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The Politics ofTnx &form · 143

stiruencies.5 He observed that in the past a pattern of incremental addition


of new tax reduction provisions had been only marginally affected by rax
reform efforts and had been etlCctively constrained only by revenue crises
on the order of war or deprcssion.6
When tax reform is viewed &om the perspective of Mayhew's electoral
connection model, the Ways and Means Committee, if it were stiU fimction·
ing as a "control committee," might be cxpcctc:d to restrain the flow of tax
benefits to local constituencies and organized groups, but the large-scale
elimination or reduction of existing tax preferences to achieve general rate
reductions is a puzzling outcome indeed-especially after the 1970s re-
forms had substantially weakened incentives for committee members ro be
attentive to institutional concerns or policy goals other than targeting bene-
fits to local constituencies or organized clientele groups. Thus the puz.z.le
presented by tax reform consists not only in an outcome in which broader
societal interests prevailed over many wcU-organizcd clientele interestS, but
also in the fact that the critical first step in enacting reform was successfully
undertaken by the Ways and Means Committee, whose power, autonomy,
and centralized leadership had been major targets of the congressional re-
form movement of the 1970s.
Why, then, did a committee that was "opened up" in the 1970s to
greater participation from the broad array of interests that benefited from
existing preferences and special provisions in the tax code vote: to eoaa a tax
reform bill in the 1980s that was actively opposed by many of those inter·
c:sts? Three factors are most important in providing the answer tO this part
of the tax reform puzzle: 1) institutional changes since the rcfom1 era that
have reestablished some committee autonomy from clientele groups and
reimposed a more restrictive dccisionmalcing process in the House:; 2) the:
reemergence of stronger committee leadership under Chairman Dan Ros·
tcnkowski; and 3) some distinctive characteristics of the tax reform issue
and the policy context within which it emerged in the: mid-1980s. 7
The &establishment ofCommittee Aut011umy

The Reestablishment ofCommittee Autonomy


As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, by the rime ux reform was
taken up by the Ways and Means Committee in 1985, the committee had
moved some distance from the more open politics of d1e reform era in the
direction of closing off some of the new participation and reestablishing
procedural autonomy in the House. These posrreform adjustments include
changes in both formal procedures and informal practices affecting the
conunittec's op«ation. The most significant of these changes include: l ) a
return to closed committee biU·drafting sessions; 2) the development of a
revised closed rule procedure for debating ux legislation on the House
floor; and 3) a rerum to recruitment practices that restrict committee ap-
pointments to experienced members from "safe" districts.
The return to closed door sessions for deliberations on tax issues first

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144 • Ntw Wap 411d Means

began in July 1982, when the Ways and Means Commirtec voted on two
conserutive days to debate procedural issues relating to a Senate-initiated
taX increase (H.R. 4961 ) in cxeattive session. The following year it became
clear that the committee was breaking with a decade· long practice of open
markups when sessions in July and October to draft additional revenue·
raising provisions (H .R. 41 70) were dosed to the public. Since 1983. all
major ux legislation has been drafted in closed ses.~ion. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate the effects of closing markup sessions. However, in·
'
impossibl~ to
.. .
isolate the effects of closing markup sessions. However, in-
terviews with committee members suggest that the rerum to closed sessions
may have reduced the influence of particular interests and dicntdc groups
in committee decisioslmak.ing and may have al~o encouraged members to
take a broader view of the issues at stake in recent tax legislation.8
First, committee members stated that the presence ar markups of rep-
rc:scnrat:ivc.~ of clientele groups and constituency interests v.-ould make it
difficult for them ro support measures that might impose costS on their
own constituencies or groups that had provided support in past elections.
These comments confirm that the pull of the electoral connection is an
important inBuencc on members' behavior. Said one committee member,
on the difficulty of writing tax legislation in public sessions: "You're not
going to solve problems in front of an audience. We're politicians and part
of that is a public posture that's required of us."' A S«ond member was
more explicit:
Say you've got a special problem in your district and those people
that support you arc sitting out thCTC in ffont. When you're mark·
ing up a biU, all you're going ro talk about is yuur interest at home.
You're not going to talk about your interest in the context of a biU as
weighed agairu1: other competing interests and seek a reasonable solu-
tion. You're going to take a hard line for what your people want.
In a scenario that was repeated a number of times in othe.r interviews,
another member explained the different environment that exists when de·
liberations are shielded &om direct public observation:
A memlxr can enter a mild prorest about the defeat of an amendment
he might otherwise feel compelled co support.... Then, when the
markup is over, the member can go out into the hall and say to the
lobbyist, "I worked to get your amendment adopted but I just got
outvoted.''
Although many issues are resoh·cd by recorded votes in closed mark-
ups (forty-eight recorded votes on substantive issues wc:re taken during the
Ways and Means markup of tax reform legislation in 1985), the committee
has often made decisions in dosed sessions through informal agreement, a
show of hands, or voice votes. As one member pointed out, even with
Tbe Polirits ofTnx Refonn • 145
closed sessions: "Sometimes '"'c don't want to take a recorded vote when
there arc a lor oflobbyists out there."
An example from the Wa)'S and Means Committee tax refonn markup
illuscrarcs the importance to members of avoiding recorded votes on-and
hence individual responsibility for- certain types of provisions. Ways and
Means Committee Democrats had agreed in the final stage.~ of the markup
to eliminate part of a tax preference strongly supported by organized labor
(exemption of employee fringe benefits) on the condition that no recorded
vote would be taken on the issue. When Republicans, frustrated by their
limited influence on the biU's development, refused ro cooperate and de-
manded a recorded vote on the issue, Democrats ba.Uc:ed at eliminating the
labor-supported preference, deciding instead to set the top corporate rate a
percentage point higher to pick up the revenue needed to maintain revenue
neutrality.9
Titc: ability to resolve issues in dosed sessions allows members to avoid
some of the direct responsibility for imposing costs on constituency inter-
ests or group allies, as was almost inevitable with rax rcfonn.10 To usc the
fonnularion developed by R. Kent Weaver, dosed meetings are in part a
mechanism for blame avoidance on issues that may have negative consc:-
quenc:cs for committee members' constituencies. 11
According to some members, a dosed deliberative process, by weaken-
ing the pull of particularistic interests, encourages members to consider
broader issues that may be at stake in committee bills. One member ob-
served that he and his colleagues tend ro be much more "outspoken" about
"what is right for the country" in closed sessions. Said another on the
effectS of closing markups: "We don't think so much about the posturing,
about satisfying someone sirting there watching you, as the needs of other
members and what wr: perceive to be important." Finally, one senior Repub-
lican stated directly: "I think without the dosed markups [Rostcnkowski]
... couldn'r have passed the rax rc:fonn act."
The return to closed committee deliberations is one factor mar helps
explain the outcome on tax refonn. Closed markups aUowcd members to
avoid individual responsibility (and thus individual blame) for eliminating
some of the rax preferences important ro clientele groups, and thus helped
avoid individual responsibility (and thus individ ual blame) for eliminating
some of the tax preferences important to clientele groups, and thus helped
shift the focus of the comminec's deliberations from protecting parochial
interests to achieving broader objectives through ta"t reform.
A second factor that has incrc:ascd the auronomy of the Ways and
Means Commincc during the 1980s has been the acceptance in the House
of more rest:riccive procedures for considering tax legislation on the House
floor. After decades of debating tax legislacion under closed rules prohibit-
ing amendments not approved by the Ways and Means Committee, rhe
House acted between 1973 and 1975 ro alter this practice in order ro allow
broader participation in tax dc.cisionma.lcing. Ll However, after a single case

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146 • New WaJ1 and Memu

of successful intervention in a tax bill (H.R. 2166) by the Democratic


caucus and experimentation with an essentially open rule on energy rax
lcgislacion in 1975 (H.R. 6860), demands for broader participation have
been accommodated through the usc of modified closed rules negotiated
through disc\lssions between and among the leadership of the Ways and
Means Commincc, the majority leadership, the Rules Commin cc, and vari·
ous blocs of members seeking changes in Ways and Means bills. 13
On most of the tax measures reported since 1975, a limited number of
specific
. .
amendments
.
have . been made in order,
..
but floor
.
amcndmcms
. ~
have
.
ous blocs o f membc.rs seeking changes in Ways and Means bills.'"'
On most of the tax measures reponed since 1975, a limited nurnbc.r of
specific amendments have bc.cn made in order, but Roor amendments have
otherwise been prohibited. Amendments allowed by the Rules Committee
have included substitute measures for committee bills (often drafted by the
Republican minority on the committee) as wcU as specific amendmentS
sought by dissident committee members or others in the House. ln any
case, by late 1985 when d1e House was presented the taX reform package
drafted by the Ways and Means Committee, the legitimacy of the m.odified
closed rule procedure was wcU established. House members were offered
the opportunity ro vote on a Republican-backed subsrirure and twO minor
amendments, bur otherwise the committee bill was prorected from changes
that might have restored taX benefits enjoyed by particular interests and
undermined the tax reform dfon. 14
The third contributing facror in the reestablishment of committee au-
tonomy has bc.cn a reversal of the trend roward more open committee
recruitment dlat appeared during the reform era. Traditionally, seats on
Ways and Means had bc.en restricted to senior members from "safe" seats.
As Rudder has emphasized, one effect of the House reform movement was
to open committee selection to freshmen membc.rs and members from
highly competitive districts. As was shown in Chapter 4, however, Ways
and Means appointments during the 1980s have been more selective.
Since 1981 neither party has appointed a member who won less than
60 percent of the vote in the previous election. As a result, only four of the
thirty-six committee members serving at the time of the rax reform markup
in 1985 had won reelection in 1984 by less than a 60 percent margin. 15 In
addition, the routine appointment of freshmen members (a practice limited
to the Democratic side during the reform era) had also stopped (sec above,
Table 4-1). Therefore, to me extent that new members and members from
marginal districts arc especially responsive to constituent interests and cli-
entele groups with resources to influence electoral outcomes, informal re-
cruitment practices, along with dosed markups and restrictive floor proce-
dures, have contributed to the reestablishment of some "insulation" for
the Ways and Means Committee from demands for taX benefits and have
allowed the committee somewhat greater procedural autonomy in the
House.
Lcgacyo; Loomis, "Me Deade"; Rohde and Shepslc, "wdcrs and Followers." One
exception to the focus on conrexrual factors in recent studies ofleadership is Owens,
"Wright ~tman," which emphasizes the importance of both personal and conrex·
rual factOrs in the devdopmcnr of Wright Parman's "extreme advocacy" leadership
style as chainnan of the House Banking and Currency Committee.
3. Fenno, Ompra:rmen in Commjntes, p. 133. In the case of committee leader·
ship, Smith and Deering have argued that increased fonnalization of sm~crure and
procedures in the House during the J970s made contexrual facrors "more useful in
explaining differcncQ among commirrcc chairs' approaches to committee politics."
Com~tlitttes in ~. p. 168. In the specific case of the Wa)'S and Means Commit-
tee, they conclude: "On the surface, the approaches of UUman and Rostenltowski
appear less successful d1an were Mills', but the changing oppommities and con-
straints they face have dictated both their leadership styles and success ratio.s." Cum·
mittea in Omgrns, p. 186.
4. Fenno, Conormmm in Cummirrus, p. 117. Fenno ha.~ also noted the in·
creased impormncc of personal factors in explaining mcmlxrs' "home styles" in
cases where conscirucncy characterinics arc ambiguou.~. Sec Hume Style, pp. 79, 91,
124- 35.
5. Sec C'..ooper and Brady, "lnsrirurional Context and Leadership Style"; Rohde
and Shepslc:, ""Leaders and FoUO\~-crs"; and Jones, " The Limits of Leadership."
6. Swenson, "lnRucncc of Rtcruitmenr."
7. The conccprual framework proposed here admittedly involves a certain de·
grcc of simplification. Although instirutional, partisan, and issue·rclated facrors may
be highly inrcrrdated over time, in concc:prualizing the opporrunitics and con·
Straints th;u exist for a lc.tder at any given poinr in rime:, it is useful tO consider each
as analyrically distinct.
8. Cited in Smith and Deering, Committees in Crmgrns, p. 177.
9. Ibid. . 177.
10. Dale Tate:, "Ways and Means: Bchuld Closed Doors," Qmgr'iSSJIJiJIIJ Q--
ttrly Wtdly R.tpon 41 (October 8, 1983): 2067; Jacquclii\C Calmes, "Few Com·
plaints arc Voiced as Doors Close on Capitol Hill," OM~ Qruurtrly Wtd~J
&pon45 (May 23, 1987): 1059-60.
11. ConprmwmdQ.ItarterlyAIIfflUJ~/985, p. 452.
12. This is nor to argue that increases in p3rry unity arc entirely due: to agenda
changes. David Rohde: has shown that incrca.'ICd Democratic unity may also lx
associated with dr.mgcs that have lxcn occurring in party and electoral politics in
the South. Sec: Rohde, "Variations in Partisanship in the House of Representatives."
13. Manley, Polirics rf FinAn«, pp. 151-247; Sindair, "Agenda, l>olicy, and
Alignment Change," pp. 308- 9.
14. Sinclair, OmpressUmRJ &Rlignmtm, p. 145.
15. Uncltis and Ricsclbach, Omgressiqmd Committee Polities; Parker and l'arkcr,
r.--:-. ;_ u~,. r -- ;-._
Notes to PIIIJts 140- 50 • 195

Chapter7
I. Joint Committcx on Taxation, Enimlltt41 Rnenue /ifftcU ofthe Prttidtnt's TtU
!Ufumt I'rop<l$al, p. 15.
2. Verdier, "Tax Rcfonn Aa of 1986." Sec also "The: President, Congress, and
Tax Rc:fonn."
3. Aaron. "The Impossible Dream," p. 6.
4. Witte, Politics ofthe Fetkrlli In""'" TtU, pp. 385- 86. Witte was hardly alone:
in this view. Sc::c, for example, Davies, United Stllla T11.-ca IUUi TtU Policj, chap. 14;
King, "Tax Expcndirurcs and Systematic Public Policy," pp. 29-30; and Conablc,
OJrram:s tu~d the I , _ TtU, p. xii.
5. The most imporcmt of the broader con.stii.UCilcics, according to Witte, has
been the middle class. Wine argues that a major f.K:tor contributing to the tax
reduction bias since World W;tr 11 has been me goal of maintaining a stable tax
burden on the middle class during period& of inllation. Politics of t!Je Fuleral lnamu:
nx. chaps. 4-12.
6. Ibid.
7. For an analysis of the cnaamc:nt of tax refonn that identifies some similar
causal faaors and offers a broader focus than the analysis of Ways and Means
Committcx politics in this chaprer, sex Conlan, Beam, and WrightsOn, TIUing
Clx!iu:1.
8. On members' views of the effects of open markups, sex also Rudder, "Com·
mittec Rcfonn," pp. 124- 26.
9. Birnbaum and Murray, Slxmlmm 111 Gu«i Gult.h, pp. 148-51.
10. Concerning the: consequences of closed sessions for tax bills prior ro 1985,
one Ways and Means member noted: " I think dosed meetings were especially effec·
rive: in dc:vcloping the: '83 and '84 tax bills, in rc:moving exemptions, and [inJ
refusing to accept amendment& that v.'OU.ld have lost money for the: Trc:asury."
11. Weavc:r, Auttmlllli& (;qpnnmmr, chap. 2.
12. Sex Manley, Poli1ia of Fimma . 220- 33; Rudder, "Committee Reform,"
...Rudder, had the greatest whole House.... .
impact on the commit- tee's and Means does, bt
operation: 1. Sec:,...-~---------------"-'~,.;-•s;'~~..__.__..,_
... freshman Dem< ... according to Rudder, had the greatest impact on the commit- tee's
William Lehman of operation: 1. Secret ballot selection of committee chairmen instead
observed: "It is n< of complete reliance on the ...
_,e.. __ : .. .. · · - - _ .... -
~ --=
-= -"'--------,.-------,.--,--.,.---,rr-,.--
spc:Ued trouble for Ways and Means.
Ln addition ro this long-simmering discontent over policy ourcomes,
Ways and Means also began to come under fire during the 1970s for "the
mechanics" of how it operated. Restricting participation in policy formula·
rion for major economic and social welfare issues to a carefully selected
group of senior members clashed with the new participatory ethic in the
ousc. said one mcmocr who joined the committee after it was cxp
in 1974: "This comrnirtcc operated in secret for so long and played it so
safe, it became a joke."57 In part, demand~ for broader panicipation in
•ssues an lCcl oy ays an cans were also ffie proo uct olfni.S6'3tion
among liberals over policy outcomes. A common theme among liberal re-
formers was that majorities in fact might ha,re existed in the House for new
policy initiativcs- inc.luding rax reform and national health insurance-but
they were stymied by institutional arrangementS that gave advantages ro
supporters and beneficiaries of the status quo. Charles A. Vanik (D-Ohio),
the member who introduced the caucus measure to expand the size of Ways
and Means, afterward explained the desirability of such a change in these
tt'mlS: "In the past, the commirtcc has operated as a brake, preventing
legislation from coming to the Roor and burying the impetus for change
such as tax reform." 58
One member who was a senior Ways and Means Democrat at the time
Banking and Currency, W. R. Poage of Agriculture. and f. Edward Hebert
of Armed Services.
While the Bolling committee was careful tO maintain extensive records
of its work on committee reform, there is remarkably little in the publjc
record related co the restructuring of the Ways and Means Committee un-
dertaken by the Democratic caucus in December 1974. In contraSt to the
revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910, \VC have almost nothing in the
way of publiC Oct>itc iliat offers a bill of partiCUlars in support of dlange,
because the procedural majority that enacted the reforms worked behind
dosed doors in the Democratic caucus. Even so it seems clear from ocher
evidence that the primary rallying points for the sweeping changes en-
acted in 1974 \VCrc impatience among Democratic liberals with the com-