An Inclusive Democratic Polity, Representative Bureaucracies, and the New Public

Management
Author(s): Rita Mae Kelly
Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1998), pp. 201-208
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/976560 .
Accessed: 18/07/2013 22:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and American Society for Public Administration are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Public Administration Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 WIN
Publicadministration
scholars over
separate
whether thepublic bureaucracy orthedemocratic
polityought tobethestarting pointofpublicadmin-
istrationscholarship. Dwight Waldo(1948),John J.
Kirlin (1996),andVincent Ostrom (1997)among
An
Inclusive
Democrafic
PolIty others,haveargued
preference
thatthedemocratic
andthatfocusing
polity
predominantly
needs
on
and
Representative
Bureaucracies, improving
infact harm
efficiency
thevery
ofadministrative
polity
processescan
thatsuchimprovements
New cManagement
Pubi aresupposed
stantive
tohelp.Procedural
rights, and
dueprocess,
of
equity, protectionminority
sub-

rights as wellas equalopportunity andequality

among citizens arevalues thathaveprecedence over
Rita
MaeKelly,
University atDallas
ofTexas efficiency.
Theyargue, andI agree, thata particular
publicbureaucracy oradministrative structure is
embedded within a particular socioeconom-
political
icsystem. Iftheresult desiredisaninclusive,demo-
craticpolity, thenthese organizations ought tobe
grounded intheories, assumptions, andunderstand-
ingsofreality thatadvance knowledge of,andgive
directiontoward, sucha polity.
attaining
Grounded inrational choiceandpublicchoice
andcontaining elements ofTotalQuality Manage-
ment (TQM),theNewPublic Management (NPM)
seekstooffer more efficient
mechanisms fordeliver-
inggoodsandservices andforraising governmental
performance levels.Sucha goalwouldappear tobe
highly commendable anddesired byallcitizens.As
Parsons, Merrick, andWatson (1996,26) in their
study ofDeepSouth mayors note,"Thesocialcon-
inlarge
tract, part, isabout theequitable distribution
ofcity resources." TheCivilRights Movement con-
cerned equalservices interms ofsewers,pavedroads,
andstreet lights aswellas equality invoting, jobs,
andeducation.
Thepurpose ofthisarticleistoexamine theimpli-
cations ofthenewpublic management movement for
representative bureaucracies andthedevelopment of
aninclusive democratic polity.In examining these
matters, I willfirst defineaninclusive democratic
polity andexamine theextent towhich thetheory
andassumptions thatundergird theNewPublic
Management arelikely toprovide guidance tothose
implementing itshouldthey wishtopromote an
inclusivedemocratic polity.
SincetheNPMislargely
derived from rationalchoice andpublic choicetheo-
I willfocus
ries, primarilyonthem.

PublicAdministration
Review* May/June
1998,Vol.58,No. 8 201

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 However, I willalsonotebriefly howTQM hasmodified these
theories.
After
themeaning
thesetheoretical
assessing
andrationale
issues,I willthendiscuss
fora representative bureaucracy. Once
The
New
Public rests
Management onrational
largely
thesebasicconcepts arearticulated,I willsuggest howa representa- andpublic
choice aswell
assumptions
asprivate
sector
and
tivebureaucracy might assistin resolving theproblems facingthe
NPM as theresultof trying to applyprivate sectorand market market
conceptstothepublicsector.
each
assumptions,
ofwhich
inturn
rests
on

Advancement
ofan methodological
individualism
and
aninstrumental
Inclusive
Democratic
Polity conception
ofindividual
rationality
TheNewPublicManagement restslargely on rational andpub-
licchoiceassumptions as well as private sector and market assump-
Basic Definition
tions,eachofwhichinturnrests on methodological individualism
Statedmostsimply, an inclusivedemocratic polityis one that andan instrumental conception of individual rationality. People
provides all itsadult,mentally competent citizenswithfullrights, arethought to "maximize theirexpected utilitiesin formally pre-
duties,and responsibilities and a senseof belonging as an equal dictable ways"(GreenandShapiro,1994,17). The psychological
partner entitled to thebenefits and burdens society offers. It is a foundations to thesupporting theories arelimitedessentially to
politicalentity thatconsciously strivesforhumandevelopment,self-interest, transactional and exchange theories. Assuming that
dignity,liberty withresponsibility, andjusticeforall.It is an open citizensarethesameas customers/consumers, theNew Public
societygrounded in actionresearch and evolutionary learning in Management mosttypically argues thatindividuals receiving some
whichrelationships anddynamic contexts matter as wellas indi- governmental goodor serviceareattempting to maximize their
vidualsandgroups. In theUnitedStatesthissociety needstowork utility (oftendefined as satisfaction) withregard tothegoodorser-
withintheframework of theU.S. Constitution anda republicanvice,andthatcontractors acting in a competitive market andseek-
formofgovernment. It is a societyin whichthepeopleshare,as ingto maximize theirprofits, willperform better, i.e.,moreeffi-
Alexisde Tocqueville, Vincent Ostrom, andHaroldLasswell have ciently, thanifa government bureaucracy provides thegoodor
suggested, a bodyof commonknowledge grounded in a shared service directly.
community ofunderstanding witha degree oftrust in eachother Aresuchassumptions necessarily problematic fordemocratic
andin thepolitical system, ofwhichthegovernment is an impor- governance? Onlyiftheyareincorrect, or gravely incomplete. In
tantbutnotthetotalpart.Thereis also basicclarity aboutthe myopinionthisis clearly thecasefornarrow versions ofrational
place:itsmaterial conditions, technological levels,andthenature choicetheory. Criticshavenotedthelackofempirical evidence to
ofnational goals.Rulesand rule-ordered relationships arepublic supporttheuniversality of theseversions (Greenand Shapiro,
andaccessible toallcitizens. 1994,17). Ferejohn (1991,283-286)additionally arguesthatcul-
A prerequisite fortheNewPublicManagement to be ableto turaltheories ofbehavior needto be incorporated intorational
promote sucha polityis thatitsassumptions andfindings about choiceassumptions and thata segmented universalism is all that
humanbeingsreflect sociopolitical Bytheyear2000 about rational
reality. choiceapproaches canclaim;thatis,Ferejohn arguesthat
one-fourth oftheU.S. population willconsist ofracialandethnic themaximizing utilityassumptions areapplicable onlyin certain
minorities. At theminimum, thegovernance structure needsto situations and contexts. Manyotherscholars agree(seeMonroe,
recognize thediversity ofpeople.The question is,to whatextent 1991).
doestheNewPublicManagement do this? Relativelyfewstudiesexplore theimpactofminority cultures
on theinterpretation ofrational, utility maximizing behavior and
Compatibilityof Undergirding the implicationof such variations for governance within the New
TheorywithEmpiricalReality PublicManagement context. Itisoften argued, however, thatlevels
ofstress-high andlow-affectmotivational drivesandwilling-
In the20thcentury in theUnitedStatesfullpoliticalrights nessandability tomaximize particular utilitiesin themanner pre-
havebeenexpanded dramatically beyond white, European, proper- dictedbyrational choicetheories (Maoz,1990,318-321).Such
tiedmales.The citizenry now includesformer slaves(mostly findings suggest thatclassvariations, particularly poverty, high
African-Americans), women,NativeAmericans, and peoplefrom crime rates,
druguse,andthemarginalization ofparticular cultures
almostevery partoftheglobe.Homogeneity amongU.S. citizens might altertheapplicability andappropriateness ofsuchassump-
withfullrights ofparticipation has,to putitbluntly, disappeared.tions.
So alsohasthesharedacceptance ofwhite-male, universal norms. TotalQuality Management theoriescritique thenarrow microe-
Assimilation towhite, European, malestandards ofcitizenship and conomicsparadigm and challenge narrow, simple-minded, self-
conformist notions ofhowtobehaveorthink "rationally" as a con- interested arguments of therational/public choicetype.The
sumer orclient ofgovernment goodsandservices haveclearly been emphasis oftheNewPublicManagement on improved "customer"
challenged bytheWomen's Movement, theCivilRightsMove- servicetakesguidancefromTQM and goesbeyondadvocating
ment,andothers. HowdoestheNewPublicManagement address efficiency aboveeverything else.Improved servicecan be more
thesechanges andtheneedforaninclusive democratic polity? costlythantraditionalbureaucratic approaches, anditisnotalways

202 Review* May/June

PublicAdministration 1998,Vol.58,No. 3

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 One of themostimportant decisionsmadebysocieties and
The inclusionofallcitizens into a universal equality governments is whatwillbe theboundaries ofdiscourse
sion making(Ostrom,1997). Whatwe acceptas outsideour
anddeci-

framework hastaken close to200years tocomplete; [yet], boundaries setsthepublicagendaas muchas and,perhaps even
morethan,whatwe placeon theagenda.Bylimiting whohas
itisstilluncertain how acceptable itisfor women standing we limitwhohas rights of representation. Bylimiting
whohasfullrights to be represented welimittherangeandscope
ofthesocietal problems thatwillbecomepolicyissuesandgeton
andminority men tohold top leadership positions theagenda.Bylimiting ourunderstanding oftheprimary govern-
mentproblem to be oneofefficiency in deliveringgoodsandser-
ingovernment andsociety vices,wealsorestrict therangeofconcerns thatareviewedas legit-
as cost-efficient
as simply ignoring customer satisfaction,atleastin imatefordebateandcollective action.
theshortrun.In addition, surveys andtheevaluations required to Representation doesnothavea self-evident meaning. Hanna
monitorthecustomer's reactionto serviceprovidea potential Pitkin(1967) notedthat"representation, takengenerally, means
meansof addressing culturaldiversity. Nonetheless, although themaking present in somesense ofsomething whichis neverthe-
TQM advocates responsiveness to every customer/consumer, that lessnotpresent or in fact."The fourtypesofrepresenta-
literally
is notthesameas providing a meansofbeingaccountable to the tionPitkinidentified are:formal, descriptive,symbolic, andsub-
citizenryand theirelectedofficials. Consumer satisfactionis not stantive.Broadlyspeaking,theydifferin termsof whether
thesameas citizen sovereignty. In fact,manynowarguethatpay- representatives "standfor"or "actfor"thosetheyaresupposed to
ingtoo muchattention to thecustomer in thepublicsectorcan berepresenting.
reduce accountabilitytotheelected officials(see,e.g.,Kettl,1993). In theUnitedStatesform ofdemocracy formal representation is
The attainment ofan inclusive democratic polity thatwillbe rec- supposed totakeplaceviatheelection process. bymeansof
Ideally
ognized as justandfairbythevastmajority ofitscitizens willnot elections wevoteto giveauthority to others to acton ourbehalf.
occurwithout setting thatas a goaland providing theories and Weholdthemaccountable fortheir actions atthenextelection by
strategiestomakeithappen. eithervotingforor againstthem.As GeorgiaDuerst-Lahti and
Onesuchstrategy isrepresentative bureaucracy. DaynaVerstegen (1995,216) note,however, "Elections
enablerep-
resentation butdo notthemselves constitute representation."
Descriptive representationrefersto theextent thatthepopulace
Representative Bureaucracies or subgroups aresimilaror comparable to a politicalbodyor
The notionof recognizing diversegroupsin electedand bureaucracy. Legitimacy ofpolicymaking and implementation is
appointed administrative positions is old.James Madisonpresent-thought to be increased ifthedecisionmakers and government
ed theFederalistnotionin terms ofhaving factions ingovernmentofficials areenoughlikethoseaffected bythedecisions to "stand
thatwouldrepresent interests andtheirmembers. In 1958,Van for"them, i.e.,torepresent them.Byunderstanding thecontext of
Riper(549-559)defined a representative bureaucracy as onethatis thepolicyand delivery problem a descriptive representativecan
"in generaltunewiththeethosand attitudes of thesocietyof present information aboutsomething notactuallypresent and
whichit is part."In 1944Kingsley stressed a groupapproach and through thesharedcharacteristics, knowledge, and understanding
thenotionthattheopinionsofvariousgroups wereto be repre- represent theviews,concerns, and situations of thosewhoare
sented.As Krislov(1974,8) putit,"broadsocialgroupsshould absent.In reality, particularindividuals mightor mightnotdo
havespokespersons and officeholders in administrative as wellas this.
politicalpositions."Initially itwasthought thatthecross-sections Symbolic representation tothefactthatsymbols,
refers likea flag,
ofthepopulation thatshouldbe represented encompassed class, a king,ora soldier, alsostandforandrepresent thingsandpeople
occupations, and geography. Sincethen,thenotionof which whoareabsent.Moreindefinite thandescriptive representation,
groupsshouldbe represented hasexpanded to increase racialand symbolic representation restson emotions andattitudes. Symbols
ethnicgroups, women,and morerecently in somecircumstances do notconveyinformation so muchas theyarea "recipient or
thedisabled andtheelderly, amongothers. objectoffeeling, expressions offeelings, or actionsintended for
The question of whois andshouldbe represented ina democ- whatit represents.... A symbolhas meaningbeyonditself, not
racy,howtheyarerepresented, and whoshouldhavestanding on becauseofitsactualresemblance, oranyrealconnection, butjust
whichissuesis critically important. As we know,mostof the becausesomeonebelievesit does"(Duerst-Lahti andVerstegen,
Founding Fathers(andprobably mostoftheFounding Mothers) 1994,217). Results do notimpact symbols so muchas whatexists
thought itwasacceptable toexclude slaves,women, andnon-prop-in people'smindsandbeliefsystems. "Symbolic representation is
ertiedpeopleas citizens withfullcivil,economic, and political basedupona system ofsharedvalues,functioning as a two-way
rights.The inclusion ofallcitizens intoa universal equality frame- correspondence, agreement between theruler andtheruled"(217).
workhastakencloseto200years tocomplete, andevenas the21st Paraphrasing MurrayEdelman,symbolicpoliticsrestson the
century approaches, it is stilluncertain howacceptable it is for notionthatwordscan succeedevenwhenpoliciesfail.Hence,
womenandminority mento holdtop leadership positions ingov- leaders mustnotonlymakeappropriate policiesandoversee their
ernment and society. Although thenumbers areincreasing, the properimplementation, theymustalso buildsymbolically on
percentages atthetop arestillwoefully small. shared valuesandbeliefs aboutboththesituation andwhatmust

Symposium:
Leadership, andtheNewPublicManagement
Democracy, 203

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
andis beingdone.
Rosenbloom
promotes
(1977, 162) stresses
thenotionoffairness
thatsymbolic
andpolitical
representation
neutrality ofgovern-
byrestricting toits
representationand
trustee
formal
mentalactions.If actionscan be portrayed as equal,fair, just,or ithas
tpes, been
possible
inmany
(and countries
even
equitable withallrelevant partsofthepopulation having beencon-
sidered,thenacceptance
constitutionalemphasis
ofgovernmental
on equality
actionwillbebroader.
bothdescriptive
A todayitisstillpossible)
toexclude
many
"citizens"from
supports and
symbolic
groups
representation. As Rosenbloom
suchaswomenandminorities from
notes,excluding
governmental
entire
positions
fIllrights, and
duties.
liberties,
"candecrease theability ofindividual members ofthosegroups to In publicagencies theentrance ofwomenintotop-level posi-
compete economically withothersand[has]a depressing effect on tions,suchas Bernadine Healyas thechiefoftheNationalInsti-
thegroup'soveralleconomicstanding." Not havingwomenor tutesofHealth, dramatically indicated thelinkbetween descriptive
minorities depicted as nationalheroesandholders ofhighpublic representation andsubstantive representation. Suddenly women's
positions orstatus inthesociety symbolically conveys theideathat health wason thenational agendainwaysnotpreviously thought
perhapstheyoughtnot be suchin thefutureeither.Symbols possible. Shortly aftertaking office Healyinitiated a $500 million,
expandorconstrain whatisfeasible,valuable,anddesired. 10-year trialinvolving 140,000women.The majorshiftin sub-
Substantive representation mostdirectly concerns acting for stantive representation in policymaking andimplementation this
another. Representation occurswhenthesubstance ofissuesand signified isindicated byMalcolmGladwell (1993,176):
wishes reflectingtherepresented opinions andinterests ispresented Shecomes from a profession,cardiology, thatdecided to
andactedupon.In rational choicetheory substantive representa- explore heart disease factorsbystudying 15,000men-
tionoccurswhenan agentactually performs as theprincipal who andzerowomen; thatlookedataspirin as a preventative
hiresherwouldifshewereacting forherself. therapy forcoronary disease in 22,000men-andzero
The threemostcommonforms ofsubstantive representation women;and thattriedto answerthequestionof
are:thetrustee, someonewhouseshisor herdiscretion to make whether estrogen wasprotective against heart diseasein
decisions on behalf ofandin thebestinterests oftherepresented; women byconducting a study oftheroleofestrogen in
thedelegate,someone whoseriously attempts todiscern thedesires preventing heart diseaseinmen.... [Shefought generally
oftherepresented; andthepolitico,
someone whoactsto maximize against] theperception that"women's complaints about
a politicalpositionor status(Duerst-Lahti andVerstegen, 1995, chest painwereemotional orinconsequential."
218). The notionsof formaland trusteerepresentation have This difference one womanmadeforadvancing knowledge
undergirded manytraditional modelsofpolitical accountability. If aboutwomen's healthis matched bydifferences AfricanAmerican
thegovernment and itsadministration do notdeliver thepublic legislators andofficials havemadeforAfrican Americans. Sickle
goodsandservices desired andreduce oreliminate thepublicbads cellanemiais nowstudied, as areotherailments, linkedto their
thatarefeared, thecitizens willvoteouttheelected officials. New genetic andcultural heritages.
oneswilltakeover, establishnewpolicies,appoint newadministra- Previous decisions to exclude womenandminorities fromcar-
tors,andtheoretically improvethesituation. diology orotherstudies might havebeenefficient, butitwasnot
Byrestricting representationto itsformal andtrustee types, it just.[Indeed, thedefense forstudying estrogen inmenintheheart
hasbeenpossible (andin manycountries eventodayitis stillpos- studies wasthatitwasmorecost-efficient thanusingwomen.Men
sible)to excludemany"citizens" fromfullrights, liberties, and did notmenstruate and hencetheirestrogen levelsdid notvary
duties.Forexample, thelongheldideathatmencouldrepresentmonthly.] Effectiveness, responsiveness toallcitizens"health needs,
womenwithout thelatter beingphysicallypresent inpolitical insti- fairness,andjusticewerenotmentioned or demanded byelected
tutionsderives from theassumption thatthemen(nonslave, most- officials untildescriptive representatives actedsubstantively to
lywhitepropertied onesat least)wereheadsofa socialunitcalled arguetheyshouldbe.
thefamily, andthatwomenwerenotdistinct individuals ina polit- A largebodyofliterature nowexistsdemonstrating thediffer-
ical sense.Men could represent "theirwomen"byactingas a enceforwomenofhaving women,and forminorities ofhaving
trusteeforthem.Thefactthatmostofthemalerepresentatives did minorities, represent theirdescriptive groupin legislatures andin
notrepresent thewomenwellsubstantively hasledto therecogni- publicbureaucracies. Whenwomenandminorities areinthedeci-
tionthattheformal representation
wasdeceptive. As theClarence sion-making and implementing structures, morewomenand
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings indicated, havingan all-male Senate minorities arehired, their concerns aremorelikely tobeaddressed,
committee "notgetit"whentheissuewas sexualharassmenttheirmaterial well-being rises,andtheirsenseofthefairness and
revealed bothdescriptively and symbolically theabsenceofsub- justiceof thepolityincreases (See Kelly,1993;Saltzstein, 1989;
stantive representation. Male formalrepresentation ofwomen's Meier,Stewart, and England,1989; and Mladenka,1989).The
interestled to thegeneral exclusion ofwomenfrommanyrights roleofbothelected andappointed leaders in promoting andsup-
anddutiesoffullcitizenship, suchas:theright tovote,whichthey porting multiracial, multiethnic, and gender diversitycan notbe
didnotwinuntil1920,manyproperty andcontract rights,access overstated. "Beingthere"matters. If someonelikeoneself is not
to credit,accessto manyinstitutions of highereducation, and present, thelikelihood ofadequate substantive representation most
accesstocareers inmanyoccupations evenwhentheyhadthecre- likely willdecline, andoftendeclinesharply. Whenthathappens,
dentials. aninclusive democratic politybecomes lessviableandlessfeasible.

204 Public
Administration
Review* May/June
1998,Vol.58,No.3

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Bureaucracies
Representative and politysuggests
service
thatmanymorethanthosereceiving
havesomerights to either thegoodsandservices
thegoodor
in ques-
theNewPublicManagement tionortogoodsandservices foregone as theresult ofthechoiceto
Representative bureaucracies in a demographically diverse deliver the particular good or service.
democratic politycanpromote efficiencyandeffectiveness ofthe Muchoftheliterature asserting separation ofpolicymaking
New PublicManagement as wellas of traditional hierarchical from administration is derived from theoretical models. As Spence
Theycanhelpattainsocialequilibria
structures. arguedas neces- (1995, 201) notes, "Ifthese recent theoretical and empirical devel-
sarybyrational choicetheorists whenpoliticsintrude in imple- opments are pushing political scientists away from thebureaucratic
mentation, and theycanhelpmanagers address thelackofcom- dominance pointofview(as theyseemto be),it is important to
andtruemarket
petitiveness conditionsinselected situations. note that they do so not by demonstrating that politicianscan con-
Figure1 compares thelogicofgovernance in traditionalpublic trolsubsequent agency policydecisions butbymodeling theprob-
administrationwiththatunfolding undertheNewPublicManage- lem away."
ment.As depicted, thecontractors, theoutsourced implementors Without belaboring thepoint,studies showthatgovernmental
ofgovernment policyintroduce substantial complications intothe agencies exercise considerable autonomy in policymaking (Spence,
accountability The customer
relationships. ofthecontractor is the 1997, 199-219; Bawn, 1995). Delegation as a form of political
clientofthepublicbureaucracy andoneofthecitizens whois the- control and accountability is demonstrably weak even in hierarchi-
oreticallysovereign holdingboththeelectedofficials and the calbureaucracies. Procedures anddecisions aboutagency structures
administrators accountable for their actions. The rarely prevent deviations from original legislative intent.Thereare
as a groupis typically
customer/client/citizen muchmorediverse value trade-offs and politics involved in almost all administrative
thantheelectedofficials, and bothmuchmoreand muchless decisions, andin manydelivery contexts. Indeed,someadvocates
knowledgeable of theadequacyofgoodsand services delivered. of the New Public Management grant that principal-agent prob-
The relativelysimplenotionoftheformal electedrepresentative lems exist in both traditional public bureaucracies and market sys-
holding thebureaucracy accountable fordeliveringgoodsandser- tems. They argue that their approach is more likely to reintroduce
vicesislessviablewithinthisframework. Howwoulda representa-someaccountability because-more thanin thetraditional public
tivebureaucracy,andcontractors thatarerepresentative ofthepop- bureaucracy-the New Public Management offers a greater hope
ulaceaswell,help? of empowering individuals (clientele), and at least specificallyartic-
The philosophy ofcontracting and muchoftheNewPublic ulatestheneedto account forcustomer preferences. Evenifthisis
Management reston theprincipal-agent relationship.In thisrela- granted, however, we stillneed to know how the New PublicMan-
tionshipthegovernment manager clearlyarticulatesthepolicy, sets agement meets the requirement that citizens in a democratic polity
performance standards,and choosesin a competitive market an will accept the choices made by a decentralized agency, an out-
agentwhowillfaithfully actin thegovernment's behalf to deliver sourced entity,or a supposed apolitical, efficiency-performance-
thegoodsandservices so thattheoutcome sought willbeattained. oriented manager? An inclusive, democratic polityrequires more
The feasibility
ofimplementing thislogicdepends on thedirect- than satisfiedcustomers.
nessandclarity ofthefollowing: thepolicytobeimplemented, the A customer can be satisfied on an individual levelwiththe
linesofresponsibility,
andtheperformance standards. It depends, quality of a particular good or level of service but then decideheor
mostbasically,on theextent towhichpolitics andadministration shewasdupedifcomparison reveals thatsomeone elsegota better
canindeedbe separated, andon theactualexistence ofa competi- deal,ora higher levelofgoodorservice. I might be satisfied and
tivemarketplace inthepublicsector. willing to pay 25 percent of my income as taxesuntilI learnthat
all thebillionaires in thecountry paidnone.Satisfaction canturn
to discontent ifthecustomer learnswhatall theoptionsareor
Politics
andAdministration mighthavebeen,or learnslaterthannoteveryone wastreated
CannotBe Separated
Figure1
Politics
andadministration cannotbe separated forseveral
rea- Accountability in theSocialServiceNetwork
sons,includingthelackofclarity ofdefinitionofpublicservice
andthelackofagreement onwhois entitled tosuchservices.
Ifall
thefunctionsofthegovernment were,indeed,simply Elected
Officials Administrators
thedelivery
ofclearlyagreeduponandclearly definedgoodsandservices,and
thedesignatedrecipientofthesegoodsandservices wereuniversal-
lyagreeduponas well,then-other thanforsymbolic reasons-it
mightnotmatter whoparticipated in themanagement ofpolicy \ Contractors
implementation.However, itis notalwaysperfectly
clearwhatthe
"publicservice"is supposedto be, or forwhom.And,perhaps
moreimportantly, whenscarcity requiresthatchoicesbe made
amonga multitude ofpossible recipients,
whohastherightand
Customers,clients,
citizens
sufficient
credibilityand trustofthevariouscitizens-tomake
decisions
excluding particular
"customers."Thisquestion ispartic-
Source:Johnston
(1986): 550. SeealsoKettle
(1993,176).
ularlyimportantwhenbeinga citizenin an inclusive democratic

Symposium:
Leadership,
Democracy,
andtheNewPublicManagement 205

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
equally. Whatisacceptable depends onwhatisavailable andfeasi- TheLackofa Competitive
ble.Formetoremain satisfiedasa customer I needsomebroader,
Marketplace
morecomprehensive andcollective information assuringmethat The New PublicManagement assumesthatcontracting and
(a) eitherallwere treated or
equally, (b) that ifpeople were treated outsourcing will work because a sufficientlycompetitive market
differently,they weretreated equitably andfairly according tocri- exists
toregulate supply anddemand. Themarket, itisargued, will
teria thatI orthose whorepresent meaccepted forvalidreasons.be abletohelpgovernment be a smarter buyer and,hence,deliver-
Moreover, formetoactorreact as a citizen holding thegovern-er,ofpublicgoodsandservices. Unfortunately, bothdemand-side
ment accountable, I needtoknow that thestandards fordelivering and supply-side imperfections permeate the public sector.Kettl
goodsandservices arecollectively not
derived, idiosyncratic to (1993) has amply documented these problems. I will highlight
eachindividual customer orcitizen. Socialequilibria indicatingonlya fewheretoshowhowandwhyrepresentative bureaucracies
conditions foraccepting delivery standards andvariations among might helpaddress someofthesemarket inadequacies.
them arecriticalforsocial peaceanda democratic society. On the demand side imperfections existin manyareas.The
Thenotion ofattaining socialequilibria inrational choice theo- government is theonly buyer of many goods and services, e.g.,
rywouldappear to becritical fortheNewPublic Management. prisons.The government also creates certainindustries and com-
According toRiker(1990,177),"Socialequilibria occurwhen plexesbecauseit is theonlyor primary buyer, e.g.,thenuclear
actors choose inthemostadvantageous way, given thechoices of weaponscomplex, toxicwasteclean-upbusinesses, space-related
others, andreach anoutcome they would notwishtodepart from. industries,andthemilitary-industrial complex. On thesupply side
Thatis,they would notwishtohavechosen differentlybecause the imperfections existbecauseoften there areonlyoneortwosuppli-
outcome reached is thebesttheycanachieve under thecircum-ersavailable. In thewasteindustry, forexample, onlytwoprimary
stances." Theactors thatRiker andtheNewPublic Management suppliersare available,Browning FerrisIndustriesandWasteMan-
arelikely toinclude inthisdiscussion would probably betheelect- agement, Inc.Theverynature ofa publicgoodtypically meansit
ed officials,thegovernment managers, and/or thecontractors. If requiresa collective,
governmental, response.Thepurerthepublic
thecitizen isthesovereign source ofaccountability, however, andif good,thefewer suppliersthere willbe.
elected officials
often delegate coredecisions topolicy andprogram These pervasive market imperfections do notincrease competi-
implementors, should notsocialequilibria alsoconcern howciti- tion.Ketd(1993)emphasizes, rather, thattheyinclinethegovern-
zens'wishes areincorporated andrepresented inthedelivery and mentandthecontractor toward a convergence ofinterests andan
implementation process? Woulditnotrequire somethought asto erosionof not onlyprivate/public boundariesbut also of
whatstructures ormechanisms wouldintheendpersuade them buyer/seller andprincipal/agent boundaries. Government options
thatthechoice wasjust,fair, andappropriate whentheir elected can decrease due to theseimperfections rather thanincrease as
officialsarenolonger directlyinvolved? interdependence grows.According to Kettl(1993, 184), "As
Giventhatmostcitizens, evenas consumers ofgovernmental boundaries blur,it becomes harder to determine withconfidence
goodsandservices, rarely havesufficient information andknowl- where one organization, suchas thegovernment, ends,andwhere
edgeofoptions, i.e.,they have"bounded rationality,"citizensoften another,suchas thecontractor, begins." Uncertainty rises,andit
looktoleaders orrepresentatives whoshare their views forguid- becomes harder andharder forthegovernment to be an indepen-
anceonwhatthe"best" decision willbe.Iftheelected officialsdent,knowledgeable buyer, capableof managing in thepublic
cannot orwillnotperform thisfunction, thenhaving descriptive interest
so as topromote thegeneral socialwelfare.
representatives whohavesomepotential forrepresenting their Whencompetition is notfeasible in thepublicsector, how,
viewsin thebureaucracy orin thecontracting agency canbe a repeating Kettl's(1993) query,does thegovernment becomea
workable substitute. Representative bureaucracies anddiverse "smartbuyer," fromtheNew PublicManagement perspective?
politicalleadership within theNewPublic Management structures Howdoesitknowwhattobuyandfrom whomtobuy?Howdoes
canhelptheconsumer/citizen accept thenotion thata socialequi- it evaluate whathasbeenbought? How can morerepresentative
librium withregard toa particular policy anditsimplementation bureaucracies help?Let'slookat thesocialservices areawherethe
hasbeenachieved, thatjustice andfairness haveoccurred even lackofcompetition andmultiple market imperfections exist.
though ina particular instance thatparticular consumer/citizenOverthelastcoupleofdecadesthesocialservices havebecome
might nothavereceived asmuch orasgooda quality oftreatment a highlycouplednetwork of contractors whoseboundaries are
ashisorherneighbor orenemy. blurredwiththegovernment. From1971to 1979alone,theper-
Assuming thatadvocates oftheNewPublic Management wish centage ofsocialservice contractors in stateandgovernment rose
tosustain democratic lifeinanincreasingly diverseenvironment, from25 percent to 55 percent (Kettl,1993).In thispolicyarena
anagreement onsomebasics suchasbeing descriptivelyrepresent- thereareoftenfewvendors, making competitive biddingandthe
edintheimplementation process wouldseemtohelpreduce con- market almostuseless as a sourceofinformation as towhichven-
flictoverinclusion andthepolitics ofidentity andrecognition. dorto choose.In thementalhealthareain Massachusetts, for
"Higher levelsoftrust ingovernment,...coincide witha commonexample, two-thirds ofthesolicitations putout forcompetitive
"cultural"perspective onwhatinpolitical lifeshould betaken for bidding produced onlyoneresponse; in another 15 percent ofthe
granted"(Laitin,1995,171). "Beingthere"
in someformshould casesonlytwovendors responded.Arizonareported
similar
pat-
be oneofthe"taken forgranted"elements
ofan inclusive
demo- terns.
Becausesuchvendors
aretheonlygameintown,thegovern-
cratic
polity
wherever andwhenever possible. mentneedsto negotiatewithandhelpthevendor.The vendor
oftenbecomesanextension
ofgovernment.
In thiscontexttheprincipal-the government-especially

206 Public
Administration
Review* May/June
1998,Vol.58,No.3

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
needsto haveinternal capacities and knowledge oftheproduct thesecircumstances thequalityofchoicesoftendepends on what
area,whatconstitutes quality service, andwhatchoiceswillwork usedto be calledthe"street-level bureaucrats,"thosemaking the
forthecitizens in theareaas wellas theclient, andwhatwillbe delivery ofthegoodorservice. Havingemployees, within thegov-
appropriate forthepublicinterest andgeneral socialwelfare. Just ernment andwithinthecontracting whoarefromthe
provider,
as knowledge ofnational standards ofquality inmental health pro- population beingservedcan promotequalityservice. Arguably
videvitalinformation fordecision making, so doesknowledge of suchemployees, especiallyiftheyhavetheappropriate professional
community expectations andneedswhicha management structuretraining, arethemostcapableof facilitating outcomesthatare
demographically representative of thepopulationcan provide. desiredbytheclientsand theirfamilies and thataremostcon-
Although surveys cangetsomeofthenecessary baseline informa-ducivetothegeneral socialwelfare.
tion,knowing whatto askandhowto askitofparticular popula-
tionsareimportant prerequisites forsuchsurveys to be successful.
Differentreligious, ethnic, andnationality groupings [andindeed
Conclusion
mentalhealthdeliverers] do notnecessarily agreeon whatconsti- Manyarguethatthechangingaccountability relationship
tutesmentalhealthor proper standards foracceptable treatment.between elected officials
whohavetop-down authority overpublic
Womenin general haveoftenbeenthought to be suffering from bureaucracies andmanagers in theNewPublicManagement is the
mental healthproblems bymaledoctors whohavehadinadequate majorproblem ofdemocratic in thenewapproach.
accountability
knowledge andincorrect assumptions aboutwomen's health. Being However, I believethatthebiggest problem is maintaining and
a smartbuyer in suchcontexts requires knowledge thata represen-increasing bottom-up control ofall officials,
thoseappointed and
tativebureaucracy mightprovide. A demographically representa-hiredthrough contracts as wellas thoseelected.IftheNewPublic
tiveadvisory andoversight citizens' boardmight alsoprovide this Management couldincrease suchcontrol andthereby increase the
knowledge, butusingsuchboardsin selecting vendors is likelyto accountabilityofthedelivery ofgoodsandservices tothecitizenry,
be quitecumbersome and time-consuming, reducing efficiencythenwe shouldrejoice. A majorproblem, however, is thatattain-
evenfurther. ingsocialequilibriais difficultamongdecision makers, and even
Whomto buyfromis alsonotclearin manyinterdependent, moredifficultamongcitizen/consumers.
noncompetitive situations. Whenonlyonechoiceexists, then,of Putnam(1993, 172), in MakingDemocracy Work, concludes
course,thegovernment either"chooses" thatvendoror provides "thatdemocratic institutions cannotbe builtfromthetopdown
thegoodsandservices itself.In situations wheretwoormoreven- (oratleastnoteasily). Theymustbebuiltup intheeveryday tradi-
dorsareavailable, however, thecriteria forchoiceandtheimpact tionsoftrust andcivicvirtue amongitscitizens." Putnam's thesisis
ofthechoiceon thepublicinterest andsocialwelfare arenottrans- thatciviccommunity basedon highlevelsof politicalinterest,
parent.Thedelivery ofgoodsandservices ishighly laborintensivesocialequality, interpersonal trust,andvoluntary association leads
in mostgovernment policyareas.Hence,oneofthechiefwaysof tohigher probabilitiesofeffectivegovernance anddemocracy. Rep-
becoming morecompetitive is tohirelowerpaidworkers andgive resentative bureaucracies andcontracting agencies thatincorporate
themfewer fringe benefits, especially healthbenefits. Fora demo- descriptive, symbolic, andsubstantive ofdiverse
representation cit-
craticsocietyconcerned aboutincomedisparities andbroad-basedizensnotonlypromote a moreinclusive democratic politythey
citizenwell-being, suchtrade-offs arequestionable. Short-sighted alsopromote moreefficient andeffective decisionmaking bygov-
choicesthatplacemoreworking citizens in jeopardy ofneeding ernment whenmarket imperfections exist.
publicassistance forhealth, housing, andchildcaredo notprovide
evidence of a government actingto promote thepublicinterest RitaMae Kellyis currently deanof theSocialSciences,the
andsocialwelfare. A representative bureaucracy canarticulate and University ofTexasat Dallas,Richardson, Texas.Herrecent books
betterweighttheseconcerns. Although somemightarguethat includeGender Power, Leadership,andGovernance: Advances inPol-
sucharguments disrupt the"efficiency" ofthetransaction, "social icyStudiesSince1950,whichwon the 1993 AaronWildavsky
equilibrium" forthecitizens cannotbe attained byexclusion of Award forbestbookgivenbythePolicyStudies Organization; The
suchconcerns. GenderedEconomy; Gender, Bureaucracy,andDemocracy; Women in
Marketimperfections also present difficulties in evaluating theArizona Political
Process;and Promoting ProductivityinthePub-
whathasbeenpurchased. In thesocialservices areaoutcomes are licSector.OtherawardsincludetheMerriam MillsAwardofthe
notoriously difficult to establish, as indeedareoutputs.In the PolicyStudiesOrganization; the 1991 Distinguished Research
mental health, eldercare,andchildcareareas,forexample, quality AwardoftheAmerican Society forPublicAdministration; a 1991
carecannotalways leadto a fully independent client. Performance Fulbright
Fellowship toBrazil(1991);andtheOutstanding Mentor
measures alltoooften fallbackon measures ofinputs orprocesses,intheDiscipline Award oftheWomen's CaucusofPolitical Science
e.g.,thenumber ofhoursworked, thenumber ofpeopleserved. In in 1996and1991.

Symposium:
Leadership,
Democracy,
andtheNewPublic
Management 207

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 References
Bawn,Kathleen (1995). "PoliticalControl Versus Congressional Hall.
Expertise:
ChoicesAboutAdministrative Procedures."American Science Laitin,
Political DavidD. (1995).'TheCivilCulture atThirty." American Political
Review, 89 (March):,62-73. ScienceReview, 89 (March): 168-173.
Duerst-Lahti,Georgia, andDaynaVerstegen (1995). "Making Something of Maoz,Zeev(1990). National Choices
andInternationalProcesses,
Cambridge:
Absence: The 'YearoftheWoman'andWomen's Representation." In Cambridge UniversityPress.
Georgia Duerst-Lahti andRitaMaeKelly, eds.,Gender Power,LeadershipMeier, K.J.,J.Stewart, Jr.,andR E. England (1989). Race,Class,
andEdu-
andGovernance. AnnArbor, MI: TheUniversity ofMichigan Press,pp. cation:ThePolitics ofSecond GenerationDiscrimination.
Madison, WI:
213-238. University ofWisconsin Press.
Edelman,Murray J.(1988). Constructing thePolitical
Spectacle.
Chicago, IL: Mladenka, K R. (1989).'Barriers toHispanic Employment Successin1,200
University ofChicago Press. Cities."SocialScience 70 (une):391-407.
Quarterly
Ferejohn,
J.(1991)."Rationality andInterpretation: Elections Monroe,
Parliamentary Kristen Renwick (1991). TheEconomic Approaches toPolitics:
A
inEarly Stuart England."In K.R.Monroe, ed.,TheEconomic Approach to CriticalReassessmentoftheTheory ofRationalAction,NewYork:Harper-
A Critical
Politics: oftheTheory
Reassessment ofRationalChoice.
NewYork: Collins.
Harper-Collins, 279-305. Ostrom, Vincent (1997).TheMeaning ofDemocracy andtheVulnerabilityof
Gladwell,Malcolm (1993)."TheChanging FaceofScience."In William E. Democracy: A Response to Tocqueville's
Challenge.AnnArbor, MI: The
Rosenbach andRobert L.Taylor,Contemporary Issues
ofLeadership.
3rded. University ofMichigan Press.
SanFrancisco, CA:Westview Press, pp.167-180. Parsons,S., R. Merrick,andR Watson(1996). "DoesRaceMatter? Policy
Green,DonaldP.,andIanShapiro (1994).PathologiesofRational
ChoiceThe- Agendas ofBlackandWhiteMayors intheDeepSouth."Paperpresent-
ory:A Critique ofApplicationsinPolitical
Science. NewHaven,CT: Yale ed at theannualmeeting oftheAmerican Political
ScienceAssociation,
UniversityPress. August 29-September 1,1996,SanFrancisco, CA.
Hale,MaryM., andRitaMae Kelly, eds.(1989). Gender, and Pitkin,
Bureaucracy, Hannah(1967).TheConcept ofRepresentation.
Berkeley,
CA:Univer-
Democracy. NewYork:Greenwood Press. sityofCalifornia Press.
Johnston,John(1986).PublicServants andPrivate Contractors:
Managing Putnam, Robert D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: CivicTraditionsin
theMixedService DeliverySystem.Canadian PublicAdministration,
29 Modern Italy. NJ:Princeton
Princeton, UniversityPress.
(Winter):550. Riker,William H. (1990)."Political
ScienceandRational Choice."InJames
Kelly,RitaMae (1993)."Diversity in thePublicWorkforce: NewNeeds, E. AltandKenneth A. Shepsle,eds.,Perspectives
onPositive
Political
Econ-
NewApproaches." In Frank J.Thompson, ed.,RevitalizingStateand omy. Cambridge, MA:Cambridge UniversityPress.
LocalPublic Service:
StrengtheningPerformance, andCitizen Rosenbloom,
Accountability, David(1977).Federal EqualEmployment Opportunity:Politics
Confidence. SanFrancisco,CA:Jossey-Bass Publishers,
pp.197-224. andPublic PersonnelAdministration.
NewYork:Praeger.
DonaldF. (1993). Sharing
Kettl, Power: PublicGovernanceandPrivate Mar- Saltzstein, G. H. (1989)."BlackMayors andPolicePolicies."
Journal ofPoli-
kets.
Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution. tics.
51 (August): 140-164.
Kingsley,
J.D. (1944).Representative Yellow
Bureaucracy. Springs,OH: Anti- Spence,DavidB. (1997)."Agency PolicyMakingandPoliticalControl:
ochPress. Modeling AwaytheDelegation Problem,"Journal ofPublicAdministra-
Kirlin,
John J. (1996). "TheBigQuestions ofPublicAdministration in a tionResearch andTheory, 7 (March),199-219.
Democracy." PublicAdministration Review,56 (September-October): VanRiper, P. (1958).HistoryoftheUnited StatesCivilService.
Evanston, IL:
416-423. Row,Peterson, & Co.
S. (1974).Representative
Krislov, Bureaucracy.Englewood Cliffs,
NJ:Prentice-Waldo,Dwight D. (1948).TheAdministrativeState.
NewYork:RonaldPress.

208 Public
Administration
Review* May/June
1998,Vol.58,No.3

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 22:54:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions