Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Open Letter
Leonardo MORLINO ……………………………………………………………………… 3
Editorial
Andreea ZAMFIRA,
Does Political Europeanness Exist? Democracy and Civil Society after 1989 ……………….. 5
Articles
Michele PROSPERO, Hegel e il Concetto di Società Civile, ………………………………. 13
Gheorghe Lencan STOICA, Civil Society in Romania and Central and Eastern Europe …... 52
Daniel BARBU, Public Sphere, Citizens’ Participation and the Legacy of Communism …… 74
Florin-Ciprian MITREA, Intellectuals and Civil Society. The Polish Case ………………… 96
Gelu SABĂU, Democracy against Nationalism. The A.C. Popovici Case ……………….... 111
Cătălin-Valentin RAIU, Civil Society as Its Own Enemy: The First Romanian Christian-
Democratic Attempt ……………………………………………………………………... 130
Salvatore CINGARI, Per un’ Analisi Critica del Concetto di «Meritocrazia» come «Ideologia»
Neo-liberista ……………………………………………………………………………... 159
Victoria SPAU, Social Movements through Music and Culture. An overview ………….…. 177
Essays
Selami Ahmet SALGÜR, Need Of Intercultural Dialogue between Black Sea Countries … 189
Book Reviews
Sorin BOCANCEA, Daniel ȘANDRU (coord.), Totalitarismul. De la origini la Totalitarianism.
From origins to consequences (Adrian-Marius TOMPEA) ……………………………………... 201
Tom GALLAGHER, Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong,
(Lucian JORA) …………………………………………………………………………… 204
Jonathan POWELL, The New Machiavelli. How to Wield Power in the Modern World
(Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN) ………………………………………………………………… 210
Alexandru RADU, Politica între proporționalism și majoritarism. Alegeri și sistem electoral în România
postcomunistă (Florin GRECU) …………………………………………………………….. 214
Event
Filip STANCIU ………………………………………………………………………….. 218
Signals
Florin-Ciprian MITREA …………………………………………………………………. 222
OPEN LETTER
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South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013
Dear colleagues,
founders of South East-European Journal of Political Science,
The birth of a journal is a tangible and strong sign indicating both the
development of a community of specialists in the field and the existence of
future plans and expectations. Therefore, this initiative must be warmly and
admiratively saluted for the courage and effort of its founders. A journal of
political science like this one creates opportunities for all of us, scientists,
political elites and citizens, to think about, analyse and initiate debates
regarding the difficult aspects that have characterized our democracies in the
recent years. Maybe this journal aims to improve our life together. Hence, I
congratulate you for this, as well and send you my best wishes.
Leonardo MORLINO
Past President of the International Political Science Association
Leonardo MORLINO
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South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013
EDITORIAL
Andreea ZAMFIRA
University of South-East Europe Lumina
Abstract: Starting from the question regarding natural Europeanness and political
Europeanness, the present paper aims to open an ample discussion about the role of
intellectual traditions and political mentalities in the creation of a common European
methaphorical identity space. As it is shown by the contributors of this volume, mainly
reflected in the way that democracy, liberal State, citizens’ participation, modernity are
understood by European societies, the post’ 89 differences between East and West are
to be explained in relation to the legacy of previous regimes and local traditions of
political thought. Moving the focus to some new issues in the literature on political
science, i.e. the postdemocracy and new forms of participation, the present paper
implicitly invites us to reflect to the future of European democratic regimes, “Europe of
values” and political Europeanness.
1. INTRODUCTION
from similarly defining the “common good” or having comparable senses of public
responsibility – which are some of the reasons sustaining the already popular
discourse about a “Europe with multiple speeds”. Nonetheless, through their Union,
the European societies illustrates that the (political) will of constructing a common
destiny surpasses the differences in political culture. In the new era of postnationalism
and transnationalism, the old theses of Occidentalism and Orientalism1 are
permanently reconsidered. Nowadays, the press, civil society and citizens ask
themselves who really is better characterized by old ethno-stereotypes and centrist
labels like “Europe of the butter”, “Europe of the spirit” (Constantin Noica).
Therefore, the question now and here is: “Does political Europeanness really exist?”
1 About this process of stereotypization: Jenó SZÚCS, Les trois Europes, trans. Véronique Charaire, Gábon
Klahiczay & Philippe Thureau-Dangin, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1985; Alain MONNIER, “L’Europe de l’Est:
différente et diverse”, Population (French Edition), No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-461; Guy HERMET, Histoire des
nations et du nationalisme en Europe, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1996; Maria TODOROVA, Balcanii şi balcanismul,
Humanitas, București, 2000.
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South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013
majoritarian parties always concentrate more executive, legislative and judicial power
than the other political actors. And “Parties are not what they were once”1:
1 Philippe C. SCHMITTER, “Parties Are Not What They Were Once”, in Stefano BARTOLINI, Peter
MAIR, Identity, competition and electoral availability. The Stabilization of European electorates: 1885-1985,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 67-89.
2 Ibidem, p. 84.
3 Tony JUDT, Europa iluziilor, trans. Daciana Branea & Ioana Copil-Popovici, Polirom, Iași, 2000.
4 Olivier COSTA, Nathalie BRACK, Le fonctionnement de l’Union Européenne, Éditions de l’Université de
content of new social and political ties between old national societies1 and, at the same
time, a proof that the European elites’ interest is not limited to a precise set of
principles and objectives but they also strive to develop political Europeanness. The
question here is whether this political Europeanness represents a value in itself or it is
just a simple vehicle in the process of European imaginary construction.
3. DEMOCRACY, POSTDEMOCRACY
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPE
1 Tzvetan TODOROV, «Construire une mémoire commune», in Bronislaw GEREMEK, Robert PICHT,
Visions d’Europe, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007, pp. 335-345; Anne-Marie THIESSE, « Une mémoire commune
pour quelle vision de l’Europe ? », in Bronislaw GEREMEK, Robert PICHT, Visions d’Europe, Odile Jacob,
Paris, 2007, pp. 345-359.
2 Justine LACROIX, “Does Europe Need Common Values?: Habermas vs. Habermas”, European Journal
Prospero, in the article included in the present volume, “Hegel e il Concetto di Società
Civile”, presents civil society through Hegel’s lens. Accordingly to Prospero, Hegel
was the author who introduced the autonomous concept of civil society, analysing it
in relation with major others concepts of the political, social and juridical sciences. It
is important to mention that Hegel, among other important scholars, considered that
“the creation of the civil society belongs to the modern world”.1 In the article entitled
“Civil Society in Romania and Central and Eastern Europe”, Gheorghe Lencan Stoica
continues to explore the historical roots of this concept, adding other philosophers’
interesting ideas (Marx, Gramsci) to Prospero’s outline. Through Gramsci, Stoica
offers us a first operational definition of the civil society: “a complex network of
cultural, moral and ideological conditionings”2 preventing from statism and
dictatorship.
Maybe one of the most comprehensive definitions of civil society is the one
given by Habermas (reproduced bellow). We retain the idea that civil society is
composed by all the formal and informal representation instances struggling for
democratic principles, instances that, at a certain moment, citizens could court for
taking over the representative function of political parties in crisis3.
“Most writers on civil society agree […] that civil society has an institutional
core constituted by voluntary associations outside the sphere of the state and
the economy. Such associations range from, for example, churches, cultural
associations, sport clubs and debating societies to independent media,
academies, groups of concerned citizens, grass-roots initiatives and
organizations of gender, race and sexuality, all the way to occupational
associations, political parties and labour unions”.4
In his article cited above, relying on the theory of modern civil society, Stoica
tries to emphasize the salient distinctions between the Romanian situation and the
ones from the neighbouring countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) before
and after ’89. A significant number of explaining factors are to be found in particular
moments in the history of these countries and the author reminds us of them. He
openly manifests his adhesion to Stephen Gill’s opinion that the role of intellectuals is
fundamental in creating an alternative “collective conscience”. Daniel Barbu reopens
the Romanian case, in the article about “Public Sphere, Citizens’ Participation, and the
Legacy of Communism”. Convinced that passivity and non-participative attitudes
after ’89 are mainly inherited from the previous political period, the author attentively
examines the communist enrolling of the society during Ceaușescu’s regime. He also
examines the so called “resistance through culture”, an interesting phenomenon that,
despite its noble resonance, is found to be nothing more than a fiction or, citing the
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001.
2 Antonio GRAMSCI, Quaderni del carcere, Einaudi, Torino, 1975.
3 Philippe C. SCHMITTER, “Parties Are Not…cit.”
4 Craig CALHOUN (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, p. 453.
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author, “an almost pathological form of ethical autism when visibility was a political
burden, if not, at times, a life risk”, “a formula lacking any political and moral sense as
long as the entire culture of the five decades of Romanian totalitarianism was the
product of the ideology, and of the variable, but implacable mechanisms of
censorship”. Barbu’s final conclusion is that the “resistance through culture” was, in
fact, an “assent through culture”. In his article on “Intellectuals and Civil Society. The
Polish Case”, Florin-Ciprian Mitrea returns to intellectuals (to politically engaged
intellectuals but also to independent ones) and their situation during totalitarianism,
opting for an extraordinary case study – Poland. Mitrea’s study follows two different
conflicts and their principal stages: the conflict between the humanist intellectuals and
the communist elites, on the one hand, and, the one between left-wing intellectuals
and the Catholic writers, on the other hand. In the author’s opinion, the contours of
contemporary Polish civil society are to be decoded through the formation and
evolution of public intellectuals after ‘45.
But today’s political culture cannot be entirely understood only through the
study of the communist period. Two of our authors, Gelu Sabău and Cătălin-Valentin
Raiu, suggest we should look back in time, at some older writings on democracy that
could give us important clues about the intellectual context within which democracy
conceptually evolved. In his article, “Democracy Against Nationalism. The A.C.
Popovici Case”, Sabău draws the image of democracy viewed by the Romanian
political thinker Aurel Popovici, an important critic of democracy, modern society and
Western liberalism, who was mainly influenced by and devoted to Mihai Eminescu’s
conservative vision about politics. In the following article, “Civil Society as Its Own
Enemy: the First Romanian Christian-Democratic Attempt”, Raiu portrays “the first
artisan of Christian-democracy in the Romanian space”, namely Bartolomeu Stănescu
(the bishop of Râmnic). Considering Christianity and democracy as quasi-
synonymous, Bartolomeu Stănescu initiated a project of evangelic democracy in
interwar Romania, but this project was destined to fail: its initiator does not prove to
be consistent with its political ideas and he migrates from evangelic democracy to
organic statist authoritarianism.
From the critique of democracy and modern society of the interwar period,
Salvatore Cingari invites us to pass to a critique of neo-liberal ideology accompanying
the postdemocratic process. His article, “Per un’ Analisi Critica del Concetto di
«Meritocrazia» come «Ideologia» Neo-liberista”, focuses on a particular aspect of this
ideology, namely the use of the term of ‘meritocracy’. In his attempt to deconstruct
this concept, Cingari revisits several classical writings on democracy, postdemocracy
and liberalism, (i.e. Colin Crouch’s and Anthony Giddens’), then analysing the
contemporaneous Italian debate on meritocracy. In the last section of the article,
Roger Abravanel’s Meritocrazia occupies an important space. In Cingari’s opinion,
hegemonic neo-liberal ideology of our times is actually using the term of
“meritocracy” as a mask of inequality. The discussion about postdemocracy, a term
referring to the evolution democracy has known during the 21st century (formal
democratic institutions, non-representative elections, aristocratic tendencies, the
takeover of the public initiative by exclusivist political-economic groups, etc.), is
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South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013
strongly related to the discussion about civil society and its enemies. Through her
article entitled “Social Movements through Music and Culture – An overview”,
Victoria Spau offers an analysis of the latest theories of social movements, an
extremely interesting phenomenon gradually flourishing all over the world. This
phenomenon makes political scientists question the future role of the new forms of
democratic participation in transforming the existing models of governance.
Specialists on civil society, collective identities or collective action are particularly
interested in the issue of social movements. The creation of social networks and
movements through communication channels, cultural and artistic affinities
constitutes an ultramodern theme of reflection for social scientists. So does the issue
of interculturality, introduced in our volume through Selami Ahmet Salgür’ essay “The
Need For Intercultural Dialogue Between Black Sea Countries”.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1 Paschalis Michael KITROMILIDES, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters
in Southeastern Europe, Variorum Collected Studies Series, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007; Idem, “Orthodox
Culture and Collective Identity in the Ottoman Balkans during the Eighteenth Century”, Δελτίο Κέντρου
Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, Vol. XII, 1997-1998, pp. 81-95; Idem, “Modernization as an Ideological Dilemma
in Southeastern Europe: from National Revival to Liberal Reconstruction”, Revue des Études Sud-Est
Européennes, Vol. XXX, No. 1-2, 1992, pp. 183-189; Idem, “The Enlightenment East and West: A
Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions”, Canadian Review of
Studies in Nationalism, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 51-70.
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Bibliography
CALHOUN, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1992.
FLYVBJERG, Bent, “Habermas and Foucault: thinkers for civil society?”, The British
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, pp. 210-233.
HERMET, Guy, Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe, Éditions du Seuil, Paris,
1996.
HERMET, Guy, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ’90,
Fayard, Paris, 1993.
JUDT, Tony, Europa iluziilor, trans. Daciana Branea & Ioana Copil-Popovici, Polirom,
Iași, 2000.
KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and
Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe, Variorum Collected Studies Series,
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007.
KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, “Modernization as an Ideological Dilemma in
Southeastern Europe: from National Revival to Liberal Reconstruction”, Revue des
Études Sud-Est Européennes, Vol. XXX, No. 1-2, 1992, pp. 183-189.
KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, “The Enlightenment East and West: A
Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political
Traditions”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 1983,
pp. 51-70.
LACROIX, Justine, “Does Europe Need Common Values?: Habermas vs
Habermas”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 141, 2009, pp. 141-156.
MONNIER, Alain, “L’Europe de l’Est: différente et diverse”, Population (French
Edition), No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-461.
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ARTICLES
Michele PROSPERO
“La Sapienza” Università di Roma
Abstract: Civil society is one of the most relevant concepts defined by Hegel’s
philosophy of law. Analysing the material and symbolic layers that create the “system
of needs”, Hegel enters a dialogue with political economics and foregrounds the
constitutive features of the modern bourgeois society embodied as a distinct existential
sphere by the representative political state. The concepts of market, contract, machine,
abstract labour, the circulation of goods, ownership, land and possession are
investigated as essential elements of the social experience of modernity. They consolidate
the original tension between the public and the private, the general and the particular,
the abstract and the concrete, the form and the content.
1. TERRA E MARE
ceto agricolo a emblema di una eticità sostanziale). Hegel non condivide l'esaltazione
della campagna e l'invocazione della sua eticità naturale presente anche in Rousseau. A
suo giudizio, «i tentativi di sottrarre l'uomo alla vita generale del presente e di educarlo
in campagna (Rousseau nell'Emile) sono stati inutili, perché non può riuscire di
estraniare l'uomo dalle leggi del mondo»1. Contrariamente a una ideologia pastorale
specificamente tedesca che sopravviverà fino ad Heidegger, per Hegel (quello dei
Lineamenti) la campagna è un elemento passatistico e nostalgico, la città è invece il
moderno, il centro dello sviluppo delle libertà del soggetto. Occorre pertanto «esser
cittadino». Peraltro solo nella città è possibile coltivare il sentimento moderno della
libertà («il senso per la libertà e ordine è sorto principalmente nelle città»). Le tendenze
del moderno vengono descritte da Hegel come un intreccio di produzione astratta di
cose e libertà dei soggetti di agire e determinare le interconnessioni sociali sulla base di
volontarie transazioni. Hegel (anche se rimarca la diversità di terra con perpetuità delle
situazioni domenicali e beni mobili e la peculiarità delle discipline giuridiche dei diritti
afferenti) è in questo senso un filosofo della produttività borghese, esalta e riconosce
la funzione del lavoro di fabbrica che ha una componente alienante e ripetitiva ma che
allo stesso tempo stimola la crescita e la qualificazione. L’operaio non è solo una
macchina passiva abbandonata sulla via dell'ottusità, ma grazie alle attività coordinate
sviluppa anche attitudine alla disciplina. Ciò perché «il lavoro non è un istinto, bensì
un atto razionale»2.
In un mondo di cose astratte, come quello dell'industria, è impensabile un
diritto statico come quello esaltato dalla scuola storica e occorre procedere verso la
costruzione di una nozione omogenea di proprietà in grado di ricomprendere ogni
forma di appropriazione e utilizzazione delle risorse e dei beni. Il codice coerente e
concluso rientra tra le funzioni essenziali del moderno che reclama prevedibilità e
calcolo per il suo regolare funzionamento. Solo in un universo statico, nel quale il
bene primario è la terra, è possibile ricostruire i fondamenti lontani dei diritti e rifarsi
al valore normativo della consuetudine e reclamare una qualche compressione della
condizione di appartenenza piena del bene. I diritti consuetudinari (che rispecchiano
sovente la presenza di interessi frazionati sulla terra) presentano però l'inconveniente
di esser «saputi in un modo soggettivo e accidentale». Occorre un codice, garante di
1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 153. Hegel non pensa che la solitudine della campagna possa sottrarsi al
mondo spirituale che ha la forza sufficiente per raggiungere anche «queste remote regioni» (ivi).
Nell'Estetica, Einaudi, Torino, 1976, p. 60 egli scrive: «certo è possibile sentir ripetere molto spesso che
l'uomo deve rimanere in immediata unità con la natura; ma tale unità, nella sua astrazione, è
esclusivamente rozzezza e ferinità».
2 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese, Laterza, Bari, 1971, p. 95. Per Hegel «tanto più meccanico diventa il
lavoro, tanto meno ha valore». Il lavoro perde qualità, attitudini, competenze e «diviene un lavoro
formale, astrattamente universale». Con la divisione del lavoro si accresce il dominio sulla natura e
aumenta la comodità. «Il lavoro diventa sempre più assolutamente morto, esso diventa lavoro di
macchina, l'abilità del singolo diventa sempre più infinitamente limitata e la coscienza degli operai della
fabbrica viene degradata fino all'estrema ottusità» (ivi, p. 99). Da questi brani emerge la parzialità di un
rilievo peraltro acuto di Karl MARX (Opere filosofiche giovanili, Editore Riunti, Roma, 1977, p. 264): «Hegel
resta al punto di vista dell'economia politica moderna. Vede soltanto l'aspetto positivo del lavoro, non
quello negativo. Il lavoro che Hegel soltanto conosce e riconosce è il lavoro spirituale astratto».
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certezza e prevedibilità, che tuttavia Hegel assume in forme piuttosto limitative come
mera «raccolta» delle consuetudini1. Anche se incompleto («pretendere in un codice la
compiutezza è una pretesa che è segnatamente una malattia tedesca»2), il codice
introduce indispensabili parametri formali per regolare i tempi moderni che
pretendono l’assolutezza del dominio proprietario. La società civile richiede ben altra
dinamicità che quella consentita dal diritto consuetudinario esaltato perché «si adduce
che esso sia vivente». Per Hegel la vitalità del diritto «in nazioni civili» non consiste nel
suo legame con le vetuste consuetudini disperse nei vari luoghi ma nella sua attitudine
a «essere un sistema entro se stesso». E' proprio il moderno («infinito impeto del
tempo») a richiedere per il diritto «il sistematizzare», a amplificare «la vocazione per la
legislazione», ad affinare l'attitudine a pensare universi normativi validi e coerenti3. Il
disordine normativo, proprio delle irriflessive consuetudini, introduce parametri di
assoluta incertezza in un mondo che ha la vocazione alla prevedibilità, alla
sistematicità dei suoi movimenti quotidiani. Il carattere vivente del diritto non può
risiedere allora nella passiva registrazione di consuetudini accidentali ma nella
costruzione pensata di un ordine normativo poggiante sullo schema unitario della
proprietà come forma della appropriazione. Un oltrepassamento dei limiti
dell'intelletto giuridico non può certo essere rinvenuto nella consuetudine ma soltanto
in un recupero di ethos capace di congiungere sistema e vita, ragione e contenuto,
dover essere astratto e essere concreto, norma e bisogno.
L'introduzione di parametri etici rischia però di rompere l'esigenza di un
sistema giuridico in sé coerente che affranca la terra da usi civici, da ogni vincolo
angusto e anacronismo feudale e pensa a norme valide come conseguenza dei
connotati astratti dei tempi moderni. Lo sforzo hegeliano è di recepire i tratti formali e
razionali del diritto senza però accodarsi al modello giusnaturalistico che esalta una
proprietà senza ethos o ontologia sociale. Secondo Hegel,
«[…] l'ambito giuridico e l'ambito morale non possono esistere per sé, ed essi
devono avere l'ethos per loro sostegno e loro base, giacché al diritto manca il
momento della soggettività, che la moralità d'altro lato ha per sé ma da solo, e
così entrambi i momenti non hanno realtà per sé. Soltanto l'infinito, l'idea è
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 211. «Negare a una nazione civile la capacità di
fare un codice sarebbe uno dei più grandi affronti che potrebbe esser fatto a una nazione» (ivi). Contro la
scuola storica, legata alle consuetudini, e il diritto naturale, connesso alla vuota astrazione astorica, Hegel
tiene fermo il carattere positivo del diritto: «se vogliamo sapere che cosa è diritto, siamo rinviati anzitutto
alle leggi» (Scritti storici e politici, Laterza, Bari, 1997, p. 287).
2 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 216. «Un codice penale appartiene precipuamente al suo tempo e alla
della pratica» ossia l'economia, la morale, la politica (Mauro BARBERIS, Filosofia del diritto, Il Mulino,
Bologna, 2000, p. 74). Si può dire che «la vera filosofia del diritto hegeliana è quella contenuta nelle
pagine dedicate all'eticità» (Guido FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001, p. 80). Per un
quadro d’insieme Paolo BECCHI, Le filosofie del diritto di Hegel, Angeli, Milano, 1990.
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reale: il diritto esiste soltanto come ramo di un intero, come pianta che si
avviticchia ad un albero»1.
della «libertà sostanziale». Il dovere è per l'individuo «la sua liberazione» giacché lo sottrae al «mero
impulso naturale», e alla «soggettività indeterminata o libertà astratta» che non perviene mai alla
«determinatezza oggettiva» (par. 149).
3 Ibidem, agg. Par. 136. La nostalgia di unità affiora spesso in Hegel: «l'idea del fondamento o della
totalità, che implica il problema (molto spinoziano) della scomparsa delle entità dipendenti, finite, in
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essa non si limita ad affrancare la volontà soltanto da ciò che è esteriore, per cui il
soggetto «non è più incatenato dai fini della particolarità». Ad essere irreparabilmente
rotti sono anche i contenitori di una eticità sostanziale che lega i soggetti, conferisce
loro un senso del generale altrimenti smarrito. «L'io è nel tempo e il tempo è l'essere
del soggetto stesso»1, scrive Hegel. Il soggetto è anche accidentalità, corpo che ha
interessi, bisogni. La sfera della finitezza, delle passioni, cioè della temporalità,
rimanda alla mondanità di un soggetto finito che non ha più alcuna immediata unità
con il sostanziale dello spirito.
Anche l'Hegel romantico che aspira a qualcosa di più solido e di assoluto cui
aggrapparsi, al sostanziale che assorbe e invera la libertà meramente astratta o
l’impulso irriflessivo, non può fare a meno di osservare il passaggio di consegne
altamente simbolico tra la terra (onore, status, prestigio) e il mare (commercio,
incertezza, concorrenza). «Come per il principio della vita familiare è condizione la
terra, possessi stabili, così per l'industria l'elemento naturale che la anima verso l'esterno
è il mare»2. Non più la solida terra, come spazio insicuro da presidiare da vicini
aggressivi e comunque valore di alta rilevanza sociale, ma il liquido mare, che è
affrancato dall'ossessione del confine e mette in comunicazione soggetti lontani, è la
dimensione che meglio incarna i tempi presenti con il loto individualismo proprietario.
Famiglia e possesso sono legati alla terra come a un che di valido e sostanziale, ma la
crescita delle potenze legate al mare si rivolge minacciosa all'universo disgregato degli
antichi valori. La «brama di guadagno», che accompagna il commercio, sfida il pericolo
e «tramuta il radicarsi nella terra e nelle cerchie limitate della vita civile, i suoi
godimenti e desideri, con l'elemento della fluidità, del pericolo e del naufragio»3. La
terra evoca orizzonti limitati di esistenza, valori rigidi e angusti momenti di godimento.
Il mare esprime il massimo di incertezza e tende a ricomprendere ogni nuova forma di
un'unità che è loro alla base» (Eugène FLEISCHMANN, La logica di Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975 p. 153).
Sul rapporto tra finito e infinito cfr. Lucio COLLETTI, Il marxismo e Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1976. Sulla
logica di Hegel cfr. Nicolao MERKER, Alle origini della logica hegeliana, Fetrinelli, Milano, 1961.
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Estetica...cit., p. 1013. La finitezza del soggetto rimanda al «vuoto dei
GIOVANNI, Hegel e il tempo storico della società borghese, De Donato, Bari, 1976; Domenico LOSURDO,
Hegel e la libertà dei moderni, Riuniti, Roma, 1999; Nicolao MERKER, Marxismo e storia delle idee, Riuniti,
Roma, 1974. G. Luckàcs nega ogni passatismo di Hegel affermando che «la leggenda dei rapporti di
Hegel col romanticismo si mostra in tutta la sua nullità ed inconsistenza» (Il giovane Hegel, Einaudi, Torino,
1975, p. 14). Anche per Della VOLPE, peraltro, il giovane Hegel antintellettualista che invoca il cuore, i
sensi, non va confuso con l'entusiasmo estetico di Schiller e «il terreno su cui si muove è e resta
illuministico, e del migliore illuminismo, lessinghiano e kantiano» (Galvano Della VOLPE, Hegel romantico
e mistico, in, Opere, I, Riuniti, Roma, 1972, p. 57). Lo stesso concetto di Volksgeist, che per la scuola storica
è «un oscuro principio unitario e creativo», per Hegel è invece un concetto illuministico, non romantico
(ivi, p. 63). Solo più in là Hegel perverrà alla coscienza mistica della comunità, alla unità vivente di
intuizione e riflessione, e alla nozione di destino che pone «lo Stato al di sopra dei singoli e dei loro diritti»
(Della VOLPE, Hegel romantico…cit., p. 184). Comunque «lungi dall'esserci uno hiatus fra il periodo
mistico, presistematico, e il periodo sistematico diremo che non è dato capire il secondo nella sua genesi
intima e nel suo motivo più profondo senza il primo» (ivi, p. 199).
3 HEGEL, ivi. Hegel registra «il rapporto col mare presso le nazioni nelle quali è fiorita l'industria».
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ricchezza negli stampi della assolutezza del sistema proprietario. Ma proprio il mare
«porta terre lontane nella relazione del traffico, di un rapporto giuridico introducente il
contratto, nel quale traffico si trova in pari tempo il massimo mezzo di civiltà, e il
commercio trova il massimo mezzo di civiltà, e il commercio trova il suo significato
storico - mondiale»1.
I traffici economici diffondono ovunque, insieme alle merci a buon prezzo,
anche figure giuridiche omogenee, contratti tipo indispensabili per affrontare con le
forme più adeguate il mercato mondiale. Come è possibile dinanzi al «significato
storico - mondiale» dei nuovi commerci via mare insediarsi nel ristretto spirito di un
popolo legato alla terra? Dinanzi alla sconfinata liquidità del mare, occorre recuperare
una più appartata dimensione territoriale che assicura «una ricchezza stabile e naturale
nel suolo» ed esprime una eticità basata «sulla fede e la fiducia»2. Il mare è l'economia
illimitata, la terra diventa uno spazio politico protetto e presidiato dalle sostanze
etiche. Il contrasto è inevitabile.
La terra è in contatto con il mare, «con ciò che è sconfinato» e la disponibilità
di mare «dà origine a uno specifico tipo di vita». I monti dividono, i confini naturali
separano. Il mare invece comunica, «l'acqua è ciò che congiunge»3. Precisa Hegel: «la
terra fissa l'uomo al suolo; la sua libertà è così ristretta da un immenso complesso di
legami. Ma il mare lo conduce al di là di queste limitazioni»4.Il mare è una metafora
della libertà che spezza argini e legami, dell'iniziativa che «risveglia il coraggio» e
incrementa «il lavoro rivolto all'acquisto». Il pericolo, il rischio, il bisogno da
soddisfare con azione intrepida sono legati al mare che così determina nell'individuo
«la coscienza di una maggiore libertà ed autonomia». Il mare rende un impulso
empirico, come la tendenza alla ricchezza, un qualcosa di nobile perché legato al
coraggio, all'astuzia, alla volontà di affermazione del soggetto. Il pericolo viene
affrontato con la nave «questo cigno del mare» che proietta oltre «ciò ch'è saldo».
L'epos originario è per Hegel certo impensabile nel «nostro ordinamento industriale
moderno con le sue officine e le sue fabbriche, insieme con i prodotti che da esso
1 HEGEL, ivi. In Hegel ciò che viene attribuito «agli spiriti dei popoli, come individualità collettive, è
sottratto all'individualità, al singolo come essere umano» (Theodor ADORNO, Dialettica negativa, Torino,
Einaudi, 1980, p. 308). In Hegel tuttavia è presente il principio illuministico in base al quale «la ragione, in
quanto principio di leggi universalmente valide, si riconosce in ogni essere razionale» (Scritti teologici
giovanili, Guida, Napoli, 1989, p. 73). Anche se l'illuminismo resta impigliato nelle «astrazioni delle morte
gore razionalistiche dell'intelletto», rimane bloccato da un «formalismo del negativo» che lascia
indifferente il contenuto, esso ha comunque colto «la categoria del diritto infinito dello spirito» (HEGEL,
Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio, Utet, Torino, 1981, p. 113).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, II, Laterza, Bari, 1980, p. 496. La
camera alta è per Hegel destinata ai grandi proprietari terrieri perché solo il fondiario «è libero dalle
tentazioni dell'esercizio di un mestiere» (Karl ROSENKRANZ, “Hegel”, in Claudio CESA (a cura di), Gli
hegeliani liberali, Laterza, Bari, 1974, p. 36).
3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 217. Su questo tema cfr. Ernst
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veramente vitale del suo pensiero giuridico e sociale» (Gioele SOLARI, La filosofia politica, Laterza, Bari,
1974, p. 211). Avverte Solari (p. 254) che «la scoperta della società civile come concetto autonomo fu il
grande merito di Hegel, maggiore certamente di quello che solitamente gli si attribuisce di aver rinnovato
il sentimento e la dignità dello Stato». Anche per altri interpreti quella di società «è la grande intuizione
hegeliana che sarà il cardine di tutta la scienza sociale e politica dei nostri tempi» (Guido De
RUGGIERO, Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1972, p. 203). Nella esplorazione della società civile Hegel «coglie i
legami profondi tra i vari istituti economici, sociali e giuridici» (Guido FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto,
Laterza, Bari, 2001, III, p. 80). Sulla «duplicità» della nozione di società civile (come sistema dei bisogni,
del particolare interesse ma anche come forma dell’universalità) cfr. Emanuele CAFAGNA, La libertà nel
mondo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1998, p. 126.
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della libertà soggettiva, costituisce il punto di svolta e centrale nella differenza tra
l'antichità e l'età moderna»1. Il diritto all’autolegislazione dei soggetti privati in merito ai
particolari interessi è alla base della moderna economia di scambio che esige un diritto
proprietario astratto e non più frantumato e diviso. Hegel però non tratta
dell'individuo e della sua astratta capacità giuridica come una conseguenza della società
civile, fonda il soggetto in maniera atemporale anteponendo la titolarità astratta di
diritti all'ingresso nel mondo conflittuale della società moderna. Nel campo del diritto
privato o astratto Hegel condivide le stesse asserzioni volontaristiche e atomistiche dei
giusnaturalisti per valicare le disfunzionali situazioni di convivenza di plurimi interessi
su di un medesimo bene. Il particolare mondo delle relazioni civilistiche costruisce un
ambito del tutto peculiare di utilizzazione piena del bene che è riparato dalle asfissianti
determinazioni pubbliche o dalla moltiplicazione delle situazioni proprietarie. Non che
Hegel accetti in toto il paradigma giusnaturalista, anzi ricorda spesso la sua avversione
per «la riflessione astratta» che fissa il momento del particolare «nella sua distinzione e
contrapposizione di contro all'universale»2. Ma la sua veduta postula la presenza di una
sfera privata o civile in cui si esplica la signoria sui beni ed è ben distinta dal momento
della statualità che, essa sì, non tollera alcun ricorso alle nozioni del contratto. Hegel
cerca solo di integrare la condizione moderna della soggettività o particolarità con
l'essenziale precisazione che l'individuo che si appropria di cose - merci secondo uno
schema astratto di dominio è un prodotto storico accertabile, non il punto di partenza.
E' solo tramite la storia del superamento delle proprietà frammentate che l'individuo si
separa dalla comunità ed emerge come irriducibile diversità e come soggetto titolare
dei beni secondo i parametri romanistica della assolutezza ed esclusività. E tuttavia,
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 124. Per questo Hegel si pone alla conclusione
«del movimento moderno del diritto naturale», di questa «scienza laica» che parte «da premesse
puramente laiche» per «rendere superflue le verità rivelate» (Franz ROSENZWEIG, Hegel e lo Stato, Il
Mulino, Bologna, 1976, p. 360). In tal senso si esprime anche Norberto BOBBIO, Studi hegeliani, Einaudi,
Torino, 1983. Per Bobbio tuttavia la ragione di Hegel non ha nulla a che spartire con quella dei
giusnaturalisti (Norberto BOBBIO, Michelangelo BOVERO, Società e Stato nella filosofia politica moderna, Il
Saggiatore, Milano, 1979, p. 74). Hegel nega che un diritto naturale o razionale possa esistere senza essere
reale, storico, positivo ma parte «dal singolo e cerca di conquistare il concetto di comunità da questa
premessa». Il suo è uno sforzo di «costruire il divenire della comunità dai singoli svincolati gli uni dagli
altri» (Rosenzweig, op. cit.). Un estremo individualismo convive con esigenze comunitarie, con istanze
imponderabili come il concetto di destino. De Ruggiero (op. cit., p. 190) avverte il rischio per il soggetto di
«un conformismo che modella l'individuo nello stampo della collettività». Questo rischio è incancellabile
dal momento che lo sforzo di Hegel è quello di transitare dalla società civile «a una società integrata» (Jan
ROHLS, Storia dell'etica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995, p. 384). In generale l'intento di Hegel è «di sostituire al
predominio del sociale quello del politico» (Claudio CESA, “Fichte, i romantici, Hegel”, in Luigi FIRPO
(a cura di), Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, Unione tipografico - Editrice torinese, Torino, 1975,
IV, p. 841).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., Scrive Hegel: «in passato si credeva di dover dedurre
dalla natura dell'uomo i principi che andavano sotto il nome di diritto naturale; nello stesso tempo si
credeva che il diritto statale non corrispondesse alla natura, fosse qualcosa di non più naturale» (Scritti
storici e politici, Laterza, Bari, 1997, p. 287). Questa scissione tra ragione e istituzioni è inaccettabile: «c'è
diritto solo là dove esiste uno Stato». Per Hegel addirittura «la storia ha inizio solo con la legge e con lo
Stato» (p. 288). Niente autorizza a santificare il dato empirico giacché «non tutto ciò che esiste è reale»
(ivi).
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generale gl'incentivi all'attività degli uomini»1. I bisogni per lui sono anche delle
costruzioni artificiali e «la razionalità della moda consiste nel fatto che essa esercita sul
gusto dell'epoca il diritto di rinnovarlo continuamente»2. Ma il dato empirico quale
sollecitazione immediata è irrilevante: la volontà crea una sfera esterna solo per
esercitare la libertà infinita dell'attore.
Hegel precisa che la proprietà nei suoi risvolti di astratta signoria su
qualsivoglia bene è una manifestazione dell'idea di libertà e non una risposta a un
bisogno legato alla disponibilità di oggetti esterni. Una cosa è il bisogno che concerne
corpi concreti e poteri dall’estensione solo temporanea, altra cosa è il diritto che
riguarda astratte persone giuridiche. La priorità del bisogno lascerebbe la cosa come
un che di positivo e di per sé sussistente, oggetto di interessi frammentati e priva di
ogni giuridica determinazione in direzione della esclusività. Ma la natura non ha questa
indipendenza ed ogni autonomia d’azione dei privati come singoli è priva della
capacità di fondare diritti. Non è un caso che una delle figure più rilevanti nell'analisi
hegeliana sia costituita dalla persona, cioè dalla espressione soggettiva della volontà
libera capace di compiere atti giuridicamente rilevanti, al riparo da obblighi forzosi o
rapporti di dominio ingiustificati. Come scrive Goethe «la nostra volontà vale la tua,
calpestarla non è facile». La volontà libera è il tratto distintivo della nozione di persona
provvista di autonoma capacità giuridica. Volontà e persona sono inseparabili e il
contratto si afferma come criterio essenziale per il conferimento e il trasferimento di
diritti reali entro una società dinamica e attraversata da una circolazione illimitata di
beni. Nella libertà della persona, non del corpo naturale ma del «soggetto capace di
diritto, di imputazione», Hegel scorge il momento caratteristico della modernità in cui
la circolazione materiale dei beni è rivestita da forme giuridiche che tamponano
l’antica scomposizione della proprietà e immettono ogni bene o interesse economico
nel circuito della alienabilità. Nel mondo moderno, con la nascita, ciascun individuo è
titolare di diritti inviolabili («sii persona e rispetta gli altri come persone»). Ogni
individuo diventa un soggetto giuridico («la personalità contiene in generale la capacità
giuridica») che può entrare in rapporti con gli altri seguendo comportamenti liberi e
privi di violenza. L'affermazione del moderno coincide con la generalizzazione delle
relazioni contrattuali e negoziali poste come fondamento della validità di ogni
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 225. In Hegel la proprietà
sebbene implichi uno schema unitario racchiude beni assai diversi come la terra, le industrie, gli oggetti
personali. «Se esiste una sfera esterna della libertà personale, della quale parla HEGEL, questa non si
trova in qualsiasi oggetto del diritto di proprietà, ma nella proprietà personale, indipendentemente dal suo
scopo produttivo o di consumo» (Helmut RITTSTIEG, La proprietà come problema fondamentale, ESI,
Napoli, 2000, p. 247).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Estetica...cit., p. 838. Il moderno lavoro unilaterale e semplificato
grazie all'invenzione delle macchine genera la moda che opera come straordinario impulso al nuovo
consumo: «il taglio dei vestiti, lo stile dell'arredamento non sono niente di permanente. La loro variazione
è essenziale e razionale, molto più razionale che il restar fermi ad una moda, il voler affermare qualcosa di
fisso in certe singole forme» (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 168). La
moda non ha a che fare con l'estetica («il bello non è sottoposto ad alcuna moda») ma con il consumo,
con la creazione di un gusto mutevole attraverso «una bellezza eccitante che vuole eccitare l'impulso, il
desiderio, la causalità» (ivi).
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rapporto giuridico e diritto reale (credito, scambio, lavoro). Hegel spiega che occorre
rimuovere ogni naturalismo legato a corpi umani concreti poiché «il diritto è il
rapporto fra gli uomini nella misura in cui sono persone astratte. È contraria al diritto
quell'azione con cui l'uomo non viene rispettato come persona, o la quale invade la
sfera della sua libertà»1. La fondazione della categoria giuridica della proprietà avviene
a questo livello generico della persona che vuole la cosa esaltando la propria privata
autonomia nel rincorrere qualsivoglia interesse economico. E' la volontà unilaterale e
del tutto irrelata rivolta alla cosa, per Hegel, a fondare il diritto astratto o potere del
soggetto di perseguire una efficace utilizzazione economica del bene. Trasferire la
proprietà da istituzione sociale specifica a manifestazione di una volontà al di fuori del
tempo significa obbedire alla non innocente supposizione che anche la proprietà sia
forma vuota che, nella sua irriducibile indeterminatezza, risulta del tutto indifferente ai
tipi storici di organizzazione della vita sociale. Quando la persona agisce con un pieno
potere di gestione economica del bene suppone che la sua volontà illimitata non
incontri più l’antica proprietà frantumata su cui gravitano molteplici interessi
convergenti ma assuma i risvolti di un dominio eminente onnicomprensivo che può
raggiungere qualsiasi cosa (con la conseguenza assurda che, poiché la cosa è sempre
l’ombra del soggetto, qualsiasi diritto di servitù vien fatto gravare sulla cosa si
trasferisce immediatamente anche sulla persona). In contatto entrano la volontà della
persona giuridica e la cosa disponibile senza che gli altri siano in qualche misura
coinvolti. Il rapporto con la natura avviene in completa assenza del nesso sociale: è
una volontà sradicata e priva di contenuto sociale quella che si aggiudica la cosa come
un legittimo coronamento della sua inesauribile brama di avere. Eppure anche Hegel si
mostra consapevole che il punto cardine della proprietà risiede proprio nella
relazionalità, ossia nel riferimento a una norma comune che conduce alla «esclusione
di tutti gli altri»2. Fissando nel semplice rapporto con la cosa il titolo originario della
proprietà egli decide di fermare lo sguardo solo sulla spontanea attività rivolta ai beni e
di mettere fuori gioco gli altri e una istituzione pubblica garante degli scambi di
volontà. Non occorrono dunque gli altri per fondare una relazione giuridica in quanto
1 Idem, Il dominio della politica, Riuniti, Roma, 1980 (“Propedeutica filosofica”). Il moderno riconosce a tutti
personalità giuridica ma non una identica capacità d’agire. «Mentre la capacità giuridica è idoneità
naturale (generica) della persona ad essere soggetto di rapporti giuridici, la capacità di agire è idoneità
naturale (specifica) della persona ad essere soggetto del rapporto (di quel rapporto) che si svolge nell’atto
(Francesco CARNELUTTI, Teoria generale del diritto, Foro italiano, Roma, 1951, p. 237). In Hegel la
persona ovvero la astratta capacità di essere soggetto svolge rapporti giuridici ed entra nelle relazioni
sociali. Ogni fondazione della proprietà sul nesso con la cosa è però generica e tautologica: «in quanto la
proprietà è un diritto reale su di una cosa non si è ancora detto nulla sul potere concreto, ch’essa accorda
a chi ne è investito. Noi sappiamo soltanto questo, ch’essa importa una potestà da esercitare direttamente
sopra una cosa, e nient’altro» (Silvio PEROZZI, Scritti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 1948, p. 445).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Scritti teologici giovanili, Guida, Napoli, 1989, p. 561. Il diritto non può
fornire protezione a qualsivoglia volontà riferita a un oggetto ma solo a quella manifestazione del volere
legata a funzioni reputate socialmente rilevanti. La volontà riguarda non solo oggetti ma precisa anche
anche una sfera di interesse nelle relazioni intersoggettive. Nel «dogma della volontà e nel puro e semplice
modo di essere del volere è escluso il rapporto con l’alterità. I vecchi pregiudizi individualistici, non
hanno ancora afferrato il senso dell’autonomia privata come fatto sociale» (Emilio BETTI, Teoria generale
del negozio giuridico, Cerveteri, Roma, 1951, p. 57).
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la volontà del singolo, con l'elemento di spiritualità che contiene, è per Hegel in grado
di aggiungere qualcosa in più all'oggetto esterno che così perde la sua indifferenza e si
presta ad essere preso in legittima proprietà. La volontà (un misto di fatto psichico
interno e di volontà esterna nel senso del negozio giuridico) è davvero potenziata al di
là di ogni limite e ciò consente di vedere il diritto anche dove si scorge soltanto una
pretesa unilaterale di fare propria una cosa.
In questa costruzione hegeliana, che fa della proprietà il momento riassuntivo
dell’appartenenza, riecheggia una concezione del soggetto come anima che sulla base
della volontà razionale azzera la sfera del tutto negativa della corporeità sensibile.
Anche il corpo è un che di esteriore su cui si esercita la volontà di possesso del
soggetto persona. «Il corpo - scrive Hegel - in quanto è esistenza immediata, non è
adeguato allo spirito; per essere organo volitivo e mezzo animato del medesimo, deve
anzitutto esser preso in possesso da esso»1. Il soggetto è pura coscienza e volontà
consapevole che vanta un potere eminente di utilizzazione economica dei beni. Il suo
corpo è invece un puro involucro naturale che dev'essere controllato e guidato dallo
spirito. Riaffiora, in questo modo, l'antico dualismo corpo - anima. Hegel scrive che
nella religione cristiana «il soggetto ha in se un valore infinito, perché è oggetto della
grazia divina. Ma l'uomo ha questo solo come spirito, e perciò è necessario che esso si
separi dalla naturalità»2. Anche Hegel si incammina verso la tradizione spiritualistica
che svaluta il corpo ritenendolo un elemento puramente sensibile privo di autentico
valore. La caratteristica essenziale del soggetto risiede nella sua capacità di agire come
volontà pura e cosciente al riparo da ogni determinazione sensibile. Il mondo esterno
viene così piegato dalle manifestazioni spirituali del volere. Tutto ruota attorno al
soggetto come centro di volontà che crea il diritto sulla base della semplice decisione
di prendere la cosa e goderne secondo le forme di appartenenza che riguardano ogni
categoria di beni. Hegel è ben consapevole che l'esistenza «è essenzialmente esser per
un altro». Questo riconoscimento del carattere relazionale dell'esistenza non gli
impedisce tuttavia di trattare il problema della proprietà sotto l'angolo di osservazione
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit. Osserva Marx: «la schiavitù legale della gleba non era
forse una prova reale contro le ubbie razionali secondo le quali il corpo umano non dev'essere oggetto di
mercato e di possesso?» (Opere, vol. I, Roma, 1976, p. 136). Sul nesso tra nascita di un privato come
ambito distinto dal pubblico e cristianesimo insiste Roberto FINELLI, Mito e critica delle forme, Riuniti,
Roma, 1996, p. 201. Quando i giuristi escludono dal novero dei beni il corpo umano registrano un
movimento storico generale di avversione alla schiavitù. Essi però sono andati «oltre il segno negando
diritti sul corpo diversi dalla proprietà: esiste infatti una folla di fenomeni di circolazione aventi il loro
oggetto precisamente nel corpo umano: tale è, in modo tipico, lo scambio oneroso di lavoro, che assume
una importanza addirittura imponente nella economia moderna» (Francesco CARNELUTTI, Teoria
giuridica della circolazione, CEDAM, Padova, 1933, p. 4).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1973. Si
rinviene «l'equazione hegeliana tra fondazione volontaristica del soggetto e riduzione privatistica del
mondo delle cose» (Umberto CERRONI, Società civile e Stato politico in Hegel, De Donato, Bari, 1974, pp.
44 - 45). Peraltro la concezione individualistica, con il dogma della volontà, si avvale di un concetto
indeterminato poiché «la parola volontà è polisensa che si presta a equivoci concettuali (Emilio BETTI,
Teoria generale del negozio…cit., p. 60). L’espressione volontà è solo » un riempitivo incolore e inutile,
generica, che sta a tener luogo di designazioni specifiche più appropriate, come dichiarazione di
accettazione, di adesione, di rinunzia, di offerta, di revoca, di recesso, di impugnazione (ivi, p. 59).
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del nesso che si stabilisce tra la volontà del soggetto («soltanto la volontà è l'infinito.
Quindi appropriarsi significa soltanto manifestare l'elevatezza della mia volontà di
fronte alla cosa») e la cosa esteriore (che non è mai «in sé e per sé, non è fine
autonomo»). Scompare così, in questa concezione della proprietà intesa come istituto
unitario, la relazione sociale tra gli individui e la proprietà come lecita appropriazione
di oggetti esterni viene fondata da Hegel già prima di aver problematizzato la società
civile, il sistema dei bisogni e l'ordinamento dello Stato. Restano perciò in campo solo
la volontà (costruita in modo del tutto indipendente dal rapporto con gli altri) e la cosa
(presentata come un pezzo di natura, un che di «non libero, senza diritto»). Oltre la
volontà singola che vuole la cosa tutta per sé non ci sono elementi di
condizionamento (gli altri, le istituzioni) che possano turbare l'epifania del soggetto
isolato che, nello schema d’impronta romanistica, stabilisce un rapporto diretto e
immediato con il bene. La vuota persona giuridica si rigonfia di cose empiriche e le
rende, con i suoi atti unilaterali di volontà, proprietà privata con l’attribuzione di una
assoluta appartenenza in capo al soggetto titolare.
In fondo Hegel attribuendo una massima estensione dei poteri al soggetto «ha
interpolato surrettiziamente la pienezza dei contenuti della volontà nell'astratta
vuotezza formale della persona»1. La categoria del tutto formale, e quindi vuota di
contenuto, di persona intesa come soggetto che vuole secondo la capacità giuridica
contiene ben impressi i contenuti materiali esterni alla sfera della interiorità e
appartenenti al mondo delle cose sociali. Non il corpo con i suoi bisogni, ma la
persona astratta dell’universo giuridico per Hegel entra in relazione organica con le
cose o natura secondo l’unitarietà della figura proprietaria. Nel suo disegno, la società
rappresenta un sistema consapevole di convivenza che compare solo dopo il diritto
astratto e le vuote determinazioni delle persone giuridiche. Il soggetto per natura è
solo un corpo, è solo con le qualificazioni giuridiche che la società costruisce, che
diventa persona. In Hegel invece il corpo è già persona giuridica che, senza alcun
ordinamento oggettivo che la definisca, entra in rapporto con la natura. Tra forma
astratta e natura particolare non esiste alcun ponte di collegamento. E perciò la forma
vuota (la persona) non può fare sua la cosa (la natura), e la cosa (natura) non può esser
fatta propria (diritto). La persona, che è solo un ambito giuridico - formale, per Hegel
ha anche una volontà ossia è in sintonia con un centro di decisione o corpo che è nel
mondo. La volontà, piena dei contenuti oggettivi che è riuscita a desumere dai reali
rapporti esteriori, incontra e vitalizza la persona dapprima costruita come vuoto
ambito formale, come astratta capacità giuridica, come generica libertà di agire sugli
oggetti. Il mondo esterno è solo un'appendice del volere e la volontà ha gli empirici
1 Mario ROSSI, Il sistema hegeliano dello Stato, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976. Infatti «se di fronte alla natura si
trova la volontà libera in quanto tale, coi suoi bisogni, desideri ecc., la presa di possesso, il darsi
un'esistenza sarà qualcosa di comprensibile, ma non di giuridico; se, a trovarsi di fronte alla natura è la
persona, essa non potrà incidere sulla natura perché non ha altro contenuto che la possibilità astratta, e
non potrà darsi nessuna esistenza». Anche nei codice si rinviene traccia della pretesa hegeliana di
«trasformare il rapporto fra l’uomo e la cosa in un rapporto fra gli uomini, nella pretesa del singolo di
servirsi delle cose con esclusione degli altri» (Francesco GALGANO, Istituzioni di diritto privato, Monduzzi,
Bologna, 2006, p.76).
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contenuti desunti senza griglie critiche adeguate dal mondo reale. Per questa
leggerezza della volontà capace di lambire ogni dimensione esterna, Hegel non si
preoccupa di precisare un limite alla volontà. Qualsiasi cosa cada sotto il suo angolo di
osservazione può quindi costituire oggetto di legittima appropriazione. Il volere può
abbracciare qualsiasi cosa (che in quanto tale, e non in riferimento ai modi di
utilizzazione, di gestione o di alienazione diventa proprietà illimitata) e farla propria
nelle forme del godimento privato. Non si capisce come la volontà di prendere tutte le
cose incontri dei limiti in questa fase che Hegel caratterizza solo per la vigenza di un
diritto astratto concepito in assenza di società civile e Stato. Tra agguerrite volontà che
rivendicano le stesse cose, solo un terzo elemento, quello pubblico, riuscirebbe però a
stabilire obblighi e restrizioni nei modi di utilizzazione del bene. Non si può, restando
solo nell'ambito del diritto astratto, e quindi di incontri privati di volontà al riparo
della statualità, fondare limiti diversi da quelli che la volontà esclusiva del singolo è in
grado di imporre. E’ insomma solo il rapporto di fatto a costituire un limite oggettivo
alla espansione della volontà di appropriazione esternata dalle astratte persone che
reclamano pienezza di signoria. Il diritto astratto senza Stato, con rapporti di
obbligazione a matrice solo negoziale, non può essere definito diritto vincolante senza
un riconoscimento dell’ordinamento e non conosce altre restrizioni che quelle
provenienti dalla potenza di ciascuna volontà. Il limite che accompagna il diritto non
può che corrispondere alla minaccia privata o alla volontaria astensione dal fare
proprie cose che anche altri vogliono. Il quanto si possegga, che Hegel fa rientrare
nell'ambito della pura accidentalità, è una questione che non può essere risolta con gli
strumenti del diritto astratto o della volontà intersoggettiva fissata nella legge positiva.
Non è la legge a stabilire la impossibilità di appropriarsi di una cosa già conferita ad
altri bensì il nudo potere di fatto.
Spiega Hegel che in età moderna viene esclusa ogni pluralità di domini sulla
cosa e viene superata la autonoma configurazione di distinti poteri reali sul bene:
«una cosa che è già di un altro non mi è lecito prenderla in possesso, e non già
perché essa è una cosa, ma perché è cosa sua. Se infatti mi impossesso della
cosa, io tolgo in lei il predicato di essere la cosa sua, e con ciò nego la di lui
volontà. La volontà è qualcosa di assoluto che io non posso mutare in qualcosa
di negativo».1
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit. Il possesso naturalistico viene potenziato a proprietà
e «la cosa prodotta per soddisfare il bisogno non è soltanto una cosa lavorata, ma una cosa appropriata
nelle specifiche forme della proprietà privata» (Umberto CERRONI, op. cit., p. 27). Molto penetrante è la
valutazione di Marx (Grundrisse…cit., p. 26): «Hegel comincia correttamente la filosofia del diritto con il
possesso come la più semplice relazione giuridica del soggetto. Ma non esiste possesso alcuno prima della
famiglia o dei rapporti di dominio o di servitù, che sono rapporti molto più concreti. Sarebbe invece
corretto affermare che esistono famiglie, unità tribali che ancora posseggono soltanto e non hanno
proprietà. La categoria più semplice appare dunque come rapporto di semplici associazioni familiari o
tribali in relazione con la proprietà. Nella società più progredita essa appare come il rapporto più semplice
di un'organizzazione sviluppata. Il sostrato concreto, la cui relazione è il possesso, è però sempre
presupposto. Si può immaginare un singolo selvaggio che sia possessore. Ma in tal caso il possesso non è
un rapporto giuridico. Non è vero che il possesso si sviluppa storicamente in direzione della famiglia.
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Piuttosto esso presuppone sempre questa categoria giuridica più concreta». Sul primato della comunità e
sul risvolto politico della proprietà antica cfr. Pietro BONFANTE, Istituzioni di diritto romano, Giuffrè,
Milano, 1987.
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Il dominio della politica…cit. (“Propedeutica filosofica”).
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«[…] l'essenziale della forma è che, ciò che è diritto in sé, anche come tale sia
posto. La mia volontà è razionale, ha valore, e questo aver valore deve esser
riconosciuto dall'altro. Qui ora deve cader via la mia soggettività e quella degli
altri, e la volontà deve ottenere una certezza, stabilità e oggettività, qual è quella
che essa può conseguire soltanto ad opera della forma»2.
1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 45.
2 Ibidem, aggiunta al par. 217. Come rileva Emilio BETTI, Teoria generale…cit., p. 63, «il dogma della
volontà non è in grado di spiegare se non con metafore di carattere mitologico e mistico certe
configurazioni di negozi. In fondo la volontà interna, l’intenzione psicologica dei contraenti non hanno
rilievo senza le reciprocità di interessi da regolare secondo schemi predisposti da forme e per questo»
l’essenza normativa del negozio sfugge completamente alla qualifica evanescente di volontà (ivi, p. 64).
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Hegel avverte la insufficienza della pura volontà singola per fondare una forma
comune vincolante e vorrebbe raggiungere disperatamente l'alterità senza di cui esiste
una pretesa unilaterale ma non già un diritto. La forma, che esprime l'insufficienza
dell'intendersi sulla base di segni e parole scambiati tra soggetti privati, non può
scaturire da un immediato rapporto della persona con la cosa. Essendo la forma un
che di posto, di pubblico, non è possibile la sua scaturigine da un legame di per sé
unilaterale tra la volontà del singolo e la cosa esterna. La forma evoca l'alterità, la
costruzione impersonale di un significato pubblico, non può essere confinata - come
Hegel invece pretende - nella unilaterale manifestazione di volontà che si esplica senza
alcun atto esteriormente riconoscibile. La persona astratta che entra in relazione con la
cosa non può essere confusa con l'individuo naturale che con la cosa soddisfa un
bisogno: per questo allora di essa non è possibile parlare prima di aver posto un
ordinamento giuridico che esprime le formalità attraverso le quali i negozi sono
possibili, gli atti di autoregolazione degli interessi sono riconoscibili da parte di altri.
3. CONTRATTO E RICONOSCIMENTO
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esige, oltre al singolo che vuole la cosa, anche «la coscienza universale» che dispone la esclusione degli
altri dal mio e dal tuo. Così «nel possesso determinato tutti hanno altrettanto il loro possesso» (ivi).
Invero la certezza della proprietà di essere protetta nella sua esclusività e pienezza è sempre legata
all’esistenza di un’autorità che interviene con il codice penale (punizioni del furto, dell’indebita
appropriazione, della violazione del domicilio) e con il codice civile (azioni peritorie, possessorie, azioni di
nunciazione).
3 Ibidem, p. 161. Anche Hegel ricade negli errori delle teorie che attribuiscono alla volontà la fonte di un
dominio completo sulla cosa corporale. Questo è un vizio teorico comune a molti autori che «credono
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erroneamente che dal fatto che uno può far tutto su di una cosa discenda naturalmente anche quello che
un altro non possa farne nulla» (Silvio PEROZZI, Scritti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 1948, p. 446). La
definizione di proprietà come disposizione sulla cosa è inadeguata a cogliere il potere connesso alla
nozione di proprietà. La volontà che si orienta sulla cosa facendola propria non implica alcuna
determinazione specifica poiché la volontà può ben essere «di una persona fisica, di uno Stato, di un
comune, di una tribù» (ivi).
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 229. Il lavoro dell'industria non
è legato solo al bisogno, è «lavoro astratto», «astratta attività» ma non ancora il «comprensivo, pieno-di-
contenuto e lungimirante spirito» (Filosofia dello spirito jenese…cit., p. 147). Sul lavoro e la recezione
dell’economia politica cfr. Manfred RIEDEL, Hegel fra tradizione e rivoluzione, Laterza, Roma - Bari, 1975.
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 149.
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Hegel va così molto oltre la raffigurazione del lavoro immediato quale titolo di
proprietà sulla cosa e segnala una forma di produttività più legata alla divisione sociale
delle funzioni e alla creazione di valori di scambio mediata dalla estensione del regime
delle transazioni negoziali. Il problema che la pretesa soluzione contrattualista
incontra è quello di fondare lo stesso contratto che non può essere posto sulla base di
una transazione volontaria. La ricerca del contratto originario che ha conferito validità
al contratto si impiglia in tautologie. Inoltre questo approccio sottovaluta che non è
per contratto tra privati che sgorgano figure di valenza pubblicistica eteronome e
fondanti le stesse nozioni di capacità giuridica e d’agire. Anche senza aderire alla
formula di Hobbes, che vuole la proprietà una conseguenza dello Stato, Hegel deve
evocare lo Stato per fondare gli istituti della proprietà che non possono certo esaurirsi
nella capacità evocativa del contratto e del riconoscimento. «Lo Stato è l'esserci, la
potenza del diritto, il sostegno del contratto e del permanere della sua proprietà stabile,
l'unità esistente della parola, dell'esserci ideale e della realtà, così come l'unità immediata del
possesso e del diritto, la proprietà in quanto sostanza universale»1. La proprietà come
rapporto mediato dalle forme del contratto ha un rivestimento giuridico costoso che
pone come non più sufficienti la fiducia data con semplici parole. Il ricorso a
formalità, a ratifiche dell'autorità, simboleggia che tra i soggetti esiste qualche «segno
di sfiducia» perché non bastano più relazioni informali o affidamenti su elementi
piuttosto aleatori come la coscienza, la doverosità sociale spontanea.
Il contratto (che Hegel confina nell'ambito del diritto privato e del
meccanismo economico e respinge con forza quale possibile fonte dell'obbligo
politico - statuale) segnala l'avvento di una società nella quale tutte le prestazioni e le
relazioni interindividuali avvengono per il tramite del consenso. «Il contratto - egli
precisa - è la stessa cosa che lo scambio, ma scambio ideale. È uno scambio di
dichiarazioni, non più di cose, ma vale quanto la cosa stessa. Per entrambi la volontà
dell'altro vale in quanto tale»2. Con il contratto, quale fonte di obbligazione, si entra in
un diritto immateriale che contempla non già l’empirico scambio delle cose fisiche ma
lo scambio di volontà che trasferisce facoltà, delimita poteri, precisa prestazioni. Con il
contratto, con i modi dell’acquisto ad essere trasferita non è la concreta cosa materiale,
sulla quale converge l’appartenenza proprietaria, ma il potere astratto di esercitare
facoltà piene di godimento economico sul bene patrimoniale. Il diritto non postula
alcun transito di cose reali o materiali ma prevede dichiarazioni di volontà con effetti
reali nel godimento dei beni, schemi formali che autorizzano transazioni, atti che
definiscono negozi e alienazioni. L’assolutezza della proprietà non concerne più il
dominio dell’empirica cosa da parte di un soggetto ma l’utilizzazione piena a fini
patrimoniali di un astratto potere di godimento ascritto al titolare. La generalizzazione
del contratto come attivazione di ogni potere di disposizione a contenuto patrimoniale
attributivo postula un sistema sociale in cui il denaro diventa il veicolo principale della
mediazione, come apprezzamento del valore economico negoziabile, che si afferma al
di là di ogni sopravvivente barriera di status. Lo schema del contratto permette infatti
1 Ibidem, p. 170.
2 Ibidem, p. 151.
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1 Hegel precisa che «intorno al mio onore e alla mia vita non ha luogo alcun contratto» (ivi, p. 154). Il
contratto, quale base delle relazioni economiche, può essere solo a tempo determinato e riguarda il corpo
che lavora, non il corpo - dignità. Anche per Marx il contratto prevede un uso limitato nel tempo del
corpo che lavora altrimenti «se fosse permesso all'uomo di vendere la sua forza lavoro per un tempo
illimitato, la schiavitù sarebbe di colpo ristabilita. Una tale vendita, se fosse conclusa, per esempio, per
tutta la vita, farebbe senz'altro dell'uomo lo schiavo a vita del suo imprenditore» (Opere, vol. XX, Roma,
1980, p. 128).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 135 - 136. Come chiarisce Solari, «il
della proprietà. Lo stesso tentativo di fondare la proprietà sul contratto si avvita in una
antinomia irrisolta. Esso infatti postula pur sempre il concetto di proprietà delle cose
o del corpo, che dovrebbe invece essere spiegato. Il libero consenso viene invocato
quale essenziale titolo che conferisce legittimità alla appropriazione privata della
ricchezza. Ma la libera volontà degli agenti dello scambio, che dovrebbe rappresentare
il fondamento della attribuzione privata della proprietà, può davvero esplicarsi solo se
di fronte al prestatore d'opera, che cede le sue energie per un tempo determinato,
esiste già il proprietario degli strumenti necessari per la produzione di cose - merci.
Qui risiede l'antinomia della fondazione della proprietà attraverso il contratto tra
soggetti eguali: il libero incontro delle volontà (mercato), che dovrebbe legittimare il
titolo di proprietà, è possibile solo se prima della relazione contrattuale tra gli agenti
dello scambio, si sia già verificata una situazione non contrattuale (ossia l'attribuzione
dei mezzi per produrre ai soggetti proprietari). Neanche Hegel sfugge a questa
surrettizia attribuzione a uno dei soggetti contraenti di dotazioni di strumenti e di
potere che appaiono di origine non contrattuale. Egli nota che:
quale il soggetto con un atto di libera volontà rinuncia alla proprietà dell’altro. Il riconoscimento
reciproco postula che io non posso pensare nulla come mia proprietà senza pensare, allo stesso tempo,
qualcosa come proprietà di un altro» (p. 115). Più che una fondazione si rintraccia in queste formula una
vuota tautologia per cui il riconoscimento suppone la proprietà che dovrebbe istituire attraverso la legge
giuridica. A sorvegliare sul quanto gli individui lecitamente possono riconoscersi interviene per Fichte lo
Stato, garante di proprietà e sicurezza, che stabilisce quanto è legalmente concesso al singolo nella sua
presa di possesso. Lo Stato delimita anche lo spazio dei produttori e «la generale liberalizzazione dei rami
produttivi va direttamente contro il contratto di proprietà originario» (p. 204).
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 67. Secondo Hegel la schiavitù è basata
sull'arbitrio e quindi essa contraddice i principi di uno Stato razionale. Egli non dubita del principio
moderno che «la schiavitù è ingiustizia in sé e per sé, perché l'essenza dell'uomo è la libertà». Rifiuta però
l'idea che si possa avere una «improvvisa abolizione della schiavitù» e non invece una «graduale
eliminazione della schiavitù che è cosa più opportuna e giusta» (Idem, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, La
Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1981, I, 253). Per Hegel dunque «non si può pretendere in modo assoluto che
l'uomo, per il solo fatto che è un uomo, sia ritenuto essenzialmente libero». Occorre dare tempo al
concetto perché l'assoluto ha una storia lenta da percorrere per ritornare in sé. Per questo concetto che
sbanda, di un assoluto che entra nel tempo, di un infinito che è nel contingente, bisogna tener conto che
«l'africano non è ancor giunto alla distinzione di sé», e che «il negro rappresenta l'uomo naturale nella sua
totale barbarie e sfrenatezza» (op. cit., p. 209).
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1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 182. «In tal senso la società civile rimanda alla sfera dei rapporti di fatto.
Anche se possiede alcune forme giuridiche, manca l'organicità capace di unificare le parti e quindi la
società civilpossiede alcune caratteristiche dello Stato ma non è lo Stato» (Norberto BOBBIO, “Società
civile”, in Norberto BOBBIO, Nicola MATTEUCCI, Dizionario di politica, Utet, Torino, 1983, p. 1085).
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Che si tratti di due differenti logiche Hegel lo ha ben chiaro. Da una parte il
diritto astratto visto come condizione della proprietà che emerge sin dalla
soddisfazione di un bisogno. Dall'altra il diritto pubblico, presentato come dimensione
specifica dello Stato che è un ambito diverso dall'economia. La società civile è un
mondo astratto che «strappa il legame», «estranea l'uno all'altro». La socialità dei tempi
moderni è solo la mancanza di un affare comune, l'unico legame che si crea è quello
non consapevole legato alla rincorsa individuale di prestigio e ricchezza. Per Hegel la
sola comunità visibile è quella che scaturisce dalla «connessione degli uomini
attraverso i loro bisogni» 1. Si tratta quindi di una falsa comunità, di un che di cieco, di
non voluto, di una autentica necessità esterna non prevedibile che mette i soggetti in
relazione solo per comperare e vendere. Nel moderno «la soddisfazione del bisogno
necessario come del bisogno accidentale è accidentale. La società civile offre lo
spettacolo in pari modo della dissolutezza. Della miseria e della corruzione fisica ed
etica»2. Dalla concorrenza e dalla divisione del lavoro mediata dalle forme propulsive
del contratto non emerge una spontanea armonia ma solo conflitto e lacerazione che
fanno disperare della possibilità di un ritorno di etica. La società civile è un terreno di
scontro tra molteplici interessi che cercano di prevalere. Hegel vi rintraccia «i diversi
interessi dei produttori e consumatori»3, ma anche l'esplosione della questione sociale,
ossia la divaricazione tra denaro e plebe, creata non da una deviazione del moderno
bensì dalla sua stessa logica costitutiva: la specializzazione del lavoro, la macchina. Il
sistema dei bisogni sollecita relazioni sociali tra uomini e un rapporto naturale tra
uomo e cose. Attraverso la divisione e la specializzazione del lavoro, è possibile la
soddisfazione di bisogni ma in un quadro di estrema polarizzazione tra ricchezza
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 243. In Hegel «la società non è una comunità;
essa è in certo senso sconfinata, o comunque priva di capacità di porsi dei limiti da sola» (Franz
ROSENZWEIG, Hegel e lo Stato…cit., p. 400). La società civile hegeliana «è sistema non solo economico,
ma anche giuridico e amministrativo, ed è chiamata perciò tanto Gesellschaft quanto Staat » (Michelangelo
BOVERO, “Il modello hegelo - marxiano”, in Norberto BOBBIO, Nicola MATTEUCCI, Dizionario di
politica…cit., p. 175).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 185. Come è stato notato «l'interesse di Hegel
per la negatività è di origine extralogica e costituisce il residuo del suo periodo romantico» (Eugène
FLEISCHMANN, La logica di Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975, p. 18). La «suggestione dei ricordi teologici»
nella dialettica hegeliana è rintracciata anche da Guido De RUGGIERO, Hegel, Laterza, Bari 1972, p. 9.
Nella descrizione del lavoro moderno non ci sono invece «lamentazioni romantiche» secondo Lukàcs (op.
cit., p. 463). Il merito di Hegel è per lui quello di aver colto il capitalismo come «totalità oggettiva che si
muove secondo le sue proprie leggi» (p. 465). I limiti hegeliani sono nella mancanza di una teoria del
valore - lavoro e nella «sopravvalutazione dei principi giuridici della vita economica» (p. 538).
3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 236. In Hegel la proprietà fondiaria inalienabile
appare come l'essenza della proprietà in quanto essa non è «una proprietà determinata dalla volontà
sociale» (Karl MARX, Opere filosofiche giovanili...cit., p. 112). Hegel pone quale contenuto della costituzione
politica «il maggiorasco, il superlativo della proprietà privata, la sovrana proprietà privata» (ivi, p. 113). La
specificità della proprietà inalienabile è che si postula «che si abbia proprietà non in una volontà comune,
bensì soltanto mediante una cosa e la mia volontà soggettiva» (p. 115). Il rapporto giuridico di proprietà,
che in età moderna postula il contratto, una volontà comune, viene da Hegel dipinto in termini di eticità
sostanziale con una autentica «religione della proprietà privata» che si esprime nella proprietà fondiaria
inalienabile e sacra. Si capisce che «nei nostri tempi moderni, la religione è divenuta in genere una qualità
inerente alla proprietà fondiaria» (p. 117).
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smisurata e povertà irriducibile. Il timore di Hegel è che il bisogno conduca a una sfera
dinamica mai doma che sollecita sempre nuovi consumi e ripropone forme sempre
aggiornate di diseguaglianze eccessive. Non c’è la soddisfazione ultima che arresta la
differenza di status bensì si incontra il sempre rinnovato stimolo a consumare beni
diversi e a contenere i costi del processo di produzione. Hegel avverte la stretta
funzionalità tra economia e regolamento giuridico. Il benessere non può fare a meno
della copertura giuridica, ed il diritto non può rinunciare all’appagamento dei bisogni.
Lo Stato ha a quale suo referente non la persona o diritto astratto e nemmeno
il soggetto o morale ma la società civile, luogo nel quale per la prima volta si può
parlare di uomo. Il ritorno di ethos serve per risolvere il conflitto tra particolare e
universale, tra legge e inclinazione, tra diritto e esistenza sensibile. Come l'etica non
annulla diritto astratto, ne svela però la insufficienza, così lo Stato non cancella la
società, ne mostra la tendenza a dileguare le qualità sostanziali entro parametri solo
quantitativi. La libertà astratta è limitata al soggetto della concorrenza, occorre una
comunità etica per rendere la sfera privata organizzata dal sostanziale1. Oltre la
soggettività vuota, emerge la persona concreta con bisogni complessi che travalicano
quelli appena abbozzati collegati alla realtà della appropriazione. Al di là del benessere
privato esiste una prospettiva di benessere collettivo che lo Stato deve recuperare
imponendo in una pubblica sfera un quadro di riferimento sostanziale irriducibile ai
canoni privatistici della concorrenza. Scrive Hegel: «la costituzione statale è la porta,
per cui il momento astratto dello Stato entra nella vita e nella realtà; ma con essa
interviene anche la distinzione fra chi comanda e chi obbedisce, tra governanti e
governati»2. La vita non può restare al di fuori dell'universale, non può esistere una
forma senza penetrazione nei contenuti. Altrimenti, da una parte la forma indica una
vuota determinazione intellettualistica, uno sterile dover essere che è sintomo di
incompiutezza, e dall'altra la vita esplica una preoccupante situazione di endemica
limitatezza e naturalità. Una vita che non viene mediata dalla forma genera insicurezza
e odio, risentimento. Precisa Hegel che «la povertà in sé non rende plebe: questa viene
determinata soltanto dalla disposizione d'animo che alla povertà si congiunge,
dall'indignazione interiore contro i ricchi, contro la società, il governo»3. Sintomo di
grave miopia sarebbe lasciare questi settori marginali in una condizione di
accidentalità, di mancanza: occorre un sistema pubblico accanto al sistema privato dei
bisogni capace di imporre una logica sostanziale, una razionalità materiale sconosciuta
all’economia di mercato. Sin dal periodo giovanile Hegel si è mostrato sensibile verso
1 Insieme alla capacità del singolo, occorre postulare la presenza del pubblico. Oltre al «diritto negativo» il
singolo deve esigere un «diritto positivo» (cfr. Pietro COSTA, Civitas. Storia della cittadinanza in Europa,
Laterza, Bari, 2000, II, p. 437). La prospettiva di integrare i soggetti è quella di un «patriottismo
istituzionale» (Pietro COSTA, op. cit., p. 442). Secondo Esnst CASSIRER (Simbolo, mito e cultura, Roma -
Bari, Laterza, 1985, p. 121), «la filosofia di Hegel è in larghissima misura responsabile delle nostre
moderne teorie dello Stato onnipresente». Tuttavia la sua critica al liberalismo non ricorre agli argomenti
del romanticismo politico e «nel sistema di Hegel non può darsi separazione alcuna tra il concetto di
Machtstaat e quello di Kulturstaat » (p. 125).
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 138.
3 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 244.
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queste tematiche: «dei nostri rapporti politici e civili, la disuguaglianza nel tenore di
vita e nei beni di fortuna hanno aumentato non solo ogni genere di miseria, ma anche
la suscettibilità e la sensibilità ad essa»1. Lo Stato non può atteggiarsi a cattiva
universalità che costruisce la forma come la soppressione del finito mondo dei
bisogni. I bisogni e gli interessi che la forma crede di aver scacciato dalla vita concreta
in realtà sono allontanati solo dalla visibilità del puro calcolo economico ma
continuano a operare in profondità e trovano il modo per alimentarsi continuamente.
Lo Stato senza gli interessi è una pura forma che supera il sistema dei bisogni solo in
astratto, nel senso che non riesce davvero a rendere il privato come una sua
determinazione. Lo Stato per Hegel deve ospitare presso di sé anche ciò che è altro
rispetto alla forma, deve giungere alla sua idealità solo attraverso il proprio altro che in
tal modo non resta accidentalità esterna accanto alla idea. Il baratro tra lo Stato e i
bisogni è la spia del fallimento del concetto di Stato che lascia sussistere fuori di sé
come realtà indipendente la finitezza, la divisione. L'unità di Stato e società civile è
l'autentico superamento delle tensioni che sorgono invece lasciando al suo posto il
bisogno contrapposto alle vuote forme dello Stato di diritto. Il problema di Hegel non
è quello di aver compreso come un’economia incentrata su parametri quantitativi e
competitivi risulti strutturalmente refrattaria alle questioni di senso, alle domande di
qualità sociale (che vanno perciò indirizzate a un ambito funzionale diverso, quello
della amministrazione pubblica). Il suo problema è piuttosto di aver creduto possibile
rintracciare una logica del concreto, del valore pubblico del disagio individuale già
dentro le sfere della società civile, che in quanto civile dovrebbe invece restare
indifferente a sollecitazioni di pubblica pertinenza. Quando saluta nel ceto agricolo un
che di sostanziale e di etico Hegel approda a una soluzione ibrida tra modernità e
passatismo.
Per Hegel la sfera particolare non può organizzare una propria autonomia
politica, deve essere invece inserita entro le coordinate generali dello Stato che assegna
una funzione specifica alle parti attraverso una rappresentanza non atomistica (alla
francese2) ma di cerchie rilevanti della società. Il suo sforzo è quello di recuperare con
i ceti una dimensione etica (comunità coesa) senza smarrire il connotato della
modernità, e cioè l’emersione dell’individuo che con il contratto dispone di uno
strumento giuridico di autoregolazione. La questione sociale in Hegel è conseguenza
della modernità che accanto al denaro produce plebe e frantuma ogni coesione.
Affrontare il disagio con la morale, con la carità privata, significa non cogliere la radice
del problema. La disoccupazione è indotta proprio dal macchinario che l'economia
concorrenziale deve necessariamente introdurre lasciando senza lavoro, per contenere
1 Idem, Scritti teologici giovanili...cit., p. 111. Hegel si scaglia in più luoghi contro l'eguaglianza astratta di
atomi: «l'universale, dirotto negli atomi degli individui assolutamente molti, questo spirito morto, è una
eguaglianza nella quale tutti valgono come ciascheduno, come persone» (Fenomenologia dello spirito, La Nuova
Italia, Firenze, 1976, II, p. 36). Sul tema cfr. Vladimiro GIACCHÉ, Finalità e soggettività, Pantograf,
Genova, 1990.
2 Per avviare all'universale occorrono le corporazioni «ma bisogna guardarsi dal ritenere che lo Stato
possa configurarsi come un aggregato di corporazioni, o che l'etica statale sia una semplice sublimazione
dell'etica corporativa» (Claudio CESA, op. cit., p. 857).
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in Hegel per il quale «la comunanza di religione costituisce una comunità più profonda, mentre più
volgare è quella dei bisogni fisici» (HEGEL, Scritti politici, Einaudi, Torino, 1974, p. 68). Nondimeno in
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Hegel appare la consapevolezza che «il rapporto tra uomo e natura è anche rapporto tra un soggetto e un
altro soggetto» (Enzo PACI, Relazioni e significati, Lampugnani Nigri, Milano, 1966, p. 266).
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit. p. 132.
2 Proprio con Hegel «inizia la dissoluzione del diritto come norma nel diritto come attività» (Guido
Un non Stato (quelli federativi «sono gli Stati peggiori») consente all'America di
fondarsi sul commercio e di assorbire le conflittualità grazie alla generosa disponibilità
di spazi. Ancora non c'è «il credito, la sicurezza dei capitali» come si incontrano nel più
solido commercio inglese. E poi la vita economica americana «continua ad aver per
oggetto solo prodotti del suolo, e non ancora prodotti di manifattura o d'industrie»5.
La concorrenza è incentivata in America da vantaggi grazie ai quali «si acquistano
campi con facilità e a buon mercato, non si pagano imposte dirette», ma «grandi
difficoltà controbilanciano questi vantaggi». I grandi spazi, che salvano dai conflitti
intensi, impediscono però la maturazione di una «società civile concentrata e
1 Ibidem, pp. 228-229.
2 Ibidem, p. 229.
3 Ibidem, p. 230.
4 Ibidem, pp. 230-231.
5 Ibidem, p. 232.
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politica pubblica e richiedono «l'impiego dei più grandi talenti». Egli trova insostenibili le «frequenti
lamentele» contro le tasse che sono invece il fulcro del moderno Stato (ivi).
3 Idem, Scritti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 1971, p. 143. E' il diritto che organizza la produzione e la
«singola potenza qual è l'agricoltura oppure quali sono le manifatture e le fabbriche o qual è il
commercio» (ivi).
4 Ibidem, p. 144.
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perfetta polizia, finirebbe col negare la libertà civile e in ciò consisterebbe il più duro
dispotismo»1. Lo sforzo di Hegel parrebbe rivolto a scomporre l’accoppiata persona -
proprietà e ad ampliare il ventaglio degli interessi meritevoli di tutela nel diritto civile
proiettandolo oltre il registro patrimoniale. La libertà civile è ben più ampia della
libertà del proprietario di cose. Il rimprovero che egli avanza a Fichte è proprio quello
di volere «che ogni azione ed essere del singolo sia in quanto tale sorvegliata,
conosciuta e determinata dall'universale»2. Se la prevalenza del diritto civile determina
l'oscuramento dell'universale, il dominio del pubblico, postulato nella maniera di
Fiche, comporta il rischio concreto dell'azzeramento dell'autonomia delle sfere del
privato. Ogni ambito giuridico, che viene posto nella sua autonomia, deve nel
contempo avvertire la sua parzialità e mostrare così un senso del limite. Tutto ciò è
indispensabile, secondo Hegel, per rispettare il campo esclusivo dell'altro «poiché il
principio morale come quello del diritto civile esistono soltanto nella finitezza e nella
singolarità»3. La morale al parti del diritto civile non può avere altri pilastri che gli
individui singoli che reclamano indipendenza e libertà d’agire. Assicurata la pertinenza
individuale delle scelte morali e della attitudine negoziale, resta da appurare il divario
reale che i patrimoni determinano tra i soggetti astratti. Il diritto, come astratta
costruzione di una forma generale insensibile alle differenze, è posto di fronte alla
«diseguaglianza della forza della vita» e quindi incrocia «il rapporto di signoria e
servitù» che vede soggetti con pari diritti vantare una potenza sociale diversa4. Gli
individui che stanno di fronte nel rapporto sociale sono equiparati nella forma, ma
sono differenziati nella vita per il grado di potenza sociale.
Hegel avverte che l'eguaglianza esteriore della forma astratta non cancella la
disuguaglianza reale della vita. Nel rapporto sociale l'individuo non costruisce un
legame, incontra piuttosto «una forza straniera, su cui egli non può nulla, quella da cui
dipende». Il soggetto è così schiacciato da «un perpetuo ondeggiare» delle situazioni
oggettive di vita che rende inafferrabile il sistema del bisogno che gli offre il
sostentamento a condizioni competitive. L'equilibrio sociale è per Hegel un prodotto,
non è solo un dato spontaneo affidato alle transazioni del mercato. Il governo deve
anche «opporsi alla natura», controllare gli equilibri mutevoli e le empiriche
accidentalità (concorrenza, prezzi). Hegel non mostra al riguardo esitazioni: «il
governo deve, poiché la natura ha soppresso la calma medietà, sostenere questa stessa
e l'equilibrio»5. La politica non può sottrarsi alla produzione continua di ordine, alla
1 Ibidem, p. 145.
2 Ibidem, p. 145.
3 Ibidem, p. 145.
4 Ibidem, p. 210. Hegel non è certo un pensatore dell'eguaglianza. Egli scrive che «con lo Stato si ha
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ricostruzione di nuove soglie formali dopo che le precedenti sono state infrante,
perché
«[…] il governo è la totalità reale avente potere, che è indifferente riguardo alle
parti, non però un astratto, ed è quindi indifferente nei confronti della singola
maniera della sovrabbondanza, alla quale una parte vincola la sua realtà, però
non può essere indifferente per quanto riguarda l'esistenza di questa stessa
parte»1.
1 Ibidem, p. 287.
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1 Ibidem, p. 293.
2 Ibidem, p. 294.
3 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 169.
4 Ibidem, p. 170.
5 Ibidem, p. 161. La vita per Hegel nei casi estremi (come per il divorzio) prevale sulla astrazione legale:
«l'astratta legge entra in conflitto con la vitalità, e la vuota, pura volontà è in contraddizione con il volere
naturale. Essa deve riconoscere la sua astrattezza e cedere di fronte alla volontà concreta» (ivi, p. 163).
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negative e non positive, non è il mercato la mano invisibile che regge l'equilibrio del
sistema sociale. E' piuttosto lo Stato il garante di un ordine difficile entro società
polarizzate per via della «ineguaglianza della ricchezza e della povertà». La ricchezza
per Hegel «diventa forza» e quindi ad essa vengono associate prestazioni, poteri.
L'opposizione sociale rende problematico l'ordine di un meccanismo economico
spinto alla perenne innovazione tecnica:
«[…] i rami dell'industria che davano da vivere ad una grande classe di uomini si
disseccano di colpo a causa della moda o della diminuzione di prezzo per
invenzioni fatte in altri paesi; e tutta questa quantità di gente è abbandonata alla
miseria, che non può far niente per aiutarsi»1.
«La libertà dell'industria resta necessaria; l'intervento deve essere quanto più
possibile invisibile - giacché questo è il campo dell'arbitrio; la comparsa della
forza deve essere evitate e non si deve voler salvare niente, che non è da salvare,
bensì dare diversamente lavoro alla classi misere»3.
L'ottica non è quella di un meccanismo coattivo esterno, che con una sfera di
comando capillare, vigila minaccioso sulle transazioni affidate alle libere scelte degli
agenti di mercato e impone logiche esterne a quelle dello schematismo proprietario.
Per Hegel lo strumento direttivo della politica è legato alle tasse, al sistema delle
imposte necessarie per correggere le ricadute sociali di industrie che innovano ma «col
sacrificio di questa generazione e l'accrescimento della povertà». L'interferenza dello
Stato, alla lunga, si rivela conveniente anche per coloro che esaltano l'autonomia dei
La sua definizione di diritto però non lascia dubbi: «il diritto come tale è il diritto formale ed astratto»
(Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, II, Laterza, Bari, 1980, p. 478).
1 Ibidem, p. 168.
2 Ibidem, p. 169.
3 Ibidem, p. 169.
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diritti proprietari e l’arbitrio degli attori economici. Hegel non contesta il mercato, egli
ritiene anzi che «tutti gli scopi della società e dello Stato sono quelli propri dei
privati»1. Pensa però che i meccanismi dello scambio, della mediazione, dei diritti civili
esigano un coordinamento tra la sfera d'azione dei singoli che operano entro la
sovranità del contratto e l'ambito pubblico chiamato a ridurre le diseguaglianze e
favorire i meccanismi della integrazione. Il moderno produce, senza violare il principio
cardine della libertà della persona e della formalità del diritto dei privati, «la
dipendenza incondizionata dal complesso sociale»2. La libertà di Hegel non è rivolta
alla mera protezione del proprietario dallo Stato, ma guarda anche alla tutela dei
singoli dalle inquietudini del mercato. L'autonomia privata, da questo punto di vista,
deve accettare i parametri della disciplina pubblica che richiede prestazioni
patrimoniali per sostenere politiche di pari opportunità, per fornire beni pubblici, per
acquisire beni comuni. Non è la difesa della proprietà dell'homo oeconomicus il criterio
per giustificare la tassazione, ma i compiti generali che lo Stato deve svolgere per la
vita collettiva. Hegel si dichiara contrario sia alla «fatua ciarla» della sovranità popolare
con le sue estreme conseguenze egualitarie sia all'empirismo proprietario con la sua
celebrazione della piena sovranità dei rapporti di contratto e di scambio. Dinanzi alle
insidie del sistema economico sottoposto a crampi periodici, per Hegel «lo Stato deve
intervenire, cercare sbocchi, nuovi canali di vendita in altri paesi»3. La mano pubblica è
anche una valvola di sicurezza dinanzi agli impacci in cui si imbatte il mercato
competitivo sottoposto a congiunture sfavorevoli. Stato e mercato non si pongono in
una rigida alternativa. Per Hegel «ci vuole l'una e l'altra cosa insieme: il potere dello
Stato nell'esserci e il lasciar esistere, lasciar fare»4. Concorrenza e politiche
macroeconomiche non si escludono tra loro. E' un mercato vestito con precise
determinazioni giuridiche e istituzionali quello che si viene prospettando con
nitidezza. La crescita affidata all’intraprendenza dei privati convive con la mano
visibile dello Stato che governa il sistema sociale complessivo.
I diritti non sono una conseguenza della mera espansione della laissez -faire, che
svolge sicuramente un ruolo produttivo e appare uno stimolo continuo alla
innovazione. Essi sono collegati allo Stato che è «un che di etico» e pertanto non può
assumere quale suo fine «soltanto la garanzia della vita e della proprietà degli
1 Idem, Enciclopedia...cit., p. 477.
2 Ibidem, p. 495.
3 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 169. In Hegel si rintraccia un primato della politica che «dissolve
l'autonomia del discorso morale individuale e di ogni procedura contrattualistica di verifica e controllo dei
conflitti» (Bruno GRAVAGNUOLO, Dialettica come destino, Liguori, Napoli, 1983, p. 111). Hegel riflette la
condizione tedesca per la quale la proprietà esprime un legame politico e «le stesse funzioni generali
appaiono come proprietà privata, ora di una corporazione, ora di uno stato» (Karl MARX, Opere filosofiche
giovanili...cit., p. 123). Dal punto di vista storico «la borghesia, fino alla seconda metà del XVIII secolo, è al
pari della nobiltà una formazione corporativa caratterizzata e sostenuta da diritti particolari» (Norbert
ELIAS, Potere e civiltà, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983, p. 235).
4 Ibidem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit. p. 174. In Hegel affiorano tre distinti concetti di Stato: lo Stato
politico con le istituzioni di governo, lo Stato civile con le tipiche istituzioni contrattuali della società, lo
Stato etico che incarna valori condivisi (John M. KELLY, Storia del pensiero giuridico occidentale, Il Mulino,
Bologna, 1996, p. 383)
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individui»1. Il controllo politico per Hegel è essenziale per una modernizzazione che
esprima crescita quantitativa ma anche sicurezza nei diritti di cittadinanza. Lo Stato è
ragione per Hegel, come per Kant. Ma mentre in Kant la ragione è un punto di
partenza, un dover essere che sacrifica il sensibile, in Hegel la ragione è un processo
che vede lo Stato transitare entro il tortuoso mondo della insocievolezza, lungo la
sfera insicura e bellicosa della società civile con i suoi bisogni inesauribili. Dal punto di
vista dell’empirico, la concorrenza non viene sacrificata, trova però una giusta
collocazione entro un parametro normativo fissato dallo Stato. Dal punto di vista della
ragione, lo Stato non indica un astratto dover essere ma agisce come effettualità
concreta. Nel processo che sale verso la ragione, secondo Hegel, i bisogni e gli
interessi vengono depurati, dapprima nella società civile e poi finalmente nello Stato,
dove perdono ogni empirica determinatezza. L'individualismo abbandona così il suo
estremo anelito particolaristico e si rende disponibile verso i parametri pubblici. La
società senza Stato è perfetta anarchia, insicurezza estrema, solo il controllo pubblico
dà ordine e razionalità allo stesso sistema economico. Non si rinviene in questo alcun
autoritarismo politico. Come osserva Sabine, «benché il potere regolatore dello Stato
sia assoluto, questo non si estende all'abolizione delle istituzioni o dei diritti dai quali
dipende il compimento delle funzioni economiche»2. La proprietà, infatti, secondo
Hegel non è creata dallo Stato e neanche risulta dalla società essendo piuttosto una
astratta determinazione della persona. Né il puro cittadino, alla giacobina, né il puro
proprietario, alla Locke, viene assunto da Hegel come base del sistema sociale. Per un
verso, egli registra la presenza di una pluralità di attori sociali che entrano in
concorrenza e assume come referente «l'uomo reale di Hobbes, che è portato a
stringere rapporti coi suoi simili dagli istinti della sua natura sensibile, da cui è
dominato come da forze cieche, inconsce, esteriori»3. Per un altro, al di là della vita
naturale che è competizione, lotta, istinto, Hegel fissa un momento di comunità e in
tal modo «all'uomo naturale degli economisti e dei giusnaturalisti, Hegel contrappone
l'uomo sociale»4. L'incertezza del mercato è coperta da un momento di universalità
reale capace di costruire la ragione a partire dalle differenze empiriche. Lo Stato, non il
diritto astratto con le sue fattispecie normative e clausole contrattuali che esaltano la
piena autonomia dei privati, è il rimedio alla concorrenza dissolutrice. Per emendare
alla società imperfetta degli agenti di mercato, che fanno tutto con i negozi previsti dal
diritto astratto, Hegel pensa allo Stato che prospetta beni pubblici e alla sua base pone
un riferimento alla «socialitas» non alla «charitas»5. Ma in nome di una «socialitas»
diversa è già matura la critica dei rapporti di proprietà.
1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 325.
2 George SABINE, Storia delle dottrine politiche, Etas Libri, Milano, 1978, p. 506. Sul tema cfr. Giorgio
BUONGIOVANNI, Antonio ROTOLO, “Hegel e lo spirito del dispotismo”, in Domenico FELICE (a
cura di), Dispotismo, Liguori, Napoli, 2002.
3 Gioele SOLARI, La filosofia politica…cit., p. 212. Nota Solari che «esula dal sistema dei bisogni ogni
esigenza ideale, universale». Gli individui sono uniti «da vincoli esteriori che operano con la necessità delle
cause naturali» (p. 213).
4 Ibidem, p. 235. La classe cui si accede per volontà è un concetto «essenzialmente ed esclusivamente
economico» (ivi, p. 237). Però lo stesso Solari non può fare a meno di precisare che «la società civile, nel
pensiero di Hegel, non è solo un sistema di bisogni, di rapporti economici, ma è anche necessariamente
una comunità giuridica e politica» (p. 239).
5 Ibidem, p. 250.
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Bibliography
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Abstract: The concept of civil society has a long and rich tradition in the political
thought and activity of the Western world, the identification of its first forms of
manifestation often intersecting both human rights issues and the first aspects of
democracy in the modern world. Moreover, the essence of the last decades’ changes in
Central and Eastern Europe followed naturally the democratic evolution, as well as
the state of justice. Therefore, the concept of civil society has a special significance, and
in order to understand its deep meaning a more through investigation, a comparative
analysis and its compulsory historical survey should be taken into account.
Keywords: Civil society, Western world, Central and East European societies,
democracy.
The notion of civil society has its origins in the writings of some major
philosophers as John Locke, Montesquieu, Spinoza, Kant, Alexis de Tocqueville, K.
Marx, A. Gramsci, etc.
In the era of the bourgeoisie’s ascension and of the promotion of
individualism, the agenda was dominated by the fundamental rights of man and of the
citizen, by the freedom of speech and the freedom of expression and association. We
deal herein with a “complex systematization of the fundamental principles”, entailing
a whole series of subsequent aspects; such problems characterised the classical debate
which transformed itself ultimately into what we call civil society. Thus, the eternal
problem of how to interweave individual interests with the social arena and, vice
versa, the social welfare with private or individual life became once more the object of
public reflection of the entire political spectrum. In other words, what is at stake is the
best way to build society itself, both in terms of private individuals and of a public
common sphere.
Indeed, the concept of civil society (civilis) is mentioned for the first time by the
English philosopher Hobbes, who points out especially in De civis, but also in The
Leviathan that the “union is called civitas or civil society, therefore society is no longer
conceived merely as natural, but as the consequence of a pact (contract), as
representative person. In Hobbes’ vision, the state of nature is that type of state in
which men fight one another fiercely (homo hominis lupus est).1
1 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile, Garzanti Editore, Milano, 1993, p. 7.
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But only with John Locke does civil society acquire a larger scope, though
synonymous with political society, therefore synonymous with the state. Locke used
both terms without discrimination. But in another very famous work, Locke
discovered and investigated other aspects without which the concept of civil society
could not have been conceived.1 We have in mind especially The Second Treatise of Civil
Government and Letter concerning Toleration. In this respect, the idea of tolerance
understood as a moral right seems to be particularly significant. At the same time,
Locke would theorise the primacy of the individual in the state, primacy founded on
contractual bases in order to “secure the person and the goods” of the individual. He
also speaks about the guarantees that should be given to minorities and about their
right to equal dignity, Locke stating that these should be immediately annulled if they
violate the laws or if they bring about a violent overthrow of the state. Spinoza goes
further, and formulates in an original way his vision on society:
“Society is very useful and even absolutely necessary, not only because it
defends us against our enemies, but also because it operates the union of
multiple activities. In fact, if people had not helped one another, they would
have lacked both time and the capacity to do as much as they can do in order to
survive and preserve themselves”.2
Spinoza too speaks clearly about fundamental rights and liberties especially in
his famous work A Theological-political Treatise. For instance, by civil right he means
each person’s liberty to maintain himself in his civil state; thus, Spinoza rises firmly
against any encroachment or limitation of the rights the individuals have in a state.
Particularly in his Political Treatise Spinoza also analyses the role of the crowd’s action,
even with its internal contradictions and limits, i.e. democracy itself. This is the
essential structure of any political association, leaving aside the historically speaking
form of government.
Asserting the importance of civil society, Montesquieu is another building
block in Western political thought. The author claims that political liberty is to be
found only in moderate governments and rejects many commonplaces that identify
liberty either with the faculty of choosing a leader or of deposing a tyrant, or of doing
whatever one desires, or with the possibility of living under a certain political regime.
In Montesquieu’s opinion, liberty is “the right to do whatever the law allows you to
do”. Even more explicitly, Montesquieu declares that “we are free to live under the
authority of civil laws”.3 He considers that liberty consists in the existence of laws and
in the certainty of their enforcement and efficiency; liberty is not the power of the
people, but the power of the laws. Experience shows us constantly that any man
invested with an authority is tempted to commit abuses and to take advantage of his
power. To prevent such abuses which are in the very nature of things, power ought to
be limited also by power. In Montesquieu’s vision, that is how the principle of the
1 Ibidem, p. 31.
2 Baruch SPINOZA, Tratat teologico-politic, Editura Științifică, București, 1960, p. 86.
3 Charles-Louis MONTESQUIEU, Despre spiritul legilor, Vol. II, Ed. Științifică, București, 1970, p. 228.
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separation of powers in a state is reached. In a civil society it is not the state that is
preeminent, but the citizen or the real human being. Hence, as other philosophers
have argued, all this entails the primordiality of the law as source of justice.
Consequently, the fundamental values that underlie any government are law, equality,
security and freedom.
J. J. Rousseau identifies the concept of civil society with the state, which he
names civil state, the other powers being particular manifestations of the one and
unique “supreme power”: people’s sovereignty. Legislative power belongs to the
people and can belong only to the people.
It is quite obvious that the contraposition between the state of nature and civil
society was a constant element till Hegel.
In Kant’s work, for instance, the unitary situation of a people that keeps mutual
relationships is called civil (status civilis) and on the whole, related to its members, it is
called state (civitas). In this respect, it is interesting to notice that Kant identifies the
state of law with the state of reason, in which the “universal” will that is given a priori
(to a people or in connection with other peoples) is “the only one that determines
what is just among men”.1 Trying to picture society, Kant sees it as a wood, where
each tree “tries to take the air and the sun of the other trees”, until they are all
“mutually compelled to rise higher and higher and that is the reason why they grow
beautifully and straightly, whereas if we leave them in liberty and separated from each
other, they grow with their branches deformed, twisted and crooked”.2
It is important to specify in this context that in the eighteenth century Europe
witnessed the constitution process of modern civil society in parallel with the
dissolution of old political relations that placed the individuals in privileged or
discriminated groups. It was this very dissolution that generated the separation of the
two distinct spheres, i.e. a depoliticised and atomised society – civil society – and the
state, as a manifestation of the political will (the political state) of the main groups of
civil society.3
From a conceptual perspective this phenomenon was best captured by Hegel.
In his Philosophy of Right (published in 1821), by using the term of civil society Hegel
dissociates from his predecessors who saw it as a political society or the state. When
he uses the term of civil society, Hegel refers both to the sphere of economic relations
and to the whole body of juridical regulations set up by the liberal (bourgeois) state.4
Hegel’s civil society includes the totality of concrete, real social states. Starting
from such concrete relations, Hegel understands the participation of politics in state
affairs as an expression of the plurality of relationships in which civil society is
articulated.
So we may see that in Hegel’s vision civil society includes not only the sphere
of economic relations and class formation, but also the administration, justice and
1 Immanuel KANT, Scritti politici e di filosofia della storia del diritto, Utet, Torino, 1956, p. 294.
2 Ibidem,p. 294.
3 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile…cit., p. 61.
4 Gheorghe L. STOICA, Concepte, idei și analize politice, Ed. Diogene, București, 1999, p. 106
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police or corporative order. In essence, according to Hegel, civil society “is the
difference that interposes between family and state, although its completion is
subsequent to that of the state, for being the difference it assumes beforehand the
state, and, in order to subsist, civil society must regard the state as an independent
entity”.1
Continuing Locke’s, Spinoza’s, Rousseau’s and above all Hegel’s ideas, Marx
too deals with the problems connected with civil society. From the beginning, says he,
civil society designates “the totality of the individuals’ material relationships within a
given stage of development of the productive forces. In fact, according to Marx,
society is defined as “the real home, the theatre of any history, and we can see how
absurd is the heretofore view on history”, which limits it to the deeds of statesmen
and states, and ignores real relationships. In Marx’s opinion, civil society includes the
entire economic and commercial life of a certain period of time and is therefore
broader than the state and the nation; on the other hand, it must assert itself externally
as nationality, and internally as state.
In his work On the Jewish Question, Marx describes brilliantly the role of the state,
as well as of civil society, in their interconnection:
“Only when the real, individual man will have summarised in himself the
abstract citizen, as an individual man in his empirical life, in his individual work,
in his individual relationships, only then will he become a member of the human
species, and not until man will have recognised and organised ‘his own
capacities’, as social capacities, consequently not separating social force from
himself, and the social force is no longer divided by the political power, not
until then will human emancipation be achieved”.2
The classical view on civil society reaches now a stage from which it will
continue to develop till the twentieth century taking the form of liberal as well as
socialist political theories.
In the last century, continuing and developing these ideas, Antonio Gramsci
offered an interesting point of view on civil society. Formulating his conception on
civil society in Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebook), he resumed and studied thoroughly
the multiple aspects of this concept. That is why we witness today a real “re-
discovery” of this idea with a large audience in many countries of Eastern Europe,
South America and North Africa. So is it an accident that Gramsci’s works are so
widespread in the whole world? By civil society he means “a complex network of
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Principiile filosofiei dreptului, Editura Academiei, București, 1969, pp.
222-223.
2 Karl MARX, La questione ebraica e altri scritti giovanili, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1969, pp. 78-79 (“Sulla
questione ebraica”).
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The meaning and the significance of the term sometimes vary because of the
specific particularities detectable in the ample movements of organisations such as
Solidarity (Polish trade union), Charta 77 (Czechoslovakia) and the National Forum of
Hungary. Still, the resemblances ensue from the universal character of these aspects
of civil society: human rights, the need of democracy, of liberty, etc.
The people’s enthusiastic response to the first free elections after 1989 in
Central and Eastern Europe was due, as Adam Przeworski will say, to fierce and even
long-lasting struggles.1 In that context (of the 1990s), the idea of civil society had a
particular echo in Central and Eastern European countries. It took the form of
conferences and articles and was sometimes used even by the ruling parties as a sort
of political slogan.2
In his work The Idea of Civil Society, published in 1992, in U.S.A., Adam Seligman
points out this fact with much rigor. He describes in detail the manifestations of civil
society in different regions of the world and concludes that this concept was perceived
in a certain way by the citizens of Bucharest, Vilnius, Budapest or Prague, and in a
quite different way by the citizens of Chicago, Toronto, Oxford or Princeton.
That is why, besides the various theoretical significances and besides the
sometimes fascinating political priorities, related to the idea of civil society, ultimately
it is a synthesis of the public and the private welfare or of ideal and social aspirations.
Therefore, for many theoreticians the idea of civil society embodies an ethic ideal of
public and social order which, if it does not overcome the conflictive needs of
individual interests and of social weal, at least it attempts to harmonise them.3 In order
to shed more light upon the meaning of this concept we shall furthermore refer to a
country from Northern Europe, namely Sweden, where civil society plays a very active
part in the life of society as a whole, as well as in each individual’s specific political
and social life. More precisely, we have in view the citizens’ trust in each other.
Swedish society allows its citizens to benefit of a wholesale institutionalization (for
instance in the case of public instruction) based on a deeply rooted common culture
regarding solidarity and trust. It should also be mentioned that in Scandinavian
countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland) public education is free of charges and
constitutes the ideal frame of society’s education. Examining the same aspects this
time in Eastern European countries, we notice a quite different situation. In this part
of the world, especially in Poland, the Church played an extremely important role. In
order to understand the quite active political role of the Polish Church, a real political
actor, we should mention that it transformed itself in an essential pillar of civil society.
Ethnical and religious divisions represent another particularity of Eastern civil
societies, justifying the significance of the syntagm of Eastern and Western civil
society. Likewise, an essential and distinctive feature of Eastern civil societies, from
Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, was the existence of samizdat writings asserting a
different vision on the individual as an autonomous social actor and as an ethical and
1 Ibidem, p. 119.
2 Ibidem, p. 223.
3 Ibidem, p. 7.
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moral entity, different from the political tradition of the respective countries. T. H
Marshall, as well as Arend Lijphart or Robert Dahl also include in their views on
democracy such aspects of the civil society. Adam Seligman identifies the following
elements: 1) the liberty to create and to adhere to organisations; 2) freedom of speech;
3) franchise; 4) eligibility in public functions; 5) the right of political leaders to obtain
support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information (liberty of expression); 7) free
elections without any administrative interference; 8) the institutions resulting from
elections depend on votes and on other preferences, etc.1 Mention should be made of
the fact that in the Western world the sense of the idea of civil society and democracy
cannot be understood without the close connection of the two concepts. In the
Eastern world, however, where real democracy does not exist and where the afore-
mentioned elements are thereby absent, we do not meet that civic spirit which creates
a propitious climate for the active functioning of civil society. The constitution and
the laws alone cannot safeguard liberty, which is kept alive only through the citizen’s
conflictive participation in public affairs. There is no liberty without conflict; by
nature, man is a partisan being and confliction is an un-removable dimension of
politics. Especially in Central and Eastern European countries, the question of civil
society takes sometimes unilaterally into consideration certain themes as justice or
solidarity. Voluntary associations or interest-based groups and corporative groups
constitute the essence, as well as the existence form of civil societies, argued Hegel in
the nineteenth century, along with other philosophers, such as Charles Tayler or
Michael Walzer, who speaks for instance about “the spheres of justice”. The
difference between these groups and the type of identity and of group alliances
characterizing the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe consists in the nature and
the determination of the relationships existing among several groups and among the
members of the same group.
In Western countries, civil society’s voluntary associations are interest-based
groups organised in such a way as to defend their mutual interests at institutional
levels (strategic action, as Habermas calls it). Their interaction with other groups (and
with the state) is characterised as rational instrumental orientation.2
Taking into account the processes that took place in 1989 in Budapest, Berlin,
Prague, Sophia and Bucharest, in his book Reflections on Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the
political scientist Ralph Dahrendorf detects a common objective of all these
“changes” or rather “revolutions”, i.e. their anti-dictatorship and anti-totalitarian
character. Yet the phenomenon is much more complex and its aim was to build the
new Eastern European societies on real democratic principles and on the principles of
the state of justice. In this context, civil society knew a significant process of
revitalisation. Auto-determination and the implication of individuals that think and act
acquired in the whole world an ever greater importance. By their action they became
everywhere in the world and especially in Western and Eastern countries major actors
in the environmental protection movement and in the defence of human rights and
1 Ibidem, pp. 226-227.
2 Ibidem, p. 17.
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liberties. When the conflict between East and West ended, most of the states tended
to consider themselves as more and more democratic, and, consequently, more civil
and closer to the values of civil societies in terms of human rights, protection of the
environment, defence of freedom, etc. Further on, we shall refer to civil society’s
functioning and existence in inter-war and nowadays Romania, as well as in Central
and Eastern Europe.
But can we still speak of a civil society in today’s Romania? The question seems
rhetorical, yet we shall try to show how it functions.
Romania’s civil society developed more thoroughly only after the enforcement
of the Constitution of 1923 which stipulated the first plenary acknowledgment of the
citizens’ freedom of association. However, till the first half of the nineteenth century,
there were few significant activities organised at the level of the Romanian civil
society. Nevertheless, all specialists agree that the existence and the assertion of civil
society can be traced back only in Romania, whereas her neighbours, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, were subject to dictatorship or to a severe
totalitarianism. Therefore, in the inter-war period Romania’s democratic regime was
widened and even generalised by the introduction of the universal suffrage which led
to the emergence of a rather fragile civil society.
The well-known Romanian political scientist Matei Dogan underlined brilliantly
these aspects and in 1946 he put them down in his Statistical Analysis of Romania’s
Parliamentary Democracy.
Did Romania really have in the inter-war decades a genuine parliamentary
democracy? Matei Dogan’s answer leaves no doubt: “We cannot firmly state that
during the inter-war period there was an authentically democratic regime in
Romania”.1 Furthermore, referring to the same context, this political scientist of
Romanian origin, living on the banks of the Seine, explained even more minutely the
causes of this phenomenon:
“We must… admit that in any democracy there is a gap between theory and
reality. We may however say that this gap was nowhere else deeper than in
Romania, a country where real democracy never existed. People’s sovereignty
was just a name and franchise had nothing in common with a representative
regime [...]. Liberties were too feebly fought for to be properly understood. The
people remained calm while at the surface a delicate revolution was going on.
There was no political education at all. There were many principles, but no
visible progress was made. With the rulers’ abuses and dishonesty, with the
rulers’ indolence and weakness, the Romanian people did not understand the
1 Matei DOGAN, Analiza statistică a “democrației parlamentare” din România, Editura Partidului social-
democrat, București, 1946, p. 109.
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value of the principles written in the Constitution and did not really assimilate
the meaning of democratic virtues”.1
1 Ibidem, p. 110.
2 Dialogue for Civil Society, “Report on the state of civil society, in Romania”, 2005, p. 18.
3 Ibidem, p. 21.
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rather feebly in the democratic process of Romania. Although there exists a law
regarding ministerial responsibility, neither in the recent past did it function, nor
nowadays. And although everybody accepts the thesis according to which the
Democratic Convention’s victory is to be credited to civil society’s support,
democracy in Romania suffered considerably because of the vicissitudes encountered
by civil society. After the elections of 2000, the relationship between civil society and
the new social democratic government was a thorny one, and the government was
often accused of trying to subdue both media and civil society.1
That is why the change of power of 2004 was perceived as positive, since the
new government was considered to be cooperative with civil society.2 But things did
not go on so smoothly and some of the many hardships civil society would have to
cope with would have their roots in this kind of “cooperation”. Nowadays, civil
society crosses a very difficult period. Because of the frequent attempts to limit civic
rights by overbidding totalitarianism, freedom itself is queried in Romania. Needless
to say, in civil society the safeguarding of liberty implies the existence of ethos and of
the awareness that life is to be lived in a community. Liberty is always influenced by
the good functioning of democratic forms so that the management of civic affairs
might be entrusted to persons pertaining to all social classes according to their activity,
merits and professional capacities. Therefore, the noncompliance of civic rights leads
to the nonexistence of civil society. However, there are civic rights in Romania, still,
by and large, they are only formally acknowledged. Consequently, modern democracy
should imperatively prevent the transformation of the leaders into a dictatorial
minority. The repeated attempts to use the procedure for government accountability
and the disregard of the Parliament are all significant symptoms that impede the
correct functioning of the democratic game.
That is why, the purpose of the frequent free elections organised on a large
scale in other countries is to confront and test the democratic qualities of a society
and to submit democratic institutions to a systematic survey so that the persons who
have the power might be reconfirmed on or replaced from the political scene.
This is a first function secured by the elective mechanisms of democracy, which
guarantees that the options of certain majorities will become dominant interests at
local and political levels. Thus can be elaborated tendencies in defining regional and
national strategies of collective administration acceptable to various socio-human
entities. The second function is secured by more subtle mechanisms, the so called
selective mechanisms of democracy meant to formulate and thereafter to implement
this strategy. It goes without saying that in today’s Romania all these things do not
exist. Lately, Romanian unions were not able to organise any large demonstration and
there was a pensioners’ movement at which only one person was present. Yet
“participation” and civic activism are the distinctive signs of a genuine civil society.
1 Ibidem, p. 19.
2 Ibidem, p. 20.
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“Civil society” has three levels of manifestation. The first level refers to the
individual, to the way he relates to power (following his own interests), to his civic and
social rights. The second level is the level of autonomous social groups. At this level
individuals’ interests crystalise giving them the possibility to manifest themselves
outside political institutions. Finally, the last level includes political parties,
associations, clubs, etc. through which individuals’ interests and desires express
themselves more efficiently with regard to political society (power). Having in mind
Romania’s concrete social realities we may say that the major structural weakness of
civil society is the citizens’ low level of participation in associative life, along with a
feeble level of organization and limited relationships among civil society organizations,
all these aspects hindering the development of a strong non-governmental sector.
Despite the numerous attempts made by civil society organisations to mobilise the
citizens around problems of both local and national public interest, people’s reaction
remains shy. Although improved in 2005 and 2006, the organisation of Romania’s
civil society is still fragile, marked by a limited cooperation and communication among
civil society organisations. Thus, in a well-constituted civil society, if we may speak of
“direct democracy”, then it stops at the first above mentioned level, i.e. at the role of
bestowing confidence upon persons elected according to their capacity to be
represented. This statute may also be acquired according to a sum of specific qualities
which allow them to integrate into a superior political game, where the ordinary man’s
diverse options (and more than once divergent) are interpreted and correlated in order
to voice the fundamental interests of certain groups, communities, etc.
Another major aspect is that a community which identifies itself by certain
values and assumes general responsibilities becomes a component of civil society. And
as soon as the social group’s identity is affirmed and institutionalised, it becomes an
active element in the sphere of social and political relationships. The uppermost level
of civil society functionality is its relationship with state institutions. This ratio
expresses the capacity of civil society organisms to interpret social reality according to
a criterion of authentic adherence to the interests of social groups in whose name they
speak without resorting to opportunism or fashions. Therefore civil society without
which authentic democracy cannot be conceived implies a continuous formation of a
political class, made up of a political party system. Consequently, the multiparty
system is a sine qua non condition of the existence of a civil society worthy of this
name and offering to social groups and classes the opportunity to militate for
freedom, autonomy, identity, civilisation and human dignity. Partially that is why the
institutionalisation of the single-party system existing in the former communist regime
and claiming to hold the monopoly of power irreconcilably contradicts the ideal of
liberty and of social group autonomy, as well as the groups’ possibility to manifest
their specificity as actors of history.
But when civil society is too frail in a state, it gets isolated and its role in the
democratic transformation of a country decreases significantly. It is precisely what we
have witnessed in Romania until recently. The country’s resources diminish or are
reduced and at the same time are directed towards other destinations, as governance
or transparency. On that account, one of NPOs main role was to participate in the
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democratisation of the Romanian society. One of the most important tools they used
to reach this objective were a democratic discourse, the introduction and promotion
of good practices cultivated by foreign NPOs. Taking into account the salutary results
obtained by Romanian NPOs, they were perceived as real promoters of democratic
values in Romanian society. And they were accepted as indispensable partners of both
the Romanian government and E.U. For this reason, they can be identified with such
organisations as those whose objective is to consolidate a democratic society in
Romania. For instance, the Pro-democracy Association is one of the most visible
organisations, for it succeeds to mobilise large masses and due to the impact of its
activity. In this respect, we should also mention as active promoters of high
democratic values the Romanian Academic Society, the Institute for Public Policies or
the Centre for Independent Journalism.1 In Romania, nowadays the state accepts the
autonomy of civil society, still its organisations are sometimes the object of uncalled
for interferences. If at national level autonomy is no longer a major problem, at local
level public authorities still exert a quite visible influence on NPOs activities. In this
respect, the case of the Pro-Europe League of Târgu Mureş constitutes an eloquent
example. After having criticised the mayor of Târgu Mureş, civil society organisations
were threatened that they would be evacuated from their headquarters situated in a
building owned by the state. Such cases were investigated by researchers and their
conclusion is that in many localities there is a relationship of dependency or even of
clientelism between NPOs and political actors.2
However, both NPOs and the state struggle to find a way towards a genuine
dialogue. The first efforts to reach an institutional relation can be traced back in 1994,
but the situation took an evident turn for the better in 1996, when different structures
were set up in order to secure the dialogue of the state with NPOs at local as well as
national level. Within the government, each ministry possesses an office charged to
supervise the relationship with civil society and to inform it on the cabinet’s
programme and activity; needless to say, there are certain offices which do not
perform their duties. At local level, despite a few exceptions, the interaction is
satisfactory. At national level, NPOs are invited to state their opinion on legislative or
political projects, as well as on public policies, but NPOs representatives pretend this
attitude is purely formal, since the government seldom takes into consideration the
suggestions made by civil society. As the access to legislation is rather limited, NPOs
contributions to implement public policies are often obstructed. Still, as far as the
implementation of the community acquis is concerned, the cabinet took counsel with
NPOs on certain chapters and acknowledged their beneficent contribution.
It is worth mentioning that in Romania only a small number of NPOs benefits
of the state’s support.3 As far as NPOs are concerned, we may conclude that their
activity stimulates the development of civil society.
1 Ibidem, p. 48.
2 Ibidem, p. 42.
3 Ibidem, p. 46.
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The most stable democracies, namely those where all these mechanisms
function well or almost well, succeed to reduce as much as possible discordant
options at macro political level by defusing tense situations at “local political” level
(simple administrative management). Thus, the complex network of civil society
operates like an unobtrusive system of individual and social behaviour conditionings,
as an integrative matrix of each individual in the universe of culture, traditions, morals,
common sense, conformism, etc. that contribute to build and structure a nationwide
moral and intellectual coherence, endorsed by a convergence of certain political and
economic objectives nourished by different social groups.
By attentively feeling the social pulse, in democratic societies the political class
does not oppose civil society, but rather follows its trail. The interaction of civil
society with the state engenders a minimal social cohesion, wherein civil society
elements represent a sort of self-control, self-regulation and self-improvement of the
“social body”. Civil society is a structure specialised in reducing tensions or conflictive
situations generated by their discordant interests in order to insert them in a “normal”
dynamics recognised as such by the state. In Romania, in spite of a normal
development of civil society, particularly in the last five years we notice a disregard
especially of state authorities as far as civil society is concerned. In this respect, the
vigorous revival of secret services stands as an outrageous example. Public opinion
does not cease to warn that specialised agencies have the possibility to interfere in
Romanian citizens’ private calls. Moreover, media is about to become more and more
centralised, newspapers acting like propaganda tools favouring in power authorities.
And to crown it all, the MPs of the former governing party struggled to pronounce
media “a threat” and finally succeeded in doing so.
Until last year, at every step, Romanian authorities were infringing the
principles of the state of justice and the separation of powers doctrine. The most
revealing example to illustrate this statement is that Romanian judges (i.e. the judicial
power) were “forced” to obey the former ruling party’s orders. The Supreme Council
of Magistracy (S.C.M.) is the only institution that seems to ignore the Romanian
president’s express command. For this reason, in his frequent apparitions on T.V.
president Băsescu has declared that justice representatives “have compromised
themselves”. Even the Senate was often rebuked because it did not embrace the order
“established” by the former majority in Parliament. The upper chamber of the
Romanian Parliament was permanently scolded. Instead of being voted in Parliament,
laws were enforced directly by the government which as a general rule disdained
parliamentary regulations. An event never seen before in democratic societies
happened in 2009 – premier Boc’s government was deposed through a motion of
censure initiated by the opposition. After the Romanian president’s refusal to appoint
Mr Johannes as prime minister, Emil Boc became once more the leader of the cabinet.
And after the presidential elections of 2009, it was the same Mr Boc who was
nominated as Romania’s prime minister. A new majority in the Parliament was
obtained through a clever expedient: some former MPs of the Social Democratic
Party and of the National Liberal Party created a new party, friendly to the
government. After countless abnormal stratagems and compromises, or after
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Nowadays, in Central and Eastern Europe civil society seems to function better
than in Romania. One of the causes might lie in a different historical background, for
in countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary certain elements of civil society
could manifest themselves even during the previous political regime. An even more
profound explanation might be that in those regions liberties and rights have much
deeper roots. “In Poland and Czechoslovakia intellectuals and workers tried to loosen
the totalitarian screw-vice.” As far as civil society is concerned, Hungary too has an
interesting history. Long before the changes of 1989, and long before Gorbachev’s
ascension at the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, civil society’s
functioning was the talk of all Budapest. More precisely, people then talked about a
“School of Budapest”, as well as about certain names inspired initially by Lukacs’
ideas, who became great celebrities even on the other side of the Atlantic. Let’s name
just Agnes Heller, Ferenc Fehler, Gyorgy Markus and Mihaly Vajda, and we shall have
a general idea about Hungarian civil society.
The quite complex creation of the “School of Budapest” was essentially the
work of Georg Lukacs, who founded it shortly before he passed away. His last book
“The Ontology of Social Being” generated many debates, and some of his pupils
criticised the master’s great unachieved work by expressing their skepticism about
some of the Hungarian philosopher’s solutions. After 1971 this “school” was enriched
by Agnes Heller’s contributions, but a decisive role was played by Istvan Herman,
who co-opted an important number of industrious young men. By attacking their
“master”, they brought again to light the “theory of reflection” formulated in the
“Ontology”, denounced the ambiguity of the terms of “essence-phenomenon”, as
well as the questionable definition of the relation between natural sciences and
philosophy, etc. Such writings and contributions, the “novelties” they introduced and
the “transgressing” of the ideological frame imposed by the “political instructors” of
that time called for discussions and generated new opinions that undermined the
Stalinist dogmatism. In the context of the 1980s Mihaly Vajda’s work seems
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Further on, Havel declares that “a totalitarian power represents an alarm signal
for contemporary civilization”. In some other writings, Havel insists that we should
1 Jan PATOCIKA, Saggi eretici sulla filosofia della storia, Einaudi, Torino, 2008, p. 176.
2 VaclavHAVEL, “Politica antipolitică”, Polis, No. 1, 1994, pp. 86-87.
3 Ibidem, p. 3.
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live in society “only in the name of truth”. This thesis was formulated as late as 1963
by the representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, such as Solzhenitsyn and Yevgeny
Yevtushenko, the co-authors of the manifesto “Live not in lies”. In a similar way, in
“The power of the Powerless”, the dissident Havel sympathises with those who still
believe in a new kind of humanity, different from the small group of Western
bourgeois.1 In Havel’s view, it is possible to establish a new type of humanitarian
order, a sort of “new polis”, a parallel polis. This would be a kind of power
established outside the already existing structure. He has in mind a structure able to
generate ethical values, values that give life a meaning and contribute to the revival of
an authentic democracy. Havel shared Potočka’s opinion, namely that “a solidarity of
the beaten” is thus created. They both referred to “those who dared to face the
impersonal power, countering it with the only thing they had at their disposal: their
own humanity”.2 For more than ten years, “Charta 77” concurred to the awakening or
rather to the revival of the Czechoslovakian society. The intellectual upholders of the
chart tried to win to their cause “those who were not satisfied with how things went
on in their country”. During the last years of the regime, more and more people
joined the demonstrators and protesters. On the eve of 1989 changes, the workers
joined the intellectuals and the students went to factories trying feverishly to convince
the population to mobilise and act. The streets echoed with slogans such as “We are
the people, but you, whom are you with?”
In 1988, twenty years after the suppression of “the Prague Spring” and due to
the influence of “Chart 77”, Dubcek’s name was again on everybody’s lips. The
general strike of November 27, 1989 paralysed the whole society. At the end of the
same year, the Czechoslovakian communist regime fell. Civil society had made
possible a “velvet revolution”.
Slovenia offers us another remarkable example. In this state, created in 1991,
after having detached itself from the former Yugoslavia, civil society asserted itself as
an alternative and not as an “opposition”, as a distinct sphere, independent and
opponent to the action of the state. The distinction between state and civil society was
the starting point for the critique and rejection of the self-governing system. As an
alternative, civil society assumed the understanding of civil and social action as a
positive activity, producing new open social spaces that created an alternative culture
and independent public spheres.3 The magazine Punk hosted the first new social
movement in Slovenia that introduced the concept of independent social life, proving
that it was really possible and inventing the first elements of a new social and political
language. Civil society is a sine qua non condition of democracy. And Slovenia was
longing to have one too.
1 Richard RORTY, “Canteremo nuove canzone?”, in Giancarlo BOSETTI (a cura di), Sinistra punto zero,
Donzelli Editori, Roma, 1993, p. 76.
2 Tomaz MASTNAK, Polis, No. 1, 1994, p. 102.
3 Ibidem, p. 103.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1 Ibidem, p. 105.
2 Adrian POP, Originile și tipologia revoluțiilor…cit., p. 411.
3 Tibor SZABO, Gyorgy Lukacs, filosofo autonomo, Ed. La Città del Sole, Napoli, 2005, p. 240.
4 Stefano BIANCHINI, Le sfide della modernità, Rubbetino, Catanzara, 2009, pp. 319-320.
5 Guido LIGUORI, Sentieri gramsciani, Ed. Carocci, Roma, 2006, p. 37.
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achieved either by taking into account the fact that the stress laid on oppressed groups
disappeared, or by opening “a new opportunity”, the revival of “the complex of
autonomous collective action” concerning subordinate classes. It is a whole complex
that might constitute civil society.
Robert Cox, for instance, includes in civil society the entire network of non-
profit organisations that along with the voluntary system represent those interstitial
forms which are not part of the market. We refer to that “framework where cultural
transformations take place”, as Antonio Gramsci put it in Quaderni. On this basis, Cox
speaks about a new participatory democracy and “a global civil society”, ground of a
possible “alternative world order”. Jean L. Cohen too redefines civil society as an
“aggregate of voluntary associations”. In 1992, together with Andrew Arato, Cohen
wrote “Civil Society and Political Theory”. In their work, the authors underline the
“relevance to modern political theory of the concept of civil society and the attempt
of building at least the general framework of a theory of civil society, fit to the
conditions existing in contemporary societies”.1 The specialists as well as the public
pay again close attention to the concept of civil society, because of their confrontation
with military and communist dictatorships in different parts of the world. It is easy for
Cohen to place Gramsci in the centre of cultural storms, since the Sardinian thinker
insisted heavily on the autonomy of society in its relation with the state, Gramsci
being perceived in this case as one of the “noble parents” of the trend which opposes
civil society to the state.
Stephen Gill too stresses the intellectuals’ importance in creating an alternative
“collective conscience”. Classes and parties have no place in this frame. Very
interesting and actual is also Giuseppe Vacca’s interpretation, according to which
Gramsci is the “thinker of globalisation, of the crisis of the nation-state and of the
creation of a global civil society”.2 Marcela Montomari argues that especially if we take
into consideration the post-national democratic horizon, the centrality of civil society
and the acknowledgment of the important role of the market these are the most
important frameworks for the interpretation of democracy and of the issues of
contemporary societies. In the context of contemporary debates on civil society Anne
Showstack Sasson’s considerations are also very interesting. This author too refers to
voluntarism, NPOs, the tertiary sector, all these being the substance of the new
relationships linking the state and the individual. Civil society is the texture through
which are reclassified the duties and the supporting roles of the “welfare state”, as well
as the capitalist market economy, incapable otherwise to satisfy most of the
individuals’ needs and requirements. Benedetto Fontana of USA stresses the frequent
“utilisation in today’s cultural and political debates of the term of civil society as
conceived either by Gramsci and Hegel or by the liberals”.
1 Ibidem, p. 38.
2 Ibidem, p. 39.
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Bibliography
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Daniel BARBU
University of Bucharest
Abstract: The author is trying to explain the communist strategy of taking over the
Romanian society beginning with coming into power in 1944 and developing during a
long period of more than forty years. The author tries to explain most people‘s lack of
reaction by their previous experience with authoritarian practices used in the last
decades on the Romanian political stage and later on, when repression has been more
and more replaced by manipulation, by some strive for normalcy of most citizens. The
author does not accept any exoneration of responsibility by the so called resistance
“through culture” which is considered to be similar with an almost pathological form
of ethical autism when visibility was a political burden, if not, at times, a life risk.
All these traditions could explain why politics was and still remains for many
Romanians such an intricate burden.
An anthropologist who had spent many years observing the people of socialist
Romania has concluded his research with a closing statement that all those partaking
in the case could underwrite beyond any reasonable doubt:
“Most people to whom I talked – young and old, men and women, workers,
peasants, and clerks – said that one of the best things about the revolution was
that it allowed them to be left alone to live their lives as they saw fit. Some
workers, in fact, were elated to be relieved of the obligation to belong to any
party. Membership in the Communist Party was, after all, a burden: it infringed
on their time, energy, and personal autonomy. Now that party affiliation is
voluntary, Olt Landers are gleefully exercising their right ‘to have no business
with anyone,’ as they say”.1
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businesses than embark on a common project. This is to assume that the entire
process of production, circulation and distribution of social goods in the public sphere
was strictly controlled and centralized by the Communist Party. According to the
Marxist model of monopoly, this domination of a single party was meant to yield a
maximum and exclusive political payoff for the communist hierarchy. In order to
accomplish this task, the single party had to prevent the people it ruled from
abandoning their participation in the communist project of social engineering, as well
as from engaging in different forms of reluctance, resilience, or even worse, of silent
or vocal protests.
There is no doubt that, under totalitarianism, the public sphere did not
constitute and did not function as a space established by the citizens through a free act
of political will, eventually translated in the explicit language of a covenant, but in a
somehow Hobbesian manner, as a space created by the “sovereign”, namely the
Communist Party, for its own advantage and usage.
It is equally obvious that any public square has to bear with the intent of its
sovereign author. Which does not necessarily mean that such a space is the exclusive
result of the choice or decision of a single political subject, be it a collective one. In
fact, there may not be, at the center of the public space, a forbidden city where all the
threads of power inevitably and ultimately lead. We should rather figure out any public
space as a stratified network of commands, compunctions, contradictions, causes,
compulsions and complicities that manage a given society. The public realm could
then be defined as an anonymous strategy that coordinates individual tactics, personal
initiatives, unequally distributed instructions, duties, and rights that are unremittingly
transferred between social actors, and converted at the level of personal responsibility.
In such a setting, the power of the sovereign “is not an institution, is not a structure, is
not a certain authority with which some are equipped” and others are not, but “the
name we give to a complex strategic situation in a given society”1.
The Romanian Communist Party found itself in a favourable strategic
situation from 1944 to 1948. As of May-June 1944, the initiative in the Romanian
public sphere, that is to say the monopoly of the restructuring of power relations,
belonged entirely to the communists, as it was the case in all the countries of Eastern
Europe2. Until August 30th, 1948, when by the decree No. 221 the General Direction
of the Security of the People (Securitate) was set up, and the total and explicit
elimination of any direct or potential opposition took on a public, systematic and
violent aspect, the communist strategy of taking over the society has not been one of
a prevailing and declared repression, but has rather espoused a legal and political
character.
From 1944 to 1948 the Romanian Communist Party made use of the public
law in order to abolish individual rights. The new power device was born and outlined
within a well-thought dynamics of licit and illicit political operations, of interdiction
1 Michel
FOUCAULT, La volonté de savoir, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 123.
2François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires, I. L’ere de Staline (1945-1952), Seuil, Paris, 1952, pp.117-
124.
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Communism and Revolution. The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,
1964, p. 78.
3 Ibidem, pp. 86-88.
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the failure of the “historical” parties to coordinate a credible and coherent opposition;
the precariousness of the political organization of social-democracy and labour
unions; the great number of “bourgeois” politicians ready to accept to be “fellow
travellers”; the massive support of prominent intellectuals (culminating in 1948); the
incapacity (if not the indifference) of the society at large to understand the historic
character of the political issues at stake1.
And again, how was such a complete and rapid infiltration of the communists
in the fabric of the public space and in the bureaucratic structures of the Romanian
state possible? How come that Romanian public space, organized around intact
institutions (the army, the dominant Orthodox Church, the Royal Court, the
established “historical” parties, an influential academia), has proven itself to be so
unable to oppose any spontaneous resistance to the Soviet political input and its
domestic operators?
The answer to these uneasy questions should probably be sought in the
neighbourhood of the relations between the Romanian society and its traditional
political class. Power relations, as they were practiced during the inter-war period, and,
then, in the years of the dictatorship of king Carol II, and later throughout the World
War II were obviously in crisis. The dual political system that strove between 1918
and 1938 to conciliate strong executives inclined to suppress political liberties with
weak parliaments elected by male universal suffrage obviously had failed in convincing
Romanians that democracy, as they were given the chance to know it, was worthwhile
defending. What the survivors of the former constitutional organization were
unwilling to accept and analyse was their very responsibility for the authoritarian drift
of 1938.
Organized political opposition to communism was thus the deed of re-emerged
political actors, tempted to draw on the same political language they used in the
aftermath of World War I and that had already given public proofs of helplessness in
the face of authoritarianism. In front of them, the Communist Party expropriated the
democratic vocation of the “historical parties”2 and achieved a relative popular
approval by promising a radical, national, and modern breakthrough. In addition, the
affirmation of the “class” character of the communist program did not constitute an
innovation in Romanian political culture, the public having been accustomed for a
long time with revolutionary, ideologically-oriented formulations, of the kind used by
the National Peasant Party.
In fact, neither the bureaucratic-technocratic vocation of the Communist
Party, nor its ambition to control the personnel of the public administration system
were absolute novelties. The civil servants compelled, by the alternate use of threats
and recompenses, to leave their positions or to become members of the Party, had
1 Bela VAGO, “Romania”, in Martin McCANLEY (ed.), Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949,
Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1977, pp. 126-127.
2 François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires…cit. , pp. 120-121.
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been officially conscripted not so many years ago, in another bureaucratic party with
mass vocation, the single party of king Carol’s dictatorship1.
However controversial the recourse to statistics may be, numbers have at least
the merit of underlining the trends and of indicating with a certain amount of
accuracy the sense of a given historical process. Let us compare the communist
membership in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria2,
before the war and in 1947, in order to grasp the dynamics of popular support for the
new regime:
Wars”, in Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, Clement H. MOORE (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society.
The Dynamics of Established One-Party System, Basic Books, New York and London, 1970, p. 216.
2 François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires…cit. , p. 196.
3 The secondary role, if not the very decline of ideology in the process of communist recruitment and
assimilation in an yet non-communist society was well documented by Gabriel A. Almond (with Herbert
E. Krugman, Elisabeth Lewin, Howard Wriggins), The Appeals of Communism, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1954, p. 396.
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explicit refusal of formal, liberal-democratic politics. If between 1945 and 1948 the
new power - as soon as it gained command of the state – resorted to interdiction and
repression in a political and legal framework, after 1948 the Party employed itself to
transforming the very nature of power relations in order to discipline and normalize
social behaviours.
The communist method of government turns after 1948 into a disciplinary, or
more exactly a self-disciplinary power that depends less on repression and
interdiction, and more on the urge to action, on initiation, emulation, and
mobilization. In other words, communism was partial to bio-power1, to a power that
assumes the vital functions of the social body. In this setting, the individual can no
longer be conceived as a mere inert biological element who is formed, given sense, or
randomly hit by an exterior agent of power, but as a bearer of power, even as a co-
author of power, regardless of the fact that he exercises this power institutionally, or
on the contrary, he is just a victim of the institutions that host the power.
When looked from the post-communist common wisdom of the 1990s,
Romanian communism seems to be an anonymous, impersonal cataclysm that fell
unexpectedly upon a population forced to improvise its resistance: armed resistance in
the mountains, political resistance in prisons, moral resistance in the households,
resistance through culture, resistance through infiltration in the ranks of the party.
Totalitarianism is very often depicted according to the rules of a siege, as a regime
imposed through repression over a society that was in a permanent, though covert,
state of denial.
The data available today indicates the fact that repression – however heinous
and inexpiable its manifestations at the level of communities, families and persons –
seems to have not played a central political role. After 1948, police procedures, legal
proceedings, tortures, incarcerations, and capital executions did not constitute social
practices capable of defining by themselves and in themselves the nature, the scope,
and the objectives of power.
Therefore, even the obviously violent decade 1950-1960 was not centred on
repression as a cardinal method of government. Despite its incontrovertible role as an
instrument of social control and change2, repression was lodged at the periphery of
the main social trends. From 1950 to 1967, according to a report of the Council of
State Security3, 73,636 persons were convicted for “plotting against the social order”
or related offences, another 25,740 were interned, and another approximately 60,000
were assigned to mandatory residence. Which means that some 160,000 Romanians
suffered directly the penal rigors of the regime over its roughest 17 years. If we take
into account their families, by using a 4.5 ratio, it would result that totalitarianism hit
1 Michel FOUCAULT, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975, pp. 137-196.
2 Alexander DALLIN, George W. BRESLAUER, Political Terror in Communist Systems, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, 1970, p. 6.
3 Lucian NASTASĂ, “Conduita conspirativă sub regimul comunist: mit şi realitate”, in Lucian BOIA (ed.)
and destroyed the lives of around 700,000 people, i.e. 4% of Romania’s population of
that time.
Let us add to these designated political victims and their households another
80,000 peasants (to whom we ought to apply again the 4.5 ratio) that the Party
avowed to have prosecuted and convicted in relation with the collectivization
process1. We attach hence another 360,000 citizens that were the immediate object of
the repressive experiment. That would enlarge the “focus group” of repression –
direct victims and their families – to a number that does not exceed 6% of the total
population.
Assuming that, for whatever reason, the records of the confidential report of
the Securitate were understated, and considering that they do not include the 1945-1949
period, it seems reasonable to multiply the numbers by two in order to approximate
the maximum figure of the political victims implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by
the repressive institutions of the Communist Party, a figure in which we include the
families of these victims. Hence, 2,000,000 individuals, or a maximum of 12% of the
total population, may fall in the category of people afflicted by “the great terror”.
These figures correspond to the estimations made by one of the most
respected survivors of the communist prisons, who evaluated the number of those
incarcerated to 282, 000, of which 190,000 are thought to have died in detention2. If
we count up the 80,000 peasants that were the forced collectivization’s casualties to
the 160,000 political prisoners averred by the report of the Securitate, we obtain a
number close to Corneliu Coposu’s appraisal. The official sources and the most
authorized unofficial accounts seem to confirm each other.
What is though the implication of these somehow cynical calculations, as long
as an elementary ethic tells us that a political regime does not need to execute millions
in order to be definitively discredited? In fact, the counting of victims could never be
accomplished accurately, and does not provide as such neither moral reparation, nor
penal mitigation, and is ultimately relevant only for the place that these figures take up
in the post-communist memory. The repressive procedures, more than the actual
number of those marginalized, discriminated against, persecuted, and executed
represent sufficient evidence for the qualification of a political regime. It would be
naïve to assert that Romanian totalitarianism is less guilty because we can register
beyond any reasonable doubt 240,000 victims and not, for instance, 2,500,000. The
execution of a single blameless person by the hands of the state should summon our
conscience as forcibly as the extermination of thousands of innocent people. The
political responsibility of Romanian society is not in direct proportion to the number
of victims, just as the moral guilt and the penal accountability of those who
participated in the repression, or were aware of it and kept silent, is not dependent on
the computation of the victims.
1 The declaration of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary session of November 30, 1961 in Ghiţă
IONESCU, Communism in Romania 1944-1962, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 201.
2 Corneliu COPOSU, Dialoguri cu Vartan Arachelian, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 95.
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The question to which these figures can really answer is extremely simple and
has no ethical connotations whatsoever, being mainly relevant for the realm of social
science: those who suffered under totalitarianism were less or more numerous than
those who improved their status under state socialism? To put it in other words, did
the Romanian society perceive communism, at the personal or general level, as a
repressive and abhorring strategy of power, or on the contrary, as a solution for
national and individual development? Was there in the way the Romanians made it
through the Alltagsgeschichte of totalitarianism1 a dominant social behaviour that can be
uncovered by statistics? Has the average citizen been rather hostile than favourable to
communism? Statistically speaking, did totalitarianism advantage or disadvantage the
majority of the Romanians? Was the public space of state socialism leaning towards
exclusion or, on the contrary, of a mind to inclusion?
Let us look at several economic and social data from the period 1950-1970,
which overlaps the epoch unanimously considered to be the climax of repression.
First, between 1950 and 1970, the real income per capita increased with 250%2.
This unprecedented rise benefited mostly the segment of society newly conquered by
the civilization of the factory, i.e. 3,592,575 Romanians (20% of the total population) that
migrated from village to town between 1948 and 19663. It is fair to say that
industrialization, launched and conducted by state socialism, produced an irreversible
transformation of the social fabric. Nevertheless, it should be clearly emphasized that
this spectacular social change driven by industrialization did not solve, at least not in
Romania, the classic Central and East European “agrarian problem” by simply
replacing peasantry with a fresh working class, as some tend to believe4. The
resurrection of this issue in post-communist Romania confirms the observation that
the process of rapid and comprehensive industrialization was undertaken somehow at
the expense of a real modernization of the Romanian public sphere5.
Yet, the weight of those relying exclusively on incomes paid from the public
budget (wages and social funds) rose from 37.9% in 1950 to 71.5% in 19706. In
absolute figures, for instance, the number of retired persons insured by the state
system jumped from 251,400 in 1950 to 1,116,500 in 19707. As it would be expected,
the number of university students for 10,000 inhabitants evolves steadily form 17 in
1938, to 31 in 1950, and to 75 in 19708; also the number of high-school students is
1 For the methodological debate of this topic, Detlev PEUKERT, Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit: Neue
BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), Developments in East-European Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C.,
1993, p. 21.
5 Kenneth JOWITT, Revolutionary Breakthrough and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965,
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multiplied by ten from 1938 (49,287) to 1970 (505,891)1. Dependency with respect to
the state – to the type of work culture it created, to the incomes and services it
provided – registered thus a massive increase.
If we sum up these figures and compare them with those of the preceding
series we can immediately notice that the proportion of those for whom the
totalitarian regime represented a permanent and violent threat, an immediate or virtual
menace lies between 6% and 12%, while those for whom state socialism meant a
positive change in status and recognition, a stable and ever-increasing income, a
broader access to higher education, a closer tie with a providing state represent at least
20% (with an overwhelming maximum of 70%).
In order to wind up this reconstructive (and tentative) exercise in social
statistics, we still have to confront and ponder the probable average numbers of the
two ranges of data. In so doing, we could conjecture that the long communist rule
repressed, excluded and marginalized about 8% of Romania’s population, but was able
to bring material and symbolic benefits to around 45% of the same population,
through such means as the generalization of modern work methods, the massive
migration from backward rural to more developed urban areas, the constitution of a
dominant technical elite, the consolidation of a State welfare system. Moreover, as late
as 1999, one out of three Romanian adults stated their belief that the condition of
liberty under totalitarianism was the similar or even superior to that of the post-
communist period2. Ten years after the downfall of state socialism, the political side of
totalitarianism registered an approval rate of 30%.
The extreme mobility of these statistical data may suggest that, between 1948
and 1989, power relations did not function only with the aim of standardizing and
normalizing social behaviours. Of course, state socialism was paying a meticulous
attention to high numbers and strongly encouraged the collective expression of
consent, as any other system of domination necessarily does. And yet, the power was
especially interested in each citizen in particular, in the management of personal
attitudes, in the supervision of individual behaviours, in the political administration of
the living bodies3.
The civilization of the factory, as a product of the economic growth and of the
migration from rural to urban areas, instituted the realm of productive labour, or,
literarily, the “workfield” (câmpul muncii) as the sole legitimate path to social
recognition that each and every individual had not only the right, but also the duty to
follow. Interestingly enough, the requirement to conduct a socially useful work as a
precondition for the dully recognition of citizenship was introduced into Romanian
political culture, along with the notion of “workfield”, by an authoritarian right-wing
1 Ibidem, p. 136.
2 21% better, 9% the same, Metro Media Transilvania, Barometrul politic. Romania, Cluj, September
1999, p. 12.
3 Zoe PETRE, “Promovarea femeii sau despre destructurarea sexului feminin”, in Lucian BOIA (ed.),
Miturile comunismului românesc, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 255-271 and Gail KLIGMAN, The Politics of
Duplicity. Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles and London, 1998.
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1996, pp. 39-57 regards the “etatization” of time as a form of subjection proper to Ceauşescu’s Romania.
3 Mainly during the 1950s and the 1960s, the term “citizen” was used in the administrative language to
designate those who, for political reasons or because of their social origin, were unworthy to be
addressed as “comrade”.
4 Mary Ellen FISCHER, “Participatory Reforms and Political Development in Romania”, in Jan F.
TRISKA, Paul M. COCKS (eds.), Political Development in Eastern Europe, Praeger, New York and London,
1977, pp. 220-221.
5 Robert A. KING, A History of The Romanian Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1980,
pp. 100-101.
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consolidation of its own power in favour of a set of policies of inclusion in its power of
some social segments whose “functional autonomy” was politically recognized1. By so
doing, and despite the official discourse about the “monolithic unity” of the society
behind the party of the working class, the power of the single party ceased to be a
unique and indivisible power. That is because the strategy of inclusion called for an
operation of functional differentiation within each level of power, a power that was
structurally expanding and typologically diversifying, being shared by various
professional groups according to their degree of empirical expertise and to their
strategic position in the process of economic growth and social development2.
The portrait of a totalitarian regime at the age of inclusion, as drawn by
Kenneth Jowitt3, overlaps the figure of Romanian communism in Ceauşescu’s period:
the party strives to demarcate itself institutionally from its repressive apparatus; the
political manager tends to replace the political bureaucrat; the scope of power is
enlarged by means of institutionalized consultations with the major social groups; the
party expands its political influence as it seems to encourage its members not only to
be disciplined and committed, but also to value their individual social-political identity;
manipulation substitutes domination in the relationship between power and society;
public policies are elaborated according to development stakes, and not any more on
an ideological basis; the representative institutions of the state (the presidency of the
Republic, the Great National Assembly, the local administration) gain a larger
symbolic weight; the nation becomes an increasingly important social good; foreign
policy is no longer an ideological confrontation, but is approached in terms of
international cooperation. The only feature of an ideal-typical integration regime that
was absent in Romania is the presumed evolution from a neo-patrimonial leadership
to an oligarchic form of government. Nevertheless, after 1971-1972, some of these
integration tendencies lost ground to the temptation to return to certain charismatic
and mobilizing aspects of the first decade of communist history4.
Notwithstanding this a-typical reversal of political trends, Romanian society
responded to mobilization as well as to the integration put into effect by the
Communist Party. Indeed, when compared to all other countries from Central and
Eastern Europe, Romania had the highest percentage of adhesion to the Communist
Party, as these data from 1983 show5:
1 Kenneth JOWITT, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes”, in Jan F. TRISKA,
Paul H. COCKS (eds.), Political Development in Eastern Europe, Praeger, New York and London, 1977, p.
101.
2 Ibidem, pp. 98-100.
3 Ibidem, pp. 96-109.
4 Ibidem, pp. 110-111.
5 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ‘90, Fayard, Paris,
1993, p. 58.
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1 Trond GILBERG, “Romania: in Quest of Development”, in Ivan VOLGYES (ed.), Political Socialization
in Eastern Europe. A Comparative Framework, Praeger, New York and Washington and London, 1975, p.
155. For a comparison, in the mid 1960s, 50% of the Soviet academic personnel were members of the
Soviet Union Communist Party. T.H. RIGBY, Communist Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1968, p. 444. It should be noticed that the Romanian Communist Party
managed in two decades to mobilize most of the intellectuals, while the brother Soviet party needed half
a century to accomplish the same task.
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rebellion against the values the regime stood for. That is why all the important books
written under communism should not be considered today as being mere cultural
goods produced in keeping with the standards of state socialism and for its
consumption, but as landmarks of a collective movement of a non-violent resistance
to communism. Nor should their authors be looked at as well-to-do members of the
communist establishment.
Karl Jaspers already noticed, shortly after the end of World War II, that many
German intellectuals who did collaborate at first with the national-socialist state,
seeking certain social and symbolic payoffs, came eventually to distance themselves
from it on the assumption that they always expressed reservations in the private
sphere; in due course, they even claimed to have been victims of the regime, and, as
such, entitled to play an important role in the post-war period. According to Jaspers,
the guiltiness of this category of intellectuals - researchers, artists, professors and the
like - is in no way different of that of the members of the Nazi party. The exculpatory
circumstances they presented in their own defence - they have created, each in his
field, valuable spiritual goods and have preserved the authenticity of the German
cultural tradition – does not exonerate them from the responsibility of having refused
to undergo a self-clarification process1.
The language of Jasper’s analysis can be entirely applied to post-communism
in general, and to Romanian post-communism in particular. Those who claim to have
resisted through culture can be told, in Jaspers’ words, that they have only enjoyed the
“freedom of a king’s fool” and have solely kept alive an “illusion convenient only for
the leadership”2.
The resistance through culture seems a formula lacking any political and moral
sense as long as the entire culture of the five decades of Romanian totalitarianism was
the product of the ideology, and of the variable, but implacable mechanisms of
censorship. Ultimately, “to create” did not constitute a form of resistance, but of
participation, participation to the dynamics of the communist public space. On the
contrary, it would be more appropriate to speak about assent through culture. Censorship
was one of the instruments employed by the regime in order to fuel the “passion for
unanimity”, as a characteristic of the totalitarian societies3.
Therefore, one can say that within the totalitarian public space, censorship
fulfilled the function of the legitimate political observer. It ensured the visibility of
each and every cultural actor: either on the list of forbidden authors, or on the list of
edited authors. Not a single writer was left unnoticed. Censorship established who
should become visible for society and who should remain visible only for the state
employees who had the assignment to run the cultural operations on behalf of the
1 Karl JASPERS, Die Schuldfrage. Für Völkermord gibt es keine Verjährung, Piper, München, 1979, pp. 19-59.
2 In fact, Karl JASPERS’ book, originally published in 1946, should simply be “plagiarized” in order to fit
the post-communist setting: if German were to be replaced with Romanian, war with gulag, nazism with
communism, we could obtain an almost exact description of the moral landscape of the Romanian
aftermath of totalitarianism.
3 Carl J. FRIEDERICH, Zbignew K. BRZEZINSKI, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Harvard
1 Klaus von BEYME, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, Macmillan, London and New York, 1996,
p. 35.
2 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, New York, 1983,
pp. 250-253.
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rather unenlightened, but it was formulated from 1917 to 1989 with good faith and
enough good reasons by numerous prominent intellectuals1. Now things are somehow
clear. Nevertheless for many decades it was not unambiguous whether communism
was a criminal plan of exterminating bourgeoisie, liberty, and freethinking altogether,
or, on the contrary, it was a generous project of transformation of the course of
history.
If truth be told, Romania lacks the alternative visibility of the critical and civic
individualism of the “dissidents”. Let alone the isolated acts of defiance of Gheorghe
Calciu and Doina Cornea, the only project, unsuccessful as it has been, of a civic
movement led by intellectuals was the one superficially articulated around the writer Paul
Goma. Such forms of secluded intellectual dissent had actually no recruitment pool, as
the beginning of “mini-cultural revolution” of 1971 coincides with a massive
colonization of the instances of validation of intellectual careers and reputations by
the Party: at the end of 1971, 60% of the academicians, doctors in science, professors,
and researches were party members2. The numbers were as high among writers,
artists, and journalists.
Be it as it may, the regime was spared until the last minute any critical review
undertaken on a proper political basis. When the critique nevertheless manifested
itself, among the older generations of the nomenklatura, or through the voice of some
writers and intellectuals, it referred exclusively to the abuses committed by high-
ranking officials. The sole exception to this rule – that remained largely anonymous
and was not capitalized politically in the 1990s – is represented by several dissident
religious groups of Evangelical persuasions that passed from the moral incrimination
of the agents of repression to the political denunciation of the nature of the
totalitarian regime. Only for these groups the affirmation of identity was invested both
in a systematic refusal to collaborate in any way whatsoever with the regime or its
representatives, and in an explicit rejection of the communist ideology3.
The invisibility of dissent could thus explain why the revolution of December
1989 was not preceded by an ideological disenchantment. The power of Marxism-
Leninism was rather powerless outside the inner circle of historical militants of the
Communist Party. And this is because Romanian communism did not succeed in
authoring an intellectual history of the triumph and the decline of its own brand of
scientific socialism4. Instead, Romanian communism was the narrator of the natural
history of its power over life.
Anyway, Soviet type totalitarianism did not manifest itself, in the practice of
government, as an ideology-oriented political regime: the proper political function of
1 Norberto BOBBIO, Il dubio e la scelta. Intellectuali e potere nella societa contemporanea, La Nuova Italia
Scientifica, Roma, 1993, p. 223.
2 Robert A. KING, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, The Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1980, p.
104.
3 An account of the “Christian opposition” can be found in Dennis DELETANT, Ceauşescu şi Securitatea.
Constrângere şi dizidenţă în Romania anilor 1965-1989, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 215-221.
4 Cf. Vladimir TISMANEANU, Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, Free Press, New
York, 1991.
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ideology was to mark a clear hierarchy between the “owners” of the system (vested
with the authority to canonize and modify the ideological message) and its mere
“tenants”, that were only required to adhere to this message without being mandatory
or necessary to believe in it1. Notwithstanding their political theories, which they
usually tend to consider as scientifically proven and therefore as able guides to the
future, totalitarian regimes are characterized by their “disbelief” in ideas, not by a
widespread and internalized ideological creed2. In Romania, the ideology of scientific
socialism was no more than a routine of the official language used in public reunions,
where citizens were required to profess the belief in the regime’s capability of
governing, providing, and leading them to “the totalitarian happiness”3, that is to say
to a certain level of normalcy in everyday life4. The pursuit of normalcy was perhaps
the greatest moral misconduct under totalitarianism. The general disinterest for
community life and the unconditional pursuit of personal interest help drawing the
map of a geographical paradox: most Romanians lived in Romania without ever
acknowledging to be present at, let alone part of the events that took place in their
own country. The strive for normalcy of most citizens, the moral emigration in which
the largest part of the Romanian society (following in the footsteps of the intelligentsia)
had taken refuge for five decades was, in political terms, more damaging than the
overt or confidential collaborationism of some citizens with a repressive and
oppressive regime. The resistance “through culture”, the resistance within “your own
self” is ultimately equivalent with an almost pathological form of ethical autism. More
than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc, communist political mobilization seemed to
have been morally demobilizing5. In socialist Romania, it was common wisdom that a
lesser public visibility conveyed a greater personal safety6. Visibility was a political
burden, if not, at times, a life risk.
Without being in itself the object of moral judgment, totalitarianism is the
result of the accumulation and institutionalization of personal actions7, performed not
only to those who have promoted the vast utopian experiment in human degradation
that communism was all about8, but also by those, definitely more numerous, who
declined or postponed to oppose this experiment. Totalitarianism as such cannot be
1 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté…cit., p. 20.
2 Ibidem, pp.158-163. The measure of this disbelief in ideology in Pietro GRILLI DI CORTONA, Le
Crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti, Angeli, Milano, 1989, p. 360.
3 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté…cit., pp. 43-79.
4 Vladimir SHLAPENTOKH, “A Normal System? False and True Explanation for the Collapse of the
201.
6 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., p. 99.
7 JOHN-PAUL II, “Reconciliatio et paenitentia 16”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 77, Roma, 1985, p. 217.
8 The qualification belongs to Daniel CHIROT, “What Was Communism All About?”, East European
sued, cannot be presented before a judge, and cannot be inflicted a punishment1. That
is why, responsibility is not incumbent on the “system”, “the regime”, “the party”, but
on the people that have participated for forty-five years in the installation of the
system, in the consolidation of the regime, and in the advancement of the communist
party.
Of course, the Romanian Communist Party is to be held responsible for
hundreds of thousands of victims, but it is only fair to admit that communists should
be themselves counted among the casualties of the basic contradiction of Marxism-
Leninism as a political theory turned into a state ideology. Indeed, scientific socialism
had no vision of the distribution of sovereignty among the branches of the
government and between the government and the citizens. Instead, it went on about
the inevitable disappearance of state power. Indeed, the state and its coercive
institutions are in a Marxian perspective warranted only by economic inequality, and a
triumphant working class will waste them away in order to open the door to
communism. The historical framers of the communist theory and strategy left the
Party leaders with no philosophical guidance on how they could move along in
extending power beyond their own relatively closed circle2. From repression to
mobilization and inclusion, the Party failed in its attempts to share sovereignty,
because it had no concept of how its administration of the socialist mode of
production could become the self-rule of a socialist people.
The people itself had no real interest, and no experience, in self-government.
Socialist citizens were typically more concerned in exploiting for their private benefit
the state-owned means of production and in informally influence the management of
things, than in participating in the government of society3. The serpent in the paradise
paradise of state socialism was thus people’s inability of expressing any common
political awareness or recognizing the value of general social goods4, regardless of the
fact that such consideration for public stakes could have ratified or, on the contrary,
undermined the communist project.
If the weight of evidence indicates that the Party was successful in its
endeavours of nation building5 and political inclusion, the question remains why so
many Romanians have chosen to take an active and institutional part in supporting a
regime that, after its demise in 1989, could not find a single pro bono advocate.
To clarify this issue, we should look at the three main avenues of political
participation in a soviet-type political regime that could be identified6. First, the
1 Nevertheless,the ethic strategy adopted by many victims is summed up by the following sentences: “the
torturers are morally irresponsible” and “it is not important to blame people, but to indict ideas”,
Corneliu COPOSU, Confesiuni, dialoguri cu Doina Alexandru, Anastasia, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 118-119.
2 Carl A. LINDEN, The Soviet Party-State: The Politics of Ideocratic Despotism, Praeger, New York, 1983, pp.
159-160.
3 Wayne DIFRANCEISCO, Zvi GITELMAN, “Soviet Political Culture and ‘Covert Participation’ in
Policy Implementation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, 1984, pp. 618-619.
4 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., pp. 162-163.
5 Kenneth JOWITT, Revolutionary Breakthroughs…cit., pp. 73-230.
6 The typology is based upon the empirical research undertaken by Wayne DiFRANCEISCO and Zvi
formal, if not ritual, participation-pledge of the Party members, but also of the citizens at
large, mainly on election days intended to celebrate – through a regular 99% turn out
– the social triumph of state socialism. To cast the ballot in favour of the Communist
Party and its mass organization was not a political choice, but a pledge of allegiance.
Second, the participation-plea, of the citizens going before state and Party authorities to
solicit the enactment of a particular right, to request for services they deemed
themselves entitled to, or simply to ask for undue favours. Third, the participation-
persuasion of citizens taking the opportunity to informally negotiate with local officials
(mayors, Party activists, chief executive officers of state companies and factories,
heads of public institutions and the like) the way policies designed at high political
level could and actually should be implemented in any particular, real-life setting1.
Thus, the general public of state socialism was confident in its own ability to exert a
factual influence on the micro-social interpretation and execution of any given
decision of the state and Party hierarchy2.
When compared to the classical forms of political participation, well
documented throughout Western societies, this three-fold “communist” version of
political participation – where inducement towers over official commitment and
bureaucratic petition – is dramatically overturned. And, in order to be faithful to the
Leninist reading of Hegelian dialectics, it is doubly reversed. Primary, and contrasting
to the Western logic, the hegemonic Party does not sum up, ponder, and translate into
public policies a plurality of interests expressed by its different constituencies; quite
the opposite, the interests of all organized social and economic groups are defined by
the Party itself, through its unchallenged control over the institutional leadership of all
recognized labour, professional, local, ethnic, or religious associations, as an empirical
analysis of the Polish society has pointed out3. Secondly, and contrary to the most
basic understanding of the rule of law, when it comes to enforcement, both legal
norms and Party decisions are subject to a complex and sneaking process of
negotiation. Social ruling and economic planning were rather literary endeavours,
which meaning was almost always bargained by the affected citizens according to
circumstantial, incidental, sometimes accidental, and always local interests4.
This model of political participation seems to confirm the Foucauldian
perspective5 on political power, which should not be conceived as an autonomous
symbolic good that can be forcibly or legally obtained, that can be transmitted, shared,
1 For this last type of participation as experienced in Romania, David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, 1970, pp. 1242.
4 The challengers of the state and Party in this process of informal negotiations were rather local and
unstable networks with unstructured and incidental interests, as Janine WEDEL has proven for the
Polish case (The Private Poland: An Anthropologist’s Look at Everyday Life, Facts on File, New York,
1986), than proper official and/or unofficial corporate interests, as Valerie BUNCE believes (Subversive
Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, New York,
1999).
5 Michel FOUCAULT, La volonté…cit, pp. 112-129.
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or distributed, as something that can be “reached”, or kept, something one can lay
hands on, or risk to lose grip of. Of course, power relations are not exterior to other
types of relations – economic processes, labour dynamics, social mobility – but
manifest themselves, most of the time, as means of production, for they do not forbid or
permit according to an established set of norms, but create and let themselves be
created beyond the legal logic of permission and repression.
Then – and this may be perhaps the essential remark – power comes into being
from bottom to top. It is less the outcome of an overall contention between the
dominated and the dominators, or of a class struggle, or of the competition between
parties, or of the poise of multiple relations that command the constitution of
ownership, family, knowledge, or institutions. Power is rather the setting where the
tensions that arise among all these factors come to a particular arrangement or, better,
the place of redistribution and disciplining of conflicts that naturally stir up the social
body. Where there is power, there is necessarily resistance to power. The latter cannot
function without contending with a multitude of indispensable, probable, impossible,
dubious, spontaneous, enraged, perfidious, calculated, suppressed, solitary, inefficient,
violent, irreconcilable, interested, self-destructive, opportunist or ready-to-
compromise bodies of opposition. Like power relations, resistance knots are
irregularly distributed all across the social networks, and seldom amount to one great
refusal, to a massive and global denial, or to a coherent centre of revolt with a specific
address. Man as subject of liberty, and the state as agent of the law are present
together in the recipe of power.
To be sure, the inhabitants of state socialism indulged themselves in an “ethos
of dependency” with respect to the state1. But it would be only fair to add that they
were also able to shape their relations to the state in conformity with an “ethic of
socialist calculation”2. In the eyes of most citizens, the state was at the same time the
ultimate provider figure and an aggressive intruder into their private life. Thus, the
state and its agencies were simultaneously exploited and avoided by the ordinary
citizen. It seems therefore appropriate to acknowledge that the “democratic
centralism” supposed by the Leninist tradition to rule the Party and the socialist
society might have been in fact replaced by a spontaneous authoritarian decentralization.
The theory of “democratic centralism” holds that when the supreme leadership of the
Party has to adopt a policy, it should do so after a free discussion, a comprehensive
debate, and an organized agreement of the rank and file; but, once duly pronounced,
this particular decision should remain unquestioned and should be carried on without
any reservation and with the greatest of disciplines by all membership. In fact and in
the realm of real socialism, the supreme leadership assumed the exclusive authority to
decide on all matters without prior consultation of the Party members; instead, what
was authoritatively determined at the top always ran the risk to be received at the
bottom with compunction and put into effect in a manner contingent on local
circumstances and incidental interests. As a rule, the agents of these informal, grass
1 George SCHÖPFLIN, Culture and Identity …cit., p. 26.
2 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., p. 166.
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roots transactions were the local Party bosses who tried to accommodate the official
policies to the particular environment they directly knew and had the task to manage.
Nowhere else in Central and Eastern Europe was this kind of informal influence more
influential than in Romania, and at the expense of a “loosened state”, an observer
noticed1. In this respect, the Communist Party should be construed not only in terms
of an overwhelming monopoly of its supreme leadership over both state and society,
but also, at its lower and larger levels, as a mediator between state and society, and, as
such, as an organization not so different from any political party operating in a
Western democracy.
Was this function of the Communist Party a late “corruption” of an initially
strong breakthrough regime, which developed an increased vulnerability to the
influence of its diverse constituencies, as Kenneth Jowitt argues2? The obvious
weakness of the post-Leninist state, able perhaps to control, but not to determine
either the social behaviour of individual actors, or the performance of public
institutions3, could perhaps be the explained by the fact that, despite its claim to be
the driving force of a classless and nationless future, the Communist Party was, after
all, but a political party, that is an organization compelled to promote social interests,
conflicts, and values that predate and command its very existence. An organization
also designed to allow its individual members to exploit their political position for
private interests4. State socialism lasted for five decades because the Communist Party
could count on a genuine constituency able to outnumber any would-be opposition.
However incongruous it may seem today, communism ultimately became a
legitimate political order in the eyes of a large majority. Legitimacy should be
understood here in Max Weber’s terms5, that is to say less as a personally and
rationally pledged allegiance, morally motivated, but as a voluntary disposition to leave
out of question and out of the reach of personal interests an order that manifests itself
as legitimate, and whose validity is guaranteed by a human instance able to use
violence in order to sanction any infringement of the established order. Such an
avoidance to call into question the state and its functions was observed in Romania
1 Robert G. WESSON, Communism and…cit., pp. 201-204.
2 Kenneth JOWITT, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: the Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime”, Soviet
Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1983, pp. 275-297.
3 Arista Maria CIRTAUTAS, “The Post-Leninist State. A Conceptual and Empirical Examination”,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1995, pp. 379-392, especially pp. 381-383. The Post-
Communist state is a “castrated” one, as Venelin GANEV, “The Separation of Party and State as a
Logistical Problem: A Glance at the Causes of State Weakness in Post-Communism”, East European
Politics and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1999, pp. 389-420 puts it, because its predecessor was already
undergoing a diminution of its power.
4 Empirical evidence of this trend in the Soviet Union provided by Vladimir SHLAPENTOKH, Public
and Private Life of the Soviet People. Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia, Oxford University Press, New York
and Oxford, 1989, pp. 227-229.
5 Max WEBER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, edited by J. Winckelmann,
1 Gail KLIGMAN, “The Social Legacy of Communism: Women, Children and the Feminization of
Poverty”, in James R. MILLAR, Sharon L. WOLCHIK (eds.), The Social Legacy of Communism, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1994, p. 267 n. 43.
2 Juan LINZ, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO., and London, 2000, p. 20.
3 Albert O. HIRSCHMAN, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1970, pp. 173-202.
4 Carl SCHMITT, Verfassugslehre, Achte Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1993.
5 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, The Semi-sovereign People. A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, The
Bibliography
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Florin-Ciprian MITREA
University of South-East Europe Lumina
The radical changes produced at the level of Polish society after World War II
were most deeply visible in the case of intellectuals. Whereas the Catholic Church and
the peasantry of Poland succeeded in passing over the post-war period by maintaining
their structure and position in society relatively unchanged, intelligentsia suffered
major transformations entailing even a possible redefinition of the fundamental
elements of its status. At the same time, the transformations undergone by the class of
Polish intellectuals served as litmus paper for the strategy adopted by the communist
party in order to establish and consolidate its power. In this respect, it is extremely
relevant that the notion of intellectuality came to designate, on the one hand, the
category of diploma and academic degree holders, and, on the other hand, the so-
called “white collars” (the category of all types of clerks).2 In fact, this double
1
Acknowledgment: This paper was financed by POSDRU/89/1.5/S / 62259 contract, for the
strategic project “Socio-human and political applied sciences. Postdoctoral training program
and postdoctoral research fellowships in socio-human and political sciences”, co-financed by
the European Social Fund through the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources
Development 2007-2013.
2 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1999, p. 34.
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significance characterised the notion of intellectual ever since this social category was
invented.
With respect to this idea, J. Le Goff shows that medieval intellectuality was
composed, on the one hand by the quasi socio-professional category of the people
who “worked with words and their spirit”, who “did not earn their living from land
rents and were not constrained to have physically demanding jobs”, working for
instance in universities, and, on the other hand, there were also the intellectuals in a
broader sense, represented by 13th and 14th century men of letters, who belonged
neither to university nor to monastic environments, but who were connected to the
urban milieu.1 Still, the main tension in that epoch was less the animosity between the
university staff and independent men of letters, but the conflict between faith and
reason. Thus, the representative profile of 13th and 14th century intellectuals was the
Averroist philosopher, compelled, on the one hand, to find a balance formula in that
context, and, on the other hand, to face the anti-Aristotelian attacks launched by
Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquino, as well as by Augustinianism.2 Another
significant aspect as to the model of medieval intellectual is the coagulation of a large
part of the intellectuals in a university corporation that becomes progressively
independent from both the ecclesiastic and the political power, asserting its own
identity, and laying the basis of a specific tradition consisting of student debates,
collective ceremonies and amusements.3 Consequently, comparing the medieval
Western intellectual (described by specialists in this historical epoch) and the one in
post-war Poland (depicted by Michnik) we can identify as a common trait the attempt
of finding an intermediary space in between the two poles of power, represented by
the Church and the State. And, to a certain extent, we can also speak of a reiteration
of the medieval conflict (resumed with the beginning of modernity) between faith and
reason, for in the year 1945 Poland witnessed a polarisation of society: in one camp we
find those who remained faithful to the Christianity inherited from their forefathers,
and in the second camp we can find those who adhered, more or less formally, to the
secularising precepts of communism. That is why post-war Poland can be portrayed,
from this point of view, by the Gombrowiczian metaphor which compares her with
“a piece of dry bread that breaks crackling into tow smaller pieces: a devout one and
another lacking faith”.4
As far as the polysemy of the notion we are referring to is concerned, the
explanations of Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli are quite pertinent, according to whom
we can speak of a restricted sense and of a broad sense of the concept of intellectual,
encompassing two extremities in between which intellectual activities are carried on.
Thus,
1 Jacques LE GOFF, Les Intellectuels au Moyen Age, apud Alain DE LIBERA, Gândirea Evului Mediu, trans.
Mihaela and Ion ZGĂRDĂU, Amarcord, Timişoara, 2000, pp. 5-6.
2 Mihai MAGA, Redescoperirea experienţei intelectuale în idealul moral al filosofului averroist, commentary on
p. 48.
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“in the restricted sense, we say that a person is an intellectual if he/she is not
only engaged in an intellectual activity, but is moreover engaged in conveying its
capacity of searching with the specific tools of the intellectual activity, in
conveying the development pathway, and the well-defined purposes of the
activity: it is only natural that he/she be above all a teacher, therefore a magister
at the school of time”.1
1 Beonio Brocchieri FUMAGALLI, “L’intellectuel”, in Jacques LE GOFF (coord.), L’Homme médieval ,
apud Alain De Libera, Gândirea Evului Mediu…cit., p. 281.
2 Ibidem.
3 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1999, pp. 34-
35.
4 Aleksandr SOLZHENITSYN, Viţelul şi stejarul. Însemnări din viaţa literară, vol. I, trans. Maria and Ion
society thoroughly impregnated with conservative values. That being so, it was vital
for the new regime to win the sympathy of that anticlerical and socialist-oriented ore
of the Polish intelligentsia, which was well represented at the level of the entire
society. It is relevant to highlight the significant difference, from this point of view,
between Poland and Romania (where the dominant intellectual tradition pertained to
the right-wing politics, therefore the regime passed to physical annihilation and to an
atrocious attempt of re-education by torture).
So, in spite of the fact that the whole Polish society was deeply imbued with
conservative values, based on the preservation of national identity and Catholicism, a
large part of the intellectual elite on the banks of the Vistula adopted a left-wing
political culture. However, what distinguishes essentially Polish socialist tradition is
the fact that it cherished particularly the idea of nation, for which reason even a part
of the Polish communists would have to endure Stalinist persecutions. Paradoxically,
the nationalism of left-wing Polish intelligentsia co-existed with a particularly
pronounced anticlerical dimension. That is why, when communism took control over
Poland, there were a big distance and tension between the Church and left-wing
intellectuals. That is the reason why Adam Michnik regarded the rapprochement of
these two sources of Polish energy as the key for the formation of a vigorous anti-
totalitarian resistance. To identify the possible bridges between the two pillars of
Polish society, Michnik had first to x-ray, as one who knew from the inside the Polish
socialist tradition, the nature and the formative trajectory of left-wing intelligentsia on
the banks of the Vistula.
Michnik believed the Polish secular left could be best defined and analysed, by
examining the changes produced throughout the years 1936, 1946, 1956 and 1966. At
the beginning, in 1936, the secular left-wing was a little bit more conspicuous through
its firm options in a few clear issues. These options had in view antifascism, the
pleading for planned economy, the support of the agrarian reform and the defence of
the principle of the separation of Church and state. Ten years later, in 1946, the
official historiography identified the left in accordance with the support offered to the
“new reality” and the new regime established by the Red Army. Despite the difficult
context, the Polish Socialist Party (the interwar PSP), represented by personalities
such as Puzak, Zaremba or Zulawski, stood unflinchingly against the “new reality”. A
similar attitude was assumed by left-wing intellectuals as Maria Dabrowska, Maria şi
Stanislaw Ossowski. Nonetheless, at the same time, other leaders of the PSP, as Julian
Hochfeld, Oskar Lange, Adam Rapacki, expressed their readiness in cooperating with
the communists. Additionally, the ideologists of the Polish Working Party (PWP)
thought they were also entitled to speak on behalf of left-wing ideals.1
The challenge brought on by the recently established power led to what
Michnik calls a split of the left. Thus, while the editor-in-chief of the journal Kuznica
talked about the progressive-minded character of the social reforms undertaken by the
PWP, other left wing intellectuals, such as Maria Dabrowska and Zygmunt Zulawski,
1Adam MICHNIK, L’Eglise et la gauche. Le dialogue polonais, trans. Agnes Slonimski, Editions du Seuil,
Paris, 1979, p. 7.
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united in the group WRN (Liberty – Equality – Independence), were evincing the
obscurantism and totalitarianism of the methods used to put into practice the
respective reforms. In this context, the year 1956, when the famous Polish October took
place, is another determining landmark for the identity of the left wing on the banks
of the Vistula. From the standpoint of political struggle itself, October 1956 should be
regarded as a consequence of the upheaval which started in Poznan, in June, the same
year (resulting in the deaths of dozens of people), and which coincides with the
moment the tough wing in the party, that pleaded for the repression by the army of
the protests, was defeated (during the debates at the Central Committee ensuing with
Gomulka’s appointment in the post of secretary of the Party) by the reformers
supported by the revolted workers of Warsaw’s factories.1 Taking advantage of this
wave of enthusiasm produced by this victory of Polish communists against Soviet
communists, the revisionist current will emerge as an expression of the “hope in the
evolution of the communist system”.2
Additionally, the fact that distinguishes in that particular historical moment the
Polish left wing current is that it assumed a double negation. On the one hand, what is at
issue is the assertion of the opposition toward the Stalinist faction inside the party,
and, on the other hand, it is about a critical approach of the traditional right wing and
the Catholic Church. In this respect, it is worthwhile mentioning the attitude of the
gazette Po Prostu, one of the sharpest spears of the revisionist movement, which was
attacking with equal virulence both Stalinist and catholic dogmatists. Another relevant
example as to the 1956 position of the Polish left is the case of the philosopher
Leszek Kolakowski. Accused by the communist regime of being an oppositionist and
a revisionist, at that time Kolakowski had adopted an explicit Marxist position,
contributed to the journal Argumenty edited by the Association of Atheists and Free
Thinkers and was constantly polemicising with the Church. As regards revisionism in
general, it was a current formed, on the one hand, of former Stalinist who criticised
the policy of the party, and, on the other hand, of anti-Stalinist left-wing intellectuals
(the most important and vocal of them being Maria Dabrowska, Maria and Stanislaw
Ossowski). Consequently, in 1956, the secular left wing defined itself through an
oppugnant relation with both the Central Committee of the Party and the Catholic
Church. In Michnik’s opinion, the main error of the secular left resided in this manner
of identifying its enemies, for it made the mistake of misinterpreting reality and of
making too feeble an opposition to the regime, without any visible results.3 As a
matter of fact, in all the countries which witnessed this phenomenon, revisionism, as
critical attitude towards real communism and as anti-Stalinism (or at least as
recantation of Stalinism), shared in making a breach in the system. Nonetheless,
sooner or later it would exhibit its precariousness, as well as the limits of its vision.
1 Jean-Marie LE BRETON, Europa Centrală şi Orientală între 1917 şi 1990, trans. Micaela Slăvescu,
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Similar to the Polish case is the cogent attitude of Russian intellectuals in the
post-Stalinist period toward the case of Solzhenitsyn. Thus, after having
enthusiastically received his short story “One day in the Life of Ivan Denisovici”,
published in the magazine Novâi Mir, on the background of the liberalisation
produced in the first part of Khrushchev’s mandate, USSR’s intellectuals began to feel
certain reservations as regards Solzhenitsyn’s subsequent writings which no longer
limited themselves to denounce Stalinism, but aimed at the very ideological basis of
Marxism. In this case, the litmus paper was the open letter addressed to the Patriarch
Pimen, which was vituperating against the atheism of the communist system, along
with the historic novel August, which was criticising the Revolution of 1917.1 We can
therefore identify a resemblance between Michnik and Solzhenitsyn, in the sense that
both of them followed an ascending trajectory in their writings and attitudes, starting
from the denouncement of the totalitarian effects of communism, without however
attacking its ideological basis, and advancing toward the severe condemnation of the
constitutive principles of the regime. The major difference between the two resides in
the fact that, while in Michnik’s case, the change of approach corresponds to a change
of his political thought, in Solzhenitsyn’s case (who, due to his camp experience, had
realised the true nature of communism), it was just a matter of change of strategy in
revealing the truth. As far as the merits of Polish revisionism are concerned, they
consisted in the fact that they evinced the necessity “of a critical participation in the
life of society” and that they disseminated on a large scale an “opposing attitude”
towards the power.2 On the other hand, this attitude was based on the erroneous faith
in the “identity between the aspirations and objectives of the liberal wing of the Party
and those of the revisionist intelligentsia”. Consequently, the events of March 1968
would entail the collapse of the “heroic myth of the party leader” (which had
substantially nurtured the illusions of the intelligentsia), as well as the breakdown of
revisionism as a way of referring to totalitarian power3.
The negative effects of the strategy adopted by the secular left wing on the
basis of a political thought inconsistent with the reality of Polish society would be
brought to light, argues Michnik, in 1966, when the conflict between the PZPR
(Polish Unified Workers' Party) and the Episcopate reached its peak. After the
closure, in 1957, of the gazette Po Prostu, this open conflict between the totalitarian
state and the Church represented the tensest moment in Polish public life. Despite all
this, the most prominent left-wing Polish intellectuals (among whom Kolakowski,
Wlodzimierz Brus, Maria Ossowska, Antoni Slonimski were the most important) did
not understand the real stake of the events and, consequently, did not react against the
defamatory campaign led against the bishops accused of having betrayed the interest
of their country. That is the reason why the sermon uttered by cardinal Wyszynski, at
the end of the year 1956, which cited approvingly Kolakowski’s essay entitled “Jesus
Christ, prophete et reformateur”, received no answer from the Polish philosopher,
1 Aleksadr SOLZHENITSYN, Viţelul şi stejarul…cit., p. 409.
2 Adam MICHNIK , Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 129.
3 Ibidem, pp. 129-130.
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p. 35.
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1 Czeslaw MILOSZ, “History of Polish Literature”, Berkeley, 1983, apud Carl TIGHE, The Politics of
Literature…cit., p. 48.
2 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature…cit., pp. 48-49.
3 Ibidem, pp. 47-48.
4 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 128.
5 Ibidem, p. 128.
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World War II represented the best moment to win the independence of his country.1
As an embodiment of the Polish nationalism of early 20th century, Dmowski exerted a
strong influence on the political culture of the banks of the Vistula long after his
death. Thus, the book in which he developed his political philosophy, Thoughts of a
Modern Pole, would become very popular not only in the days of its author, but also in
the ’80s, as an incentive text of the Solidarity, as movement which strove to regain
national independence.2 In this work, Dmowski states that “the primordial goal of the
Popular National Union is the power of the Polish nation and state...”3 To achieve
this goal, it was necessary to create a “material base for the Polish force” by
developing the cities, the crafts, and the country’s industries and commerce, by
strengthening the middle class, the numerous and prosperous households of the
peasants and the thriving working class. This material dimension of the Polish power
had to be accrued by the moral force of the nation which can be the fruit but of “the
education of society in a religious and national spirit, instilling in the citizens the
feeling they are all equal before the law and that they all have the same responsibilities
in the state”. Dmowski’s quality of conservative and catholic intellectual is made
conspicuous by the fact he declared that the pillars which support national education
are the Church, school, family and the authority of the state. Moreover, the leader of
Endecjiei states resolutely that the nation’s moral education rests on religion, the
Church paying the role of guide of moral life. That is why, Dmowski argues that “all
religious beliefs should enjoy a total freedom of confession and rite in Poland”, but, as
“the overwhelming majority of the Polish nation is catholic”, everybody should
acknowledge the leading role of the Catholic Church.4
Hence, Roman Dmowski and Stanislaw Stomma represent the central
landmarks of the category of catholic Polish writers, both of them having as priority
the relation with the Church and the nation’s moral, economic and political
strengthening. As in the case of Polish intellectuals any approach of an issue related to
national identity cannot ignore the moment this nation lost its sovereignty after the
18th century partitions, we should mention that the way Dmowski deals with this
moment is one closer to the realist rather than to the romantic tradition in Polish
political thought. Thus, in Dmowski’s opinion, the three partitions of Poland (in 1773,
1793 and 1795) among Russia, Prussia and Austria had as main cause not so much
external, as internal factors (represented by the decay and corruption of the szlachtei, the
ruling class of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). Denouncing the noble and
proud experience of Poland as a “historical nation”, still bearing the seeds of her own
destruction,5 Dmowski believes that the solution to regain sovereignty lies in a
domestic moral and economic strengthening of Polish energies. By building a program
1 Ibidem, p. 128.
2 Peter F. SUGAR, Naţionalismul est-european în secolul al- XX- lea, trans. Radu Paraschivescu, Curtea Veche,
București, 2002, pp. 221-222.
3 Roman DMOWSKI, “Mysli Novoczesnego Polaka” (Gândurile unui polonez modern), Sklad Glowny
Gazeta Warszawska, Warszawa, 1933, apud Peter F. Sugar, op. cit., p. 205.
4 Ibidem, p. 207.
5 Ibidem, p. 219.
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based on the existing realities, in tune with positivist thinkers, Dmowski considers that
the defence and consolidation of the nation had to be effected with the instruments of
education. But unlike the positivists (who maintained themselves at an apolitical level),
Dmowski pleads that the struggle had to be extended in the political plan too, through
the respect and the enforcement of the existing legal framework. For the leader of
Endecjiei, the solution to the Polish issue resided largely in a rapprochement to Russia,
given that Prussia’s policy of Germanisation of Polish territories had become an
increasingly great threat.1 Discarding the romantic philosophy of all or nothing, the
realism promoted by Dmowski evinces the necessity to collaborate with Russia and
with the other partitionist powers, with a view to obtaining political concessions
leading progressively to autonomy, as a first step to a future independence. This
strategy would be successfully applied also in October 1956, when, unlike the
Hungarians who played the independence card, the Polish people limited themselves
to fight for a leader of the Polish Communist Party chosen by themselves and not
imposed by the Soviets.2 So the Polish conservative and catholic intellectuals’ political
thinking more often than not tended to realistically evaluate the political situation, to
distinguish between short term and long term objectives of the country, and especially
to obtain and preserve an as large an autonomy as possible which might promote
educational activities (with the help of the Church, family and school) meant to fortify
the nation. Naturally, such a perspective excluded romantic revolutionary philosophy
and the radical fight with the system. That is the reason why the members of this
intellectual current were regarded, especially after 1945, as too inclined to compromise
with the regime. Similarly, the adepts of the organic work philosophy of the 19th century
were accused by those who did not agree with this perspective on resistance that their
political passivity stemmed from the desire to protect their economic interests.
In fact, two categories of intellectuals asserted themselves within this current:
those who, like Dmowski and Stomma, were anxious to create a basis for the nation’s
resistance founded on conservative values, and others, as the writer Jerzy
Andrzejewski (1909-1983) who, as Czeslaw Milosz pointed out,3 in the context
generated by the totalitarian communist regime, turned from catholic moral to the
moral of social conformism. Andrzejewski is portrayed by Milosz as a representative
type of moralist intellectuals deprived of that inner substance that would have been
proper for the public role he assumed. Because of this spiritual inconsistency, says
Milosz, the number of catholic writers is extremely small in the 20th century, which
confirms the fact that “usually the so-called conversions of intellectuals pertain to a
rather dubious species and do not differ from the transient conversions to surrealism,
1 Stanislaus A. BLEJWAS, Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth
Century Poland, Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1984, pp. 195-197.
2 Ibidem, p. 199.
3 It is about the character Alfa through whom Czeslaw Milosz presents, in fact, not only a singular case,
but a whole category of intellectuals attracted, in the beginning, by the values of Catholicism, but who did
not take deep roots in this perspective, and yielded, later on, to the pressures and temptations of the
totalitarian regime. Cf. chapter „Alfa or the moralist” in Czeslaw MILOSZ, Gândirea captivă. Eseu despre
logocraţiile populare, trans. Constantin Geambaşu, Humanitas, București, 1999, pp. 90-115.
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“Hypocrites! If you need Catholicism, then become more serious and try to get
closer to it with sincerity. Let not the common front you are going to make be
just a political one! I just think that no matter what might happen in our
spiritual life, let it be as profound and honest as possible. It is high time atheists
sought a new understanding with the Church”.5
1 Ibidem, p. 92.
2 Ibidem, p. 94.
3 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 196.
4 Witold GOMBROWICZ, Jurnal…cit., p. 49.
5 Ibidem, p. 49.
6 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 195.
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they cherish the conviction that Poland can be saved only through the Church, they
do not adhere to it. Thus, explains the primate, “the intellectual approaches the
Church because he is in search of political thrills, but he does not live a life filled with
grace”, although “grace is the main force of the Church”.1
Another symptom of this intellectual category is, according to Milosz, the abuse
of words, in the sense that the respective writers are not deeply convinced of the reality
of the conflicts they create in their works. What characterises mainly the Alpha type of
intellectual is the passage, according to the political context, from catholic ethics
(fashionable during the inter-war period) to the ethics of loyalty, as a prolongation of
Christian ethics, but opposed to social ethics (a theme widely spread in the political
underground literature during the war) and then to the ethics of the New Creed (enacted
by socialist realism).2 According to Milosz, the sole remedy for this sort of intellectual
and moral stumbling is the passion for truth. Frequently this passion for truth finds its
expression through “that inner voice which prevents us from uttering too many
things”. We have in mind that restraint which should govern a writer when he feels he
cannot say all the truth, but only a part of it.3 It is precisely in favour of this complete
harmony between the author and his text that Witold Gombrowicz militates when
confessing that: “I believe that all the things I endorse have a value inasmuch as an
idea severed from a particular man does not fully exist. There are no other ideas but
the embodied ones. There is no word which is not also a body”.4 We find this idea,
differently formulated and in another context, in Adam Michnik’s work, where he
plainly pointed out that “the motherland of intellectuals is the Truth” and that their
duty is to say the Truth.5 The specific nuances which individualise the two Polish
intellectuals reside in the fact that Milosz stresses artistic truth (in other words that the
writer must not deal with the themes and concepts he works with as if they were some
toys, he must treat them as realities which have to be experienced), and Michnik
understands by the duty of telling the truth especially the protection of the civil rights
of the members of the national community. Let us add to all these standpoints also
Leszek Kolakowski’s, according to whom the most important responsibility of
intellectuals is the “correct and as less as possible guileful utilisation of the word”.6
For Kolakowski,
“it is less the truth than the spirit of the truth which matters, since no one can
swear never to be mistaken; but the spirit of the truth can be preserved, which
means never to relinquish a vigilant suspicion related to one’s own words and
1 Ibidem, p. 195.
2 Czeslaw MILOSZ, Gândirea captivă…cit., pp. 95-111.
3 Ibidem, p. 115.
4 Witold GOMBROWICZ, Jurnal…cit., p. 118.
5 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 259.
6 Lezek KOLAKOWSKI, Modernitatea sub un neobosit colimator, translated by Mihnea Gafiţa, ed. Curtea
identifications, and to know how to recant one’s own errors and be able to
amend them alone.”1
In conclusion, the pivotal challenge which any attempt to x-ray a model of the
engaged Polish intellectual must assume has in view the possibility of identifying a
category of intellectuals situated in between or outside the two poles of power. In this
respect, the question that rises refers to the ways in which this sort of intellectual
might preserve his independent statute, while keeping his statute of engaged
intellectual too. The answer given to this query by the Polish pattern of anti-
totalitarian resistance rested, it seems, in unceasingly fostering and assuming the
fundamental tension between what Adam Michnik called the model of the priest,
represented by cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, and the model of the buffoon, embodied
by the rebel writer Witold Gombrowicz. The profile of Polish civil society, even in its
current hypostasis, cannot be depicted in all its complexity without taking into
account these two historical paradigms of the Polish intellectual, as well as the
specificity of their dialogue.
1 Ibidem.
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Bibliography
BARANCZAK, Stanislaw, Breathing Under Water And Other East European Essays,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1992.
BLEJWAS, Stanislaus A., Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival
in Nineteenth Century Poland, Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, New
Haven, 1984.
BOETIUS (of Dacia), Despre viaţa filosofului, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005;
DAVIES, Norman, Heart of Europe. The Past in Poland’s Present, Oxford University
Press, New York, 2001.
De LIBERA, Alain Gândirea Evului Mediu, trans. Mihaela and Ion Zgărdău, Amarcord,
Timişoara, 2000.
GOMBROWICZ, Witold, Jurnal, selection, translation and notes by Olga Zaicik,
Univers, București, 1998.
KOLAKOWSKI, Lezek, Modernitatea sub un neobosit colimator, trans. Mihnea Gafiţa,
Curtea Veche, București, 2007.
LE BRETON, Jean-Marie, Europa Centrală şi Orientală între 1917 şi 1990, trans. Micaela
Slăvescu, Cavallioti, 1996.
MICHNIK, Adam, L’Eglise et la gauche. Le dialogue polonais, trans. Agnes Slonimski,
Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979.
MICHNIK, Adam, Scrisori din închisoare şi alte eseuri, Polirom, Iaşi, 1997.
MILOSZ, Czeslaw Gândirea captivă. Eseu despre logocraţiile populare, trans. Constantin
Geambaşu, Humanitas, București, 1999.
SOLJENIŢÂN, Aleksandr, Viţelul şi stejarul. Însemnări din viaţa literară, vol. I, trans.
Maria and Ion Nastasia, Humanitas, București, 2002.
SUGAR, Peter F., Naţionalismul est-european în secolul al-XX-lea, trans. Radu
Paraschivescu, Curtea Veche, București, 2002.
TIGHE, Carl, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press,
Cardiff, 1999.
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Gelu SABĂU
Hyperion University of Bucharest
Abstract: This article seeks out to analyze the critique of democracy in Romania
during the first half of the twentieth century. The starting point of this analysis is the
opposition between nationalism and democracy theorized by the Romanian political
scientist Aurel C. Popovici. We can find the origin of A. C. Popovici’s conception in
Eminescu’s critical attitude towards modern society and French liberalism. A.C.
Popovici emphasizes the irreducible opposition between democracy, which is global and
universal, and nationalism, which has the capacity to underline the cultural specificity
of every nation. I will try to compare the way in which Popovici refers to democracy
and nationalism with the approach of this ratio in Western societies (England or
France).
1. FOREWORD
Aurel Popovici is one of the most important political thinkers of the beginning
of the 20th century. Born in the then Austro-Hungarian administered Banat, he studies
medicine and political sciences in Vienna and Graz. His intellectual path shall be
decisively marked by his origins. Even since his time as a student he stands out
through his protests against the abuses of the Magyarization policy, even being
sentenced to serve prison because of Memoriul Studenților din România (The Romanian
Students’ Report). In 1906 he compiles a project of federalization of Great Austria
aiming to solve de problem of nationalities within the Empire and becomes close to
the crown prince Franz Ferdinand, who was a sympathizer of this project. The
assassination of the prince in Sarajevo in 1914 and the offset of the Second World
War will cause the permanent termination of this project.
During his time in Bucharest he teaches German and manages the Sămănătorul
(The Sower – archaic Romanian) magazine, after Nicolae Iorga quits. In 1910 he
publishes a volume entitled Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne
(Nationalism or Democracy. A critique of the modern civilization), gathering articles published
within Sămănătorul during his management. This book and the one about The Great
Austria are the most important works of A.C. Popovici.
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“We consider that his paper Statele Unite ale Austriei Mari (The United States of
Great Austria), suggesting the federalist solution, his attempts to convince
Austrian authorities to put into action his federalist ideas, as well as his
combatant attitude towards democracy were decisive for his future course by
expressing ab initio reserves concerning his theses”.2
I have chosen to study here A.C. Popovici’s political vision because for me he
is an important fraction of the multitude of conservative and nationalist Romanian
thinkers in the 20th century. Then, by the trenchant opposition that he sketches
between democracy and nationalism, A.C. Popovici’s vision had an important
contribution in the radical critique of the democratic regimes in the inter -war period.
Furthermore, by the fact that his vision is in a certain degree the result of the
historical circumstances, it can offer an important indication of the manner in which a
certain culture and political mentality came into being in our country, a culture whose
roots are in my opinion still alive.
In the present study I shall handle specifically the analysis of the ideas and
vision presented in Naționalism sau democrație. First and foremost A.C. Popovici
describes himself as a conservative, explicitly relating to two masters of the
conservative thinking: Edmund Burke, who was also considered the father of
European conservatism and Mihai Eminescu, the man Popovici calls “our times’ signs
1 We would like to point out a few studies on Aurel C. POPOVICI: Virgil NEMOIANU, “A
Jeffersonian Neoconservatorist in the End of the Century Vienna: Aurel C. POPOVICI”, România și
liberalismele ei, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, București, 2000 and Constantin
SCHIFIRNEȚ, “Aurel C. Popovici: a conservative point of view on the nation”, and “Aurel C. Popovici
on the federalist state organisation of the nations”, in Idem, Geneza modernă a ideii naționale, Albatros
Publishing House, București, 2001.
2 Constantin SCHIFIRNEȚ, Geneza modernă...cit., p. 102. We consider that his reservations concerning the
works of Aurel C. Popovici were likely determined by his ideas concerning a possible Austrian federative
state, excluding the existence of a Great Romania, and not his critical attitude towards democracy, taking
into account that in the interwar period there was a relatively strong anti-democratic current.
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prophet”1, the author that probably had the most influential political vision among the
Romanian conservatives. Popovici makes several references to Edmund Burke, and he
dedicates an entire encomiastic article to Eminescu. It is true that we can find all traits
of conservative thought in Popovici.
Firstly, we notice the exposure of the “reasonable” vision according to which
the state is the result of a social contract coming from the rational will of individuals.
Like Eminescu, who almost obsessively repeats, Popovici also states that “the state
[…] is not an artificial, drifting product. Its origin and entire existence is a product of
nature and not a simple logical abstraction, not an intellectual construct”2. As such,
societies, nations and states are the result of an unlabored historic evolution, of a
certain population on a given land. So, we are dealing with the organic vision of
society development, with all that it implies: gradual evolution, where as that of a plant
that grows in time, any intervention from the exterior is improper and having a
detrimental effect. The growth of a society has to begin with its own resources,
represented by traditions, customs and beliefs, and not from formal rules inferred
from an a priori lucidity.
Even more so the respective rules do not necessarily match all societies.
Popovici is here in full agreement with Maiorescu’s conservative critique of the forms
without substance:
“The language, beliefs and manners sustain a people, and new laws allow it to
naturally grow further. But again, only if they match its character. Because this is
the only way laws can be accepted by the people. This way, the people get
«perfect» laws in the law book, in pockets with gazettes and speeches, while
their souls are in discontent, revolt! Because the entire being of the nation, its
whole nature had been drained by absurd, disastrous laws and theories”.3
1 AurelC. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne, Albatros Publishing House,
București, 1997, p. 92.
2 Ibidem, p. 195.
3 Ibidem, p. 135.
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“Practical politics is not an exact science yet, but a sui -generis art. From the
positive and certain results of sciences, even the so -called politic sciences, it can
only take what it needs. It, not science! For political, not doctrinarian purposes.
Because politics is neither an experiment laboratory nor a formula department,
of «conceptions» of history or legal vocabulary, of theories about «historical law»,
of «natural rights», etc.” (original emphasis).2
Opere politice, Vol. II, Timpul Publishing House, Iași, 1997, p. 26. For a critique of political rationalism in
Eminescu, see Ioan STANOMIR, Reacțiune și conservatorism. Eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian, Nemira
Publishing House, București, 2000 (chapter “Secolul raționalist, tranziția și libera Engliteră”), pp. 140-195.
4 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 213. Also see Edmund BURKE, Reflecții asupra
Revoluției din Franța, trans. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp, Nemira Publishing House, București, 2000, p. 138.
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critiques. Eminescu denies the ideas of political modernity starting from his critique of
the way in which the modernization of the Romanian society took place. This
modernization process, starting with 1829 with the entry of the Romanian provinces
under the economical and ideological influence of the West, is accompanied by a
paradoxical phenomenon: on the one hand we have the birth of a new structure,
typical for a modern society (centralized administration, banks, bureaucracy, railway
system, etc.), and on the other hand the demise of the small craftsmen (the ones that
should have become the new bourgeoisie) under the pressure of the competition with
foreign industrial goods.
Modern Western society is based on an industrialized economy with an added -
value that enables the birth of a middle class. In relation to that, Romania has a double
disadvantage: on the one hand it exports agricultural products (with low added value)
and on the other hand it imports industrial products that carry a significant added
value1 The only thing is that, a modern political regime, in order to be effective, needs
a strong middle class. In our case, in return, the middle class is made out of social
strata dependent on the state that is “superposed strata”, as Eminescu called it: clerks,
bankers, intellectuals, attorneys, etc2. So, lacking a middle class leads to the inability of
putting into practice the principles of a modern constitution3. To this, we can also add
the deterioration of the fate of the peasants in the second half of the 19th century, the
social class that is considered to be the highest in number in Romania in the
respective period of time and, according to Eminescu, the only productive social
strata4
In consequence, the modernization accomplished by the liberal Forty -Eighters
in the name of the principles of political modernity leads, at least on a short term, to
the deterioration of Romanian society. Eminescu draws the logical conclusion,
through a line of argument that starts from the social contract, through The French
Revolution and the Forty -Eighters Movement to the decadence of Romanian society.
This is an explanation for his alternative point of view on the state, as a product of
nature and not the result of a rational contract between individuals.
Unlike Eminescu, criticizing modernity first and foremost because of its social
effects, the reasons for A.C. Popovici’s critiques pertain to the national problem, more
precisely the situation of the Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That is
because the Hungarian Forty -Eighters apply, in the name of the sovereignty of the
people inspired by the French Revolution, a Magyarization policy, by people
understanding mainly the Hungarian ethnics:
“Kossuth had foreseen the ideas of severance from Austria with the purpose of
centralizing the power of Hungary in the hands of the Hungarians, that it may
1 Mihail EMINESCU, “Icoane vechi și icoane nouă”, Timpul, 13 December 1877.
2 Idem, Opere politice...cit., p. 21.
3 Mihail EMINESCU, “Influența austriacă asupra românilor din principate”, Convorbiri literare, 1 August,
turn the multinational, historic and actual mosaic of Hungary into a homogenous
nation. To this end, he started from the democratic concepts. He would only
recognise in Hungary a single sovereignty: that of «the nation». Sure enough, the
Hungarian one” (original emphasis).1
“The politician draws from modern politics, and these politics from the
democratic ideology. In Paris, Rome, Athens, and Belgrade – same stereotyped
accusations to the politics, like in Bucharest. It seems like they are the same
politicians, same «independents» and the same gazettes. The differences are only
of a formal, exterior character. Because all but a few start from the same
constitutional principles”.2
1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 16.
2 Ibidem, p. 142.
3 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Stat și națiune. Statele Unite ale Austriei-Mari: studii politice în vederea rezolvării problemei
naționale și a crizelor constituționale din Austro-Ungaria, translated by Petre Pandrea, Editura Albatros,
București, 1997, p. 206.
4 “Culture comes, as we already know, first of all from the cult a people has for the moral order of the
world, its own order. Civilisation, in a narrow sense, is a technical development. It makes physical
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Through history, traditions and customs, culture is the holder of the spiritual identity
of a people, while civilization, with its modern political and institutional forms, with
the new technologies, has the tendency, through its leveling platen, to destroy
authenticity and cultural differences. This is the source of A.C. Popovici’s rhetoric
writings on Western culture, a “waiting staff” culture, just because it has lost its sense
of tradition, while “superior culture” is based on the faith in God. From this point of
view, a simple Romanian rural priest is for Popovici superior to a scholar from the
civilized world that has lost faith1.
Another reason for A.C. Popovici to stand against democracy is this
acceptation of the term. That is because for Popovici democracy is first of all direct
democracy, on Rousseauist filiation. Or, direct democracy is generally unfeasible, with
the exception of some small communities2 Then, the fact that democracy is based on
the sovereignty of the people entails the involvement of all citizens in political
problems. The problem arising here comes from the fact that generally people are so
ignorant when it comes to highly complex political problems. Hence, as Popovici
ironically remarks, a shoemaker is asked to have more cognizance than a citizen called
upon to express his political opinion:
“[…] us, who consider ourselves sovereign atoms, we greatly appreciate always
being told about «democracy» and we think of ourselves as the «true» power in
the state. A delusion, like many others in life. As for reality, both now and
before, there is little else than demagogy. And that leads any country and any
people to perdition” (original emphasis).4
survival possible, by offering us the conditions and facilitations belonging to the material life, clothes,
communication”. (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,…cit., p. 27). For the difference
between culture and civilisation, Aurel C. POPOVICI, also see Geneza modernă...cit., pp. 109-111.
1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,…cit., p. 38.
2 Here is a relevant quote from this point of view: “Radical «true» democracy, is a simple mental
abstraction that could never have existed and can never exist but in eternal promises and eternal
deceptions, continuous reprimands and brotherly fighting. Democracy is a word. Because this is the
nature of the peoples and in fact only one person or a group of people can govern them. Never, and for a
thousand words, a people cannot govern itself“ (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație…cit., p.
356).
3 Ibidem, p. 173.
4 Ibidem, p. 358.
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Thence, for Popovici, the danger of the democratic regimes is the fact that they
allow demagogues access to power, hereby destroying the elite of society, whose true
role is that of safekeeping and passing on the values of a nation. The main risk is the
nation itself dwindling.
In all verity, notwithstanding his great political knowledge, A.C. Popovici
displays the limitations of his notion of democracy while debating it1 with Constantin
Stere. Popovici’s entire perspective on modern democracy is questioned through the
distinction Stere makes between the forms of state and the forms of government2. Therefore,
Stere correctly points out that democracy is a form of state that has the tendency to
assert itself everywhere in the modern age, from the simple reason that today there is
no other form of legitimate sovereignty except the sovereignty of the people. Unlike
the democratic state, that has the tendency to become universal, the forms of government
define, through their constitutions, the way in which sovereignty is carried out. The
forms of government are those that have to take into account the specific
characteristics of each state.
governing are dependant of the way in which sovereignty is exercised. See Constantin STERE,
“Democratismul and A. C. Popovici”, Scrieri (Writings), Minerva Publishing House, București, 1979,
pp. 579-584.
3 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,...cit., p. 359.
4 According to Burke, democracy corrupts natural order, because the idea of equality between individuals
is against nature. Society relies on order and on a hierarchy that imitates the hierarchy of the created
world. Unlike Rousseau, who considers that the equality between individuals is given by their freedom to
take part in the exercise of power, Burke considers that freedom is only for those who exercise power at
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principle, unlike the principle of equality that is homogenizing and plebean. The duty
of any state is to defend the elites’ creative capacity from the cosmopolitan threat of
democratic egalitarianism1.
A.C. Popovici’s conservative ideas thus gain a liberal nuance. And indeed, he
finds the best conditions of any society’s development in the blending of the two
political ideologies:
“[…] the normal life of a state, of a nation, needs only two parties: a
conservative party, that needs to maintain, preserve the inheritance of the past, to
defend historical continuity [...] and a liberal party that represents the necessary
changes imposed by the times, but always with the intention to deepen, to strengthen
the national character in the country and in the people” (original emphasis).2
Therefore, nationalist conservatism and liberalism are the factors that can
determine the healthy and natural development of a society. However, liberalism is a
positive factor only if moderate, i.e. it does not lead to democracy3 But are nationalist
conservatism and liberalism compatible from Popovici’s perspective?
If we refer to classical liberalism that is based on the inalienable rights that the
individuals possess in a natural state, the civil society being a product of the contract
between these individuals, then liberalism is incompatible with nationalism.
Nationalism entails the individuals’ organic belonging to community and places
community above the individual, while liberalism prioritizes the individual at the
expense of community: “according to this (contractual, natural rights) conception,
society is posterior to the individual and not the other way round, as organicism of all
types claims; in the organicist vision, society is prior to individuals, or according to an
Aristotelian formulation [...] the whole precedes the parts”4. One of the consequences
of the liberal conception of the individuals’ inalienable natural rights is the minimal
role of the state in society, the function of the state being to guarantee the protection
of these rights.
Notwithstanding A.C. Popovici’s nationalist and organicist outlook, there are
passages where he sounds like a classical liberal, speaking about the minimal role of
the state in society:
the expense of the subordinated. Therefore, freedom is incompatible with citizens’ equality (Leo Strauss,
Histoire de la philosophie politique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1999, p. 770 and Edmund
Burke, Reflexions sur la Révolution de France, trans. Pierre Andler, Paris, 1989, pp. XLI-XLIII).
1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., pp. 362-363.
2 Ibidem, p. 351.
3 “National conservatism and moderate liberalism, these are the conditions for a healthy development. I
deliberately say: moderate liberalism, because I myself am certain that it is only through moderation that
liberalism becomes national. By no means through its evolution towards radical democracy”(Ibidem, p.
106). For the multiplicity of possible relations between liberalism and democracy, see Norberto
BOBBIO, Liberalism și democrație, trans. Ana-Luana Stoicea, Editura Nemira, București, 1998, pp. 74-99.
4 Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalism și democrație...cit., p. 34.
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”But then, what does the state have to do not to create dissatisfaction for its
people or peoples? To this I answer: the state should not be over -enthusiastic
especially in matters that do not concern it. The main thing for it to do is: to
grant its people or peoples the freedom they need to develop on their own, in
their national and individual spirit, in accordance with their past and their
specific nature”.1
One notices that in the above paragraph Popovici talks about the relationship
between the state and the people or the state and the peoples. The employment of the
singular “people” may make us think he refers to the all citizens of a state, but when
one talks about “peoples”, we understand that the phrase means the ethnicities within
a certain state. Thus, Popovici implicitly refers to a multi -ethnic state. And it is at this
point that liberalism and nationalism intersect. While according to classical liberalism, the
individual is the possessor of inalienable natural rights, Popovici transfers these right
onto a nation, therefore a population that shares one ethnicity, language and customs2.
From this perspective, A.C. Popovici is the follower of the 1848 tradition of
Ardeal, that defends the rights of the Romanian population in the Empire, especially
through the character of Simion Bărnuțiu. In the 1842 protest he sends to the Magyar
authorities in response to the decision of the Diet from Cluj to adopt the Magyar
language as the official language in Transylvania, one finds the roots of a juridical
philosophy that was very important to all the supporters of the national rights of the
Romanians in the Habsburg Empire. Here is a passage from Barnutiu’s text:
“[...] each man or people (emphasis added), as a speaking creature has the right to
live in this world and manifest their personality (jus subsistentiae personalis), to
move their bodily force, their hands and feet, to earn their outer fortune, and
the spiritual force [...] to earn their inner fortune: knowledge in various sciences,
arts, foreign languages and native tongues (jus libertatis personalis); and these rights
should be granted to all individuals and peoples equally (emphasis added), as all people
and peoples are equal subl. n.), in this respect [...] (jus aequalitatis personalis) (emphasis
added)”.3
1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 157.
2 This is Aurel C. Popovici’s definition of the nation: “Nationality is defined as: a people, who lives in the
same territory, speaks the same language and has reached a homogeneous national consciousness, yearns
for a common cultural-political ideal. The main characteristic of nationalities, that also gives it a great
political importance, is represented by the national consciousness [...]. This is the cogito, ergo sum of
nationality: a moral unity based on a common thinking” (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Stat și națiune...cit., p. 199).
3 Simion BĂRNUȚIU, “Tocmeală de rușine...”, in Petre PANDREA, Filosofia politico-juridică a lui Simion
Bărnuțiu, “King Charles II” Foundation for Literature and Art, București, 1935, p. 42.
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Here is a paragraph from the German philosopher from whom Bărnuțiu explicitly
gets inspiration:
“[…] although there is only one primordial right directly based on the nature of
the material -rational being - that is the right to validate oneself as a person in
the phenomenal world - which may be called the right to personality, since every
person can be considered from three perspectives, this right can be divided into
the three rights - of personal subsistence, of personal freedom and of personal equality
(emphasis added)”.1
Junimea”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. X, No. 2, 2010, p. 253.
4 Ibidem, pp. 252-255.
5 In our opinion, Petre Pandrea does not really talk about “synthesis” in the technical sense of the word,
that is the explicit presentation of opposed theses that eventually generates the synthesis. He explicitly
demonstrates the influence of Krug’s thinking over Bărnuțiu and states that Bărnuțiu’s ideas result from
adapting the German philosopher’s ideas to the historical context: “Krug’s philosophical foundation
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context, could not have been possible in the absence of an organic concept of the
nation, itself based on the analogy between the individual and the society. It is the
conception generated by Herder and the German Romanticism and which strongly
influenced the ideas of the 1848’s spirit in Romania. Only in this way could the nation
become a topic of law “the nation is considered an organic, natural structure,
endowed with laws of development similar to the ones typical of living organisms. [...]
Around 1848, the nation was not an arbitrary construction, neither fallible nor
contingent. If it had been different, it could not have become the topic of claims based on the
idea of natural right (emphasis added). In order to become socially and politically
lucrative, nation had to be founded on natural criteria. [...] Nation [thus] becomes in -
attackable, getting all the rights of a living organism”.1
In his turn, A.C. Popovici acknowledges the legitimacy of the transfer of these
rights from individuals to communities, spotting their origin in the French
Revolution:
“The ideals of freedom and equality of the French Revolution initially referred
to individuals. Soon, they were then taken over by social groups [...]. By the
subsequent differentiation of these general ideas about freedom and equality,
the principle of nationalities became foregrounded. If many peoples could
replace the monarchic principle with their right to self -determination and their
power, why would not other peoples have the right to set themselves free of the
absolutism imposed by means of race to another privileged people?” (original
emphasis).2
“But in our case, the national fight was fought precisely between the historical -
political and the national -political principles. Or, if you like, between
constitutional rights founded on historical factors and national rights, claimed
today. If, since then, since the beginning of these fights the national -constitutional
becomes the criticism of his own society with Bărnuțiu; applications are added and they are national; but
the form remains far from Krug’s stylistics.” (op. cit., p. 65). There is no similar demonstration in
Savigny’s case, and the Romanian commentator states that Bărnuțiu knows him via Krug, too. (op. cit., p.
57). He considers that Savigny’s influence is determined by the historical contexts and the similar roles
held by Savigny and Bărnuțiu for their peoples (op. cit., p. 80).
1 Mona MAMULEA, “Toposuri romantice în fundamentarea filosofică a naționalismului românesc”,
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principle had been acknowledged and applied, the multiple minority issues as
well as the dualist crisis would have disappeared”1 (original emphasis).
Taking over a considerable part of ideas from the Enlightenment and the
German historicism, via the spirit of the 1848 in Ardeal, A.C. Popovici attempts a
synthesis between liberal principles and a nationalist conception. The present study
continues with a critical examination of Popovici’s nationalist conception. I will do
this starting from the characteristics attributed to any nationalist thoughts and
ideologies by Isaiah Berlin3, establishing the extent to which Popovici’s thinking meets
the criteria of this ideology which involves:
1) the belief in the supreme need to belong to a nation;
2) the belief in the organic relation between all elements that make up a nation;
3) the belief in what is ours simply because it is ours;
4) when confronted with competitors for rivalry and authority, the belief in the
supremacy of your beliefs4.
Let us consider each of them:
1) the belief in the supreme need to belong to a nation states that every
individual belongs to a particular community, whose way of living is different from
that of other communities. This community is based on certain customs, traditions
and values, that cannot be understood by individuals who are not its members. This
means that people do not share certain universal values, such as good, truth or beauty,
but rather that there is a plurality of values, irreducible to one other, that can even
clash in certain situations.
This belief in the individuals’ inherent belonging to the national community is
stated by Popovici several times when he claims that there is no “humankind”, only
“nations”.
1 Ibidem, pp. 110-111.
2 For cases when the national law is opposed to historical law, see Romulus SEȘIANU, Principiul
naționalităților. Originile, evoluția și elementele constitutive ale naționalității, Editura Albatros, București, 1996, p.
109.
3 Isaiah BERLIN, “Naționalismul”, în Adevăratul studiu al omenirii, trad. Radu Lupan, Editura Meridiane,
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1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,...cit., p. 72.
2 Ibidem, p. 72.
3 Ibidem, p. 73.
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2) As we have seen, the belief in the organic relation between all elements that
make up a community, is a common feature of all conservative outlooks. Hence, it
also emerges in A.C. Popovici’s case, where conservative organicism is combined with
ethnicism and the romantic historicism.
3) the belief in what is ours simply because it is ours. In other words, we believe
that something is good, right, beautiful or true because it belongs to us. This belief is
to a certain extent a consequence of the conception presented in the first point. If one
does not believe in the existence of some abstract realities and universal values, then
the sole criterion for judging value is a local one, that belongs only to me and my
community. The almost unavoidable consequence of this conception is a reversal of
the value criterion: something is not good or beautiful because it matches general
criteria valid for goodness or beauty, but it is good or beautiful because it is
acknowledged as such by me and and by those who belong to my community. Taking
this reasoning to its extremes, one can say that what belongs to us is good or beautiful. This
is the manner of thinking typical of a person who evaluates the supreme criteria of
value in relation to belonging to a certain community.
A.C. Popovici is a representative of such a belief, especially when he criticizes
Western culture, claiming that it is a culture that has detached from faith and
traditions becoming a culture of “waiters”. Hence, from Popovici’s perspective, a
Romanian country priest is superior to a cultured Western person, only because the
former represents the authentic national culture: “The other, His Holiness, our village
priest from the hilltop, lost in Europe, leads a patriarchal, reactionary and miserable
life, according to our civilized valet or waiter. Here, dear reader if your mind and heart
are in their right places, I am asking you: which of these two people is a real factor of
culture from a Romanian national perspective?” (original emphasis).1 Therefore, in the
absence of a unique criterion of assessing different cultures, the sole available criterion
becomes one’s belonging to a certain community, in the present case, one’s belonging
to the Romanian nation. And Popovici fully confirms this aspect: “real culture cannot
even be conceived unless in a national sense” (original emphasis).2 Hence nationality becomes
a criterion of value for a certain culture.
This manner of thinking is reconfirmed when A.C. Popovici talks about
religion. From a nationalist perspective, the Supreme Being itself is conceived within
the grid of certain national particularities. Thus, every people has a particular manner
of conceiving its God: “despite all the philosophical abstractions, the conception of
the English, German and of every strong nation is typical of such a nation, however
cosmic God may be conceived. Even the catholic faith, despite its very old, Roman -
imperialist universality, is more or less differentiated according to nations” (original
emphasis).3 Hence, God himself, which is the Good and the Truth, is filtered through
the grid of national particularities by the nationalist A.C. Popovici. It is true that he
1 Ibidem, p. 38.
2 Ibidem, p. 38.
3 Ibidem, p. 259.
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does not suggest a complete identity between God or Church and the nation1, but he
specifies that these national particularities are linked more with the significance
acquired by certain rites and the way in which faith in God modifies a certain
particular mentality2. But the manner in which nationalist thinking in general or A.C.
Popovici’s in particular, conceives the relation between the existence of God and that
of a nation lays the foundation for an equivalence between God and nation or
between religion and nationalism, which eventually leads to the possibility to employ
religion from an ideologic perspective.
4) With respect to the last feature of nationalist thinking, the belief in the
supremacy of your beliefs when confronted with the beliefs of some rivals, it must be
said that this is an “offensive” feature if nationalism. A.C. Popovici’s thinking does
not contain such a feature, probably because the aim of his nationalist conception is
primarily to obtain rights for the Romanians in the Austro -Hungarian Empire and
not to impose the Romanians’ supremacy over other nationalities. However, the
potential of this “offensive” perspective of the nationalist ideology will be fully
remarked especially in the interwar period, which is also the period when nationalist
and totalitarian thinking in Europe reaches its peak. And interwar Romania is not
avoided by these historical realities. One of the famous examples that illustrates this
fact is Nae Ionescu who presents several references of the legionary ideology in a
series of informal conferences during his detention period in the detention camp at
Miercurea Ciuc: “The character of the nation: offensive and imperialist par excellence,
i.e. an organism that can only live in expansion, life, dynamism. Consequently, the one
who wants to know God will only do it by conquering the outside, strangling
someone, hence the nation is dynamic, it is life, it is offensive and imperialist”3. Of
course, this paragraph contains all the ingredients of nationalist thinking, that Nae
Ionescu takes to their extremes: first of all, there is the analogy between nation and
organism. The nation is like an organism that has reached its full maturity this time (it
does not need to fight for the acknowledgment of its own rights, which are granted to
it as a consequence of a natural evolution) and it needs to conquer the vital space for
manifesting itself. Like the organism that grows and comes to naturally attack the
environment, nation becomes expansive and imperialist. Then, if God is identified as
a national God, in the way it is conceived by each nation, it is normal that every nation
should fight for the existence of its own “God”. Therefore, by means of a national
God, religion can become a mere pretext for political fight between several nations. It
is just that in this way, starting from the premises of nationalist thinking and pushing
1 Like the case of Nae Ionescu, who at some point became an exponent of the legionary ideology:
“Chruch and nation overlap with us, the Orthodox.” (Nae IONESCU, Fenomenul legionar, Antet XX Press,
București, 1993, p. 52); or “If the nation represents God on Earth, I am only interested in the God
experienced by me, not by Hungarians, French, etc.” (Ibidem, p. 55).
2 “There is a certain difference between the one in Italy and the one in Belgium, between the Polish and
the German one. Not with respect to dogmas, not in ritual, but in the mind of the peoples and in the life
practice” (A. C. Popovici, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 259).
3 Ibidem, p. 53.
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this thinking to its limits, religion becomes an instrument of political ideology and
nationalism can be turned into a mere pretext for aggression.
6. CONCLUSIONS
1 “Précisément la democratie, telle que nous la comprendons, vient à l’existence dans le cadre national”
(Pierre MANENT, “La démocratie et la nation”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. I, No.
1, 2001, p. 10.
2 Pierre MANENT, O filozofie politică pentru cetățean, trans. Mona Antohi, Editura Humanitas, București,
2003, p. 95.
3 “La difficulté politique pratique de la démocratie peut être résumée ainsi: le principe démocratique ne
définit pas le cadre dans lequel il s’exerce. Par exemple, le vote d’autodétermination d’un peuple, acte
démocratique par excellence, s’exerce dans un cadre déterminé préalablement par des instruments sociaux
et des principes étrangers à la démocratie, et même le plus souvent contradictoires de la démocratie
généralement, par la tradition confirmée ou corigée par la force. Avant que les Français, se considérant
désormais comme une nation, pussent prendre pour eux-mêmes la souveraineté, il fallait que quarante
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benefit from the formal framework of modern democracy. In other words, the West
displays the evolution from a national background that at some point generates a
democratic form, while the East presents a democratic form that generates a national
background. But according to Manent, in this case the background and the form are
alien or even opposed to each other. This aspect was theorized in Romania by Titu
Maiorescu’s theory of forms without a background.
In the present case analyzed, not only does the author acknowledge the
opposition between the democratic form and the national background, but he detects
an irreconcilable opposition in this juxtaposition. Even if the democratic framework
enables Popovici to claim national rights for the Romanians in the Empire, he still
considers democratic formalism a strong enemy of the qualitative principle that he
identifies with the nation. Popovici eventually chooses firmly: nation against
democracy. This option is significant as to a certain extent it illustrates how political
modernity was perceived in Romania.
rois – selon le slogan monarchiste – aient préalablement, par marriages et guerres, fait la France” (Pierre
MANENT, “La démocratie et la nation...cit.”, p. 11).
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Bibliography
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Cătălin-Valentin RAIU
University of Bucharest
Abstract: In this paper, by presenting few political ideas of the bishop of Râmnic
Noul-Severin, Bartolomeu Stănescu (1875-1954), I am trying to portray how a
social-Christian political vision has failed in the Romanian interwar period. In his
case we are rather dealing with a transplantation of a doctrine named „Social
Christianity” and defined as an eclectic body of counter-revolutionary ideas
implemented with liberal tools and born out of socialist sensibilities. Although
important figure in the Romanian Orthodox Church and Senate, moreover as a
public promoter of Social Christianity, the failure of his political project gives us the
clues to understand why Christian-democracy has never been born in Romania, as for
instance in Italy, along with the principles of subsidiarity, anti-statism, democracy,
personalism or anti-communism. On the contrary, the political reading of the interwar
ecclesiastical debates and events is due to prove that the society was incomplete
modernized, eager for paternalism and authoritarianism and mostly under the siege of
an organic nationalism which has expelled both liberal and Christian-democratic
approaches.
1This study is part of a vaster research entitled “When Social Christianity wears the Mitre: the Bishop of
Râmnicul Noului Severin, Bartolomeu Stănescu (1875 -1954)”, presented as a Ph.D. thesis in September
2012 at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Bucharest, under the guidance of professor
Daniel Barbu, Ph.D.
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his totally innovative in the Romanian space social-Christian vision, till 1938 when he
is dismissed by King Carol II. Harassed by all Romanian non-democratic political
regimes, Bartolomeu Stănescu dies in abiding loneliness in 1954, in the monastery of
Bistrița, in the county of Vâlcea. During his public activity and without actually having
a programmatic scheme, the hierarch produced a political discourse that impresses
with its modernity, authenticity and especially its capacity to detach itself from
institutional rigours. Or to put it more overtly, Bartolomeu Stănescu distinguished
himself constantly from the ecclesiastic and political mainstream of his times and, for
a moment, he was the only Romanian that implemented in Romania Christian
democratic ideas and principles.
Was Bartolomeu Stănescu a Christian-democrat at least in a certain period of
his public activity? In this chapter we shall analyse this hypothesis considering several
independent variables of the hierarch’s discourse, such as the nature of democracy,
the human being’s centrality in the political architecture imagined by the bishop, the
refusal of state assistentialism, the solidarity principle, social justice and the sense of
private property and salary, and in the following chapters we shall analyse the
subsidiarity principle in Bartolomeu Stănescu’s thinking, anti-statism and the
importance given to the intermediary bodies of society.
1. ASSUMING DEMOCRACY
The Romanian Social Christians, in fact like the great majority of their
European inspirers, do not consider that compatibility between democracy and
Christianity can be possible1, in the sense that a democratic regime does not
accommodate to the organisation of the Orthodox Church, an order specific rather to
aristocracy than to democracy:
Bartolomeu Stănescu does not keep aloof from Irineu Mihălcescu and does not
try to demonstrate the compatibility between the synodality of the Church and the
people’s sovereignty identified with democracy, he is rather interested in the
relationship between the state and society, the structure of rights and obligations and
the attempt of rounding them off with a rationality inspired by Christian theology. To
test the hypothesis according to which the bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu was a
Christian-democrat, we have first to understand his viewpoint on the nature of
democracy as political regime. Thus, democracy, in its modern form, is not possible in
1 Cătălin RAIU, Ortodoxie, postcomunism și neoliberalism. O critică teologico-politică, Curtea Veche, Bucureşti,
the absence of the distinction between individual and society, and one of its main
purposes was to free the human being from the patronage and tyranny of the state:
“Therefore now that thanks to social sciences the second human being, namely
society, has finally been discovered, Christianity has to deal with it too, at least
as much as it has dealt with the individual, when it had to emancipate the
individual from the tyranny of the State”.1
p. 13.
5 Idem, “Vom avea autonomia bisericească?”, Universul, Vol. 37, No. 132, 1919, p. 1.
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any form of modern democracy is impossible, with the exception of far-left ideologies
that claim a democratic filiation:
At the same time, democracy means the centrality of Christianity in the life of
nations and not necessarily of Churches, though it is impossible that a society be
imbued with Christianity in the absence of a strong Church, be it established as in Great
Britain, or disestablished as in the United States of America. Bartolomeu Stănescu
suggests however that it is not the Church-institution, endowed with a certain social
and even political authority that builds democracy, it is her message which permeates
the consciousness of communities of people:
“The brotherhood of people made by Christianity does not ensue from the law
of the state, which does not create, but merely sanctions certain social principles
and methods, and stems from the consciousness and the heart, which are the
real creative and regulating powers among men”.2
“We, the religious men in the Senate, we occupy ourselves above all with the
soul; and we believe it is natural and good to do it with you, for this time the
evolution of life led us willy nilly to democracy, where we are first of all required
to have a soul. Without a soul, the democracy we are asked to live has no
foundation and is harmful, since it brands matter and instincts, dictates to the
soul and kneels human nobility”.5
At the same time, modernity has to bring about a reform in religious life too,
especially if the divine-human institution wants to have a certain social relevance,
assumed by Bartolomeu Stănescu through Social Christianity. In this respect, but
chiefly because of the ontological quasi-synonymy between Christianity and
1 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 210.
2 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 103.
3 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 244.
4 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 63.
5 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 243.
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democracy, the Romanian Orthodox Church should open herself to democracy, not
by changing its canons, but by carrying out an administrative reform, mainly as far as
the hierarches’ behaviour towards their priests is concerned: “The sacerdotal
autonomy, as discretionary power of the bishop, is not in tune with the democratic
spirit, on the contrary, the two of them will always quarrel”1.
The quasi-synonymy between Christianity and democracy makes Bartolomeu
Stănescu view the democratic regime as a reality encompassing not only the political
domain, but also the social and economic zone. The only definition of democracy he
formulated in the public space is destined to reduce democracy to the subsidiarity
principle, equality of chances, the human person’s right to bring one’s personality to
the fore, but also the obligation of the state to make this really happen.
Simultaneously, democracy cannot be associated with Russian communism for it is
characterised by a certain dose of elitism which the political body itself cannot secure.
The definition of democracy given on the occasion of his intervention during the
debates in the Senate on the Education Act is the more important as it is not part of the
probably written text of his discourse, being a spontaneous retort addressed to a
question asked by another senator:
contrary to Christianity, such as the idea of liberty in whose name many crimes were
committed, or the anonymisation of the human person among the huge masses of
proletarians:
“Let us deprive democracy of its fraternity and let us leave it to the Church, for
this virtue was never more terribly close than to the democracy of the French
Revolution, when the revolutionaries killed not only thousands of compatriots,
aristocrats and ecclesiasts, but they guillotined each other as no species of beast
does on the face of the earth”.1
It was difficult to speak in that epoch of the complete and effective assumption
of democracy, just as it was hard to speak about the separation of the Church from
the state, given that they were commonly associated with Russian bolshevism, which,
as a neighbour of Romania, was considered by the contemporaries as a real threat of
contamination. Thus, the bishop’s concern was to delimit ideal democracy from the
failure of certain regimes pretending to stem from democracy, and also to find the
decisive ingredient able to build democracy.
Bartolomeu Stănescu was not a philosopher to remain rooted in the traps of
philosophy or to find himself in the embarrassing situation of not being able to
express his ideas without giving examples. A proof in this respect is his manner of
explaining his vision on genuine democracy which is applied in only two Western
countries. Thus, in the United States of America and Great Britain democracy is more
than a mere political ideology, it is a concrete reality that meets the requirements of
the positive aspects brought about by modernity2, as well as the requirements of
Christianity, given that both “[…] the English and the American peoples shine
through their religiosity”3.
Although Bartolomeu Stănescu identifies the presence of an evangelical
inspired democracy in both American and British nations, he seems inclined to admire
more the American model, where Churches have always been disestablished:
“Luckily it is a country where life tends uninterruptedly to identify itself with the
Gospel, where the very basis of life is the Gospel itself, and this country is
America […]. The state and the federation itself are organised on Christian
bases, but the clergy was almost all along the leading element of political
achievements in America. Moreover, if we have a look at the Americans’
individual and chiefly social deeds we shall discover there unmistakably the
spiritual man. Though divided in different dogmas and rites, faith is there strong
and linked to Jesus, so that we see their dollars help their brothers in faith, with
the intention that each and every cult conquer the world and turn it into a flock
and a shepherd. And as for personal abstinence, the Americans are puritans;
1 Idem, O scurtă privire asupra unor stări de fapt de azi în legătură cu viitorul, Tipografia “Episcopul
Vartolomeiu” a Sf. Episcopii a Râmnicului Noului Severin, 1935, p. 23.
2 Idem [Arhiereul V. BĂCĂOANUL], “Principii pe cari va avea să se întemeieze autonomia Bisericii
Ortodoxe de Răsărit în Regatul Român”, Arhiva pentru drept şi politică, No. 1, iulie-septembrie 1919.
3 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 277.
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[…] To think that they prohibited alcohol by law shows clearly they have this
propensity towards abstinence. But it is the social-based love they have for their
fellow creatures, their self-denial, that best illustrates how inoculated they are
with the Gospel of Jesus. […] with the principle of authority connected with the
principle of liberty, constituting thereby the driving force in all the fields, be
they social, political and cultural, etc. Why is this combination so good? Because
if left alone, authority becomes tyranny, and liberty left alone become license.
Just as God combined light with darkness to give us the day, likewise authority
should intermingle with liberty in order to have a good social governance.
Hence America has the organisation and the state of affairs that can form the
spiritual man so that he might work with them”.1
“I cite herein some persons in whom this instinct appeared Christianly through
the works produced by Him in their minds and souls. In North America
between 1781 and 1789 two of these persons were George Washington and
Alexander Hamilton, who put their lives at stake and supported each other like
brothers to unite the 13 republics existing at that time. Washington was the
inspirer, the guide and the soul conqueror in order to give these quarrelling
republics a political unity. And Hamilton was their constructor or their social
and political architect […] Before Carnegie North America had Washington and
Hamilton as political energies, who gave these 13 republics the Constitution of the
United States of America, in 1787, during a congress held in Philadelphia [...].
Seeing they would not agree, he kept the tension high all the way during his six
hour speech which made them work for three months at the said convention.
So however political this Convention might be, it was engrafted with Christian
moral, not only because it put an end to the quarrels and brawls of these
republics, but also through their federal support, which continued and continues
even today to exert itself in the most peaceful and the most brotherly manner. They
were followed by Mac Kinley, who opened the economic frontiers for the
United States. The current President Roosevelt has proven to be very much like
these three afore mentioned men”.3
If the key of the American democratic political formula, in which the Church
was disestablished by the Constitution, was, though not explicitly named, the covenant
theology, in England’s case the success of democracy is given by local traditions,
among which having an established Church seems to be the most important of all.
Thus, Bartolomeu Stănescu admires the centrality of the Church in the public space,
1 Ibidem, p. 165.
2 Michael HORTON, Introducing Covenant Theology, Baker Books, n.p., 2006; A. Glen MOOTS, Politics
Reformed: the Anglo-American legacy of covenant theology, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2010.
3 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Cursuri misionare cu preoții eparhii la Sfânta Mănăstire Arnota, Editura Sfintei
both in Great Britain’s and in the Jewish cases, which are in total antithesis with
nations that put reason above faith:
“In London, for instance, on a Sunday, you will see that all industrial and
commercial enterprises are closed, along with cinemas and theatres; and only the
temples are opened; and their religious sermons too get out in the street, where the
preachers speak to passers-by. Until the present day, England did not secularise
almost anything of the social power of her Church, for even today weddings in
the English rite are as valid in the English state as the marriage performed by
the registrar. Even nowadays religious wedding produces in this civilised people
the same civil effects as a civil wedding; and it is even more desirable than this
one [...] Therefore you can see how deprived is the English people of the
religion which has forged the virtues of its race, of the religion which has
formed its compact social mass, of the religion which has created and is still
creating the energies of life, and of the Church they moulded into organisation
and dogma during the years; but without prejudicing the vigour of its religious
element, but only to nationalise it even more [...] Behold what faith can do! It
indents the soul with energies, competent people in all domains, in agriculture, in
industry, in commerce can use to adapt the individual as soon as possible, as
safely and as conscientiously as possible to this sort of occupations”.1
“In British countries, says Valentin Brifant, a counsellor of law at the Court of
Appeal in Brussels,[...] the liberty of association, to refer only to this one, has
always been more flourishing than in continental Europe, where the ancient
Roman right preserved its prominence almost exclusively [...] in England, the
ancient adage «state in state» whose mystifying meaning always made our law
makers shiver, engendered no fright in these countries. [...] On the contrary, in
the United States freedom of association is complete, regardless of creed or
goal; religious associations, scientific associations, recreation associations,
educational, charity associations, etc. have all the liberty to organise, to make
frequently quite substantial fortunes, to legislate and to govern within their
respective attributions”.4
1 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., pp. 287-288.
2 Although the freedom of conscience is almost traditional in North America, the moral heredity of the
Americans born by puritans engendered this application to human life of the Christianity of the first
centuries, to which the American religious breaches are valueless (Bartolomeu Stănescu’s note).
3 Bartolomeu, STĂNESCU, Cursuri misionare...cit., p. 89.
4 Idem, “Principiile de bază ale reorganizării noastre sociale si ce însemnătate ar avea pentru reorganisarea
Bisericii Ortodoxe de Răsărit din România întregită”, Solidaritatea. Revista social - creștină, anul I, No. 5-6,
n.p., 1920, pp. 168-169.
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Hence, “the democratism of Christianity brought about the equality before the
law”1,which means that the exigencies of democracy should be the rule of law, in
other words the lack of hazard and arbitrary, and the centrality of the human person,
whose rights and liberties should prevail over the state:
“Two centuries ago, through Christianity and the American and the French
revolutions humankind won and consolidated almost entirely all the rights of
man and of the citizen. Afterwards modern civilisation adopted these rights
regarding them as a sacred and inviolable patrimony of all humankind resting
them on both human nature, to which these rights are naturally attached, and on
the modern legal regime, which leads today all the cultivated peoples of the
world”.2
1 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 19.
2 Idem, “Cârmuirea sovietică nimicește în Rusia până și dreptul de închinare”, Renașterea. Revista de cultură
religioasă, anul IX, No. 3, 1930, p. 81.
3 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă , 2nd ed., Nemira, Bucureşti,
2004, p. 139.
4 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 64.
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did they sacrifice their assets, and even their lives, until they succeeded to assert and
secure it through the chart of the rights of man and of the citizen”1. Thus, the target
of the democracy imagined by Bartolomeu Stănescu is a solidarity inspired once more
by Christianity:
“From the principle on which Christian hierarchy is organised two things result:
1) justice or equality before the laws and 2) the commitment to charity, i.e. the
strong shall help and shall sacrifice themselves for the weak. When combined,
justice and charity give birth to solidarity, a new phrase in both legal and social
sciences of today”.2
2. SOLIDARITY
Solidarity is the social and political formula which opposes to both socialist
syndicalism and liberalism which did not count social justice among its major
objectives. Accordingly, solidarity is “that establishment where people are not
powerful or humble by predestination, but only due to the natural differences between
their own forces, and in which evangelical fraternity is ensured through mercy, in
other words through the love and sacrifices of the mighty for the feeble, and of the
feeble for the mighty”3.
Solidarity being the major theme of the Group of Christian-Social Studies
Solidaritatea, several of its members contributed with studies and articles. One of them,
Șerban Ionescu, seems prone to view solidarity rather as the settlement of the conflict
between social classes:
3. ANTI-ASSISTENTIALISM
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“As instrument of order and support to all its citizens, the state is compelled to
take care of their existence, as well as of the nation’s existence, and to re-
establish in the economic field not the equality, but the possibility for all the people
to live, work, and earn, by expropriating from where there is plenty in order to
give where there is nothing. This legally legitimated conception of restoring the
economic equilibrium means the right to exist, a right which belongs to anybody
who comes into the world, and the public power has the obligation to secure it”.1
Although it is not a right holder but with the consent of the citizens, the state
must not assume the production of weal, it has just to facilitate the citizens’ access to
prosperity. At the same time, when through its natural mechanisms (philanthropic
associations, the Church, private charity, etc.), society cannot assure a decent life to all
human beings, the state is compelled to intervene. However, in order to prevent
people from being tempted to expect to get everything from the state, the bishop
repeatedly solicited that the compulsoriness of work be introduced2 in the very text of
the fundamental law:
“I see that the freedom to work has been guaranteed. Still this does not mean
that the freedom to be idle is also guaranteed. The freedom to work is guaranteed
by the public power, so that no one be hindered to choose any profession he/she
prefers; so that no one be oppressed in his/her work engagement; and not to
escape from work and proclaim our sloth sacred and inviolable. [...] the freedom
to work is guaranteed to those who work, and everybody should join their
ranks, and profit of the protection of the Romanian State; and who should not profit
in the bosom of the Romanian people of the toil of those who work, and
without whom they could not live. Along with the freedom and compulsoriness
of work, I think the state should recognise itself under the obligation of the
present Constitution of inoculating to its inhabitants a special competence for any
kind of occupation, commencing with handicrafts, agriculture, etc., and ending
as today with universities, in the case of intellectual occupations”.3
4. EVANGELIC DEMOCRACY
Leaving aside for the time being the anti-statist dimension and that of the
intermediary bodies of society, the democracy of evangelic inspiration imagined by
Bartolomeu Stănescu as the ideal political regime starts from the centrality of the
1 Ibidem, p. 312.
2 Ibidem, p. 356.
3 Ibidem, p. 267.
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needs of conservation and completion of the individual’s life, as incentive of the entire
social body’s progress:
“Hence, our economic life shall have to develop in such a way so that each
individual, be he valid or invalid, each institution, be it old or new, find their
existence and their capacity to evolve through their own produce; and so that
those entitled and responsible of social life find thanks to this produce of our
economy the means to fully satisfy all our cultural needs, from whose
capitalisation we expect the utmost and the paramount force of our nation”.1
“We live in total falsehood, i.e. in a social life regime in which, according to
inscriptions and doctrines, authority is limited and placed under the control of
civil liberty, but where liberty, with the exception of the political vote, is
deprived of any means of assertion and fulfilment of its duties as social, new
and fundamental factor. Hence the satrapical authoritarianism of our public
bureaus, left because of the disorganisation of liberty with no legal liability
towards the citizens even when they are abused because of the clerks’
incompetence or sloth; [...] the assertion on any occasion of this rotten
authoritarianism, dangerous to public education, through which our bureaus
strive to repair the otherwise Platonic losses, caused by modern constitutions, to
the escorting authority of Roman law; hence the rapid discredit of our public
authority, which the spirit of liberty of the modern civilisation we live in can no
longer tolerate, not even in Romania, under its antiquated forms; and hence too,
the spread of anarchy under all its shapes, be they big or small, engendered by a
1 Ibidem, p. 354.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, p. 350.
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“Whereas we, the Romanians, who did not enhance our selfishness, long since
superposed on our ancestral altruism, not even with competence in enterprises
of personal interest, nor with the knowledge of physical and social
environments, for the benefit of the affairs we attend to… but solely with an
insatiable desire for wealth, we are the classical model of torment, which we
inflict ourselves on our persons, as all sorts of social and individual squalidity,
through the power and the certain fruit of our selfishness, unpolished by
Western ways”.2
1 Idem, “Principiile de bază...cit.”, p. 171.
2 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul general la începutul anului 1928 sau Primejduirea omenirii, Tipografia Cozia,
Râmnicul -Vâlcea, 1928, p. 53.
3 Ion MICLEA, Elemente de Politică Creştină, Tipografia Vremea, n.p., 1947, p. 25.
4 Alexandru MAMINA, Dimensiunea religioasă a gândirii contrarevoluţionare franceze, Corint, Bucureşti, 2002.
5 Nicolae T. BUZEA, Socialismul şi creştinismul social, Tipografia Eparhială “Viaţa Românească”, Chişinău,
1926.
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In his turn, the political scientist Marcel Gauchet observes the difference
between liberal democracies and those inspired by Christianity according to the
trajectory assumed by both of them. Thus, whereas liberal democracy creates the
conditions of an unprecedented expansion of the state, which becomes part and
parcel of the social mechanism2, Social Christianity, as a source of Christian
democracy, is rather interested in recomposing civil society which it wants entirely
organised in all sorts of groups:
“Civil society manifests itself less and less under the form of organised segments
acting precisely by virtue of their share as independent and self-consistent social
blocks (as it was for a long time the case in France, for example, of the catholic
confessional block). In a profound sense, the social movement becomes the
individuals’ movement”.3
5. TYPOLOGIES OF DEMOCRACIES
INSPIRED BY CHRISTIANITY
Thus, the formula of the democracy imagined by the hierarch, called by himself
evangelic, due to the fact that its source professed by Bartolomeu Stănescu is the
Gospel itself and especially in order to avoid its being mistaken for Christian
democracy with which it does not superpose exactly, is characterised by the centrality
of the human being, subsidiarity, solidarity, the concern for the natural communities
of society and the primordiality of the human being over the state.
In spite of the numerous attempts of democratisation that populated the public
space in the interwar period, the authoritarian political formulas dominated not only at
the level of political projects, but also at intellectual and even academic levels. That
being the case, Bartolomeu Stănescu may be included in both the afore-mentioned
categories, just as his friend Mihail Manoilescu, who was one of the most cited and
influential Romanians in the interwar international academic milieu. Mihail Manoilescu
succeeded to create a sheer corporatist current which nurtured not only the European,
but also the Romanian professors who sought to bring again to the attention of public
opinion elements of the traditional Romanian corporatism4, iron-guardists and even
the King Carol II. Thus, on the background of anti-democratism and of the royal anti-
1 John MILBANK, Simon OLIVER, The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group,
London & New York, 2009, p. 352.
2 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii: o istorie politică a religiei, trans. Vasile Tonoiu, Nemira, Bucureşti,
2006.
3 Ibidem, p. 304.
4 Eugen PAVELESCU, “Corporatismul Moldovei secolului al XVIII-lea”, Lumea Nouă, Anul V, 1936.
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“The theoreticians of organic democracies stress the fact that people are
naturally members of many groups of social relations, employment, professional
associations, universities, districts, parishes, etc., in contrast with artificially
created larger groups, such as political parties, which divide people […] why
shouldn’t we organise political representation on the basis of primary unities?”.4
In his turn, Raymond Aron calls these regimes – in which the requirements of
democracy do not superpose over a tradition of parliamentarian practice – pluralist,
constitutional, though oligarchic, regimes5. Therefore, although we find elements of
corporatism, of representation and institutionalisation of interests, especially
economic and occupational interests, in all political systems, democracies like the
Romanian interwar democracy passed quite quickly to corporatism, the idea of ethical
and ethnic state, of exacerbated nationalism, going back to tradition, yet gazing at the
future. In this respect, the case of Bartolomeu Stănescu can offer us a few clues about
the failure of the Romanian interwar democracy in general, and especially about the
failure of the evangelic democracy formulated by our hierarch.
For the Oltenian bishop modernity is not merely the golden age of humankind,
it is also his own golden age, the chance to put into practice genuine Christianity,
uncorrupted by the political doctrines of the divine right, and in which the human
being finds fulfilment in the earthly order through rights and duties. At the same time,
modernity is that epoch in which natural right and the evangelic message become
congruent, in which society as entity separated from the individual is born, and along
with it the human person becomes not only a subject of the earthly world in general,
but also a political subject.
1 Constantin C. BÂCA, “Românizarea prin bresle”, Lumea Nouă, Anul V, No. 10-11, 1936.
2 Mihail MANOILESCU, Preoții și profesorii în statul corporativ, Tipografia ziarului “Universul”, Bucureşti,
1934.
3 Nicolae T. BUZEA, Socialismul şi creştinismul social, Tipografia Eparhială “Viaţa Românească”, Chişinău,
1926, p. 275.
4 Juan J. LINZ, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2000, p. 211.
5 Raymond ARON, Democracy and Totalitarianism, trans. Valence Ionescu, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1968.
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1 Cătălin RAIU, “Social Christianity and The Constitution of A New Political Subject”, Studia Politica.
Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, pp. 259-273.
2 Jacques MARITAIN, Omul şi statul, trans. Livia Iacob, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2008, p. 145.
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6. SUBSIDIARITY
From one end to the other of his reflection, the bishop asserts some principles
specific to Christian democracy, which he never abandoned. We have in mind now
the principle of subsidiarity1, a rare reflection in the Romanian intellectual space:
“The Church sanctifies and fights herself for the right of each and every
individual that comes into the world to make the best of his/her forces and
talents, advising however everybody not to infringe on someone else’s rights.
This is the democracy I fight for. Democracy is the right of each individual that
is brought into the world of making the most of his/her forces, talents and
aspirations of bettering one’s soul, not only through personal efforts, which,
happening to be feeble, are entitled to benefit of the support and aid of one’s
peers and of the entire human society, just as Jesus recommended”.2
Subsidiarity turns then into a fear of the increasingly greater power of the state
and into an anti-statism meant to express the primordiality of civil society over the
state in a given order of rights: “The state itself, with all its powers, debases itself if it
is not counterbalanced, as is the case of the Church, for instance. The Church can
likewise get corrupted if it is not counterbalanced by another institution, such as the
state, for example”.3 One of Bartolomeu Stănescu’s major concerns is to ensure that
the state will not be able to interfere on the field of the assertion of the citizens’
natural rights; therefore he focuses all his attention on the way citizenship is devised
by the superposition of several layers consisting of social and political rights. His
perspective is consonant with the long and difficult construction of Western
democracy: “In Western democracies the citizen is the result of the accumulation of
political and legal practices and guarantees. Positive political or social rights, whatever
they might be, cannot be acquired unless beforehand negative liberties have already
become a reality”4.
By contrast, his professor Émile Durkheim, who cannot be suspected of
Christian democracy, argued that, on the contrary, the state is the one, which
promotes the citizens’ natural rights and establishes their limits:
“The state is the that creates and organises and makes a reality these rights. And
indeed, man is a man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all
that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other
animals. It is society that has raised him to this level above physical nature: it has
1 Chantal MILLON-DELSOL, Statul subsidiar. Ingerința și neingerința statului: principiul subsidiarității în
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Durkheim sheds light on democracy only at the level of its functioning, so that
democracy corresponds to the need of moralisation of society, for individuals accept
laws less passively2 and because in democracy man takes directly part in decision
making. Thus, in Durkheim’s view, democracy is that “[…] political system by which
the society can achive a consciousness of itself in its purest form. The more that
deliberation and reflection and the critical spirit play a considerable part in the course
of public affairs, the more democratic is that nation”3. Nonetheless, democracy is
helpless without secondary social staff and groups that free the state from citizens and
the citizens from the state.
However, for Bartolomeu Stănescu's democracy is rather a zone of
manifestation of early Christianity. Hence, even during his antidemocratic period, the
bishop does not choose his examples from European corporatisms rooted in
Catholicism; he seeks his examples in the two countries where evangelic democracy
has triumphed:
“Carnegie’s and Rockefeller’s example who gave 730 billion of francs in order to
build up foundations, among which we may quote the Pasteur institute, to
which he contributed 55.000 francs, will be for Christian individuals models to
follow. Of these five total inner and social states, and of all the public and private
institutions of Christian peoples, the Christian clergy possesses the surest means
to be used and the most powerful levers to sustain it in its pastoral mission in
eparchies and parishes”.4
The bishop observes that democracy is in danger because it does not create
good leaders able to imbue the political body with a unitary creed5, in other words it
lacks the elitism specific to conservatories and it relies on the fact that if left alone the
people are unable to govern themselves. Moreover, democracy failed to produce
morality in society, in the sense that if medieval man was a spiritual man, modernity
created a homo oeconomicus, a man subject to the flesh, prone to lies, hatred, treason,
theft, crime and tempted by sexual debauchery, aspects that precisely the authoritarian
European regimes endeavour to better:
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For Bartolomeu Stănescu, from the “organised legal common effort [and] the
servant who gives orders”3, thus the state, becomes an “academy of tested
competences”4, in other words, it becomes a dominant state, guarantor of the organic
community, head of the economy, reflecting a sole undivided will, quite like a God5.
After the national reunification of 1918, the Romanians no longer had any major
objective to reach, fought for nothing more, which means that democracy did not
succeed to inflame the energies of society:
“All these energies meant to strengthen our social body are now channelled into
our individual personality, where, by bringing a surplus of forces, incite us
toward a negative activity, that is to say they arouse in us various passions, the first
of them being the strong desire for better living, greed, etc. [...] energies are not given
by God to be mere means of human selfishness, they are also meant to be
means of the social body, for the constitution of social beings in general, viz. of
institutions and nations. That is why we have to give to our surplus of national
energy a new superior objective, able to unify, invigorate and guide them towards
good. Gentlemen, fortunately, in our earthly lives we still have two vast and
powerful objectives that touch the energies of our nation, to wit we still have
the economic objective and the cultural objective”.6
1 Idem, “Omul de astăzi”, Românizarea, Anul IV, No. 73, 1938, pp. 1-2.
2 Idem, “Principiile de bază ale reorganizării noastre sociale și Ce însemnătate ar avea pentru
reorganisarea Bisericii Ortodoxe de Răsărit din România întregită(II)”, Solidaritatea. Revistă social-creștină,
Anul I, No. 7-8, octombrie-noiembrie 1920.
3 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 361.
4 Ibidem, pp. 88 -91.
5 Peter J. WILLIAMSON, Varieties of Corporatism. A Conceptual Discussion, Cambridge University Press,
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Hence, although democracy does not promise tomorrow’s good, but rather the
avoidance of today’s evil, Bartolomeu Stănescu has this quasi-eschatological
1 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul...cit., p. 26.
2 Jacques MARITAIN, Omul şi statul…cit..
3 Daniel BARBU, “Destinul colectiv, servitutea involuntară, nefericirea totalitară: trei mituri ale
comunismului românesc”, in Lucian BOIA (coord.), Miturile comunismului românesc, Nemira, Bucureşti,
1998.
4 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii...cit., p. 291.
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perspective on the creation of the moral man as a result of the superposition of several
social and political practices, the most important of them all being the centrality of the
Church, whose mission is, among others, to arouse individual consciousness and to
unify the soul of the political body:
1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Principiile de bază ale...cit., p. 240.
2 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul...cit., p. 33.
3 Idem, Formarea omului întreg de către clerul eparhial și cel parohial al Sfintei noastre Biserici Ortodoxe Române,
Eparhiale din 13 Maiu 1929”, Renașterea., Revista de cultură religioasă Anul VIII, No. 6, 1929, p. 202.
6 Clinton ROSSITER, James LARE, The Essential Lippmann. A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy,
8. CORPORATISATION OF SOCIETY
“In Antiquity and even in the Middle Ages the role of the state was to dominate
the people. In the modern era, on the contrary, it plays a quite different role, to
serve the people. It is so dictated by the nature of things, and it was so enacted
by the French Revolution; and so says our Evangel too. […] European peoples
took into account this new political direction of the state; and since the French
Revolution, they put at its disposal for this purpose three instruments: a political
one, a technical one, and a material one. The political instrument is national
sovereignty; the technical one is duty and the capacity of the state to examine
competently the people’s common and natural needs, and to organise public
services in order to satisfy them; and the material instrument is taxation. The
legitimisation of taxation ensues from the serving role of modern states; […] the
legal instrument of national sovereignty is necessary because through national
sovereignty the state exerts on the people its supreme and unique
commandment that puts into practice the spiritual link that must exist between
citizens. […] These considerations prove beyond any doubt the legitimisation of
taxation, or its justification through natural law, which neither human law, nor
divine law can infringe”.2
However, his 1934-1935 project for a political regime provides no more the
sovereignty of the political body, and stipulates only the King’s sovereignty, who
embodies all the aspirations and needs of the people, organised in professional
corporations. There is also a certain continuity, at least at the methodological level,
between religious, political and social heresy, “which can be abnormal, that is to say
prejudicial to human life, as it was the case for instance of the French Revolution,
already cited in here, but also of all religious heresies and schisms in the world3, or of
social upheavals, such as those that shake Russia nowadays”4. Consequently, in the
absence of a national soul full of morality and especially in the absence of a faith in
the people as source of power, the bishop fears that even “the Godless, soulless and
lawless”5 communism could be considered democracy.
Additionally, the project of the Academy of Tested Competences to reduce state
bureaucracy at only 25 technocrat members led by the King equals an anti-
bureaucratic political regime generated by the bishop’s aversion for both the state’s
1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 66.
2 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 245.
3 As for instance the Inochentiștii, whose cult consists in such sexual debauchery that overshadows even
brothels which are specialised in this kind of depravation (Bartolomeu Stănescu’s note).
4 Ibidem, p. 279.
5 Ibidem, p. 42.
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omnipotence and incapacity of producing social consensus, which means that the
state should assume its role of pedagogue. Thus, Bartolomeu Stănescu positions
himself against democratic liberal regimes, in which the claim of the state to broaden
bureaucracy does not necessarily imply the need to submit individuals’ activity to a
unifying plan imposed from above, it only means that the state should adapt to
spontaneous social changes. So, as liberal democracies consolidate themselves, the
state too grows, it does not diminish, trying to meet the expansive dynamics of
society, which should be rendered to itself through self-determination and
liberalisation in all domains:
“The need for a state corresponds to less and less out-dated authority and more
and more representativeness. The democratic state no longer imposes the
course, it creates a relationship of functional correspondence, of reflection when
acting, wherein instead of making prevail an intrinsic necessity, the self-
assumption of the social body, the actual self-possession should materialise
under the form of effective rule”.1
In this way, the bishop falls into a trap similar to that neoliberalism which was
experimented in countries as Great Britain and the United States of America, in the
1980s, and eventually extended in all Europe, in other words the trap of freeing
society from the state’s tutelage, but of putting it under the exclusive authority of one
of its fundamental realities, namely free market. Therefore, just as the neoliberal state
has to be a transparent one, with a discrete presence in economy, education, health,
etc., the state imagined by the bishop too has a sole attribution, i.e. to organise society
in professional corporations. Bartolomeu Stănescu’s state is peopled by a few
technocrats who govern, not in the name of a politically assumed vision or on behalf
of their liability towards citizens, but in the name of their scientific expertise.
Furthermore, the bishop stands against the democratic construction of Western
countries from where he actually had borrowed his examples and where states were
inserting themselves more and more deeply in society through public services
precisely to liberate it:
Consequently, the greater the role of the state in society, the more naturally
does it become present in the collective mechanism, without thereby engendering
statism or assistentialism. Hence, Christian democrats plead for a certain degree of
interventionism of the state, which would be totally inacceptable for classical
1 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii...cit., p. 292.
2 Ibidem, p. 317.
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liberalism, yet at the same time they attack more severely Marxism than liberalism,
which they associate to the state’s dictatorship and to the implicit negation of Christ’s
fundamental teachings, viz. the infinite value of human being.
1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, “Cuvântare despre educaţia copiilor, rostită la conferinţa «Alianţei
Universale» de la Stokholm, în luna august 1925”, Biserica Ortodoxă Română, Seria II, Anul 43, No. 12,
1925, p. 716.
2 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiți. Vot și putere de la 1821 până în prezent, Polirom, Iași, 2011.
3 Daniel BARBU, Cristian PREDA, “Building the State from the Roof Down: Varieties of Romanian
Liberal Nationalism”, in Iván Zoltán DÉNES (ed.), Liberty and the search for identity: liberal nationalism and the
legacy of empires. Central European University Press, Budapest, 2006.
4 Stănescu BARTOLOMEU, “Datoriile economico -sociale ale statului din punct de vedere creştin”,
and Nicolae Dobrescu, both professors at the Faculty of Theology of the University
of Bucharest, saw in Bartolomeu Stănescu’s Social Christianity but a political
programme, inspired from Die christlich Partei and Le christianisme social, socio-political
movements of Germany, and respectively of France1, which means that behind the
association between modernity and Christianity there is no sheer scientific resource,
but merely a political ideology, subject to transience and even contrary to the
Romanian Orthodox Church. Thus, although we did not identify a cause-effect
answer to the reasons which underlay the lack of influence of the Romanian social
Christianity or to the reasons why the members of the movement gave up the project
initiated by Bartolomeu Stănescu, the ecclesiastical and political elites’ silence betrays
an utter lack of interest in the only formula of Christian democracy in interwar
Romania.
10. CONCLUSIONS
To top it all, Bartolomeu Stănescu’s democracy is the pray of the very novel
element it contained, namely the subsidiarity principle, which remains in both
formulas of political regime conceived by the Oltenian bishop, or, in other words,
subsidiarity in its democratic formula is very close to subsidiarity in the authoritarian
formula. Bartolomeu Stănescu leaves the scene of the history as a character rejected
by several political regimes (Carol’s dictatorship, the Iron Guard, Antonescu’s
dictatorship, and the communist regime), but he enters the zone of historiography and
history of political ideas as one of the few Romanians who sought to put into practice
Christian democracy through an intellectual formula.
1 A.N.I.C., Fund of the Ministry of Cults and Public Instruction, File no. 2638/1913, sheet 38.
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Salvatore CINGARI
University for Foreigners of Perugia
Abstract: This article examines a particular aspect of the linguistic and cultural
«neoliberal» hegemony, namely the use of the term «meritocracy», as a concept related
to the idea of improving the degree of justice in society. The view expressed here is
that in a more general process («post-democratic»), this term has an «ideological»
nature, in the sense that it actually functions as a mask of inequality. Therefore, the
debate in Italy is reconstructed, considering some mainstream texts, but also some
interventions that deconstruct the ideology.
David Harvey, nel suo libro sulla storia del neo-liberismo1, insiste
«gramscianamente» sul ruolo dell’egemonia culturale conquistata dal neo-liberismo a
partire dalla fine degli anni settanta. Tale egemonia corrisponde ai processi produttivi
segnati dal passaggio al post-fordismo e alla finanziarizzazione dell’economia,
agevolata dalle scelte politiche degli stati, in un quadro istituzionale che possiamo
definire come «post-democratico».
Il termine «post-democrazia» è entrato nel linguaggio politico europeo con il
libro di Colin Crouch del 20032. Esso intende enucleare la costituzione materiale dei
paesi capitalistici, così come si è andata assestando fra anni ottanta e svolta del secolo.
Una realtà politico-sociale, cioè, in cui, a causa di una progressiva deregolamentazione
dei mercati e della finanza, le concentrazioni di capitale privato si sono
particolarmente rafforzate sovrastando il potere degli stati sovrani e quindi della
cittadinanza democratica. Non sono più le aziende che cercano di guadagnarsi il
favore degli stati, ma viceversa. Di conseguenza sulle grandi decisioni che riguardano
la vita delle persone, influiscono sempre più le grandi lobbies economico-finanziarie. I
partiti non hanno più il ruolo di mettere in connessione i bisogni delle persone e dei
corpi sociali con le istituzioni, ma di collegare queste, appunto, ai poteri forti
dell'economia privata. In questo scenario le istituzioni pubbliche, e, in particolare, le
istituzioni di welfare vengono progressivamente erose da processi di privatizzazione,
giustificati con le retoriche dell'efficienza e della produttività, ma, in realtà, mosse
1 David HARVEY, Breve storia del neoliberismo, Il saggiatore, Milano, 2007.
2 Colin CROUCH, Postdemocrazia, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2003.
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dall'esigenza di mettere a disposizione dei guadagni privati e di borsa più ampie fette
di beni comuni.
Il risultato di questi processi è quindi una riapertura drammatica della forbice
delle diseguaglianze sociali e un arretramento dei diritti individuali e collettivi. Non
solo il lavoro diventa sempre più precario e non tutelato, oltre che scarsamente
disponibile, ma i salari e gli stipendi vengono sempre più compressi in favore di
rendite, prevalentemente finanziarie, e profitti. L'economia basata su delocalizzazioni,
investimenti in marketing e nella finanza, fa sì che la produttività o i guadagni non
corrispondano più allo sviluppo collettivo. Non più denaro-merce-denaro, ma denaro-
denaro. La capacità, quindi, del capitalismo, di generare ricchezza collettiva, sembra
spenta e, così, anche rotta la relazione fra capitalismo e democrazia1.
La previsione è che in pochi anni sarà smantellata la sanità, l’istruzione e la
previdenza pubblica, con una massa neo-servile assoggettata alla condizione precaria
del lavoro e una minoranza oligarchica padrona delle risorse economiche. Un ritorno,
perciò, all'antico regime, in cui pochi potranno istruirsi, spostarsi, curarsi etc. e molti
avranno difficoltà a farlo. Si parla di «post-democrazia» perché tale situazione viene
«dopo» alcuni decenni in cui la pressione esercitata sulle élites occidentali dai
movimenti dei lavoratori e dell’Impero sovietico aveva generato un compromesso fra
capitalismo e diritti sociali e, quindi, il ricordo di ciò dovrebbe consentire di misurare il
presente col recente passato e con i suoi residui giuridico-istituzionali.
In questa temperie si diffondono saperi economici tutti schiacciati
sull'economia neo-liberista ispirata dalla scuola di Chicago e discorsi etici e politici
caratterizzati da una svalutazione dell'intervento dello stato e della gestione pubblica
dei beni comuni, a vantaggio dell'idea che ognuno debba essere imprenditore di se
stesso. L'uguaglianza economico-sociale viene svalutata, in quanto invece si ritiene che
avvantaggiando i grandi patrimoni si determinino le condizioni per accumulare
capitale da investire per una ricchezza comune che, come abbiamo visto, in realtà non
si produce. La democrazia viene esaltata soltanto nel suo lato procedurale: essa è
ritenuta in crescita sulla base dell'aumento dei paesi in cui si svolgono libere elezioni,
ma senza che sia considerato il peso condizionante dei grandi poteri economici sulle
dinamiche politiche e quello dei media e della microfisica «consumistica» del potere.
In questo ordine egemonico, un ruolo importante ha avuto in Italia, negli ultimi
anni, il concetto di «meritocrazia». Tale idea è apparentemente connessa ad una critica
democratica del sistema oligarchico. In un paese a scarsa mobilità sociale dove
dominano le grandi famiglie, il nepotismo, il favoritismo, il clientelismo e talvolta la
vera e propria corruzione, richiamare l'idea che l'assegnazione dei ruoli vada riportata
al merito e alla competenza e non alle relazioni personali, sembrerebbe un assunto di
semplice buon senso. E tuttavia tale discorso sta finendo per andare a costituire una
vera e propria ideologia della diseguaglianza, in quanto va a giustificare le differenze di
classe, configurandosi come una sorta di teodicea del neo-capitalismo. Il merito, quindi,
1 Cfr. Alberto BURGIO, Senza democrazia, Derive APPRODI, Roma, 2009; Luciano GALLINO,
Finanzcapitalismo, Einaudi, Torino, 2011; Piero BEVILACQUA, Il grande saccheggio. L’età del capitalismo
distruttivo, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2011.
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non come base della distribuzione di determinati ruoli, ma come giustificazione delle
posizioni sociali esistenti e delle differenze di classe. Il concetto di meritocrazia,
inoltre, è volto anche a sottolineare la necessità di selezionare i ruoli sulla base di un
criterio di efficienza ed a valorizzare, a questo fine, quindi, la formazione di classi
dirigenti e di leaders piuttosto che l’attenzione all’elevamento culturale e civile
dell’intero corpo sociale, il cui benessere è visto solo in funzione, appunto, della
possibilità di essere guidato da «eccellenze» (concetto peraltro non privo di mediate
suggestioni nietzschiane). Si tratta insomma non solo della diffusione di massa delle
teorie elitistiche, ma di un ritorno in grande stile dello stesso elitarismo
aristocraticistico e irrazionalistico (non a caso venato di giovanilismo) del primo
novecento, che accompagnava, non a caso, i processi di accelerazione imperialistica
del capitalismo, come George Lukács ben comprese nella Distruzione della ragione.
L’elitismo stesso tende ormai a lasciare il campo democratico guadagnato con
Shumpeter per tendere ad un «modello Singapore» in cui meritarsi i diritti non
rimanda tanto alla sfera dell’autonomia personale quanto a quella dell’obbedienza e
della subordinazione gerarchica1, dal momento che non si tratta più, per i lavoratori, di
organizzarsi ed unirsi per esprimere un conflitto al fine di rivendicare collettivamente
diritti individuali, ma di «stare al proprio posto», cercando individualisticamente di
ottenere premi e approvazione dai superiori; e in cui è quindi facile slittare dall’idea
che chi merita deve assumere più responsabilità a quella che chi merita deve avere più
diritti.
Non stupisce allora che il dato più ricorrente nella letteratura «meritocratica» è
l'assenza di attenzione per i meccanismi produttivi e redistributivi utili affinché una
società abbia quelle caratteristiche di giustizia tali da far emergere il «merito». La
meritocrazia viene declinata come uguaglianza di opportunità (che sarebbe anche
sinonimo di «socialismo»), ma tale uguaglianza viene vista come il frutto di particolari
sistemi educativi, oppure proprio come frutto della distruzione dello stato sociale,
nell'idea che mentre esso accresce rendite di posizione, la società privatizzata favorisce
la mobilità, come se il liberismo sfrenato non menasse alle concentrazioni
oligopolistiche e quindi all'immobilità.
Che l'idea del «merito» sia poi connessa alla cultura economico-aziendale
egemone emerge dal proliferare delle pratiche di valutazione quantitativa nella scuola e
nell'Università, con le connesse dinamiche etico-culturali ispirate alla competizione e
all'enfasi elitaria sull'eccellenza al posto della cultura egualitaria che si era affermata negli
anni sessanta e settanta. Allo stesso modo, in campo sociale, si assiste ad una
diffusione di una cultura securitario-autoritaria, in cui si distinguono i cittadini
«meritevoli» da quelli «immeritevoli», spesso razzizzati e criminalizzati, in modo
parallelo a come, a livello di politica internazionale, vengono stigmatizzati gli «stati
canaglia».
Nel seguito di questo saggio intendiamo dapprima ricostruire alcuni aspetti
della genealogia del concetto di «meritocrazia», soffermandoci poi su alcuni momenti
del dibattito italiano attuale.
1 Cfr. Bruno TRENTIN, “A proposito di merito”, L’Unità, 13 luglio 2006.
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1 Dizionario di politica, UTET, Torino, 1976.
2 Anthony GIDDENS, La terza via. Manifesto per la rifondazione della socialdemocrazia, Il saggiatore, Milano,
1999, pp. 102-103. Per Giddens era illusorio pensare che l’istruzione potesse colmare le diseguaglianze in
modo diretto, dato che il livello di essa rispecchia le diseguaglianze stesse (ivi, p. 110). Anche per
Romano Prodi, autore della prefazione, non bisognava rincorrere «sconsideratamente le mitologie
liberiste e meritocratiche» (ivi, p. 10).
3 Michael YOUNG, L’avvento della meritocrazia (1958), Edizioni di comunità, Milano, 1962.
4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento e rendere il ostro paese più ricco e
Mannucci, in sede di introduzione, parlava della meritocrazia come dell’ «esatta antitesi
della democrazia».
Ma allora come è possibile che oggi il termine sia diventato parte dell’agenda
politica dell’opinione pubblica, dei media e del personale politico di stampo
«progressista»? In realtà, in effetti, il concetto, se non il termine, non è del tutto
estraneo alla cultura di sinistra. Infatti è vero che esso si incarna nella cultura politica
del dopo restaurazione, in sistemi elitistici come quello di Guizot, in cui non è più
l’origine aristocratica, ma il merito personale cristallizzato nella ricchezza che attesta la
capacità di attingere alla «ragione»1. Ma è vero anche che il problema di enucleare
un’idea di società in cui il «merito» non è privilegio, è un tema che percorre la
riflessione che, da Rousseau a Marx, cerca di andare oltre la democrazia liberale. E’
stato Galvano della Volpe2, nel saggio intitolato, appunto, Rousseau e Marx e quasi
coevo all’opera di Young, che ha cercare di ritessere questo filo. In Rousseau, scriveva
Della Volpe, un problema di fondo era proprio quello di far sì che le diseguaglianze
fra gli individui legate alla dimensione politica e civile, non siano differenti da quelle
determinate dalla capacità di lavoro e dal talento degli stessi. Notava Della Volpe che è
però soltanto con Marx che si effettua una critica risolutiva alle radici di quella
discrasia fra ineguaglianza civile e ineguaglianza naturale, instaurandosi una società in
cui ognuno riceva a seconda del proprio lavoro e cioè del proprio merito. Della Volpe,
che scriveva in epoca post-staliniana, riteneva di vedere realizzato tale modello nella
società sovietica. Ecco perciò che in qualche misura possono essere comprese certe
convergenze fra Gobetti e il giovane Gramsci nel segno del liberismo meritocratico, in
cui certo emerge l’ascendenza in certo modo «borghese» del lavorismo marxista. E’ lo
stesso Della Volpe che, però, accenna all’inizio del saggio a un tema che poi non
sviluppa, e cioè quello del comunismo come società che non dà più a tutti secondo il
merito, ma secondo il bisogno. E’ solo per questa via che in certo modo si può emendare
il «naturalismo» insito nello stesso Rousseau: se si premiano i meriti naturali, infatti,
non si determina una nuova aristocrazia? Cos’era l’aristocrazia alle origini, se non una
borghesia primitiva, che però agiva in campo militare piuttosto che nel mercato, per
acquisire potere?
Ecco quindi che da un lato la linea Rousseau-Marx sottopone fortemente a
critica l’idea meritocratica contemporanea. Essa, infatti, è sempre declinata sul piano
della moralità e legalità pubblica, senza mai andare a vedere quale sia la situazione
economico-sociale, nel suo lato produttivo e redistributivo. D’altro lato la tradizione
marxista, con l’idea della centralizzazione del bisogno, condivide con la stessa
1 Cfr. ad es. François GUIZOT, Della sovranità, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 1998; Della democrazia in
Francia (1848), Centro editoriale toscano, Firenze, 2000. Su Guizot come teorico del merito cfr. Il bel
saggio di Mario TESINI, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia del linguaggio politico”, Paradoxa, gennaio-marzo
2011, pp. 59-64.
2 Galvano DELLA VOLPE, Rousseau e Marx e altri saggi di critica materialistica (1957), Editori riuniti, Roma,
democrazia costituzionale del secondo dopoguerra1 l’idea che una serie di diritti sociali
sono universali, a prescindere dal merito dei soggetti che ne sono titolari.
L’attuale discorso meritocratico, rimuovendo sia il problema dell’uguaglianza
economico sociale per garantire pari opportunità, sia la questione di un livello di diritti
riguardante la sfera del bisogno e non del merito, rischia così di diventare la
giustificazione della diseguaglianza, mascherando i privilegi con il velo del «merito»,
come anche Fisher, negli anni settanta, sottolineava nella succitata voce del Dizionario
di politica. Ma non c’è in gioco soltanto questa sorta di teodicea del capitalismo, ma
anche la neutralizzazione del conflitto sociale. La società e le classi scompaiono di
fronte all’individuo e alla sua responsabilità. In fondo si tratta della riproposizione di
ciò che già si era affermato nella prima metà dell’Ottocento nei paesi anglosassoni, e
nella seconda metà in Italia, e cioè l’ideologia del self-help2, che tendeva a giustificare
una ridotta mobilità sociale dalle «classi pericolose» alle élites. Si trattava cioè di una
vasta pubblicistica rivolta al «popolo», a cui si diceva di vincere le tentazioni
conflittuali verso le classi più abbienti, ed evitare le spinte aggregative fra svantaggiati
per sconfiggere i forti, investendo le energie, all’opposto, nel pensare che ognuno,
individualmente, poteva riuscire ad essere fra quei pochi che avrebbero scalato la vetta
del successo: «fai da te», «aiutati che Dio t'aiuta», «chi la dura la vince», «chi si ferma è
perduto». Questi sono alcuni dei motti self-helpisti, che, non a caso, consigliavano a
tutti di «stare al proprio posto», al di fuori dei ristrettissimi canali deputati alla mobilità
sociale consentita. Oggi – come nell'Ottocento il self-help - l’ideologia del merito
giustifica la nuova disuguaglianza del nuovo ordine neo-liberista, che riproduce le
società pre-democratiche dell’Ottocento.
La criminalizzazione della povertà, assimilata alla devianza e contrapposta al
«cittadino meritevole», è un risultato, ad esempio, di questa logica. La meritocrazia
rivela inoltre una certa parentela con il razzismo stesso: nella misura in cui, cioè, essa
naturalizza la posizione sociale e quindi la essenzializza gerarchizzando così la società3.
Anche per Rousseau, del resto, il «merito» era una «dote naturale».
del carattere negli epigoni italiani di Samuel Smiles”, Incontri mediterranei, No. 1, 2004, pp. 149-160.
3 Su ciò cfr. Alberto BURGIO, Nonostante Auschwitz. Il «ritorno» del razzismo in Europa, Derive Approdi,
Roma, 2010.
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1 Giuliano Da EMPOLI, La guerra del talento, Marsilio, Padova, 2000.
2 Alberto ALESINA, Francesco GIAVAZZI, Il liberismo è di sinistra, Saggiatore, Milano, 2007.
3 Adolfo Scotto DI LUZIO, La scuola degli italiani, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007.
4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento…cit., pp. 14-18.
5 Cfr. anche ivi, p. 241.
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1 Ibidem, p. 20.
2 Ibidem, pp. 20, 37-41, 53-55, 109.
3 Su ciò Mauro BOARELLI, “L’inganno della meritocrazia”, Lo straniero. Arte-cultura-scienza-società,
aprile 2010, No. 118 [www.lostraniero.net]; Mario TESINI, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit.”, p. 66.
4 Cfr. Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento...cit., p. 68.
5 Ibidem, pp. 52-57. Pur ritenendo che studi non meglio precisati dimostrerebbero che il
condizionamento familiare incida meno dell’intelligenza cognitiva e delle capacità caratteriali, Abravanel
sostiene poi, contraddittoriamente, che lo stesso condizionamento sia fondamentale per determinare il
livello di migliori opportunità educative. Ivi, p. 61.
6 Ibidem p. 81.
7 Ibidem, pp. 207-210.
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in età scolare, dato che «ricerche approfondite» (ma non precisate1) evidenzierebbero
come a sette anni si possa prevedere il reddito del bambino a trentacinque2. Insomma
Abravanel non comprende come il problema di Young non fosse l’errore possibile nel
sistema di selezione genetico-aristocratico, ma il sistema stesso.
Per costruire una società meritocratica è necessario, per Abravanel, approntare
sistemi di testing nelle università sul modello americano, rompendo con la diffidenza
italiana per le classifiche e le misurazioni «obiettive e quantitative»3. Si tratta un po’,
cioè, della filosofia che di recente cerca di improntare la valutazione universitaria
italiana, i cui parametri quantitativi sono da tempo oggetto di accese critiche e dibattiti.
Alla stessa filosofia attingono i test PISA, attraverso cui la scuola italiana è stata
monitorata con il risultato di segnalare una forte discrepanza fra Nord e Sud.
Altra resistenza culturale alla meritocrazia, in Italia - paese, a suo avviso, dove
domina una mentalità parassitario-assistenzialistica -, è secondo Abravanel la paura
che essa porti al licenziamento dei nullafacenti e che inoltre, come temeva Young, si
inauguri una «aristocrazia dello sperma». Egli fa invece notare come l’Italia abbia una
delle società più diseguali del mondo, più di USA e Gran Bretagna4. Qui da un lato
l’autore sembra non considerare come l’Italia abbia registrato nuovi coefficienti di
accentuata diseguaglianza da quando le politiche neo-liberiste si sono gradualmente
sostituite a quelle socialdemocratiche. Anche dove sostiene che le politiche per il
mezzogiorno han dato risultati inaccettabili, sfornando dati dal 1995 al 2005, non
considera come sia proprio in quel lasso di tempo che si inverte una tendenza invece
positiva, in questo senso, nei decenni precedenti, in concomitanza con la fine dei
provvedimenti redistributivi per il Sud5. D’altro lato va registrato come stranamente
egli utilizzi USA e Gran Bretagna come esempi di società diseguali, dato che lamenta
che l’Italia lo sia di più, quando poi in altri luoghi essi vengono rappresentati come
modelli di società meritocratica e, quindi, secondo il suo discorso, di società
egualitaria.
Il carattere «meritocratico» delle società anglosassoni è peraltro riportato da
Abravanel alla cultura protestante e a quella laburista. Ciò secondo lui attesterebbe che
anche in Italia il terreno può essere fertile ad una riscoperta, da parte della destra, del
libero mercato e, da parte della sinistra, della mobilità sociale, in quanto l’incidenza
della cultura cattolica e di quella comunista non dovrebbe quindi essere un ostacolo
insuperabile6: ma in tal modo egli sovrappone in modo aproblematico protestantesimo
protestantesimo e cattolicesimo, laburismo e comunismo. Tanto più che subito dopo
viene fatto un rinvio al motto di uno dei modelli dell’autore e cioè la ditta McKinsey:
«up or out»7. Nelle aziende, nota Abravanel, ormai lo stipendio non è più calibrato su
1 Anche Mauro BOARELLI, “L’inganno della meritocrazia…cit.” [www. lostraniero. net], fa notare la
frequente mancanza di riferimento alle fonti da parte di Abravanel.
2 Cfr. Mario Tesini, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit.”, p. 83.
3 Ibidem, pp. 21-22.
4 Ibidem, pp. 24-25, 159.
5 Ibidem, p. 192.
6 Ibidem, p. 25.
7 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.
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1 Ibidem, p. 130.
2 Ibidem, p. 133.
3 Ibidem, p. 175.
4 Ibidem, p. 186.
5 Ibidem, p. 184.
6 Ibidem, p. 131.
7 Ibidem, pp. 141-143.
8 Ibidem, p. 40.
9 Ibidem, p. 41, 143-144.
10 Ibidem, pp. 42-47.
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3 Ibidem, p. 256.
4 Ibidem, p. 257. Abravanel passa a criticare il sistema educativo italiano, sostenendo che i test Pisa
pongono l’Italia agli ultimi posti (ivi, p. 246) e che addirittura un terzo delle lauree sarebbero valutate 110
e lode, aggiungendo che «secondo il rettore di un’importante università italiana, da noi il 110 e lode di una
bella ragazza viene considerato quasi sicuramente immeritato» (ivi, p. 247). Segue la descrizione del
sistema dei concorsi con il risultato predefinito, caratterizzati da minacce fisiche di tipo mafioso (ivi, p.
248).
5 Ibidem, p. 314.
6 Ibidem, p. 315.
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ordine», di una giustizia «rapida e senza compromessi», tanto che in America, società
meritocratica per eccellenza, la maggioranza dei carcerati ritiene di «meritare» la
propria condanna1. Anche questo assunto sembra collidere con la nostra civiltà
costituzionale: l’ha fatto notare Francesco D’Agostino, sottolineando che la sanzione
non mira a punire il condannato, ma a «reintegrarlo» nella società, riconoscendolo
come soggetto di diritto2. E’ utile ricordare qua anche Shakespeare che, nell’Amleto, fa
dire al protagonista che trattare ogni ospite come «merita» avrebbe voluto dire
condannare ognuno alla «fustigazione», data la condizione umana3.
Secondo Abravanel, mentre nelle società feudali, schiaviste, castuali, la
diseguaglianza giustifica privilegi ingiusti, nelle società meritocratiche la diseguaglianza
è considerata «giusta» in quanto basata sulle «pari opportunità e la «mobilità sociale»4.
Dal punto di vista specificamente politico, la nota più eclatante è l’enfasi positiva
posta sul «sistema-Singapore», di cui esplicitamente si rimarca l’ordine ed efficienza
come valori da apprezzare anche se non accompagnati da istituzioni democratiche.
Singapore, per Abravanel, infatti, «non è una democrazia, ma i suoi cittadini non
sembrano preoccuparsene più di tanto, visto che il livello di reddito pro capite è fra i
più alti del mondo»5. Anche la Francia è peraltro considerata modello di meritocrazia
nell’apparato pubblico, per l’eredità fortemente gerarchica di tipo napoleonico6.
L’ordine discorsivo che stiamo analizzando, insomma, è emblematico della
convergenza fra neo-liberismo e autoritarismo: della torsione anche culturale,
insomma, verso la post-democrazia.
Abravanel non è per l’abolizione del Welfare, ma per la sua revisione in un
sistema che incoraggi i «veri» deboli a prendere rischi7, citando il Giddens della Terza
via, che, però, abbiamo visto prima come diffidasse del concetto di «meritocrazia».
Con un tono quasi sprezzante Abravanel sostiene che non bisogna fornire sussidi a
«disoccupate» e «ragazze madri» ma finanziare più asili nido8. Il welfare, insomma, non
non deve essere una «rete di sicurezza dei barboni delle metropolitane»9. Questa
immagine del «barbone» – che curiosamente sembra riprendere una tipica offesa
rivolta dallo yuppie italiano degli anni ottanta a chi veniva ritenuto indietro nella scala
sociale – ritorna a proposito del fatto che secondo l’autore in Italia c’è paura della
meritocrazia perché si rifiuta l’idea dell’emarginazione a cui il modello americano
sembra condannare fette significative della società10. E’ a suo avviso necessaria, del
1 Ibidem, pp. 60-61.
2 Francesco D’AGOSTINO, “Ben gli sta: che cosa merita un criminale”, Paradoxa, Vol. 1, 2011, pp. 18-
23.
3 Cfr. Mario TESINI, Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit., p. 59.
4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento…cit., p. 62.
5 Ibidem, pp. 21, 145. Tipica dell’atmosfera del libro, la seguente frase supporto delle argomentazioni
svolte: Lee Kuan Yew, considerato da Henry Kissinger «l’uomo più intelligente nel mondo orientale» (p.
146).
6 Ibidem, pp. 147-152.
7 Ibidem, p. 69.
8 Ibidem, pp. 85-86.
9 Ibidem, p. 95.
10 Ibidem, p. 108.
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resto, la massima flessibilità sul mercato del lavoro, compensata dagli ammortizzatori
sociali, ma il salario minimo deve esser basso come in USA, per far respirare le
imprese1. Il servizio pubblico, inoltre, per Abravanel non deve diventare un’occasione
occupazionale, ma puntare sull’eccellenza2.
Coerentemente con le sue posizioni «platoniche», Abravanel è favorevole a
pesanti tasse di successione (ma, in modo sintomatico, solo per ragioni «simboliche»),
però non problematizza il nodo politico del loro attuale arretramento giuridico-
politico nel mondo occidentale. Stesso discorso per il suo sostegno alla tassazione del
capitale rispetto ai redditi da lavoro. Quanto ai cresciuti redditi dei super-ricchi, a suo
avviso, essi sono da «lavoro» e non rendite da capitale, in un contesto economico
idealizzato in cui le aziende sarebbero allergiche al nepotismo3. Arriviamo quindi ad
un punto fondamentale del suo discorso: la forbice che si apre sempre più fra ricchi e
poveri è, in realtà, un discrimine fra chi merita e chi no. L’importante è a suo avviso
che, nonostante la diseguaglianza, il benessere collettivo aumenti, come (secondo la
sua personale ricostruzione) insegnerebbe il modello inglese post-tatcheriano4.
Probabilmente senza esserne consapevole, Abravanel torna ad usare toni di violenta
intolleranza, affermando che con la globalizzazione, l’economia postindustriale e dei
servizi (high tech), comincia a serpeggiare il credo che «i parassiti di oggi siano i poveri e
non i ricchi»5. Le minoranze avrebbero oggi tutti i diritti di acceso all’educazione e per
per questo, dato che alla fine nessuno dovrebbe poter lamentarsi, si sta affermando un
rigetto dell’egualitarismo e un primato della responsabilizzazione a svantaggio della
solidarietà6.
Il carattere ottimistico della visione abraveneliana emerge anche quando a
quello ch’egli percepiva come uno sbandamento anti-meritocratico di Young, oppone
che l’inglese «non poteva immaginare la società attuale, in cui i quotidiani abbondano
di cronache e di storie che celebrano la gentilezza, il coraggio e la devozione di
cittadini qualunque e la dignità di lavori umili»7. Per Abravanel il mondo di oggi è
basato su una nuova economia dei servizi basata su un accesso ai beni dei redditi
medio-bassi (discount, aerei low cost, telefonia, servizi finanziari). Quindi un
miglioramento della qualità della vita dei cittadini8. La meritocrazia segnerebbe il
futuro del mondo globale e sarebbe basata sulla «superiorità cognitiva»9.
1 Ibidem, pp. 88, 206.
2 Ibidem, pp. 85-86, 88.
3 Ibidem, p. 73, 161.
4 Ibidem, p. 74.
5 Ibidem, p. 115.
6 Ibidem, p. 116.
7 Ibidem, p. 94.
comunque a premiare una minoranza (ivi, pp. 100-101). Abravanel sembra ora dire che il contesto
familiare è più importante dei fattori ereditari e critica anche The bell curve (ivi, p.106). Egli sottolinea
come l’intelligenza cognitiva non sia la sola da considerare in prospettiva meritocratica, ma anche quella
emotiva, caratteriale e comunicativa deve essere valutata per prevedere il reddito futuro (ivi, pp. 106-107,
157-158).
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Ovviamente il testo è stato scritto pochi mesi prima che esplodesse in modo
conclamato la crisi economica tuttora in corso.
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false aspettative, bisogna invece, per la Scaraffia, decretare la crisi «della scuola che
deve accogliere tutti, che deve abbassarsi al livello dei meno dotati e dei più svogliati
invece di selezionare i migliori».
Anche Pietro da Cortona ritiene che in Italia il merito sia stato sacrificato ai
diritti «collettivi», ch’egli però non vede come tutela delle posizioni ingiustamente
svantaggiate, che, in quanto tali, rinviano a diritti di carattere universale, ma a
particolarismi corporativi. In modo sintomatico egli conclude: «so bene che il merito
non è tutto e che non tutto può essere soggetto ad un tale criterio. Sono fermamente
convinto però che quando il merito è applicato negli ambiti giusti abbiamo maggiori
probabilità di vivere in una società più funzionale, più efficiente e, forse, addirittura
più giusta ed egualitaria». Insomma («si noti il «forse, addirittura»): la giustizia e
l’eguglianza sono un optional, mentre i valori sociali primari da perseguire sono la
«funzionalità» e l’ «efficienza»1.
Laura Paoletti2 ritiene necessario trovare criteri oggettivi per valutare il «valore
aggiunto culturale» e poter così selezionare i tagli alla cultura, che vengono dati come
«naturali». Sebbene l’autrice sia consapevole che non si può fondare un criterio
oggettivo, elevandolo a criterio assoluto, ella ritiene tuttavia che si possa prenderlo
come criterio per «gestire e orientare certe dinamiche nella direzione desiderata».
L’idea è che i beni culturali (musei, biblioteche, Archivi) si misurino con il numero dei
visitatori o con il numero di volumi posseduti. Da un lato la Paoletti riconosce che
non si può schiacciare l’identità di un istituto culturale sul marketing, ma dall’altro non
può fare a meno di concedere che se un evento culturalmente significativo non
richiama pubblico, allora il problema è, appunto, nel piano «marketing». Sembra quasi
che la «ragione» combatta con le urgenze del pensiero unico astratto disseminato
ormai nei saperi gestionali, pubblici e privati. In pratica una biblioteca settoriale (o
archivio o museo) frequentata da pochi cultori o con pochi volumi, deve essere più
facilmente tagliata di un’altra con coefficienti più alti che, però, nulla dicono del suo
effettivo significato scientifico-culturale.
Gli ultimi tre saggi della silloge si discostano invece dalle posizioni appena
riassunte. Mario Tesini mantiene un approccio molto sorvegliato e abbozza una
ricostruzione genealogica del termine, da Young a Bourdieu, e, guardando al concetto
dietro la parola, risalen anche ai classici della letteratura, oltre a soffermarsi in modo
particolare su Guizot. A riscontro egli dedica alcune pagine critiche proprio ad
Abravanel, enuncleando il dichiarato carattere «ideologico» del suo discorso3. Se per
Tesini la meritocrazia può costituire un criterio «orientativo» utile, qualora esso invece
voglia diventare un parametro di valutazione oggettivo fondativo di un nuovo ordine
sociale, allora l’esito è la distopia di Young.
1 Pietro GRILLI di CORTONA, “Significato e ruolo sociale del merito: alcune riflessioni”, Paradoxa, No.
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1 Cfr. Marcello OSTINELLI, “Eguaglianza e merito nella scuola pubblica”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V,
2011, pp. 69-81.
2 Cfr. Francesca RIGOTTI, “Contro il merito”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 82-93.
3 Nadia URBINATI, “Il merito e l’uguaglianza”, La repubblica, 27 Novembre 2008.
4 Bruno ACCARINO, “Meritocrazia come premio di obbedienza”, Il manifesto, 25.06.2008.
5 Cfr. Vittorio MATHIEU, “La meritocrazia come postulato”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, p. 14.
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1 Giacomo MARRAMAO, “Montezemolo? Una retorica del merito grave e discriminatoria”, Liberazione,
2 giugno 2007.
2 Giuseppe CALICETI, “Appunti di scuola. Quanti scempi in nome della meritocrazia”, Il Manifesto, 9
novembre 2008; Giuseppe CALICETI, “Le aberrazioni di Abravanel”, Il Manifesto, 06-10-2012.
3 Enrica RIGO, Maurizio RICCIARDI, “Meriti senza debiti: quel diritto all’accesso negato dalla
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Bibliography
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Victoria SPAU
University of Southampton
Abstract: The author seeks out to offer an overview of the main theories of social
movements in the last decade, emphasizing the importance of culture in producing
collective action. In the past, Old Social Movements (OSM) theory defined
movements through the lenses of political process, rational actor or resource
mobilization theories. This paper centers more on New Social Movements (NSM)
theories which focus rather on a cultural approach to social movements and stress the
importance of collective identity, framing and networks in understanding the
mobilization and participation of movements. The author shows that all these
interrelated processes discussed by NSM theories are important for the achievement
of collective action.
1. INTRODUCTION
1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52,
1985, pp. 781-816; Idem, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert
KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 41-63; Verta
TAYLOR, Nancy WHITTIE, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of
Women’s Movement”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp.
163-187; Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements: an Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford,
1999.
2 William A. GAMSON, “Constructing Social Process”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS
(eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 85-106; David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN,
Robert D. BENFORD, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation”,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 456-481.
3 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the
Veil in the Algerian Revolution”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements
and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 144-159; Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”,
in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London,
1995, pp. 127-143.
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2. OVERVIEW
In the last two decades, a developing interest has been noticed in the analysis of
culture as an important element in understanding the emergence of social
movements4. In the past, movements were seen as a response to a destabilised system,
whereas mobilization process theorists were mainly concerned with understanding
“the structural shifts that gave collective actors the resources to act collectively on
longstanding grievances” and considered the state as central to people’s concern with
actions5. The rise of social movements such as “animal rights movements”, “gay and
lesbian movements” or “the psychiatric movement” from the ‘60s raised new
questions regarding the people’s motives to engage in a movement6.
However, before the rise of New Social Movements (NSM), movements were
defined mainly through the lenses of political process, rational actor or resource
mobilization theories7. The cultural approach to social movements emphasizes the
importance of collective identity8, framing9, networks1 and collective action in
understanding movements’ mobilization and participation.
1 Charles TILLY, From Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1984; John D.
McCARTHY, Mayer N. ZALD, Social Movements in an Organizational Society, Transaction, New Brunswick,
1987.
2 Doug McADAM, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 1930-1970, University of Chicago
Free Press, New York, 1984; Simon FIRTH, “Music and Identity”, in Stuart HALL, Paul DU GAY
(eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage, London, 1995, pp. 108-125; Ron EYERMAN, Andrew
JAMISON, Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in Twentieth Century, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1998.
4 Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit.
5 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities and Social Movements”, Annual
pp. 749-788; Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challeng...cit.”; Idem, “The Process of Collective
Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social...cit.; Donatella DellaPORTA,
Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit.
9 William A. GAMSON, “Constructing Social Process”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS
(eds.), Social Movements...cit.; Erving GOFFMAN, Frame Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975.
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1 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion...cit.”; Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social
Movements...cit.”
2 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements: an Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999.
3 Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., p. 76.
4 Alain TOURAINE, The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge University Press,
p. 273.
6 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion...cit.”
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network where actors “interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate and make
decisions”; and emotional investment “which enables individuals to feel like part of a
common unity”1. For Melucci, “collective action is a producer of symbolic
orientation and meanings that people are able to recognize”2. Thus, at the same time,
collective action is also symbolic action.
Eyerman and Jamison3 add to Melucci’s symbolic action the concept of
exemplary action of cognitive praxis (seen here as the process of identity formation)
which is “more” than just symbolic. For them, art and music, as cultural
representations, are more than symbolic producers because “music and art are lived as
well as thought: they are cognitive, but they also draw on more emotive aspects of
human consciousness”. As Eyerman and Jamison argue, ”as a cognitive praxis, music
and other forms of cultural activity contribute to the ideas that movements offer and
create in opposition to the existing social and cultural order”4. The role of these
cultural practices, such as rituals or music, is seen here as an “apparatus” through
which the collective actors express their emotions.
Rituals evoke emotions such as fear, passion, anger, love, hate, faith etc.
(Mellucci), and are the “glue of solidarity” (Collins). Solidarity, as Touraine argues,
sustains the conflict which is essential for the presence of a “we”. In order to motivate
the “we” to take action, the symbolic elaboration is crucial5. Rituals have symbolic
components such as song, testimonials, chants6. For example, as Eyerman and
Jamison states, “music, in particular, embodies traditions through the ritual of
performance. It can empower, help create collective identity and a sense of movement
in an emotional and almost physical way”. In the context of rituals, songs reunite and
remind participants of their scope within a movement and “locate them within a long-
standing tradition of struggle and protest”7.
In his analysis of music and identity, Firth is concerned with how music
constructs an experience from which identities are developed8. He argues that “music,
“music, like identity, is both performance and stories, describes the social in the
individual and the individual in the social, the mind in the body and the body in the
mind; identity like music is a matter of both ethics and aesthetics”9. Cristiana Olcese
argues that through art, social movements not only communicate within the larger
society, but also internally10. She sees art as a master trope which “enables people to
make up their own meanings and objectives” helping people to “achieve personal
1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert
KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 44-45.
2 Ibidem, p. 46.
3 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements...cit., p. 23.
4 Ibidem, p. 24.
5 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., p. 73.
liberation and redemption”1. Through arts, the individuals who form the collective
can express their emotions and feelings. Besides rituals, the symbolic expression of
emotions is built through objects (identifiers, iconic persons, key artifacts, central
events and symbolic places, stories, occasions, persona and roles2. Lofland divides the
category of roles between creators or “knowledge creators” (intellectuals, artists and
scholars) in charge with the production of culture and “disseminators of culture” such
as culture retailers and artistic performers3.
Polleta and Jasper are talking about “institutional identities”, where the
development of a “group pride” is another form of identity4. The goal of this practice
is to construct a form of solidarity and loyalty of members towards the organisation
they activate in. In this context, the symbols and strategies used resonate with those of
prior members5. For example, when activists sing “We shall Overcome”, they recall
and identify with the same tactics used in the civil rights movement6. Thus, collective
identity secures the continuousness of collective action in time7.
In order to construct a collective identity one needs a conflict which forms a
group (the “we”) with shared beliefs and values bond by solidarity and connected
through a social network. Thus, people need this common “tool kit” to build the
collective identity needed for action. The next question would be by whom and
through what is this “tool kit” formed? As dellaPorta and Diani point out, “the
symbolic construction permits us to attribute to the events and behaviours of
individuals or groups a meaning which facilitates the activation of mobilization, but
frame analysis allows us to capture the process of the attribution of meaning, which
lies behind the explosion of any conflict”8.
In the context of conflict, collective identities need to be incorporated in
frames of justice and injustice so that the collective actor can distinguish between
“we” the group, and “them”, the conflict9 As Snow and his colleagues argue, identity
construction is an ”inherent feature of the framing process”10. Thus, as well as
identity, framing is an important feature that helps one understand movements’
mobilization and participation.
1 Ibidem, p. 33.
2 John LOFLAND, “Charting Degrees of Movement Culture: Tasks of the Cultural Cartographer”, in
Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 188-216.
3 Ibidem, pp. 205-207.
4 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.”
5 Ibidem, pp. 297-298.
6 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements...cit.
7 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit.
8 Ibidem, p. 69.
9 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.”, p. 292.
10 David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD, “Frame
2.2. Framing
and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.
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specific goals, Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) make use of what scholars
called “frame alignment processes”.
Snow and Benford identified four alignment processes: “frame bridging”,
“frame amplification”, “frame extension” and “frame transformation”. Through
frame bridging, frames concerning particular problems are linked. Frame
amplification, necessary for most movement mobilization, has the role to intensify
existing beliefs and values. By frame extension, SMOs interests and frames are
extended from their initial interests by including new issues of concern for new
adherents. Finally, frame transformation is concerned with the change of “old
understanding and meanings and/or generating new ones”1. Following Snow,
Johnston analyses discourse on the influence of behaviour and argues that the goals of
these frame alignment processes can be found in the social movement’s speech which
is also influenced by culture. For Johnston, the “ ‘true location’ of a frame is in the
mind of the social movement participant” and the “structure of mental frames can be
reconstructed through the close analysis of the discourse of social movements”
because “people do things with words”2.
At the same time, discourse involves creativity and repetition. As Billig states3,
“an orator discourse that seeks to create new movements of opinion toward a
minority position will often repeat, and claim to exemplify, the values of the
minority”. By repeating signs, values, themes of an ideology etc., people develop a
nature of “sensus communis” which provides the “resources for moral dilemmas to
think and argue about”. On the contrary, social movements (the minority) provide
arguments against the common sense (the majority) perception. Billig argues that no
matter if the arguments of the minority oppose those of the “common”, the majority’s
opinion is changed even by taking an offensive attitude. Hence, repeating a discourse
affects people involved in a movement as well as those who are not.
Drawing from their research on women’s movement and the lesbian and gay
movement, Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, illustrate discourse as embedded in
ritual in order to construct collective action frames. By using the radical feminist
movement, Taylor et al. describe how collective identity frame was constructed
through “an extensive network of alternative institutions such as bookstores, music
festivals, self-defence and martial arts schools, rape crisis canters, publishing houses,
and travelling agencies”4. These alternative networks provided the solidarity incentive
that facilitated movement participation. In order to understand how “mobilizing
identities” are formed, scholars of social movements turned to network analysis5.
1 Ibidem, p. 625.
2 Hank JOHNSTON, “A methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata”, in
Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements…cit., pp. 218- 227.
3 Michael BILLIG, “Rethorical Psychology, Ideological Thinking, and Imagination Nationhood”, in Hank
JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp.
64-81.
4 Verta TAYLOR, Nancy WHITTIE, “Analytical Approaches...cit.”, p. 165.
5 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.”, pp. 288.
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1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52,
1985, pp. 781-816; Idem, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert
KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture...cit., pp. 44-45, 49.
2 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., p. 112.
3 Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS
(eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 128 -129.
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music takes us”1. For example, in the civil rights movement, blues formed an
“informal network” connecting migrant workers who were moving across the
country2.
Considering art and music as both knowledge and action, Eyerman and
Jamison, argue that art and music, as cultural expressions, influence the societal
culture and become “functional devices for recruitment or resources to be mobilized”.
Hence, culture is a “space” and a device for resource and moreover, of additional
resources. For example, the radical feminist movement network mentioned above is
not only a “space” of oppositional culture, where collective identity is formed, but is
also a provider of material resources through the institutions formed by this network.
However, the focus should be on resources as symbolic goods3. For Fine, “cultural
expressions, slogans, and patterns of rhetoric are vital sources- manipulated
consciously or emerging spontaneously- that symbolize the causes of discontent for
movement actors and serve to energize and justify their actions” whereas the ideology
(seen as culture) of a movement is the best resource for mobilization. The free rider
problem is resolved by the set of nonmaterial resources and rewards provided by this
idioculture4.
Further, as Fantasia and Hirsch point out, culture is not just a static field which
provides opportunities and constrains for a movement. More than supplying the
resources needed for a movement to survive over time, culture provides the resources
for new practices and meanings. Social movements or “heavens” are networks in
which “members of subordinated groups discover their common problems, construct
a collective definition of the sources of their oppression, and note the limits of the
routine means of redressing grievances, where collective identity and solidarity are
cultivated in practices, values, and social relations”. These “heavens” provide the
socio-organizational foundation for cultural transformations and collective action5.
Thus, networks are important because they enable the organisation of action, cultural
diffusion, and the framing and reframing of movement ideology and demand6.
1 Simon FIRTH, “Music and Identity”, in Stuart HALL, Paul DU GAY (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity,
dissertation), University of California, Berkeley, 1986; Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and
Social Movements…cit., p. 79.
3 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements…cit., p. 24.
4 Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS
Veil in the Algerian Revolution”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social
Movements…cit., pp. 145-146, 159.
6 David A. SNOW, Robert D. BENFORD, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Aldon MORRIS,
Carol MCCLURG MUELLER, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven,
Conn., 1992.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
1 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., pp. 62, 109.
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Bibliography
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SNOW, David A., Robert D. BENFORD, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in
Aldon MORRIS, Carol MCCLURG MUELLER, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1992.
SWIDLER, Ann, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”, American Sociological
Review, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 273-286.
TILLY, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1984.
TOURAINE, Alain, The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
TOURAINE, Alain, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements”, Social
Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 749-788.
TOURAINE, Alain, The Workers’ Movement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge &
New York, 1987.
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ESSAY
Abstract: In human history, living together in peace without violence and problem
has been a challenge for all humanity. Sometimes it has achieved, but it has just as
frequently failed. It means that human beings prefer living together with people who
are like them rather than with people who are different in appearance, speaking,
eating, dressing, behaviour and beliefs, i.e. people from different cultures. However,
cultural diversity and difference is a standard characteristic of modern societies. In
these societies, individuals have to live with the people from different nations, colors,
religions, languages and cultures. Black Sea Region is one of the most diverse regions
in the world in terms of all these differences. Ethnic and religious diversity is an
historical reality in this part of the world. There are Christians, Muslims and Jewish
populations living together over centuries in a peaceful atmosphere. The States in
Black Sea Region should develop cultural, educational and social policies to maintain
this coexistence for the future generations.
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Dialogue has been identified in the European Commission’s Agenda for Culture in a
Globalizing World as a tool contributing to the governance of cultural diversity within
European societies, trans – nationally across European countries and internationally
with other regions of the world. For this reason, the European Union has to create
means by which to raise the awareness of and promote the cultural sphere, with a
view to encouraging the European Union’s inhabitants to manage cultural diversity.
Finally, the Commission proposed that 2008 be declared the European Year of
Intercultural Dialogue. This declaration was the result of this modern concept
concerning the intercultural dialogue in Europe. The European Year of Intercultural
Dialogue seeks to increase the visibility, efficiency and coherence of all European
programs and actions that contribute to intercultural dialogue, such as the “Europe
for Citizens 2007-2013” and the “Culture” program. This initiative also aims at
integrating, as much as possible, intercultural dialogue in other European policies,
actions and programs (European Union, 2008). The general objectives of the
European Year were the following:
to promote intercultural dialogue as an instrument to assist European
citizens, and all those living in the European Union, in acquiring the
knowledge and aptitudes that enable them to deal with a more open and
more complex environment;
to raise the awareness of the European citizens, and of all those living
in the European Union, about the importance of developing active
European citizenship which is open to the world, respectful of cultural
diversity and based on common values (European Commission, 2008).
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In human history, living together in peace without violence and animosity has
been a challenge for all humanity. Sometimes this goal was achieved, but it has just as
frequently failed. It means that human beings prefer living together with the people
who are like them rather than with people who are different in appearance, speech,
eating, dressing, behaviour and creed as compared to their own community, shortly,
people from different cultures. However, cultural diversity and difference are a
standard characteristic of modern societies. In fact, this standard character is not
always something “desirable”. In these societies, individuals have to live together with
people from different nations, colours, religions, languages and cultures. This situation
can cause a feeling of alienation of individuals and distrust between them. Cultural
diversity in a society should be a treasure to celebrate and to be proud of, rather than
a problem to overcome. Intercultural dialogue gives an opportunity to a forward –
looking model for managing cultural diversity (Council of Europe, 2008). To
understand a situation like that, people from different cultures living in the same
society need to interact with each other in their daily lives.
Moreover, most people in certain societies have to cope with several cultures
in their daily lives. Individuals in such societies need to have a dialogue with all
different cultures1. For this reason, intercultural dialogue is a long – lasting process
that requires a worldwide participation at all the levels of the society. Intercultural
dialogue must represent the first issue of all politicians and policy makers. Otherwise,
it will be very difficult to establish a world in which people understand each other.
Intercultural dialogue shares in managing multiple cultural connections in a
multicultural atmosphere. As a result of intercultural dialogue, individuals have a
chance to achieve a new identity balance, to respond to new challenges and
experiences and to add new understandings to their identity without relinquishing
someone else’s origin. Intercultural dialogue also contributes to avoiding pitfalls of
1 Leonidas DONSKIS, Troubled Identity and the Modern World, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2009, p. 19.
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several great global powers. The states started their economic and political
cooperation and deeper integration with the rest of the world. These economic and
political changes provided some profits to the peoples living in this region.
The geopolitical and economical importance of the region has increased at the
beginning of 2000s. The region plays a key role in the transportation of oil and gas
through Asia to Europe, and offers a new economic market for global powers such as
Russia, USA and the EU. All these powers developed their own policies regarding this
region. As a result of the increasing importance of the region, we can classify these
powers or interests in the region into three groups:
1. The interests of Western countries: this group includes the US and the
major European countries in the EU. They produce different strategies
for the region.
2. The interests of Russia and Turkey: these two countries have an
increasing power in the region countries and have also some important
strategies about them.
3. The interests of the rest of the region countries: these countries are
very diverse and are confronted with different problems and issues.
(Major Interests And Strategies For The Black Sea Region, p. 3)
Within the new post-bipolar conditions of world order, regionalization has
been seen as a positive and promising response to contemporary problems and
challenges. Regional cooperation has been suggested to be particularly valuable in the
regions that undergo fundamental political and economic transformations, as well as
in the areas, which might originally lack mutual trust and confidence. Several authors
have expressed their doubts whether the Black Sea area actually constitutes a region,
arguing that it makes little sense geographically, historically, or even culturally.
However, directly facing the real challenges such ideas may appear rather as a distant
intellectual exercise. Although accepting that the Black Sea states do not show any
dominant common regional identity, the area shares a lot of economic and political
incentives, which create appropriate opportunities, even needs, for regional
cooperation1.
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The Black Sea region suffered important political changes starting from the
end of the 1980s. The democratic life and process of the region was influenced by the
communist regime, with the exception of Turkey and Greece. 20 years after the
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collapse of the communist regime, the effects of this period on the democratic
process are still topical in certain countries of this region. These effects still play
important roles in overcoming the problems related to the democratisation process.
While the democratisation process is completed in certain countries, the semi -
authoritarian system is still valid in some others. Democratic institutions are still weak
and people have no or have little experience related to democratic rights and political
processes in these countries. Moreover, the party systems in most of the countries in
the region are not yet stable.
It is obvious that the countries of this area can get more benefits from
regional and international cooperation than from having independent relations with
different countries, because of the geopolitical position of the region. International
powers and organisations are also aware of this geographical importance. For this
reason, international powers such as the EU, the US, Russia, China, NATO started to
establish new relations and cooperation with this region.
As a result of this renewal of the relations, many organisations, structures and
programs in the Black Sea region have been established since the collapse of the
communist regime. Most of these organisations and programs are basically political,
but economic relationships are also envisaged. Some of the main organisations are the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), Black Sea Euro-region (BSER), Organisation for
Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), Black Sea Cross Border
Cooperation, the Black Sea Forum, Black Sea Organisation for Integration and
Sustainable Development, the Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia
(TRACECA), the Danube Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS), the Interstate Oil and
Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE), Black Sea Security Program (BSSP).
Most the countries of this region became members of these organisations and
programs, and also started to participate in the activities they organise.
In fact, the countries in the Black Sea region are very different in terms of
size, economic situation and social life of the people. On the one hand, there are
European countries such as Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and on the other
hand there are small countries like Moldova and Georgia. In addition to this diversity,
there are some states in the Russian Federation such as Caucasus. This structure of
the Black Sea countries attracted the global powers including the EU, the US, China
to this region. Among these powers, the EU is the most critical power for financing,
lending, investment, and other official assistance for the local countries. This concern
of the EU affected the regional cooperation between the respective countries.
Moreover, the region has become even more important as it effects the connection
between East and West and North to South as a result of the increase of crude oil and
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natural gas transportation by pipelines and other economical movements. For this
reason, promoting the regional cooperation and relationship between these countries
is the main issue in the region.
Unfortunately, all economic, political and geopolitical changes and
developments did not avail to the solution of the problems and conflicts persisting
between the states of this region. The global powers mentioned above created a more
fragile situation and affected the normalisation of these states. They caused
secessionism, ethnic conflicts, economic and political crises in the region. Instead of
finding solutions to the main issues of the region, the Black Sea states tend to vie each
other for power and influence.
However, the economic, political and social development of the region needs
a successful regional cooperation, which can only be obtained by promoting the
dialogue between the local countries that includes debates about various issues -
social, economic, cultural, environmental, energy sources, and transportation.
Moreover, the regional states and international policy makers can also act as
follows to develop the stability and security of the region:
The states should not use the force in their relations with the other
states and be respectful of international conventions in their relations.
The developed countries should encourage the regional states
politically and economically.
The international policy makers should support the peace and efforts
for peace.
The Black Sea region is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms
of cultural and religious differences. Ethnic and religious diversity is a historical reality
in this part of the world. We find here Christians, Muslims and Jewish populations
living together over centuries in the same atmosphere. The structure of the Black Sea
countries is very different in terms of population, size, economic and financial
situations, governance system, and social life. Because of this diversity, it is very hard
to establish regional organisations or integrations that include all the local countries.
However, if new approaches and ideas are developed by regional and international
powers, the region can become a peaceful zone with a powerful economy and stable
political systems. The states in Black Sea region should develop cultural, educational
and social policies to preserve this coexistence for future generations.
For these reasons, there should be new understandings and relations between
the countries and the societies of the region so that pending problems and priorities
be discussed and solved with the help of new strategies. This can happen also by
intercultural dialogue and relations between the Black Sea countries and other
neighbourhood countries. This dialogue can aid the new approaches to solve the main
problems of the region and also to give new chances to the local policy makers to
create more secure, stable and welfare societies.
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It is clear that the intercultural dialogue between the Black Sea countries
promotes the regional stability and cooperation. Moreover, the intercultural dialogue
plays an extremely important role in advancing regional cooperation and finding the
best solutions for the problems of the region. This dialogue should be established
between all the components of society. Political leaders, religious leaders, non -
governmental organisations, universities, schools all should involve themselves to
develop the intercultural relation between the regional countries. Some through
training should be organised to form this dialogue with these different social groups
such as students, politicians, members of NGOs, public servants, etc. These activities
are very important especially in conflict regions.
To establish the intercultural dialogue in the Black Sea region, international
powers, organisations and policy makers have an important role to play along with the
regional states. Among these international powers, the EU plays the main role,
because three countries of this region, namely Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, are
members of the European Union and Turkey is in the negotiating process to become
a member state too. Moreover, the EU established very good economic relations and
became the most important economic power in the region. Additionally, the Union
plays an important role in implementing social and political changes in the region.
Intercultural dialogue remains a political priority, which reflects, facilitates and fosters
the core objectives of the Council of Europe and its member states to promote
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Intercultural dialogue is not only an
enhanced means of communication, which can build trust and mutual understanding,
but it can also serve as a basis for peace and sustainable development in the Black Sea
region and its neighbouring regions.
Intercultural dialogue should be a political priority for the region states and
international policy makers. For this reason, the European Council started to support
several international conferences and organisations for the development of
intercultural dialogue. The Council published the White Paper on Intercultural
Dialogue described as a ‘key policy document’ for intercultural dialogue. The EU
supported the “intercultural dialogue as a basis for peace and sustainable development
in Europe and its neighbouring regions” conference that was organised in Baku, in
2008. Ministers of different countries responsible of culture participated in this
conference. They adopted the following decisions made during the conference:
to acknowledge cultural diversity between and within countries as a
common heritage of humankind;
to agree to contribute to sustainable economic, social and personal
development, favourable to cultural creativity;
to promote a sustained process of intercultural dialogue, which is
essential for international co - operation, with a view to promoting
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law;
to reaffirm the important role of cultural policies at national, regional
and local level and their contribution for promoting intercultural
dialogue;
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1 Roberto ALIBONI, “Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with the European
Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol.
6, 2006, p. 166.
2 Sergiu CELAC, Panagiota MANOLI, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism in the
Black Sea Area”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 201.
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South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013
Bibliography
ALIBONI, Roberto, “Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with
the European Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 166.
AYDIN, Mustafa, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and Integration into Euro-Atlantic
Structure”, Perceptions, Vol. X, 2005, pp. 29-30.
BSEC Assembly Report, Report on “Dialogue among cultures in order to build trust
among nations”, Belgrade, 2006.
CELAC, Sergiu, Panagiota MANOLI, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism
in the Black Sea Area”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006.
DONSKIS, Leonidas, Troubled Identity and the Modern World, Palgrave MacMillan, New
York, 2009.
STRITECKY, Vit, Challenges for the Black Sea Region, last accessed on May 2012,
[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/challenges - for - the - black - sea - region -.tr.mfa].
***European Commission, “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”, 2008, last
2012, [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/culture/l29017_en.htm].
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BOOK REVIEWS
Sorin BOCANCEA, Daniel ȘANDRU (coord.),
Totalitarismul. De la origini la consecințe
[Totalitarianism. From origins to consequences],
Institutul European, Iași, 2011, 451 pp.
The 19th and the 20th centuries Totalitarianism, Public Sphere and the Essence
brought the fall of monarchies and of the Political, George Bondor, for
hereditary descent. Therefore, the rule of example, circulates the idea that
dictators became one of the two most dictatorship leads to people becoming
frequent forms of government next to isolated, therefore destroying the existing
constitutional democracy. From Latin relations between them and their
America’s self - proclaimed leaders, born relationship with reality. By doing this,
after the fall of central authority in the totalitarianism becomes the worst disease
nations freed from the Spanish rule to of the public sphere.
the new states of Africa and Asia, where Caius Dobrescu uses Hannah
dictators quickly rose after World War II Arendt’s volume, Men in Dark Times, as a
and the communist and fascist regimes departure point and correlates it with the
from various technologically advanced ideas of sociologists Alfred Schultz and
countries, dictatorship took its toll on Peter Berger. Dobrescu takes a special
territories and populations all over the interest in his material, the portrait of
world. Hermann Broch, from Arendt’s Men in
Published in 2011, the present Dark Times.
volume marks 120 years since the birth In the third chapter of the first
of the Romanian savant Petre Andrei part, Florin Mitrea, leans over the more
who was among the first Romanian profound analysis of the roots of
theoreticians to reject dictatorship totalitarianism done by Hannah Arendt.
publicly and in his writings. The papers Starting with the roots of the
published in this volume are grouped phenomenon (nihilism, the worship of
into four parts and the fifth one is history, truth and lie in politics), the
dedicated to the national conference with author concludes with the solution given
the same title held by Petre Andrei by Arendt to the evil of dictatorship: a
University from Iași. revival of the truthful politics resulted
The first part of the book, entitled from a public life based on solidarity,
Hannah Arendt. The Critique of truth and liberty.
Totalitarianism reunites articles from The last chapter of this part,
authors who used Hannah Arendt’s written by Cristiana Arghire, contains a
writings as a starting point and offers comparative study on Hannah Arendt's
new insights into her theories. In the first and Michel Foucault’s perspectives on
chapter of this part, entitled the roots of totalitarianism with an
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possible the submission of the Romanian Romanian writer Ion D. Sârbu. This time
Orthodox Church in just two years after it was the communist regime, although
the war. The methodological starting Ion D. Sârbu was a supporter of the left.
point of the author is represented not The third victim is Maria Așembrener
only by the classical conditions (political, and her case is presented by Daniel
economic or geostrategic) but also by the Șandru. By describing her case the author
human factor. Being a state institution it states that, in a totalitarian regime, the
was clear that the political views of its instauration of terror inside the social
leaders would affect the political space takes place at all the levels, from
orientation of the whole Orthodox the public discourse to family life.
Church. By directly participating in the
Lavinia Betea, tries to understand search of the victims of communism,
the mechanisms of the communist Marius Oprea tells the story of The Lost
regime by resorting to interviews with People, the story of the martyrs of
exponential political figures of the regime communist violence, of bodies buried in
in her chapter. The next chapter of this graves, at the margins of cemeteries, but
part is a film chronic of Ceaușescu’s especially stories buried deep inside the
Autobiography directed by Andrei Ujică. memories of those who chose not to
The author, Ovidiu Șimonca, speak of what they had endured. The
suggestively adds the phrase the question of what is left of Romania after
degradation of a leader, the dissolution of a the fall of communist regimes is
world to the film title. answered by Carmen Mușat in the final
Mark Bucuci takes on the subject chapter: Redefining Politics: Evil and Fear in
of cruelty, as it is institutionalized by the the Contemporary World.
totalitarian regimes in the chapter entitled What makes this book so
Totalitarianism and the Mechanisms of Cruelty: interesting also makes it hard to read due
a Rortian interpretation. to the gravity of the ideas it underlines.
The next chapter, written by Doru The whole analysis of the totalitarian
Tompea, is dedicated to the memory of phenomenon, culminating with the
the Romanian savant Petre Andrei who presentation of case studies that bring
openly opposed fascism during a time in back unpleasant memories from
which this ideology was increasing in Romania’s past, a legacy that, in the end,
popularity, position that later cost him its people have to accept, can be a
his life. In his chapter, Antonio Patraș frightening image of the peril that the
honours the philosophy of another human being can be to itself.
victim of a totalitarian regime, the
Adrian-Marius TOMPEA
“Petre Andrei” University of Iași
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Tom GALLAGHER,
Romania and the European Union:
How the Weak Vanquished the Strong,
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2009, 304 pp.
SDP’s and Adrian Năstase’s rule). In one altitude of his chair was too high to see
of the most interesting chapters, “Crafty the “details” on the “ground” related to
natives lead the Eurocrats astray,” corruption cases or administrative miss-
Gallagher is particularly eager to expose management.
his non dissimulated antipathy for the The book offers a unique list of
Social Democratic Party, PSD in documented failures of the state to meet
Romanian (the largest party in Romania, its promises and obligations performed
with most of its rulers being former by the Romanian politicians at that time,
leading members of the Communist and a unique of its kind and alarming
Party). The political reforms were again radiography of European Commission
neglected thanks to the relative economic practices, methodologies and civil servant
progresses and accelerated privatization professionalism.
which allowed the EC to grant Romania Although many of the information
the so much needed status of “functional revealed by Gallagher is quite well known
market economy”. In conclusion, and debated for years by specialized
Romania was allowed to enter the EU Romanian political analysts and
with more compromises than any other intellectuals, the very fact that a
candidate state, even with a lower status prestigious British scholar succeeded to
than Bulgaria. bring them together in a synthesis book
about one of the list known and often
neglected EU country (despite its size
1. BOOK STRENGTHS and economic weight) is salutary.
Additionally, in my view, another major
As some critics have noticed one strong point of the book (confirmed by
of the major strengths and added value the “time test”) resides in the fact that
of this book is that it focuses on actual the author is not only criticizing the EU
key political figures and their performance, but he also offers credible
personalities rather than on institutions, solutions.
which is normally the research feature in Here are some quotations from
academic studies of EU policies. the book: What could the European Union
However this major strength is carrying have done? At least seven things:
one of its major weaknesses (which is “it could easily have asked
anyway inherent to such an approach). the Romanian government for more
The focus on personalities and powers of oversight and intervention in
individuals often drives the entire order to try to overcome the key
investigation into a disputable speculative blockages preventing Romania from
field, many assertions looking like cheap becoming a law-based state, one where
scandal magazine gossip, not to say citizenship mattered and the state
personal attacks. facilitated economic development”;
Günter Verheugen, the “it could have created task-
commissioner in charge of enlargement forces to improve the capacity of key
during the negotiation with Romania and parts of ministries and regulatory
Bulgaria is characterized as being an agencies which needed to function in a
arrogant top EU official who from the competent way if the country were to
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have a chance of holding its own against Many observations and analyses in
competitors”; terms of language and presentation style
“it could have created a different seem to be rather preloaded from the
form of regional system in order to allow Romanian scandal press than from a
for the successful distribution of pre- moderate scholarly work based on facts
accession funds”; and evidences, presented in a certain
“it should have given education context and then compared to other
a prominent place in the accession CEE countries from the region and then
strategy, in light of evidence that poor with the similar problems encountered in
countries can recover quickly from the EU 15. The bombastic language and
underdevelopment when this is done”; expressions used in this book correspond
“it should have emphasised rather to apocalyptic scenarios than to a
conditionality as much in political areas scientifically documented work. Forced
as economic ones. A longer period parallelisms like the one with Mussolini’s
should have been allowed before Italy in 1922, expressions like “red
particular areas of the national economy counties”; “absolute control over the law
were opened to foreign competition”; and order”; “uncontrolled capitalism”
“it should have customised rules etc, are alarmist, and exaggerated. One of
for the right to use pre-accession funds the final “verdicts” labelling the EU
in a way that suited Romanian conditions accession of an essentially unreformed
(rules that were made far simpler, and Romania as “one of the biggest setbacks
funding access more resistant to for democracy seen in Europe since
interception by corrupt power-brokers)”. 1945”, is not only bombastic and easy to
In sum it’s a unique of its kind dismantle, but also again unexpected
synthesis of explained and interpreted from the pen of a professional historian.
facts and figures from a little known As many reviewers have already noticed,
corner of Europe useful for academics, Tom Gallagher's book is “a look back in
practitioners or just for the public with anger at a decade-long story of deceit and
professional, intellectual or business betrayal. Anger is generally a bad counsel
interests in Romania. in writing the sort of book that gets
published by university presses”.1
The lack of comparison with other
2. WEAKNESSES EU countries is another major deficiency
of the book. Devoting more space to the
In my view, many of the carefully failings of other EU members might
documented corruption cases, state have produced a less apocalyptic view on
capture, hidden lobbyism and bribery of Romania. There are indeed other EU
the Romanian political elite in this member states renowned for their
“typical Balkan” country are depicted out administrative inefficiency, where the
of their context, and are unidirectionally
and selectively presented in order to
demonstrate an initially assumed
1 Toby VOGEL, “A look back in well-controlled
anger”, European Voice, 10.09.2009
hypothesis (a procedure usually avoided [www.europeanvoice.com] – 19.03.2013.
by professional historians).
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justice system has many failings, where purchasing power had fallen by nearly 50% since
organized criminal networks are 1990. In 1989 the Romanians had been
powerful, and where the relationships weighed down by shortages, but household costs
between politicians and major business such as rent and heating usually did not exceed
interests are notorious, or where 10% of an average income. Both the fallen
progressively fewer individuals or purchasing power by 50% as compared
organizations control increasing shares of with 1989 and the assumption that the
the mass media. And all this in spite of household costs such as rent and heating
decades of old EU membership. did not exceed 10% of the average
Paradoxically, the streets of London or income are wrong because the author
Belfast during the 70’s or early 80’s with generalizes them. Gallagher forgot to
sometimes more than 10 bomb attacks mention that it might have been the case
per day would not have looked more perhaps with the rents paid in
apocalyptic than Bucharest in 2009. nationalized houses (where the rent was
The general conclusion which rather symbolic) and not the case of real
depicts the Romanian political elites as rents (after 1990 most of those houses
specialised in venality and the Europeans were sold to their rent payers at symbolic
as specialised in incompetence is a flashy, prices).
but inaccurate assertion. The venality is Finally many of the assertions
not the exclusive attribute of the made in this book are contested by the
Romanian ruling elite or administration, evolutions occurred these last four years.
and the EU bureaucrats are not More precisely, during the economic
necessarily incompetent. Indeed, no one crisis it was not Romania (nor Bulgaria or
denied the need for continuous other Eastern European new member
transformation and improvement of the states) who put the entire EU in trouble
European Commission, but the book as by destabilizing the euro as the Greed
such does not seem to have done much sovereign debt crisis did. The budgetary
research on the EU officials point of deficits of Romania as well as her public
view, being almost entirely sourced from debt is smaller than those of other EU
media debates. member states, the severe budgetary cuts
Some assertions in the book will and sacrifices were understood and
question the author’s familiarity with the largely accepted by civil society with no
EU basic procedures. Tariff barriers were street turmoil, there were also no
lowered far more quickly than was the case with escalation of far right xenophobic
Spain and Portugal when they joined in the discourses attitudes or actions (as it was
1980s. According to the European Act the case in some well quoted EU western
(1993) there was a 10 years transition democracies). Withal, the predicted
period which gave Romania in theory invasion of Western Europe by
enough time to prepare its economy for Romanian delinquents did not occur
the competitive pressures of EU market. either. In fact, the statistics show that
Moreover, there is no connection actually the level of criminality among
between the EU membership and the the Romanian expats is within the
removal of protective tariffs. Romania average of other nations. Additionally, in
today is a low-wage, high-tax economy in which Romania in the last two years more
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parliamentarians have been convicted of political class and civil society too eager
corruption than anywhere else in the EU. to keep in this part of Europe what it
The recent Cyprus financial crisis was so badly needed and looked for in
seems to confirm that if there is a serious the last two centuries Romania seems to
thereat addressing the European be rather the docile sheep among the EU
Construction it will not come from member states and in terms of size and
Romania as professor Gallagher suggests strategic importance one of the greatest
in this book. With an unemployment and most important investments the EU
level of around 8% (as compared to 27% made for its own future.
in Spain, Greece or south Italy), with a
hard working community of expats and a
Lucian JORA
Romanian Institute of Political
Sciences and International Relations
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Jonathan POWELL,
Noul Machiavelli. Cum se gestionează puterea în lumea modernă
[The New Machiavelli. How to Wield Power in the Modern
World],trans. Alexandru Șiclovan,
Cartier, Chișinău, 2012, 504 pp.
and by the will to take risks when the belongs to Blair. Besides courage and
result is uncertain. Powell shows this instinct, the leaders must acquire five
through Tony Blair’s working manner. qualities: competence, ability to communicate,
Tony’s almost instantaneous decision to charisma, perspective and charm. Just as
candidate for party leader, when John Machiavelli said about new leaders, a
Smith died in 1994 proves his courage. A prince must offer astonishing proofs of
more fearful politician would have his abilities (p. 72). In a unique manner
moved away from Gordon’s path, his the author shares his thoughts about the
older partner in development of the New third quality necessary for a political
Labourism, but he felt that Gordon leader – charisma (p. 87). In Powell’s
missed his chance (p. 57). Through the opinion, charisma may be obtained; it is
vision shared by Powell a manifestation not an inherited quality. Even people
of courage is shown as well when one without inborn charisma, insists the
confronts the opposition. Tony did this author, such as Mikhail Gorbaciov and
in his election campaign in 2005, John Major, can make heads turn when
exploring the issue of immigration, a hot entering a room, due to their dignified
topic in the British politics, by which the figure, because of what Max Weber
labourists attempted to win votes of the called habitualness of charisma. An essential
traditional conservatives. Tony praised ingredient of the charisma is optimism.
the remarkable advantages that Powell comes with relevant arguments
immigration had brought to Britain in a from electoral races: Blair versus Major,
public speech. This did not bring votes Bush Jr. versus Gore, Obama versus
to them but blocked any arguments for McCain, Clinton versus Bush Sr. etc.
conservatives for the rest of the Tony had an optimistic spirit that
campaign. Had this issue been ignored, appealed to people – writes his
there would have been a gradual decrease councillor.
of the labourists’ votes (p. 60). Even if well-known, we can not
By analysing the qualities that a neglect this allegoric comparison of
political leader must have, the author Machiavelli, which recommends that a
comes back to Machiavelli’s thinking, to prince be at the same time lion and fox,
later find its relevance for the modern because the lion can not dodge traps,
era. Machiavelli considers that besides neither the fox wolves. Therefore, one
the ability to make decisions, a successful must be fox to avoid traps and lion to
prince must be born with good political chase away the wolves. A leader must
instincts. Some leaders choose the have the ferocity of lions and all the
perfect tone, while others are tone dead. cunning of foxes. Tony was a master of
Powel states that Tony’s reaction to the constructive ambiguity. The most
news of Princess Diana’s death, on 31st spectacular demonstration of his fox
of august 1997, was an example of qualities was when Tony managed the
perfect tone. He had an instinct northern-Ireland issues, states Powell (p.
concerning the public’s state of mind. 209).
The author reveals a quote from his Is it better to be loved or feared?
diary: he definitely feels a real pain… It is Machiavelli’s question full of
Especially since the phrase People’s Princess meaning for the current political life.
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Machiavelli’s answer was this: since love (p. 211). During his period of stay on
and fear cannot coexist, if we must choose, it is Number 10, Tony Blair was backed by
safer to be feared than to be loved. The author two American experts from the staff of
states that when Tony became the leader the president Bill Clinton, concerning the
of the Labourist Party, he was considered research of the public opinion.
both by conservatives and press to be a Another useful moment for those
Bambi, a weak and defenceless chess- practicing the big politics is the so-called
piece, which may be easily overcome by pseudo-agenda of the prime-minister.
the situation. It was extraordinary how Powell stated that Blair’s day of work
fast Bambi changed into Stalin, a dictator was a congested one. Basically, he had no
stepping on the others’ wishes (p. 209). time to think at the big picture. That is
It is important that, since the 16th why, to overcome this situation, the staff
century, Machiavelli granted importance began to insert fictive meetings in his
to public opinion. He writes in Speeches: It agenda at least an hour or two in the
is not without reason the motive for which the middle of the day, (p. 265). The prime
voice of the people is like the voice of God, minister sometimes did not understand
because the public opinion has a remarkable the code applied by his councillors and
accuracy in prognosis… Powell follows-up requested these meetings to be cancelled.
on the importance of the public opinion The relations between the political
in the modern political system, leader and the press are a different
confirming the importance of the public compartment of governance. Machiavelli
opinion for a prime-minister. The Survey says that it is not essential for a Prince to have
of the public opinion is an essential all the qualities enlisted above, but it is
instrument of the prime-ministers, but mandatory to act as if he had them all. A prince
social surveys, such as intelligence should… be careful not to slip a word from his
secrets, must be handled with care. mouth which may not live -up to those five
Without these, a modern leader is blind. qualities, because people judge more with their
At the same time, the author warns that eyes, since they see many but few can understand.
social surveys represent an image of the The same thing could be said in
past, not a vision of the future, thus a regard to the leaders of our days. This
leader uses it as if steering while looking phenomenon can be made and
behind the boat. The numbers help to controlled with the help of the
find your position in the ocean and may favourable media. The author admits that
tell something about the state of the each time when things became
waves, but they do not guide the course. complicated, it was necessary to refresh
That is why a wise leader must use social the contract with journalists. Blair’s staff
surveys as an instrument, not as a made, in this regard, invitations to dinner
substitute to his own political instincts. for chief-editors in the small dining room
Of course, we may not agree with of Number 10. And there plans for
the author, if we talk about quality media coverage were made (p. 291).
research of the public opinion by focus- Even if, the author admits, the intimate
groups. But Powell interferes, stating that contact between the leader and the media
these are subjective and seldom reveal is not always recommended, Machiavelli
the visions of those who hold the power says that a prince must always think how
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to avoid actions which could make him understood, says the author at the
hated and despised. A careful prime- beginning. The same happens with Tony
minister, advises Powell, will keep a Blair, writes Powell at the end. When
certain distance from the press and will responsible history is written, I will be
see them so rarely that the journalists will surprised if Tony Blair will not be seen as
consider the meetings a special event. one of Machiavelli’s great princes, one
At the end of the book, Jonathan upon whom Fortuna smiled and who
Powell writes that the prime-ministers had the courage and intelligence to take
are preoccupied with their legacies. Even advantage of it.
in 1998 he suggested that the world will The book is an attempt to learn a
remember Tony Blair for Northern lesson about leadership and about the
Ireland, the constitutional reform and the exercise of power for future
political migration towards the centre. practitioners. It deserves a special place
However, Tony Blair’s main political will in the library of any intellectuals who are
is the change of face of the British interested in the mechanism of
politics. governance.
That which finally brings down all
leaders is arrogance. The arrogance did not
affect Tony Blair. Machiavelli is poorly
Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN
Institute of European Integration and
Political Science Academy of Sciences,
Republic of Moldova
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Alexandru RADU,
Politica între proporționalism și majoritarism.
Alegeri și sistem electoral în România postcomunistă
[Politics between proportional and majoritarian systems.
Elections and electoral system in post-communist Romania],
Institutul European, Iași, 2012, 365 pp.
Authority during the election period so budget and structure, with roles in
that it becomes the only independent managing the election process alongside
authority of Executive power through the Ministry of Justice/ Internal Affairs.
Florin GRECU
Hyperion University of Bucharest
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EVENT
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MEDMODEL 2012
The first international symposium named “The Mediterranean model and the
extended Black Sea region” took place on 7-9 June 2012 in Bucharest and was
organised by the University of South-East Europe Lumina and the Italian Institute for
Philosophical Studies from Naples.
The Mediterranean model influenced the peoples from the Black Sea area and
its extended region for a long time. The two “areas” have even nowadays multiple
common elements, between them having taken place interferences, influences and
confluences. Those values resulted from the dialogue among numerous cultures. For
millennia, those have influenced, complicated and enriched the history of a space of
meeting civilisations, idea confrontations and all diversity that is specific to nations.
The world of the Mediterranean has influenced in different proportions almost
the entire extended area of the Black Sea and even the fascinating Russian civilisation.
Can this extended region of the Black Sea constitute, in its turn, a model with effects
comparable to the Mediterranean one? The purpose of the symposium was to find,
through scientific debate, possible answers to this question. Within the themed
sections, attempts were made to identify the similar elements, interferences and
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reciprocal effects, as well as the specific aspects in culture and civilisation, politics and
institutions, as well as economy.
This scientific meeting reunited important personalities from the higher
education environment from Italy, Turkey and, of course, Romania. Among these:
Luigi di Comite (Aldo Moro Università di Bari), Daniel Barbu (University of
Bucharest), Giovanni Lobrano (University of Sassari), Havvanur Şahin (Karaelmas
University), Vittore Collina (University of Florence), Maurizio Vernassa (University of
Pisa), Luigi Mascilli Migliorini (“Federico II” University, Naples), Marisa Valleri
(“Aldo Moro” University, Bari), Cristina Badon (University of Florence).
We mention this scientific event that took place in the spring of the previous
university year in order to make a first announcement of participation at the second
international symposium under this name that shall take place during May-June 2013
in Bucharest and Constanța, with the purpose of deepening and extending our
research area.
Filip STANCIU
University of South-East Europe Lumina
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SIGNALS
RECENTLY PUBLISHED
Andreea ZAMFIRA,
Une sociologie électorale des communautés pluriethniques,
L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012.
Starting from developing a picture of electoral behaviours in
multilingual communities, Andreea Zamfira’s book highlights
the influence of the ethno-linguistic factor on the electoral
behaviour. An important contribution of this paper is
represented by the proposal of a new analytical model able to
refund the complexity of elections in countries that have
experienced the cultural diversity, on long historical periods.
Richard E. WAGNER, James M. BUCHANAN,
Democraţia în deficit. Moştenirea politică a lordului Keynes,
translated from English by Radu Şimandan, preface by Robert D. Tollison,
Humanitas, București, 2013.
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TO BE PUBLISHED
Johannes STEPHAN,
The Technological Role of Inward Foreign Direct Investment
in Central East Europe,
Series: Studies in Economic Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, June 2013.
Vera TRAPPMANN,
Fallen Heroes in Global Capitalism
Workers and the Restructuring of the Polish Steel Industry,
Series: Studies in Economic Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, May 2013.
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CONFERENCES 2013
Third, on May 24-26, 2013, will take place the 7th edition of “THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY STUDIES”, organized and
hosted by "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security
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Studies. The aim of the conference is to scientifically debate issues such as: the global
economic crisis as a challenge to the traditional views on globalization, the new
approaches and policies demanded by the global security and, also, the year 2013 as a
switching point in the development of democracy and the existence of the market
model. The conference is structured along three tracks, as follows:
I. Political Science Track
II. International Relations Track
III. Security Studies Track
For more details, see: http://conferences.ulbsibiu.ro/crissp/
Florin-Ciprian MITREA
University of South-East Europe Lumina
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Daniel BARBU
Salvatore CINGARI
Florin GRECU
Lucian JORA
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member of the editorial team for the Romanian Review of Political Sciences and
International Relations (issued four times a year in Bucharest, under the patronage
of the Romanian Academy). Previous appointments include visiting research
positions at the Jagellonian University (Cracow, Poland 2002), National Centre
for Research on Europe at the Canterbury University (New Zealand, 2002),
Shandong University (Jinan, China, 2007) and Woodrow Wilson Center in
Washington DC (2009). Lucian Jora’s academic interests range from Cultural
Diplomacy, as a tool for European Integration process, to European Regional
integration Strategies.
Florin-Ciprian MITREA
Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN
Michele PROSPERO
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Cătălin-Valentin RAIU
Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science, M.A. and B.A. in Orthodox Theology, all
at the University of Bucharest; doctoral research fellow at the University of
Nottingham (for seven months). He is interested in political theology, political
theory and the history of political thought. Recent published book: Ortodoxie,
postcomunism și neoliberalism. O critică teologico-politică, Curtea Veche Publishing
House, București, 2012.
Gelu SABĂU
Victoria SPAU
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Chambers of Deputies. Her main research interests are: social movements, the
involvement of the Romanian civil society in the political sphere.
Filip STANCIU
Gheorghe STOICA
Adrian-Marius TOMPEA
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Andreea ZAMFIRA
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