Section 1.

Procedural Due Process:

A.) Judicial Proceedings

Title of Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

● Palanca was indebted WoN it is essential No. Actual notice Due process in a judicial proceeding
Banco Espanol to Banco Filipino; his in procedural due not required. (requisites):
vs. Palanca parcel of land was the process for the 1.) There is a court or tribunal
mortgaged property notification to be Publication or clothed with judicial power to hear
to secure his debt seen by Palanca mailing (as modes and determine the matter before it
● Palanca failed to of notification), 2.) The court or tribunal must
make payments: does not involve acquire jurisdiction over the person
Banco then executed any absolute of the defendant or the property
an instrument to assurance that the that is the subject of the proceeding
foreclose the absent owner shall 3.) Defendant must be given an
mortgage of Palanca’s receive actual opportunity to be heard
land notice, which is 4.) Judgment must be rendered
● Palanca left for China NOT absolutely upon lawful hearing
and never returned necessary. ● Foreclosure case: notification
(up to his death) of the proceedings to non-
● Banco had to notify resident owner is essential
Palanca about the and can be done either by
intent to sue him, by mailing or publication
means of publication
using a newspaper
● After 7 years: Vicente
claims that he is the
administrator of the
land of Palanca; files a
case in Court in order
to annul the
foreclosure
 procedure
● Defense of Vincente:
there was no due
process as Palanca
never received the
summons

On November 12, 1993, Whether the ex Contrary to petitioners’ submission,

Galvez vs. CA petitioners Honorato Galvez, parte motion to the absence of notice and hearing
the incumbent Mayor of San withdraw the does not divest a trial court of
* Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one original authority to pass on the merits of
Exparte refers Godofredo Diego were informations is null the motion. It has been held that—
to a motion or charged in three separate and void on the “The order of the court granting
petition by or informations with homicide ground that (a) the motion to dismiss despite
for one party. and two counts of frustrated there was no notice absence of a notice of hearing, or
An ex homicide for allegedly and hearing as proof of service thereof, is merely
parte judicial shooting to death Alvin required by an irregularity in the
proceeding is Calma Vinculado and Sections 4, 5 and 6, proceedings. It cannot deprive a
on where the seriously wounding Levi Rule 15 of the competent court of jurisdiction
opposing party Calma Vinculado and Miguel Rules of Court; and over the case. The court still retains
has not Reyes Vinculado, Jr. (b) the appropriate its authority to pass on the merits of
received notice remedy which the motion. The remedy of the
nor is present. On December 15, 1993, should have been aggrieved party in such cases is
This is an before petitioners could be adopted by the either to have the order set aside or
exception to arraigned, respondent prosecution was to the irregularity otherwise cured by
the usual rule prosecutor filed an Ex Parte amend the the court which dismissed the
of court Motion to Withdraw informations by complaint or to appeal from the
procedure and Informations of the original charging the dismissal and not certiorari.”
due process informations. This motion proper offenses
rights that both was granted by Judge pursuant to Section
parties must be Villajuan also on December 14 of Rule 110;
present at any 15, 1993 and the cases were
argument considered withdrawn from
before a judge. the docket of the court.

On the same day, Prosecutor

Villa-Ignacio filed four new
informations against herein
petitioners for murder, two
counts of frustrated murder,
and violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.

Thereafter, a Motion to
Quash the new informations
for lack of jurisdiction was
filed by petitioners before
Judge Pornillos on January 3,
1994. At the court session
set for the arraignment of
petitioners on January 24,
1994, Judge Pornillos issued
an order denying the motion
to quash.

In the meantime, and prior

to the arraignment of herein
petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was
issued on January 20, 1994
by Judge Villajuan granting
the motion for
reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the
reinstatement of the original
 informations, and setting the
arraignment of the accused
therein for February 8, 1994.
On said date, however, the
arraignment was suspended
and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals,
assailing the order dated
January 24, 1994 issued by
Judge Pornillos which denied
petitioners’ motion to quash
filed for the new
informations. As earlier
stated, respondent court
dismissed the petition in its
questioned resolution of
February 18, 1994, hence
this petition.
1. The state prosecutors Did the respondent It is a mandatory requirement that a
State who are members of judge commit grave new law should be published for 15
Prosecutors the DOJ Panel of abuse of discretion days in a newspaper of general
vs. Muro Prosecution filed a in taking judicial circulation before its effectivity.
complaint against notice on the When the President’s statement
*Prosecution is respondent Judge statement of the was published in the newspaper,
also entitled to Muro on the ground president lifting the the respondent judge admitted of
due process of ignorance of the foreign exchange not having seen the official text of
law, grave restriction CB circular 1353 thus it was
misconduct and published in the premature for him to take
violation of the newspaper as basis judicial notice on this matter
provisions in the for dismissing the which is merely based on his
 Code of Judicial case? -- YES personal knowledge and is not
Conduct. based on the public knowledge
2. The case at bar that the law requires for the court
involves the to take judicial notice of.
prosecution of the 11
charges against The doctrine of judicial notice
Imelda Marcos in rests on the wisdom and
violation of the discretion of the courts. The
Central Bank Foreign power to take judicial notice is to be
Exchange Restriction exercised by courts with caution;
in the Central Bank care must be taken that the
Circular 960. requisite notoriety exists; and
3. The respondent judge every reasonable doubt on the
dismissed all 11 cases subject should be promptly resolved
solely on the basis of in the negative.
the report published
from the 2 Generally speaking, matters of
newspapers (Inquirer judicial notice have three
and Daily Globe), material requisites:
which the judge
believes to be (1) the matter must be one of
reputable and of common and general
national circulation, knowledge;
that the Pres. of the (2) it must be well and
Philippines lifted all authoritatively settled and
foreign exchange not doubtful or uncertain;
restrictions. and
4. The respondent’s (3) it must be known to be
decision was founded within the limits of the
on his belief that the jurisdiction of the court.
reported
announcement of the The principal guide in
Executive determining what facts may be
 Department in the assumed to be judicially known is
newspaper in effect that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
repealed the CB 960 said that judicial notice is limited to
and thereby divested facts evidenced by public records
the court of its and facts of general notoriety.
jurisdiction to further
hear the pending case To say that a court will take judicial
thus motu propio notice of a fact is merely another
dismissed the case. way of saying that the usual form
5. He further contends of evidence will be dispensed
that the with if knowledge of the fact can
announcement of the be otherwise acquired. This is
President as because the court assumes that
published in the the matter is so notorious that it
newspaper has made will not be disputed. But judicial
such fact a public notice is not judicial knowledge.
knowledge that is ● The mere personal
sufficient for the knowledge of the judge is not
judge to take judicial the judicial knowledge of the
notice which is court, and he is not
discretionary on his authorized to make his
part. individual knowledge of a
6. Hence, the fact, not generally or
complainants contend professionally known, the
that the respondent basis of his action. Judicial
judge erred in taking cognizance is taken only of
judicial notice on those matters which are
matters he purported “commonly” known.
to be a public
knowledge based Things of “common knowledge,” of
merely on the account which courts take judicial notice,
of the newspaper may be matters coming to the
publication that the knowledge of men generally in the
Pres. has lifted the course of the ordinary experiences
foreign exchange of life, or they may be matters which
restriction. are generally accepted by mankind
a. It was also an as true and are capable of ready and
act of unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
inexcusable facts which are universally
ignorant of the known, and which may be found
law not to in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
accord due other publications, are judicially
process to the noticed, provided they are of such
prosecutors universal notoriety and so
who were generally understood that they
already at the may be regarded as forming part
stage of of the common knowledge of
presenting every person.
evidence
(trial)thereby In this case, respondent judge, in
depriving the the guise of exercising discretion
government and on the basis of a mere
the right to be newspaper account which is
heard. sometimes even referred to as
b. The judge also hearsay evidence twice removed,
exercised took judicial notice of the supposed
grave abuse of lifting of foreign exchange controls,
discretion by a matter which was not and cannot
taking judicial be considered of common
notice on the knowledge or of general notoriety.
published Worse, he took cognizance of an
statement of administrative regulation which
the President was not yet in force when the order
in the of dismissal was issued.
newspaper Jurisprudence dictates that
which is a judicial notice cannot be taken of
 matter that
has not yet
been officially
in force and
effect of the
law.
This is a petition seeking the
Carvajal vs. CA nullification of two
Resolutions issued by the
Court of Appeals on August
3, 1999 and May 25, 2000.
On October 9, 1997, the
Supreme Court promulgated
a decision, In G.R. No. 98328,
penned by Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban. denying Juan C.
Carvajal's petition to reverse
the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The latter court
upheld the trial court LRC
a statute before it becomes
effective. The reason is simple. A
law which is not yet in force and
hence, still inexistent, cannot be
of common knowledge capable of
ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of
the requirements before a court
can take judicial notice of a fact.
Hence, it was impossible for Judge
Muro and was improper for him to
have taken cognizance of the CB
Circular No. 1353 when it was not
yet in force at the time the
improvident order of dismissal was
issued
Whether or not the Petitioner claims that he was denied
petitioner was due process because he was unable
given (the) chance to take the witness stand. We
and the disagree. The essence of due
opportunity to be process is the opportunity to be
heard or allowed to heard. It is the denial of this
fully introduce his opportunity that is repugnant to due
evidence in the process. In this case, petitioner was
(proceeding) for afforded an opportunity to present
Land Registration witnesses, and he did present three.
and (to) rest (his) However, petitioner did not invoke
case; his right to take the witness stand
even when the trial court ordered
the submission of the parties
Case No. 414(-A), LRC
Record No. N-60084 filed
before Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City, Branch 71.
In dismissing petitioner's
application for registration
of title of a parcel of land in
Antipolo City.
The Court recognized
respondent Solid Homes, Inc.
as the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by
TCT No. N-7873, situated in
Antipolo City.
On May 13, 1998, petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo City a
complaint for annulment of
title with damages against
private respondent.
Petitioner allegedly acquired
portions of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. N-7873
by inheritance from his
father Felix Carvajal who
came to possess the
unregistered land in 1938,
continuously, openly,
adversely and peacefully in
memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings.
Because he acquiesced to the
termination of the case, he forfeited
his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by
his allegation that his own counsel
hardly participated in the
proceedings. The records show that
said counsel did cross-examine
Engineer Silverio Perez by
propounding clarificatory questions
to the latter. In any event, the client
is generally bound by the acts of his
counsel. Petitioner has not shown at
all that his previous counsel had
acted in such grossly negligent
manner as to deprive him of
effective representation, or of due
process.[20]
In support of his contention,
petitioner cites Tirona vs.
Naawa[21] which held:
We hold the view, however that
respondent Judge erred when he
ordered the dismissal of the
registration case over the objection
of the oppositors; and when he
refused to reconsider the order of
dismissal and reinstate the case he
the concept of an owner up
to the time of his death.
On August 12, 1998, the trial
court dismissed petitioner's
complaint.
On August 3, 1999, the Court
of Appeals issued the
questioned resolution. The
decretal portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, for being
insufficient in form and
substance, the petition for
certiorari should be, as it is
hereby, DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED."
The petition revealed that
petitioner failed to comply
with Rule 46, Section 3, par.
2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requiring the
statement of the material
dates showing when notice
of the judgment or final
order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a
motion for the new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was
filed, and when notice of the
denial thereof was received.
had neglected to perform an act
which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, and had
thereby deprived the oppositors of a
right to which they are entitled.
Such ruling finds no application to
the present case, because neither
Respondent Mariano Raymundo
(the applicant in the land
registration case) nor Petitioner
Constantino Tirona (the oppositor
in the cited case) was a holder of
any certificate of title over the land
intended for registration. Such
being the case, the land registration
court was ordered to act in
accordance with Section 37 of Act
No. 496[22] either by dismissing the
application if none of the litigants
succeeded in showing a proper title,
or by entering a decree awarding
the land applied for to the person
entitled thereto.
 On May 25, 2000, the Court
of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition filed on
July 7, 2000.
On March 13, 2001, the
Perez vs. Kapisanan ng mga
Estrada Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(June 29, (KBP), an association
2001) representing duly franchised
and authorized television
and radio networks
throughout the country, sent
a letter requesting the
Supreme Court to allow live
media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan in
order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the
proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our
history."
The request was seconded
by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his
letter of 5 April 2001 to the
Whether or not No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that
media coverage be television coverage of judicial
allowed to air proceedings involves an inherent
Estrada’s trial to the denial of due process rights of the
public. criminal defendant: "Witnesses
might be frightened, play to the
cameras, become nervous. They are
then subject to extraordinary out-
of-court influences that might affect
their testimony. Telecasting
increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual
prejudice to the defendant. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects
him to excessive public exposure
and distracts him from an effective
presentation of his defense. Finally,
the television camera is a powerful
weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of
the public."
The right of people to information
Chief Justice and, still later,
by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo
Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the
Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez formally
filed the petition.
does not prescribe that TV cameras
be installed in the courtroom. This
right might be fulfilled by less
distracting, degrading and more
judicial means. In a criminal case, a
life is at stake, and the due process
rights of the accused shall take
precedence over the people's right
to information. The accused has the
right to a public trial, and the
exercise of such a right is his to
make, because it is his life and
liberty that is in the balance. A
public trial is not the same as a
publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the
rule on the exclusion of the witness
intended to ensure a fair trial...could
allow the 'hooting throng' to
arrogate upon themselves the task
of judging the guilt of the
accused...will not subserve the ends
of justice, but will only pander to the
desire of publicity of a few
grandstanding lawyers."
Court is not unmindful of the recent
technological advances but to
chance forthwith the life and liberty
of any person in a hasty bid to use
and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the

This is a motion for
Perez vs. reconsideration of the
Estrada decision denying petitioners’
(September 13, request for permission to
2001) -MR televise and broadcast live
the trial of former President
The sub judice Estrada before the
rule is part of Sandiganbayan.
the law relating
to contempt of The motion was filed by the
court. The rule Secretary of Justice, as one of
governs what the petitioners, who argues
public that there is really no conflict
statements can between the right of the
be made about people to public information
ongoing legal and the freedom of the press,
proceedings on the one hand, and, on the
before, other, the right of the
principally, the accused to a fair trial; that if
courts there is a clash between
these rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right
of the people and the press
because the people, as the
repository of sovereignty,
are entitled to information;
and that live media coverage
is a safeguard against
concerns heretofore expressed are
aptly addressed, is a price too high
to pay.
Whether or not No. No. The Court has considered the
television and radio arguments of the parties on this
coverage of plunder important issue and, after due
case be allowed. deliberation, finds no reason to alter
or in any way modify its decision
prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of
the trial of the former president. By
a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its
member, the Court denies the
motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage
of the trial, the Court, by the vote of
eight (8) Justices, has resolved to
order the audio-visual recording of
the trial for documentary purposes.
Seven (7) Justices vote against the
audio-visual recording of the trial.
Considering the significance of the
trial before the Sandiganbayan of
former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes
that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real
attempts by any party to use time broadcast but for documentary
the courts as instruments for purposes. Only later will they be
the pursuit of selfish available for public showing, after
interests. the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every
On the other hand, former case to which the recording
President Joseph E. Estrada pertains. The master film shall be
reiterates his objection to deposited in the National Museum
the live TV and radio and the Records Management and
coverage of his trial on the Archives Office for historical
ground that its allowance preservation and exhibition
will violate the sub judice pursuant to law.
rule and that, based on his
experience with the
impeachment trial, live
media coverage will only
pave the way for so-called
"expert commentary" which
can trigger massive
demonstrations aimed at
pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a
decision one way or the
other. Mr. Estrada contends
that the right of the people to
information may be served
through other means less
distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and
radio coverage.
B.) Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

Title of Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

Toribio Teodoro, the
Ang Tibay vs. manager and proprietor of
CIR Ang Tibay, laid off 89
laborers, who were
members of the National
Labor Union (NLU), due to
alleged shortages of leather
materials. The National
Labor Union filed a
complaint for unfair labor
practice against Ang Tibay,
alleging therein, among
others, that Toribio
dominates the National
Workers’ Brotherhood
(NWB) of Ang Tibay, another
union in the company, and
that Toribio discriminated
against the NLU and unjustly
favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated.
The Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) ruled in
favor of NLU, due to the
failure of Ang Tibay to
present records of the
Whether the CIR’s
freedom from the rigidity
of procedural
requirements prescribe
special requirements of
due process in
administrative cases.
The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the
Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." The fact,
however, that the CIR may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one’s
cause and submit evidence in support
Bureau of Customs and
Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather and thus to
disprove NLU’s allegation
that the lack of leather
materials as a scheme to
discharge NLU members.
The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the
decision, finding no
substantial evidence that the
89 workers were dismissed
due to their union affiliation
or activities.
Thus, the Solicitor General,
in behalf of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed a
motion for reconsideration,
while the NLU filed a motion
for new trial, praying that
the case be remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations.
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something
to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing; or
at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be, and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the CIR,
with instruction that it reopen the case

Sometime in February, 1993, a
OCA vs. certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a
Pascual letter, addressed to Hon.
Reynaldo Suarez of the Office
of the Court Administrator of
the Supreme Court, charging
that irregularities and
corruption were being
committed by the respondent
Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter
was referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation in
order that an investigation on
the alleged illegal and corrupt
practices of the respondent
may be conducted. Ordered to
conduct a “discreet
investigation” by the then NBI
Director Epimaco Velasco
were: SA Edward Villarta,
team leader, SI Reynaldo
Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI
Florino Javier and SI Jose
Icasiano. They proceeded to
receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set
forth.
Whether or not the We find that the evidence on record
evidences presented does not warrant conviction. We note
against Judge Filomeno that the only bases for the Report and
Pascual were strong Recommendation submitted by
enough to convict him. Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon
consist of: The Complaint, the
Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing of
the bribery case of respondent judge
at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not
afforded the right to open trial
wherein respondent can confront the
witnesses against him and present
evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is
unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if
the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or
any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and
should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which
respondent belongs demands no less.
Before any of its members could be
Angat, Bulacan, in order to
look for Ceferino Tigas, the
letter writer. Tigas, the NBI
team realized was a fictitious
character. In view of their
failure to find Tigas, they
proceeded to the residence of
Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondent’s sala.
In his affidavit executed on
March 23, 1993 before SA
Edward Villarta, Cruz
declared that he was the
accused in Criminal Case No.
2154, charged with the crime
of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge, after
conducting the preliminary
investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he
committed was only physical
injuries and so, respondent
judge assumed jurisdiction
over the case. Cruz believed
that he was made to
understand by the respondent
that, in view of his favorable
action, Cruz was to give to
respondent the sum of
P2,000.00. Respondent judge
is believed to be a drunkard
and, in all probability, would
faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since
the charge is penal in character.[7]
The above-quoted Report and
Recommendation of the investigating
judge had fallen short of the
requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of
irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness,
Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI
Reynaldo Olazo on several material
points.
It will be remembered that the charge
was intimated by someone who must
have had an ax to grind against the
respondent judge but who, by reason
of cowardice or lack of evidence to
put up a righteous case, did not come
out in the open and instead wrote an
anonymous letter. The letter-writer,
naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did
not specify crimes committed or
illegal acts perpetrated but charged
respondent with anomalies in general
terms. Respondent judge could not
have been expected to make a valid
answer or to otherwise defend himself
from such vague accusations.
need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the
NBI agents assigned to the
case caused respondent judge
to be entrapped, for which
reason, the judge was thought
to have been caught in
flagrante delicto. NBI agents
Villarta and Olazo filed the
following report:
“On 25 March 1993, at about
4:00 in the afternoon,
CANDIDO CRUZ met with
Judge PASCUAL at the
Colegio de Sta. Monica, near
the Municipal Building of
Angat, Bulacan, where Subject
is attending the graduation of
his daughter. CANDIDO
CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL
that he already had the
P2,000.00 which he (Judge
PASCUAL) is asking him.
However, Judge PASCUAL
did not receive the money
because according to him there
were plenty of people around.
He then instructed CANDIDO
CRUZ to see him (Judge
PASCUAL) at his office the
following day.
While then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco, upon being apprised of the
Tigas letter, ordered the NBI
investigating team to make a “discreet
investigation” of respondent, the NBI
team had instead caused an
instigation or the entrapment of
respondent judge. Not having found
letter-writer Tigas and concluding
that no such person exists, they
sought out an accused before
respondent’s court who could
possibly be respondent judge’s virtual
victim. Approached by the NBI team
was Candido Cruz, a person who had
been brought before the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for
preliminary investigation on the
charge of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge gave judgment to
the effect that the crime committed by
Candido Cruz was that of physical
injuries merely. He declared then that
he had original jurisdiction to try the
case.
But, respondent’s action in this regard
was perpetrated some time before
Candido Cruz was “persuaded to
participate in what they (the NBI
agents) called ‘entrapment
operation.’” The opportune time to
bribe the respondent should have

At about 8:30 in the morning
of the following day (26
March 1993), CANDIDO
CRUZ proceeded to the office
of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan, and thereat
handed to him four (4) pieces
of P500.00 bills contained in a
white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed
with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the
Undersigned stayed outside
the court room and after about
15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ
came out of the room and
signaled to the Undersigned
that Judge PASCUAL had
already received the marked
money. The Undersigned
immediately entered the room
and informed Subject about
the entrapment. Subject
denied having received
anything from CANDIDO
CRUZ, but after a thorough
search, the marked money was
found inserted between the
pages of a blue book on top of
his table.
been before he acted in reducing
Cruz’ criminal liability from
Frustrated Murder to Physical
Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It
was unlikely that respondent would
ask for it on the date of the
entrapment on March 26, 1993, the
favorable verdict having been
rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI
Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite
the fact that he “scoured” the table of
the respondent in search of the
envelope, with marked money in it,
no envelope was found and so he had
to call Candido Cruz who was already
outside so that Cruz can locate the
envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find
reason to favorably consider the
allegations of respondent judge in his
defense that, at around 9:30 o’clock
in the morning of March 26, 1993,
Candido Cruz, along with the NBI
agents, went to the Municipal
Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido
Cruz, alone, went inside respondent
judge’s chambers, located thereat, and
placed before respondent judge an
envelope containing marked money.
Respondent judge thought that what

Subject was invited to the
Office of the NBI-NCR,
Manila wherein he was
subjected to ultra violet light
examination. After finding
Subject’s right hand for the
presence of fluorescent
powder, he was booked,
photographed and
fingerprinted in accordance
with our Standard Operating
Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of
our investigation together with
the person of Judge
FILOMENO PASCUAL was
referred to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman, with the
recommendation that he be
charged and prosecuted for
Bribery as defined and
penalized under Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.”
was placed before him was a pleading
for filing and so, he told Candido
Cruz to file it with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, that is, in a room
adjacent to his chambers. Candido
Cruz replied that it was the money the
judge was asking for. Upon hearing
this reply, respondent judge suddenly
erupted in anger. He grabbed the
envelope on the desk and hurled it at
Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on
the floor. Respondent judge then
picked it up and inserted it inside the
pocket of Cruz’ polo shirt and drove
him out of his chambers. NBI Agents
Villarta and Olazo immediately
entered the door of the judge’s
chambers, introduced themselves, and
told respondent judge that the money
that Cruz gave him was marked.
Respondent judge told them that he
did not receive or accept money from
Candido Cruz. After respondent
judge said this, the NBI Agents
nevertheless proceeded to search the
room, examined tables, drawers, and
every nook and cranny of
respondent’s chambers, and the
pockets of the pants of respondent
judge. Even after rigid search of the
chambers of respondent, the NBI
Agents failed to find the envelope
containing marked money allegedly

Lumiqued was the Regional
Lumiqued vs. Director of DAR-CAR. He was
Exevea charged by Zamudio, the
Regional Cashier, for
dishonesty due to
questionable gas expenses
under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying
gas receipts for
reimbursements and that he
had an unliquidated cash
advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained
that she was unjustly
removed by Lumiqued two
weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was
referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the
complaints were conducted
on July 3 and 10, 1992, but
Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second
given by Candido Cruz to respondent
judge.
Does the due process The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The
clause encompass the right to counsel, which cannot be
right to be assisted by waived unless the waiver is in
counsel during an writing and in the presence of
administrative inquiry? counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be
invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason,
in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the
right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was
not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The
investigation conducted by the
committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose
of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the
 hearing date, he moved for law for the complaints filed against
its resetting to July 17, 1992, him. The right to counsel is not
to enable him to employ the indispensable to due process unless
services of counsel. The required by the Constitution or the
committee granted the law.
motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he
himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
The Investigating Committee
recommended the dismissal
of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon
adopted the
recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52
dismissing Lumiqued.

On September 17, 1990,
Fabella vs. CA DECS Secretary Carino
issued a return-to-work
order to all public school
teachers who had
participated in walk-outs
and strikes on various dates
during the period of
September to October 1990.
The mass action had been
staged to demand payment
of 13th month pay,
allowances and passage of
debt cap bill in Congress. On
Whether or not private Yes.
respondents were
denied due process?
In administrative proceedings, due
process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent’s
legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance
of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and
to defend one’s rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as
October 1990, Secretary
Carino filed administrative
cases against respondents,
who are teachers of
Mandaluyong High School.
The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in
writing why they should not
be punished for having taken
part in the mass action in
violation of civil service
laws.Administrative
hearings started on
December 1990.
Respondents, through
counsel assailed the legality
of the proceedings on the
following due process
grounds: first, they were not
given copies of the
guidelines adopted by the
committee for the
investigation and denied
access to evidence; second,
the investigation placed the
burden of proof on
respondents to prove their
innocence; third, that the
investigating body was
illegally constituted, their
composition and
appointment violated Sec.9
of the Magna Carta for Public
to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special
law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers
administrative proceedings
involving public schoolteachers.
Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear
public school teachers’
administrative cases should be
composed of the school
superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or
national teachers’ organization and
a supervisor of the division. In the
present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the
local or, in its absence, any existing
School Teachers. Pending the
action assailing the validity
of the administrative
proceedings, the
investigating committee
rendered a decision finding
the respondents guilty and
ordered their immediate
dismissal.
provincial or national teacher’s
organization” as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly,
these committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction.
Thus, all proceedings undertaken
by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis
for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers’
organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an
impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right
to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement
of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard. Other minor issues:
Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA
4670 was complied with because
the respondents are members of
Quezon City Teachers Federation.
We disagree. Mere membership of
said teachers in their respective
teachers’ organizations does not
ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this

On 26 April 1994, a red
Summary Cortina Ford, driven by
Dismissal vs. C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with
Torcita his aide, PO2 Java, in the
front seat and his wife with
two ladies at the backseat,
were overtaken by a Mazda
pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey
section, the teachers’ organization
possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by
the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their
underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the
teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating
committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative
in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670
was repealed by PD 807. Statcon
principle, a subsequent general law
cannot repeal a previous specific
law, unless there is an express
stipulation. Always interpret laws
so as to harmonize them.
Whether Torcita may be Notification of the charges
proceeded against or contemplates that the respondent
suspended for breach of be informed of the specific charges
internal discipline, when against him. The absence of
the original charges specification of the offense for
against him were for which he was eventually found
Conduct Unbecoming of guilty is not a proper observance of
a Police Officer, Illegal due process. There can be no short-
Search, Grave Abuse of cut to the legal process. While the
and driven by one Reynaldo
Consejo with four (4)
passengers in the persons of
Alex Edwin del Rosario,
Rosita Bistal, Carmen
Braganza and Cristina Dawa.
After the Mazda pick-up has
overtaken the red Cortina
Ford, and after a vehicular
collision almost took place, it
accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hacienda
Aimee, a sugarcane
plantation owned by the
congressman. The red
Cortina Ford followed also at
high speed until it reached
the hacienda where Torcita
and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del
Rosario and Jesus Puey
occurred. Torcita identified
himself but the same had no
effect.
PO2 Java whispered
to him that there are armed
men around them and that it
is dangerous for them to
continue. That at this point,
they radioed for back-up.
Torcita, upon the arrival of
the back-up force of PNP
Cadiz City, proceeded to the
Authority and Violation definition of the more serious
of Domicile, and Abuse of offense is broad, and almost all-
Authority and Violation encompassing a finding of guilt for
of COMELEC Gun Ban. an offense, no matter how light, for
which one is not properly charged
and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative
cases filed against Torcita did
not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to
the specific act of being drunk
while in the performance of
official duty. There is no indication
or warning at all in the summary
dismissal proceedings that Torcita
was also being charged with breach
of internal discipline consisting of
taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The
omission is fatal to the validity of
the judgment finding him guilty of
the offense for which he was not
notified nor charged. Further, the
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal
Board that Torcita "committed
breach of internal discipline by
taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have
been substantiated by factual
findings referring to this particular
offense. Even if he was prosecuted
place where Capt. Jesus Puey for irregular performance of duty,
and Alex Edwin del Rosario he could not have been found to
were. On 6 July 1994, 12 have the odor or smell of alcohol
verified administrative while in the performance of duty
complaints were filed because he was not on duty at the
against Torcita for Conduct time that he had a taste of liquor;
Unbecoming of a Police he was on a private trip fetching his
Officer, Illegal Search, Grave wife.
Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile, and
Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban. The 12 administrative
complaints were
consolidated into 1 major
complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police
officer. The Summary
Dismissal Board, however,
did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that
Torcita threatened anybody
with a gun, nor that a serious
confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that
the urinating incident took
place, and held that the
charges of violation of
domicile and illegal search
were not proven. Still, while
the Board found that Torcita
was "in the performance of
his official duties" when the
incident happened, he
allegedly committed a
simple irregularity in
performance of duty (for
being in the influence of
alcohol while in performance
of duty) and was suspended
for 20 days and salary
suspended for the same
period of time. Torcita
appealed his conviction to
the Regional Appellate Board
of the Philippine National
Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo
City), but the appeal was
dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon,
Torcita filed a petition for
certiorari in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City
(Branch 31), questioning the
legality of the conviction of
an offense for which he was
not charged (lack of
procedural due process of
law). The Board filed a
motion to dismiss, which
was denied. The RTC granted
the petition for certiorari
and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned
decision insofar as it found
Torcita guilty of simple
 irregularity in the
performance of duty. The
Board appealed from the
RTC decision, by petition of
review to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the
same for the reason that the
respondent could not have
been guilty of irregularity
considering that the 12 cases
were eventually dismissed.
The Board filed the petition
for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

Whether or not Coronel The notation does not deny

Office of the Carmencita D. Coronel is a
Ombudsman Senior Accounting Processor
vs. Coronel of the Linamon Water
District, Lanao del Norte.
In Board of Directors of
administrative Linamon Water District, by
cases, a finding virtue of Resolution No. 056,
of guilt must be Series of 1997, designated
supported by [respondent] as Officer-in-
substantial Charge, effective October 1,
evidence. In the 1997 until a General
present case, an Manager shall have been
unauthenticated appointed. In the morning of
photocopy of an October 14, 1998,
alleged receipt [respondent] called for a
does not meeting the officers of the
was deprived of due respondent of her right to due
process process. In administrative
Whether or not the proceedings, the essence of due
administrative process lies simply in the
proceedings of the opportunity to explain one’s side or
Ombudsman erred in the to seek reconsideration of the
decision rendered. action or ruling complained of.
What is proscribed is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing. In this
case, respondent was given every
opportunity to be heard.
Significantly, her intelligible
pleadings before the CA and this
Court indicate that she knew the
bases for the ombudsman’s
Decision. In fact, she very ably
constitute different Water Districts in
substantial Lanao del Norte and Lanao
evidence to del Sur. Since it was nearing
show that lunchtime, the group opted
respondent is to continue their meeting the
guilty of luncheon meeting, attended
dishonesty. In by more or less ten (10)
fact, absent any persons. [respondent] paid
authentication, for the lunch in the amount
the photocopy of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as
is inadmissible shown in cash Invoice No.
in evidence; at 0736 dated October 14,
the very least, it 1998.[respondent] claimed
has no for reimbursement of her
probative value. expenses covered by
Voucher No. 98-11-23,
chargeable against the
representation and
entertainment account of her
office. That very same day,
the voucher was approved
and [respondent] got her
reimbursement in the
amount of One Thousand
Two [H]undred Thirteen
[P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C.
Sausal, Jr. was appointed
General Manager of Linamon
Water District filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao a sworn letter-
complaint against herein
Coronel for dishonesty. The
pinpointed its alleged errors that
she thought would merit our
review. Not having been left in the
dark as to how it was reached,
respondent’s insistence on a denial
of due process has no legal leg to
stand on.
In administrative cases, the
quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial
evidence; that is, such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. In the instant
case, the complainant did not
present evidence to support his
theory that the photocopy of the
original duplicate reflected the true
amount, or that OR No. 0736 had
indeed been falsified. That
oversight was fatal to the discharge
of his burden of proof. A reasonable
mind will not carelessly jump to the
conclusion that respondent is the
guilty party.
The complainant’s evidence to
prove falsification consisted of an
unauthenticated45 photocopy of
the original duplicate. He could
have obtained an affidavit from the
restaurant proprietor or employee
complaint alleges that
[respondent] falsified the
cash invoice she submitted
for reimbursement by
making it appear that the
(P1,213.00) when in fact, it
was only (P213.00), as
reflected in the photocopy of
the original duplicate of cash
invoice No. 0736 dated
October 14, 1998.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this office finds
and so holds that respondent
CARMENCITA D. CORONEL
is guilty of DISHONESTY and
is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of
all leave credits and
retirement benefits,
pursuant to Section 22 (a) in
relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV
of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
She is disqualified from re-
employment in the national
and local governments, as
well as in any agency,
including government-
owned or controlled
corporations. Let a copy of
who had issued the receipt, in order
to attest to its due execution and
authenticity. Absent any proof of
due execution and authenticity, the
alleged photocopy of the original
duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not
convince us that it is an accurate
reflection of the actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a
liberal view of the conduct of
proceedings before administrative
agencies, it also consistently
requires some proof of authenticity
or reliability as a condition for the
admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of
authenticity, the photocopy of the
original duplicate should be
considered inadmissible and,
hence, without probative value.
Given the flimsy charge and the
paucity of the evidence against
respondent, there is no need for her
to present additional evidence to
vindicate herself. The Office of the
Ombudsman should have dismissed
the Administrative Complaint
against her in the first place.
Clearly, her guilt was not proven by
substantial evidence.
 this decision be entered in
the personal records of
respondent.
Secretary of On 13 January 1977, then
Justice vs. President Ferdinand E.
Lantion Marcos issued Presidential
Decree 1069 "Prescribing
the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin
M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the
Government of the United
States of America. "The
Senate, by way of Resolution
11, expressed its
concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It
also expressed its
Whether Jimenez had the
right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation
stage of an extradition
process.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D.
Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of
the charge against her for lack of
substantial evidence. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
No.
Extradition Presidential Decree (PD) 1069
process is which implements the RP-US
only a Extradition Treaty provides the
preliminary time when an extraditee shall be
investigation; furnished a copy of the petition for
there are no extradition as well as its supporting
formal papers, i.e., after the filing of the
criminal petition for extradition in the
charges extradition court (Section 6). It is of
during this judicial notice that the summons
point includes the petition for extradition
which will be answered by the
extraditee. There is noprovision in
the Treaty and in PD 1069 which
gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the Justice Secretary
copies of the extradition request
from the US government and its
supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request
is still undergoing evaluation. The
DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US
government, maintained that the
Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant
concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents
accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by
the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the
requested state resident in
the Requesting State). On 18
June 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale
0522 containing a request
for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale
were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for
said extradition. Jimenez was
charged in the United States
for violation of (a) 18 USC
371 (Conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud the
United States, 2 counts), (b)
26 USC 7201 (Attempt to
evade or defeat tax, 4
the extraditee a right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage
of an extradition process. It is
neither an international practice to
afford a potential extraditee with a
copy of the extradition papers
during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. Jimenez is,
thus, bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the extradition
process’ evaluation stage. Further,
as an extradition proceeding is
not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not
akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former.
The procedural due process
required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with
a determination of the precise
nature of the government
function involved as well as the
private interest that has been
affected by governmental
action." The concept of due
process is flexible for "not all
situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind
of procedure." Thus, the
temporary hold on Jimenez's
counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 privilege of notice and hearing is
(Fraud by wire, radio, or a soft restraint on his right to
television, 2 counts), (d) 18 due process which will not
USC 1001 (False statement deprive him of fundamental
or entries, 6 counts), and (E) fairness should he decide to
2 USC 441f (Election resist the request for his
contributions in name of extradition to the US. There is no
another; 33 counts). On the denial of due process as long as
same day, the Secretary fundamental fairness is assured
issued Department Order a party.
249 designating and
authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition
documents, Jimenez (on 1
July 1999 requested copies
of the official extradition
request from the US
Government, as well as all
documents and papers
submitted therewith, and
that he be given ample time
to comment on the request
after he shall have received
copies of the requested
papers. The Secretary denied
the request. On 6 August
1999, Jimenez filed with the
Regional Trial Court a
petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Director of the
National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus
(to compel the Justice
Secretary to furnish Jimenez
the extradition documents,
to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on,
or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request
impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to
set aside the Justice
Secretary’s letter dated 13
July 1999); and prohibition
(to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering
the extradition request and
from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to
enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed
to the extradition of Jimenez
to the United States), with an
application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of
preliminary injunction. The
 trial court ruled in favor of
Jimenez. The Secretary filed
a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
On 18 January 2000, by a
vote of 9-6, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition
and ordered the Justice
Secretary to furnish Jimenez
copies of the extradition
request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within
which to file his comment
with supporting evidence.
On 3 February 2000, the
Secretary timely filed an
Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
Whether or not Due Process
Gov’t. of the In the case of Government of extraditee is entitled to Is an extraditee entitled to notice and
USA vs. the United States v. Hon. notice and hearing hearing before the issuance of a
Puruganan Purganan the court had the before issuance of warrant of arrest? It is significant to
occasion to resolve the issue warrant of arrest note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
as to whether or not Extradition Law, uses the word
extraditees are entitled to the Whether or not the right immediate to qualify the arrest of
right to bail and provisional to bail is available in the accused. This qualification would
liberty while the extradition extradition proceedings berendered nugatory by setting for
proceedings are pending. hearing the issuance of the arrest
Private respondent (extraditee) warrant. Hearing entails sending
invoked the constitutional notices to the opposing parties,
provision under the 1987 receiving facts and argumentsfrom
Constitution, that persons are them, and giving them time to prepare
entitled to bail except those
charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death when
evidence of guilt is strong. The
court, in rejecting the claim of
private respondent held that
said constitutional provision is
applicable only in criminal
cases but not to extradition
proceedings. Again, the court
reiterated its pronouncement
in the Lantion case that the
Ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine
whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition
treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable.
Equally important, is
the pronouncement that the
court of the requested state has
the discretion to grant or deny
bail and that as a rule bail is
not a matter of right in
extradition cases. But the court
enunciated that there are
exceptions to this rule if only
to serve the ends of justice, (1)
once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight
risk or danger to the
and present such facts and arguments.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered immediate.
Thelaw could not have intended the
word as a mere superfluity but, on the
whole, as a means of imparting a
sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued.By using the
phrase if it appears, the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early
stage. The trial court is not expected
to make anexhaustive determination
to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing
of the petition. From the knowledge
and the material then availableto it,
the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression -- a prima facie
finding -- sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the
arrest anddetention of the accused.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
community; (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.
Having no statutory basis the
applicant bears the burden of
proving these exceptions with
clarity and precision.
Unfortunately, the court
exercised its discretion in
denying bail to private
respondent who considered
him as a flight risk when he
fled the United States after
learning of the criminal
charges filed against him.
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for anypurpose
shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
afterexamination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons orthings to
be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or
affirmation -- of complainantsand the
witnesses they may produce. There is
no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear
insufficiency of evidence on record,
judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. In
the present case, validating the actof
respondent judge and instituting the
practice of hearing the accused and
his witnesses at this early stage would
be discordant with the rationale for
the entiresystem. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest,what would stop
him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if
he so desires -- in his effort to negate
a prima facie finding? Such a
procedurecould convert the
determination of a prima facie case
into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial
of the main case superfluous.
Thisscenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is

an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of theaccused. If a different
procedure were called for at all, a
more restrictive one -- not the
opposite -- would be justified in view
of respondent s demonstrated
predisposition to flee.

Right to Bail
Extradition Different from
Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As

suggested by the use of the word
 conviction, the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
theRules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings,because
extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to

bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the
loss of freedom as hereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will
not apply toa case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution

stating that the right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended does notdetract from the
rule that the constitutional right to
bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application
only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
Hence, the secondsentence in the
constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be
taken tomean that the right is
available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in
nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez

is sought to be extradited are bailable
in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the
present case. To stress,extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply
for bail before the courts trying the
criminalcases against him, not before
the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not

a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion andtyranny, as
well as the power to promulgate rules
to protect and enforce constitutional
rights. Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad
enoughto include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the
right to due process extends to the
life, liberty or property of every
person. It is dynamic andresilient,
adaptable to every situation calling
for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the

ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law,bail may be
applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be
a flight risk or adanger to the
community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the
highestcourt in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or

specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general

Gov’t. of Hong Private respondent Muñoz
Kong vs. Olalia was charged before Hong
Kong Court. Warrants of
arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of
Arrest was upheld. The
principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears theburden of proving
the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an
executive,not a judicial, responsibility
arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of
police assistanceamongst states,
which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this
power should be characterized by
caution, sothat the vital international
and bilateral interests of our country
will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this
Court is ever protective of the
sporting idea of fair play, it also
recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Yes. Petitioner alleged that the trial
WON a potential court committed grave abuse of
extraditee is entitled to discretion amounting to lack or
post bail excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to
petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a
petition for the extradition of
the private respondent. In
the same case, a petition for
bail was filed by the private
respondent.
The petition for bail was
denied by reason that there
was no Philippine law
granting the same in
extradition cases and that
the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent
judge subject to the
following conditions:
1. Bail is set at
Php750,000.00 in cash with
the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the
issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all
times hold himself amenable
to orders and processes of
this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond
bail, the right being limited solely to
criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private
respondent maintained that the
right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed
what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675
April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends
in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public
international;
(2) the higher value now being
given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling
will be forfeited in favor of their treaty obligations; and
the government; (4) the duty of this Court to balance
2. Accused must the rights of the individual under
surrender his valid passport our fundamental law, on one hand,
to this Court; and the law on extradition, on the
3. The Department of other.
Justice is given immediate In light of the recent developments
notice and discretion of filing in international law, where
its own motion for hold emphasis is given to the worth of
departure order before this the individual and the sanctity of
Court even in extradition human rights, the Court departed
proceeding; and from the ruling in Purganan, and
4. Accused is required held that an extraditee may be
to report to the government allowed to post bail.
prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week;
and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of
accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court
soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the
corresponding
lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to
vacate the said order but
 was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence,
this instant petition.
Ocampo vs. A mass graveyard was found Whether or not the
Abando at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte by the 43rd
Infantry Brigade containing
67 skeletal remains of those
believed to be victims of
“Operation Venereal Disease
(VD)” by the Communist
Party of the Philippines/
New People’s Army/National
Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the
Philippines. This was done to
purge their ranks of
suspected military
informers.
Members of the Scene of the
Crime Operation team
conducted forensic crime
analysis to identify the
bodies by way of DNA
sample. The initial report of
the PNP Crime Laboratory
on their identities remained
inconclusive, but, in a Special
Report, the Case Secretariat
No.
petitioners’ right to due
process was violated.
NO. Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A preliminary investigation is "not
a casual affair." It is conducted to
protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and
anxiety of a public trial. While the
right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is
statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive
right and a component of due
process in the administration of
criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary
investigation, the right to due
process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves
to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondent’s
side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the
allegations and defenses lead to a
of the Regional and National
Inter-Agency Legal Action
Group came up with ten
names of possible victims
after comparing the
testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.
Police Chief Inspector
George L. Almaden and Staff
Judge Advocate Captain
Allan Tiu sent undated
letters to Pros. Vivero,
requesting for legal action on
the twelve attached
complaint affidavits. These
were from relatives of the
alleged victims of Operation
VD who all swore that their
relatives had been abducted
or last seen with members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
Charging them with murder,
the affidavits were directed
to 71 named members of the
group, including the
petitioners. Namely, the
petitioners were Ocampo,
Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad
who were all pointed out to
be members of the Central
Committee that ordered the
reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the
respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer
is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is
reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of
one's defense." What is proscribed
is lack of opportunity to be heard.
Thus, one who has been afforded a
chance to present one’s own side of
the story cannot claim denial of due
process.
As to the claim of petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis that they were
denied due process, we quote the
pertinent portion of Prosecutor
Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing
and pursuant to the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and
served with Subpoena at their last
known address for them to submit
their counter-affidavits and that of
their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not
campaign to be carried out
in 1985.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero
issued a subpoena requiring
them to submit their
counter-affidavits and
Ocampo complied. However,
Echanis and Baylosis did not
do so because allegedly they
were not served the copy of
a subpoena. As for Ladlad,
though his counsel made
formal appearance during
the preliminary
investigation, he also did not
submit for the same reason
as the two.
Pros. Vivero, in a resolution,
directed the filing of
information for 15 counts of
multiple murder against the
54 named members,
including the petitioners. He
also caused some
respondents to be used as
state witnesses for their
testimony is vital to the
prosecution. Said
information was filed before
RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch
18 presided by Judge
submit their counter-affidavits
because they could no longer be
found in their last known address,
per return of the subpoenas. On the
other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro
and Ruben Manatad submitted
their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the
required Counter Affidavits in spite
entry of appearance by their
respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero
to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a
respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to
reach a respondent were made, and
he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence,
the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in
place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay
the prosecution of offenses.In this
case, the Resolution stated that
efforts were undertaken to serve
subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due
Abando.
Prior to receiving the
resolution, Ocampo filed an
Ex Parte Motion to Set Case
for Clarificatory Hearing.
Judge Obando found
probable cause and ordered
the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them with no
recommended bail.
Ocampo went to the
Supreme Court by way of
special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 and asked for
the abovementioned order
and the prosecutor’s
resolution to be annulled. He
said that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others
was then already pending
before RTC Makati and so,
the crime of murder was
absorbed by the rebellion in
line with the political offense
doctrine.
The Court ordered the
Solicitor General to comment
on the issue and also
ordered the parties to
submit their memoranda.
process. It was only because a
majority of them could no longer be
found at their last known addresses
that they were not served copies of
the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad,
through his counsel, had every
opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal
entry of appearance and, thereafter,
to participate fully in the
preliminary investigation. Instead,
he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that
"litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case."106 Having
opted to remain passive during the
preliminary investigation,
petitioner Ladlad and his counsel
cannot now claim a denial of due
process, since their failure to file a
counter-affidavit was of their own
doing.
As to Ocampo’s claim that he was
denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero
From the oral arguments, the
Court found that the single
Information charging them
all of 15 counts of murder
was defective. The
prosecution moved to admit
amended and new
information, but Judge
Abando suspended the
proceedings during the
pendency of the case before
the Court.
Meanwhile, Echanis was
arrested and he, along with
Baylosis, filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable
Cause with Prayer to Dismiss
the Case Outright and
Alternative Prayer to Recall/
Suspend Service of Warrant,
but it was dismissed by
Judge Abando. Around this
time, Ladlad filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with the RTC
Manila.
Echanis and Baylosis moved
to reconsider but it was not
acted because, as per request
of the DOJ Secretary to
change the venue of the trial,
due to the 19-day delay in the
service of the Resolution, it must be
pointed out that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the
prosecutor, not from the date of the
resolution. This is clear from
Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on
Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration/
reinvestigation if one has been filed
within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the assailed resolution.
Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo
received the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March
2007,108 the former had until 27
March 2007 within which to file
either a motion for reconsideration
before the latter or an appeal
before the Secretary of Justice.
the records were Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to
transmitted to RTC Manila. file the instant petition for
Echanis and Baylosis certiorari directly before this Court
continued to seek relief from on 16 March 2007.
the Supreme Court in
response to Judge Abando’s
orders. Echanis also prayed
for his release.

Both Ocampo and Echanis

were granted provisional
release by the Supreme
Court under cash bonds.

As to Ladlad’s Motion to
Quash, it was denied by
respondent judge and the
same happened to his
Motion for Reconsideration.
Ladlad sought to annul the
latter’s orders by way of
special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.

As to their bail, Ladlad filed

an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail
whereas Baylosis filed a
Motion to Allow Petitioner to
Post Bail which were
granted, with no opposition
from the OSG (bec. they’re
consultants of the NDFP
negotiating team, then
 having talks with the GRP
peace panel).
Estrada vs. Sometime in November and
Ombudsman December 2013, the
Ombudsman served on Sen.
Estrada two (2) criminal
complaints for plunder,
among others. Eighteen (18)
of Sen. Estrada’s co-
respondents in the two
complaints filed their
counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14
March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen.
Estrada filed his “Request to
be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the
Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses
and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s
request was made
“[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the
evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may
not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to ‘have
access to the evidence on
No.
WON petitioner Estrada NO. The denial did not violate Sen.
was denied due process Estrada’s constitutional right to due
of law process.
First. There is no law or rule which
requires the Ombudsman to furnish
a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections
3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, for
ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial
of his Request for the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents
violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however,
fails to specify a law or rule which
states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents. Neither Section
record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II
of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the
Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request, which is
not the subject of the present
certiorari case.
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure nor Section
4(c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the
time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from
Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter
such affidavits [of the complainant
and his witnesses] have been
secured, the investigating officer
shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and
other supporting documents,
directing the respondent to submit,
within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x."
At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section
4(b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not
the affidavits of the co-respondents.
Obviously, the counter-affidavits of
the co-respondents are not part of
the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to
the Ombudsman for the issuance of
the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored

that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause,
and “probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner.
A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a
trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish
his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those
granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is
defined as an inquiry or proceeding
for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required
in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a
well-founded belief” as to the fact of
the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof.
A preliminary investigation is not
the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. We are in accord
with the state prosecutor’s findings
in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of
the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining
therein.

Third, the technical rules on

evidence are not binding on the
fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. If by its
very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by
the accused, we find no compelling
justification for a strict application
of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in

preliminary investigations is not
akin to those in administrative
proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay.
The quantum of evidence needed in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
greater than the evidence needed in
a preliminary investigation to
establish probable cause, or to
establish the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay
refers to “substantial evidence,”
while the establishment of probable
cause needs “only more than ‘bare
suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’.”
In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable
cause, the prevailing definition of
probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause,

however, as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be

established with hearsay evidence,
as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because
such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties. However, in administrative
cases, where rights and obligations
are finally adjudicated, what is
required is “substantial evidence”
which cannot rest entirely or even
partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because
substantial evidence excludes
hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence.
To require the application of Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence
required in determining probable
cause from evidence of likelihood
or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went

beyond legal duty and even
furnished Sen. Estrada with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically
named, as well as the counter-
affidavits of some of other co-
respondents. In the 4 June 2014
Joint Order, the Ombudsman even
held in abeyance the disposition of
the motions for reconsideration
because the Ombudsman granted
Sen. Estrada five days from receipt
of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims
made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied
with the existing Rules on
preliminary investigation and even
accommodated Sen. Estrada
beyond what the Rules required.
Thus, the Ombudsman could not be
faulted with grave abuse of
discretion. Since this is a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65, the
Petition fails in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process
requirements mandated in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not
applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations
of statutory law giving rise to mere
statutory rights. A law can abolish
preliminary investigations without
running afoul of the constitutional
requirements of due process as
prescribed in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary
investigations do not comply and
were never intended to comply,
with Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS. Preliminary investigations do
not adjudicate with finality rights
and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations
governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
requires substantial evidence for a
decision against the respondent in
the administrative case.In
preliminary investigations, only
likelihood or probability of guilt is
required. To apply Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, to preliminary
investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required to
establish probable cause. The
respondent in an administrative
case governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, has the right to
an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.
In preliminary investigations, the
respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case

governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, the hearing
officer must be impartial and
cannot be the fact-finder,
investigator, and hearing officer at
the same time. In preliminary
investigations, the same public
officer may be the investigator and
hearing officer at the same time, or
the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the
control and supervision of the same
public officer, like the Ombudsman
or Secretary of Justice. This
explains why Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, does not apply to
preliminary investigations. To now
declare that the guidelines in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential
requirements in preliminary
investigations will render all past
and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation
 of constitutional due process. This
will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases
now pending in all courts
throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can
proceed until a new law designates
a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine
probable cause. Moreover, those
serving sentences by final judgment
would have to be released from
prison because their conviction
violated constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being

premature and it constitutes forum
shopping.

C.) Academic Discipline

Title of the Facts Issue Held Ruling

Case

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Immediately apparent from a

Guzman vs. NU Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel reading of respondents' comment
Ramacula, students of and memorandum is the fact that
respondent National they had never conducted
University, have come to this proceedings of any sort to
Court to seek relief from what determine whether or not
they describe as their school's petitioners-students had indeed led
"continued and persistent or participated "in activities within
refusal to allow them to enrol." the university premises, conducted
In their petition "for
extraordinary legal and
equitable remedies with prayer
for preliminary mandatory
injunction" dated August 7,
1984, they alleged that they
were denied due to the fact that
they were active participation
in peaceful mass actions within
the premises of the University.
The respondents on
the other hand claimed that the
petitioners’ failure to enroll for
the first semester of the school
year 1984-1985 is due to their
own fault and not because of
their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human
rights. That as regards to
Guzman, his academic
showing was poor due to his
activities in leading boycotts of
classes. That Guzman “is
facing criminal charges for
malicious mischief before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila in connection with the
destruction of properties of
respondent University. The
petitioners have “failures in
their records, and are not of
good scholastic standing.”
without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism,
coercion and intimidation, slander,
noise barrage and other acts
showing disdain for and defiance
of University authority." 4
Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a
criminal case for malicious
mischief against petitioner
Guzman, cannot, without more,
furnish sufficient warrant for his
expulsion or debarment from re-
enrollment. Also apparent is the
omission of respondents to cite this
Court to any duly published rule of
theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment
for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum
standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural
due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed
in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
(3) they shall be informed

Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin
Agura, Normandy Occiano,
Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco,
Non vs. Judge Emmanuel Barba, Sonny
Dames Moreno. Giovani Palma,
Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos
and Daniel Torres, students in
Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not
allowed to re-enroll by the
school for the academic year
1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass
actions against the school in
the preceding semester. They
thus filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Daet
(Branch 38) seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment
to the school, but the trial court
Whether the school No.
exclude students because
of failing grades when the
cause for the action taken
against them relates to
possible breaches of
discipline.
of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating
committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
The contract between the school
and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high
priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the
State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for
schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his
contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired,
cannot be justified. Still,
institutions' discretion on the
admission and enrollment of
students as a major component of
the academic freedom guaranteed
to institutions of higher learning.
The right of an institution of higher
learning to set academic standards,
dismissed the petition in an
order dated 8 August 1988. A
motion for reconsideration was
filed, but this was denied by
the trial court on 24 February
1989; stating that they waived-
their privilege to be admitted
for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they
adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first
semester of school year 1988-
89. In addition, for the same
semester, they duly signed
pledges "to abide and comply
with all the rules and
regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the
College Department or School
in which I am enrolled."
Hence, the affected students
filed the petition for certiorari
with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction before
the Supreme Court.
however, cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights
to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation
of their right to equal protection.
Thus, an institution of learning has
a contractual obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to
pursue. However, when a student
commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he
forfeits his contractual right; and
the court should not review the
discretion of university authorities.
Excluding students because of
failing grades when the cause for
the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible
breaches of discipline not only is a
denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basic
tenets of fair play. Further, the
failures in one or two subjects by
some cannot be considered marked
academic deficiency. Neither can
the academic deficiency be gauged
from the academic standards of the
school due to insufficiency of
information. Herein, the students
could have been subjected to
disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the mass actions,
but
the penalty that could have been
imposed must be commensurate to
the offense committed and it must
be imposed only after the
requirements of procedural due
process have been complied with
(Paragraph 145, Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools).
But this matter of disciplinary
proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic; as the
students have been refused
readmission or re-enrollment and
have been effectively excluded
from for 4 semesters, have already
been more than sufficiently
penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have
committed when they led and
participated in the mass actions
that resulted in the disruption of
classes. To still subject them to
disciplinary proceedings would
serve no useful purpose and would
only further aggravate the strained
relations between the students and
the officials of the school which
necessarily resulted from the
heated legal battle.
ADMU vs. Leonardo H. Villa, a first year Was there denial of due No.
Capulong law student of Petitioner process against
University, died of serious respondent students.
physical injuries at Chinese
General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center. Petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked
to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Said
notice also required respondent
students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students
received a copy of the written
notice, they failed to file a
reply. In the meantime, they
were placed on preventive
suspension. The Investigating
Committee found a prima facie
case against respondent
students for violation of Rule 3
of the Law School Catalogue
There was no denial of due
the process, more particularly
procedural due process. The Dean
of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students
to submit their written statement
on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges. The nature
and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the
twin elements of notice and
hearing.
The Minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as
petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed
in WRITING of the nature and
cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right
to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them
entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then
required to file their written
answers to the formal charge.
Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the
charges against respondent
students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of
violating Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in
view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the
Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the
University Administration.
Accordingly, Fr. Bernas
imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent
students. Respondent students
filed with RTC Makati a TRO
since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A
day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board to investigate
the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and
Mendoza. This was requested
to be stricken out by the
(4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating
committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
It cannot seriously be asserted that
the above requirements were not
met. When, in view of the death of
Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia
del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo
Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February
11, 1991 to submit within twenty-
four hours their written statement
on the incident, the records show
that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the
charges. While of the students
mentioned in the February 11,
1991 notice duly submitted written
statements, the others failed to do
so. Thus, the latter were granted
an extension of up to February 18,
1991 to file their statements .
Indubitably, the nature and cause
of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices
dated February 14 and 20, 1991.
respondents and
argued that the creation of the
Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of
due process. This was granted
and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
30 It is to be noted that the
February 20, 1991 letter which
quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of
Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to
respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show
that respondent students were
given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to
answer the charges leveled against
them.
The requisite assistance of counsel
was met when, from the very start
of the investigations before the
Joint Administration Faculty-
Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance
and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students.
Respondent students may not use
the argument that since they were
not accorded the opportunity to
see and examine the written
statements which became the
basis of petitioners' February 14,
1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting
that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be
said to detract from the
observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily
include the right to cross
examination. An
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING conducted to
investigate students' participation
in a hazing activity need not be
clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991
hearing which characterized the
rules on the investigation as being
summary in nature and that
respondent students have no right
to examine affiants-neophytes,
reveals that this is but a reiteration
of our previous ruling in Alcuaz .
Respondent students' contention
that the investigating committee
failed to consider their evidence is
far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 ordered clearly
states that it was reached only after
receiving the written statements
and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses. Similarly, the
Disciplinary Board's resolution
dated March 10, 1991 was
preceded by a hearing on March 2,

In an effort to make the
UP vs. Ligot- University of the Philippines
Tan (U.P.) truly the University of
the People, U.P. administration
conceptualized and
implemented the socialized
scheme of tuition fee payments
through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP),
popularly known as the
"Iskolar ng Bayan" program.
After broad consultations with
the various university
constituencies, U.P. President
Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of
Regents issued on April 28,
1988 a Resolution establishing
the STFAP. A year later, it was
granted official recognition
when the Congress of the
Philippines allocated a portion
of
the National Budget for the
implementation of the
program. In the interest of
1991 wherein respondent students
were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
With respect to the March 29,
Whether or not the 1993 meeting, respondent
Board of Regent considers the same as
violated Nadal's right to "unquestionably void for lack of
due process when it due process" inasmuch as he was
rendered a decision not sent a notice of said meeting,
finding Nadal guilty of that imposition of sanctions on
the charges against students requires "observance of
him" during the March procedural due process," the
29, 1993 meeting. phrase obviously referring to the
sending of notice of the meeting.
However BOR ruled that in any
event it is gross error to equate due
process in the instant case with the
sending of notice of the March 29,
1993 BOR meeting to respondent.
University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of
individuals whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of
the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases
have been appealed to the Board of
Regents as the final review
body. At no time did
respondent complain of lack of
notice given to him to attend any
of the regular and special BOR
democratizing admission to the
State University, all students
are entitled to apply for
STFAP benefits which include
reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies
and student assistantships
which give undergraduate
students the opportunity to
earn P12.00 per hour by
working for the University.
Applicants are required to
accomplish a questionnaire
where, among others, they
state the amount and source of
the annual income of the
family, their real and personal
properties and special
circumstances from which the
University may evaluate their
financial status and need on the
basis of which they are
categorized into brackets. To
further insure the integrity of
the program, a random
sampling scheme of
verification of data indicated
in a student's application
form is undertaken. Among
those who applied for STFAP
benefits for School Year 1989-
90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a
student enrolled in the College
meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Counsel for Nadal
charged before the lower court that
Nadal was not given due process in
the March 29 meeting because the
ground upon which he was again
convicted was not the same as the
original charge. Obviously, he was
referring to the basis of the
conditional votes on March 28.
Whether or not Nadal was telling
the truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship
grant from the AdeMU.
However, Regent Carpio himself
testified that the charge
considered was "exactly the same
charge" of withholding
information on the income of
Nadal's mother. It should be
stressed that the reason why
Regent Carpio requested a
verification of Nadal's claim that
he was a scholar at the AdeMU
was that Regent Carpio was not
"morally convinced" yet as to the
guilt of Nadal. In other words, he
sought additional insights into the
character of Nadal through the
information that would be
obtained from the AdeMU. The
Court in this regard find such
information to be irrelevant and a
of Law. A team composed of
Arsenio L. Dona and Jose
Carlo Manalo conducted a
home investigation at the
residence of Nadal. Ms.
Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt,
was interviewed and the
team submitted a home visit
report. Consolacion Urbino,
Scholarship Affairs Officer II,
found discrepancies between
the report and Nadal's
application form. Forthwith,
she and Bella M.
Villanueva, head of the
Office of Scholarships and
Student Services, presented
the matter to the Diliman
Committee on Scholarships
and Financial Assistance. In
compliance with the said
Committee's directive, Bella
Villanueva wrote Nadal
informing him that the
investigation showed that he
had failed to declare, not only
the fact that he had been
maintaining a 1977 Corolla car
which was owned by his
brother but also the income of
his mother who was supporting
his brothers Antonio and
Federico. Nadal was likewise
mere superfluity. In his July, 12,
1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although
inconsistently, that his mother was
a "TNT" who could not find a
"stable, regular, well-paying
employment" but that she was
supporting the education of his
brothers with the help of another
son. The court constitutes this as a
sufficient admission that Nadal
withheld information on the
income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. The court
also sighted that respondent aspires
to join the ranks of the
professionals who would uphold
truth at all costs so that justice may
prevail. In those who exhibit
duplicity in their student days, one
spots the shady character who is
bound to sow the seeds of
chicanery in the practice of his
profession. With this the court
ruled that it sufficiently shown that
respondent has committed an act
of dishonesty in withholding
vital information in connection
with his application for STFAP
benefits, all in blatant violation of
the Rules and Regulations on
Student Conduct and Discipline of
petitioner University, the latter's
informed that the Diliman inherent power and authority to
Committee had reclassified impose disciplinary sanction may
him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket be invoked and rightfully
4), retroactive to June 1989, exercised. Therefore deciding that
unless he could submit "proofs the BOR did not violate Nadal’s
to the contrary." Nadal was right of due process. The lower
required "to pay back the court is hereby ordered to
equivalent amount of full DISMISS the petition for
school fees" with "interest mandamus.
based on current commercial
rates." Failure to settle his
account would mean the
suspension of his registration
privileges and the
withholding of clearance and
transcript of records. He was
also warned that his case might
be referred to the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal for
further investigation.
commercial rates." Failure to
settle his account would mean
the suspension of his
registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and
transcript of records. He was
also warned that his case might
be referred to the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal for
further investigation. Nadal
issued a certification stating,
among other things, that his
mother migrated to the United
States in 1981 but because her
residency status had not yet
been legalized, she had not
been able to find a "stable,
regular, well-paying
employment." U.P. charged
Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT)
that he committed acts which
find him guilty of willfully and
deliberately withholding
information about the income
of his mother, who is living
abroad and that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla
car. As such, the SDT
imposed upon Nadal the
penalty of expulsion from the
University and required him to
reimburse
all STFAP benefits he had
received but if he does not
voluntarily make
reimbursement, it shall be
"effected” by the University
thru outside legal action. The
SDT decision was thereafter
automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P.
Diliman for review pursuant to
Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on
Student Conduct and
Discipline. Board of regents
modified the penalty from
Expulsion to One Year-
Suspension, effective
immediately, plus
reimbursement of all benefits
received from the STFAP, with
legal interest. However the
BOR also decided against
giving Nadal, a certification of
good moral character. Nadal
forthwith filed a motion for
reconsideration of the BOR
decision, in the next BOR
meeting Regent Antonio T.
Carpio raised the "material
importance" of the truth of
Nadal's claim that earlier, he
was a beneficiary of a
scholarship and financial aid
from the Ateneo de Manila
University (AdeMU). Learning
that the "certification issued by
the AdeMU that it had not
given Nadal financial aid while
he was a student there was
made through a telephone
call," Regent Carpio declared
that there was
as yet "no direct evidence in
the records to substantiate the
charge." According to Carpio,
if it should be disclosed that
Nadal falsely stated that he
received such financial aid, it
would be a clear case of gross
and material misrepresentation
that would even warrant the
penalty of expulsion. Hence,
he cast a conditional vote that
would depend on the
verification of Nadal's claim
on the matter. U.P. President
and concurrently Regent Jose
V. Abueva countered by
stating that "a decision should
not be anchored solely on one
piece of information which he
considered irrelevant, and
which would ignore the
whole pattern of the
respondent's dishonesty and
deception from 1989 which
had been established in the
investigation and the
reviews."In the morning of
March 29, 1993, the AdeMU
issued a certification to the
effect that Nadal was indeed a
recipient of a scholarship grant
from 1979 to 1983. That
evening, the BOR met again at
a special meeting, according
to Regent Carpio, in
executive session, the BOR
found Nadal "guilty."
However, on April 22, 1993,
 Nadal filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and
prayer for a temporary
restraining order against
President Abueva, the BOR,
Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura, Armand V.
Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

D.) Deportation Proceedings

Title of the Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

Lao Gi vs. CA Filomeno Chia Jr. was Does the CID have Yes. Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
made a Filipino the jurisdiction to SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be
citizen by virtue of determine the arrested upon the warrant of the
Opinion 191 by the deportation? Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
Secretary of justice. officer designated by him for the purpose and
However, this was deported upon the warrant of the
revoked when his Commissioner of Immigration after a
father’s citizenship determination by the Board of Commissioners
was cast aside due to of the existence of the ground for deportation
fraud and as charged against the alien:
misrepresentation.
Charges of (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after
deportation were filed the effective date of this Act by means of
against the Chias. false and misleading statements or without
Charges also alleged inspection and admission by the immigration
that they refused to authorities at a designated port of entry or at
register as aliens and any place other than at a designated port of
that they committed entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No.
acts of undesirability. 503.) ...
The Chias said that There must be a determination of the
the CID has no existence of the ground charged, particularly
authority to deport illegal entry into the country. Only after the
them which was hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there
denied by the CID. must be appositive finding from the CID that
They filed a petition they are aliens before compelling them to
with the Supreme register as such. This power is
Court for a writ of the police power to protect the state from
preliminary injunction undesirable aliens injurious to the public
which was dismissed good.
for lack of merit. Since the deportation is a harsh process, due
Their MFR was also process must be observed. In the same law, it
denied. is provided that:
No alien shall
Earlier, Manuel be deported
Chia’s case of without being
falsification of public informed of
documents in alleging the specific
he was a Filipino grounds for
citizen. He was deportation
alleged to have done nor without
this for the sale of real being given a
property. The trial hearing under
court acquitted him rules of
by saying that procedure to
Opinion 191 was res be prescribed
judicata and cant be by the
contravened by Commissioner
Opinion 147. The of
CID set the hearing Immigration.
for the deportation The acts or
case against the Chias omissions that
and told them to they are
register as aliens. The charged of
Chias tooks further must be in
action. Their petition ordinary
for injunctive relief language for
was denied by the CFI the person to
of Manila. They be informed
also lost the appeal in and for the
the CA. The Chias CID to make
was denied. a proper
judgment.
In their SC petition, Also, the
they seek to set aside warrants of
the CA decision. They arrewst must
argued that they be in
weren’t subject to accordance
immediate with the rules
deportation, the on criminal
presence of fraud in procedure.
the citizenship, the On the information of a private prosecutor in
CA’s overstepping of the case: Deportation is the sole concern of
appellate jurisdiction, the state. There is no justification for a private
and the resolution of party to intervene.
the SC didn’t make a
ruling that the
petitioner entered the
Philippines by false
pretenses.
Domingo vs. This is a petition for Whether or not Yes. The Court ruled that BOC committed grave
Scheer review under Rule respondent’s abuse of discretion in causing the arrest
45, of the decision of arrest and and
the Court of Appeals detention was detention of the respondent. Aliens may be
granting the premature, deported from the Philippines only on
respondent’s unwarranted and grounds and in
petition for arbitrary the proper manner provided by the
certiorari and Constitution. The United Nations
prohibition Declaration on Human
annulling the order Rights grants every person rights, and that
of arrest no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
issued by petitioner, arrest, detention
and permanently or exile. BOC ordered respondent’s
enjoining her from deportation without even conducting
deporting the summary deportation
respondent from the proceedings, but merely relied on the
Philippines. The speculation of the German Embassy and
appellate court the Vice Consul
reversed the that it is improbable that the respondent
Summary will be issued a new passport, warranting
Deportation Order of the
the Board of deportation. The respondent was not
Commissioners. afforded any hearing at all, and not given
Respondent Scheer the opportunity to
is a native of put up a defense for himself, thus violating
Germany, who was his right to due process. A deportation
eventually granted a proceeding
permanent may not be a criminal action, but since it
resident status in the affects the liberty of a person, the right to
Philippines. He due process
eventually married of a respondent must be respected. Even
here and started a six years after the motion for
family as well as a reconsideration of the
business in Palawan. respondent which was still not attended to,
Vice Consul out of nowhere and arbitrarily the agents
Hippelein informed were
the Philippine ordered to arrest him. Even after being
Ambassador to issued a new passport and even securing
Germany clearances from
that the respondent the PNP and NPA, the BOC still proceeded
had police records with the deportation. BOC is required to
and financial resolve the
liabilities in motion of the respondent first, giving him
Germany. The DFA the chance to be heard and present his
receive evidence. The
from the German petitioner put up the defense that they
Embassy in Manila cannot review cases decided before the
that the respondent change of
is wanted in members, but since it is the same
Germany, and government entity, they have the authority
requested to to review past cases.
turn over his In addition, the court finds the contention
German passport to of the OSG for the respondent to leave the
the Embassy. country
Thereafter BOC then just re-apply again ridiculous when
issued a Summary there is no legal impediment for the
Deportation respondent to continue his stay in the
Order dated country.
September 27, 1997.
It was stated that the
deportation shall be
held in abeyance
pending
respondent’s case
and he shall remain
in the custody of the
bureau. In issuing
this the
BOC relied on the
statements of the
German Vice Consul
on the speculation
that it is improbable
that the respondent
will be issued a new
passport, the
warrant of arrest for
insurance fraud and
alleged illegal
activities in Palawan.
Respondent
nevertheless stayed
in the Philippines
after
airing his side to
then BID
Commissioner
Verceles, the latter
giving him time to
apply for a
clearance and a new
passport. Scheer
eventually filed an
Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration
stating that his right
to due process was
violated, for there
was no notice or
chance to be heard
before the issuance
of the deportation
order. Eventually the
criminal case for
physical injuries
against the
respondent was
dismissed, and he
was issued a
passport. He
informed
Commissioner
Verceles about this
matter and
reiterated the
cancellation of the
order, but the
Commissioner did
not respond.
Thereafter
Commissioner
Domingo assumed
office and on June 6,
2002, she
ordered the
apprehension of the
respondent who was
held in custody
awaiting
deportation.
Shocked, respondent
sought remedy with
 the CA, during the
hearing of which the
Solicitor
General suggested
that the respondent
leave the country
first then just re-
apply. A decision
was
reached in favor of
Scheer, permanently
enjoining Domingo
from continuing the
deportation, hence
this petition.

E.) Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Professions

Title of the Facts Issue Held Ruling

Case

Philcomsat vs. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Whether or not No. No. There is no
Alcuaz Philippine Communications Satellite there is an undue delegation.
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the undue The power of the
authority to “construct and operate such delegation of NTC to fix rates is
ground facilities as needed to deliver power limited by the
telecommunications services from the requirements of
communications satellite system and ground public safety, public
terminal or terminals” in the Philippines. interest, reasonable
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to feasibility and
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and reasonable rates,
PLDT. which conjointly
 more than satisfy
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT the requirements of
was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and a valid delegation of
regulation of the Public Service Commission legislative power.
later known as the National Fundamental is the
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). rule that delegation
However, Executive Order No. 196 was later of legislative power
promulgated and the same has placed may be sustained
PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the only upon the
NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to ground that some
acquire permit to operate from the NTC in standard for its
order to continue operating its existing exercise is provided
satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it and that the
however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its legislature in
current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to making the
fix the rates on EO 546. delegation has
prescribed the
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its manner of the
commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the exercise of the
said directive and holds that the enabling act delegated power.
(EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates Therefore, when the
for public service communications, does not administrative
provide the necessary standards which were agency concerned,
constitutionally required, hence, there is an NTC in this case,
undue delegation of legislative power, establishes a rate,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. its act must both be
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the non-confiscatory
provisions of EO 546, providing for the and must have been
creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing established in the
powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT manner prescribed
under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be by the legislature;
inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in otherwise, in the
the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory absence of a fixed
powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified standard, the
its said submission to mean that the order delegation of power
mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue becomes
delegation not of legislative but of quasi- unconstitutional. In
judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which case of a delegation
allegedly requires an express conferment by of rate-fixing power,
the legislative body. the only standard
which the
legislature is
required to
prescribe for the
guidance of the
administrative
authority is that the
rate be reasonable
and just. However,
it has been held that
even in the absence
of an express
requirement as to
reasonableness, this
standard may be
implied.
However, in this
case, it appears that
the manner of fixing
the rates was done
without due process
since no hearing
was made in
ascertaining the
rate imposed upon
PHILCOMSAT.
Globe Telecom On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with Whether or not No. There is no legal
vs. NTC public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order the NTC’s order is basis under the PTA
the immediate interconnection of Smarts and not supported by or the memorandum
Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, substantial circulars
with evident bad faith and malice, refused to evidence. promulgated by the
grant Smarts request for the interconnection NTC to denominate
of SMS. SMS as VAS, and any
Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on subsequent
7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the determination by the
Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to NTC on whether SMS
comply with the conditions precedent required in is VAS should be
Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7- made with proper
93,19 and its omission of the mandatory regard for due
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. process and in
On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now conformity with the
subject of the present petition. PTA; the assailed
Both Smart and Globe were Order violates due
equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation process for failure to
in the submission of the documentation required sufficiently explain
for interconnection and for having unduly the reason for the
maneuvered the situation into the present decision rendered,
impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely for being
within the definition of value-added service or unsupported by
enhanced- substantial evidence,
service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8- and for imputing
9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their implementation of violation to, and
SMS interconnection is mandatory.The NTC also issuing a
declared that both Smart and Globe have been corresponding fine
providing SMS without authority from it. on, Globe despite
 Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition the absence of due
for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set notice and hearing
aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking which would have
any further action in the case. Globe reiterated afforded Globe the
its previous arguments that the complaint should right to present
have been dismissed for failure to comply with evidence on its
conditions precedent and the non-forum behalf.
shopping rule. They claimed that NTC acted WHEREFORE, the
without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no petition is GRANTED.
authority to render SMS, pointing out that the The Decision of the
matter was not raised as an issue before it at Court of Appeals
all.They alleged that the Order is a patent nullity dated 22 November
as it imposed an administrative penalty for an 1999, as well as its
offense for which neither it nor Smart was
Resolution dated 29
sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation
July 2000, and the
of their right to due process. The CA issued a TRO
on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe assailed Order of the
called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC NTC dated 19 July
decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a 1999 are hereby SET
deregulated special feature and does not require ASIDE. No cost.
the prior approval of the NTC.

Corona vs. The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was 1.) Whether or WHEREFORE, for all
UHPAP created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 not the the foregoing, this
to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and the respondents have Court hereby rules
pilot age profession”. acted in excess of that:
After hearing from relevant government jurisdiction. Respondents
agencies, pursuant to said charter, PPA General 2.) Whether or (herein petitioners)
Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued not the Philippine have acted in excess
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] Ports Authority of jurisdiction and
and corresponding Memorandum Order in (PPA) violate with grave abuse of
1992, stating that all existing regular respondents’ right discretion and in a
appointments which have been previously to exercise their capricious,
issued shall remain valid up to 31 December profession and whimsical and
1992 only and that all appointments to harbor their right to due arbitrary manner
pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, process of law. in promulgating
henceforth, be only for a term of one year from PPA Administrative
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or Order 04-92
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a including all its
rigid evaluation of performance” to regulate implementing
and improve pilot services by instilling Memoranda,
discipline and give better protection to port Circulars and
users. PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 Orders;
which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots PPA Administrative
must have a license and train as probationary Order 04-92 and its
pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, implementing
are given permanent and regular appointments Circulars and
by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot Orders are declared
age until they reach the age of 70.Upon null and void;
learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after The respondents
publication in the newspaper, the United are permanently
Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines: enjoined from
(a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the implementing PPA
DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that Administrative
only the PPA Board of Directors [as governing Order 04-92 and its
body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, implementing
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Memoranda,
Office of the President, which first issued a Circulars and
restraining order to the PPA on the Orders.
implementation of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s No costs. SO
answer, then dismissed the appeal/petition ORDERED
and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
 Corona, that the PPA-AO (i) merely implements
PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA, not
of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates,
not forbids practice of the profession,
recognizing that such exercise is property
right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with the
requirement in the PD to consult only with
relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally
finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6.
Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null
and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction
with grave abuse of discretion and (iii)
imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA
on its implementation.Assistant Executive
Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review
[of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme
Court.

F.) Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatement, etc.

Title of the Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

NPC vs. Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein
Zozobrado respondent, is a permanent
employee of petitioner
National Power Corporation
(NPC) assigned as Pilot in the
aviation group, received a
letter from NPC President
Frederico C. Puno, informing
him that he was being
WON due process was No. Both procedural NO. Both the
followed in dropping and substantive due substantive and
respondent from the process was violated. procedural aspect of
rolls. due process were
violated by petitioner
in dismissing
respondent.
As to the procedural
dropped from the rolls.
Zozobrado filed an appeal
before the CSC questioning
NPCs implementation of
dropping him from the rolls.
CSC dismissed Zobrado’s
appeal and MR.
Respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court and was granted.
Petitioner filed for MR but
was denied.
Respondent had been
dropped by petitioner from
the rolls due to
Unsatisfactory or Poor
Performance.
CA ruled in favor of herein
respondents finding that the
separation was made with
utter lack of due process.
aspect, not even one
requisites laid down by
Memorandum Circular
No. 12 has been
complied with.
Respondent was never
notified in writing of
his Unsatisfactory
rating within 30 days
from the end of the
semester when the
Unsatisfactory rating
was given.
Respondent was never
warned in writing that
a succeeding
Unsatisfactory
performance shall
warrant his separation
from the service. Even
the allegation of the
oral notice itself (that
petitioner claims and
respondent
categorically denies) is
clearly an afterthought,
having been utilized for
the first time in the
Motion for
Reconsideration of the
assailed Court of
Appeals decision and
was never used as an
argument in the
administrative
proceedings. The proof
of such notice, a self-
serving affidavit of the
very individual who
unilaterally gave the
apparently groundless
rating, deserves scant
consideration.

As to the substantive
aspect, evidence shows
that petitioner never
denied that
respondents
unsatisfactory rating
was due to
respondents testimony
in court concerning the
graft charges against
NPC employees. On the
day respondent was
supposed to testify in
court under pain of
contempt, Gen. Lagera
suddenly sent him to
fly the NPC President
despite the fact that
another pilot was
assigned to such
mission.
Moreover, Gen.
Lagera’s ill motive is
further proved by the
fact that respondent
was kept in the dark as
to the status of his
employment even
though the same had
already been
terminated two
months earlier. It
appears that the sad
news was relayed to
respondent only on his
natal day affair. We can
see no reason for the
two months delay
other than the
devastation Gen.
Lagera expected to
cause by imparting the
shocking news on
respondents birth
anniversary, during a
celebration and in
front of other people.

As further found by the

Court of Appeals, when
respondent brought to
the Grievance
Committee the matter
of his unsatisfactory
ratings, the Grievance
Committee
recommended a review
thereof to take into
account respondents
quantity of flying
hours. Pilots have
traditionally been
rated by the number of
flying hours spent in
their career, and
respondent had more
than double the flying
hours of the two other
pilots of the Aviation
Group combined.
However, Gen. Lagera
blocked such review,
claiming that he had
already considered the
same, albeit minimally.
This is a clear
indication that Gen.
Lagera really wanted to
take it upon himself to
solely give the
Unsatisfactory ratings
to respondent, in
violation of the
approved Performance
Appraisal System
(PAS) of the NPC.
 Espero Santos Salaw was a
credit investigator-appraiser
of herein respondent
Salaw vs. NLRC Associated Bank.
His duties included
inspecting, investigating,
appraising, and identifying
the company's foreclosed
assets; giving valuation to its
real properties and verifying
the genuineness and
encumbrances of the titles of
properties mortgaged to the
respondents.
Salaw and a fellow employee
were alleged to have
conspired in selling twenty
(20) sewing machines and
electric generators which had
been foreclosed by the
respondent bank from
Worldwide Garment and L.P.
Money Garment, for
P60,000.00, and divided the
proceeds thereof in equal
shares of P30,000.00
between the two of them. The
Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary extracted
WON petitioner’s No. NO. Under the Labor
dismissal was legally Code, as amended, the
justified. requirements for the
lawful dismissal of an
employee by his
employer are two-fold:
the substantive and the
procedural. Not only
must the dismissal be
for a valid or
authorized cause as
provided by law
(Articles 279, 281, 282-
284, New Labor Code),
but the rudimentary
requirements of due
process — notice and
hearing — must also be
observed before an
employee may be
dismissed. One does
not suffice; without
their concurrence, the
terminate would, in the
eyes of the law, be
illegal.
As to the LA’s finding,
petitioner was
terminated without the
benefit of due process
of law. The
Sworn Statement from them
without the assistance of a
counsel.
Rollie Tuazon, the bank
manager, requested
petitioner to appear before
the bank's Personnel
Discipline and Investigation
Committee (PDIC) which
petitioner attended and 3
months after, his termination
became effective for alleged
serious misconduct or willful
disobedience and fraud or
willful breach of the trust
reposed on him by the
private respondents.
Petitioner filed an illegal
dismissal case against
respondent and likewise
submitted an affidavit
recanting his Sworn
Statement before the CIS.
The labor arbiter ruled in
favor of the petitioner.
Private respondents
appealed to the NLRC and
reversed the LA’s decision.
respondents' initial act
in convening their
Personnel Discipline
and Investigation
Committee (PDIC) to
investigate
complainant (after the
CIS experience) would
have complied with the
demands of due
process had
complainant been
given the opportunity
to present his own
defense and confront
the witnesses, if any,
and examine the
evidence against him.
But as the records
clearly show, the
complainant was
denied that
constitutional right
when his subsequent
request refute the
allegations against him
was granted and a
hearing was set
"without counsel or
representative.
The investigation of
petitioner Salaw by the
Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
respondent Bank'
investigating
committee violated his
constitutional right to
due process, in as
much as he was not
given a chance to
defend himself, as
provided in Rule XIV,
Book V of the
Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the
Labor Code governing
the dismissal of
employees. Section 5 of
the said Rule requires
that "the employer
shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend
himself with the
assistance of his
representative if he so
desires."11 (Emphasis
supplied.) Here
petition was
perfunctorily denied
the assistance of
counsel during the
investigation to be
conducted by the PDIC.
No reasons preferred
which vitiated the
denial with irregularity
and unfairness.

As aptly observed by
the labor arbiter, the
respondents premised
their action in
dismissing the
complainant on his
supposed admission of
the offense imputed to
him by the Criminal
Investigation Service
(CIS) in its
interrogation in
November 1984. The
said admission was
carried in a three-page
Sworn Statement
signed by the
complainant. Aside
from this Statement,
other evidence was
presented by the
respondents to
establish the
culpability of the
complainant in the
fraudulent sale of
respondents'
foreclosed properties.
Even the minutes of
proceeding taken
during the
investigation
conducted by
respondents were not
presented. ... This is a
glaring denial of due
process.

Considering further
that the admission by
the petitioner which
was extracted from
him by the Criminal
Investigate Service of
the Philippine
Constabulary (National
Capital Region)
without the assistance
of counsel and which
was made the sole
basis for his dismissal,
cannot be admitted in
evidence against him,
then, the finding of
guilt of the PDIC, which
was affirmed by the
public respondent
NLRC; has no more leg
stand on. A decision
with absolutely
nothing to support it is
a nullity.

Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is
a Governor of Quirino.
Castillo-Co vs. Congressman Junie Cua filed
Barbers a complaint before the Office
of the Ombudsman against
Governor Castillo-Co and
Provincial Engineer Virgilio
Ringor for alleged fraud
against the public treasury
and malversation. (Sections
3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, and Articles
213 and 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.)
Significantly, the
dismissal of the
petitioner from his
employment was
characterized by undue
haste. The law is clear
that even in the
disposition of labor
cases, due process
must not be
subordinated to
expediency or dispatch.
Otherwise, the
dismissal of the
employee will be
tainted with illegality.
1. YES. Petitioner
WON the Deputy claims that under
Ombudsman has Republic Act No. 7975,
authority to issue the only the Ombudsman
preventive has the authority to
suspension sign the order placing
officials with a 27
WON petitioner was salary grade or above,
denied due process like petitioner-
because she was not governor, under
afforded the preventive suspension.
opportunity to In this case, the
controvert the suspension order was
evidence against her neither signed nor
before the order of approved by

Congressman Cua charged
that the equipment
purchased was reconditioned
instead of brand new as
required by resolutions of the
provinces Sanggunian
authorizing such purchase.
Other irregularities claimed
to have been committed
included overpricing, lack of
public bidding, lack of
inspection, advance payment
prior to delivery in violation
of Section 338 of the Local
Government Code, and an
attempt to cover up such
irregularities.
A week after the complaint
was filed, Governor Castillo-
Co and Provincial Engineer
Ringor were placed under
preventive suspension for a
period of six (6) months.
Said order was signed by
Emilio A. Gonzalez III,
Director, and approved by
Jesus Guerrero, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.
Petitioners thereafter filed
preventive Ombudsman Aniano
suspension was Desierto. Rather, said
issued. order was signed by
Director Emilio
Gonzales III and
approved by Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon
Jesus Guerrero.
There is nothing in RA
7975, however, that
would remotely
suggest that only the
Ombudsman, and not
his Deputy, may sign an
order preventively
suspending officials
occupying positions
classified as grade 27
or above.
Moreover, Section 24
of Republic Act No.
6770 and Section 9,
Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office
of Ombudsman
similarly provides:
SEC. 24. Preventive
Suspension. -- The
Ombudsman or his
Deputy may
separate motions for
reconsideration. Both
motions were denied in a
Joint Order signed by
Director Gonzales and
approved by Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero.
Petitioner file for special civil
action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for
temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to nullify
the Order of the Deputy
Ombudsman directing her
preventive suspension and
claiming that the Deputy
Ombudsman has no authority
to issue the preventive
suspension against them.
preventively suspend
any officer or employee
under his authority
pending an
investigation, if in his
judgment, the evidence
of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against
such officer or
employee involves
dishonesty, oppression
or gross misconduct, or
neglect in the
performance of duty;
or (b) the charge would
warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the
respondents continued
stay in office may
prejudice the case filed
against him. Xxx
SEC. 9. Preventive
suspension. Pending
investigation, the
respondent may be
preventively
suspended without pay
for a period of not
more than six (6)
months, if, in the
judgment of the
Ombudsman or his
proper deputy, the
evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the
charge against such
officer or employee
involves dishonesty,
oppression or gross
misconduct, or neglect
in the performance of
duty, (b) the charge
would warrant
removal from the
service; or (c) the
respondents continued
stay in office may
prejudice the case filed
against him. xxx

Under these
provisions, there
cannot be any doubt
that the Ombudsman
or his Deputy may
preventively suspend
an officer or employee,
where appropriate, as
indicated by the word
or between the
Ombudsman and his
Deputy. The word or is
a disjunctive term
signifying
disassociation and
independence of one
thing from each of the
other things
enumerated. The law
does not require that
only the Ombudsman
himself may sign the
order of suspension.

2. NO. A preventive
suspension, however,
can be decreed on an
official under
investigation after
charges are brought
and even before the
charges are heard since
the same is not in the
nature of a penalty,[13]
but merely a
preliminary step in an
administrative
investigation.

In connection with the

suspension of
petitioner before he
could file his answer to
the administrative
complaint, suffice it to
say that the suspension
was not a punishment
or penalty for the acts
of dishonesty and
misconduct in office,
but only as a
preventive measure. A
suspension is a
preliminary step in an
administrative
investigation. If after
such investigation, the
charges are established
and the person
investigated is found
guilty of acts
warranting his
removal, then he is
removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty.
There is, therefore,
nothing improper in
suspending an officer
pending his
investigation and
before the charges
against him are heard
and be given an
opportunity to prove
his innocence.

The fact that the said

order was issued seven
days after the
complaint was filed did
not constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
The immediate
issuance of such order
is required in order to
prevent the subject of
the suspension from
committing further
irregularities. Such
prompt action,
moreover, is in
consonance with
Section 15 of RA 6770
which exhorts the
Ombudsman to:

xxx give priority to

complaints filed
against high ranking
government officials
and/or those
occupying supervisory
positions, complaints
involving grave
offenses as well as
complaints involving
large sums of money
and/or properties.