Th< Univmit)' of Chicago l'r<ss.

Chicago 00637
The University of Chicago l'r..s. LJd. London
0 1994 by The Universit)' of Chicago
All righu reserved. Publi•hcd 1994
Paperback cditi()ll 1997
Printed in 1M United Stat<> of An,.,ricl
02 01 00 99 98 97 2 3 •I ~
ISBN: 0.226-04~23·8 (doth)
ISBN: 0.226-~24·6 (paperback)

Librory o f Congr<» Cat.>loging-in-Pubhauion Data

Bt>JCllC, Jo>cph M.
The mild ,·oice- or fC'a.son : delibcrati,·e ckmocracy and American
national gO\'<mm<m I Jo.cph M. Bcu<u c.
p. em. - (American politiu and political econom)' Jeria)
lncludn bibliogr;~phical rcfcn:necs and index.
I. United Son es. Congr•••· 2. Lcgi!lation-United States.
~- Democracy-United State•. I. 1i0c. II. Sene>: Amcri<an
politi<J and political economy.
JKIOOI .847 1994
328.73'077-<lc20 93-~0669
C IP

® The paper u.sed in thi.s publk:uion m«U the minimum

roquircmcnu of the A me ricin National St.a ndard for lnfonnation
Scicn<CJ-Pcmta ncncc of Paper for Printed Library Ma terials.
ANSI Z$9.48-1984.
 CONTENTS

Preface xt
Int roduction
2 The Creation of Deliberative Democracy in
the United States 6
3 Uelibcration, Democr.tcy, and Policymaking 40
4 Bargaining and Collective Decisions: The Limits
of Explanation 67
5 Interest, Ambition, and the Character of
Lawmakers 106
6 Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process 150
7 The President's Contribution to Congressional
Deliberations 182
8 Public Opinion and Democratic Statesmanship 212
Appendix: Case Studies of Congress:
Domestic Lebtislation. 1946-1970 247
Notes 25 1
Index 277
[T]he mild voice of reason , pleading the cause of
an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too
often d rowned, before public bodies as well as
individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avid-
ity for immediate and immoderate gain.

James Madison, Federalist no. 42

 n recent yean, many Americans and more than a few political scientists ha,..,

I come to belie,•e that democradc deliberadon in Congreu-wherebyjudgrnenu

are made on the meriu of policies and renect the intc.rests and desires of
American dtiuns-is more myth than re:ality. In 1his major new interpretation of
American government, j oseph M. BeiiiCtte argues that the institutional framework
created by the founding fathers continues to foster a gCM:mment that is both dem~
cratic and deliberath..,, He demonstrates not only the limitations of nondeliberati'"'
explanations for how Ia"~ are made but also the continued -'llllity of genuine rea-
soning on the merits of public policy. Bessette also assesses the contribution of the
presidtncy to policy deliberation and addtases the proptr rtlationshlp of public
opinion to policymaldng.

'1'his ..oorlr. on Congreas and the policymaldng proceas returns modem political
anal)w 10 the lc:-..,1 of seriousneu and public..piritedn<"U of 1M F<tkraBsu. •
-Jarnts C..ascr, Uni...,rsity of Virgini:a

"(This book) will force many in the field to rethink their :assumptions about tht
ways mtmbers of Congress makt their dtcisloru. •
-~ane Mansbridge, NorthWtstern Uni,..,rsity

"Bessette's boolr. iJ one of the moot interesting and important •oolumes written on
Congress in 10me time. It desenft 10 be read by all serious students oflegislative
politics, the presidency. and democratic thtory ... as well as those who would
endeavor to sen ·e the ~public on the noor of the Congress itself."
-Gary 1.. Cregg II, <Anpu and IN Prailkn9

·[A) fascinating and thoughtful book. ... Bessette crafted thiJ book with an obvious
concern for the efficacy of the democratic state, and his ma.ny rich in•ights will be of
lasting value."
-E;Ieen 1.. McDonagh, Political St:Wu• Quortnly

Ja.epb M.. ae-ue is the Alice Tlo,..,ed Tuohy Associate Professor of Co\oemment at
Oaremont McKenna College.

ISBN 0-22b-0~~2~-b

Amcrian Politics and Politial ~my

A ~rics editrd by lknjamin L J'>&e
 Chapter 8 is the most important of Bessettes chapters. But,
in this chapter there is some good transparency stuff that
starts on page 9 of this pdf (and is referenced in chapter 8).
As usual Bessette's finding sources no one else is using.
Click here to go immediately to page 9

CIHAP TER SIX

Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process

[T]his House, in its Legislative capacity, must exercise its

reason; it must deliberate; for deliberation is implied in
legislation.
James Madison, 1796•
[O]bviously I bring a differem view [to Congress]. That
is what any congressman does. That is why we give
speed1es. That is why we are here.
Representative Ga.ry Fran ks, 1991 •
As the last two chapters have demonstrated, any compre-
hensive account of the functioning of Congress must include
both deliberation and nondeliberative activities or influences.
Others have described these two ways of making policy deci-
sions as "problem solving" and "persuasion" versus "bargain-
ing" and "politics";' as "analytical policy making" versus "the
play of power";• and as "discussion" versus "struggle." 5 If we
adopt the term "political" to describe activities and considera-
tions extraneous to the meritS of an issue (which is consistent
with common usage),6 then we would say that political in-
fluences within Congress include such diverse activities as
"wheeling and dealing," favor trading, exercising political
muscle, pursuing private ambition, parliamentary maneuver-
ing, bribery, etc. If we define bargaining broadly-so that
exercising political pressure becomes making side payments-
then bargaining and the pursuit of reelection probably consti-
tute most of the political, or nondeliberative, activities and
influences that affect policymaking in Congress. Writing about
politics generally, Han na Pitkin described well the combina-
tion of deliberation and nondeliberative activities and forces:
Politics abounds with issues on which men are
committed in a way that is not easily accessible to
rational argument, that shapes the perception of
argumentS, that may be unchanged throughout a
lifetime. It is a field where rationality is no guar-

150
Locus of Deliberaticn 151

an tee of agreement. Yet, at the same time, rational arguments

are sometimes relevant, and agreement can sometimes be
reached. Political life is not merely the making of arbitrary
choices, nor merely the resultant of bargaining between sepa-
rate, private wants. It is always a combination of bargaining
and compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting
commitments, and common deliberation about public policy,
to which facts and rational arguments are relevant. 7

This suggests the utility of analyzing congressional behavior in terms

of a deliberation-"politics" dichotomy. As table 3 illustrates, many of the
most important features of the legislative process in Congress are subject
to two distinct interpretations or explanations.
In addition to clarifying the differences between political and delib-
erative explanations, this sketch iJiustrates how far a deliberative in-
terpretation may reach in explaining the structure and procedures of
Congress. Such central features as the dominance of committees, the
role of the leadership and of subgroups within Congress, and the in-
fluence of lobbyists and the executive branch may aU contribute to the
substamive consideration of public policy. The point is not that nonde-
liberative factors or forces are unimportant, but rather that policymaking
within Congress is best understood as a complex mix of politics aiUI de-
liberation, of the "play of power" and the reasoned effort to promote
good policy. With this background we can turn to the key features of the
lawmaking process in Congress.

The Locus of Deliberation in the Modern Congress

To the nonmember and casual observer, Congress presents its delib-
erative face most prominently in public debates on the floor of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. This is where legislative proposals are
advanced and defended, where the opposing sides present information
and arguments to support their positions, and where, ostensibly, mem-
bers are persuaded of the meriL'I or deficiencies of legislative initiatives.
In form at least, floor debate represents the most public and official ex-
pression of Congress's deliberative character, of its responsibility to rea-
son about the merits of public policy.
In important respects, however, the substance does not match the
form. Indeed, one of the frequent disappointments of tourists to the
nation's capital is to sit in the gallery of the House or Senate chamber
and observe a handful of representatives or senators reading speeches in
Table . A Comparison of "Po litical" and Deliberative Explanations or
3
the Congressional Process
Political Deliberative
Issue or
Explanation Explanation
Characteristic

To publicize issues in To elicit the informa-

Function of committee
order to mobilize sup- tion and arguments
hearings
port outside Congress necessary to make in-
formed judgments
Committee dominance An implicit logroll Members defer to the
in the legislative pro- across committees judgment of those who
cess (i.e., high success have deliberated fully
rate on the floor) on the pending issue
Function of floor Merely "pro forma"; or Final opportunity to
debate only tactically signifi- hear the strongest ar-
cant; or useful for en- guments pro and con;
hancing standing with useful also as an infor-
constitutents mation source regard-
ing the contents of
.-effare
complex bills ;:~iM
InAuence of committee Control over resources Members of Congress .:.en! deba tf
and party leaders and/or parliamentary defer to individuals of
procedures enhances sound judgment;
ttH,Ju'e Ru
bargaining leaders persuade oth- limd 16. i
opportuntttes ers through rational
argument
Role of subgroups, Tactically advantageous Facilitates collective
such as state delega- for coordinating the ac- reasoning about com-
tions or ideological tions of like-minded mon concerns
groups legislators (e.g. , maxi-
mizing attendance on
key votes)
lnAuence of lobbyists Ability to influence Source of highly rele-
voters; source of cam- vant information and
paign funds; employ- arguments
ment opportunities for
retired legislators;
bribery
Influence of the execu-
tive branch Possesses vast resources Uses its extensive in-
with which to bargain form ation resources to
for support within persuade legislators of
Congress the merits of its
proposals
Locus of Deliberation 15)

a nearly empty room. In the Senate it is not uncommon for important

bills to be "debated" with as few as three or four senators present. "We
get in here working hot and heavy i.n debate," Senator Ernest Hollings
of South Carolina complained. "and there is no one here to listen." 8 In
the larger House, attendance is usually higher, but many of those who
attend seem more interested in conversing with colleagues, reading the
paper, or even napping than in attending or contributing to debate on
the floor.
If Congress's deliberative character depended crucially on what hap-
pened on the Aoor of the H ouse and Senate, one might be forced to
conclude that serious deliberation plays only a tangential or episodic role
in the business of fas hioning the nation's laws. Yet given the number and
variety of issues that confront the modern Congress together with the
limited time available for Aoor debate, it is clear that most deliberation
111ust occur elsewhere than on the Aoor. Consider, for example, the Nixon
administration's Family Assistance Plan initiative, briefly discussed in
chapter 4. This long and complex legislative proposal would have re-
placed the existing welfare program for families with dependent chil-
dren (AFDC) with something like a guaranteed annual income. Assigned
six hours for general debate on the House floor (in accordance with a
rule issued by the House Rules Committee), it was debated on the after-
noons of April 15 and 16, 1970. (Normally Aoor debate in the House
and Senate takes place in the afternoon, with the mornings officially re-
served for committee meetings.) ll hardly needs arguing that a thorough
examination of the issues involved in the Family Assistance Plan would
require much more than six hours-which is already considerably longer
than the House norm of one or two hours for floor debate on many bills.
Indeed , by the time the bill had reached the House floor it had been the
subject of thirty-five hours of public hearings before the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means and of another seven weeks of executive sessions
of the committee. Whatever deliberation took place on the floor of the
House on the Family Assistance Plan on April 15 and 16, it was dwarfed
by the momhs of deliberation that preceded it.
It is obvious that a few hours of general debate on the floor of the
House or Senate cannot on most measures begin to provide the oppor-
tunity for the searching analysis of issues that a full-fledged deliberative
process requires. The detailed analysis of information and arguments
that constitutes the core of the deliberative process must be concentrated
in earlier stages of the congressional policy process. A recent detailed
154 Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process

analysis of floor politics in the House and Senate concludes that although
floor discussion in the House and Senate does not "achieve the ideal
form of either debate or deliberation," this does not mean "that little
debate or deliberation takes place in Congress. To the contrary, debate
and deliberation occur frequently and everywhere." 9

Formulating and Introducing Policy Initiatives

Although the formal legislative process starts with the introduction of
a bill in the H ouse or Senate by a member of the respective body, the
actual deliberative process may begin weeks and months before, as some
combination of the members of Congress, their staff, executive branch
officials, interest group re presentatives, and outside experts fashion a
policy initiative. In some cases th.is formulation stage may occur entirely
outside Congress. T he historical extreme was reached during the famous
"Hundred Days" of Franklin Roosevelt's first term, when eleven major
bills were drafted in the executive branch "and sent to Congress in se-
quence." T hese received "less than forty hours of debate altogether in
the House and all [were] enacted within sixty days of their submission.
OnJy one major bill (a banking bill) originated within the Congress it-
self." 10 Three decades later, after Lyndon johnson ascended to the presi-
dency, Congress again exhibited an uncharacteristic willingness to accept
policy direction from the executive branch . The landmark Economic
Opportunity Act of I 964, for example, was
"legislated" almost entirely within the executive branch and,
indeed , virtually without prodding from congressional or
other "outside" clienteles. The draft bill that President John-
son sent to Congress on March 16, 1964, was th e product of
almost a year of discussions and negotiations among high
level administrators and economists. The process was culmi-
nated by a barnstorming five weeks of work by a special task
force headed by [R. Sargent] Shriver. 11
Such extreme deference by Congress on policy matters is, however,
quite unusual. It is more common for the members of Congress to con-
tribute directly to the formulation of policy proposals with the assistance
of personal or committee staff and perhaps interested outside parties.
This may involve a kind of min i-deliberative process: not a comprehen-
sive canvass and assessment of diverse opinion on the matter at hand but
instead a more narrowly focused effort by a smaJI group of like-minded
individuals to fashion a legislative remedy to some social, economic, or
 155
.tical problem. Such pre-introdu ction act'IVIty ·
poll may co · .
art of the total congressional deliberation 00 a bill nsutute a maJ.or
~on Act of 1958, for example (briefly discussed .In chapter · The Federal Avla-
4) , b'
11 • •
the formal Ieg•slauve process for a short h · v~s su ~ect
to h . . t ree-month penod from
XI a\ 21. J958, w en It was mtroduced by Senato M'k M
' . 23 h . r I e onroney' to the
followmg August , w en President Eisenhower sig d . .
recedmg . th e b'll'
I s c
tOrma ·
1 Introductio n was an int ne . tt mto h law. Yet
P . . . .· . enslve t ree-month
mg, studted analysis of a·
Penod of.mformat10n gather . . . tr
r
sa1ety problems,
t and drafung and redraftmg of leg•slatJve provisions by a t f h .
. earn o tee nl-
Th
• cal and legal experts o rgamzed
. .
the dehberauon responsible
.
and guided
for the Federal
by Senator
Aviat ·
Mo
Act
nroney.
d
us,
100 occurre at
least as much before the bill was introduced as after.•2
Even bills drafted entirely outside the House and Senate may require
some degree of congressio nal deliberatio n before formal introduction
.- into the chambers. Only members of each body have the authority to
introduce bills; and although members may perform this task as a cour-
tes\ to the executive branch, interest groups, or others, they may at times
refuse to be so closely associated with a new proposal unless persuaded
of its merits. Ranking committee members and party leaders, in particu-
lar, may be reluctant to lend their prestige to a bill until convinced of its
basic soundness and value.
his the importance of prominent sponsorshi p to a bill's prospects for
success in Congress that leads administra tion officials to expend substan-
tial effort in trying to convince committee and party leaders to introduce
presidential proposals. For example, the Kennedy administration's suc-
cessful persuasion of Congressm an Kenneth Roberts of the need for
federal enforceme nt authority in air pollution control (discussed in ch~p­
ter 3) was part of an effort to convince Roberts to sponsor the admt~l­
I istration's bill. Here an important part of the deliberati~·e ~rocess 10
Congress involved simply the decision to sponsor the leglslauon. R?b-
ertss• SWttch · was decisive for the su bcommllte · e h e c hair · ed·· "By changmg
.
ht's own mmd · he at once changed the mm · d s o f t h e subcommtttee, the
primary institution with which he was working." 13 It is possibl~, perhats
likely, that the Clean Air Act of 1963 would not have passed wtthSouhtt ~e
e-
ad .... ·10 · . ·
"' 1Stratton's successful persuaston o t 11S ey
f 1 · k . congressma · . n. uc N'
for sful Prestdent txon,
r ts at persuasion , however, are not always succ~s . t' I971 with
•or example, found that even a persona 1 meetm · g m January o
· h e Commit-
Rep · . R 1 r an on t e 11 ous · . pon-
•esentativejohn Byrnes, rankmg e pu) tc
tee on Ways and Means, could not convmce . . Byr nes· to be the rn~JOT s
156 Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process

sor of the administration's revenue sharing plan. 14 This fai lure turned
out not to be decisive, as the Revenue Sharing Act passed in 1972.

Deliberating within Committees

By design it is in committees and subcommittees that the most de-
tailed and extensive policy deliberation occurs within Congress. The
committee and subcommittee structure of the House and Senate is an
institutional device intended to solve the fundamental deliberative prob-
lem that faces a finite legislative body entrusted with hundreds of com-
plex domestic, foreign, and national security issues. Were the members
of the House and Senate to meet only en bloc to consider legislative
proposals, time limitations alone would render it impossible for the leg-
islators to gather more than the most cursory understanding of the per-
tinent information and arguments bearing on each issue. When the
number and complexity of issues outstrips the time available to each
member to devote to legislative duties, some division of labor is necessar-
ily called for. The committee system of the U.S. Congress, organized on
the basis of subject matter, provides for one such division of labor.
It is within the committees and subcommittees of the House and Sen-
ate that true subject matter expertise can be developed. Although the
full membership of the House and Senate cannot become expert on all
the issues, smaller numbers of each branch can indeed develop expertise
on a smaH set of issues, especially when members serve on the same com-
mittee (or subcommittee) for many years. Thus, the committees and sub-
committees provide an opportunity for the kind of detailed examination
of information and arguments that a genuine and serious deliberative
process requires. In principle, these smaller decision-making units de-
liberate and exercise their judgment for the institutions they serve. As
Senator Muskie explained in his conversations with Bernard Asbell, "In
order to handle the volume of legislation, committees divide up the leg-
islative work, the spadework as it were. So committee credibility is an
awfully important thing." Indeed, "a reputation for good judgment" may
be the most important factor in explaining why some committees are
more influential than others in Congress. "'
Public hearings are an essential element of committee deliberation.
And although they often serve other purposes as well-such as gener-
ating public support for bills, embarrassing the administration, or pro-
moting the visibility, and perhaps reelection prospects, of committee
members-hearings are eminently suited for investigating the merits of
pending proposals. Witnesses appear before the committee, make brief
 [)lltbfratlllg u•ithin Committtes
157

tatements, present longer form al statemems C'lOr the record d

ora1 . .
ond to questions from commmee membe S h . • an
res P . fl . I . rs. uc wnnesses ofte0
tude the chte egts · h
auve sponsors of the bill ' h •g k' . .
10C . . . -ran mg admtmstra-
. offiCials. other mterested members of Congress, state and/or local
uo 0 . .
fficials, representatives of mterest groups (including pu bl tc ' .
O ·d . . mterest
and outs• e experts. In prmctple hearings ought ..d C'
groups).
. . . . ' tO prov1 e lOr
.
a wtde range of vtews fot and agamst the proposal uncle r const'd erauon-
,et it is not unus.ual to hear charges t~at witness lists are "stacked" by th~
Chairman and hts staff to fa vor. one stde or the other· One sc hoar 1 goes
so far as to argue that ~ongresstonal hearings on domestic spending pro-
~ grams ha,·~ be~ome, m effect, "rump hearings" where only the pro-
de~ spending stde IS presented, thus resulting in a "systematic departure
each from the parliamentary ideal." ts
The vitality of discussion frequently manifested in committee hear-
.llnit ~ ings, especially on significant public issues, and the importance that
ton ofbl,1
politically sophisticated actors attach to the thorough and careful prepa-
"'.An;r~
. ..... ration of testimony indicate that the hearing process is not generally a
dmi • pro forma exercise. Again , according to Senator Muskie, "committee
oi :."t r-.. hearings are supposed to make a contribution .... You try to shape the
lelr..tJ. . hearings so that there is dialogue, debate. Questions are raised so the
.~,~
•
I ~;.o.,..
... committee understands the underlying complexities." 17 More so than is
often recognized, committee members demonstrate an interest in, and
deed de
openness to, what can be learned during hearings.
ieneon~
Not only do hearings serve the information needs of committee and
1eco~ subcommittee members entrusted with making the initial recommenda-
,r dewid~ tion on a proposed bill, they may also shape the subsequent debate in
nd ~r~ Congress by surfacing the major arguments for and against the pe~~ing
hwn-:Jlll-· measure and by clarifying the strengths and weaknesses of each posmon.
In his account of the passage of the Watenvay User Charge Act of 19~8
J[tl!JIJili d
rh~JI
~reviewed in chapter 4), T. R. Reid relates how, even th~ugh the bill
I J, iUC Introduced by Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico held lmle prospect
of passage, "there was a host of people who considered t~e [S~nate] ~ub­
!lee) Ul'
Jlllrtcf ~~ committee hearings crucially important." 18 These heanngs 1 ~ Apnl of
..lj~J·
Jr~"' f!.i 1977 were "the first extended public debate by interested parttes on the
so!lle pros and cons of the idea [of a waterway user fee]. The argu~ents set
forth at the hearing would shape Congress's debate over the Issue for
months ... to come." t9 Through four days of hearings more t~an four
do2 . • t rs an academ1c econo-
en Witnesses testified includtng severa 1sena 0 • .
mist, representatives of the affected barge interests, conse~' ~uon s:ouph~·
and s d The paruCipants 10 t 1s
ecretary of Transportation Brock A ams.
 Deliberation and the Lawnwking Proa 11
158

initial public debate on the ..vaterway user fee show~d every i.ndication of
appreciating its importance to subsequent congresstonal deliberation on
the issue.
If there is sufficie n t support to report a bill at the conclusion of the
hearings. the committee (or subcommittee) will ~eet in a "m~r~up" ses-
sion, a line-by-line reading and (often) redrafttng of the o n gmal pro-
posal. ll is in these sessions that the detailed substantive decisions are
3
made in light of the testimony presented in the h earings. The character •
of these bill-writing sessions varies from committee to committee and ..:~!bJI
from ch airman to chairman; some markups are con siderably mo re delib- ' nrut
erative than oth ers. Sen ator Muskie described his manner o f running ~ttl~
markups before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Po llution ,olle
this way: "I don't come before them with a fait accompli. l d o n't begin _ o~n
markups saying, 'Now, this is what 1 think we n eed to d o.' I let the thing
.. retU
evolve. But l make proposals as we go along .... I'll lay out issues one
at a time, as somethin g 1 think has m erit, that I'm willing to discuss and
debate, and listen to their reactions." 20 H er e is how the lo bbyist for the
environmental group, Frie nds of the Earth, described the markups be-
fore Muskie's subcommittee:
The whole operation is much m o re subtle tha n I thought.
One of th e surprises is t h at the orch estratio n o f deals is not
apparent,. at least t~ me. What goes on is the working out o f
compromtse .... I tmag ined , when they we re behind closed
doo.rs, that the decisions would be much fa ster . Yo u know, the
ch.atrman names the issue, everybody's already made up his
mmd or made his trades, a nd t h ey vote. But it's n ot like that.
There's a real process. ...

. best. thing abo u t mar k ups , the reason I go to th e m reh-.

The
. k' ' ts that yo u can pte
gtously · k up the nuances of each m e mber ,s
t h tn . mg · You do n 't get t h
. at f rom their public sta te m ents and
pu bl •c postures.
spected
.
h . , You ge t to see who's arttculate, who's re-
' w o tsn t, how the dynamics work.2•
.
This cha raCLe rization is broad ly constste · f
markup . . nt with an earlier d escriptiOn o
5esstons 10 o ne of h
tends to be · c- • t e standard works o n committees: "there
pany and sen· tnlormal
· .
gtve-and ·ta ke among the members th at crosses
IOrtty 1tnes ' th . ' n·
members say that h' wt con stderable freedom . Perce pu vc .sta
at t ts stage th · II . 111ce
and the member wh h , e. ga ery player' d eclines in unport•
0
as done hts h o m ework' takes the lead ." 21
Committee Defmse of Recommtmdatitms 159

This last description was written at a time when nearly all markup
sessions were conducted behind closed doors. O ne reason why the "gal-
lery player" was less important in markups than in hearings or on the
floor was simply because there was no public gallery in markup sessions,
no broader audience to which the member could appeal beyond the
committee members and staff present. The markups put a premium on
face-to-face discussions on the substantive details of legislative proposals,
thereby enhancing the importance of the legislator who was more inter-
ested in drafting a sound bill than in promoting hjs personal popularity.
This suggests that in some circumstances deliberation may benefit from
restrictions on public scrutiny. It thus raises the question whether the
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s in Congress designed to foster greater
accountability of legislators and more "government in the sunshine"-
including the opening of markup sessions-have been good for delibera-
tion. (We shall return to tills issue in chapter 8.)

T he Committee Defense of Its Recommendations

As noted earlier, the committee system is a concession to the dictates
of deliberation. To ensure that the merits of issues are adequately ad-
dressed, the full bodies delegate the central deliberative function to sub-
units of the institution. These subunits do not merely act, or wi.ll, for the
parent body, but reason, or deliberate, for it. In an ideal legislature, com-
mittees will always decide exactly as the parent body would have if the
full body had considered with the same care and attention the informa-
tion and arguments presented to the committee. In such a legislature,
every committee would perfectly represenL the full body across every
dimension that might affect legislative decisions, such as party member-
ship, ideology, geography, interest group support, responsiveness to
publjc opinion, etc. In the real world, however, such perfect correspon-
dence of comntittees with their parent institutions cannot be presumed;
thus, the legislature cannot realistically expect that committee delibera-
tions will invariably lead to the same decisions that would have resulted
from full-fledged deliberation before the entire body.25 It follows that the
legislature must in some way judge the judgments of its committees. Al-
though it lacks the time to duplicate committee deliberations, the full
body must nonetheless assess the merits of committee recommendations.
Consequently, it is not enough simply for the committees to make deci-
sions; they must defend their decisions before the full body. In the mod-
ern House and Senate there are two principal mechanisms through
160 Deliberation and the Launna,king Process

which committees seek to persuade nonmembers of the merits of their

decisions: in writing in a committee report and orally through floor
debate.
The committee report is designed to communicate in a clear and effi-
cient way the major provisions of a recommended bill and the arguments
for and against (if there are dissenting views) its passage. More than a
formal accounting of the committee's recommendation, it is written to
persuade others of the wisdom of the committee's decision by providing
"condensed, readily usable informarjon." 24 The author of a major study
of voting decisions in the House concluded that the committee report's
"brevity and summary nature, its ready availability on the floor, and its
usefulness as a kind of communication channel for members of the com-
mittee, make the report a particularly valuable source .... Of all the
types of reading available, this one probably has more direct, immediate
impact on specific votes than any other." 2 ~ Similarly, the author of a stan-
dard work on congressional procedures writes that "[f]or many mem-
bers, or their staff aides, the report is the only document they read before
deciding how to vote on an issue." 26
The final test of the committee's recommendation occurs on the floor
of the House or Senate. Indeed, it is less accurate to think of the floor
proceedings as open and general debate among the members of each
body than as an opportunity for the committee to defend its recommen-
dations. (A more general discussion of floor debate follows.) Those who
manage the debate for and against the bill, by choosing the other speak-
ers and controlling their time, are usually leading members of the re-
porting committee or subcommittee; and most of the principal debaters
are usually members of the reporting committee. Throughout the de-
bate the focus is on the committee's work and the committee's recom-
mendations. Committee leaders seek to persuade the membership that
the committee has carefully and fully deliberated on the bill at hand and
reached a sound judgment of its merits.
Since floor debate offers relatively little time to demonstrate the
merits of the bill under consideration, especially if it is a long and com-
plicated proposal, one task of the bill's proponents is to convince non-
committee members to trust the judgment of the committee-in effect,
to defer to the previous committee deliberations. For example, during
the House debate on the Family Assistance Plan in April of 1970, Rep-
resentative Hale Boggs, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means
Committee, told the membership that
Corr.mittte D1mse of Recommendatzons
161
more than a majority of the memb
\\a\ and Means at the beginning 0 fe~s of the Committee on
the proposal with considerable m· _t _e hearings approached
. ISgtvmgs But f
ing alternatives.' ~nd after looking hard · a ter exam~n-
callr at the extstmg welfare programs 'a~~efully, and cnti-
worked over the past 30 years-after th ~ow t~ey have
and very intensive debate the comm't at very mtens1ve study
. ' I tee came as I 'd I
most to a unarumous conclusion that th' h. sal •a -
. 1s was t e prope r an d
right thmg to do.2'
·1
·-\committee Republican , Jackson Betts • made as·1m1 ar appeal:
The Ways and Means Committee has spent ho dd
k f d .b . urs an ays
and wee s o e 11 _erat1ons and has, with refining amend-
ments, approved th1s proposal overwhelmingly.

On the basis of this tremendous amount of work, honest and

conscientious effort to answer the objections which have been
made to the present welfare program over the }Cars. 1 do not
hesitate to ask the H ouse to support this biJJ.:?s
At the conclusion of the debate, Carl Albert, the Majoritv Leader. spoke
briefly in favor of the bill. He did not discuss its merits but simply noted
that although "the bill before us may not be perfect, ... an overwhelm-
ing number of those members who serve on the committee that has had
the responsibility for this matter have reported it out and ha'e recom-
29
mended it to the House as being better than the existing S}Stem."
In each of these cases, the bill's proponents were asking the mem-
bers of the House to trust the judgment of the \\'a\s and ~feans Com-
.
mntee. The proponents argued t h at t h e mem bers ofrhe commHtee . were
· · · ·s proposal \ eL after
themselves initially skeptical of the a d m1msrranon · d
. . d t ') over mam months an
senously investigating the issue m great e al . .
c d ·nst
1 thiS maJOr deparrure
f
care ully reviewing the arguments ,or an aga . ·rree
. d 0 f · menrs Non-comm1
m welfare policy they were persuade Its ·. h. kind of
' ity to duphcate t IS
members, who do not have the opportun . h s done a sen-
d ·1 hat the commutee a
eta1 ed deliberation, ought to trust t d . d menton the issue.
ous and responsible job and has reached a soun ~u g eached the same
I I . h l the commntee r f
mp ICJt m this appeal is rhe '1e'-\ t a h d 'fall the members o
co nc1us1on that the full bod} wou Jd have reac. e 1 d " and "mtensJ\e . ·.
th . ''intensive stu \ .
e House had engaged m the same f "honest and consCJen-
~ebate" and had devoted rhe same amoun_r o As noted in rhaprer -t,
hou!l effort" to this maner as had the committee.
162 Delib~at.irm and the Lawmaking P1·ocess

participant-observer Daniel Moynihan concluded that "the committee

had done the work of the House ,for the H ouse.... This was deference
to reasonable, moderate men." 30
Thus, the very logic of the committee system in the House and Senate
dictates some degree of deference by the full membership to the judg-
ments of their committees; for there would be little point in having com-
mittees at all if the full bodies could thoroughly deliberate on committee
recommendations afresh. It is not surprising, then , that on average the
House and Senate endorse about 65-70 percent of committee recom-
mendations without revision and pass another 15-20 percent of com-
mittee bills with amendments. In only about 10-20 percent of the cases
do the full bodies simply reject committee proposals. 3 1 If observers such
as Moynihan and participants such as former Senator Muskie are to be
believed, a committee's "reputation for good judgment" is decisive to its
success in the full body.
In addition to the importance of its collective reputation for sound
deliberation and good judgment to its success on the floor, the commit-
tee also exerts influence through its individuaJ members. When non-
members of the committee are seeking guidance as to how to vote on the
floor, they may look not only to the decision of the committee as a whole
but also to the views and position of one or a few members whose judg-
ment they trust. Every legislative committee in the House and Senate has
both Democrats and Republicans; most also have some representation
of the ideological range within the two parties; and most have members
from diverse kinds of districts or states throughout the nation (urban or
rural, industrial or agTicultural, etc.). In many cases the nonmembers of
the committee will be able to identify committee members who share
their basic politicaJ orientation and whose judgment they can rely on as
a guide to how they themselves would have decided if they had deliber-
ated fully on the issue. According to one study of "cue-taking" in the
House of Representatives: "When a member is confronted with the ne-
cessity of casting a roll-call vote on a complex issue about which he knows
very little, he searches for cues provided by trusted coUeagues who-
because of their formal position in the legislature or policy specialization
[i.e. , usually members of the reporting committee)-have more infor-
mation than he does and with whom he would probably agree if he had
the time and information to make an independent decision."'2 This de-
liberative short-cut will be most effective when the "cue-giver's" policy
views closely match those of the nonmember of the committee and when
Commitlee Defense of Recommemlalions 163

he has genuinely "done his homework" by closely reviewing the perti-

nent information and arguments and seriously thinking through the
merits of the issue at hand. If either of these conditions is absent, then
the nonmember's vote may not match what he would have decided if he
had served on the committee and had personally reviewed the issue at
length."
Because the committee's success on the floor depends at least in part
on convincing the full body that its members have reached a sound
judgment on the bill under consideration, one way for opponents to un-
dermine the committee's case is to challenge the sufficiency of its delib-
erations. An illustrative example is the Senate floor debate on a relatively
obscure bill reported by the Government Operations Committee that
would have disposed of several thousand acres of federal land in lllinois,
the DesPiaines Public Hunting and Wildlife Refuge Area, by selling part
of the land for industrial development, selling another part to the state
of Illinois at fair market value, and transfet·ring the final portion to Illi-
nois at no cost for conservation and recrear.ion purposes. The precise
arrangement had been worked out by an ad hoc subcommittee of three,
chaired by Senator Edmund Muskie. Senator Wayne Morse strongly op-
posed the bill because it violated the so-called "Morse formula," which
was an understanding that had guided previous Senate decisions for sev-
eral years that required that when federal land was transferred to public
agencies for public purposes such agencies should pay one-half the fair
market value. Muskie's bill had not actually applied this formula, al-
though it may have approximated the result.
For three days Morse spoke out against the bill on the Senate floor.
T hroughout the debate he attacked the competence of the commit-
tee's work, especially its failure to investigate thoroughly the Army's
claim that one of the tracts of land in the bill was needed for military
purposes:

I say most respectfully that the committee report docs not sat-
isfy me that the members of the committee wem thoroughly
into the mattet· of whether the Army in fact needs this prop-
erty for Army purposes. I think the Senate is entitled to a
much more thorough hearing, I say respectfull y, than the one
the committee gave this matter.' •

Morse did not argue that the committee was wrong about the Army's
claim, but only that the presumption in such a case should be in favor of
/64 DeliberatiQII and the lAW111ailing Process

the Army and that although "that presumption is subject to rebuttal ...
the committee should have presented in the report the evidence in re-
buttal, in addition to the committee's conclusion ."'~ The committee
serves only "as an agent of the Senate as a whole," but on this matter
"the committee has not fulfilled all its oblit,rations of agency." 36 Morse
concluded, "As the senior Senator from Oregon, I am entitled to evalu-
ate the work of the committee. I think the committee did a poor job. I
want the Record to show that evaluation.""
Muskie and subcommittee member Senator Ernest Gruening de-
fended their work before the Senate. Gruening maintained that "the
committee made a very thorough study.... [It] very patiently heard all
sides again and again; and I doubt whether many investigations were
any more thorough than this one."'8 Muskie was equally forceful in de-
fending the committee's work:
I submit, in behalf of the subcommittee, that we devoted
long hours to this problem. We listened to a great deal of tes-
timony in the hearings and talked with a great many persons
outside the hearings....

I emphasize again that this action was not taken lightly. It

was not done ofThandedly. It was not done without long, seri-
ous. meticulous thought and care ....

[W]e were not negligent in considering the bill; ... we re-

ally probed for the facts which we considered important;
and ... we acted after deliberate consideration of those facts,
and reached a judgment which we thought was fair.'9
Although Morse was not successful in persuading the Senate mem-
bership to overturn its committee, the debate between him and the
committee underlines the extent to which floor debate in Congress is
dominated by the committee's deliberations and serves as a final testing
of the soundness of the committee's judgment.
This debate also highlights an important House-Senate difference. In
the House Morse's prolonged challenge to the committee would have
been impossible, for it is unlikely that such a relatively minor bill would
have been assigned more than one, at most two, hours of general debate.
Morse, himself, would have been lucky to receive up to thirty minutes to
make his case. Because the length of House floor debate, control over
who speaks, and the kinds of amendments permitted on the floor are all
determined by rules issued by the House Rules Committee and voted on
 iff Drjmu of Recommendatzom
CormnIl 165
tt~
1~ b\ the membership.' oppone~ts_ to ~om mittee bills are forced to abide by
<~n­ procedural constram ts and ng1d ume limitations beyond their control.
lh,l. In the enate, o n the othe r hand , where most debate is governed by
t) '\ \1 ··unanimous consent agreements," a single senator can refuse to abide by
Jtd lrJ the proposed speaking limitations and _ca_n therefore can speak at length
a11~ on a matter before the fu ll body. Th1s 1s perhaps the most important
and consequential difference between House and Senate procedures. At
times this privilege of speaking at length in the Senate, one of the most
!ltd cherished traditions with in the body, becomes a parliamentary device for
:rl!h actuallY preventing a vote on a bill. Such "filibusters" can be broken,
under current rules, by a "cloture" vote requiring the support of a con-
ll~
stitutional three-fifths of the membership (sixty senato rs). Even when
forct:·A
"cloture" is invoked, however, it usually comes only after the opponents
of a bill have had ample time to vent an issue full y.
It is the Senate's much smaller size than the House a nd its tradition of
operating less by formal rule than by "gentlemanly" agreement among
its members that make it possible to have procedures that allow indi-
'idual members to speak at le ngth on the fl oor (although this can wreak
ha\·oc with the scheduling process and give members numerous oppor-
tunities at the end of the session to extort concessions from their col-
leagues). This opportunity to e ngage in extended debate gives individual
senators, especially nonmembe rs of the reporting committee (such as
Senator Morse in the above exa mple), a much greater chance than their
House colleagues have to influence the full body's deliberations on a
pending matter. Thus Senate deliberations o n legislative issues are poten-
tially much less constrained by prio r committee deliberations. Senators
need not defer to committees quite as much as their House collea~es
do, because floor debate in the Senate affords much more opponumt-v
ror an independent review and assessment of the key issues involved in
a committee recommendation .
_It is only occasionally, however, that senators can tak~ advantage of
this opportun ity · for over the course of a legislative sessiOn the Senate
has only about a~ much time as the House to debate approximate!) the
~ame number of issues and bills on the floor. The opponunit }' afforded
Individual senato rs to speak at length on rh.e floor c~n n.ei thc• mcrease
the net time available for floor debate dunng a IeglslatJ\ e session nor
t<:duce the number and complexity of issues to be a?dressc~. I hus. the
ba\1<. pattern that applies in the House holds al.so 111 the Senate: most
dtiJlx:ratlon necessarily occurs within the commlllees, and fl oor debate
~<:rve . · • · d
s as a fina l test of the committees JU gmen t ·
 ,.. pmuss
Drllbrraticm and thr Lau·makma
/M

Per~uao;ion through Floor Debate

isputed that Aoor debate focuses attentiOn on the
\\ h 1Ie H canno t be d . . .
. f . •nd 1ruuments suppo rting a committee s pohcv recommen
m ormauon .. • .., . -
. h'lt ., le"" clear is whether real pers uas1on occurs as a result or
d auo11'>. '' • 1 · ·tS most eas1·1\ d'1scerned ,,·hen
. d 1 the Aoor uch persuasiOn
\\ hat IS '\al 0 I · . .
le~'lawrs actuall' change their minds .after lt~temng to or participating
Aoor debate Although the con\'enuonal w1sdo~ h~lds that floor de-
111
bate does not change minds. case sru?ies o~ the legtslauve process as ,,ell
•I • j

as the tesumom of participants provtde ev1dence to the contrary. ~Jl ~

The authors o f the studies of two modern landmark statutes, the Em- .,e\er.
plm mem Act of 1946 and the Landrum-Griffin (Labor Refo:~> ACl of ~f II~
1959. report that speeches on the floor of the Senate were dec1s1ve to the ~:Ilforlll
success of the bills. During Senate floor debate on the former. Senator ~(l)Ol
jo eph O'~lahoner. "an independent, middle-of-the-road Democrat ...
~lh~l
[with a reputation] of knowing more economics than anrone else on
,ilie If
Capitol H1ll." deli,ered a major speech in support of the Full Emplov-
~mecr
mem Bill.~ In his comprehensi,·e case study Stephen Bailey describes its
,~er ii
effects:
-Educ
It 1s rare that a speech on the floor of the Senate actualh
chan~es stubborn Senate minds. 0 '.\lahonev's presentation
was an exception. It is generally conceded bv friend and foe
alike that the \\\ oming Senator's dramatic, illustrated lecture Carl
on the economics o f S. 380 had a marked effect on the final Der
\Ote \\'ith the use o f charts and graphs placed in the well of 100 ~ff
the enate floor and against the back wall of the chamber. the
~:)'~ l ahone\ breathed economic respectability into the pend- .ott ft()(
mg.legislauon: With the attitude of a patient professor he ex-
aa har
plamed techmcal economic concepts to his colleagues. 11
~i~t

In the second case a s peech by Senator j ohn McClellan persuaded the

~enate to adopt a tough labor reform bill. H ere two independent in,es-
ugators reponed the persuasive effects of McClellan's speech:

I~ a length., Senate speech . . . ~1cCiellan delivered an impas-

s~on~d ~lea for a toug h labor law, punctuated by references to
the ndmgs of his Select Committee .... The atmosphere in
~ e Senate became o ne o f marked deference and adulauon
°~ enator ~lcCiellan . the proven long-publicized fighter of
1
: r ~?rupuon. As a result of his ~peech the focus of the de-
atde s 1 ted sudden ly to ~fcCiellan and aw~" from [John] Ken-
' o f the debate ··
ne ' · · - · \fcCiellan no,.. clear!} had charge
Persuasion through Floor Debate 167

Spectators could actually feel the Senate respond to the

speech delivered in the grand manner reminiscent of the ora-
tory of the century before. It was clear that senators had been
moved. 45
On these important bills, according to the case study authors, some
senators were persuaded to vote contrary to their original inclinations by
what they heard on the Aoor. How often this occurs is impossible to de-
termine; nonetheless, no less seasoned an observer and legislative par-
ticipant than fom1er Speaker of the House J im Wright of Texas has
written that "some votes are always changed by debate."•• As we have
seen, however, genuine persuasion does not require an actual change of
mind; for it also includes the process whereby the reasoned considera-
tion of information and arguments moves a legislator from broad initial
dispositions or preferences to specific decisions or actions. We should not
conclude that because final positions are consistent with original incli-
nations the intervening debate was without effect. On the contrary, it
may be the crucial link between inclinations and decisions.
Consider in this respect the House debate on the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Ed ucation Act of 1965. The following case study excerpts show
the importance of a Aoor debate th at in the end did not actually change
congressional minds:
Carl Perkins then assumed the brunt of the leadership for
the Democrats. He cited the need for federal aid legislation
and offered broad supporting comments on the significance
of the particular bill before the House. After he gave up
the Aoor, the Republicans ... , led by Goodell of New York,
hit hard at what they thought were the weak spots in the
legislation.

The Republican attacks on the formu la and other aspects

of the program began to have telling effect on the Democrats.
Goodell had Perkins, Powell, and H ugh Carey disagreeing
among themselves about what the biU was intended to ac-
complish and just how specific programs would work under
the law.. . .

But even with all the research and preparation, the Demo-
crats were reeling under the attacks of the Republicans. Per-
kins had been an effective subcommittee chairman by many
accounts, but to several observers and participants he was not
in control of the Aoor situation. ll was precisely this kind of
168 Deliberation and tlte LawiiUlking Proce.ss

situation that the Democratic leadership wanted to avoid.

They did not want the key sections of the bill to appear inde-
fensible to that body of liberal Democrats unsure of what they
were about to support. ...

While all this was occurring, the Administration's education

strategists were siuing in the gallery of the House, "scared to
hell" as one of them put it. 4 $

The Democrats eventually regrouped and carried tl1e final vote. In the
end, most liberals supported this liberal bill. But if this account is accu-
rate, liberal support was not automatic, not a foregone conclusion inde-
pendent of ilie debate on the floor. The proponents' early mishandling
of ilie debate in the face of effective Republican opposition seriously
jeopardized the bill's chances for passage because, for a while at least, key
provisions "appear[ed] indefensible" to the body of liberal Democrats
who were inclined to support federal aid to education.
In some cases a representative or senator may carry cross-cutting in-
clinations with him or her into floor debate. Senator Muskie recounts
how he attended floor debate in the Senate one day in 1975 to decide
how to vote on an appropriations bill amendment authored by Senator
John Tunney that would have denied funds for an experimental dem-
onstration of a breeder reactor. "On the face of it," Muskie reported,
"that looked like an amendment I would naturally support, it being the
environmentalist position." In this case, however, Muskie's inclination to
support the "environmentalist position" was opposed by a five-page
memo written by one of his staff recommending a vote against the Tun-
ney amendment. Muskie's reaction: "What the heiJ gives? So I went there
and sat and listened to ilie debate until I made up my mind. And I voted
against the Tunney amendment.... That was a case where I decided to
stay there long enough to hear Tunney explain his view, and [Senator
J ohn] Pastore explain his view, and that gave me a better perspective on
the vote than the memo did."•6
Whatever the actual impact of the arguments advanced on the floor
of the House or Senate, there can be little dispute that most floor debates
on important national issues involve some element of real, often vigor-
ous, exchange between the opposing sides. The bill's sponsors (almost
always from the reporting committee) begin by explaining and defend-
ing their proposal; opposing legislators attack weaknesses in ilie bill; the
proponents respond to opposition charges. Generally, as in the case of
the House debate on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a
PerSI.LilSitm through Floor Debate 169

biJI's defenders are not free to ignore the opposition. The two sides do
not simply talk past one another but enter into a real exchange. Of
course, the leaders in the debate do not try to persuade each other;
rather their efforts are directed toward those listeners who remain un-
decided. Even if this is a small fraction of the whole, successful persua-
sion on the floor may be decisive on a closely di vided issue. In fact,
reports one investigator, "it is still a regular occurrence that a quarter or
so of the House membership will spend hours in the chamber listening
to the debate; if not to change their minds, then at least ro gain more
infonnation, to listen for new arguments, or perchance to formulate an
opinion when they do not hold a strong view.''H
ln addition to actually attending floor debate, there are other ways
that members of the House and Senate can be informed and influenced
by what is said on the floor. One is through staff. As an aide to Senator
Domenici reported, a senator unable to attend floor debate personally
may "send at least one staff guy to sit in the gallery and take notes, so
you're debating for the staff and you hope they'll pass the good stuff on
to their Senator."•8 Another mechanism for following floor debate with-
out actually attending is through the Cong?·essional Record, which is de-
livered to all House and Senate offices early in the morning following
each day's debate. The legislator may scan the Record or have staff ex-
cerpt or highlight important sections. While this does not help with de-
bate limited to a single day, it can be an effective way to track the
information and arguments presented during a several-day debate. In-
deed, it may be "a far more efficient way of following the proceedings
than spending time on the floor. "'19 Moreover, for some years now House
and Senate offices have received live broadcast coverage (firsLjust audio,
then audio and video) of proceedings on the floor, allowing staff to track
floor debate for legislators tied up with other activities. Finally, these
mechanisms may be supplemented by informal word of mouth whereby
important d evelopments on the floor are communicated throughout in-
formal networks of legislators and their aides.
It follows, then, that low attendance on the fioor of the House or Sen-
ate does not mean that floor debate serves no deliberative purposes. A
fascinating example of such a case reportedly occurred during Senate
floor debate on the San Luis Reclamation Bill of 1960, during which the
arguments advanced by Senators Paul Douglas and Wayne Morse over
four days to a nearly empty chamber attacking a key provision of the
committee bill successfully persuaded a majority of the body.
At issue was whether long-standing federal policy limiting tO 160 acres
170 Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process

the amount of a farmer's land (320 acres if married) that could be irri-
gated with water from a federal reclamation project ought to apply to
the state portion of a proposed joint federal-state water project in Cali-
fornia (called the San Luis reclamation project). The Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs had unanimously reported to the full
Senate a bill to authorize the joint project that specifically exempted the
state portion from the restrictions of federal reclamation law. This ex-
emption had not seemed pa1·ticularly controversial since this issue had
not been raised or debated by any of the parties during the one-day
hearing before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation. With
its broad bipartisan support and unanimous committee endorsement,
the bill seemed assured of passage by the full Senate. Nonetheless, after
four full days of floor debate, during which Senators Douglas and Morse
vigorously attacked the exemption provision in the face of the uncom-
promising opposition of the bill's sponsors, the exemption was defeated
by the full membership. Douglas's explanation for why he and Morse
were successful , presented on the floor just after the amended bill passed
the Senate, is worth quoting at length:
Mr. President, I think the result of this vote indicates the
importance of discussion and debate, because when the bill
was brought to the floor on last Tuesday everything was ap-
parently primed for its speedy passage. The committee ...
had brought in a report advocating the bill with the inclusion
of section 6(a) [the exemption provision). This provision was
supported by the two very amiable, popular, and able Sena-
tors from California. The great majority did not know a Sl·eat
deal about the bill, and therefore was ready to approve it.
1 must admit that the two Senators who primarily took the
floor to oppose the measure, the senior Senator from Oregon
and the senior Senator from Illinois, would probably never
win any popularity contest among the members of this body.
We had before us for consideration, therefore, a measure
with everything in its favor.
The Senator from Oregon and the Senator from lllinois in
the debates of last week and yesterday tried to develop the
facts in this case, and I think we demonstrated to the satisfac-
tion of those who listened and read the Record that, with sec-
tion 6(a) in it, it was a bad bill.
There were only a few people who listened to the debates.
At times it seemed to be a futile exercise. There were only a
Persua.sitm through Floor Debate 171

few people on the floor as we talked against what seemed to

be overwhelming odds.
Yet the extraordinary thing is that as the facts were devel-
oped one could see the opinion of the Senate change. Senator
after Senator took the floor to say he believed section 6(a) was
a bad section and should be eliminated from the bill.
T he analysis of the bill spread by a process of osmosis
thro ugh the Senate as a whole, so that those who did not hear
the debates nevertheless read the Record or colleagues upon
whom they relied relayed information to them:~0

Normally a unanimous committee recommendation on a bill of pri-

marily local interest would be decisive. In this case senators who did not
serve on Interior and Insular Affairs knew little to nothing about the
details of the proposed reclamation project, had no reason to believe that
substantial controversial issues were at stake-especially given the com-
mittee's unanimous endorsemem-and thus were inclined to defer to
the deliberations of tl1e committee. Yet according to Douglas the argu-
ments that he and Senator Morse advanced on the floor over four days
were decisive to the defeat of the exemption provision even though few
senators were actually present to hear their case. T he "discussion and
debate" that occurred on the floor developed facts and issues that chal-
lenged the merits of the exemption provision of the committee bill. A
few senators "listened'' to the arguments against the bill in person, some
"read the Record," and others were relayed information from "colleagues
upon whom they relied." In the end, the arguments made on the floor,
carried throughout the Senate largely through indirect means ("a pro-
cess of osmosis"), persuaded a majority that the committee proposal "was
a bad bill."
A detailed examination of the four days of debate on the San Luis
reclamation proj ect reveals additional features of the deliberative process
that led the Senate to reject the exemption provision. This episode about
a relatively obscure bill provides a useful window on the nature of delib-
eration in Congress.
First, in opposing the committee proposal Douglas and Morse empha-
sized that the committee had not really addressed the merits of exempt-
ing the state portion of the joint project from the restrictions of federal
reclamation law. Since the committee had not genuinely deliberated on
this issue, the usual deference to committee deliberations was not justi-
fied. Indeed, on the third day of debate, a member of the reporting com-
172 Deliberatio11 a11d the Lawmaking Process

mittee, Senator John Carroll, took the floor to explain that the commiuee
had not in fact considered the implications of the exemption provision
and that the floor debate had convinced him to oppose this feature of
the bill that he had previously endorsed. Thus, Douglas and Morse did
not so much ask their colleagues to reject the j udgment of the committee
as to deliberate on issues largely overlooked by the committee; for the
floor debate was the first time that these issues were fully addressed. As
noted earlier, Senate procedures provide a greater opportunity than ex-
ists in the House of Representatives for challenging committee recom-
mendations through extended debate on the floor.
Second, Douglas and Morse gave two kinds of reasons for insisting
that the debate, after fi lling most of a Tuesday and T hursday, should
carry over into t11e next week. One was to give senators not in attendance
sufficient opportunity to stud y the record that had been made on the
floor so that they could understand "the merits of this issue." 5 1 The other
was to give the American people a chance to reflect on the controversy
and to communicate their views to their senators. "We are confident;'
Morse explained , "that once the American people come to understand
our position, they will be with us, as the American people always have
been in all the other areas when land frauds and land steals-what I
would call in this instance a water steal-finally come to be understood
by them." 52 Even after debate resumed on the following Monday after-
noon, Morse was still predicting an extended fi ght: "There will be some
more afternoons of debate on this issue, if necessary, in order to make
the public aware of what is involved." 53 Denying the charge that he and
Morse were threatening to "filibuster," Douglas maintained that the
vote had to be delayed "to develop the debate and the public under-
sta nding." 54
At first gla nce these two reasons for extending debate might appear
to reflect two distinct strategies for defeating the exemption provision :
( 1) a deliberative strategy, persuading senators through arguments on
the merits, and (2) a political pressure strategy, generating constituency
pressure by taking the case direclly to the people. This second strategy
helps to explain the heavy dose of high-flown rhetoric and impassioned
declamation engaged in by Douglas and Morse. Characteristic was Doug-
las's vow "to fight on the beaches, in the fields, on the streets, and from
house to house, in an effort to protect the people of the United States
from one of the greatest land steals that has ever been attempted in the
history of the Nation." 55 He accused the bill's proponents of "com[ing)
Per.ruasiun through Floor Debate 173

into this chamber shackled with the chains of the Southern Pacific Land
Co., the Boston Ranch Co., the Kern County Land Co., the Standard
Oil Co., the other oil companies, and other large landowners in this
area ." 56 And he wondered why on this issue the bill's leading proponents,
California Senators Thomas Kuchel and Clair Engle, should be "against
the people." 57 ln a similar vein Morse called on the Senate to "stand
up . .. against powerful interests when they seek to execute such a dia-
bolical scheme which would do such great damage to the public interest.
There is no language I know of that could gloss it over. T here it is, in all
its ugly nakedness, in the pending bill." 58
However effective rhetoric such as Douglas's vow "to fight on the
beaches, in the fields, on the streets, and from house to house" might
have been for Winston Churchill two decades earlier when Britain faced
its greatest crisis, it is unlikely that Douglas and Morse truly expected
such emotional and colorful language to carry the day with their col-
leagues on the matte r of how federal reclamation policy ought to apply
to a novel j oint federal-state water proj ect in central California. Rather,
their inten tion seems to have been to reduce a fai rly complex legal
issue unlikely to have much impact on the general public to an easily
understandable matter of simple right and wrong, of the "people" and
the "public interest" against "powerful interests'' with their "diabolical
scheme." If the main issues in the debate over the exemption provision
could be effectively communicated to the public in t.hese terms, then
it would become risky for senators to vote against Douglas and Morse,
even if they were unpersuaded of their substantive case against the
exempuon.
.
While it is perfectly plausible that in a particular case political pressure
could succeed in moving a maj ori ty of the Senate to vote in a certain way,
irrespecti ve of the merits of the issue, there is little evidence that popular
pressure was a major factor in the disposition of the San Luis Reclama-
tion Bill debate. Indeed, there seems not to have been much public in-
terest at all in this contr·oversy during the week the issue was before the
Senate. For exam ple, the few communications from the public opposing
the exemption provision that Douglas inserted in the Record near the end
of the debate were almost entirely from California. Moreover, neither
the New York Times nor the Washington Post carried any StOries at all on
the San Luis controversy until after the amended bill passed the Senate.
Even the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report ignored the issue in its edi-
tion covering the week that included tl1e first two days of Senate Hoor
/74 Deliberation arulthe Lawmaking Process

debate. Only after the bill passed the following week did Congressi(mal
Quarterly cover the story. Thus, there is little reason to believe that the
debate on the Senate floor had aroused the public into pressuring their
legislators to oppose the exemption provision in the San Luis bill.
Rather than viewing the public appeal of Douglas and Morse as a
strategy distinct from their deliberative efforts, it is more accurate to see
these two facets of their case as complementary or mutually reinforcing.
Even while the San Luis bill was the subject of formal floor debate in the
Senate, it was necessary for Douglas and Mor·se to compete for the at-
tention of their busy colleagues. Committee business, paperwork, con-
stituency service, meetings with interest groups and delegations from
the state, staff guidance, raising campaign funds, and assorted other
activities all compete with floor debate for a senator's time d uring the
weekday afternoons when debate is usually scheduled. These pressures
operate even when important legislation of national scope is before the
Senate. When decidedly less important issues are at stake, such as a
single water project affecting a single state, it becomes quite easy to ig-
nore floor debate in favor of other business.
Faced with a decided lack of interest in the San Luis bill among their
colleagues, it was necessary for Douglas and Morse to raise the stakes in
the contest, to give senators good reasons to pay attention to the debate
unfolding on the floor. One way they did this was by rhetorically con-
verting the technical legal issues involved in the exemption controversy
into a contest of broad principles with potentially widespread populist
appeal. T his alerted Liberal senators in particular that significant prin-
ciples might be at stake, not merely narrow legal ones, and that simply
supporting the original committee bill might turn out to be politically
unwise. After receiving positive soundings from a handful of Senate of-
fices a few days into the debate, Douglas and Morse became increasingly
confident that their arguments would prove persuasive if they could get
the rest of their colleagues to pay attention. Thus, the political pressure
strategy, not likely to be decisive on its own, was intended to serve the
underlying deliberative appeal.
lt is not uncommon in Congress for legislators to maximize the public
appeal of their issues and positions in order to attract the attention of
their colleagues. Committee hearings, in particular, are often staged ,
through the selection of witnesses and topics, to enhance the likelihood
of media coverage and public interest. While publicity seeki ng often
serves nondeliberative purposes-reelection, ambition for higher office,
ego gratification, etc.- at times i£ is intended to foster deliberation by
Persuasion through Floor Debate 175

getting busy legislators to focus on the information and argumentS that

support policy innovations. For example, when Senator Pete Domenici
led the fight in the 95th Congress to get the barge companies to pay for
some of the upkeep of the nation's inland waterway system, he and his
staff worked hard to generate favorable publicity on the bill in part just
to get other senators to pay some attention to this fairly obscure issue.
"One of the big problems with this user-charge business," Domenici ex-
plained, "was that nobody in Congress ever thought about the inland
watenvays-except the guys from the big barge states."~9 Domenici was
delighted when the Washington Post picked his bill as the subject for a
series of weekly articles on the legislative process in Congress: "If my
bill was going to get on page one of the Post every week, that might
make people around here start thinking, ' Hey, Pete's onto a pretty
good idea,' and I'd have a better chance to win." 60 Because the Post was
widely read by members of Congress, its continuing coverage of the
progress of the user-charge bill greatly increased the prospectS that other
legislators would pay some attention to this issue and perhaps begin to
think through the meritS of this substantial policy innovation. This illus-
trates something of the complexity of the relationship of deliberation to
such putatively nondeliberative activities as public appeals and publicity
seeking.
In addition to the several ways described above in which floor debate
may serve a deliberative purpose-changing or "making up the minds"
of those in attendance, providing essential information and arguments
that circulate throughout the chambers, and generating political forces
that pressure legislators into making an independent assessment of the
issues at stake-the nature of floor debate as a final, public testing of the
rationale for a policy innovation may operate retrospectively to reinforce
the deliberative process at earlier stages. Prior to passage virtually every
important bill will be subjected to public attack on the floor of the House
and Senate. Its opponentS will attempt to expose weaknesses, highlight
inconsistencies, and call into question underlying assumptions. Infor-
mation will be d isputed, arguments challenged, and conclusions denied.
In anticipation of this public interrogation, the leading proponents of
legislative proposals, those who will shoulder the burden of the public
defense, will prepare themselves with the strongest arguments and most
reliable information in support of their case. "I am trying to get at the
basic factS," Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills ex-
plained during hearings on the Family Assistance Plan in 1970. ·• I can
only make a decision and l can only propose something, so far as I am
176 Deliberatiqn ar1d the Lawmaking P.roct.ss

individually concerned, to the Members of the House when 1 have the

facts, and I can substantiate it." 6 1 The proponents will pay particular
attention to earlier attacks on the bill-during committee consideration ,
for example, or in the other branch, or perhaps from the executive
branch-and they will fashion an appropriate rebuttal. Members of Con-
gress who have built up a reputation for competence, seriousness, and
effective leadership on the floor will be reluctant to jeopardize all this by
defending a bill that can easily be made to appear foolish, ill conceived,
or poorly drafted. In this respect the very prospect of floor debate may
promote deliberation well before the actual debate has begun.

Deliberatin g outside Formal Channels

Committee consideration and floor debate constitute the basic formal
elements of the deliberative process in Congress. These may be pre-
ceded, as discussed above, by informal deliberation in the formulation
and sponsorship of legislation. Informal deliberation, however, need not
cease after the formal process has begun; it may continue throughout
congressional consideration and parallel the more structured process.
One of the principal mechanisms for deliberation in Congress out-
side the formal channels is the policy-oriented caucus, or "legislative
service organization." This category includes broad-based ideological
groups, such as the Democratic Stud y Group in the House, to which
several hundred liberal Democrats belong; groups that focus on a spe-
cific policy area, such as the Environmental Study Conference with
members from both the House and Senate; groups that promote the
shared economic interests of districts or states, such as those focusing
on steel production and tourism; and ethnically oriented groups, such
as the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Cau-
cus. Some policy-oriented caucuses do little more than sponsor occa-
sional informal meetings; others, with full-time staff and office space,
conduct a variety of activities meant to influence the legislative process.
The Democratic Study Group, for example, conducts briefings for its
members, sponsors task forces on specific topics, and produces several
different kinds of reports analyzing bills and issues before Congress. It
also has its own whip organization to maximize attendance on floor votes
and to develop and communicate legislative strategy. What these cau-
cuses have in common is that they are collections of legislators with
shared policy interests who work together to promote common goals.
Through briefings, discussions among members, and the preparation
and communication of written materials, policy-oriented caucuses pro-
 177

11Hi rne ch, mi sm for de lib era tio n distinct f rom commt.ttee
h trH1l 1 ' te.
fi'
ln the 102d Congress (lg g 1_ 92 ) the re
,. floo r de ba
1 " .111<1
1c •
· H
,
.,un~ ·h cau cus es m t 1
1e ou se an d Se na te • organi·Led around
J{l su< .
~~~
, I _01 101crests as an rm al wel far e,• aviation • bee f • b'rotech no1ogy,
'' ,~stJt'~ cem en t, en ergy, foot ware r
• h · clea n wa ter , co pp er, dru g enf01 ' IOr-
utg. h'rg h tee h no Iogy, h omelessness insura nce , m·1n1. ng,
IJI'·ll, Ilt'•·tlth care. '
.
ce, ste el tex tiles , to un·sm, and
,,,r . . ,5 social sec un t). soybeans, spa
,flr00"' ·
•
1
,,t'n·s Issues.
11
' .• 11 uctured tha n the se cau cus activities bu t pe rhaps as 1·m po rt an t
ll''~ s . .
pri vat e meetings among
hrdeliberauve process m Co ng res s are ad ho c
s and /or the ir sta ff. In ch ap ter 5, for example, we saw how
<'lll,llor
~fu ski e, n of the En vir o~ m.e ntal P?llution Sub-
,~n Sen ato r Ch air ma
e basi hts tdeolo~ca l opposite,
omnunee. clatmed to be to the arg um en ts of
lllav be Jam es Bu ckl ey, the sub com mi tte e's ran kin g minority member.
-.enator
forrnur/ a cru cia l sta ge in the for mu lat ion of the Cl ean Ai r Act amendments,
\I
"\' 1.1
"' er, need no ~lusk•e and Buckley me t to ex plo re the
possibility of a compromise on
s. To As bel l's su rpr ise , the me eti ng seemed devoid
throughou auwemission sta nd ard
ed process pol itic al con flic t: "T he se tw o me n are n't bar gaining. Th ey're not prob-
of
s .. .. [T] he air is free of
'
ongress out· mg for each oth er's weaknesses an d str en gth
ug h the au tho r ha d ex pe cte d a "m eet ing where. as they
r ''legislatlle tension." Al tho
e, the y 'cu t the de al, '" ins tea d he fou nd something like
~ ideologJcaJ sar aro und her
trolling automobile exhaust
~e. to which gen uine reasoning ab ou t the pro ble m of con
e an d Buckley agr eed to a
us on a spe· emissio ns. Before the me eting en de d, Muski
of aut o em iss ion sta nd ard s tha t wa s a "re tre at" from existing law
erence 1nth new set
was calling for. It was the
1romore the but more str ing en t tha n wh at the ind ust ry
ched ag ree me nt between
1se focusing
expectation of the two me n tha t hav ing rea
elv es "th ey [co uld ] ho ld the Se na te in lin e to pas the new stan-
roups. such thems
public polic}' issue would
;panic cau· dard."t.3 Th us, Se na te de lib era tio ns on this key
e delibe rations of the
be decisively affect ed by the inform al an d privat
rmsor occa·
two subcomm ittee leaders.
ffice space. str uc tur ed proce s fre-
rocess . Another form tha t de lib era tio n ou tsid e the
ve P . en leg isl aw rs an d the representative _of
~uently tak es is me eti ng s bet we
{or 1ts t rep res en t the inte1~ests of comr~eroal
gs I lnt~re st gro up s. Or ga niz ati on s tha
ch as ban ks or oil com pam es) or of dtscrete
r:es seve7, or Industria l ent itie s (su
ngresS· s of ind ivi du als (su ch as far me rs or veL era ns) or that pro mo te ce ~­
gr_oup
\.0 te' ood go ve rnm en t" or e_nv•-
0 or ta•n broad "public int ere st" go als (such as ··g
c31 )'
pro tec tio n) oft e n ma ke pre sen tat ion s in committee h_e an ng s
hese ronme nta l
how ever, do Interest
·'' vit/1 or op po se po licy inn ov ati on s. Ra rel y,
rs ' to sup po rt
tO a,l5
pe als to the fo rm al leg isla tiv e proces. . for the '. de-
,.,,
n go·ot' gro ups
vote as much,
lim it the
if
ir
no
ap
t mo re , of the ir per sua siv e eff ort s to pn \'a te meeungs
~
ses pfl1'
178 Deliberatiun and the Lawmaking Process

with legislators and their staff. The legislative coordinawr for the Na-
tional Fanners Union gives the following description of how he and an
ally tried to persuade senators to oppose the committee bill authorizing
the San Luis reclamation project:
George [Ballis] and I trudged up and down the Senate corri-
dors, calling on one Senator after another. If the Senator was
not in or could not see us, we talked to his administrative as-
sistant. Our technique was first lO set up a tripod for the maps
[showing the high concentration of land ownership in the area
to be irrigated by the San Luis project] and, while George's
assistant hung them up, George and I talked.64
Occasionally, the lobbyists had to settle for brief exchanges in the Senate
corridors:
About a week before the San Luis debate started on the
floor of the Senate, I ran into Senator [Richard] Neuberger
as I was coming out of my cubbyhole in the Senate Office
Building... .
As we walked, I tal ked as fast as I could about how the San
Luis bill would weaken reclamation law and the family farm
in states other than Califomia.
"You've got a good point," the Senator said. "They told me
the 160 acre limitation was protected. Otherwise, I wouldn't
have voted for it in committee."
When I told him I hoped that Senators Morse and Douglas
were going to fight the bill on the Roor, the Senator indicated
that he could hardly sponsor and speak for an amendment of
a bill he had previously voted for.
"But I'll think about it. If what you say is true, this could
be a dangerous precedent that might undermine reclamation
law." 65
In the course of the short walk from the Senate Office Building to the
Capitol the lobbyists raised issues that Neuberger had not previously
considered, even though he was a member of the reporting committee.
As unstructured and ad hoc as this "meeting" was, it gave the lobbyist an
opportunity to make his case in abbreviated form against the merits of
the committee bill and thereby sow some doubt in Neuberger's mind,
eventually leading to the senator's active opposition to the bill. Of course,
to say that lobbyists make reasoned appeals to legislators in private meet-
ings does not deny that other kinds of appeals may also be made, such
as reminders about past financial or organizational support, intimations
Deliberaling ouiSide FoT'TTUll Cha.muls 179

about the prospects for future support, and none-too-subtle references

to "grass roots" interest in the issue back home (stimulated perhaps by
interest group activities).
Finally, informal deliberation also includes priva te study and reflec-
tion by members of Congress. For example, when the House Ways and
Means Committee decided to report out Nixon's Family Assistance Plan
in February of 1970, committee chairman Wilbur Mills an nounced that
he was "going into retreat" to think through his own position on the bill.
He indicated that even though he would not lead the fl oor fight against
the bill, he might vote against the measure on the floor. Yet, as we have
seen, Mills soon decided not only to support the committee measure but
also to sponsor it in the House. Thirty-five hours of public hearings and
seven weeks of executive sessions had exposed Mills tO a wealth of infor-
mation and arguments in support of the administration's proposal. Yet,
by his own account, he was not finally persuaded of the merits of the bill
until he had spent another week privately thinking through the infor-
mation and issues involved.
Such a dear-cut sequencing from the formal deliberative process to
private study and reflection is not typical of lawmaking in Congress.
More commonly, private deliberations will be brief periods squeezed out
of a hectic daily schedule during which legislators review committee re-
ports, clippings from the Congressio11al Record, or staff memos on legisla-
tive issues. Such private reflection may also extend to evenings at home
away from the distractions of the Capitol.
Deliberation that occurs outside of the formal legislative channels,
such as that described here, is by its nature more difficult to identify and
analyze than that which occurs in the formal committee and floor stages.
Moreover, it is more closely intertwined with the nondeliberative activi-
ties so common "behind the scenes" of the legislative process, such as
vote trading, deal making, and pressure politics. It is almost second na-
ture for journalists and political scientists to assu me that whatever occurs
behind closed doors in Congress must be something other than genuine
deliberation about legislative issues. Yet there is nothing about the nature
of reasoning on the merits of public policy that restricts it to public fo-
rums. T he reasoned consideration of information and arguments can as
well occur in a private meeting as in a public committee hearing or dur-
ing floor debate. Indeed, as noted earlier, a shield of secrecy may actually
foster deliberation by screening out political influences that might dis-
courage free and frank discussion and exchange of views. (More on this
last point in chapters 7 and 8.)
180 Deliberation and the Lawmaking Process

Deliberation over Time

T he reasoned consideration of information and arguments that oc-
curs within congressional forums, whether formal or informal, is part of
a well-defined two-year lawmaking process that begins when Congress
convenes in January after each national election and ends with final ad-
journment, usually a month or so before the next national election. Nor-
mally, a legislative proposal must pass the scrutiny of subcommittee, full
committee, and floor debate in both the House and Senate within the
two-year life of each Congress if it is to become law. If a bill fails to
overcome all these hurdles by the time of final adjournment, it must start
the process anew in the next Congress.
Yet, unlike the formal legislati ve process, the actual deliberative pro-
cess in Congress is not confined to a rigid two-year cycle; for on some
issues the full dimension of the deliberative process may extend over
several, even many, Congresses. Consider, for example, the congres-
sional deliberations that led to the passage of the War Powers Act of
1973. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "the im-
mediate legislative history of the war powers bill can be dated to the
controversial Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 and the subsequent con-
duct of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia without valid Con-
gressional authorization." 66 By the late 1960s many in Congress had
come to believe that the president had overstepped his proper constitu-
tional authority in initiating military hostilities. This led first to the pas-
sage of the National Commitments Resolution by the Senate in 1969.
Extensive hearings on this growing controversy were held in the Ninety-
second Congress (197 l -72) and resulted in the passage of separate
House and Senate bills. These bills were reintroduced the following year
in the Ninety-third Congress, where the differences were resolved and a
law was passed over President Nixon's veto. Thus, the process of opinion
formation on the war powers issue extended over the better part of a
decade. Examining a single committee hearing or Aoor debate during
this period would be like looking at one frame of a movie film. Move-
ment of opinion would likely be indiscernible; the presentation of infor-
mation and arguments would appear ineffective. Only a much wider
temporal focus would reveal the true dy namics of the deliberative pro-
cess in Congress.
On other important issues, as well, the deliberative process within Con-
gress has extended over many years. lt is not unusual for a policy inno-
vation to take up to a decade or more to move from a novel proposal to
Deliberation over Time 181

the law of the land, as, for example, James Sundquist has shown in his
account of the passage of key elements of President j ohnson's Great
Society program. 67 This is one reason why legislators are not reluctant
to introduce proposals that have little chance for passage within the im-
mediate two-year legislative cycle. The Senate, in particular, has been
described as an incubator of public policies which makes a distinc-
tive contribution by "gestating [new] ideas, by providing a forum for
speeches, hearings, and the introduction of bills going nowhere for the
moment." This "process of gestation" encourages policy advocates to
"keep information up to d ate on ... prospective benefits and technical
feasibility. And it accustoms the uncommitted to a new idea." 68 Over
time, what began as a controversial, or even radical, idea may gain ad-
herents th rough increased familiarity with the underlying concepts, the
persistence of the problem addressed by the proposal, and the persua-
siveness of the supporting information and arguments.
Congress, in this respect, is not an isolated institution. It is necessarily
influenced by the constellation of ideas that predominate in the la rger
social and political system. As these ideas chan ge over time, so too does
thinking within Congress. Although the correspondence is not perfect,
changing congressional membership, staff turnover, and electoral con-
siderations all ensure a degree of responsiveness to external opinion. "To
a very great extent," writes Paul Quirk, "the direction of policy change
depends on the state of opinion about the public interest. That opinion
includes the values and attitudes of the mass public; the general ideolo-
gies of the attentive public and political elites; the more specific policy
and program doctrines of practitioners in each area; and the pertinent
theories and research findings of policy analysts and social scientists." 69
It follows that those forces that shape public and elite attitudes on social
and political issues will have an impact on Congress and its deliberations
about public policy.
 I K ~twr Jr .. on the< <~hlorn a
1 'l<ltc
d \\ tltam · l
pp -,_, . an ( Jwo/jor Pobtzn (Ch~<.c~go
6 lll\et It\ of Chi-
A 10
Ln!lsfaJ'urr ",a/1J'Dm __ d - q_-..6. On the ''a'' that the prt•
I 0 '1-..J, an 1 '- . . •'ate
I ... - csp pp ·ub tantne poho accompl1'\hmen 1
d rn11ne ' ' • ~t
lat ~ Gill un e p PP· 209-232. 23s-39, and 2-t3--tfi
\ " p. JCU11 • ("~ •

Chapter "JX f Re re,entati\ es. \larch I 0. 1796, m AnnaL1 of th~

1 Debate m the Hou~e 0
th~orrgr~ss Fmt St>HIOn ( \\'ashmgton 0 C Gale
·
L d tal , Four
~
493
d ;aton I '4° P · f k5 R. Connecticut). quoted in the ml.lhtnf{ton
Rep~ntau'e Gan ran
p. Juh 3 1 1991 . P· B 2 ("' v k·j h \\' 1
Jame- \larch an d H erben 1mon. Orgamzatwns .'e'' •Or . o n 1 e\ and
So 195" PP· l?qff. · p (E I d Cl'fr
4 Charf~, E. Lindblom. Thr Poilc;-.\Ja.Rmg rocess ng ewoo 1 •S, N.J.:
Prenuce-Ha I ~6S), pp 5. 28. .
:; fd\\ard ( Banfield. Here the People Rule: Selected Essays, 2d ed. (Washmg-
ton l> C: : AI:.! Press. 199 I ). pp. 374-76. . . .
6 for example. ,,hen the Ho use Repubhcan Policy Commmee refused in
juh of 1979 w endorse a proposed constitutional amendmem to ban school
tru mg, a rep<mer for the Wa.shmgton Post concluded ~~at ::two factOrs are respon-
Sible (,r the Repubhcan backoff, one of them political (July 24, 1979). The
p()IIIIC<~I ~ fact(Jr \\as the concern by Republican party leaders in the H ouse that
a fr,rmal end(Jrsement of the amendment would hinder efforts to attract blacks
''' the· part~ . The mher factor dealt with the actual wording of the amendment:
thar 11 <~ppeared to ban busing for nonracial reasons like overcrowding and to
>{' t" (.hngre~~ ne" authority over local schools. Presumabl y, this second factor

"-<~ "''' fhhucal because it addressed the merits of the p roposed amendment.
7. Hart nil Pukm, Th, Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of Califor-
rua Pr<·\s, I ~J72J p. 2 I 2.
Ss \\iilrc r J Olevek, f.rmKresswrwl Procedures and the Polley Process (Washing-
,,,n U ( •· Ctmgress1cmal Q uarterly Press, I 978), p. I 56.
'J )rt·H·n ) )rnuh, CrJll tr, Order: Floor Politics in the /-lome and Senate (Wash-
rngrtm )) C.. BHJ(,kmg\ Institution' I 989), p p. 239-40.
1' 1 J.urws L. )undqurst 7/ IJ 1· • ·
IJ ( B .. • 1" PC me and Resurgence of Gongms (Washmgwn,
, rt,r,rng\ Jnstllutlon, 19R I ), pp. 135-36
I I Jc,hll H•bby :JIId K , . I) 'd " . . " .
(tLjNtt1f l!tl/ (\c·w Yr k·
11 1
o~<; ' . av1 son , T h e Executi ve as LcgrslatOr m On
1',, ,.•11 11flt·llc· Rc·dlrH• Iof! , R111c ha n a nd Wins ton 1967) p . 220.
cJ ( ' , ' '
l , 11 1vc-" 11 Y ( .,. 1, ' •'ntgrt\\ lasse!> the l·{lderal Aviation Act of 1958, Inte r-
l'rt·ss JCJ(1 JJ "'1.,c 11• I IJ~r ;uu No • C2 ( U n•· vc rsn· y, Ala ba m a: Un1vc· rsn· y o f A Ia b a ma
./
I, R•HI(hlll
, 'l I,,,
B.
•
11
R1plc·
y pp. I 0- I :t
"( '
l

lnm , t·d J r('(lt·ll c N ( 1 .'!·

1
.ongrt·~s a nd Clean Air," in CongreJ.\ aut! Urban Prob-
l' '/.7(1 • ' '' vc·l;nlcl (Washil•gLOn , D.C.: Brookings I nstitution, 1969).
J '1 l';,u J l>rnn rrw I '1111' I 'I/ . .
' ' '1" 1 11
H''Vtrnte Shar111g ( Bioomingwn: Jndmna Uru-
vr·r\lly l'rt" ' 1'!7"
. ••), p. ll 'i .
/
• 2
. QuOted .'-:.
(

'
rl;. [)oU
16 Ja ~"
Fr.a
\ 'Our
' a-
1-
A<bc
1 R Retd
\\ H fl'"eenun and 0

1 lbsd P -
A ~II Thr MrliLlU' ~nbot1T h""''" p 4
_I Ibid p lb
__ c.cor-c-c Good'"'".: Jr Thl' Llltk IL fat r Amherst M
Massa buset~ Pres. 19t0. p 16 m lm,er\n\ or
_S see Randall :-.n-ahan. ~ru \\iry and ~ft'an.s. Rifonn and Chan t
f990°
l.llOI'l~ c..crm,.,tlu ( hapel Htll. L:nl\crsll\ of :-.:onh C'..arohna Pres< Ccn~t
fir a u-,c:ful dt'CU"ton of the relation~htp of the repre . ' PP ' 3-
( · · ">entau,cnt-\, of tht-
\ U' and Mean'. A>mmmee tn the H ou~e of Repre~entaU\t ., t o ll< d e1tbtramc:
respc>ll'iblhlle' -
94 j o hn \\ K111gdon, ConJ!TI'Mmms \'Olw£" Dt(lszom 3d ed (' , bo
- · · · ·"'"" .-,.r r. Cm-
\eNl\ of \f JC htgan Pre<..s. 19!591. p. 102.
?5 lbtd .. p 2 12
?6. Oleszek ConweuwiUJI Procedure~. p. 74.
21. L $. Congress. House. 9 I st Cong .. 2d sess.. I 6 April 1910 Con~msumal
&curd 11 6 I 2060.
'1 • Ibid. 15 Ap~l 19 70 p. 11897. 29. Ibid.. 16 April1 970. p. 1?06-t.
30. Damel .\fO\ mhan . The PolriiCS of a Gooranteed Income C\ e'' York: \'inuge
Bool.s. Random House. I 9 73). pp. 427.429- 30. Emphasis m the ori~nal.
31. Randall B Rtple\ , Congress: Process and Polzc), 2d ed '\e" York: \\'. \\'.
~onon and Compam. 197 ). pp. I90- 91.
3'1. Donald R. .\fanhews and James A. Stimson. Yeas and Xa)s: .\ r-~a Dr~
UaJ~n.e m tJv C .S Hous' of Rt frmml.o.tn.·es (;\e\\' York: John \\'ile\ and "'· IY- :>
p. 45
33. For a discussion of a ~md of deliberative cue-talung in the California ~tate
legislature. see Wilham K. ~tuir, Jr. . u guwture: Califomza "s Sch• >I for Politu:s (Chi-
cag(J: L"m,ersll\ of Ch1cago Press, 1982). p. 95.
34 L S. C..ongress. Senate. 86th Cong .. Ist sess., II August 19:>9. Conr;m·
Wntll &r(Jrd I 16 : 154 88.
35. lb1d.. p. 15489. 37. Ibid .. 12 August 19~9. P· 1~649
36 l b1d , p. 15491. 38. Ibid .. II Augustl9:>9.p.l:>-t
39. lb1d. pp 15497 15498 and 12 August 1959. p. 15649. .
' · ' ' c
1 b Cmve~ll\
40. Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: O um Ia
Pres~. I950 ), p. 56.
41. l bid ., p.ll9. U · ersit\Cae
1
42. Samuel Patterson, lAbor Lobbying and lAbor Refonn, mer· ""
Prc~ram No. 99 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill , I966 >· P· I 3 . . \' k· Colum·
. 43. Alan 'vfcAdams, Power and Poltltcs in lAbor ugulaiiOn (:\e" or .
1Jia University Press, 1964), p . 95.
 •, llfJ
2i0
/l'm<rdurrs, P· Ill
I; t mwrrulntlll .f (~ "
>uorcd Ul 01.-'ll • ~ \I nrC\, ,.\11 Art o, ( 0/lf!US.S C\\ •ork \\ \\
41 Q E dcnbc.·J ~ .uul Hm
15 fugciiC I 1.,- '141
1'\orr•m. !!Jb!J). PI' - '; -\ obod\ Krwu~. P· 262.
lb \,bdl. T/lr ::,mn,. • \ '•1111'' Dtci<wllJ. p 99.
( , /I'Tf'UI//1'11 ~ t "
,- h:ml!<Ion. ' 0 1 ·' fi-
I I ( >II!,'Tt " ' " " " ' Od\llt"), p .l. <) I')
I~ Rc.·1c · ·' · • I ' 1m" Drrmn11s. PP· - - ·
Ill f..mgdnn. Coll.l(rt""u"' ;l'. th...Con". l l se,s., 12 \l ,l\ l<11<l, Cm,s;rnnonal
. rre~'· · Scn.llt " ll'l\lOI\ '' [ thiS btll1s
.)0 l ') C.ong
· ·
cIt.''tl''b<:< I ·111 t h <:account b,
0
- "000 I he lcgP•1,Jt IH '
fl,rord llb .o 1- 11 mcrs Union: An!{m \l t Don.llcl. Tlu Sar Lrns
'-1 1 fm the auun.l 1 ' · · 9 , \' ,
rht Iou '"' c- ,<..,
/lr rlnmatwn Bdl. E<tglcwn ·•1 111 p 1 ,tetJCal Pohuc~ '\o. _h I 't. '' or" :\tcGra,,.

H1ll. L S Congre~~. Senate. .,

:, I.Ill62)
. 1 c ..,. lsl -.ess .. 7 M.n 19.'i9. Cous;rt'S.IIOJUJ/
o 1ll l .o 11 ., ..
fltrord I03. 76 79.
56. Ibid .. p. 7~.l9.
.i:!. lb1d . p. 7678.
:"J:I Ibid .. 11 Ma1 1959. p. 7869. 57. Ibid .. 7 \1<11 19:'19. p. 7672.
."i-1 lb1d .. p. 7849. 58 . Ibid., p. 767~
55 Ibid.
;)<l. Quoted in Reid. Ccmgrei.\/OIIal Od)'llf')' . p. 56.
fiO. Ibid.
61. House Committee o n Ways and Means. Social Smmt)' and \\elfau Propol-
a/1, Hrarings, 9lst Gong.. 1st sess. (1970). p. 2365 . ..
62. See Burdett Loomis. The Nt•w Amencan Polztwan: Amlntwn. Entrrprnuw-
l!up, and the Changing Focr of Poilt1cal Life (:-.Jew York: Basic Books. 1988). pp. l-l9-
5 i. on the growing use of caucuses to sen·e the issue interest of leg1slators.
63. Asbell, Tht' Smatl' Sobod)' Knows. pp. 94. 92. 96.
!H. McDonald, "The an Luis Reclamation Bill.'' p. 8.
65. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
66. Senate Commiuce on Foreign Relations. \\ar Pou•t·n. S. Rept. 250 wAc·
companyS. 440, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., I':! .June 1973, p. 4.
67. J ames L. Sundquist. Politic.1 and Polin•: The Eisl'llhmt't'l. 1\.t'llllt'dv. mul johtl·
\l/11 Yt•ar~ (Washington , D.C., L 3rookings Institution. 196~). .
68. Nelson W. Polsby, Congrt•.,,\ and the Presidency, :~d cd. (Fngkwood Clill's.
N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1976). pp. 99- 100. '
69. Paul J. Quirk. " I11 Defense or the Politics of Ideas." Ill jounwl c>fl'clillt(,, ~tl.
no. I (February 1988): 40.

ChapLer Seven
. I. W~lOdrow Wilson, Cml,\flftttwnol Cottt'l'nment 111 tltt' l'nltt·d Staft .' (:-\e" \ or!..
Columbm Universit y Press, pa perb.td.. editio n . 19l) I. origm.llh publillht'd 111
1908), p. 72. '
2. Aniclc II , section :3.
:1. Leonard D. Whitl', 77u• foi•rlt•ta /i.l/1 : , \ Stud\' 111 \dlluni.,flclfit•1• fli.,f<>n' (:\l'"
York: M.tunillan Com pan, , 1!}5()), pp. 5-t -55.
I. Quott•d in ibid., p. 55.
!i llw l'Mt.'ption:. alt' H '«HmH•d llltl)l(l.. p. f>i.
(j ll)lcJ • p. 56.
The most important stuff from this book is Chapter 8, but Bessette questions transparency in a number of places p J 1 , Rr(orm
and in a number of different ways. This Reagan story is a really good one, and one I had never heard before
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 - - - - - - - -- - - - - - --· · ~---

Fh r Prr\yf'fils (
210
'''11r1J
"c ~111ch ,nlllror th( prestdent and h1s ~ubord1•
br that SecreV~n Rt'l{•lll '' '" in c h,11 ge h "'•tv, (
tO t IlC the
d , drn!{
•
111 t nts
of t.tx 1cform whereas Congrcs~ prror to
""' ""I--'outhe drrecuon an d ttmpo oII tht• di\cu~~iolns.rou RItc,111 ~ <•
1
hl on
(l)ntrol"" ue mstrucuon\ 10 I 1lt ot lt.:r '· .md th - th at he· • lh <t lot ~rr< n~d g \\o.t~ tommlttetl to an unJUSt and mefficrent s~ tem
n()•tuon ro 1"
r ld derermme the I n-.t,un Dq>artrncnt'
at m th .
. c c:nd
"d1
1 rr, ~ JO' pr
od rnLthitudt·
' of 'pur,tl mterests. Reagan "" srmph (t]he
mcnt "ou s pos111. Ill I11
\lithe: other parmrpant~ \Hrt thcH· ,u Regan· b. 0n r111 <1g • oel bl a mplaver in t,tx relmm Althou~h he' seldom took an .JC-
..,,~,!<
.h h s tdd '•~ n0rtant
,..,,1111r·
{onn
' t 'orked for hrm 1 roug 1dm ,undisputed a h rng ant1 tt he tw 0 .,ear ta' deh.He . . . . the con~enamc prc,tdent·~
e{ot'C • • . . Ut ori •II 1
wensure that the 1ssue> ,H 11an l(<t'lved a thorough at} dRe,,..,an " to , role rn effort once cormclercd the bastion of hber.tls earned tre-
J bl t 0
nc:atment n ·'''lte111 "' .~pp011 fo; ;nbolic signihcante. \>\ lthoul hts backing, taX reform (I>Uid
Conrrast thiS hierarchical control
. .
. with the situ atron th "''< "cudou·>v: happened. With it, it became a powerful poliucal jugger·
muttt lor subcomminee) chamncn 111 .the House an d Senat faces com ,er ha (' . I . . Congress on th1s . .rs~ue,
"' ••• Given the power o specra mterests tn
put~tHeh 10 charge. the) possess \CI) little real auth . ate. J h< · 1
rJUt- assessment of the merits ol reform had no chance wrthout the
kaguc1 · each of "hom is .an independ{'nt actor in waysth onty ovc1 the,/Ugh . pu bl.rc pre"urt.'
<ol. 1 fJrr
lar president's ·mvo1vement. H ere .rt was not acm·e
M>rk for cabmet secrecanes rareh . . are.
Owing
.
.
the·rr JObs at
t0 h
tho~e '-ho ~umoved Congress-legisl ators noted how little public imere't there
, wcnt• rather than therr .supenors, comrnlltee m em be rs b .t <'II co o. ed be even after presidential speeches- but rather the fear on
11
10
ddrberau•e process commuments. mteleMs ' and v·lews ove nng to tht :~rt of the leading legislators that the~ would be publici\ blamed b1
. th·
charrman has huJe control. Consequent!\· ' thev' ha ve 1rtlle ·r '•hich · RrJgan for killing reform. In contrast to the panem m 19ti I of dehver·
rc\pond 10 drrection . from . abo'e
. on an\· matter i ncons1stem . · h to
lllcem11e
rng elevised addresses on the eve of crucial votes in C~ngrc"· Rea~an
polrucal rmerests. Th1s srtuauon necessaril} impai rs t h e charrm . wu· lheu 1
1984-86 used his popularity more to prod Congress 1nto awon than
co slructure a 1horough and systematic deliberat·rve process ansab1ltt1 · h' 10
dictate specific votes. This allowed his subordinates to conunue to
commruee or subcommittee. Indeed even co . wrt rn 1he 10
· · ' mpe 11rng attend make the case for tax reform on the merits in the variou> formal and
heanngs an d markup sessrons IS problematic • T l11s . I.S not to say th anee at
L.. . tnformal forums in the House and Senate.
deJIIJt'rauve process . necessarily requires hie1.arc h.1ca1 control b at even h Ahhough Congress was designed to be 1he nation:s p~em1er delibera· 1
thha1 rn some crrcumstances • particularly wh ere .rssues are com · Ul1 ra1 erd
111e institution, there is obviouslY no guarantee that II Wllllunwon • ' ''
' e partiCipants have their own private agend d . ~ex an •hould. Madison and other leading framers. it will be remembe~ed. h.td
h ~s, stea y dlrecuon from
Allributed the failures of the state legislatures and the nauonal ~<~~!{l'e'\
lht wp ma' "ell result in a more c
rclr<:" of lhe ke, ISsues. om pre ensrve and better organlled
dunng the 1780s at least in part to the strength of a "local ,ptnt, <:r of
h appears, then. that the . ofpowerstodeltb-
rei a t.rons h 1P o f separation ·r 1 · · · .. · 1 n·ng -tate }C<>'ISiator' from the
eratron A . . oca prejudrces [and] mtere!>t\. . 111 c 1'e I f [their] ) o
stale" .
and n.tuon.tl
· h nauonal gove rnment IS · more complex 1han ongr·
nall ourhnedmencan
10 lOm prehensive •and permanent Interests · h o · .. Is thl) problem .un
\rmpl}
1·
d rn.bc apter 2· While not rncorrec.t, · <
it is also nor sufnoenr Ieg1~lators
.f
from "the great inlt'rt'M\ •
ol t ·e nauon. .
t to pre>en1ng t.l' .t<h ,m·
10 <:sen e the legis/at 1 more deliberative inswuuon . · ''l fcrcnt from Senator Pacl.wood >tornnulmen r Senator S11ntn'>'. e II ort.,
\\ htn <juick. d d . . ure as t1e
. not reqwred · ·
· lcrsurc rages for the timber in tereS!> in 0 •cgon. . I . rorn ._
collect inf( an . eCISIVe act'ron IS when there rs ro in Idaho or 1rom ,,ert.~llll
c·cutlvt b .
ll mauon, analyze It
. • a crnauvc~. · and fash' ion proposals, Ihc ex·· tl>. piotcct timber· mining, and . agt~r . u 15 tult' indusln, ' For. 11Hl\e po1ll I
ranc 11 can bnng t0 b .. . . 110t Lr,t~slcy's desire 10 helt> l ow<~'~ (.lut<lll\• , I tree . \ 1.e\'· ed ,I\ I 11e, \11111 0 ,.
O e·tsrl\
no1rna11 lc d . ear capac rues beneficiaiLO dehberauon 111 1 e 11~' 1 ' ' 110 ' .'
. from 1· Jun Ill the leg·151 · ul• rlleas in which the n,ll ion.tl of the Jl.lll' ol the
tron .. ature. These include (I) the grearerrns · tl . · 11 d kt 11 , c mtere sts 01
H: p1cfe1ences of po1li lt•' ' l teclthln ( orwrc" w n:.t,<>ll
. 1JO1Ill< a/ force s t hat sec rcc y can J>l omote, (2) less o( a. com· 1 . "t•ll be >t·tter 'Ill • · ,.,
rmtrnf•nt to tl • 11 toe, 1 !he prc>tdcnn nt.n . •turn !he j,,ue ol ,cjMl<lliOil ol
1<: Interests of 1 f d (3) grcJtrr 11 10
.tl><>ut 1he lonunon good \\ t' ' 1lot t
1
CJiga'"'at 11m d P0 1e1 ul exte1 nal groups. and g<J'crrl.
an control Yi
mc·nr call fcJr d . . · et "hen the exigencies of mo ern h !)()''CI\ b11efh in the nl''' dt.tptt'l
I C<I\Jie exe . . 'b uon.t J
JlH·c cnnulalc·\ A d . cuuve actron, it i~ energy, not deh era 11,~0
11c111 t111· tiHJ n ahhougl1 \U<. 11 enc•r gy must be 1ntorrnc . c d b} de "'
P 111 lCJplc~ t ·
only with a kind ol uneasy ren
sioO·
oexJsl
 ~ CHAPTER EIGHT
Public Opinion and Democratic
Statesmanship
Bessette really hits on some great points concerning transparency.
But most of them are not until page 221 (9 pages into the chapter.
So click here to go there right away.

lilt is the reason. alone.. of the public. th:;u ought 10 c:xm·

troland regulat~ t.he go\'t"ntment.
Publius. 1788'
Ddiber:uivc democracy is a system of popular government
that f<»ters rule by the informed nnd reasoned judgments of
the citizenry. by what Madison called "the cool and deliberate
sense of the community."•The fundamental premise, or cen-
tral propo.'lition, or deliberative democracy. 3! sketched in
chapter 2, i.'l that there are t"'O kind.'l or public voice in a
democracy-one more immediate or spontaneous, less well
informed. and less refl«tive; the other more deliberati•·c. lak-
ing longer to d"'·elop. and resting on a fuller con.'lidcration of
information and argumenl$-and that only the Iauer is fit to
rule. Thl»<' who created the American constitutional system
belie-·ed that on most issues. most of the time. deliberdti\-e ma-
jorities would not exist independently ouuide of go•·emment.
but rather would be formed through the operation oft he gov-
e rnmental institutions, as the representatives or the people
reasoned about public policy for their constituents. T hese two
points explain Madison's claim that in a well-designed repub·
lie "the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people" would often be "more consonant to the public good
than if pronounced by the people themsclvC$.''' llecau..: rep-
re-sentatives have the time., information. ;.and institutional en·
vironment to reason together on issues t1cing the nation. the
public voice to which they give expression may beller promote
th<' public good than t.he immediate and direct voice of the
people.
Madison's argument applied today would mean that public
altitudes measured by an opinion poll are likely to be 1=
deliberative and less conduci•·e to the public good than public

212
l'11blir Opinion (Jtul /NM()('fnH~ Statt$lnaruhip 21)

attitudes informed and deepened through the opermion of rcpresen-

L1tiv~ institulioru. The very 1erm "public opinion" implies 1he exis-
tence of dc:'l·elopcd public auiludes. Yet when auitudes a~ measured
by an opinion poll. th~· may rcprt'SCnt little more than the aggTe-
gation of hund~ of ofT-hand. unrefleah·e rcsponscs to a pollster's
questions.
Consider. for enmple. how a national polling organization would
m~.tSurc " public Of)inion" on the desirability of initialing a comprehen-
sive national health insurance progTam. II is likely 1ha1 500- 1500 phone
calls would be made 10 a nationally rcprcscntalh'c sample of homes. The
t'espondems. in1emtp1ed from other activities :md 101ally unprepared
for 1he sulljecl. would be asked one or more qucsli<ms to gauge their
suppot'l fot· a national program to ensure health care coverage for all
Americans. II would be surprising if mosl respondents had read or
thought much aboul the arguments on each side of Ihis issue prior to
the telephone call, or, if they had. if 1hey could iru1amaneously recall the
pertinent issues. Mos1 ~spondenu. consequently. would voice sponta-
neous ~actions, unsupported by any serious re~soning about 1he argu-
ments pro and con . lndttd. it could hardly be otherwise. Men and
women who might be quite capable of reasoning abou1 1he merits of
national health insurance if exposed to. and gi•·~n ampl~ time to reflect
upon. the relevant information and arguments arc not likely to produce
a dcliber.uh·e opinion instamaneousl)·· Ye1 the results of 50()- ISOO of
these instantaneous reactions will be aggTCgated 10 portray "public opin-
ion" on na1ional health insurance. Replace thO. issue wi1h :my other of at
leas1 moderate complcxi1y- wdfare reform. auto emill$ion controls, the
Strategic Defense Initiative. etc.-and the poim is 1he same . We should
no1 be surprised if instantaneous opinion bears little o·csemblance 10 wha1
would result from serious reasoning o n the merits.•
In his per~ptivc account of the role of public opinion in American
politics in 1he la1e ninet~nth cer.uury. the British analyst James Bryce
de!Cl'i~ unn:O«tive public opinion ohis way:

111e simpleSI fonn in which public opinion presents itself

is when a sentiment spontancou..Jy ri5CS in the mind and Rows
from the lips of the average man upon his -ing or hearing
something done or said. Homer pr=nts this with his usual
vhid directness in the line which frequently ~rs in the Iliad
wh~n the effect produced by a s1-.:h or ~ent is 10 be: con-
veyed: "And thus any one was ,;aying as he looked :u his
214
. . ahc:s wh.at m.ay be< ,ailed the ru-
m·ag . I1I >out " I Ius t>htasc· <1t:S< I
. It as th<' prev alcn t .unpr cssao n of
1lamt•Jitcll) ~I •,.,. '"'' of opan ton (not ever y u1an) \<lys. 1.1'. 11 IS
.
I IIC IIIOil l(ll 1•
It 1s what .111y nl• 111 . · 1
. J thou ght or \'ltsh wht< 1 an OCCU I·
tht:• rMtur,tl ,nHI the· gc·m•r ,t
, c·n1 t' t•vokc·s '
, . hlic oJ>tnion as not 1he resu lt of "con sciom
AI tlus I utlun ent.l l' st ·~( , pu
ons rorm ed on t h <:
. • rule more than 'tmp • ressa
1(',1\011111~. but I ,II 1lC:I IS I .
HII of 1ht morttt·nt
.. , 1 . to bv re.ad mg news pape rs ancj ta lk'mg wtth
.. . .
I . .a
. c:s d· v' duab bcgm to. mov e (rom ltrst ampres-
h lt'llcl s ancI ,l(qu.unt,!ll< · · 111 1 1 . . . .
.
sum ~ tomorc:st tu
. ttl ··' ,,.·w s If the assuc as one of pubh c pohc.y. the oppo s-
· 11 ' · .
. for m bitt supp ort as the rmun ltnes of deba te arc
Ill~ SIC1C:S WI \It 1 ·
lortn t·d and patt) allt:giances take hold In the ~nd a . .
maJO nly of the
peop le nl.l} endo rse <HI<' side or the othe r Acco~ dm? to Bry~
e. hm\e ver.
thts P.~ocess of
the· , ,crag<' man make s lillie inde pend ent cont tabu uon to
1
opm ion fo11nation . Has belie h haw been large ly tnOu ence
d by \\~a~ he
h." heard and , cad." and the "clem ent of pure pers onal
conv tcuo n,
bast·cl on mdi" adua lthm king . ts but smal l." 7

'lo Brvn · the chief and owrr idin g impe dime nt to the aver
age citiz en\
delib erati ons on publtc mau crs was not lack of rapa city but
lack of time
"The citill·n has liLLie time to think abou t polit ical prob lems
. Engr ossin g
all the wm kmg hour s. his avoc ation leave s him on I} stra)
mom ents for I
thas fund amen tal duty.... [ ll]e has not lcism c tO do [his
think ing] for p
hamself." '\!o maLLet how capa ble the an:r age rttiz en migh
t be of think -
ing throu gh and reach ing infor med judg men ts on majo r
polic y mau ers,
tht reality is that the: dem ands of earn ing a lavel ihoo d leave
liule time
for inde pend ent analysts ol publ ic issues. This wou ld be true
even if the
avea age utiLen had a wmp cllin g inter est in publ ic matt ers;
but . .tcco rd·
mg to Bt y<e: thas is haadly the case: "to the gt cat mass of man
kind in all
places, publt~ <tuestions come in the third 01 foua th rank
amo ng the
llllc_aests of hfe, and obta in less than a third or a four th
of the leisu re
ava tlablc: for think ing.'" ' Tht• prob lem is exac et bate d whe
n issue s of sub·
M<~nual complcxaty ate at st 1k 1 ·
• e; or some assucs " requ ire unin tenu ptcc1
an< l what may he call •d . · .
c sucn ta11If or profe ssion al Mud v" 1" and othe rs.
sut I1 as fananual m.nt crs b k 1
H'<jU ite subst· .. .. . ' tin ruptc y rules , and ll ansp ottat ion polt< ~.
1 cous uucu ve sk'll "" "P II'
"ts 'low d antaa
1 · 1 • u > ac OJltn. .ton .
' Bryr e wntc . '·
•111 c umsy Ill gra r . .
1 he\C' th .. , · . PP tng \\llh large ptMt ical prob lems ."''
1 t < nnpe
·
sc·vcre 111 ne tonst .. dnne nts t 0 · · .
· <lltzen deltb crati on on poliC\ assu es-
dq~;rec· ol comt>lc' amt\ , com pel mgr ·mter ests for · ·
Ieasu re ume . and I I\C
Xtty mvolved 111 · many . .
lcgaslatave and ,1dmu. ustra . ..
lt\t 'I
'
~
I'Jt
Public Op;,ion am/ lkmot:ratiL. Statesmanship 2/j

mancrs-effce1h·cly undercut. in Bryce's ,·icw. the key premise of "or-

thodox dcrnuu:uic theory": that "every citi~en has, or uught to have, . . .
a definite view, defensible by argumeniS, of whitt the country needs." "
What th~ people in a large and heterogeneous dcmocr~C) can contribute
to public polky is not detailed dircaion resulting from substantial inde·
pendent deliberdtiun but rather "a sentiment grounded on " few brood
considerations and sin1plc trains of reasoning." Thi.s sentiment is more
likely to be influenced by bru;od considerations of'justicc. honour. and
peace" than by "any reasoning (the people] can apply to the sifting of
the multifarious f:ICtS thro,.·n before them. and to the drJ,.•ing of the
legitimate inf~rences therefrom.""
Obviously. much has cha nged in the United States since Bryce's ac-
count or the lalc nineteenth century. The work week has sho rtened .
affording Americans greater leisure time. Educational auainment. mea-
sured by years offom1al schooling. has risen substantially. Mass electronic
communications have replaced newspapers as the principal information
sourc~ on public issues. Compared to his counterpan of a century ago.
1hc: 3\'cr.agc Amcrian uxby h.a$ mort lc:i.surc. more c.-ducuion, and more
infom1ation about public affairs. Nonetheless. it would be a mistake to
overstate the irnpaC'I of these changes on the problem of cititcn delibera-
tion. The 3\'cr:lgc: American may now work an hour or two less per day
(and perhaps one da)' less per week) than in Bryce's time. but once com-
muting cime. meals, errands, and family time arc factored in. rhe ~·rei ..
sure" a\oailablc· for the study of public policy is at most a few hours each
weekday evening and a few more on weekends. Mureovcr. the same tech-
nological developments that have gh•cn us mass communication of in·
fm,II<:Hion on current events have also resulted in the crctttion of an
e nt ertainment industr)'· especially television. that effectively competes
for the attention of the citizenry. Indeed . accounts of the early nine·
teemh century suggest that Americans of the time. faced with fewer en-
tertainment op1ions. were exposed to mor~ serious political di.scu.ssion.s in
the fom• of specches, lcetures. and debates 1han is the c:uc •nday. In any
C\'Crtt. it is likely that new competition for tl•c attention of the cititenry
has more than offset the net gain in leisure time from a century ago.
Finally. even if one concedes that Americans are no"' better educated
and more infom1ed about pub~c affairs than C\'er before (not an un-
queSLionable proposition). it must also be acknowledged that technologi-
cal advancement. the rise of the United States as a world !>Ower, and the
expansion of the domestic responsibilities of the national government
 Pulilrr Opmwn and Democrat" Sta~ 1 man.shtp
216

. If· < lt···tlth and safety, economic management, etc.) hav~

1al we ar ·• ~· 1 • ~
(
~It . the number breadth, t~nd comp exrty of public polin.
1stly rncrea\t'C1 ' · bl' -,
~· fh "t'nls •1 formidable imped1ment to pu IC auention, un.
' ' ,
1\SUCS. IS Jll< '
derstanding, and deliberatron. . . . .
. ·n for example, how rn Congress rtself most leg1slators 1
we h ave s~c . . h - ·
.h c " hundreds of complex 1
1ssues ave 1m1ted opponu-
faced wrt v'1111 ,., 011 . ·
. · any sustained way the rnformatton and arguments that
111 ues 10 revtew 11
1 • •
· suh• CJtttsldc of the commrttees. on wh1ch •they serve. If those
Ix:;u on IS '-·' · •
whose full-time responsibility it is to momtor an? rev1ew pohcy proposals
I,Ke such impediments, we should not be surpnsed _that t~e average citi-
ten, with but a few hours a week tO devote to_ publ~c affa1rs, engages in
little independe 111 deliberatio.n on ~or~p~cx ~auon~l1ssues. On a ~omplex
matter like the Nixon admimstrauon s Family Asststance Plan , dtscussed
in previous chapters, we should expect little more from the average citi-
1en than a generalited sentiment on the need for welfare "reform ," for a
n,nional income floor for all Americans, or for a larger federal role in pro-
moting the welfare of the poor. Yet these sentiments, derived from a host
of miscellaneous influences-ra dio and television coverage, newspaper
reading, maga1.inc stories, the views of "opinion makers," conversations
with acquaintances, and personal experiences or prejudices, etc.-hardly
constitute the kind of reasoning on the merits of public policy that ought
to control governmemal decisions. Again, the problem is not the imellec-
tual capacity of the average American to reason about public policy, but
rather time constraints, competition for leisure time, and the number
and complexity of public policy issues.
It is important here to distinguish between deliberation about the de-
tails of complex national laws and deliberation on simpler issues or on
mauers closer to home and over which citizens exercise greater respon-
sibility. Elihu Root, for example, who served for six years in the U.S.
Senate after stints as Secretary of War and Secretary of State in the Mc-
Kinley and Theodore Roosevelt administration s, argued against such
democratic devices as the initiative and referendum but in favor of the
people _themselves deciding "certain great simple questions which are
suscepttble of a yes or no answer" such as "where a capital city or a county
seat s~all ~; locate~" or '\~hether the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be
permuted. We m•ght thmk now of such straightforwa rd matters as
1\'hether to limit cong•-esstona · 1 terms or whether to legaltze . currenuy' .1 ·1·
. .
· matters the problem ts
· 1attve · not d eter-
hot . .drugs. , Yet on no rma1 1egts
n~n~mg 'what ought to be accomplished " but "how to accomplish it."
·
1 hts necessarily invol ves t h e " stud y and mvestigation" k'
of "the wor 111g
 2/i

cat numb er and varit:t\ of motiv e, me ·d t ent to hum an natur . ..

,ra grplicat
1 ed an
d f
o ten oh~cure fans ·· M e .tnd
··corn . b J f laws in \~avs. th·tt orcon ·r new I . .
he exisu ng oc Yo . ' aws nnpmuc
t . . ' • are not ob\ 10 . "
11 pon d ~S "'ttho ut de-
d anal}s•~- fhus, for Root , "the on!} met!
U> by \'htCh 11·
I h d
. lation can be reac e t\ the meth od or rull C1ISCUSS
tale • . tntc •gent
fegJS 'fi · I()n C(Hnpanson •
e"s mod• tcauo n and amen dmen t of p ropo~ed leg"la ·
or \l • t .
. ht of discu ssion and the contr ibuti on and con [I f ton m the
I•S h trt o manv mmd 5 .. I
was much more like I . b . · n
dern()('raCV sue a proce ss to e found Ill repr
~ . I . b d' h
ti\e legJS auve <>, "1es t an. amcmg the cit·,hn
't
1 " s d.trect 1y. "
C·
~er lta ..
Jn addtu on to Root s great s1mplc quest ions" susce pu'II > e to stmple 'res
·. quue . bl f .
r answers, avera ge Ctlltc ns arc obvio ush
0 110 . .
1 capa e o deltbcrat-
·,ng on Junes , wher e they arc taken away from their no rma1 pursu.as to
. . r
focus their auen uon rwrdsome hour s or days on matte rs of great tmpo . ·
• • 1d . r-
tance cnmm a eten ants or nvil litiga nts Juror s itl ·
cnmm 1 · a case\,
10 ·.
for example, a~e made keenl y awar e of how profo undlv their judgm ent
The vesting of such we·1ght} matters
can affect the ltfe of the defen . . dant.
the
in the hands of avera ge Citizens can hardl y help but to concentrate
mind and prom ote serio us delib eratio n. "
1

Simila rly, loc~ l m~tters like publi ~ schoo l ~olicies or locating highw
ays
cns
mar have suffiCient 1m pact on the lives and Intere sts of ordin an citi 7
issue
as to create a powe rful incen tive to devo te time and atten tion to the
ers.
and to argue the m eri ts of the oppo sing sides with familv memb
neigh-
friends, and neigh bors. Yet as the scope of the policy widens. from
d-
borhood to town (or city), to coun ty, to state, and to natio n, each indivi
(one m
ual's responsibility fo r the resul t dimin ishes to the infinitesimal
neccs-
)Ul tlrt· rwo hund red millio n o r so), thus weak ening the kind of incentive
well in-
liX' I sar)' to invest heavi ly in the readi ng and resea rch to become
:tl rrl?t formed.
ns to
J !!t [.l The point here is not to dispu te the capacity of Amer ican citize
, or jus-
Ill ibt ~· reach sound judg mems abou t their own intere sts, the publi c good
tice, but rathe r to clarif y the impe dime nts to publi c deliberati~n a_bo~t
the
~~ details of natio nal po licies a nd thus the necessity for a large msutu
uonal
1,or~ltt role in deter mini ng a nd fas hio ning "the cool and deliberate ~cnse
of ~he
~~~ hsts
community." Since the confl ict betw een Fede ralists and Anu-Feder~
~,!!!~ \'Igor ·
~~ over the ratific ation of the Cons tilUt ion of 1787. Ame ricans have du·cct
· ·1mpo r tance of
ous1y, and at times passi onate ly, de bated the re 1auve
~·
.
· ffi · 1 · deter mmm g
·
C·lttzen opini on versu s the judgment s o f publi c o c.a s m
must re-
the_ cours e of natio nal policy. The full conto urs of this deba te
7 f 1a
lllatn beyon d the scop e o f this volum e.'
•
1
c·tven the impe dime nts to publi.c d e I'•berauo n 1 . 1
° the de tal s 0 I .
tiona) policies, and thus to the formation of a deliberative public opinion,
what, then, must political leaders do to foster the rule of deliberative
majorities in the United States?
page218
The Responsibility of Legislawrs
In American representative democracy, national legislatOrs serve, in
effect, as surrog-ate deliberators for their constituents. Where the citi-
zenry lack the time, the institutional environment, and perhaps the in-
tet·est to deliberate in depth on public issues, legislators are expressly
chosen to devote their full care and attention to public matters. 11tey
have the responsibility 1.0 review information and arguments on legisla-
tive proposals and to exercise their best jud&'1Tlent on behalf of those
whom they serve. This deliberative imperdtive, this duty to deliberate, is
an i.ntrinsic element of the American constitutional order. It carries ma-
jor implications for the behavior of the members of the House and Sen-
ate and especially for how they relate to public opinion while carrying
out their representative responsibilities.
First, it bears directly on how legislators spend their time. If law-
makers are to meet their deliberative responsibilities, they must keep
fundraising efforts, meetings with constituents, and frequent trips home
from crowding out essential deliberative activities such as attending com-
mittee hearings and lloor debates, studying key information and argu-
ments on legislative proposals, and, generally, entering into reasoned
exchange with their colleagues. Sound deliberation is uncompromising
in the demands it places on the time and allention of lawmakers. Because
the deliberative imperative dictates that legislato•·s devote a substantial
portion of their work time to serious reasoning about the merits of leg-
islative proposal~. a legislator who fails to do so forfeits an essential re-
sponsibility to his constituents. Thus, it is a mistake to view constituency
set-vice as legislators' o nly responsibility to those the)' represent. Legisla-
tors who properly understand their duty to their constituent.~ will not
allow the ombudsman role to squeeze out the activities necessary for
sound deliberation.
Second, legislators must not delegate excessive deliberative responsi-
bilities to sta!f. It can hardly be doubted that representatives and sena-
tors need policy information and advice from staff. Not only do too many
issues come to the Aoor for each member to monitor and analyze in ad-
vance. but most legislators would find it impossible without staff suppon
even to stay abreast of the issues that come before the committees and
subcommittees on \\'hich they serve. ln such a situation the temptalion
can be strong to delegate the essential deliberative function to staff, with
the member •·eserving to himself or herself on ly a final review, through
a staiT briefing, prior to voting in commiuee or on the noor. page 2 19
Yet legislators are not elected merely to cast votes based on staff rec-
ommendations. Rather, their responsibility is to exercise their own rea-
son and judgment on behalf of their constituents. There is no assurance.
after all, that a decision arrived at primarily through staff deliberation
and recommendations will be identical to one that the legislator would
have reached on his or her own by personally eng-dging in the delibera-
tive process. Although most high-Je,·el staff likely share the basic policy
dispositions of t.heir principals, some may in fact have personal policy
agendas at variance with the elected official or beliefs 1hat are more
ideological or doctrinaire and thus Jess amenable to compromise. Since
congressional staff arc not elected by or accountable to the citi~cnry, ex-
cessive delegatio n to staff raises questions about democratic control of
governmental decisions. At the very least such delegation adds another
stage between the public and policy; at worst it severs the link between
govenunental deliberations and public interests and sentiments by hand-
ing over tltc deliberative process 10 a publidy unaccountable body.
Thus, the: vast expansion of staff in Congress in recent decades poses
serious issues for the linkage between democracy and deliberation in the
American political system. Moreover. as Michael Malbin has argued.
even if staff aides faithfully represent the political views and interests of
those for whom they work, their sheer number and importance in Con-
gress have replaced direct face-to-face discussion and deliberation among
representatives and senators, rather common not so long ago, with staff
negotiations "in which each party is trying to achieve the best deal for
his own side." '" R;u her than experienced elected officials from through-
out the country coming together to articulate the interests of their con-
stituents, share their experiences and j udgments with one another, and
reason toward common goals, "we see members relying on staff techno-
crats ... whose knowledge of the world i$ limited 10 what they learned
in school or from other participants in the specialized Washington issue
networks." In tum , "we see politicians taking general positions. leaving
the details to staff. claiming credit. and learning about the impact from
their constituents..... lnstead of thrashing it all out before the fact. the
members too often do not know enough of the details they would need
to deliberate until after a program is implemented."" Concomitant with,
and at least pan ly the result of, staff growth has been a "weakening of
deliberation" in an institution "that works best when it responds to con-
220 Pub/it Opinion an.d Dtrnorrmu Stat~'llf'tfln.s/lip

sLitucnts' ncc.,.d s and interests in a se-tting chat enc.."'uro:ages the lllt!tnbcr$

tO think more broadly."'"
The o-ole of staff in policy deliber.uions within the m.uional govem·
mcnl nicely highlighu the potential tension bea..-een democracy and de·
liberation. Few would dispute that if the elected members of the House
and Senate delegated all ddiberath·c functions to their aides and simply
rubber-stamped staff recommendations, the American CongTCSS would
per force be a less dcmocrdtic institution. Yet in some circumst:mccs de·
cisionrnaking b)' staff may more closely approximate the deliberative
ide;al of reasoning on the merits than decisionmaking by elected officials.
Indeed. we have seen how well the staff that w;~s a•wmbled under Sec·
retary of the 'l'rcasnr)' Oonald Regan deliber.llt'<l on the fashioning of
the administration's proposal for income tax reform in 1985. Not one
member of the gronJ>. including Regan himsdf. w;~:s :m eleetec.l official.
Had this proposal originatec.l with the clccted members of Congress.
r.uhcr than in the executive branch. it is unlikely that this issue, which
affected so many powerful interests. would have been as thoroughly and
as fairly analyzed with a ••iew to sening the national interest in tax n.--
form. It may be wondered. then. why deliberation " 'ithin Congress
would not be well SC:I'\'cd by a similar staff-dominated decision process.
11te issue here is how far one can go in the direction of rule by profes·
.)ionals or cxpc:ns. whcf"C\·cr located in ahe feder.al go\'cnuncut. without
undennining the regime's fundamental democratic chilr:tcter. It is one
thing for the president, an elected official. to delegate the fonnulation of
a dewited propos:ll to his :tides and quite another for the members of the
I louse and Semite. elected to make the nation's Ja,"s, to de1Cf,'3tc the de·
cisive decisinnmaking pnwer to those the)' :tppoint to their personal :md
committee smff. What emerge as propos.ils from the executive branch.
which must after"" be deat•ed by the Office or Managemem and Budget
or. on imponJnH m:tttcrs. by the president himself. are merely rccom·
mcndmions to the Congress. No matter how many professionals or ex·
pens contributed to their formulation. the lawnmken in the Congress
retain complete fonnal authority to enact the proposals virtually as is, to
amend them. or to rcj«t them. It is at this stage that the interesu and
desires of the American people must be brought to bear through their
elected officials. whert" deliberation and democracy must be conjoined.
1l1crc is some point. howe•·er hard to define. beyond which the gro•·; th
of swff influence in Congress ncccssaril)• undcnnincs this conjunction of
deliberation and democracy.
The third implication fot· the behavior of legislators is that they must
 221

be: open to what they can learn from their colleagues and others :md thus
must be: willing to reach condusion5that deviate from. and perhaps con-
trddict. their original dispositions. When the deliberative proce55 com-
mences, l~slators cannOt know where it will lead. Rea$0ning through
the infonnation and arguments brought to their attention may $0lidify
original dispositions. modify them, or in some cases show them to be
incomistent with good public policy. Since legislators' initial policy posi-
tions are likely to mirror those of their connit uents. their deliberations
may result in policy positions at variance not only with their initial (>pin·
ions but also ••ith the views of those they represent. This is a funda-
mental and recurring issue for deliberative democr.tcy. It is wh)'. for
example. members of the House and Senate arc not. under the U.S.
Constitution, rccallnble betwL>en elections, as were the delegates to the
national Congress under the Aniclcs of Confederation. 1\ lixt-d tenn of
office assures legislators that they will not be immediately disciplined by
their constituents for responsibly carrying out their duties. It also gives
them some time to explain the soundneM of their vie,.•s to constituents,
Great stuff
begins here
potentially fostering a more infonned and deliberative public opinion
(more on political rhetoric and public opinion below).
founh. the duty to deliberate well may often be inconsistent with at·
tempts to conduct policy de,liberations on the plane of public opinion. for-
mal legislative deliberations in the contemporary Congress-committee
hearings. markup $eSSions. and floor debates-are. with few exceptions.
now conduCted in public. This necessarily creates multiple audiences for
every question, commem, or speech delivered in a Clommiuee room or
on the floor. These audiences include the legislators in anend;mce. other
members of the full body. interest groups, the media, the members' own
constituents. and the American public more geneo·ally. Although sound
deliberation dcm:mds th;~t legislators address each other with reasoned
appeals. the openness of the legislative proceu creates incemives to
curry favor with interest groups or to posture before ouuidc audiences.
This can take the form of what David Maylu:w calls " position taking"-
making " pleasing judgmental statements.""
Posturing, or position taking, is hardly a new phenomenon in the U.S.
Congress. "In all assemblies." wr'Oie James Bryce a century ago. "one
must expect abundance of unreality and pretence, many speeches obvi·
ously addressed to the gallery.""' Indeed. according to Bryce. the House
of Representath·es was more prone to this kind of beha••ior than any
comparable legislative body: "it talks and •·otes ... M if every section of
American opinion was present in the room:' 2 ' As •• rcsuh. ·•a set speech
 222
. . . tcnch h<.·c orne not an expomion or an
10
sub•n t of 1m porta nee
upon an} .b 1J ·t p1t·< t' o r e I·a bo r, '
·ttC ·md lu.,h-llown declamation." l4 This
n
,ugument u ' , . ller Scnalt". where the members were better
wa\ less common Ill t1le sma f h
t e
.
.
connecuon
.. ssessed a keener sense o
k110 wn to each other ,rn<1 po · · . f ( (:
• .. behavior and the act tons o the ull body. Yet
bc:t ween theu pet son a 1 ,
nen in the Senate• thete were "show clays :

a senes o r \e. t d 1.scc>urses· an: dcll\cred on some• promment •

• • • L· . ·I . . tor brings down and fires off 111 the atr, a
question. c .•t< 1 scna . . . . . I b
.. d rauon whtrh m.t) ha' e 1Ill e eanng on
caref u II > pH'(MH' o ·
what has gone before. In fan the speeches are made not to
convince the asscmbly,-no one dreams of th~t·-. b~t to keep
a man's opinions before the public and sustam hts fame. : ..
(T]hese long and sonorous . harang~lCS .~ re mere rhetoncal
thunder addteS\cd to the nauon outstde.-

Such postunng. so common in Br}·ce\ tll~e a~d in our own._ under-

rnmes deliberation in several distinct ways. First, 1t deflects the Ume, at-
tention, and energy of legislatOrs away from productive deliberative
activities. Second, it can make genuine reasoned exchange virtually im-
possible within formall)' deliberative forums such as committee meetings.
How. for example. can some members coolly and rationally exchange
information and debate issues if others are playing to the cameras or
trving to make headlines? And third. it degrades the deliberative process
by reducing argument and persuasion to the plane of unreflective public
opinion, often resulting in oversimplifica tions, distortions, and, at times,
outright appeals to passion and prejudice.
This points to the broader issue of the relationship of secrecy and its
opposite, accountability, to sound deliberation, a matter that was touched
upon in the discussiOn of markup sessions in chapter 6 and in the treat-
ment of the delibenttive capacities of the executive branch at the end of
chapter 7. Next to the desire to democratit.e power in the House and
Senate, the most powerful idea driving the massive institutional reforms
of the 19~0s ~.nd 1970s in ~ongress was the demand for "government in
the su~shme. Secret meeungs, such as markup sessions and conference
com_mlttees, should be ended; public meetings of commiuees or the full
bodtes ought to be open to electronic broadcast so that the widest pos-
sible audience could observe Congress in action; and votes in committee
and on the ~oor should be recorded so that constituents could hold their
· d.
· was accomphshe
· act ·tons. All th1s
rcpresemauves
. accountabl e 10r
c
t h etr
But whtle these changes \ . bemg · d . . . . .
vete ma e, few etther 1ns1de the msmu-
1'ht lltJpotuibi/ity of IJpsfnloN 221

lion or out asked how ther would affect Congress's core responsibility to
deliberate well for the nation. The drive for accountability- and there·
fore less secrecy. more recorded •·oting. and more publicity-res~.< on
one or both of two prcmiS<.'S. One stems from democratic theory: If the
people arc 10 conU'OI their elected officials, they must know what their
representatives and senators are doing on their behalr. Because it is the
job of legislators to carry out the wishes oftheir co11stituents, they have
no basis for m:tki11g irnponam decisio11s i11sul:ued from public •·icw. The
seco11d premise. though related to the first. is less principled and more
C)•nical: Legislators cannot be trusted 10 do what is t'ight for their con·
sci1Ucnts or the muion on their own. Behind che rloscd tloo~ of a
markup session or during the eJfecli\'ely anonymous \'Oting in Commit·
tee of the Whole in the House. they will "sell out" their constituents or
the brooder public in order to curry f:l\'01' with some powerful imcrest
grou1> for some narrowly self-imcrcstcd reason: c:unpaij,'ll funds. orga·
ni~tional support for UJXoming rumpaigns. future employment pos·
sibilitics. etc.
If, however. we take scriousl)' the deliberdth·e responsibilities of na-
tional legislators, particularly in light of tlte tension betw~n democracy
and deliberation. we may come to •oiew the issue of secrecy and account·
ability somewhat ditTercnlly. For example. if"e begin not "ith the demo-
cratic premise that the people ha,·e a right to monito• every official act
of their reprcsemath•es or .,;th its cynical .-ariant that legislators arc not
to be trusted. but rather with the view 1h;u most lawmakers who scn·c in
Congress genuinelydesi1-e to promote lhe public good. lhcn the question
lx:c.-omc~ whet her the glare of public scrutiny :md formal :tccoumability
ror e''cry vote in committee and most votes 01 1 chc flour ron tribute...~ w or
hinders dclibemtion in service of the public good. Indeed. we can iden·
tify in principle a variety of ways in which maximizing accountability and
publicity can harm deliberation or. conversely. " 'ays in which insulating
lcgisl~•tors to some dcgrc.-e from public scnatiny c;en 5upport and enhance
dclibcnuion .,; thin Congress.
First. maximiting publicity can, as we ha•e seen. promote pos1uring
at the expc:n.sc of genuine reasoning about the public good. To put it
ditTercntly, "hen meetings are not held in public- like mat·kul> sessions
and conference commillec meetings for most of the history of Con·
gt'CS$-or wlocn the audience of open meeting• is limited to those in at·
tcnd:mce-likc commiuee hearings and floor debates umil radio and
tCIC\tision wen• allowed in a (ev,t decades 3~o-thc serious $Ubs1antivc:
lawmaker wlu) has "done his homcwor'k" takes precedence over his less
224

studious colleague with a knack for publicity. This can only be good for
$0und deliberation on public policy.
Sc<:ond. the opening up of the legislative process c:an make lawmakers
much more directl)' accountable to interest groups whose support they
may need for reelection. Lobbyists. after all, now actually sit in on com·
mittec markup sessions. This may constrain the policymaking cfforu of
lawmakers to actions that serve the interests of narrow groups at the
expeme of the broader public good. It must be n:cognited that there is
no way to OJ>en up the legislative process to the people without allK>
opening it U(l to lobbyists and interest groups.
T hird and similarly, by making lawmakers more directly answerable
to their spccifoc geographic constitutems. greater accountability and
publicity may make it more difficult for these putatively "national" leg·
isla tors to rc3lK>n together and work toward policies in the broad national
interest. If national policy ought to be merely the aggregation of the
perceived interests of the geographic parts of the nation. then there is
no problem. L\ut if there is such a thing as a national interest in areas like
defense policy, international tr.~de. domestic economic policy. respon·
sible budgeting. or social welfare that cannot be reduced to the percei~ed
inten:su of the geographica.l pans of the nation. then it is the resportsi·
bility oft hOSt: we send to the House and Senate to r""son together about
ho"' to achi~e it. Such collective deliber•tion will lx rendered impos·
sible if the members of the House and Senate arc. like ambassadors from
sovereign states. bound down in their day-to-day polic)·making efforts to
what i5 acceptable to their geographic constituencies.
What '~as absent in the 1960s and 1970s in Congrt'SS as the old ways
wct'l: swept aside was an understanding of the tension between democ-
racy and ddiberation and therefore a recognition that "reforms" that
nmkc: the American governmental system more democratic may not en·
hance the deliberation that is nc~cssary for democracy to be successful.
We arc now living with the coruequences of this shortsightedness, as a
growing body of evidence is demonstr.lting.
One study. for cx:tmple, argues that making the markup sessions of
the House: Appropriations Committee public h;l! exacerbated budget
problems by decreasing "commiuc:e members' willingness to reject spend-
ing requests." In addition. requiring recorded voting in Commiu<e of
the Whole has led to "more ''Otes by those lacking knowledge about and
interest in the issues before them" both because of the dramatic increase
in the number of recorded votes and because members fear the cleo oral
consequences or being recorded absent."' Several other studies have
Tilt RtspoouibifiiJ cf l.tgislnton 22}

document<'<~ how "governmem in the sunshine" has significantly in-

creased the access and influentt of lobbyisiS. and therefore interest
groups.: "'The idea was to make 1hc procc:ss more "dcmocr.:nic.' but in
practice. sunshine measures imensilied the access of lobbyists."" "We
now know," concludes another author. "that open meetings filled with
lobbyis~S, and recorded •·otes on scores of panicul•ristic amendmeniS.
serve LO increase the po"·e.rs of special interests. not to diminish them."
He adds that "the increased reliance on n :corded •·otes has actu:~lly made
it easier for narrow groups to hold legislators acoounmblc because most
of these votes arc on panicularistic amendments."" A study of tax policy
in Cong•·c~ showed how "the sunlight of open meetings" meant that the
members of the Ways and Mea ns Committee in the House "could now
be held account:oblc for their positions on every provision that made up
a tax package. In shon the ... Committee was easier to penetrate. par-
licul"rly by org:tnizcd imcresas. and much lcs.s autonomous. In I urn. Lhc
committee could no longer pro•1de cover for House members.''"
The opening up to public scrutiny of the markup sessions of the
House Wa)<s and Means Committee is espt.-c:ially interesting because this
is one of the few reforms in Congy-css that has subs<oquentl) been rolled
back: in 1983, after a decade of open markups. the rommiuce returned
to c.loscd sessions. Since then, "all major tax legislation has been drafted
in closed SC$5ion."'" Why this change against the grnin of openness and
accountability that ~ dominated the reform [>criod ? To put it most
simply. the commiuee, wishing to act responsibly on mx matters, had
learned how enhanced accou ntability to interest grou1>s and constituent$
had undcnnincd collective deliberations about n:ttiomtl tax policy. As
report t-el 10 the author of the most recent book-length stud)' nf the Ways
;111d Means C..ommittce. the member• found it dinicult in open sessions
"to su1>port measures that might impose costs on their own constituen-
cies or groups that had provided suppon in past elections." C.omplcx tax
i~ues that im·olvcd competing intcresiS could not be w lvro "in front of
an audience:· In closed $CSSions. on lhe other hand , tht: members could
"a•·oid some of the dinect responsibility for i•nllOsing costs on constitu-
ency interesiS or group allies." As one commillce member related about
closed sessions: "A member can enter a mild protest about the defeat of
an amendment he might otherwise feel compelled to suppon .... Then.
"'hen the markup is over. the member can go out into the hall and 53)'
to the lobbj•ist. ' I workro to get )'OUr amendment adopted but I juot got
outvoted."' In a word. closed markups allowed the members "to take a
broader view of the issues" and to think less "about the posturing, about
It is hard to imagine a more thorough write-up of the whole topic of secrecy in legislatures, but Bessette seems unaware of
King's powerful focus on the interactions between Congressmen themselves (vote buying & trading which rely on
226
transparency) & Smith's work on the in-fighting with amendments, as well as using all internal calls to transparency to
pressure Congressmen. Indeed Besette never correlates secrecy in Congress with Secret Ballots (intimidation and bribery).

s:nisfying someone suung there wau:hing you:· Comminee members

were convinced that rewming to closed markup$ reduced constituency
and imer~t group pressures. e nhanced deliberations about the national
imerest in tax policy. and resulted in bener policy o111puu."
Contrdry to this general line of argument. howe, cr. it could be main-
tained th~t reducing secrecy in Congr= promO!~ deliberation by re-
ducing the opponunities for logrolling. making side payments. or other
kinds of"whecling and dealing." It is r•re. after all . for such de:•I making
to be conducted in the open. which is testimony to the force of the public
norm that legislation should be decided on its merits. If bargaining can
be forced out of the formallegislath·e channels through the di~infectant
of publicity, then perhaps congressional deliberation will benefit.
There arc two problems with this a rg ument. First. there is no reason
to believe th:tt if bargains cannot be made in commiucc meetings. for
example. they ••ill not be made somewhere cbe. J>hone c-JIIs and private
meetings in congressional offices pro,•idc plenty of insulation from pub-
lic scrutiny and thu~ ample opponunil y to strike deals. Second. as Wood-
row Wibon argued in his famotn critique of the late-nineteenth..:entury
Congress. it is principally public deliber•tion-"thc instruction and ele-
vation of public opinion"-that benefits when Congress operntc:s openly.
rather than internal congressional deliberation." Consider. for example,
the question period in the British Parliament. This public opponunity
for the opposition to quc:stion the prime minister and the cabinet, now
C\"Cn televised, scf\'C$ not so much to impn>ve the quality of rcasorting
about policy within Parlia ment as to inform the broader community about
the govemmcnt's policies and plans.
h must be emphasized that the point here is not that one c:mnot have
ac tht sfune time bo•h democratic accoumahility ami 50ttncl reasoning
about public policy. Indeed. the American constitutional system was con-
sciously designed 10 ;~ccomrnodatc both principles or go:tls. R:uhcr, the
issue is what kind and degree of popular control. of public accountability,
is appropriate: in a democracy whose governing ins1itutions must retain
the capacity to reason well about ta ..·s and their adminiStration. A$ noted
earlier. the proper test of legislati'c re.poruivcnc:css in a dcliberati,·e de·
mocracy iJ whether the results of the deliberations of the lawmakers ap-
proximate what the majority of citizens would h"'e decided if they had
engaged in the same reasoning process. Yrt if lawmakers arc properly to
carry out their deliberative responsibilitic:s for the citizenry. tl>e)' must to
some extent be protected against the intrusions of unreOective public
opinion. T he institutional environment in which they work must allow.
Tht RtJJKmsibili'1 of L.tgulntur> 227

and even encuur-•ge. legisiaiON to proceed wherever reasoning on the

merit.s lead~. even if this is some distance from initial public senti-
ments. The r<suhs. though at times inconsiSlent with unreRective pub-
lic attitudes. may be the best :opproximatiou that can be achie,·ed of
deliberative public opinion. of the "cool and deliberate sense of the
cornmunil)'...
If we are not used to thinking about the positive benelit.s of secrecy
for dcli!J<,ration in Congress. we are more willing to accet>t the connec-
tion bet ..·een secrte)' and dcli!J<,ra!ion in othcrcontext.s. 'Ote secret ballot
in democratic elections. after all. was intended to free vote" from pres·
sures that migh1 dis1on their decisions from judgmcnl5 on the merits of
candidates for public office. Similar!). within (',ongress it.self leadership
contests are usual!)' decided by a secret ballot of the mcm!J<,rs of each
pany within each branch. Yet. it could IJ<, argued, such secret voting ren·
ders the rank-and-file mcm!J<,rs unaccounlablc to their constituenl5 in
their choice of pany leaders. Allowing se<ret ballo1s sacrifices account·
ability in favor of protecting the individu;ti'S pri••ate judgment of the
merits of candidates for leadership positions. Indeed. 1he U.S. Constjtu.
lion it.self wou written in secret. and a lthough a journal was kept (not
published until 1819). votes were rccord<"tl ottl)• by state. with no indic:l·
lion of individual votes. Delegate Ceurge Mason's reasons for opposing
the recording of indh•idu;el ' 'olc5 is inslniCii\'c; ..such a record of Lhc
opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change or them on con-
••iction ."» Maximizing public accounwbility conld impair sound delib-
eration. The point of these c~amt>lcs is not that Congress would function
more deli!J<,ratively if' it simply closed the doors and slopp<-od recording
\'Otcs. but ruther th;:u the drive for maximum openness and accounta·
bility is not an unmixed blessing. Those rt'$pOnsihle for making C.ongress
mot'C accounctblc over the p:tst several decades have thought too little
about also making Congress mOt'C dcliiX:t'alivc and about the ""'YS in
which accountability can threaten deliberation .
The rd:uionship or serrccy :uul :u;t'OU nl:ehilil y tn sound deliberation
within Congress is but unc ex;~mplc:. though perhaps the most impor-
tant. of how the structure. procedures. and rules of the House and Sen·
ate affect 1he c:opacity of these institutions to dcliiJ<,ratc well for the
nation the)' serve. Another is the proliferation of suocommiuees in Con·
gress in the decades afler the legislative rcorg-•niza1ion of 1946 substan-
tially reduced the num!J<,r or full committees. This proliferation has
spread legislators so thin. especial!)' in the Senate. that i1 is impossible
for the memocrs to keep up even with the husiness !J<,fore their own
 PuMrc Opmum and Drmocralic StateHnaR!hrp

228
. . Bet ween the mid-19 50s and the early
1 ,· 111xomm attces. . .
omnutt c.'t'' an< · . lttt"e and subcom mtttee asstgn ments
1 . nbet 0 1 comn ~
1990s tlw ,tH'r..tgc. nut . d ubkd. from :l.O to 6.H. and per senato r
per I I ou,c.· m<· 1nhct more t t.tn °
1 .
7
q 10 11.0.11 As a result, attend ance at
. . 1 1 t Hl J>c..· rcent. 1tom ·· . .
tnc re.t\t < •1 X>ll f lriouslv low (tt can be dtfficu lt even to
" o tc..•n, . nons) 1< · ,
· •• 1 anng' ·k . all(! \awm.t kers defer more and more
conuntllt c te.
,~-:c.·t a quotan
10
n at m.u . up .~c. s~ directi on. As noted ear\'tcr, d e J'b • erauon · ·ts
. 1 , k
. .
w ,tall tot tnfotm . .tuon h ,an< . dem.ands ll places on lawma crs. If thev
unrompt<lllll~tng 111 t e tunc . ·
. ·I t'ttl(' . t" ice .ts mam hcann gs .md marku ps, the\
\f)('ll d I1,1 11 ,IS 111111 I I •11 .
. r · 1l(, IDss wdl infonu cd about more matter s for whtch .
I\ I 11 0 lll'H'SS II\ ~ .
the\ bc.u ,1 form.tl respon , 1bilitY and on wluch thev vote at the cructal
.,t.tges in the..· lcgtslati 1 e P' ocess. h1 th~s wm. the em,pmYer~ent of the
nwmb en nt.~ 1 umktm ine the dehbc rauven ess of the lawma ktng process.
One could mal-t• a ~imtl.ar argum ent about the practic e of legisla ting
tluoug h those "omnib us" btlls in" hith a mniad of dtstinc t measu res are
lnouah t to«eth et into one legislative packag e of such length and com-
t h.ttC\ fe" "ho 101e lot it unders tand its conten ts. Grant ed that in
" '--
plt•'\.Jl\
" bod\ \i\..t· Congre ss sonw defere nce must be sho1' n bY rank-a nd-file
members to the recom menda tions of comm ittees (or else the comm ittee
"'tem would collapse). if .1 lcgislati1e propo sal gets too large and com-
pie" and rontai m too manr distinc t pro,·is ions. it "til becom e l'irtual l\
ampossihle for tlw repon ing comm ittee to inform the memb ers ade-
quate!\ throug h the comm ittee report and floor debate of the conten ts
of the bill.md the reasom suppo rting its passag e. At this point the l..md
of reason l•d judgm ent that the full memb ership can make about com-
nHttee tl'tomm endati ons in a delibe r..ui,·e bod\' berom es nothin g more
than bhnd defert' nte.
As tht• catalo<> . "'•c L • o f ·mstttu · · uona · 1 t'eaLUres near the end of• chapte r:>-
'ugges b. unul rcn:nt dec,tdes the mt•mb ers and leader s of Congr ess un-
ho" import •1nt ·tt ''as to struct · ·
lll'e " ennro n-
derstooc.l ''ell . - ure the leatsla
0
ment to foster respons ible..• I·"".ma 1..·mg and ,\ nauon . al outloo k. But as
·
power
, ha' been democ . ru • tu1e. d an<I pu b he . o;crutim enhan ced. there has
Ix en too httle auenu on both 1 • 11 · h ·11 C
tional fl'ttuisites 1. d .' ~ .ongres~ and "tthou t to the insutu -
o soun dehbe ratton .

Tht'
..
Political Execu ti\ e '·md tl••(, B ureau cran
1 he questio n of hm, political I
dehber .tme matom ie- . ' t•aders ought to promo te the rule of
· :., anc1 t11erefo re h 1 .
optnto n .• , nm rc..·~ttt ned m, t le\ ought to rel.ue to pubhc
·· .e ..u.c, na. Those .m the exenll t' e
· 1 leaiJ
tOt1e c- s atl\
Th.t EJC«f1thrc tmd thr Burtnurraq 229

branch confront the same issue. ahhough in a different form. and make
their o"•n distincti\·e con1ribution.
By the very nature of the executive branch . the deliberations that OC·
cur within i1 :are lc:ss closely tied 10 public sentiments o r 10 the \'ic:ws of
external groups than tlte deliberations ,.;thin Congress. This is largely
because the elec:toral principle does not extend as deeply into the exe·
cutive brnnch as it does into the legislature. With the exception of the
president and ••ice president . the principal players in the executh•e
br•nch - White Uouse staiT. high-ranking political :tpiX>illlccs in the de-
partments and agencit$, and senior careerist,5-()\,·e 1heir posirions ro
appointment or to advancement in the career scn•icc.» T hns. high·IC\·el
poliliCtl executives and senior carecrist.s ;uc not individu~tlly accoumabJe
to the electorate. Their car<oer interests :n·c less aO"o:("tcd hy "'hat those
outside the governing innitutions think of them than is the case for
electctl t·eprcsematives. Consequent!)'. they do not face 1he same pres-
sures as those in Congress to embrace. or at least to mollify. either gen-
ernlized popular sentiments or the views of spedlic extemal groups.
Moreover. a. noted previously. the secrecy of m 0$1 exc:cuti,·e branch
ddiberntions insulates the decision process from public anention and
influence in a w-• y that is uncharacteristic of ddibcntion.s in Cong~.
This "'lative insul>~ion of executive branch deliberations from public
scrutiny presents spttial challenges to executil·e branch dcdsionmakers.
Because there is less public posturing and less defetcnce to un rcfiec-
tin· public opinion within the While Uousc and the administ,.,tti•·c :ogcn·
cies than within Congress. officials of the executive branch ha•·c greater
freedom :ond opportu nity 10 promote the kind of expct1isc. syste matic
analysis. and long-,.,mge view of the public good that is essentjal to sound
politic:.tl dcliberruion . To a subst:tntial degree thb is done through the
pern1nnent bureaucracy. which. at its best. is " rcposilot")' for pract.ic:tl
wisdom about problems of governance derived from r ears of firsth;ond
experience. ru the la•e Uerben J. Storing h:u arguctl. "the civil service is
one of1hc few inslitutions \\•c: h:n'e for bringing the accumulatt.-rl wi.sdorn
or tlte p;tst to bear upon political decisions."'" In carrying out i10 ddib-
erntive function 1he bureaucrncy is benefited b)• a "degree of insulation
from shifting political breaes." The thoughts and actions of ci.;l ser-
vants, who ha•·e a drfactD life tenure. are "not governed so striCti)' ;u Iare)
that of the I>Oiitical executive by periodic elections. Their posi1ion en-
ables them 10 mitigate the partisanshil> of l>rirt)" politics. and it gives them
some protection from the powerful temptation. to which the pany poli-
 _........ ,~

230
. . . ·ve tht'l><·ople's inclinations rathe1 than their
II< i,lll IS alWil}\ SUbjeCt. lO SCI

mtt·n•sts."H . t- hmn l>ublic opinion can be beneficial to

II howcH~I: some msu1a .I011. llroblcm'> for . .
democratic comro I here
I .
• 1
ddihc1<Hion. 1t can a 1so cre.l <: . . .
. h 1 • !citbel ,1uons of career c1v1 1servants w11l bear
a·rn:um the danger t at t lC < . . • • •
. . senurncnts and des1res. Stonng s response 1s
huh: rdauonsI11p lO pu bl tc · d' · ·
· . · · h United States does not represelll a ISUnn w11l
1hat 1he nv11scrv1ce m t c .. .
· · · d nt of the broadc1 pohucal commun1ty. On the con-
01 spu 11 me1epen c h A · ·
.. A · civil service .. rcpresent[s] t e mencan society
trary, t 11c mencan · · . . .
·1 f · 1 of faithfulness" Indeed, ''the mterests, opm1ons, and
wtl 1 a a1r c egrec ·· .
· ·1 nts are intimately bound up w1th those of the com-
va Iut·s o f Cl\'1 serva
· 1 ole .. ~s It must be aclm1tted. nonetheless, that the same
mun11vasaw1. ·
degree of msulation from publir sen1~mcnts t~at promotes de~ision-
mal..mg through expertise and svstemauc analys!s creat~s a potcn~1al for
narrO\\ ness of view. rigidity of approach, and 1deolog1cal commitment
inconsistelll with fundamental public desires.
Thus, the issue of the conjunction of deliberation and democraq
takes opposing forms in Congress and the bureaucracy. ln Congress the
predominantly democratic character of the decisionmaking process cre-
ates environmental influences and personal incentives not always con-
genial to serious-minded deliberation. ln the bureaucracy, on the other
hand, the same institutional features that promote sound deliberation
create conditions that may impair democratic control.
Political executives, like legislators, have a responsibility to foster the
rule of deliberative majorities. In so doing, they must understand both
the contribution that the bureaucracy makes to this end and the corre-
sponding danger that it poses. Their task is to promote an atmosphere
of genuine deliberation within the bureaucracy by encouraging and sup-
porting the development of substantive expertise, the rational analysis of
info~mat!on. and a~guments, and decision making through reasoned per-
suasion. fh1s reqwres protecting the deliberations of career civil ser\'ants
from po~itical force~ and pressures that might undermine reasoning on
the mer~ts, much hke the way Treasury Secretary Donald Regan pro-
tec_ted his small band of delibcrators, which included both political ap-
pomtees and careerists, in the developmem of the Treasury I tax reform
proposal. On the other hand • beeause career c1v1 · ·1 servants· arc not d'1-
rectly. accountable . to the communny, ..
· the pohucal executive must bees-
peCta 11y a 1crt. to s1gns that a c·l VI·1 servants• attachment to external interests
. ,
01 personal 1deology have intruded . . .
process Th d l'b . upon and distorted the dehberattve
· e e 1 eratlons of the men and women who constitute the
 2Ji

career sen·ice, like the deliberat ions of congress iontl ta ff. "t.11 not nec-
' . . . . · ' s
,\anh result tn condust on conststen t with whm a del'b . · · .
e 'd d t eratt1e majortt\
d
11 ould have eet e .

Presidential Actions
Although t~~ White ~ouse staff, departm ent and agenn heach. mhet
htgh-level pohucal appomte es. and ci,il servants ,til contribut e to e>..ecu-
111e branch deliberat ion, the presiden t alone possesses the comtituti onal
authority to take binding executiv e actions. The Constitution vests the
chief executi1e with authoritv to enforce the laws. make nomin.tu ons to
htgh office, pardon ofTen es, recomm end rneasun.' \ to CongtC\\ . 1ecei1e
ambassadors, and comman d the Armed Forces. In carl) ing out these
tasks president s exercise their personal judgmen t, informed by the facts
and argumen ts brought to their attention through the presidl•ntial ad-
ltson process. What relations hip is there, then, between tlw Judgmen t
and actions of presiden ts and deliberat ive majoritie s? What •~. ;md what
ought to be, the connecti on between president ial decisions and publir
opinion?
\\'hen the framers vested the executiv e power Ill an office wtth mdefi-
ntte reeligibility, a term longer than any state gO\crnor 's, sub~t.tnualln­
dependen t powers, a salary that could not be changed by Congr~s~
during any one term, and a mode of election independ ent of the lcgt\·
lature, they sought to ensure that presiden ts would act on tlw basts of
thetr independ ent judgmen t and will. Freed from the "unboun ded com-
plaisance"3'1 to the legislatu re so common among ~late gmc'
1110" and
~mewhat insulated from direct popular control, pn·,ident s IWH' to fum-
lion as constitut ional officers. responsib l) and inckpcnd enth t,ul\ mg
. . f ·d t)H be of "tdt·,prea d
out th etr duttes. Howevc1 respect u 1 pre~• enb nug . .
. · nl oJ>tnton fw .tt uon\
pu bl tc sentimen ts or of stt ongly he< 1 1 wngresstO I • ·
1 • rtU ided by t he'll own
properly within the executive sphere they were 10 ><,.., .
ll.unl 1ton
... . .mterest 1.t.qu ired · "' . .
UI:Sl understa nding of\\ hat the nattcmal act h1' 0\\11 oplll·
. . 10 Inc to
Put tt, "the executive should bema <,Jlu,ttwn <' 1
· 111 tgh t nl.t t 1w 01111
" ·"'At time~ \ll< h
·
. d d eetSIOil. .se acuon'
11>n with v·
tgOI an . sorat . 'I IIIII\ IHI\hed
oft ·1 mca,uH.·
'· emporat y resistanc e 10 popular, 1 unwt ' · . d ..cJ 11 c 1 dlec-
uv 1h · 101 "mort' < oo 1 ,111 ' ' '
· e people or Congre\ \ to allow tum· . ·dentnl jucl~ment
h<m "•I I I d' d·uHC: between J>IC:SI '
· n other cases t 1e 1scor • rtht end uH t 1tllll1ghout tht' ptt:,t·
and bt· . lh tf the· in-
pu tc or congressiom1l c1est res nu,.., . ·xt elecuon. c·,peua ,
den 15• . .
term, ueaung an tS\ttC fo1 t 1JC. nt
tumbe . . t' ttttional oflt< c: t ~ w rt•-
nt ''as lunnmg a gam. ,.
.....w atcd m chaptt'l 2. t h e <•11>·It
-\s e1a.x. H \ o cons t
•
2}2

sist public desires. at least for a time, wa.s intend('(! not to create a gov-
erning will independent of the people thcm5elves but rather to promote
rule by deliberati•·e majorities by protecting them againlt the follies of un-
reftccti•·e public opinion. The president's four-)'e:>r tenn and indefinite
reeligibility were intended to foster the kind of long-range view of the
public good that ought to guide the citizenry itseJfbut is often o•·ercome
by more imm<'<liate. or transient , impulses and desires. In this respca
the president was to be like the Senate, and both were to serve as a coun-
terbalance to the most popular branch, the Hou.se of Kepresentathoes.

0£1. 1/J£11117"/0N. R£/•IIES£1'/TIIT/ON, ANV 5£1'1\lli\'I'ION

OF POWE RS
In one rc::spt..-ct. ho"'•ever. the president t~ unique. C\tCn by comparison
with the Senate; for he alone represents the entire nation, something tO
which no single representative or senator can lay claim. f or Jeffe..on it
was espcciall)' the president who '"command(ed( a view of the whole
ground.''" The president's representational uniquen<oss. his identity with
the nation as a whole, Iii$ him, more than any other single political fig-
ure. to anieulate and promote the deep-seated values and goals of t.he
American dtiunry-•oalues and goals that may bc ovemtatched or over-
shado.,·ed by more tangible and immediate political or economic intcr-
CSI$ within a congressional district or state.
This representational difference can be the source of signifocant con-
flict betwc:c:n Congress and the presidency. !•resident Jimmy C.•rter diJ.-
covcrcd this when he sought to subject congressional decisions on water
pl'(ljcCI$ of great intere$t to local communities-prqject s such as build-
ing dams. dredging rivers, and impro••ing harbors- to a r:ttional assess-
mem of national water policy needs. Intense congressional opposition
thwarted ony serious change in existing practice. In this and like contro-
versies both of the political institutions !Seem tO renect public opinion.
but in two different ways. During the water policy controversy. Congress.
it is reasnnable to argue. effectively gave voice to the millions of citi%ens
who w•mcd better Hood control. cheap hydrod~-ctric power. improved
irrigation of famtlands. more efficient water trAMponation. and ex-
panded outdoor r.,.;reational aeti•ities. The presidency, on the other
hand. aniculated the generalized public semiment for economy in gov-
ernment and for rational and coherent national policies. a sentiment
likd)' shared even by those who favored the water projects.
This dichotOIO)' in public sentiments-institutio nally manifested in
separ:ttion of powers conllicts-is not limited to issues such as water
 prtu dmt wl Jlrtums

2JJ
po hn. Ind eed.. som
I
e mai nta in tha t it is a pen·asive ~ f
.\merican socra we lc-•are stat e and even that eatu re o the mo der
. h d c- d' . it h 1 . n
electorate as opt e 10r rv1ded pan v gov ern e ps to explam wh, the
. . men t
10 recent d eca d es. Th e \'Ote rs. n rs arg ued sen more o 1ten than not
d 1.
Democrats w Cong ress to prov1d .
e serv
· argc maJ• onu •.
es of
. . ices and goo d ·h'l h
more consen auv e Rep ubl ican s to the White s ''
. . Ho use top 1e t C\ e]e,·ate
111 gov ern men t and rest ram ts on tax auo n. (lt romote cconomv
. . , is impos<bl . .
~ 110,, wh eth er Bill Cli nto n s ele nio n to ,1 eat t111s um e to
. I . . g- the pre sid e'"' · ]gtl? .,
J1mm\ Can ers e ecu on 111 I t6, an aberTation from til"~ cIll • - IS, 1I"C
urre nt nor m of
di,·ided gov ern me nt or a retu rn to the mo
re usual hi\toncal pattel n of
one-part) con trol .)
Thu s, conAict bet,~·een Cong~ess a nd the pre
sid eno mav rcpre~em ,
clash am ong com peu ng values. rnterests. or 1
goals of the utiz enn rtself.
reflecting suc h dic hot om ies in pub lic opi nio
n as ( 1) the ime rem of the
pans versus the who le, (2) con side rati ons of
sho rt-t erm ve1sus long-tem
benefits. and (3) the de ire for good~ and sen 1
ice~ 'ers us a r ecogni
costs and limits. In this res pec t the kin d 11011 of
of deliberation fmtercd bv
American sep ara tion of pow ers is not unl ike
the del ibe rau on that onu 1 ,
within an ind ivid ual wh o is forc ed to assess
and balance com peu ng 1\SUe\
or benefits at stak e in som e dec isio n or cou
rse of action. In so far a' th"
balancing is esse ntia l to sou nd del ibe rati on.
sep ara tion of pow en wn -
fliets may actu ally pro mo te the form atio n of
del ibe ram e majorrties
L!X CO J.X AX D TH E C/\ '11 . \-1-'A R.
PRt .ST IH .\ //A I A ( / [ ( ) \ .'>
ASD DE LI BE RA T/\'£ M A.JO RJT JJ-.
,
The fram ers' dist inc tion bet wee n sur fac e
public opi nio n and deeper
deliberauve opi nio n was at the cor e of 1her
r und erst and rng of govern·
ment and politics and , acc ord ing !), cen tral
to the ir mstitution.tl dt·,ign
As we have see n, it was hop ed tha t the rela
tively len gth \ term~ of off in
for the pre sid ent and sen ato rs tog eth er with
the ir ind uec t modes of clet ·
tion would give the se officials the inst itut ion
al capacit \ to res!st n~ndehb·
erative imp ulse s or de ma nds of the peo ple
. therebY allowmg um e fol
reason and jus tice to prevail. As wielders of
the executi\·e .p~wer. preM·
dents would be ena ble d to resi st unr efle
ctn e surf ace opm ron as thev
soug ht to pro mo te the dee per an d mo re
rea son c•d r>uoals and values of
the Am enc an peo ple .
Th rs .ts for exa mp le precr~e .
ly hO\\
Ab h 1 Lmcoln's bw gra p he1
ra an
Lo rd Cha 'rnw ood , des crib' . . ·
ed hr ~ acu ons <1unn g the critical Civil
(gc. . . . . Wa.r vem.
\N.-s Thr ee lon g yea rs of war an<I very I .. ' asuahres rn Gt. tnts cam·
· . . . led' ) '' · . ..
pargn agarnst Lee 111 Vrr d
gmra had sap pe pu bl " confidence 111 the \\al
 l'rt/lilr Opmron and Dcmocrallf Staltlma 111 hiJI J>mulrntwl Arl11111'
2J.I 215

elTon and wcal..cncd the North's resolve to p•·css on to complete vi nor). .mo~t loudly heat d,. ran oulv· in a rough and approx 1·mate 'ras h.
1011 be I t'J>I t:.\('ll((l(IVC. II
Responding 10 lim puhhc dissmi~f.lC t ~on in the s_pring and early sum met
of 186~. Rcpublic.tn patt\ leadt'r'> se11ou'h <Omtdered replacmg Linwln
lien· Lrnwln. by rl'fu~mg t_o folio''' the shifting public attitude~. ~>as a
as the pall\ nommec fm pt c'1dent f01 the \Jm ember election. The
Democrat~. "ho nommated (,eneral George ~lcCiellan for the presi-
more ·~~ulwntl< repr<'~entau~•e of "the true and undellving of th<' '"II
pt:opk· th.m thmc 1\' llh thc1r fingers on the pulse of the wi 1 enn. In
denn m .-\ugust. sought w g.un poliucal ad' antage b\ adopting a plat-
Charnwood\ 'ic·". I. me oln was
form that decried "fnm '<'<II~ of failure to restore the L'nion b\ the
e'-penment of ''ar" .md calll·d for an 1m mediate ''cessation of hostilities." tlw embodiment. 111 a degree and manner '' htch are alike
.-\bout the \Jme timt• lmwln. who had received the Repubhcan nonu- t.llt'. of the· mmc· c.on,tant and the higher judgment of hts
nation the month bdmt·. wa\ .Jd\1\Cd b\ leaders of his pall\ that his t){'oplc· It 1\ plamcr \till that he embodied the resolute pur-
elewon wa, hopclt'''· Tht•th,unnan of the tentral Republican Commn- pmt· "htc h underla' the fluctuations upon the surface of
tht·it poltllt<illifc. 1
tee e\cn retommt'ndt•d to l.mwln that he make O\ertures for peace.
Throu~hout tht' uoubhng tune Lintoln remained steadfast. He ab- In a ll.lrt O\\ \eme Lincoln's msistence on pursuing total 1 ICton
\tlluteh refust•d to mniatt' am O\ enure' to the South for a negotiated throughout I RIH in the face o! growmg public opposition might appear
":•ulement or to t•ntct mw am ch,tus~tom initiated b' the other side that undcmoc 1<Hie. If. howe' er. one accepts the central principle of delibera-
dtd notwncede the tmiolabrlin of the l 1mon and the abolition of sla\· llll' de moe t acr-that \urface opinion mar bear little semblance to deltb-
en. MoreO\cr, tc.nful that ~lcCidl.m would succeed him in March of cr.nivc judglllC'IIl\ .llld that only deliberati,•e opinion ought to ntle-then
1865 and negoti<~te an end to tht' war on terms that would ultimatel y l.iuwln\ anion~ appear i11 a \'en different light. Indeed, il Charnwood's
undermine the Un10n or prc\<.'rvc sl;n en. Lincoln moved vigorously 10 intcrptctation i., .,ound. then Lincoln's behavior stands as a quimessemial
end 1hc war milililrilv bdon· March. example• of political leadership in a deliberative democracy. Despite "the
We ha\c no \1\lt'mauc publir opinion data from 1864. If we had, it fluctuations upon the surface" of the political life of the nation. the ".true
•mght well 'ho'' tha1 In tht' \tun mer o! that year a majority of the people <~nd undt•t h mg "ill" and the "resolute purpose" of the people _remamed
had lml tonfrcknct in I lll(())n\ handling of the war (a "failed presi- unchanged. l'n'""'nl Ill' the change in the surface ,,e,~·s. Lmc~ln re-
denc 1 ·:,1 and 1't'1t w1llrng to 1cat h ,Ill accommodation of some sort with lllanwd ttue 10 tht· "h•ghct judgment." the more deliberauve oprmon. of
tilt' South. llw J>lt:\ldl'nt. ho\\C\t'J, relu,t'd to conf01 m his actiom 10 lhe Ill(' Clllll'lll\
·
'hrhmg 1>ubl1c 'tt1lnlltlll . .md 1t:'>olllleh put '>ued a firm and unam b'1,· mt· I -lll<oln'• at !lOll\ of lli6~ "ere u1umate' · 1 \In • d'cated
' · not onh b1 .the
CJU\ CCJUf\l' of ac 1111n If 1 1 h nd of I ucIglll<'tll of hl\101 1 but .tho 111 a 'en tangt'bl e ''·a1 b' hts o'en' helmmg
I en and tlw nul· .mw n '' '" 11ght 111 insisting upon 1 ce
'a\ ·1 1 o be • • percenl of the popu 1ar ' ·0 te and 212 of 2:B
· ·I t'lllon Ill '-o~t·mhl'r (;>.? bl.
. t\llllCII 1111' of the lmon. this might appear 1 rlt
'~lllph. the <a't' c1t '1 ,,,.,,. 1l'dder .tt 1111~ on the ba\1~ of his persona1un der· ·I
c t·ctoJ,tl , otn) \\hat e'-platn~ thtl> apparent ' 1 rna >
si1 e 'h1f1 of pu dt<
'tandmg of tht· , · \'ct 111lin toll bc·t IH't'n \ug11 , 1 ol lli64• 1' hen L'mco In ~eemed a ~ure Jo~er. ,m.
(h . < nnmnn ~cK>cl tonu ''" to ~c-,, " 1\e pubhc destre~.
dllli\(K)(j., lnltl pl ·t . \ n' t'tllbt•t "hc·11 ht· hn unc: ,, btg wtnner!• \\'h 1'le ~orne part of Ihi'>'1II1'
t .t11nn 'll~J.:t'\1' .1 mm e complex \IC\\:
' ' h b 1 field {Atlanta 1e11 w
\nd lo lhnw \ 11 11 - of ''•" tt·tt.unh dut w '-nttht•t n \U<le'~ on c e au e h
1
f
th. \ I 1l' <•Ill' nf ,,II c l,r"t:' <tnd m all d"tntt' c•tnc r.rl \hc 1 nl.ln in \qllcmht·r ). a not1wr m." ha'e been 1 c n•;u h. t 11
.
· · II he1
h td 10•nt l, '' hn h•td 'lt. t 1ll'n ht'at 1\ and "e• c gtnng a I th
t puhltt ddtht·t,lltun tlt.~t tlw ,tppro.Jc
h of the elc:c.uon and t t c.tm
. lhe mind
ola lXI 11l:l\e tllJ>rt,tl\c · 1 hk nf tht' ll<llion . 1he· pohuca · · I <fl'1' ).. h concentr.H<
"•mid ,,., tn 1 1
tlt
enl I '11 ~ 11 tl\dl lmrn t•d Ht•t IIOil'· It c: an~•1 ·
> • g~
d cl w
nl th " "''' 1>t·t·n t hc mo't <~n'-iou' mom I1 bent prest em' rc•wr ·
t -11 11\U\t ht.' rqwated-to gu C''
lt·\ fw,c· lht' det tm.lll' ll> tt.'\lt'l' an meum d ·red J'ud"·
hu~<. l,.1''·II h " 1111 P"'"II 1..
. ' tdl wd 10 ma e con,, < "
... 'al I 1It d,"'"''' 1 II . ..., n· t't I upn11 h1' poll< ll'' .mel dt,!lacte•. ' L-. e the n.uitm
llll'lll llu~>ln 1 " <·• ' "·" th.tt tht·n popul;~r go'
11 lilt• 11
' ' .thout \\htthu ht Ill
h noncnt '' rll udl\.'1' >Cf\
"op..... . nf ,1 k.tck1\
nf rl" f>l" 1Ill I It' It \II h I)( lt .l\ 1Ilt' ttut• ,mel un d er I\ I. IJU" \\I II1 1 •l'beratl\
1 e a,se~sme n 1
tllol! th , "I' I ' " ' Ill 111 ~ 1 1HIIltl\ (,ltld 111 \mtnca pet hIP' ' t' 1t•,uh 1' l1l..t·h to bt· ,1 nH/1\.' <e 1 h" Jlubltt
11
' 11111\1) tl 11 .1It' l>t· • I01tn.tta ~ 1h.ut cutt· ntH filet II \ IUl ch bet"een e ecuon' 1
·" t't ·•~t of pohuu,lll\ "ho'e 'Cli<C' '
 P~tblic OfJintnll tmd Drm()cratic St(l(r 1111 nmlup l'oltllwl Rltrlflllf a111l J>r/tlmatu111
216
2Ji
deliberat ion" fostered b' the rhctonca l aCLi' it\ that accompa nies a prcst- ted I heod01 e Rom(.'\ eh to de'c ttlw the naw · 1 1 II
dcnual campa1gn. And although in Lincoln'~ umc ll was not yet accept- . .. >n' 11 KW\1 o tce il\ .1 "hull
pulpu. modc111 Arne11C'am f><llfl< ulady CXf>t' 1 1 • ~
able for pres1dential candidat es to ('ampaig n personal ly for oflice, others • • • - < ' •< 11 pres•dc·nt' to he
1hetoncal !cadet s-gwdm g, ins11uc ting awl • · 1 ··
did so on theit behalf: "men of high characte r cond ucted a vigorous • . • . . . • ' 111·'J>IIIIII{ l1C Ull/('111 y. A,
tht fon•s ol puhl•c and med•a dll('llllon prc\idc·11 · · 1 .
campaign of ,peeches for Linwln." 110 Lecturin g at Yale in 1907. Secre- . • . • · 1'· It ·~ >e1tt•vc•d, ,If<' 111
,, u111que pos•tton to addre'' tlw c ltllt'n\ 011 l>uhltc tff
tan of tate t.hhu Root des< nbcd presiden tial election campaig ns as the ' <liT~. W appc·,JI IO
then better nature\, and to ~<'c·k then ~upnfl 1 t fm fal\tght 1 1
"greatest. most useful educatio nal process C\et known in the world ... ,... ec po •c tc·' ru
ptomot~ the common weal. B) <~<ling a~ a kiud ul n.lltcmal ~hoolm,J\Itl
{during whtch millions of voter~] are engaged l01 months in reading and the pres1den1 nm J~romote the formation of ddihct,lllvc majoritb .
hearing about great and difficult question s of governm ent, in studying . In <.~ntrast to r h1~ modern cxpco:ui on that p1 e\idc·nts <~nd other pub-
them. in comidering. and dis<ussing, and l01 ming matured opinions It< offwals ought to promote public deliberation through rhcton<.
11111 , 1
about them" I hi~ educational process Ia' ~ " the solid foundation of of those who "1 <>l(' the Amem,u t Constitution nenher mtended nor de··
~und judgmen t. sober self-restr amt. and famih<trit\ with political ques- ''red that the nation's leaders cmg<tge 10 frequent dtrc·c r rhetorical wnt<~c 1
uons among the gO\ erning mass."" llith the citiLen• y. Cognian t that the public at large• l,t<ked the tJrnc.· .111d
The events ol 1864 recall not onh the framers' desire for leaders to informat ion nctessarv lor sound deliberation out he 'PCtific.\ of n<~llon.tl
resist unsound public desires until "reason , just icc. and truth [could I re· polic> and that ave• age citizens 1'ere much more \ubjc<l w mismfcmn.t·
~am thetr .luthont\ over the public mind," 1• but also Hamilton 's defense lion, deceptio n. ptejudice . p<~~"on, ,md demagog•< <~ppeals than "ere·
of a substanualterm of office lor the presiden t. " Hct'' een the commence· their represem atl\ e\, the\ belie' ed that the best son of poliucal dc:ltbc:ra-
mem and t~rmmauon of [a four-\ea r term]," H amilton wrote, "there llon 1\'0uld occu1 rnainh uo1tluu then carefufh crafted m~rirutiom f fw
would alwaH be a considerable mter"al in whith ... (a presiden t) might lessons of the his tor v of popular governments and 1he c•xpencnces of the
reasonabh promise himself that there would be time enough ... to make "critical period" had confirmed the dangers of wnduuin g public pulley
the communit\ sensible of the proprietv of the measure s he might in· on the plane of publk opinion. A\ noted in chapter 2. 111 the ne''" tn·
c~me to pur,ue ·· fhe prestdem .like Lmcoln m 1864, would convince the depende nt Amctt<a n states men with "talen~ for fo" tnmgue. and the
cmzenn of the nghtness of lm auions not through rhetorica l persua· httlc ans of popul,tri tv" had risen w public office b\ <~ppeahn~ to pubht
• but ratht·r b\ '"estabh~hmg himself in the c\teem and good-will of ch~cnchantmenl mer taxes and debt\ and bv prom•~•ng stmphsut cure\
1011
'
h1~
. comutucn t' .. th rough .. th <' pmofs he had gtven
. · o f h 'IS w1s
· d o m and fc>1 t•conomic ilk fn some states the) nldnaged to g.un wntrol over pub-
mteO'Tn' · •·• ~ 0 Ut \Cars ou~h1
~ ~ ~ the um·•~e aucJ
~- t<> be e nough time for the peop1e lO rec· 1.I( po1·ICY and to pu\h through lllC:<tSUleS · I ha1 r"n"ct"cf
ogntLe th( h un; of ''ise leader,Jup. It is thJOugh performa nce. not per· \hon-sig hted ~<:numents the' had helped to incite.
\lla'ton that the pr d In the I ramer\ \IC\\ 1h1s . . 1 denwnstrdted that d tou
est ent "C>uld ment red<:< uon expenen< e amp\ da
d d pubh< "'>IIC 1 l•dS a · ngc:r
Pohucal RhelO •re<t hn~age bet\\een pubhc senurnenrsan r 1
n c an d t h e l·ormau. on o f Odtbe rall\e . ' I· onues
•' a] 10 go,crn me nt\ ··"·holh and pllleh repu bf tcan... In pm\lrlmg .
rhat 1uu.·
b
Hamilton, !,ulure t . . temati< .,• . d b dangNCHI I 1mtrumen 1 '
d 1 o pn1mmc rhetorica l le,1dc:t ,hip 111 h1' W• h d)(~. popular r hetottC l<~v about "' il rca I l11 h f 11 0 w
e en,t' uf <1 \II 011 .., hroug '1 h1· 1 ·. · . · nd them,dvt'l w I eJr c
1nad'cncncc
, " pre~•<1enn 111 the Fnlnalnt Paptn " '" not t f < 1 ambtllou \ mc·n w11h hule w (C>nHnc .•1rlm wulcl
lor th 1 . 0 re o 1 re1ud"c\ Jm 1Pil''"
a th e ramn, hd1c,ed that polttlc.ll rhewnc "•1' rn <Ill ten, but then ,f,.tll ,It mflammg popu .1r P ~ wm bound tht·
real t 1tan an aid to h I . I hi' \IC" 111e bl , \loreo,er 1 r1 re
1113, •
~tIll oc1d to the '
t t' ornt.Hton of dehht·t.ll iH· maJonliC :' . 1 to po"er <1nd cltr<:ct pu It P"111 1
n uf •<·numenl .mel
. . on hi' l>t·opI<: Jnd then of he tall toget hc·r 111 w a do<eb unlu
con, 1dt'tatt < >ntcmporan 'tudent of poltuc,. for up < Jl
on It mu~ht 1 ' 1•1111on thh ,,m1fd undermm c tht: lc·adcn d 1111 1 10 11 uh\land pubhc
11 not ~"<'lllldl h appc<tl that pollltcal tlutoiiC "'at le,l,l 1lt•tW11<. 1,· • ltnalll"" Jnd uuerc·'"
.tot c fun I rlt'\t I CI on 1ho1e 1e s tnt
poht" ..11h . c l<mtllg of dc·lihc·t .litH clc:motran ln,o1Jl.11 oct.llton :." en h the peop thc:fr,unc: f'i r<'JC:Cit't I
ctnuc tal..e, tl'
1 I ciJct
\\uuld S<:tnl to"~ · " " " of llhtruuH m o1 H',t'oned pet ' l '
la,,otl.
e<J not tornude lkc,ut\C of I hCit' ~ 11 ICh uf danger~. f "rchn/1111{1 an< c:n
I
"'' prodtu tn 1 11 "' •pu I,Jr rhetoric f .• rular mean> 11
and lllfurn1cd P bi e 11 pu., 1<.: dchhet.ll loll and t 1HI' 0 I 1c.··•"' hJl
Ll J' .1 norrn.1 nr "I: h , 1.,, k 111 rt·pre,enl..lll"''
U IC JUd<T
,.,mcnts Indeed 1c:flnun~: th~ •clllllll<•Ill' I l tr f1 h thC\ pul I CIT
• I< 1li{J the publt< \It'''~" R3t t:r.
218 l'obllcol Rhrttmr ami Dfilbnatum
2)9
. . . . al
and til tllSiltU llOll desicr n for mode ratin g and eleva ting publi c auitu cb
:: . . . .• . , • . · of symbols, char ges of uneth ical beh;tvior, and disto niom of opponents'
.
and dcstre anc I thus achte 1·tngjU St and eflcc tt1e rcpu bhca n gover nmen t
. . . records. I his char ge is le~t:lcd agatn~t both pard campatgn commerctals
Although framers like ~ladtson and Hanu lton. dtd not den, the pm.
and face-to-face deba tes. In fact, campaign debates bear ~o little the char·
'b'l' , f pol>ular rhew rit of rraso ned J)('rsuaston, they !care d that if
Sl 1 tl I 0 3 . . h . actcr of rc<tsone d argu ment that repor ters and commentators frequentlv
popular oratol\ ~~ere enc~Juraged. deltb era!l ve r . cton c would not hold
make light of the label itself. prefe rring to de cribe the~e c1ents as "Joint
its 011 n agan w mesponstble pa~stonat~ .tppe als. I he gre.l! threat to
dppe aram es" or "jom t pre~s conferences ...
opular go1ernmem wa~ that the ··paJS/ 0111, . • . not the l"l'ti.IOIJ. of the
~ublic would sit in judgment. But it is the reaso n. ;tlo~:; ol the ~ublic Several majo r wnte mpo rarv studies of the popu lar t hctoric of those
dccte d to Congre~s and the presi denn tend to confirm the relam e in-
that ought to wmr ol and regulate the gme rnmc nt. Rhetonc 11a1 frequ ent' of delib erativ e rhetoric. Between 1970 and 19ii, Richard
dangerous precisely bec.mse it wa~ the princ ipal mean s of inflt~ming pas·
Fenno trave led with eight een members of the House of Representatives
>ion>. of appealing to cn1 1 and preju dice. " 1n the ancie nt republic~."
to their di\tri cts to obse ne IHm' the legislators tnteracted 1111h thetr con-
Hamtlton \\tote ... whetc the ,,hol e bod1 of the peop le assembled in per·
\ll!Uent:.. Abou t two-t hirds of the 1i~its took place dunn g the fall elec-
son. ,1 single orator. or ,m artful state sman , \\'as gene rally seen to JUie
tion perio d. Altho ugh Fenno did sec ..a few instances" of education. or
wtth as complete a swa1 as if a scept er had been place d in his single
reasoned persu asum . b1 legislators...the onh generalinuion supportable
hand :· But thr~e anoe nt orato r\ neithc1 gaine d nor main taine d thetr
b\ the e1 1denc e:· he \\'rote...ts the apparent paucit1 of educauonal ef-
rule because thcv excelled at public instru ction and reaso ned persuasion .
fon. "; 1Simi larlv. in his stud) of presidemial c,unpaign rhetoric tlw fo-
On the contrat\, bccau'>c of "infirmities incid ent to collective meetings cused on the elect iom of 1960 throu~h l9i6. Benjamm Page rea<hed
of the people .. [t}gnorance [t'> ] ... the dupe of cunn ing. and pass10n conclusions consi'>tcnt with the l'ie" that genuine reasoned persuasron ts
tht ,1a1 e ol '>ophistn and decla matio n.'"•l Whe n orators rule. it is be·
not comm on:
cause the1 ;uc master' not of reason and argu ment . but of cunning.
. .mg
'>ophtstn . and dcdamauon. the mo~r stnl.. feaw rc o f can
. d tdate · rhetoric about poliC\
.
· 1 ampu unsp eech ~3\Sit r-
It mu~t be •ltJ...nowledgcd that the kind of "hard " dema gogu ery feared is it~ extre me' aguene.,,. Th e tl pt<a c ' .,.,.. . . f
. . b
ru,.th norh tng spectfic a out P0 tc 11 altern au' es: dtscus ~rons o
hi the framcn i~ not now the problem in the Unite d State s it once was.' . . d
h•1, modern ·-\nJenc,m the i'sue s arc hidde n awal in lit!le-pubhclled.statements! an
· po1·tUeta · n,, at tht· nauo · nal. \tate. or 1ocal le1 cl. · xtended d1scusstons ea1e
't·tm to. h.ubor the tnr1 d . P O'>llio n pape rs. E1en t11e 1110' 1 e. .1 d · fre·
1 angerous ambt uons of the dem<tgogu e and. d 1 1 ort poltc ~tan s are m
ma111 ques tion~ unan s,,cre · n '~fi 'p "de ual tanclidates
.t(( ot dmgl• 1c1 e · r hetotte . al
•· ' ngage tn effo n' to fome nt envv o f 111e pr<Jil· ·
qucn t. mcom ptcuo · tnd unspec 1 c re't 11
t'llted da"c ' 01 Certatnh us. • . ~h htle anua lh o;;nin£(
art• ''-tile d , 11 appe anng to sal mu 11
•
IO tntllc ractal or ethntc hatre d 01 preJu . ·
dttt'.
I
1tt ~0111h nl a 1 • ·d
arge lllt die da'>s. whow me111be1' appre ct.llt ·. • the tnt hull·.
pnHance of pro .
pert\ ttghts and of soun d econ omic and fimtnc ial pnh·
lll''>. has h,ad a mod , oftcr•r<1 I of the ,crbiage wno;ists of
etaun g cffeu on .-\me tKan politi cs and 1
1 '1s' In lllo\t camp.u!{n speethcs. muc 1 ttttn aeneral I{Oals.
pupuIar t hctnnc 111 dd. .
.t tlton, tlw ll!ltl et, tlt\tic c h acter of
I ,\nte·ll
11 e· 1 de'>< ttpuo n\ of pro blem'>, protnt'>e~ ,
to .1 •
<" tnd
.,
'" .-h
.
prat<e
ctn o ecd- \II 11 .
,,h 11 11 ' .
men .nr created c•qu<~l"-h,,., heltw d to fo,tet a >C ' •n' ><' <' CttltU\111 of the opponcnr~. pa st .f>enod'date rman '.'
's o11 n
'
p.tfll. '
' mc•.tth to be• 1 11
••
fot the past pl•rfonniltHC of tht '' 111 1
'l'lcd all . ' utlle n of the L'1111 c·d St,tlt''> 1n .1 " · " 1 1' 1 tt ha' ' •
>tlln otah, .t,, cl ct 1' J' ,.ffre ' I uh''
lo , .., 11111 'llH<:"lulh a poltt tt' of dtl '"'en .
<:" 111. Perh. tp' the 1110'1 H1tere,ung stu 1 111 th•'·h r<:,pethe 11111l'(eenth .tncl
tnnpo1,.1 1 \ H:Ict th 111 1 · 1ctrt< < dentl tl speec e' 111
.· • lt't<'t'> l11tle !{t'l1l ltt\t' dem, tgogt r t ht•tor .. th< ·•nal\\1\ ol the ch.u.t<Ler o I pre>•. ' , h anm· dingW ''heth er tll'l 1
lllettG tn 1)11111
1 II • . • mnzed 'I" el es
<' t\ not to ,,1\ th.n deltht•t.tll.\l' 1 1lt·tort• ', ,,t
1 ,. .....
nunn lntln·<l h 'Cnttcthcl'ntUttl''> Ju t<C.tl(g f loaico~lh trom .xgm-
111 . , nt' rh.ll ··moH·< .,.
pupul.u thtt<u 1I t lr llllt'r' <nnee·1n' .thour the n.nurt• ,11 ld tjU3 . d pttl'
1
11<~ntfe,tt·d 1 ··dcH·Iorn>d .u ~ume II armH nt·nt or '' c:rt
.
lllng to c·nd ., ..,,•ttl'• of ar!(ument but noI oH·r,ttrple ,...
' r-- , ··
PI.tllll th.u 11111d.e ·Ill pt·ll 1.'1\I1 •llt.alogou' to the It t•quenr I1 ' ot<C •I ht' . ' nl 'l:i6 prc:sldt:n-
1<.tlt"u1·," n n <.1n11>a·111. 11 t 1te·ton. , 111 . 1 he• •· In 11\ ,,u .
1111 the l nile d St,Hl ' " · . i•rnor t'
I111,,11 'llttph ·• "h't of (>llHtl'-.. ~trung wget T I found th.at not a \tnl{k
11 11 u 1'
"'or ot lie
hona ltltt·' · unu·. 1Jt,u, (11 om•,, .,. Ill·11 upll · • 'P<'l·c hn Irom thl' liH' nllt'l h cenw n ·
 P~tbhc Opm10n am/ nnnocrat1c Statw11a h,p
uo 111 f'oilllffl i Rhetonr a111l Dellbt>ratum
2.Jt
one could be das~thrd ,\s a "de\(~ loped at gume nt" ,md only II percent
era! ~~if fusion of know ledge " sc~ th<H ·:public opmion should be enlight-
of the ,peeches we 1c a "series of argum ents." By nmtra st, 55 percent ol
ened : to prese t ve sound public crecht: and to "observe good faith and
the ,pee< he' were d "h\t of pomt~" and :H per~ent were a mmbination
of a ~t'tll'' of arguments and a hst. \\hen all maug ural adchesscs and 1usuce to all natio m." \•
lim majm effort of civ1c mstructton. tssued on the verv t'IC of Wash-
State ot the Cnion messages were anal)• lcd separ ately, 9 perce nt of those
ington's depar ture from public life-in deed, in the very address an-
delivctcd in the twentieth ccntu n wert• judge d to be "deve loped ar- nounr ing his de< i\ion not to run for a third term- stand s vmual h alone
gument' and 18 penen t a '\enes of argum ents." In the nineteenth
among \\'ash mgton's prestd ential speeches and addresse~. Onh hts Fir~t
centut \ thr corre, pondi ng hgure s were much highe r: 21 pet cent and lnauglll al Add1 css, which provid ed a natural opportunity for the incom-
74 pencn t respecti1clv.~7 Altho ugh we shoul d be carefu l notlO infer too ing prc~ident to addre ss the nation on the vinues of union and the new
mu(h hom the mt'Tl' classi hing o f spcnh t•, in this mann er. the conclu- comll lution al mder . prm1d cs a compa rable example from the first prest·
~ion ''ould ~eem tn lollo1' tiMt tclati1 eh It''' peech cs and addresses of dent ol public msll uction throug h rhetonc. It ts re1ealmg that when the
modern president' bear a formally ddibc ratil'e chara cter (whether or ocnt\1011 for ~uc h a spec< h was repeat ed after lm reelection 111 1792,
not 11ell argued or per~ua.sin·). \\'.t,hi ngton dt'111ered what ~till stands as the bnefest Inaugural Address
If. J' the enden tt here su~ge\ls. popul .1r delibt·r<llll'e rheton c b1 na· m the h1sto n of the prestd enc1- a mere four sentences. totalling ~33
uonallt~~latot ~ and prestd em' ts a rclau \eh t-art' pheno meno n in the ''oHb. It is littua llv unthtn kable that a modern prestdent would shnnl.
Unned 'ltate~. tht~ would seem to confir m the view~ of Madison, Hamil· from any such oppor wnitl to speak w the people.
ton, and other lt:achnl{ lrame t' that ci1 ic instru uion ll\ pohtir al leaders '\onet helc\\ , howe1·er reluCtant \\'a)hington "''s w engage 1n popular
thrnue;h rt:awned persuaston " not a nee l'\San da\ -w-da \ acti1·itr 111 a .
rhetonc of am ..on throu g h out h15 sen.-1ce ·' 11 the exeru u'e ulhce. the
delilx:r.ul\e demcKran. Doe' 11 folio" . tht•n, that berau se popul ar delib· dra fuug.
and .tS\ll<lllCe o f l I1e Fare"'eII "''ddres s el ldence.s. a .behef that .
etalilc rhctom "tdati veh taH' in the l lnited States that it is cmirell .
some public benef it m1ght 1\'C resu l rom II I r effort~ at Oil(' tmtruc uon
f
tnCidl'ntalto the ' l1ccess o 1 ,\ mettc an .'
demo crac':. through rhew m. \\'ashm~tton h1mse a rat er . If h· d h modes t expe<tJ
. IIOilS o
Comr.tn _to the pnncip le, ol the lcadm g lrame l\, accor dmg tO which . .
the unpa< t of tm words. 'ot hl..elv lO m.t e a l. "stron g and lasunl( 1m pres-
. .. h. . h
populdr dchbetall\C' rheto11c ''ould phi) no fonna l role in the govern· Ston." 01 10 "conti OILhe usual curren t 0 11 e h passm m a1 besl 1 e1 m1g I
m~ u! the ne11 11 ll ·.. h ments
' ton. A mellt<lll state\m ·
c·n from the begmn · · g have
tn produ t(' "some JMnial bencfH .
. some uc<J'
tonaJ good as l e ·• rgu
• ( f . rll ~pant
dtmun,trated b1 th
l'lr awom .1 belief Ill the utihl\ . ,md per h•1Ps neces· nderat e 1ht: o pa ·
ol tlw .1<ldre'~ "nm' .tnd then recur to 111
UTI
1 1
' h1 · ol at lea\t <>e. . I d) to '"'ard Jg;tlllst
<awma1 l'llons to ).\tilde and tnstru ct t 1ll' <1· t izenf\ tc, ''•1111 .tgamo. . h 1 f r 0 rewn 1111ngue. an
,t tlw mt~c It' '<> ·~ . " ..., ,.,-
t roug11 rhetonc 11 u • shing·
1on' 1·.u Cl,ell \dd IC most l.unou s eat h c·xample 1' !'resid ent .,a
.. the 1m po~t u re' ol pretem kd patnom rn. 1 r dehberati\ e
.. d to en~al(e ut popu a
1 · le.,,, ''luch 11as i\\ut•d <I\ a w11W: n mcs'>•1ge on che \\,1\h mgton \ o,uHcsson ,tho ten e d
: · lh 10 111auf{ural ad·
nnH, .mnl\e r,,u' ol th . h ,
thc l'lul d h c ' 1!:llllll( ol tht ( .omti tuuon Ill the cIl' I(,., •uate) u> r hl'll>rtc 'P<•nn l(h. hrmunl( \lll
oct
'
1 10 m pnnop J
urredj'uo,t four 1ears
•
d e1p •a Come I h I1 nh1 e, •• mp 1es nH
1tt111 1 I. nuon .1nc ''a' ch\\t'tnlll<lll'cl throu g oil . I the na < t\\c·, One ol tlw mo't uol<''' 0
1nd hi' ~uppnner~.
. r
. It '' lat hc clt·'>n 1I . I I tl•cllon at( f 1 • 1 honi,IS Jclter. on •
htc·ntl \\ I xc ·" tlw "<mll ht'l' ol ,111 o ld .til( a c .. a let \\,1\hi ngron ldt off1tl' "'1en . . chnuu,1ration ol the na·
a., lllll(ton '>ou •I the pnn \• ' I .. I ren(!.. In I 1•e a . f
<tpl1-, and !: ll lo •n'u uc 1 t. 1, Idle!\\ 1 lit tens 111 . -d tt·..,•n~t to tt'H'I 'l' "mon.IH lit ll·<lth e "re,olu unn o
throu~h,
a<tuu ' nee e 111
''· to Jlll''l' l\l' llw blt:"tll~' of hhc.•rt\' · tdll<'\l llcm.tl ~"' t.J nmt nt. engull'l'l t'<l '' hat .Jefler>On <J (
J ·lft·I'Unldll·repubhc. ·
Jn
ca,, ol "·" (I\ 1I 11 I . I tht 1. I HUll' <1 l..md ul 1dnundu1!{ of !he Jt')tlnlt' onh ~ , m tflio, "cmllt''l of
11111~, ol clkct . ' ' 1l liJJhlliUtion,llch.1111{t' an< be!(ll
I'd 111 1 1
h1\ unu11 r 1 1\c '""·"m "' 1. 1111 1lt'lll lo1 tlw new u.tllOJI I (' ·•II >l>l'•• t ll1111uplt·,. L pon t.tl..tn~ olhct:, •1rtc 1 hi'> p.trl\ d re,1ckno from Iht' .e
J L d
·
111\llJu prc·'t I 1 1
l)<llllt• 11 "(luunn' hi t.tp!Ulllll( lht· I lnu,e. Sen,lte .u; :ddrc· " 111 he.ll p.uii'Jn
'-tit II and P• 'I It I ll umon , 'lh~· p.-tll.uluun ol 1011
mpeJ11\ to I (<i
•n1pau I he cue1 t lt>c.t ahet.t llon\ 111 the ~oH·t nrnt·nl
th tl ,,t>L1 tt.tl"" · Jdlt-r ,wl ,ough t Ill h~> ln.n;~:•u·~ pnnuplt-': -(£)\e n dtlfer·
R' oltlw ' utll
11 I
" ' PJit\ 1
" 1 11! 1,I( ""unt f, I" emph .t,ttin g c.omnulll beht ',111 le \\t hJ\l" calktl ll\ dlf·
' \ ' <111 : In Kll-11 d ,,~,1111'1 !Ill' 'P 111
1
hi<
' 11 • Cl It ( ClJ{Ili(C.. I} I'll ll' nl l>(lllllllll 1\ 1101 d 11 'lt'll'-e nl P11 nup
11
1'11 1\\ I(> t•••l I 1 11 ._ I• h'i.)t'll"
' ll'll!.(l<>n olll<l lll<llolhll .ue 1JI( I ..ell· •l .1 I l It' \\'c.• ,1rt' a11 RMrJuh 'r hc.ans.
11u .I pro~ Ptlll\ lc.·11 I I .,.1mc.· pout<IP ·
l<> I>IOIJIOil ..... ,IIIUUOll' I" I l ' ' ~ '111 n,lfJie' h1c t111 en " t u
 Puhilr Opmum ami Dr mll (l(l /1( Stat,\mar 1p
11 11 l'ollllml Rlll'lrmr (11/ (/ /)rilb!'ra/mu
241
,,e ate a II Fed ~·rali~ts" · · He went on to de tai l I he "e~\l'.nti. al pt inciJ>Ie~ of
' 'et 111 llCill .. wht< h would sh.1pe th e nC . 10 1~e 1 su,td~ sc~uthernns of the evil~ of sec
ou r ( ,ol . \\ ad mm tst rau on. The,c
"
e~~ 1on , it mav have been help-
mciuded, among olhc~. "ec1ual an d t''-J< 1 JU~ lui In wn vm un g _11 or the rn crs wh, a polllo
IIce to all nw n ; no "eman. n of the countrY. desiring to
gling alliance," wuh foreign na tio m: "th e 1evc 1 its bo nd s wn h the H'St, ou
~upport ol th e St,l\e gm·cm. ght nm simph to be allcll\ed to go
ments in all their righ1s ": " I he prc scn ·at ion (11\'11 1\ <I). 115
of th e Ge ne ral Gm·crnmcm
ns wh ole constnutional 11gor", "a bs olu te a<qul(: 1he most no tab le ea r h examples of po
10
scence tn tlw d<xisions pular deliberative rhetoric bv
of 1hc m,11 on t\, 1ht' \llal pn nc ipl e of rep ub pre~id e nt\ oth et tha n thr ou gh maugural
lic s''; "e co no m} in the pubh< addreS'iC\ occurred dunng An~
expense". "encoma~~;emcnt of ag ric ult ure . drew Jackson's ad mi m\ tra lio n. As we sa' '
in chapter 7.J ac bo n\ message
an d of co mm erc e as it'\ hand-
ma1d": "the d1ffu~•on of mformation": an d to Congres~ 111 Ht~2 an no un un g his \Ct
fre ed om of religion c1nd of o of the bill rechartering 1he
the pr e'\ The~e pri nn ple ,, ac('()rdmg to Jef llan~ of the l nit ed Sta tes was addre
ler so n: ssed to the people over the heads of
1heir repr csc11tati vcs. (It s po pu lar 'harac
form the bn gh t wn std lau on '' hich !1.1~ go te1 is am ph demonstrated b'
ne be fo re us and 1he f.1<1 tha t 11 be ca me a Democra1ic cam
gutded ou r ~tep' throu~~;h an age of rev olu paign document 1n the 1832
tio n an d ref orm a· election.) An d alt ho ug h tim length\ docu
uon The '' !'dom of ou r \age> ,mel hlo od mem ended 111\h a passtonate
of ou r he roe s have .1\lack on th e rich an d powerful. most
been de1oted to then an am me nt. rh t'\ sh of the message wa~ a substanual.
ou ld be the creed detailed ( nti qu e of the Bank on comtiwtio
u£ our puliucal fanh. the l<'Xt ol ci1 ic in'\tru m•l and policv grounds. Thm.
nion.C"' dl a rh ew 1 ·ical ap pe al 11 was both popular and dclibe
The mhet inaugural add res\ that ri1 al<. in rati,e. at least rn
im po rta nc e the first of Jef· large pa rt On ot he r cxcas1ons. also. Jackso
n utiliLed formal addresses to
fer,on\ wa' deh1ered b\ Abr.tham Lincoln . .
ma ke dehber,IIIVC appeals to t he nu · rv. •sucl1 addresses included lm
· zen
on the eve of the nation's
l(featest <n "' Between Linwltfs ele uio n to
th e pre s1 de nry in November dnnu<~l messages to Co ngress. h1s proclamauon on
of 1860 and hi\ tnaugurauon on \la rch 4. the auempt b' South
18 61 . st' \en so uth ern state~ Carolina to "n ul lih .. federal Ia' '· and his "pr
otest" to the Senate come~t·
h.ul formalh "setedecl" fro m the UIHOn.
1 his wa~ on e mo nth before •he tng •ts au tho rit v w ce ns ure hu. n .or r
orden·ng the secretan of the treasu n
fall of fu n ~umtcl, the )Ctcs~ton ol fou1 mo lo rem o't ' the public funds from the Ban ~ f the L mted 'ltate\ t ree
h
ol fun.,c~le hostihtie, A he r re,tssuring the
re \late>. an d the beginmng
-;outhct n states that ~e had lear, l>efore its charter"'"~ to e\.p!r . ....
°
1111
tntt"ntton of imerfenng with ~la\cn ,, ht•te . e . ffi . I• ho enttage 111
it alr ea d\ cxio,ted. Lincoln PI<.'Sid t·ms. of <o ur, e, are not l e h on h pu b 1I( 0 ICIJ ., 1\
med h" hr ,t 1 · 1
nau~ura to pt e~cnt a ma ste rfu
bl .. fi centun ~·J~ n t)
· M se< ess · the repu to n 1
\ htr H·l u111w the . l cao,e a!-(iliii · wn JlC>pular 1he to ric fh ts '"a ' as tt ue 111
r1 1 he bcginntng dt~wur·
" au~ument t1lat \l't C\\ IO n ha d
a ton su tuu·on a 1 <lf legal 0 ' \loi(:O\ t.'r. alt ho ug h the ing nor ms at
h<~'"· I· tntnln "'1t t 1 h . .
go, ern
·
I
ncu on .. pp hn
__,
•
" o l le ca no l th<· matte! 4
1\ed popula1 rh cto n( lor all nauona ufficlill>. I111> IIIJU1
Pldtnh the t"ntr· 1 d f
I·
t,~ \('\Cit'h 10 me mb ers of tle I , H0 use and ~enate tha11 10 pre-tdent .
~
1 I11
\ rna1nnl\ I 11
' a 1 ea o o,ec-c,,ton .·~ the c" e'" e o 1 an'ar· II d
·
Se nate "e re r-
,.rsonalh ,ampatgn·
< tn Tl' \ll ,lin · t IH . lliO • and lu,, ca nd id, tte ' for the Hou~e an
I nnnatton, <tnd. IC 1 . tOilS ttll lldl rhe< "' 111 f he carh ntnelet'nth cen·
.
· . a"""< 1liln~mg,,t,th \\l th dclth . . 11 111.,e., g or olftcc throug-h ,pee< hes an d deb,ues 111 1
" I pnpul,u nptn 1111 1 et. tte < • " I
I c . JCceptable ,.or those
111
1
• ttn. lllott• 1h,m ,, h,tll cen1un >e ote th" bec amt' ' .
a 1let• jlCOJll· \\1
' ..tn< 'en ttt ne nh . " the on h 1ru t' so ' u ct" "
ll
4\p 11
,_h 1r..-u cd th.tl the 111°'1 c~n ·
Hx·1er tqe <l ' it do n ol llt 'H '"" ' 01 Ill tng to tlw ptt '\ld en n 1nd t ·ed · t1 can r..,.. ' ,.,
ma " I1\ "' to ckt
. ' ~t·qut·nu,tl pn pu lat deltber.utve 'heturtC o ",';' ere en•h·<t•ntun ·\nu•nc ...t
,, 1111 ,
111 . 'P" tt" n l n.tntnnl, " 111111 m ,ih k I he t u k of ettt lt'l l and fonner I\ ht~r'
ttl \a' ••~
.tblt• I · .-.:· •m am m .u ran ge na ·nt , " "h ol h 111. · t< lm•''' '•II
lit not It om a pre~tdcnt. ut b fro m J prl\ a h sr>t·echc~ 0
" ' t 1,11 r l'lt.:1 1 111 f of cou r>e . 10 1 <' ,... h fa
p<nt,m in "'m ~ t 1ll' m.lfot "' (ll ttl ltp k .m..tH 111 01 de '· "m'<H'\~m.tn It om lllrrw" Tltt' re ers.
' lon u,. , .tit th.tt " lef t"' \b 1 I 1
htc h culmntJted 10 '' •
'>t•tt ~"'"' lht tl oil,ttll I 1111 oln tn 1ft<' I ".
n:J
0' on '''" ·en . '
. np 111:11 "'' 1 le
I S ·phen Doug1a,.
rn,,
pnnupl1 ul "I ~. "u~. "" ' I Hn u I . h .u ta <O I1<' 1•<' d 11l( I. .
u, 'l'\ t·n dt· ba te' tn .., .. !{ St'll•llt' tJI •
the ln:J · d d trhe l>t:mo< r.111<
11 " ~" t illt.tdttiiUil <> t I , lht 11 11011 atlea ero
tot utl <,u ha 1llt JI 11 •111 go) \ •tl •
lnl <·m · m. •ic ull \tt tlt \n. tt< 1 1 1, 1tI \ ,,
,,, .,. 11 Utnht:nt o,cn,tlor tn Ill'
111 0 '' Jll ·• n.J
tn"l"llltt\ '-li' Ilt "a h·tt~d I 1111 I
J..
r1,,1t1 l>•rt, Ls
ul(ll 1he .. · ·su1>rt·me
111ur., tht• d "tl ltt s ''o uld <n lltl lllt .tlh ht< •1 •
L
' 1 1
~· ~lt l'd \It !to ug h L11u oh l'
'
. lwtorll ·11
1\\ ,II
f ktl j,,,,
Co11 ·
.
.t \I'd ! be l or e the llltnt>l'
Se<J.tte om)>·
ptlhll<• tl Cr t'''
f ,r 1he nJiltlrt b1
<
I '1' I hr ./ \w /1 de ci, jun h.t d 1 rNt t'C ' 11
2H /'uhl lf Ofmmm flllll Vrmm rn/1( .\ftl/r 1-. I
""Ill I 11(1 Cortrltlllt/11
245
ruhn~ tllilt CongH ,, had no aut horn 1 to ptoh ibn ,l,t~ er \ 111 the terrn orrt,
. ,ho prof esse d a mor dl rndr lfere nce w the cxtenston of 1
1
tim' 01 cr111 rnrng the famou\ \1tW>Uit Com pror nl\e of 1820. Oougl;" . . . s averv. L'
rt 'ilf'ndt"d w th", olllTIIIt·r '' b1 ba,m g ht' cam p.ug
challenge , a\ he saw II, wa, 10 hmu the "influence (Doug!'•) · mco1n's
n for rcelec tum 10 tht . .. .
~ >s exerung
'i<nate em •thr grta t funclamemal prlllctple" of -,df -g01 euu ne on pubhc senu men t .
111 • or
"J)(>pular ,,,\erergnt 1 "· "tl~<tt the people· of C'ac h ~tate ,md cac h terri In thi~. and lik~ communities. public ~nument ~ c~ery­
olth!!> Lnron halt the n~:ht
ton 1
thm g. \\ rth pub hc \enu men t. nothing can farl; wuhout
of regu laun g thei r Ol\11 dome~uc wn.
11
ctr m rn thc·rr o~.r1 wa1. suhJCCt to no othe r linu tatro n or 1es11 itt ion noth ing can succ eed . Con sequ ently he who moulds public
than
thar ''h11h the <.om tnuu on <Jf the L nuecl ~tate' rmp mc· ' upo n them \enu mt·n t. goe \ deep er than he "ho enacts statutes or pro-
·••
!he \trength of l>ou gla'\ pmii>On \\aS th.u rt '<'em ed to pr ovrdc· the nounC<' ' deci wm s. He makes ~tatutes and decmons possrble
bait\
for renm uhng the 11e~>s ol '\1onh .mel ~outh anc lthu , clelu~ing the o> imp o\\ib le to be exec uted.'•7
wn-
trolcr~' 1>\Cr tht c·xtenwm of \la1 en l into ln bclr eH·d \tro
ngl~ othc·r· Or, a\ Lmc.oln had put it two years before: "Ou r go~emment rests
"11<:. Throughout 1he c.tmpargn he soug ht to per suad c the· peop m
le ol public opin ion. Who ever can chan ge public opmion. can change the gov-
lllintJt\ that the u.ttron "a\ at d <rrtic .tl t u rnm g pom t 110 the rssue
of ernm ent, prac ucal h JU~L so muc h."'
'l<t\Cfl I ht foundc:rs. ht mamta>ned. had teco gniz ed the fund amtn
tal Alth ough Lincoln lost the Senate race. the campaign achrcved two
inJUIUcc 1>1 1la1en and had lool.ed tn''' ud liS ulum ate <:'ti ncti on Sla~
1">1ated the decpt\1 pnn cn large pur pose \. Fi rst. b1 gett ing Douglas to affirm that t~e people of
uplc ol the -\mc rKa n nat ion -the equalit) ol a
tcrriwr > coul d pre1 cnt slaver> b) denying it the protecuon of posrU
all men -dnd 11 ought not to be exte nded 10 am territ<H v or Mate wher I<.'
11 drd
e law -com rat v to the righ ts uf slave holders as enuntiated rn the Drtd
n<>t I hen <'XIII Tl ]ht·rt "no rea~<m 111 the 1' ()rid." Linc oln rnsisted.
~r~u dt(l sion - Lincoln ,,·as able to dr11e a ~>edge bet~>een Douglas and
~>h\ th< •wgro I\ not emnlt·d to all the natu ral 1 rght s enu mer ated in the · mg
· 0 ouglas's prospeCts for na·
'>Ou1he111 Dem ocra ts. 1here bv unde rmm .
lkda ratti )Jl of lndc::pendt•JI(e the righ t I() hie. IIbe rt\. and the
purs uit or ·
Uonalleader~hrp on the sla1 en .>ssue an d 1ater elecuon 10 the presrdenn.
~<~ppme ' In lrt·quenth quo ung hr\ anta gon r\t's decl arat ion that h<· '>ccond Linw ln 's f01 <cful defe nse of the anri-sla 1en pos 1 ~ 100 . eame
<<~rb ""' ''hc1hc·r •Ia ·. IS VOl<:<1 d ()1\11 or vote d up.'. Lrnt dd
·' llty · O111 ·IOSIS · tC·d h.rm fam • · t
e ouh idc of lllinoi~ and great1I assrs c·d in his nomrndu on an
that Dt>U" I<~,··s pr1"' ron , at 1)(Jlt<mr ~>as
. " one of mor al ind>lfcren<e to~ Ial· tlecucm to tlw presidenCI 111 1860.
,., Sh<>Ulci D<n"'l 1 1 1
"d\S 11 t~>s >e emb rate d hy the Arne> iurn
coin marntllrned tl II pt11J > c, ,rn·
m wou amrtullt 10 a repud r,ur on ol the ptrm rp Ie' 0 1
1 . .
t 1 11
Ikd.uau<m ,1I 111 d Con dus ion:
111t. frf'td<,.ns cn epc·m1c·ncc thus und er m111tng tlw torm ·r\to ne• 0 I Dem ocra tic Stat c\rn ansh tp · an d Oeh'be·rau1.e oum " ocra n
1o~c·d
·
1 A
>} meru am and <·vent uall v lead rng w 11rc extcl . r· . . . · I life undt·r the Consutuuon o 17
. r g;
~~~mol 'laH-r\ tl h · 1 hl' lust ~t·ven deta dcs of nauon,r
IIOUI ( 11111 the 1 OUn tr,
hd · .Le fundamental pnn·
In! lll1t1
" A\ IIIIJI ln~ 11,." 1\hat ~>dl
1 u•n•l es 01 tr w
s rlww rrta l <lt~\h w11h I>oug,J~'
. · • '' 11 IIC\sed r>enoclrt pop u ,,r 51r '"' I I r p1111on "Ill use Je (·
dl ''·•k c rnlu 11
1I fn()f( • tJ . ,. uplt:\ ol Aurt·rit.rn deu wcr aq. 1he\t• "con .f.
test ' o
f the Cons ·
tiruuon. a'
1,\ \ldl< Il'trt•l· ldll d II·M Ill I hf l '> '><·nail ( f h•· If lllili cit'( 1
llOil "'1 ~ h he ,w rcauo n o
' ' er\o n\ term chd not 'rop 1111 1 1
t,uodrtl 1.., ' arm "lu1111 lll'll I 11\\11 1.11npa>gn' IH'r<' plec1gc·r I to on( d J>l'< red .Jilt1 .,
d d 111shed. bur went
ee
shap•· rl 11. tht <>thtor 1 II11 llldnl ol 1he lc·.r<hng h ;unero. IM ex ·. "re' oluuuns" of the carII
IHII h11rg less 1han a gt and <11111e~L 111
"" "
1
pu >lu Hunt!' 1111 111 ' "''' ""to 1111 ltui<· tht' Jdft•r~onr.· rn ,Ill . d )'II ~,oman 1 1850s
. ' h I en i"uc mill
t~111'1 ol tl11 <kt· t"'" lrll(H " 1,1nt t· ru 1\rnt•rt·~
c"" 1t.- 111," ,,er ' .
' 11 nt•tt·truh cc· ntu n and the \ltU gge
I t e ',1\ I
f<~c} \r the· tnr I t I I I . <'1111'~' d d 1'' the Pmwes~>~t' era 0
llu 111111 ~ 111
, 1 ' ' I II tnmdt~>g tlu publrf rrun<I It"' " lolll1 1..tlt·>.
\II< h coutcst~ ol oprnron re<u. rrt• urn" ' 1' '\cw Oc.rl
< '' \l,wt•t ~ w . , d rll:\ Rofl\f:lt' IS
ll·~t(t·<Jj 1111 l I ' it\ lllllltrtlllf·d 1<> lf'\ll l<tin g 11\ ,pll. t 111t' l..ttf lllllt'tt•t·n th and ucrh centu · "60 1nd the
• ..
I'>Ut that ••1<1
11
~·lulrh.tl 11 ... ~tt>OI 1
carh rwen h 1<HO < ,Jild b ' '
" Ill I 1" '•>ur '' ol ultun.ll< exru h 1 tht I'J'Ifh thl' U\ll rtgh l\ ,uug
•gk' II1 I t' . .
U>otkruu 111.,11\1< \\ ••I tlu I< •L>l>< 1lltg gt•tu·l,tlion h.HI hc·t·n prog•rt'-'· t\l' 1
I
I{
·r ndlt ht· lr.rmer- IJl\IJ IU· I
I'I!!O S Jlun C't . d bern ccn
I •v 11,.. H·l•·• rl <:''li•lll "tc1 olul lon" ol thl' · · J tx·ruion nllhtll an lit
mal
''""' "" L~ tl ' ' ss I'" s~"" ,,1 II" l.tH 1n1t·tt''' ro ''" tt•nd '
11 111111 I r 11 , <HI <1t• t ' ultr rhcro rt<
[1<1\ltl\t 1\fl<x' " i'"••nulg,tll•111 I
l II '' "M hool <JI rloought th.ol '.tH I ·1\ "J' ·• 1, • dt·,i gn "it h "' ,,x 1 11 , 1ntun< 11,n ag.r>"'' pop.,•.· wnl<'' 1'· rhe't
"'" •} VI<" 111 I 1, '•lll llu' ol goH 'I nuw nt .In< I" runt'' bt•tnt•c•n lit 1
k.
IHI>Illllll nt pol11 11 .rl Jt-,ulc·r' It ' l)oul ( ' it;IVt· '""' kl·d d 1u Jill( I ht• "nor 111 ' 1
2-16 Puhlu Opmum am/ Drmorrar1c Stat•< Sll/lllllh,,,

stru~gle\ 0,er the pubiK mind haH' r,tlled lot th a tvpe of popular lead- A P l) !~ ~ DlX
ership for whiCh the archite<t' ol the Constitution did not plan.
The l..md of communtt\1\tde dehbetauon imohed in these periodtc Case Studies of Congress
rene,,ab. or en•n re-loundmg,, of the .-\met;tan polit1 una1·oidabh
place' rhetoncal demand' on n<Utott.~l leader\. l ' nless one posits that all Domestic Legislation, 1946-1970
political de\t~lopment 111 cl demo< 1.1n ., netes~arih beneficent. then one
must accept the po"ibiht1 that mer tune a once democratic people could
lose thetr comnmment to the t11in pillar' of lreedom and equalit1 of
m~hb that 'mtain republitan ~met nment. At tho~e decisi1e histoncal The: 'c:lc:c tion c tllt'll•l lm thc:<e \IUdte' are de'<Tibed at the bel(lnnmt: of
<ildj>tl'l ~ (p 1)/).
momenb "hen the 1en tharacter of deliberau\e public opinion t~ at
tSSue. it •~ not enou~h for pohucal l<.>adet, '•mph to reflect and articulate Emplowu nl \ rt of 19--16
the underl\ln~ ,,.nor JUd~ment ol the pt·ople. C.enamh Lincoln·~ great Batln. 'Jtq>lwn "- · ( ""~"''" \Ink" n lA~ . \ e11 \ orl· Columb1a L'ntiCI"\Il\ Pre".
fear m the I .:>(h "a' that e'en deltberam e public opinio n would em- l!l:iU
brace a position of moral neutralit\ to11ard s)a,·en. in direct comradition Sderln•,. Stnl/rr· , \rt of 19-18
of the deepe't printtple' of the nauon ,\foldmg the "cool and deliberate ldwb,, ( hdc: ~ ,mdJohn f Gallagher. fh, 5r/utn·tSmttt.{ft. :\e" \ orl
sen,e of the commumt\," not mt·rch re~pondmg to it. became at thi<; Dodd. \lbtd ,mel C.ompam. 196!>.
cnucal JUnctut e the htght•st task .tnd the most profound responsibilin· of Rrflprocal [rade tlrt of 1955
democrauc statc,man~htp. Bauc:r, Ral'rnond. lth1el dcSola Pool, and Le,.is :\ Dexter -~mmmn Bu•mt" and
When fu nda mcntaI regune ptmnple, · · are at stake in a democraC\ , PuM, P11hr.\ Nc:\\ \'otl-. : Atherton. 1963.
pubhc mterest in and att . h b . .
~nuun lO t e U\mcss of go\'ernment mcrease Federal ,\tmrmum 1\{rgr !ncrea1e of 1955
dramaucalh. and n Ilion· 1 1 1 · mm · d.
Th f ' •1 e ecuon~ ><'tome tonte,ts for the pubhc I1Iet. (,u,. I l .r([IMlll/l't' ( nmf><Jif:?l for n Frdnnf ·11' 111"''"n llagt 1/95il· Ll~:lt-wn
•
e uncuonma of th~ 111 · C;l\t 'ltudtt'' 111 l'l.tttrc,ll Pohuc' \ o. -1 \'ell \or!.... McCr.tii-Htll l9t>O
" 'tlluttoth netcssarih becomes a secondan mat-
ter as the b.J_,1c du c: t1011 f . .
. c o nauonal p<>IJC\ is decided b1 the elewon .\'atwal C:r11 ( llarii\-Fulbrtf{hiJ Br/1 of 1956 (l'ttordJ . . Pr
returns. \\ hether the I· . . (1
d c CCt\tOn ., fot good or lor til cannOt be kno11n 111 1( 811
• tf>n ~ dnh 1 f"bfr..m .. nllllt/, \arura ''"
1 lmer-l'nllef'Sll\ ( .J<e '"
a lance for tn the: l' I I . . h l!lt.i''
delibe nc tlt'll ts notlung in human nature or tn 0 11 ,~r,uu \ n. -1!? Lnl\t•r,lt\
' \ 1.1>.un.1
1 l 'nll ·Nil of -\ldbamA f're-<,
c.:
-
ratII e de moo a 1 1 1 f
)Xlpula d 1be < ' ' TU<Ilnc:d th,tt can !{Uarantee the "isdom 0 Cn·r/ Rwftt, /Jill of/9 56 ( Rrjtrlrd) l .,... , < I><'
r e • rauotl\ \\t· •I d . . d o<- \n I " 1 d w om...-r" I mer- "'" 11 •
ran must .... · .tr~ <: to conclude that deltberau1 e em ..,
I \\ IL•tlllw;, r Hr ·
't·hon ' . ' f -\l.abanu Prt-'. 19tH
\tdual no-htU<: 0~utd~d
f h
b, a I><Xi 1 CJ1 thought-,111 ·
undeT\tandtn~ 0 10
1 . dl- Prnt:l Ill \u. so llllll'l'll'· \l~b.lm.l l ntH''"'ll' o .
., ' · t e dut 1 . 1 · d I
..elt-::mern ~'" <111/t'lhlup, and of the means and en ' 0 II"flllt
untml o,.1 !956 and !961 •
mc:nt-that j, . · 1 a't Pollll/11111 ( l fl 1 p II Control. 1'1;6-61
occ<t'IOnalh 111 txtc·rr1.11 to tt-elt .mci that ., the b<DtS. at e len n111 I' 1 ~n.l \1 Jlcr
0
uuo11
• popular t:' \I h.nll I t'l(l'l.nll<" r>tti<' J. \ (I~:JI<:Und.
't.tte'lll.trl\lup of the htghc:~t ordc:t. I11 (
.011
. Ll. I ( ,.1 bl Frt-u< 1"1<
l rl~lll /'woum.< <'< 1 < 1•16!1
- ' B llllJnrr, Jn ...utuuon. .
PI> 1.!-IO<t. \l.t,hrnl(l<lll, ll < rt '

/·, r/, trd h wllo/1 ~rt1VI9 ;,\ M if J9H lnl<:l·

Redl••lcl ~ llllllt·llt '> ( ,, "I' uf•lhrFtdnnl ~~::;:,J lnrlcNII of \1.1·
l \ t ·• LruH·r'H' .
111\u'll\ ( ''" P~t•~r.tm u '-
1'••u., 1'11•1
1'1 "''· -
•\ "''"llal ~ 1 1 ol/flllllfl ami
1rtt111J',\ p c l'uhhc
\jwlfl ' ~. \IJ,ftm.::wn.
(,llfl I (I . \f
•11 \11'1>11 Jlir \rttwun 1 1

\tfJth "'"''· l'lh:!

Jli
_,_
,-~
\ ·., 1<1 Pa!!t'-'1'---,,-
' _,
,_3

t.ll dtflcu:nu : beliH'<:n b.ln:;umn g and c.khbcr.ltlon o~ tmpflc, lh.n no rc.tl ~r­
,u01,1011 lhmm;h reJ'<•nmg ,,n the m<'m' <>H "" 1\ILhm 1ht• t'\t't uu' e br.tlll h 01
Chapte r Eight
m1dauon ' bet\\t'Cil the t'\t'lUil•t' .tnd Com~rc'' 1. .ftdrrnlut no. 49. 111 Alexande r II.Hluh?n . Jame~ \fad•~on . and J ohn Ja •
1
36. R.1ndall 8 . R•plt·• ton~" th.tmplt> n' .\1d 10 \uP'""· 1958- :>9. m 11v frdrraiL<I Papr,-,., ed fhmon Ro<<ucr (::\e\1 \orl. 'e'' American L1bran.
f.cnt:Tn.l and l'rban l'r(lblnA.<, ed fr~knt ' Ue;l\cl.tm l (\\ ,t,hm{!'tu n 0 ( l~ltill. p. :H - .
Brool..mt' ln,tituuon . ~~~~·~'). p 53. ~ Fr.f,.rah<t no. ttl p. 'lM
Si Jt•hn l '""'tt' "(:C.mwllinl! ndmqut'n (\ E.\C'Cllll\ l'. t <llll{l't"-'IOll,ll .md l ff'irml <I no I 0. p !\2
Ju~t·lnlt•. 1961-1>-t 111 ( lt·.t•eland. C:om:u" .md trbo11 Pr· 'rr'"' p 1-16. 4 ~e. for e '3mple. J.tmes . fl'hl.m. D.·moaan muf o,·hhn-ahu/1. \ ,-,. D~rr
~' \\ tl(>drt'" \\'tl,on, (An.•llluiJO MI Got'tlllmolt. p. i I. t '"' Jm Drmorraltc Rt{onn ( '\ew H.11 en Yale lml'er<ill \ Pre"'· 1991). pp 8:?-.'\3.
~q "'' .. l..man. T• . Tnumph of Pohfu,, p. I ill. Pas:c .md hapsro note. hc.lwe,er. thai "b' the time nauon.JI poll~ are taken . pub-
'" !hod p ~ll' n . lbtd .. p ~th IK opsmon has ohen been ·refined and enlal'l{ed. throu~:"h pubhc debate '>«
.... !hid.. p ~... 411. lbtd .. p ~51 lkntamm I Page .tnd Roben Y Shapsro. Tlu Roucmnl Public FIJh Iron of T•· · 1
.. ~ Ibm. p. ~~o -1- t btd . pp. :?-l~-:>11. m ~- r m~· p,. n Prrfrrma > C.h1ca~o l·ru,e~n' or Ch•ca~ Pr~'· 199:?),
.. ~ lhtd .. pp. ~~ 1- ~~ .. , lbtd . p. ::!::!:? . p 391 \et. a' drscu>,ed belo''· there n·mam <enous imped1m emsro d1rec1 public
11 lb•d p. ~t\r. dehberauo n abolll the dctasls or public ptlhCit'>.
-1'' '><:~ Jho the lt'l'\ u ..etul dt'<'ll'-'"" '' ·1 he Lumt' ol B.tnram1111.( .tncl ; J.unes Bnce. fhr ~mtncan Cnm,••Jmn·alth. 3d ed1tion.:? •nb. (:\e'' \ orJ..:
"\1 ,.,. l ,, Nllll!. 111 (ot'<'~'ll~ <. Ed" art!- Ill Pr· "lmt·:J lnft u" t • Corlt.-rt" (~n
\laomll.tn Compa111. 19091. ,·ol. :?. p :?-I i
flanet o \\ H freeman 1~-.n pp 131-3-l :md 139-H.
6 lbsd p :?-!;:- I I. Ibid .. p. 3.>6
!>0 " tod..man, 77u Tn · ' P. llhcJ, p :?1>-t
- lbsd. p 2-19. 1:?. Ibid.
at tbm , p ~'~- " lbsd . p 2~; t:l lbsd .. p. :?.>n.
~~ Fo1 a thoughtlu l dt"u'"on ol tht· ''J' the ·rhetoltc,l l pre,sdenc ' • Jt't>p-
9 lb1d. p. 250 1-1. lb1d .. pp. :?50-.51.
<ttdl7l·, d.-hberat" '" bt·t\\t"t"n the brant ht•,, '<'C Tuh~. Tht Rhrttn cal Prr•r<ftllo.
..," pp 1n t- ;:? 10 lbsd .. p. 331
I) Ehhu Root . .~ddr,,v, ,, Gin,.. .,...,11 11•1d cu,:.m.vup. ed Roben Baron :.~nd
• "c<: lor c\3mplt the cnuqu~ ol tht· \\ hne Hou'e dn ""lll pnxt"' 1h.11
J_an'"' Bro" n on f recptll'l. :\.\ Book (or l.ibrant"' '>c."n~· 1969. lim pub-
""' ..." lll<' "lr11n contra <'PI"xlc b1 tht· utmms"l' •11 .tpp<>~lllt'd b' Pre•sdenl
RC'a.:;an (john lrn.cr, ldmund ~lu•I..Jc, nd Bn-m • O\\HOh) Rt•• •rt t· . Prt•· li-hed Ill 1916 pp. 9-1-95 .
..tn.l~ 'pmcl Rn-uu Roarrf, ft'bruan It•. Ill-.- \\a,hinl!l on. DC. L . . (,o,ern-
mem l'nnun::; O!Tstt, i!'" i ).
16 In the <ummcr ol 1~l9:?. "hen the hN draft of thl• buol.. "as berne;
plttt-d, I ''as called for tht: fir> I time to ..en,. a• a juror on both .1 rnmmal an 3
co;·
5'1 ldlrc\ H . Runb.tum and Alan'> mil ""l" tn the Lu~ An~des Counl' court' These "ere la•rh 1' pscal ca'<'' a
ma!nJ,l.obbpsl.•, and tAr l rdJAr/t Tn \lurra1 , '' ''" •· rot (.u. '' Gu/(h: /.,ru·· tt•1d~n1ial burttlan .tnd J n.>rsonal inruf'\ dasm from a traffic ac<tdt'nL .-\Jthout:h
T 'Rtfi rw '<'" YOTI.. \ mta~e BO<>I.•. th
:a b<tul the ~UIIt
·
Random Hou ..... lfl'iJ. p "'S trc "J' lm.le dtflt'rt:rlH '..-- .
of opsmon amont: I h e JUrol" ·
- of the
~5 Ibid. p ,.; lnmrnal dclend.tn t opuuon "a' ,harph •plir m the ci11l ca...- 3 ' 10 th~ apr~n­
:;o"' lbI d • p. 'U.
56 lt»d
60 lhsd., p. ;-.
~tc.- arnount ot the ~lont·tan a1•-ard h.tblhll tor the accident had pte~ lOU;,; "
Oldmut<"tl). :h a re•uh ddsberau on' m tht· cnmmal ca'<' Ja•rcd on 1\~.h ut ,:'
1
5i Ibid
hI Ibid , p. -.<1 hou 1 '
5,' lbtd p i-1 r." ulc dehberau on• m rhe Olllt.l'<' •lrt'll hcd to 'o('\t'O houf'. ·
n uvo ca '
nd care
I)~ I h.- t'lllph....,, h..,,. Olllh. d It (no 1 1 1 1cl.. b1 the 'cnou•ne<- s ~
• c ':>cnlll\ ,., or anah ucal. n.tturc ol. the Rt ._:.sn " n ·'P ufJun memben but for mel 1'a'' " 1
L.:..>; 1
I h
P '~'t' Ill t c drnhm tlf the u '-lth 1 L Th ..e 11ert' ddrbt·r.tu 'e "'"""''
"re1nrm propo ...tlm no''·" dense' th.Jt tht' 11\l'lll• " Ut h tht: JUror- .1ppn>ac.hed their'·'' e o-
L .. f h R '
1 0 tr.~ lh a re•pon,sblc- "'3'
l e l"':'dn zmu p b ' Clr Luc'tto pcrfomlt ht·lr Oil< d Ull~' .
.·
'''' ' h 1 " "h Ih em to th.-
ld f ' ' rout;
........ pte ttt'n<e' or dJ,..,. , 1u011 L. dralun.: prNC'-' a It~"' " I r-' •or re.:ent I
Ill d !jL~ tton 'o('(' e,fV'.
31 ·r OIUt'll (' ,..,ra
en _ _._ r· ' '""' IIU\ ha1e lx-<-n form.-d thn>uch c,pcn· ad<lmon' 10 the <a"C' or ::rr < Ra/lt1tlllf Pu/JlN P'.1!"t'• .. nd -.ha- r·
<t'> or '""'-"m 1'ffi.' otb.,r tha d 1
100 ru~ult~ou .. orca-
0.1 ..1. n 'PJ""'"~·~ mah .. ,, ol tht· nubli< :;:OO<I tor Clalh the OWttOn' 111 no1c.· I' ol ch.Jptcr 3. 111 Tit'
mt"'-. "'JX'ncnc~ m tht' c r 0
Ptru 'J>e<.sfic.J!h contt:•l the nouun th.ll pubh< ~ . 101lr':_ a~<' rh~t a .. nhh
1 11
cuk,.uon of ,~uc• hum orpolllte orofc.,..sonal t•dut.tuon . or the tn· 1 '
a~ " rd1.tble .:U'd C' ror JX'r.l 1C\ n•.toun".
<haptn 3 Pr100 "' to x·n c ""
p;tnt-...1n "n "< he dt-hmunn ol ddsbt:r.JUOII 111 - h . tramcr,' d1.1ra< u.-nl41·
or publ 1 h li"lt> '._.,,_ rclutt>S I < ' nd
63 Btmbaum .1nd \lu .. < OJllnlon daw h>r 1 C' pa>l · • - 1t'mn•>ran t"tTOI"' .1
"ot\ of bl
&4 JR.. pnnop;ll "'" ' -.at (,IU'n C.uldl pp 190, 19~ dclu pu IC optmon a• .. u !Jt'Ctto ~po p ' 11ar fJu(IU3UOO
b •.
h ~ f mer' , 3 , tu•c t>«n n::: hI
r-
mentto ~ <'=JOn to thu t'tkr.Jhuu on ".l' J;.mc' Ba:..er' rommn ' 10n• or M tumuh ami d1'ordcr ~ -\!thou:: 1 1'3. . , .. "10 :o~ffiiCI
~ "~c-
• BIJ'tlba 1 -~"' 'rot' the otl arid ~- IOOU•IT\ trhcrro" n umc-,thl' problem. P.lt'<'an d 'haptro
of";._ ,. "'
""'·'i'·ro ·, an:v·
um ~ .... Murra\ Gl ~tu 1 G p 2'6 U. no.. \
,_ \ •thout mrcnn::: mto ::-cue.. ~1 di•CU"!On ' " ' '
tuuon:s• .. < .n ra.-!l10run1:
""-'II I onh nott• th.n "'' ca•<' h.-r<' lor a Lu:::e m ..u
 \uln lu /•,,~,., ? 10 >/1
275

tht "ttHII .u!tl c\1•111WI.lll' wll,l' nl liw ICIIIIIIIIIIII I\" t(''l' IIIli 1111 I ill p1ublt'l11 ul ltr<, 1'..\ . I , 1'<1. Rnhttl \ . (,uld\\111 (Cluc.o~o R.111<l M< N.tlh .11u l ( nutp.ttl\, l 'lhl,
lhu 111 ,111111" ol puhlu np11111111 but,·" llnH•cl .thnlll', nn 111111' lclla.l1,11111\, 1OIIIJll'll 1%1 ), I' rr,r,,
unn Iell ll·l'lllt 111111', .1111lllu· 1111111h1'1 ,end wmplc''" ) nl puhln puhc v """''· '17 ll11rl ., p I r, I
IU llud , p I '1:1
111 \tc 1 h.wl 1 M.1llnn I """'''' 1(, /""' 111111n•n C:tmK""" ''"" \111/frtlltlt/rr I·" 'Ill ll11<l p I lh II llud p 1'1:1
lutr •1 UrJ>rrorll/<111 ( ,,.. HCII>rtlll ~l'\\ \111 ~ l\.1"1 lltl<l~\, I' IIIII) p :! lh '1'1 l rdnulnt 1111 r I p II '\
11 1 lh1tl pp '.! 17 Ill I'' J 11\1 ln.utgur .tl, tn \ ( muJnlulwn oJtltt \fr "IIJ.:t' aud JJ,I/Jtl\ tt/ tltr l't
~n lind p :1:1 1 I ell \l.tlh•n\.u~unwfll,cll<llll ,l,cll ,c11tl ch·lciM·c,Hcun,-.·,· p.n
dmh. l 18'l 18'17, t·tl J.olln II Ru h.11<l""' · IU "'"· ( \\,1\IIIII,I(IC III , ll ( 1 ,.~
Ill ul.u h r urlrtlnl /(, '"'" "'"" ''"· PP· '.!:1'1 '>I ..... cl "I kk~·""'" · l klcht'I.IIIU II, <.m''"""''"l 1'1111111<); orr,., , tll'lh l ll't'l), '"I t, p. :1:1 t
,111 d 1h1• Nl'\\ Rul1 ul Cctllf:ll'"" "'·'l \1,111 ," 111 I hum." I• ~1.11111 ,tud Nu1111.111 I·
1'1 l.o1d Cl~o~~nwnncl , llnnl111m lmroln , 'ld t•cl (N1·W \'Uik . ll t•n
( It 11\lt'111, t•d ' · ll1r \', u• l'ulll{t I\\ ( \\ ,I\I11 Ill-( 11111, ll ( . 1\ 111<' 111 .111 I• 1111' 1)11 I\I' lc I\ II 11 lloh .111 <1
I ·""'flolll\ , I '117). '''I' pp 'IK7 1:!7
hilt I 'IIIII pp I I I 77 ..,,.,. ·""' \lt'H ' II ""'"'''II
llrtkllll{ /'ull/u /'u/u 1 I IIIIJ•}ul II ll~tcl p 12h. fh llurl , p 12 1
lJro '1 \nuTiftlll (,mrlfunrll l ' 't'\\ \cu1. 1\,,,lt 1\uul\. l'tK7) pp •1 '"lK .uul h~ I I 11>111 I' 2:1:1
:!I ll.l\1(1 R \l.c\ht\\ ( ""111"' 1/u llrtlmlll ( "'"'"'"'" ( '\t·\\ II.IH'Il \,ck 17 1111111 RcHU lrilltr"""" (,,.,,,mu tumll til rttllllfl. u l f.(ulw·rr U.u un .nul
llll\<1'>1\ l'~t·"· l'li II. pp hi h'.! ).1111<'' 111!11\11 '>IIlii !11n pen I ' \ U1H1k' lm I thl ,ll .,., '>l'llt'\ l'lh'l, ""I pub
'!.'.!. 1\nu \mnuau Cummtmuwrlth \ul ., p I lh l"lwtl 111 I 11 h ), p 17
1

2:1 lh•d ,, ,, lhttl. , p. l l !) II! l•l'dunlllt 1111 10:1, p 'II! I

'! I lt11d , p I I'> 111 / u/unfHI I Ill 7 1 I' ) 'I I
:!h 1),1\td J \u~;lt-r .uul"'tthll' l R \\,tldm,ou (.m•K"" 11ml /)nmHIIIt\ (\\ ,t'h 'lO l rt/na/1\tnn I'J p ~J7 t·mph.''" 1n the UIIJ,; tn. tl
111(;1<>11 I) (. ( nii)(H """'·'I Qu.n 1c 1h l'1e " I'IK 1) I'I' h'l .1111 I K I On I ht· I t'l.t "t I /'((loah,t nn •K. p lt.U
nun,lup lK·,\f.u·n the hutl~t'l dt:fu 11 .uul upt·u c umtnaUtT tn.ulup,. 'l'(_' .tl'u J.mu·, ,., \n J.tnu·' ( '-·'''I' HI\ uwJul cl''' "'''"II uJ elu h.t'IC h pc 'ul tlun.tJ.:UI{U
l I' t\ tu I Ju ( ult~nr ''{ 'l"'"d"'~ \\ "' ( '"'~'"" 1 ,, I'\ hnmul lJu1 \low\ (S.tn h .an u \. uu lud 111~ lilt' C'II\IIIH linn Ito \H t•n .. h.t ut 1111 I ·'uh dt"rti.IJ.::U.to:t H 1 \ w Jl
1111
""" I('> I'"" 1'1111) I' I > ilutlml \dttlnm llum) 11111/ /Jt~·t!upnunl ( PtJIItt'lcm , l\ J I'IIIICt' IWI ltll\c'l\11\
~7 l'.t\ nt· 1hr I ullu11 uJ \Ju~tdt~eg, pp I '• .o11tl '.!:I ""'"· 1'17'1>. PI' :1 17 ·n
:.!H I{ Ucml(l•" \tnuld lhr / 0~11 uf t llltJ!.I''HWnf ll \ttum (Nt'\\ fl.au•n · \.th' ..,.·~ Joutult 1\, ft '\\ d , UI\
()f .111 tftt · lhUII).t'ftl IIHIIC" tft>qlh . thutll lfH· CfHliWC
t tll\t·fMC\ l'tt·'' 11l1Hil pp 'l7r., .uul :!.7 1 IIIHl lx ·I\\CTII pullttl\ .ttlcl 4'tUIIUI11U'I hC,'t\H'(H fll , lll'lt. IIHHC'Jt''ll\ .tlld pofttat,lf
:!I) c.ulutmc 1 W.ucltkt I·Jv.al Kt~JHII1'1tlulu\ , \ .tllllC'' .uulthc Rc·\-tlllH' \It'\\\ .uuJ hd1.1\IUI 111,111 f,tHit'\ \t.ulhUII h 1"1 llllt ' tl·\1111~ ln IIUit tlt.tl ,1'1 I.Ut.• ,t\
( 4tlnnutlc t~ ttl l...nu'-"' UnuiiUtlnr d lth t d f\\a\htn~HIIl I) ( ( .tut~I~'\\IUI1otl I K:! 1 \t.u IJ,un hdtc·\ nl I h.tt hll u 1c p-upul.uum J.:luh 1h m 1ht· l HIlui '\l.lh , "nuhl
'.l.u.nu rh f•tt.·u l*'K'II p ·I'HI nt:tttu.tlh lt\llh m,t p1upn1\lt \\ m.tfUIII\ nhuh \\Unlcl ''-'ltnlhh 1luc·.rh11 rlu·
\IJ R.uu'l.tll 'tt.clt.tlt \ru• \\fl\\ 111111 ,\111111 Urjmm twd ( Jw 11 K, w , ( UIIJ(Ir\ '~t1111q olfHuprtt \ IIJ.thh lltllu· u.tltcJII '\n II;; Htt~tluftlu hmndn '""'"' uf
"" 1 ( mmtlllttr (( h.tpd ~I tit l IH\'('1 \II~ nt N nt tit ( .. tl ulltt.t l't ''""''· I 1f 1J0), P· I 11
111
tier l'olttun/ 1/um~ltluf fnnu \ ,1/mltum, t•<l. M , 111111 Mnt'l ' (lrult.tll.cpol" llnhh,
I l 1111<1 PI' 11'1 I'• ,coati 17'1 'tee .cl"' I' I '•7 'lc•c .cl<u IJ,o\ orl It 111'.1111, Mt r tr ll ( .ruup.r11\ , 1'17'1), 1'1' '•Ill 'I
llmcclll\ J C•ml.llt ,uul \l.ll)(ollli I \\111(111\UII ''>ohllll( the Kulcll1 u l l.o\ l(c r) I RH h.ntll h ·uuu, Jt ,,,,, ,,,,,. llut4H .\lrmltrn ,, n,,.,,01\/,,h ( 1\U'IIInn
lilt m P.tJ t} c c,cHI" llllttu ttttl tlu l'uluu' ,,f ldt . h /'o"lunl \t '' mr {}tlllrlfll\ IU'•
11 " 2 (li~)Ct, ilt'i
1111 I he uh IHI.t)(t 1 uf , c 1 t t \
I ttllo 1\1""" ,nul C ""'I"'"' 111'/KI. l't> Ill::' hI
111 tlu 1 h \ t I11JJI11t lit ul lin I·'' ·,I Ut' HJ.Utllll I l'.t~t· ( lluun ,,,//tiro,' W f',q,frtrlur l/f,tr''"' Uullun,ll \lt.tl
Rti•JJm \ctoll'tKh u•l•uthrlu '"-''Uht.• l 1 tnuh uul( uuyt• mul/lulm al /)tJfHJ~'III\ ( ( hu ,t)(U l 111\4'1''" ttf ( lm I)(U Pu·,,. I'I 1X), pp I ,·• ••
'\~ \\uuchu-... \\ '''•Ill ( '"' '" lmml ("'• ,.,,,,11;
f( It \c l.md \\ ul ltl l'ulJh\ltllt)C 1h JtUit~ I\ lult, , Jlu IU~tlmrurl l'tnttlrm \ ( J'IIIIt<lttll , ' J f'tiiUtlnul m
Cwup.ct 1 }• M• rt•h.ut 1\rttt~ l 'lrJfJ ''''KIIc.tlh Jlltblr,lu cl111 IKH •J I' 7'J ""''" l'rt ''· 111117). I' I II
3
~ M.n; l .ut.llul rtl, llir Jt,u,/, nj tlu r rdnnl I tmr'tliiJuu oj 17.'1'7. 1 vnl'- r,7 lhul 1'1' I 1:? 1'1
( '"' ll.t\c·u \.tit ltll'oti\H\ P" I'UIItt u1 I p IUfM,t\ ''Kl •H " Lu ('\\C II \cldt t''ll\, Ill HnutK' \ trtitll'ri/JI ,, uJI"I' r,, "''"''' \UI I I'P ., I rl
il 1\;'" 1111 111
J t Jtll\h Ill I fu,tn., I ,, I
1mu uut \It• 11•11 1 J \1.alhtll, \ ttnl "''
I tv ', t ',, , f'IIJ/ I'JIJ (\\ 11
I' II i I 111Kiflll lt ( ( UIIKII :\ llill.tl ( )ll.ll hI 1\ l'•'t')), •'f lhul p ,., 4
ltU Jc lie 1 Cllt I II 'II III.UIL'Ht.tl \,f,llc" 111 tlud pp ,.q '' I
I \'t II llu If' (11' idt ttl
ld l1tuulu l1"1 ht.III~Ut tl \dcltc·,, IU thul \ul h p 11
tth the pt ul 1 ut 1 111 , \• lu
h'' I ttl .111 .cc tfHIIII uf tlu tollh hhhtt\ ttf tlu II'' ul pupul,u tlu·tutH h\ pt('
Jil r tdf 111
ul, "" ~~·, lull,, 1ft, UhttutNul /', wh"' l I'P 11 1 ~n
'\IJ I lc J!,, II I ~IIIII IIto( l'nlllu til' Ill H
h'\ llu\ .ucnlllll fil ,t\\'1 11~1111 lf .lltl \ J,,ff.l , t ll\1\ 1•/ llh lhr111, !Ji cldnl \11
 276

• z ,,,mill thm~ltlllhbaln ('>t•.utk. \\ ,e\h · l 111\('1\ll\ ol ~<1\lunu

/nln prr111111111 ~~11 " ,.,
lOll l'tt'\\, 197'~, <II 11(111•1111 puhft,fl('d Ill I 'I 'ill).
llw fthh 1 1111 Clln l)oul(l·•' dt•h, ell·, ( •. ell•,l)lllj(. llluHU \, (><whee 7. 11!5!!, 111
111
' ( I ' til' < t1! J m/lllflll11 <·d Rn\ I' 1\,1\l!'r,!llol\.(, t'\\ Beun""''""·
I , 1, .o ,, rt. ttl1 "'"111'I 1111 111 ,, l?
\!22-1! .\r; 11/w toll\IIIUC:Il( \
\ J Rull(l'" l ' ntH'I\11\ l'tt'"· 1'1'.:1). 1nl '1, P· ~t
d((OIIIlldhtlllh
Qua} le\. D.~n, reccpll\cnt~• tu, U:!
pH'\\IIot'' <cm\luuc:nn \CI\ itt'; pubhc111 anclt<~x refonn, 211<i
· fij 1 hi r. 1 , 1 luu uln l)uul(l•" ckh.m ( )tl,n• •'· llhnul\, l.ugu~t 21, J 1!5!S. 111 ,\t~t'llllolll , Ututt:, \!~.:in. 2 Anstotle, 253n CJ
ebtd . p IIi. \d,um 1\r(){ k. n 7 arm\ comrol, 130
ti7 I heel. p 27 Ad.um, lnhn, 11!5 Arnh.tn, Lam, 253n. CJ
bli !bod p Ill
611 "'lp<·ct h .11 ,, Rt·puhlll ·"' U.IIUJIIl'l, ( lm.tgo. llloncll\,'' 111 ibed .. H>l. 2, on dchiX'r.uoun. II Arr011, Kenneth J., :!57n.!li
Ad.unl, l<>hn Qutnc '·on the< rnoul pe- \nides of Conleder•tmn, i, lto-i, J21
p. ;11!5 rtod. (j 7 Asbell. Bernard, I 15-:!0. 15h, Iii
,tdl(:l\,11 \ dt'lllC>H,It \, 251!n 22 A>ptndll, \\'ame 114
.tdH•rll\1111( '" JMrl of -c:lf-uotcrc\t model.
cr.
"·' Batie\ Stephen t.. tl 7, I hti
A~ OC Su Aod lo ~.muhe' woth Oepcndem Baler. Jame,. 206-!1. 27:!n 1; 1
Choldrt·n Sallis. George. I ill
Agricultuec. Dc:p.uunc:m ol. 92, 9!1 Bank of the Unned Slale\, IX3, ll!fi-.~.
Agtoc ullllr(' Ad1uMmen1 Au. i I 194. 243
Agncuhuoc: .md ~c;,c~tn , Senate Commtl· Barber. Benjdmm, 258n I I!
l('C 011, 75 bargaimng. Su nlw wmptutnlle, lu~o:rull­
Ago ~tulntoc Coumultc:c:, llou~e: ,,nd food mg: stdc P•l\ men!\
~lamp,, 69-71,75-7.79, 1! 1-98 backfiring, 196
Aid 10 F;emi lit•' with Uc:pt'tHknl Children coexi5ting wnh dehbcr.euon, 72
(AFOC), 15:1 control of, 1hrough publu '''· :!:!ti
.eir pollulinn . Str Clc:an Ai o At!\ defined a' poliu,al .ec ll\ 111 150
.eirpmu•. 194-5 versus deliberation IJX-100.
Albt·tt, C.erl, 94. I til 260-ln.Sfi
Allmqunqur f'r~btuu, I ~5 CXCCS.I\C, 199-201
A ll l\on. (;e.elt.llll, 70 rood Stamp -\o ul I %4, ti<J- iO,
1\MA. .\rr Anot'llt.m ~kcht.tl 1\>~ooJl ton 76-81
,ombtlt()ll .\rt \l'll ltliCIC'I Hepburn \ct. 11.111
t \lltrllrtl 11 /J 11 '"''" ttntl l'ublu 1'<1/to. 6!1 illegitmlalc b' pt ""dt:nt. lllh
Atll('!lt.l!1 ~kdR.tl '"')(I,IIICUl, 7:! for lo<:.\Uon ol n.tllon.ol <dpll.tl, II>!, I •1:\
Atlll·l·~:dct.tlt't', 7.:! I :1, :111. 21 i ~ledtcare \n of 11Jti5. ill
\pptclprt.lltCJtl\ (.unllllllll't', llou~t'.II I as method ol bueldm~: m.llllrtltn ; i -:-
' " ' '"'" t' mt·mbt.·r,htp pt nmult'' ddtb- 122
ct.tltcm, 117 as pan ol ~11-mlet "'' mU<Id, :1
lw,triu~-:' ht'ld mtln,<·d 'C'>tnn. IIi pea nul sub>td\ tor Ia' lUll. I~~~
an d pehU.lSIOO. 1.,., I'll'
--· • l
pubht 111o1tl.u IH<''""'"· 117 22 I.
:!h 7n ICi!l as po~1111 e ~UO<I. llH
"'b..tltllttliiii.'C ·'flll<>ltttmcnl\. 2h7n lti<l b1 Rt:d~an 197 -!!Ill
\pJUUpll,iiUUl\ ( :on\lllll(l'C.' ~'ll.Jl._., 121 for rt"ele< uon. l!ll'
\t\'.1 ltt·dt·~t•lul""''lll \tt ul 1!16 I, til\-9 relet led Ill (,l\Or lllt<.I"HIIrl>: 1~1'1
~ll)tUIHt"lll\ \rr 11/\1 lt,ltHIIMtiUI1. pt'~UJ- b1 R<>t>"'1ch , I htx>dute, I<IU
\IUI\, Jht•IUIIC .1, tht:OI\ ut \mc1u,an J-Xlllllt'\ -,h II, I
.ttldtn\l'd tn puhl11. '•:! mt.: ot J>O'H'r m, 1~,2
I!l~
m , culHHiltt·t• hc.·.u lit).:'• B.1rr1 811.111. 2ti In "•li, 26 In 57
Cnhe•o.lnhn u,t· ul, 129-:11 8.1ucr. R.l\ nwnd. ti i -I\
l)mnt•IIU 1, Ptu.-. u,,. ul. I :.!2 8.11h, Buth. Ul
" !'it•lllt'111 ul d ('!I bt·t ,otiC HI, :> I- :!, I :o:\ llc:.un. O.ll od R. 27 In ;II
:,.,d ~.u111h l"''''·utu• PlttU, II:! lkolllcl. \nhur ~•ti- i,ti2-.l
111flnm dt·h.tt<', I 1\ I Bt'\oell!', Juwph M.. :!32n 1'\
h.lllll't'i<d In pulllt", I 'oll I Bt·tt\, j.~<L,un, ltll
uo<lrh 1 n~ ltu ,auclu.'IU. t', r,2 b•f~lllll'lltllc.·g:t,J.ttu1l". 2
I _.,flul••tU th.IU h.HUolll11tH1 1qr, h1ll~ 1n 1 1 1 1 I t t , 1 1 I'; r.
N()t<.s to Pagf'S 212- 217 27)

Chapter Eight
I. Ftt1tmliJI no. 49, in Altxallder Hamihon. Jamt$ ~1 adisor'l. and john J ay.
nte Ftdt>talist Paptrs. ed. Climon Ross.iter (New York: New American Library.
1961). I'· 3 17.
2. Frdemlut no. 63. p. 3S4.
3. Ftdtroilst no. I0. p. 82.
·1. See. for example. Jlmes S . Fishkin. D~ntoctary and Dtltbt-r4lwu : Ntw Dir«·
t101ujor /#mocmtic Rffrmn ( New H;n·cn: \'aJc Uni,·ersit)' Press, 199 1). pp. ~2 -83.
Page and Sh:apiro note. howe\'cr. th:u ''b)' the time nationai J>OIIs art" r.1kcn. pub·
lie: opinio n has c>ften bt.oeJ\ 'rcf1ntd and enlarged' through p ublic: debate."' See
Bcrtiamin I. l~gc and Robcl't Y. Sh apin.-.. 1'hr Rab<m<tl Pttbht : Fifty YI'OI'$ uf Tmub·
m Amuutm.s• Pol.cy J'trtferntu.s (Chicago: Uni\'ersity of Chicago Pr'ess. 1992).
p. :391. Yet. a.s discussed belo"'· there remain serious impediments to dir•c;c1 pt1b!ic
delibtr.ttion about the details of p ublic- policies.
5. .Jarrles Bryce, T'1v Amtrium CtJmmmllt.'ftllth, 3d edition. 2 \'Ois. ( New York:
Mtt.emillan Compomy. 1909), \'QI. 2. p. 247.
6. Ibid .. p. 2<18. I I. Ibid .. p. 356.
7. Ibid .. p. 249. 12. Ibid.
8. Ibid .. p. 2S7. 13. Ib id .. p. 2;0.
9. Ibid .. p. 250. 1•1. Ibid .. pp. 250-5 1.
10. Ibid .. p. 331.
J 5. Elihu Roo t. AdduSY~ o" Ccntt<mmmt aud Cllr:.nuJup. ed. Robert Bacon and
James Brown Scou (Frecpon. N.Y.: Books fo r· Libr.trk"S Series. 1969. finl pub·
lish.:d in 19 16). pp. 94-9:t.
16. In the summer' of 1992. ~~herr the first dl"3fl of this book was being rom·
pleccci. r \~.ts called f(>r che lil"$t tin1e cc) scr,•t as a jur<1r (JI) both a critninal and a
civil cast' i1\ the LA» :\rlgtles CO\U'Il)' .:ourlS. These " 'ere fairl)' t~·pical cases; 3
residential burgl.ary and a personal i1tiury claim frt.nll a trallic actldenL Ahhough
there wa.s little differenr.e of o piniorl among the jur'Or.s ~bout the guilt of the
crimin3l defendant. opinion was sharply 5plit in the c;i\'il ca.o;.c :l5 to the :tppropri-
:ue amou m of the moncmry a ....-ard (liability for 1he ac<'idcnl h:u.1 prc,·iousl)' been
admitted). As a result, dclibcrarion$ in the criminal ca.s e lasrcd o nly about an
hc)Ur. while delihcrations in the cidl case scrt'tt.hed I() 5(:\'CO hours. In boch case5
(no o\'erlap ofjury members but for me) I was stmcL: br 1he seriousn ess and <art"
"'ith whieh the: jurors approochtd their task. Thtllc wc:1'c ddibcr.Hi\'C bodies do·
ing 1hc1r lx:st 10 pcrfom1 their ci''iC' durics in ;a responsible W<t)'.
17. For I'CCtn\ additions to the case fo•· ~reattr citizen deliberation. see c.spc·
ciallr tht ci1a1i0ns in note I~ of t"haprtr 3. In Tht> llllllc'"«l P11hll<. P<lgt- and Sh:t·
pim SJ:>edticall)' mnlest the notion thai public opinion is coo wm uhuou~ o r c~• ·
p l'it'ious 10 St:f'\'c: as a reliable guide for' J>Oiic,·rnaking. ·n"''' <argue.· IIMI :1 " 'e ah h
of puhl1c o ')inion data for 1hc past tift)' years rdutc:s the (r.-u ncrs· cha~ct cri1..a·
liOn of p u blic Opinion <I.Ssubjt::CIIO ''Jl(lpHiar ftU<;Uiations," '"f('IHJ)Or.try C:n'()f'$ and
delusions," m· "tumult and dasorder:· ;\It hough rhc fr..mtr'S m.ay h:l\'c lx:cn riglrt
:.d lou\ their own time. this. p1'oblem . l~ge and Shapiro argut. see1ns not to aflttCI
u.s I)OW. With<>ul entering into general disc.'m sion or Page and Shapiro·~ argu·
ment. I only note that nw c~t~ ht·rc for ~~ large.· in:stiwtion:.l role in f:'tshioning
2N

the ''tut'\1 ~11<1 d thbc:r.U(" ~uS<" u f the: commt•mn" r~t .. nut un 1tu: p •·nhlt·m nf
ffocltMI14)th of J)uhht· opimull but. as nOtt"d :.bo\ l", un l unc tun'" rainh, 'umpeu ·
tton rur ll"I$Ure titnt', :md lht: number a nd compi(Sil\ of publtt lM'ht\ ISIIU~.
IM. Mkh.;.el I Malbut, l'n~fffltd n,,.,.. ,,llllnY'\' (Nit~"~.,, S/Dh nnJ ,,., ,.~,.
''"' oJ H,pttvNialnY (~Yrwlfl('ult~.C\\ Yorl.: B.e.slif 8ou~. I!J~H· I'· :l it)
19 lbtd.• l>l'· 2 17-·IK
~~. lbM:I .. V· 2~ I. for \l albln'~ .,~Uillt'rU ilbuut ~ufl .md ckl•brtdiKHI, ~ p;;.r·
tintlo~th (.'NtlrrtnJ Rtp,vHtnln~. PI)· 2!\~J-.51. and - lk-k,c.mon. l>c-Mxra1ion•
•md the X'-"" Rnlc- of (A)tl,l(~nal Sli.rf... m "I hum.. , t \l,um ;md ~onn.tU J
OrnloiCm. t'(h .. "f1t, Nru• (;,o"K"" (\\'ashingtun. I).C,; Amcri<~•n f'llh'tpo~· ln ~ti·
tuu·. t tl81 ), PI'· 1$4- 77. Set- .liStI SIC\'t."ll Kflman, .\fnAm,t~ /J"Nb/u J',Jw, l 11op;jul
~ 'tntt (){ Ammfml (;m..,.nuliffll ( 1'\t-"\'.' York; lb.str 8 tMik... ltl~71. I'P· !'• I - ~,N .md ti:!.
2 1. l).n 1d It MOl) lu.•w. (,',m~m.~: TJ,,. £lrfllmd Omnt'lltml (1'\f'\\ H,l\ t•n: Y<•k-
l lnhcr•l•r l'r<'$.). l!J7<1 1.pp. til-62.
2:!. 1\l } 'ct'. A•ttmmu (~,,~,mrrnlltlr . w l. 2. 1;. 1·111.
:t:i. Uucl. :l:l . I hid .. I' · 11!1
~ I . Ibid .. p. 115.
2ti. O,wicl J. Vv!(k• .mel Sitlncy R. \\'<tldm.lll, C.'•mt'"" (IIIII / ).rNtlNHif't cw.•
~h-
111).4UJ II, 0 .( .• : (:.nlf(fC.,.SICII\,11 Qu~l'ltrf\· l 1rt·~(, ltJI'<,;j), pp, ti~J .nu(l'C-1 ()ll lht: rd,t•
''' .n ..h•p ht'•~ t'c"n tht• budget dc:rtei<.and ••t)('n c• lu•tmt lt't' ,,,,,rL••I"· ....,,. ,,,,... J;ulH;..
I l'o.~ \tlf' . 711, t ,11/Wft ~~ S/l"lldutx. WA-_t Cm1~,.-...c, I J l " ""·;mil tho' ,\tnou ' ''Ul h .ul·
ulo4.-.: 1<:.' llro.... I!J4Jh. p. 1~ .
~i . Ponm.•. 17ttt:Nitr.~,ofSJWHdml· pp. IJAud!!2
~X R l)tltt,Kl.a.. Amuld. 7M I.DJ!H -f ' "'"P"''I1Jitiii.Vtm'l U\r'~ ll;n nr 'o.llf'
lm\C''''" l'rt"..!t. 19tlO).l•V 27?. .md :lH
~J C;uhc"nrW' E . Kudckr. "'fl3Ca1 RnptHDibthl\ , t.unt<.. ~. ;md lhf' KnMIUt":
(.onmnltet'i ... m L.o•xrn.~ RntHuMinnl. ·hh t-d (\\'~tunl(t'"'· n t t unJ:U''"""\al
(.!u.ttlc• h I'''-"""· l~b<IJ), V· :!:..J!J.
~· R.md.tll ~~~~h.ul . .\'ru• ng,, ami r\lrt'~lf,, H,/m• nml ( lumg, 11; a C.mt(r(·•·
'hmul (:VNtNIIIIf' tCh;tpc.-1 tiill: L'nh·('~il\ ,,f :"innh ( ;.Hnhu.• l 't'(•(,., ~ ~~HH. p. I H .
:SI lbicl., 1'1• 14:i- 15 .tnd 173. !it>t" •• 1~'1 p . 1!)7 . •'M.·c.• 4''"" ll,t\tfl K. lh~•IOl ,
runu th\ I· Cnui.Ul , .mel ~lall(.n'C'I T. \\' l'll{hl!ttlll. "SuhllllJ, lht• klcldlc· nt 1.1). M,,•.
fi1n 11 : l'.tll~ ( 'ti iHJk'Wic m :md lhf' Pol ilk' (If Jdt'.t..." l ·'iJII/((11 \ Nmtt' <J.uuanA lfiZ•.
IIU, ~ (IVIJO); 1~)1'(, ttll lhl' .l(h ;u t l,tj;{t'~ u l $4.''1~'\'\' Ill Ill(' (1,'\'C,'IH))IIIt'lll ul tilt' l':tx
Rd •n n1 At 1 '•f I ~Jtitl in b;: •th t h(' c:s4.·t ut j,•<· l ut~ u' II a nd C:un)tr'4."h,
!i2. Wt w.xlruw \\'il!((m, c:mlj..'1h~UJ1Wl ( ~lt¥'fll llrl.,l ( ( :,,., d.·nd: \\'otld l'ubh,hinl(
(:.uul):tll\ , \let l(fl,,n 1\ll(tks. IV.:;!), ut·ixi n.tll~ pubh .. ln•clm l rt)(r,l. p . i:!
:s:' Mrt:\ •·•• rr;~nd, rd .. I,,.. R,ronl· 41/ ,,, Frtl••ml c;.,.,...,,MII II/ J ii'tl , -1 \'HI..
t:'oiew H.:.,·t·n: Y.tlr l ' nt\'('ISII\ llr~ 1~\4;), \ol. I. V· Ill (M.H :ltt•
:'-1 :'\~Pntl.ln J. Om~t<'H'l. Thu1110» t:. ~l.mu . .Hut l-Ilt li.tt'l I M.1lhm. \ ·,uri ''"'
toltf• 11# (..uHP'"· I ~JI-1 1JCJ2 1W•.:shiu J>thHI. O.C . ( :un~~....~ 11MI Qtt.tt lt'rh. lW!t
I'· II ~.
~·· t..H•n 1ht- \Me; pn-std't'lll, whu l'i lunu.tlh .-lrtn"fl IH ufhu• uu lht· h.1llut
Mth lht' l)ft"<otdt'Ut • ..tt h~~ hiJo. ~ttkMl. 1hn .. 1~h ..t J, /-1rlu ·'PilfUIIIItl('nl h\ lht-
J.nnad('m
$h t ktftton f. 'ltw tn)C. "'t\llitk al Pdtl lt"~ •• ud tht.· 6u1 t'olllt , .., ' . m J'IJilttflllltlt+
the "cool and deliberate sense of the community" rests not on the problem of
nuctuations of public opinion but , as noted above, on time constraints, competi-
tion for leisure time, and the number and complexity of public poliC)' issues.
18. Michael J. Malbin. U11tlrclrd Rtprtstnlaliva: Cortgressiotwl Staff a11d lht Fu-
turt of Rtpresmlalive Governmmt (New York: Basic Books. 1980). p. 246.
19. Ibid .. pp. 247-48.
20. Ibid .. p. 251. For Malbin's argument about staff and deliberation, see par-
ticularly Untltcltd Rtpmmlativu, pp. 239-51, ~nd "Deleg;uion. Deliberation,
and the New Role of Congressional Staff." in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J.
Ornstein, cds., Tht Nn.J Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1981). pp. 134 -77. Sec also Ste,·en Kelman, Malring Public Poliq: A Hoptfid
View of Ammcan Gatom~mn1t (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 54-58 and 62.
21. Da,>id R. Mayhew, Congrm: The Eltcloral Conntctio11 (New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1974). pp. 61 - 62.
22. Bryce, Ammca11 U>mmo11u't!alth, vol. 2, p. 146.
23. Ibid. 25. Ibid .. p. 119.
24. Ibid., p. 145.
26. David J Vogler and Sidney R. Waldman, CA11grus a11d IXmocraq (Wash-
ington. D.C.: Congressional Quanerly Press. 1985). pp. 69 and 84. On the rela-
tionship between the budget deficit and open committee markups. sec a.lso James
L.. Payne, TilL Cullurt of Spt11di11g: Why U>ngrw U ves !Myottd Our MtatlS (San Fran-
cisco: ICS Press. 1991), p. 15.
27. Payne, Tht Cttlturr of Spet1di11g, pp. 15 and 22.
28. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congrtssio1wl Aclio11 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), pp. 275 and 274.
29. Catherine E. Rudder. "Fiscal Responsibility, Fairness, and the Revenue
Committees," in Co•tgr•.ss Rtto•uidemt. 4th cd. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press. 1989), p. 229.
30. Randall Strahan, New Ways flllfl Mtlms: Rifonn a11d Cila11ge ;, a Congres-
sional Commill.tt (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). p. 144.
31. Ibid .. pp. 143 - 45 and 173. Sec also p. 157. See also David R. Beam,
Timoth y J Conlan. and Margaret T. Wrightson . "Solving the Riddle of Tax Rc-
fonn : l":!ny Competition and the Polities of Ideas." Political Sdmu Qullrterly 105.
no. 2 (1990): 198, on the advantages of secrecy in the development of the Tax
Rcfonn Act of 1986 in both the executive br;mch and Congress.
 -
32. Woodrow Wilson. Cot~gressional Gm,enwuml (Cleveland: World Publishing
Company. Meridian Books. 1956, originally published in 1885), p. 72.
33. Max Farrand, ed., Tile Ruortls of lilt Federal Co11vl!lllion of 1787. 4 vols.
(New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press. 1966). ''01. I, p. 10 (Ma y 28).
34. Norman J. Ornstein, T homas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin , Vital Sta-
tistitstm Congrt.ss, / 99/ - / 992 (Washington. D.C.: Congressional Quanerly, 1992),
p. 113.
35. Even the vice president, who is formally elected tO office on the ballot
with the president, ad1ieves his position through a tit facto appointment by the
president.
36. Hcrbenj. Storing. " Political Panics and the Bu reaucracy," in Political Par-