaring petitioner a nuisance candidate and disqualifying
him from running for Senator in the forthcoming national elections in May 2004. Likewise assailed is the
Order of the COMELEC En Banc dated 26 March 2004 declaring the 18 February 2004 Joint Resolution as
final and executory.

On 15 December 2003, petitioner filed with the COMELEC his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Senator in the national elections in May 2004. He alleges that he is one of the senatorial
candidates of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

On 30 December 2003, respondent Francisco I. Chavez filed his COC also for the position of Senator. He is
running under the Alyansa ng Pag-asa, the coalition of respondents REPORMA, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO
and PROMDI.3

Meanwhile, on 22 December 2003, REPORMA, represented by its President, Renato S. de Villa, filed with
the COMELEC a Petition seeking the cancellation of petitioner's COC and his disqualification as a candidate
for senator.4 On the same day, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, represented by its President, Raul S. Roco, and
PROMDI, represented by its President, Lito Osmeña, also filed a similar Petition with the COMELEC. They
were joined by REPORMA in their petition.5 Both Petitions contended that petitioner's COC should be
cancelled and that he should be disqualified from running as senator in the May 2004 elections because: (1)
petitioner filed his COC merely to cause confusion among the voters, to the prejudice of Francisco I.
Chavez; and (2) petitioner has no capacity to mount a creditable nationwide campaign.6

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that respondents REPORMA, AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO and PROMDI have no legal personality to file their respective Petitions. He pointed out
that when respondents filed their Petitions on 22 December 2003, Francisco I. Chavez had not yet filed his
COC with the COMELEC; hence, it is not he, but Francisco I. Chavez who, by his later filing of his COC,
should be declared as a nuisance candidate. Petitioner further argued that as a veteran journalist and
broadcaster, and as member of various civic, religious, national and international organizations, he had the
capacity to mount a nationwide campaign.7
The KBL filed an Intervention/ Comment to the Petitions and argued that petitioner cannot be considered a
nuisance candidate because he is a nominee of the KBL, a political party with a significant number of
followers nationwide.8

On 18 February 2004, the COMELEC issued the assailed Joint Resolution declaring petitioner a nuisance
candidate and disqualifying him from running for senator in the May 2004 elections. The COMELEC noted
that petitioner had been previously disqualified from running for senator in 1992 and 1998, and that when
he ran for senator in 2001, he garnered a measly two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. It found that
petitioner lacked the financial capability and the political machinery to mount a nationwide campaign.9

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC on 23 February
2004. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Calendar Appealed Case for Hearing by the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division elevated the entire records of the cases to the Banc for proper disposition.

REPORMA, ASKYON DEMOKRATIKO, and PROMDI filed with the COMELEC En Banc a Motion to Strike
Out Petitioner's Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration.

On 26 March 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dismissing petitioner's Notice of Appeal and/or
Motion for Reconsideration because the same was not verified as required under Rules 7 and 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and declaring the Joint Resolution dated 18 February 2004 as final and
executory.10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on 31 March 2004. He alleges that the COMELEC First
Division erred in: (1) declaring him a nuisance candidate; (2) not dismissing outright respondent political
parties' Petitions on the ground that they are not the real parties in interest in the cases filed therewith; and
(3) not declaring that respondent political parties engaged in forum shopping, in filing their Petitions with
the COMELEC. Petitioner also claims that the COMELEC En Banc erred in holding that the Joint
Resolution had already become final and executory.

The instant petition is denied outright for error in the mode of review.

Petitioner should have filed a petition under Rule 64 or a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not the present petition for review under Rule 45.

Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit (COA).11 In form, a petition under this Rule is akin to a Rule 43 petition in that errors
of fact or law may be alleged therein.12

Like Rule 43, Rule 64 provides that findings of fact of the Commission whose judgment, final order or
resolution is assailed, which are supported by substantial evidence are binding and shall not be reviewable
on appeal.13

A petition under Rule 64 must be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under
the rules of procedure of the COMELEC or COA, shall interrupt the thirty-day period. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition under Rule 64 within the remaining period, but in no case
less than five (5) days from notice of denial.14

A petition under Rule 64 must also be verified and must include the Commission concerned as a party
respondent.15
As distinguished therefrom, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 raises as a ground lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, of any
tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-judicial functions in performing the act assailed therein.16

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order or resolution.17

A petition filed under Rule 65, like a Rule 64 petition, requires the inclusion as a party respondent the
tribunal which issued the assailed judgment, order or resolution.18

Even if the Court treats the instant petition as one filed under Rule 64 or under Rule 65, the same should
still be denied for failure to show that the COMELEC committed errors of fact and/or law, or that it acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in declaring that petitioner is a nuisance candidate and in ordering his disqualification to run
as senator in the forthcoming national elections in May, and the cancellation of his COC.

Section 6919 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the COMELEC, motu proprio, or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate and to refuse to give due
course to his or her COC or to cancel one already filed if it is shown that: (1) the candidate's COC has been
filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, (2) the COC has been filed to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of names of the registered candidates, and (3) where other circumstances
show that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for office.

COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 also specifies the instances where the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a COC:

SEC. 6. Motu Proprio Cases. - The Commission may, at any time before the
election, motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy of any
candidate for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-list:

I. The grounds:

a. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess the constitutional and legal
qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be elected;

b. Candidate who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of candidacy to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute;

c. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy could cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of names and surnames with other candidates; and

d. Candidates who have no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy had been filed or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack of such bona fide intention,
such as:

d. 1 Candidates who do not belong to or are not nominated by any registered political party of national
constituency;

d.2 Presidential, Vice-Presidential [candidates] who do not present running mates for vice-president,
respectively, nor senatorial candidates;
d.3 Candidates who do not have a platform of government and are not capable of waging a nationwide
campaign. (Emphasis supplied.)

The COMELEC's ruling is based on facts which lead to no other conclusion but that petitioner is indeed a
nuisance candidate:

Records show that [petitioner] had twice been disqualified and his certificate of candidacy cancelled. First,
in 1992, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 104704 disqualified him from running for senator. Then in 1998, the
Commission did not give due course to his certificate of candidacy.

In 2001, he ran as the official candidate of the KBL, However, he showed a dismal performance as he
obtained a vote of only 2% of the total votes cast.

Melchor Chavez has, in the past, not shown any capability for a decent campaign. Now, he presents no
significant credentials for a better capability in this election. He is not even an official candidate of a
political party since the nomination by KBL was no accepted by him. He is wanting in financial support for
a nationwide campaign. He has no political machinery to count on.20

The rationale for the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not demonstrated a bond fide intention to run for office is the State's compelling interest in ensuring
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the elections. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions
should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant
modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot -
the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic
[process].21

ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the petition for pursuing the wrong mode of review and
for lack of merit.
COA

G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS;
AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
ANTIQUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the Reconsideration 1 of the resolution promulgated
on August 19, 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Courtdue to its non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for:(a) the late
filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. 3

Antecedents

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangaysecretaries, treasurers and tanod,
the former obligating ₱4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the
payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU
appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On November 15, 2012, the COA
issued its decision denying the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local
Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group
insurance coverage for barangayworkers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, 7 and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial being received by
the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was
dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of
the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

Issues

In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the
reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals; 11 and that the
petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified declaration; and prays that the declaration
attached to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the
Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by previously submitting a compact disc (CD) containing the petition for
certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it showed and proved grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed decision.

Ruling

We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.

Petitioner did not comply with

the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with the
requirement on proof of service.

The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of
Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered
mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry
receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance withthe rule is
mandatory, such that

there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr.,
who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos.
70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the
petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt
numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended
the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with
the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did
not comply with the requirement of proof of service.15

II

Fresh Period Ruleunder Neypes

did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for
review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the
period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.16

The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule
64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or
of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that
the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the
challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the
notice of denial.20

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days
from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received
the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed
the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period ruleshould apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner
herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under
Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

III

Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.

The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, to wit: (1)
the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a year before
promulgating its decision, and more thana year in resolving the motion for reconsideration, in
contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an
interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution,
COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local
Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.25
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.26

A close look indicates that the petition for certioraridid not sufficiently disclose how the COA committed
grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of
discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither
arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator
Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government Codein the Legislature,
expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was
the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the
Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further reason
of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA
acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

IV

Petitioner and its counsel

exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members

The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance with the
requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even "a perfunctory scrutiny" of the petition for certiorari
and its annexes could have easily shown that it had attached an affidavit of service to the petition. It goes
on to make the following statements, viz:

25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes up to its last
page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of the proof of service; 26. In turn, the
same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this Honorable Court who took the observation
from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in fact, it is not;27

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill consequences of their
own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on others like the
Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language that accused the
Court and its Members of ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication.

We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court and its Members.
We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was unfounded and undeserved. As
this resolution earlier clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a proper affidavit of service.We do
not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and its counsel been humbler to accept their self-
inflicted situation and more contrite, they would have desisted from their harshness and disrespect towards
the Court and its Members. Although we are not beyond error, we assure the petitioner and its counsel that
our resolutions and determinations are arrived at or reached with much care and caution, aware that the
lives, properties and rights of the litigants are always at stake. If there be errors, they would be unintended,
and would be the result of human oversight. But in this instance the Court and its Members committed no
error. The petition bore only cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere
"perfunctory scrutiny" would not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain in writing why
they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and disrespectful language
towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show cause why he
should" not be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit; ORDERS the
petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from
notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty.
Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not be disbarred.

SO ORDERED.