Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Uniquely exposed and intensely political, it is the object of the combined awe
and denigration with which Americans view their elected officials. In the past
few decades Congress has endured periodic criticism from bot h scholars and
other citizens for its inefficient procedures, its undemocratic structure, and its
political shortcomings, whether real or imagined. These criticisms, together with
greater executive participation in legislative functions (discussed in Chapter 7),
have called into question the very survival of our national legislature as a viable
policy-making instrument.
Nor has Congress remained unmoved in the face of external challenges. In
recent decades many institutional alterations-formal and informal, planned and
unplanned-have occurred on Capitol Hill. The modern history of Congress prob-
ably begins with the landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, spurred
by the extensive investigations of a joint committee chaired by Senator Robert
M. LaFollette, Jr. (Prog.-Wis.), and Representative A. S. Mike Monroney
(D.-Okla.). The act produced far-reaching innovations in congressional practices,
especially in increasing staf f resources and reducing the number of standing
COmmittees; some other reforms, particularly in fiscal procedures, fell by the
wayside. Many minor innovations have occurred s~ce World War II in response
to the increasing work loads of individual members. Others have arisen from the
ebb and flow of party fortunes: The advent of a Democratic administrati.on in
1961 led late Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D.-Tex.) to take control of
the obstreperous House Rules Committee; an outsized Democratic majority in
the 89th Congress enabled liberals to enact a series of rules changes; disastrous
253
changes would arouse stiff oppositio n, especially from the senior leaders he
. '
reasoned that the omnibus approach would permit a few "ice cream" provisions
to make the "spinach " provisions more palatable. He was fond of pointing out,
for example, that the 1946 act had been approved partly because it had been
accompanied by a pay raise and a retiremen t plan desired by most members.
According to Monrone y's resolution (S. Con. Res. 2), the new joint com-
mittee, like its 1945 predecessor, would be prohibite d from recommending
changes in House or Senate rules. Obviously many of the innovations that Mon-
roney had in mind, like reformula ting committe e jurisdictions, involved amend-
ing the rules, but these proposals could emerge from the joint committe e's work
and then (as had actually occurred in 1945-194 6) be processed by the two
houses separately. Monrone y argued on the Senate floor that contentio us rules
fights, like that over the Senate's cloture rule, should be avoided. "The intent of
this resolution," he told the Senate, "is to seek solutions to the problems of
2
Congress on which there is a consensus that something should be done."
Several reform senators, led by Joseph S. Clark (D.-Pa.), charged that
reform would be meaningful only if the committe e were free to probe what
Clark called "our present iniquitou s rules." "I find myself unable to agree,"
Clark declared, "that the resolutio n as [Monroney] has caused it to be drawn
would accomplish what the body of the resolution purports to do." Those who
drafted the resolution, he declared, "do not wish to put their support behind
any investigation ... which might conceivably overthrow the balance of power
in the Senate." He went on to estimate that the limitation would cut out as
much as three-fourths of the work that the committe e ought to accomplish.
During the previous Congress Clark himself had proposed no fewer than twenty-
seven rules changes, and "not one of these ... changes in the rules ... could be
the subject of recomme ndation by the joint committe e llllder the resolution of
the Senator from Oklahom a." Although Clark's position was supported by a few
liberal colleagues from both parties, his amendme nt to the Momone y resolution
was defeated 29 to 58 on a roll-call vote; on March 9, 1965, the Monroney
proposal was adopted 88 to 0.
On the other side of Capitol Hill creation of a joint committe e was one of
a series of demands presented to Speaker John McCormack (D.-Mass.) by liberal
Democrats, their ranks swollen by the 1964 elections and their organization
spearheaded by the Democratic Study Group (DSG). McCormack saw to it that
the resolution (H. Con. Res. 4) reached the floor under a no amendme nt rule.
Two days after the Senate adopted the joint committee plan, the House
approved it quickly by a voice vote.
The committee's twelve members (six from each chamber divided equally
by party) underscored the complex politic~ constraints under which it was to
work. They were designated by the House and Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders. Monroney, who headed the six-man Senate contingent, was a genial
moderate acceptable to both conservatives and liberals. Representative Ray J.
254 Inertia and Change
Madden (D.-Ind.), who led the House delegation and was named cochairman,
was chosen by Speaker McCormack because he was a "safe" liberal who was also
a member of the House Ru1es Committee. The other members were chosen to
represent faithfully the various ideological points of view in the two houses.
The joint committee's first action was to adopt unanimously a brief state-
ment interpreting its scope of operations. 3 The statement was drafted specifi-
cally to answer the charge that the prohibition on considering rules changes
would render the hearings meaningless before they even began. It noted that the
joint committee had a mandate to study and take testimony on all aspects of
Congress and was limited only in what it could recommend. As time went on,
however, persistent quarrels among the staff members (who were divided accord-
ing to political party and chamber) precluded the kind of cohesive research
effort that had been completed single-handedly by scholar George Galloway for
the LaFollette-Monroney committee.
Laboring under these handicaps, the joint committee inaugurated hearings
on May 10, 1965. It relied mainly on hearings to gather information, hearing
199 witnesses-mostly congressmen, but also scholars, interest-group spokesmen,
and a few executive officials. The printed testimony ran to 15 volumes and
2,322 pages. "I think just about every reasonable and constructive idea for the
reorganization of Congress-plus a few silly ones-is in our files," Monroney
reported. No fewer than 275 separate proposals were presented. They ranged
from Senator Clark's demand that Congress reassess its role in society {but-
tressed by 70 pages of testimony on dozens of subjects) to one member's sugges-
tion that the congressional restaurants improve their service. Most proposals in
fact came from incumbent legislators, and typically they reflected their authors'
particular institutional statuses.
After the hearings had been concluded Monroney's committee took ten
months to negotiate its report. During this period scattered meetings were held,
and members discussed the proposals freely and bargained for agreement on a
fmal report. Essentially the deliberations represented a two-step process. First,
those proposals were eliminated that were deemed actually undesirable. Next the
committee had to agree on that combination of desirable proposals that would
have the best chance of passage in both houses. Some of the ideas that fell by
the wayside at this stage were included in supplemental views filed with the
committee's final report. 4
On July 21, 1966, the Monroney committee revealed the results of its
deliberations. Sixty-six proposals received the unanimous backing of the com-
mittee, which ·immediately incorporated the provisions into the omnibus Legis-
lativ~ Re~~gani~ation Act of 1966. The heart of the report was a "committee bill
of n~ts, dest~ned :o regularize committee procedures, prevent the arbitrary
e~erc1s~ of cha1rm~n s powers, and protect minority-party rights. The bill of
r1ght~ Included such proposals as recognition of the majority's right to call
meettngs and report bills in the event that the chairman refused to do so more
frequent open hearings, broadcasting and •telecasting of hearings at the' com-
2
coJnrnit tel' ,s lin tit 'd ruanda t, and broad ideological tni . ture~ not to tnen tion its
lintit 'd tint' and r'sources ~ th e oJnissions Wl~ t't' pr '{ii · tabl~. lndcl'd~ th' tt ne of
Ut I"'IH>rt reflect 'd p 'rf' ·tly th, approach of its ·o ·haiunan" S 'nator Mon ..
roncy . .... J\ lot or lit tic refo11ns add up to a hig rl'fonn,", hl' reruarkl'd during >Ill'
of th' h 'a rings.~.~., f we ar, 'Oing to get an up- to-date, tnodern ('ongrl'Ss, it will b'
a lllOsaic you build front lots of lit tl' itnprOVl'lll 'tl ts."'
lH.lW th~ St'ttat' as t\ltl . )f tht' 10 pH>post'd :tl\H:'ttdttll'tlts th ~1t Wt'll dl'ft•atl'd
(no ar thlll was takt'H nn anotln't l t), th) ft'W a than Jlt\ ltl\' ft ltll Sl'll:tilt ;lad~
and d~·aft with S\1 ·h l\l:titt'tS as ·lotur " ((H. Sl'lP ' ti O ll of l t.llllllll( t' l h·tit t\ll'll, ~ttll!
thl~ St'll!lt ··s 1\llt:-tnaking ptl\V t' . All Wt'tt' t'asU .. dt'l 'tt d. (ln fill' ')thl' t h ~tnd,
Mont on' had ht' 'n autlHlti 7.t'd h his couuuU (t'' 't)llt'a•u es t ) ac 'l'pt .nut ud-
nu.'n ts that wnuld tnakl' th' hill ttHHt' ac 'pta hi ~ to tht' St u,lft' ,ts a \VIhlh:' . ( t tla
~'> aan~tHhHl'llts that Wl'l'l' ·tdoptt'd ~ \ dl'alt with l'OllliHittt'l pt llt'\htn's and
t'Utl\l' frotu l)t..'tnot:ratic l'tlllltuit ftt' leadt'a·s IHltH tht' South and ~outll\ l'SL 'rh'
iotut t' ntntnittt' t' a ·quil'Sl't'd to all hut t ol tin Sl' atnt'lldttl 'tlts . 'rht' 1 ttt.Hilttl' )
atnt'tHhneut" Wt'll' tnainl " ~it..·t' r n':un " ptovashHlS ltkl' .L1c )h Ia Us" (I' . N., ·.)
voir '·ntnplin 'atiou s Sll'lll hH tln' Nt'Unft' t lO(ll and I htgh SCllf rs(I' .-Pa .) ,lll ,,) ..
tnntic data .. pt'Ol'lSSiug ra~· llittl'S lor tiH' I ihull' nt ( \ Hl 'h' SS . 'rht' patll' ltl l t
:tl' 'OtllllHldat ion l(')lll'Sl'llll'd h thl' l\) :tt\ll'IHhlll'tl ts \Vas Siftd I tl'all t \ r I l sttnil.ll
ptor ess was hl tak' pi art.' in th' llousP- thouglt th, sl ~ ,H 1 d till\\' , 11 (l\llld , ,,.Jld
h , in plivutl' .
'l'he sttat PJ' ot :tl'l' OtHHHHlnfton Sl l' t\H d to havt' p·lid ,)t t , lt,'tt, ,) 11 ~t · 11 c h 7.
thl' S 'll ' tlt: adopted S. \ . h ,, voh' )r 7, to t> . Both Slu:tf\:' .111 d ll,l\1Sl
1\lllllhl'lS of fht• ioiu t ' OtHillif t l' agll •d that flll'lt t COt\\t\\t'tHl t( i\lll S ft:td SUI tV 'd
vit tuall iut:a ·t. S. 3 tltt'll tuovt•d to tit' 11,)\lSl' \ll p ' Ph'Sl utati es,
257
Two days after tl1e Senate had approved S. 355 , Speaker McCormack
referred the bill to the House Rules Committee . He was acting on the advice of
veteran House Parliamentarian Lewis Deschler, 7 who argued that, after all, the
bill did propose changes in House rules. The real reasons behind McCormack's
and Deschler' s decision were somewhat different, however. The committee bill
of rigl1ts, which Senate committee leaders had succeeded in modifying some-
wllat, was still too potent for McCormack and the circle of senior committee
chairmen around him. He would not, if he could prevent it, allow the bill to go
to tl1e House floor until these provisions were drastically diluted. The Rules
Committee, composed mainly of senior and "safe" congressmen of both parties,
provided a reliable tool for transforming the bill. Or perhaps the bill could be
sidetracked altogether, for Rules Chairman William Colmer (D.-Miss.) was known
to oppose the whole idea. As one member of the committee confided,
McCormack had "put the bill in the refrigerator"-where, as it turned out, it
would remain for more than three years.
Various attempts were made to revive the bill. Chairman Colmer began
hearings on April 10, but they were suspended before the first day was over.
There followed a fitful and more or less clandestine series of negotiations
designed to reach an acceptable compromise. In all , seven "committee prints"
(versions) of the bill were produced, mainly at the instigation of Representative
Jack Brooks (D.-Tex.). All were designed, in the words of a staff member who
helped to prepare them, to "write a bill the Speaker [or, more properly , his
Parliamentarian] would allow to be reported out." Some reformers charged that
the committee bill of rights was being so emasculated that "it would be worse
than no bill at all." Republicans charged that Brooks and others were gutting the
minority-staffmg provision through requirements that the committees' majorities
retain fmal control over staff decisions. Such conflicts occasionally surfaced in
the press, as one side or the other attempted to gain support for its position.
In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the congressional reform issue
took on a partisan flavor as 1967 wore on. It was obvious to everyone that the
elderly cadre of Democratic committee leaders had decided to hold the reform
measure in the Rules Committee, hoping that they could remove its committee-
related proVIsions or even kill it altogether. For their part, many Republicans
had long been resentful of unfair treatment at the hands of Democratic com-
mittee chairmen. Some chairmen allotted no staff assistance for minority-party
members, and many tried to withhold information from the minority. When
younger, activist Republicans first raised the issue in the late 1950s, they
received little encouragement from their own party elders, who, as often as not,
had reached comfortable accommodations with their Democratic counterparts
and were perfectly content with the situation. When Ford had been installed as
GOP Conference (caucus) chairman in 1963; it had been generally understood
that he would bear down on the minority-staffing issue. 8 He had immediately
appointed a Conference Task Force on Congressional Reform and Minority
258 Inertia and Change
Staffing, headed first by Fred Schwengel (R.-Iowa) and then b~ James C. Cleve-
land (R.-N.H.). 9 As more and more senior Republica ns were retued, especially in
the Johnson landslide of 1964, younger activists came to dominate the GOP
apparatus in the House. They presented a striking contrast to the Democratic
leadership, epitomize d by the likable but aging Speaker McCorma~k-
1 0
On May 10, exactly one month after the Rules Committ ee s one-day hear-
ing, the House Republican Policy Committe e issued a call for immediat e ~ction
on the reorganization bill. On August 22 Cleveland reactivate d the twenty-two-
man task force "to put pressure on House Democra ts to report out" the Senate-
passed bilL "I want to make it clear," he emphasiz ed, "that I am talking about
the bill passed by the Senate, not some watered-d own 'comprom ise version.' We
have worked too hard on this legislation, and the need for moderniz ing Congress
is too urgent for us to accept anything less than the modest reform package
embodied in S. 355." Thereafte r task force members arose almost daily on the
floor to comment on the delay and to insert in the Record comparis ons among
the various committe e prints. On October 11 the entire Republic an Conference
voted unanimously to ask the leadership to schedule floor debate on S. 355
under an open rule, but the session ended without any stirrings from the Rules
Committee.
Republican sniping at the Democra tic leaders resumed early in 1968 and
continued througho ut the year. In fact, Minority Leader Ford delegated a por-
tion of the GOP response to the President 's State of the Union message to young
William A. Steiger (R.-Wis.), who spoke of the need for congressi onal reorganiza-
tion. When pressed, McCormack and Majority Leader Carl Albert (D.-Okla.) said
that, yes, they favored a reorganiz ation bill and certainly hoped that the Rules
Committee would come up with a report.
Meanwhile, the ultimate fate of the reform package was in jeopardy on
another front. Monroney 's strategy had dictated a number of "ice cream" pro-
visions to accompany the necessary "spinach " in the bill. But, while S. 355
remained bottled up in the Rules Committ ee, both House and Senate found time
to enact some of the more attractive provision s piecemea l. Representative
Madden called this process "ho-dagg ing"- a Hoosier term that apparentl y means
stripping the measure of its more attractive features. Some of tl1e major "ho-
dags" occurred when the Senate voted to increase each senator's clerk-hire allow-
ance (Monroney opposed it on the floor as removing one incentive for enacting
S. 355), to add to the Capitcl police force, to consolida te telephone and tele-
gram allowances for individual members, and to establish an ethics committee.
Several House committe es adopted rules to curb the chaitmen 's power and to
protect minority- party rights. However laudable these moves may have been,
they were correctly viewed as deterrents to the basic reform bill.
Late in the session a group of thirteen Republic ans, led by Donald
Rumsfeld (R.-111.), began to use delaying tactics on the House floor to publicize
the congressional-reform issue and to protest the leadershi p's unwillingness to
I
• •
Related events were taking place, however, that were finally to unlock the
refonn bill from the Rules Committ ee's deep freeze. The ferment centered on
the House Democrats, who had returned as the majority party even though the
voters had elected a Republican to the White House. The party clearly needed
compelling spokesmen to challenge the administr ation in the coming years, but
it was badly divided after the disastrous Chicago conventio n and the ensuing
campaign. As Democratic legislators returned to Washington, they faced a dis-
heartening prospect. The disconten t and disillusionment that had been smolder-
ing among young and middle-seniority members for at least a decade burst into
the open. "The House is like the Black Hole of Calcutta, " said one of the harsher
critics. Freshman Congressman Allard K. Lowenste in (D.-N.Y.) agreed: "Nothing
prepares you for its horrors." 1 2
In a real sense, House Democrats were victims of their own past successes.
Since 1932 they had controlled the House for all but four years, usually by
substantial margins. Democratic incumben ts, moreover , had until recently
tended to come from less competitive districts than had their Republican
counterparts. As a result, House Democrats were older on the average than
Republicans: Their median seniority was 6.5 terms (thirteen years), compared
with 4.6 terms (nine years) among GOP ranks. Their leaders, too, were older:
House committee chairmen Averaged almost sixty-seven years of age, whereas
ranking Republican members of those same committe s averaged sixty-one years.
And, whereas House Republicans had streamlined their party apparatu s in the
1960s (see Chapter 4), middle-seniority Democra ts-men in their forties and
fifties, for the most part-wer e disenchanted and bitter at their minimal role in
party affairs.
The disenchantment was manifested in many ways, but it naturally
focused on seventy-seven-year-old Speaker McCormack. The day after Christmas
1968 Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.) announce d that he would challenge McCorm ack for
the speakership in the initial Democratic Caucus of the 91st Congress . That his
challenge was doomed from the beginning was obvious to everyone (the story is
related in greater detail in Chapter 4). What was telling, however, was the
amount of discontent that Udall's candidacy uncovered. Under the circum-
stances, a vote of "no confidenc e" from virtually one-third of the party mem-
bers was an unmistakable warning, and Speaker McCorm ack could not fail to
heed it.
Although they lost their battle to oust McCormack, the challengers none-
theless won several concessions that promised younger members a larger voice in
party and legislative affairs in the House. One was an agreemen t to hold regular
monthly party caucuses. Another was to establish a holiday and vacation
schedule to enable members, especially younger ones with school-aged children,
to spend time with their families and plan trips to their districts. McCormack
also agreed to support a study of electronic voting systems for installati on in the
House committee chairmen averaged almost sixty-seven years of age, whereas
soon after, Colmer indicated that he would not try to pigeonhole S. 355 any
261
longer ... ongrcssional reforn1 l1as bccontc a syntbolic thing to n1any 1ne 1nbers,
4
3
to l1aving a bill.'' 1
Eve11 witl1 tl1is i11forn1al tu1derstandit1g, progress was not imntediate. It was
not until April 22 tl1at Coln1er designated a special Rules subcommittee, to be
cl1air d by Represe11tative B. F. Sisl (D.-Calif.) , to study the matter and to write
an acceptable bill. 1\ltllOtlgl1 not identified witl1 tl1e refonn cause, Sisk was
known as a fair and l1ard-workh1g legislator, a tnoderate Den1ocrat of southern
e traction wl1o enjoyed tl1e cot1fidence of tl1e House leadership. Once l1aving
been give11 tl1e assigntnent, Sisk persisted doggedly in tl1e face of lukewarm
leadersl1ip support and often conflicting dire~tions. Soon he won the respect of
even tl1e most disgru11tled refortners, wl1o testified to l1is fairness in l1earing them
out. His counterpart, senior Republican H. Alle11 Smitl1 (D.-Calif.), tl1ougl1 never
identified witl1 congressional reform, also demonstrated determination to
develop a meaningful bill. Of tl1e remaining subcommittee members, only
Ricl1ard Bolling (D.-Mo.) was known for l1is refo1mist sentiments. 14
Sisk's group spent tl1e summer and early fall poring over previous pro-
posals and preparing a new draft bill. Additional staff l1elp was recruited from
the Legislative Reference Service, tl1e Office of the Legislative Counsel, and the
personal staffs of Colmer, Sisk, and Bolling. By late October a draft was ready
to be presented in a series of seminars and then circulated to all members of the
House. Meanwhile, the subcommittee opened eigl1t days of hearings: First a
Budget Bureau official discussed fiscal policy making; tl1en media representatives
expounded on the roles of radio, television, and newspapers; and finally thirty-
five representatives spoke. 1 5 lt was seven more tnontl1s before tl1e Rules Com-
mittee was ready to report its own revised bill.
H.R. 17654 as it was reported was somewl1at bolder than tl1e con1mittee
prints that had been circulating dtlring tl1e previous Congress. Title I, devoted to
the committee system in t11e House, embraced a long list of specific provisions to
regularize procedures for (among other tl1ings) calling meetings, broadcasting or
telecasting hearings, respecting minority-party rigl1ts. The major goal, as tl1e
subcommittee put it, was "to strike a tnore jttdicious balance between tl1e pre-
rogatives of the majority and the minority parties wl1ile at tl1e sm11e tin1e preserv-
ing tl1e legitimate rights of individual comn1ittee 1nen1bers." 16 Beyond prescrib-
ing new rules, the bill was designed to prot110te eqtiitable con1n1ittee operations
by more indirect means- by encottraging con1n1ittees to adopt n1ore detailed
written rules for themselves a11d by giving tl1e public n1ore opportunities to
scrutinize committee work. Otl1er titles in the bill de a] t with new congressional
fiscal controls, increased sources of infor1nation (including additional conlnlittee
staffs and an enlarged Congressiotlal Researcl1 Service), and housekeeping
matters like data processing, the Capitol Guide Service, Senate rutd House pages .
and modernization of the House gallery facilities.
Although not intended to en1body sweeping changes, H.R. 17654 was a
262 1ncrtia and Chang
reform in the House. At first, agitation on the reform bill was concentrated
among a few of the most liberal member~, like those in the Tuesday Group.
Once the Rules Committee seemed determtned to produce a measure, however,
the group's leaders were galvanized into action by the desire to build a broader
coalition for reforms than the Tuesday Group and their GOP allies could hope to
achieve. DSG's staff proved indispensable to the entire operation.
Although the DSG provided the broadest base for reform among Demo-
crats, there was no lack of reform sentiment on the Republican side of the aisle .
The minority-staffing issue aroused special energies, although that single issue by
no means preoccupied Republicans. When the 91st Congress opened, the GOP
lacked vigorous leadership on such issues, but Dellenback, Steiger, and Barber
Conable (N.Y.) soon moved in to fill the vacuum. Even before lines of communi-
cation to DSG opened, they agreed among themselves to divide chores: Dellen-
back would keep track of proposed amendments, Steiger would handle press
relations, and Con able would coordinate overall strategy.
Talks between Democratic and Republican reform leaders proved fruitful,
for both sides had decided to avoid partisanship. "We decided we couldn't make
this a political issue because we'd lose the reforms we sought, and they were
more important than scoring some political points," Conable explained. In such
a partisan institution as Congress, though, bipartisanship was not without its
hazards. The collaboration was viewed with suspicion by some. "One has to be
careful about how many things he gets into at one time around here," one
Republican reformer commented. "Some of my colleagues are beginning to refer
to me as 'the honorary Member of the DSG.' "
Throughout the 91st Congress, the GOP leadership felt intermittent pres-
sure to take a more partisan stand on congressional reform-especially because
the Democratic leadership was vulnerable on this score. Minority Leader Ford
resisted these appeals, maintaining that Smith and the Rules Committee should
be given a chance. Ford appeared to believe that a good bill would be worth
more than an issue to the Republicans and to Congress. Turning reform into a
partisan issue also had tactical drawbacks: Good working relations with Demo-
cratic leaders were necessary if President Nixon's legislative program was to have
any chance of passage, and some senior Republicans, with whom Ford had to
work closely, were themselves only reluctant supporters of reform.
At the initial mid-June breakfast session the two factions decided to draw
up a bipartisan list of amendments to present during floor debate on H.R.
17654. Memorandums and telephone calls crisscrossed congressional offices for
the next few weeks; lists of possible amendments were exchanged and their
merits weighed. Many of the proposals emanated from such reformers as those in
Thomas M. Rees' (D.-Calif.) breakfast group (the Tuesday Group), and Rees
himself hired an extra staff assistant and drafted almost 100 amendments on a
variety of subjects. Once the proposals had reached the DSG-Raider group for
serious consideration, much of the background work was done by Linda Kamm,
a DSG staff member.
265
The coalition was searching for ideas that would be potent yet also reason-
ably likely to pass. The bill's sponsors were apprehensive about what might
happen on the floor; the reformers were equally worried. As they saw it, two
eventualities were to be avoided. If too many "extreme" amendments were put
forward, a wave of negative reaction might set in, and all the amendments would
be defeated. On the other hand, if too many controversial amendments were
successfully tacked onto the bill, the leadership might turn against it and try to
defeat it on final passage. Rules Committee members Sisk, Bolling, and Smith
repeatedly warned others that, if the bill were loaded down with amendments,
Colmer would not hesitate to have the Committee of the Whole rise without
reporting the bill ("Colmer will just fold his tents, and the Committee of the
Whole will never report") or, failing that, would try to kill the bill in conference.
The coalition convened in a Capitol room supplied by Majority Leader Carl
Albert (D.-Okla.) and after a few sessions was able to agree on a basic reform
package of ten proposals. Agreement on this bipartisan package served to focus
the reformers' efforts, ensure more orderly floor debate, and dissuade many
individuals from offering their own proposals. Because of this package, most of
the 200 or so amendments being prepared were never offered on the floor. The
DSG-Raider group also made certain that its package of amendments was widely
circulated and understood in advance of floor debate; as the debate progressed a
daily agenda put out by Gibbons' office became an essential guide for partici-
pants on all sides.
In formally announcing the bipartisan package on July 8, Gibbons and
Conable noted in a joint statement that "secrecy undermines the democratic
process and saps public confidence in the House as a responsive and effective
legislative body."
Unquestionably the most important of the coalition proposals was one
introduced by Charles Gubser (R.-Calif.) and Thomas P. O'Neill (D.-Mass.) to
permit recording of teller votes on major amendments during House considera-
tion of legislation. In a teller vote representatives file quickly past two tellers and
vote "aye" or "nay," without any record of who voted which way. The device
originated in t11e British House of Commons and has been used on this side of
the Atlantic from the early days of the Republic. It is used only on amendments
22
and only when the House is sitting as a Committee of the Wl1ole. But the
House almost always sits as a Committee of tl1e Wl1ole for serious consideration
of legislation, and so the most significant votes have often been cast in unre-
corded teller votes. The technique has been attractive because it is quick and
simple and allows members to vote without worrying about public repercussions.
In the 91 st Congress alone unrecorded teller votes were used on such key issues
as the Senate-passed Coopcr-Cl1urch runendment to limit tl1e use of land troops
in Southeast Asia; attempts to cut appropriations for military projects, including
the antiballistic missile system; efforts to cut development funds for tl1e super-
sonic transport; and controversial aspects of the D.C. crime bill.
Unrecorded voting in Committee of the Whole l1as represented n1uch n1ore
266 Iner tia and Change
than an exercise in secrecy. It also has butt ress ed the pow er of com mitt ees by
making it more diffi cult for coal ition s to oppo se bills on the floo r. Partly
because votes were unre cord ed, deba tes were ofte n poor ly atte nded and com-
mittee managers usually prevailed. Ther e were few mem bers who coul d not cite
instances in which their own ame ndm ents had faile d beca use too few of their
allies had shown up on the floo r. Inde ed, ame ndm ents pres ente d in Com mitt ee
of the Whole usually failed; duri ng the year imm edia tely prec edin g deba te on the
reform bill, 53 of the 73 telle r vote s take n on the floo r had repr esen ted defeat.
During the same perio d 85 of 113 division (stan ding ) vote s had been defeats.
These expe ditio us semipublic prac tices were part of the set of proc edur es that
supp orted the com mitt ee syste m and frag men ted pow er in the Hou se of Repre-
sentatives.
Almost everyone who wrot e abou t the Hou se-s chol ars, repo rters , and
even representatives themselves-had paid scan t atten tion to the imp orta nce of
Committee of the W11ole practices. "It !eall y show s how this plac e can get out of
touc h with itsel f," Gibb ons rema rked. For several year s, how ever , inte rest in the
matt er had been building, and in May 1970 it sudd enly burs t into the open .
Journalists and lobb yists in the galleries were begi nnin g to try to reco rd the
votes of individual legislators. AI thou gh key cong ressm en were easy to iden tify,
it was virtually impossible to keep track of large num bers of legis lator s. Peop le
not in the repo rters ' gallery were even mor e hand icap ped beca use of an inex -
plicable rule that gallery visitors may neith er read nor take note s.
The issue came to a head as a by-p rodu ct of Hou se lead ers' hand ling of
mou nting antiw ar sent imen t on the Hill. Criti cism of tlte Viet nam war, not to
men tion foreign polic y and mili tary spen ding gene rally , had by that time
become politically respectable. In 1966 a grou p calle d Mem bers of Con gres s for
Peace thro ugh Law had been crea ted to coor dina te effo rts; by 197 0 it had grow n
23
into a full-fledged organization of nine ty-ei ght mem bers with a staff of eigh t.
The group was bipartisan (one -thir d of its mem bers were Rep ubli cans ) and
bicameral (including eighteen Sena tors and seve nty repr esen tativ es). Esse ntial ly
the group perf ortn ed back-up and coor dina tion func tion s for indiv idua l legis-
lators and their aides. It was also able to mob ilize an outs ide lobb y calle d the
Coalition on National Priorities, a loose alliance of mor e than twen ty chur ch and
peace organizations.
In spring 1970 this latte r grou p stati oned abou t forty "spo tters "-m ostl y
liberal House staffers- in the visitors' galleries to try to reco rd indiv idua l votes
on defense-related issues. Each spot ter was char ged with mem oriz ing the facial
and physical characteristics of four repr esen tativ es so that he coul d tell from tl1e
gallery which were walking past whic h teller. Duri ng Hou se deba te over a $20. 2
billion military appr opri ation s bill, a series of key ame ndm ents that wou ld have
reduced military speuding was defe ated on teller votes. The anger of antiw ar
legislators reached its zeni th on May 6, whe n Pres iden t Rich ard M. Nixo n's
Cambodian offensive caused heat ed deba te on Sou thea st Asian polic y. Anti war
267
forces lost all the votes, but the coalition quic~y prepared lists of these votes
and sent them to all representatives, asking for any corrections before they were
released to hometown newspapers. Howls of rage could be heard all over Capitol
Hill. Members whose votes were recorded incorrectly or who had hoped their
votes would not be publicized found it difficult to counter the adverse publicity.
(The spotters, as it l1appened, were not overly scrupulous in recording members
when they were unsure of the vote-the idea being to evoke just such an angry
response.)
It soon became clear that many members had been stung by such inci-
dents.24 One of them was Gubser, who had earlier been attacked by an oppo-
nent in his district on the basis of misleading spotter information. The Gubser-
O'Neil! amendment had thus evolved just as the DSG-GOP coalition was form-
ing, and it was a natural focus of reform sentiment. O'Neill, a member of the
Rules Committee, first presented his proposal at a final committee session on the
reform bill; it lost by a 6 to 6 tie vote, thus making it necessary to take the issue
to the floor. Meanwhile, DSG's mid-June survey of its own members showed
that this was by far the most popular of all the reform proposals; eventually 182
representatives of both parties cosponsored it.
Republicans found the teller-vote amendment attractive for reasons having
to do with the prerogatives of the minority party. House rules provide that those
opposed to a bill have the right just before final passage to offer a motion to
recommit the bill to committee with or without instructions for revision. A
successful motion to recommit ensures opponents of a chance either to defeat or
to alter the pending measure, and the vote on this motion is often the most
critical vote on a bill during House deliberations. Control of the motion to
recommit rests with the minority party.
In efforts to have votes on matters acted upon in the Committee of the
Whole recorded, liberal Democrats had started to use a maneuver that threatened
to wrest control of the recommit motion from the minority party . On several
occasions liberal strategists had sought to defeat (by roll call) the calling of the
previous question on GOP motions to recommit, announcing that such votes
would permit new recommit motions embodying amendments previously
defeated in Committee of the Whole. Liberals advertised such votes as the
equivalent of substantive votes on the rejected amendments. Sensing that this
tactic threatened their traditional control over the motion to recommit and
faced with substantive it1terpretations of procedural votes, many Republicans
seized upon tl1e notion of recorded teller votes in tl1e Committee of the Wl1ole.
The very fact of Gubser's sponsorship of the teller-vote amendment also
encouraged GOP support. As one Republican leader commented, "When you get
a respected conservative like Cl1arlie Gubser working for a reform like this, then
the boys know that it isn'tjust some scheme by tl1e far-out crowd."
The teller-vote amendment promised to revolutionize legislative pro-
ceedings by stripping the semisecrecy from the most crucial voting on the House
268 Inertia and Change
floor. But other amend ments were impor tant too. One propo sal struck at closed
committee meetings: 43 percent of all hearings and meetings held by House
committees were closed to the public in 1969. The Appro priati ons Committee,
for example, held every one of its 330 meetings that year behin d closed doors. 2 5
Impor tant sessions of such House comm ittees as Ways and Means , Armed Ser-
vices, Judiciary, and Foreig n Affairs were also closed . 26
The ten proposals were chose n from the scores being circul ated because
they were considered to have the broad est appea l and the best chanc e of passage.
Many in the bipartisan group would have gone much farthe r. An attack on the
seniority system was plann ed by Rees, Charles Yanik (D.-O hio), and Henry S.
Reuss (D.-Wis.), who drafte d an amend ment propo sing that a comm ittee chair-
man not be required to be the senior memb er of the comm ittee. Other s also had
seniority amend ments to offer. The DSG-GOP coalit ion avoid ed the seniority
issue because it had no chance of being resolved on the floor and might weaken
efforts to modif y senior ity throug h the party caucuses.
On the Repub lican side of the aisle relate d reform activit ies were taking
place concu rrently with the DSG-Raider negot iation s. A 19-me mber House Re-
publican task force (with Conab le as chairm an and includ ing Steige r) had been set
up by the GOP leadership to frame recom mend ations on the senior ity system.
From its incept ion in March until the Labor Day recess the task force met
weekly in a confer ence room just off the House floor (next door to the room
used by the DSG-Raider group ). From the beginn ing, progre ss on the reform bill
was of conce rn to the task force: Floor action on H.R. 17654 could create a
hostile atmosphere for furthe r reform effort s within the partie s, and seniority
amendments of the Rees-Reuss-V anik type could drasti cally restric t the task
force' s scope. (A more compl ete accou nt of the task force' s activities is pre-
sented in Chapt er 4.)
As plans for the floor challenges evolved, leader s of the coalit ion group
checked with their respective party leaders. Retiri ng Speak er McCo rmack took a
detached but bemus ed stance. " McCo rmack 's real attitu de is that this is none of
his business," one leading Demo crat confid ed. "This is Carl's busine ss." As
Majority Leader and the Speak er's heir appar ent, Alber t tried to placat e both the
reformers and the comm ittee leaders. One DSG leader descri bed Alber t's role:
We met with Carl early in the game as part of our stagin g opera tions.
He was sympa thetic but didn' t comm it himse lf. He's alway s weigh-
ing his positio n against that of the comm ittee chairm en. He know s
that if he wants to be a successful Speak er he has to play ball with
them.
His Republican count erpart , thoug h somew hat more comm itted to reform ,
struck essentially the same pose. One GOP reform er descri bed Ford this way:
269
The remaining top party leaders on both sides remained aloof, and some were
hostile to the reform proposals.
Even though they lacked the Whip and organized communications re-
sources of the DSG, the GOP Raiders worked to sell the proposals on their side
of the aisle. Memorandums from Conable, Steiger, and Dellenback describing the
amendments were sent to all House Republicans. Cosponsors were sought from
within the party's ranks. Raider leaders formally presented their arguments at a
meeting of the House Republican Policy Committee and at a well-attended
Republican Conference (caucus) that stimulated unusual interest. The GOP
reformers were eager that all members be informed about the proposed amend-
ments to prevent opponents from claiming that the amendments had been un-
veiled without adequate notice.
The antisecrecy amendments made an attractive package that immediately
put opponents at a disadvantage. But the DSG-GOP leaders recognized that they
would stand little chance unless a bandwagon for support started rolling. In the
weeks before floor debate on H.R. 17654 the DSG prepared an intensive cam-
paign to publicize the amendments. The lobbying effort, Staff Director Conlon
explained, followed "the classic two-pronged effort" of talking to represen ta-
tives and persuading outside organizations to generate pressure.
A series of three meetings was called to acquaint lobbyists with the reform
bill and the proposed floor amendments. The theory was that many lobby
groups would profit from open sessions and votes. Not all the groups were
interested, but a few were. "We got a big lobby effort going," Conlon said. "But
it is what you would call a 'public interest lobby.' They understand that this bill,
with our revisions, is really going to revolutionize this place." Actually, most of
the help came from such liberal and labor organizations as the AFL-CIO, the
National Education Association (NEA), Americans for Democratic Action, the
National Committee for an Effective Congress, the National Farmers Union, and
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. On July 10 AFL-CIO Legislative
Director (and former representative) Andrew J. Biemiller wrote a letter to legis-
lators saying that "the AFL-CIO urges you to be present on the floor when H.R.
17654 is before the House ... ." Letters on behalf of the antisecrecy provisions
also went out from the National Farmers Union and the NEA.
Even more successful was the coalition's appeal to journalists around the
nation. The antisecrecy theme was selected partly with this appeal in mind. As
one leader of the drive said privately:
270 Inertia and Change
The reform bill reached the House floor on Monda y, July 13, under a rule
that permit ted four hours of general debate , followed by consideration of
amendments under the "five-minute rule"- which permits each membe r to speak
no more than once or for no longer than five minute s on any single propos ed
amendment. The House was to sit as the Comm ittee of the Whole. In presenting
the rule for approval, Chairman Colmer issued a warning to the reformers:
want it, 1 would suggest to them [that] they stay pretty well within
the lines of reason and not try to just revamp the whole Congress
28
and the character of the legislative procedures now in existence.
Other committee leaders echoed this warning. After a day of general debate, the
amending process began, also in the Committee of the Whole.
The proceedings did not start auspiciously for the bipartisan coalition. Its
first major proposal, presented by Representative William D. Hathaway
(D.-Maine) and forty-two cosponsors, was designed to open more committee
sessions to the public. It would have required that a quorum of committee
members conduct an open roll call each day on whether or not that day's
meeting or hearing would be open or closed to the public. The proposal actually
involved two amendments, one covering hearings and another covering com-
mittee mark-up sessions (which are usually closed to the public). Hathaway
asked for and received unanimous consent to have the two amendments con-
sidered together, a move that turned out to be a tactical error. The notion of
open hearings might well have passed, but the thought of open mark-up sessions
horrified many members. 29
The error was not long in revealing itself. Representative Emanuel Celler
(D.-N.Y.), veteran chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, followed debate
on the reform bill from his usual seat in the front row. Then he asked, "Does the
amendment provide for 'hearings' or for 'meetings'?" "Under the unanimous
consent request, I will say to the gentleman, it applies to both," Hathaway
replied. Later Hathaway argued that only lobbyists have access to committee
members when secret meetings are employed. "Now just one minute," inter-
jected peppery Wayne Hays (D.-Ohio). "If you want to write up a bill with a
lobbyist sitting at every Member's elbow, some of you who like to proclaim
yourself as ultra-liberals ... are going to have a rude awakening." 3 0 Represen ta-
tive George Mahon (D.-Tex.), chairman of the prestigious Appropriations Com-
mittee, declared that, if open mark-up sessions were instituted, "the silent
majority will not be there, but the special interests will be well represented."
Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D.-S.C.), chairman of Armed Services,
remarked that many hearings on national-security matters would have to be
closed. He said that the proposed change "is not needed. We get along well
now." A majority of his colleagues seemed to agree, for the Hathaway amend-
ment was defeated by a 102 to 132 teller vote. I
e of am end me nts con sid ere d the re, and the irre spo nsi bil ity of legis-
importanc
sec retl y on suc h que stio ns. " Th e sec rec y of the Co mm itte e of the
lators' voting
id the perils of
Whole has allowed too many Members to duck issues, to avo
sia l vot es, " he con clu ded , "bu t tha t is no t the spi rit of this nation, nor
contro ver
ess ." Th en O'N eill add ed a com me nt sug ges ting wh y som e re ..
of this Congr
me rs had bec om e so int ere ste d in his am end me nt. Re fer rin g to the many
for
eco rde d vot es on cru cia l issu es, he dec lar ed tha t if con stit uen ts had known in
unr
ir rep res ent ativ es had act ual ly vot ed, "I bel iev e we pro bably
the past how the
have passed more
would have had some different results. Probably we would
pieces of legislation."
ple beh ind the am end me nt dre w ver y litt le crit icis m. The pub-
The princi
ty had don e its job , and few me mb ers we re wil ling to go on record in favor of
lici
Mo st of the dis cus sio n wa s dir ect ed at sev era l am end me nts to the
secrecy.
House passed the
amendment (two were accepted and two rejected). Th en the
'Ne il! tell er- vot e pro vis ion by voi ce vot e, wi th "sp ott ers " on duty in
Gubse r-O
the galleries.
rem ain ing eig ht am end me nts pre sen ted by the bip art isa n coalition all
The
voi ce vot es. Per hap s the mo st con tro ver sia l wa s the pro vis ion for
passed, most by
er com mit tee sta ffs for the mi nor ity par ty. Alt hou gh by tha t time the idea
larg
om e a rall yin g cry for Re pub lica ns, it wa s fie rce ly opp ose d by many
had bec
lared, "I have long
Democrats, including mo st com mi tte e cha irm en. As Celler dec
ed tha t the com mi ttee sta ff wo uld ser ve the me mb ers , no t only along ideo-
hop 3 2 He
s of ski lled pro fes sio nal s and cra ftsm en. "
logical lines, but along the line
one-third for the
objected also to the rigid app ort ion me nt of staffs (th at is,
ori ty par ty) . Oth er sen ior De mo cra ts add ed the ir voi ces . Ye t the amendment
min
t to Re pub lica ns and a key sto ne of the bip art isa n ref orm coa lition.
was importan
was heard to com-
As if to underscore the trade involved, a Democratic liberal
ly to a con ser vat ive Re pub lica n as the y mo ved tog eth er through the
ment wry
now wh at are yo u goi ng to do for me ?'' Th e tell er vot e was 1OS
teller line, "A nd
in fav or of the am end me nt- tho ug h the com mi tte e cha inn en did not let
to 63
the matter rest there.
sensus were
The ten amendments on which the reformers had achieved con
the att em pts to mo dif y the bill on the flo or. A tot al of sixty-five
only a few of
end me nts we re act ual ly pre sen ted ; thi rty -six we re acc ept ed and twenty-nine
am
ly the thr eat of def eat for the ent ire bill pre ven ted mo re from being
rejected. On
in traduced.
mo st of the def eat ed pro pos als we re tec hni cal in con ten t a few
Although 'Dante
pre sen tati ves Sch we nge l and
struck at basic issues. One, pre sen ted by Re
wo uld hav e elim ina ted the use of pro xy vot es in com mittee
Fascell (D.-Fl a.),
gs. The pro pos al pas sed the Co mm itte e of the Wh ole bu t wa s defeated on
meetin
bef ore fina l pas sag e of H.R . 176 54. Sev era l am end me nts wo uld
reconsideration
dif ied the sen ior ity sys tem : a Fas cel l pro pos al to per mi t election of a
have mo
for m his duties, a
chairman if the incumbent chairman was unable to per
273
At a time when our institutions are under increasing attack from all
directions for not being responsive, we have passed a bill that will
make this Congress more responsive to its own membership
and ... to the people it serves ... . I am proud to have been part of
this most historic moment. 3 7
The rest of the bill's history was anticlimactic. The Senate promptly sched-
uled the bill for consideration. During debate on October S-6, the floor manager
was Metcalf, who had been a member of the Monroney committee. 3 8 In pre-
senting the bill to his colleagues Metcalf recalled that it had been former Senator
Monroney who had started the history of the law six years earlier. Of the 16
amendments accepted by the Senate, thirteen were presented by Metcalf; all
pertained to the Senate, and most were uncontroversial. One of the five defeated
amendments was Senator Robert Packwood's (R.-Ore.) bid to eliminate the
seniority system, which failed on a 22 to 46 roll-call vote. The final vote on the
bill was 59 to 5 (the opponents were all conservative southern Democrats).
Two days after the Senate had acted, the House accepted the amended bill
and sent it to the President. The leading Washington newspaper marked the
event with only a two-inch story.
\vhich had seldom been overturned on the floor , were soon being challenged in
the glare of national publicity. On March 30, for example, during discussion of
Sidney Yates (D.-Ill. proposed amendment to delete funds for the supersonic
transport from the Department of Transportation appropriation, Yates called
out, ~ r. Chairman, I demand tellers with clerk." Tellers were ordered, and for
the next twelve minutes members streamed onto the floor, picked up and signed
green or red cards (signifying 'aye" or "nay" on the amendment), and walked
past the tellers to deposit the cards in ballot boxes on either side of the chamber.
\Vhen the cards \vere counted, the House had voted 217 to 204 to reverse seven
years support of federal fmancing of the SST.
Political commentators were quick to credit the recorded teller vote. As
veteran reporter . . orman C. Miller put it, the recorded vote substantially
weakens perhaps the most effective carrot-and-stick power the committees
hold.' The rules change will, he said,
force more meaningful votes in the House on issues that the _!em-
bers, as a whole, have heretofore tended to let the committees
decide. And the committees, for the most part, tend to be advocates
for the interests whose bills they handle; any diminution of their
influence thus should tend to reduce the influence of special
interests. 4 1
Of course the precise impact of the innovation may change as time goes on, and
other devices like more frequent imposition of closed rules, may soften the
effect of recorded teller votes~ But it seems fair to conclude that ''the refonn
makes the House a far more open political arena than it had been ... 4 2 And
that fact alone , as students of politics know, can serve to alter the power struc-
ture of an institution.
The recorded teller vote illustrates a central truth about the politics of
reform. The proposal was widely accepted as a limited remedy for a problem
that many members had faced in bringing amendments to the floor. Its capacity
for altering fundamental power relationships was largely overlooked by the
277
The t:nate dt:batc on . Con. R ' '. _can be found in U. S., Congres • Senate, Congressionol
Record. daily ed .• 9th ng.. 1st scss .• -9 Mar h 1965. pp. 4 __ 3-4429 .
ngn: ,'s, Joint C n1n1ittcc on the Organizati n of the C ngre~ ' . Organizatio1l of
. 89th ong .... d scs~ . . 1966. . Rl~pt. 1414. lthough the c n1n1ittcc 's rcl tnnlen-
cre unanin1 us. th' House Rl:public.ln ddcgah:s tiled supplcn1cntal vie\ ~ urging.
thcr things. n1in rit -part c ntr 1 f ne in estigati c c mnrittec \Vhen a :ingl
ntrolh:d b th h us~s f ngrc ..·s and tht: pre 'tdCtll:y . curtailn1cnt f 1 bbying by
__,.__,utiv branch. discl sure f a,·sets and inc n1c by nlctnbers. and pr vision: relating t
n ing of political can1paigns .
·n .. • his appointnll'nt b _ pl'akt:r Nil"h las c ng\V\)rth {R.- hil) in l "chl r ha,
rk d lo all ' for l"~\l'h sUl' 't: t:ding p~akl·r as ~Ul adviser c.: n. nnd intcrpr~tt:r f.. tl1c H u~·c
rul . I~ ·ntil·c 8{ UShl'f. "Thl" Speakl'r's ~lan : l'\Vis n~schler. ll \1St: P.~rli..Hn~nt ..lri~ln."
Jtla hington I< 11th/y. ( pril l 70). pp. ----7.
27 s Inerti a and Change
13 Quoted in Miller.
14 Other members were John Young (D ...Tex.) and Delbert Latta (R.-Ohio).
17 By the time that general debate (the stage of consideration of legislation before action on
amendments in the Committee of the Whole) had ended, more than 200 amendments had
been drafted. By their sheer number they threatened to prolong consideration to the point
at which the bill could not be acted upon.
18 A description of these events was written by Andrew J . Glass, National Journal (July 25,
1970), pp. 1607-1614.
19 These informal groups are explained in greater detail in Charles L. Oapp, The Congress-
man: His Job as He Sees It (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1963), pp. 36-45 ; and Miller,
" Chowder and Marching Society Does More than Eat and Strut," Wall Street Journal, March
4 , 1971 , p. 1.
20 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record 85th Cong., 1st sess., 30 January 1957,
103, 1324-1326. '
2
3 The work of MCPL is described in Congressional Quarterly, July 31, 1970, PP·
1952-1956 .
279
24 Representative Steiger (see Chapter 2) found himself incorrectly recorded on five of six
vote upplicd by spotters for the Milwaukee papers.
28 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91 st Cong., 2d sess., 23 July
1970, p. H6598.
29 At the time of the debate only one congressional committee-the House Committee on
Education and Labor- opened its mark-up sessions (and verbatim transcripts of them) to the
public. The committee had long been a liberal-conservative battleground, with jurisdiction
over many of the more controversial domestic issues. Attending the sessions or even reading
the transcripts is an eye-opening experience.
31 UoS., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 27 July
1970, p. H7155.
32 Debate on this amendment, which was introduced by Frank J. Thompson (D.-N.J.), can
be found in U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
15-16 July 1970, pp. H6750-6756, H6845-6854.
33 Debate on the Rees--Reuss-Vanik proposal can be found in U.S., Congress, House, Con-
gressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 27-28 July 1970, pp. H7189-7193,
H7251-7252.
37 U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st Cong., 2d sess., 17 Septem-
ber 1970, p. H8893.
38 For Senate debate see U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, daily ed., 91st
Cong., 2d sess., 5-6 October 1970, pp. S17122-17138, S17141-17182.
39 For a discussion of the politics of reform, see Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock,
and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), esp. chap. 3.
280 Iner tia and Change
in U s Co
40 The lively e change of views on this poin t can be foun d · ., ngress a
1, PP H ' ouse,
Congressional Record, daily ed., 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 22 Janu ary 197
also Richard L. Lyons, "Ho use Opens with Squ abb le Ove r Spo ils," Wash ingt ~n ~ 8
-70. See
ost, Janu..
ary 22, 1971, p. A-7.
41 Miller, "Ho use Refo rm Begins to Tak e Hol d," Wall Stre et Jour
nal, April 2, 1971
'p. 8.
Mar ch 23 19?
42 David S. Broder, "SS T: Hill Refo rm Vic tim, " Washington Post, ' 1,p.A-19
•
D.- .
r p~ cee i o and called a 'p e ·o ' lle · o- .,.
ti n, then the main m tion took ano ther half ho r . B./ this time he Ho
c n umed ne h ur and thirty--eight min utes hn saris".. ing e e _on e th
qu' r m wa pre ent .
Rayburn then moved to dispense with reading of the joum al-n orm all_ a
-ed
r utine mean of facilitating business. On that afte rnoo n: ho Iever: Da ·s insis
for
c n a fulJ reading. embers were heard to groan audibly as the)' disappe ared
lunch. J·our minutes later Davis, noting that the chamber was empt)'ing made a
a
point f no quorum. Twenty-two minutes were required to reassemble
qu rum, after which the round robin of roll calls began again. Three roll calls
en
were completed. (Jp to that poin t the House had spen t three hours and flite
minutes on quorum caiJs.
The clerk resumed the reading of the jour nal while members drifted awa)
s
once more. Twenty minutes later Williams look ed arou nd at the empty chm
and raised a point of no quorum. And so it wen t for mos t of the afternoon.
In the end Davis and Williams rele nted and allowed the House to consider
the
the bilL After the journal had been approved Ray bur n ordered the call of
committees under the Calendar Wednesday procedure. When the clerk reached
for
Banking and Currency, Chairman Brent Spence (D.-Ky.) called up S. 722
de-
c< nsidcration. Minority Leader Halleck called for a test vote on the bill,
Jnanding a roll call on whether or not the House wan ted to consider it.
The
-
motion carried comfortably, 221 to 171 . With this vote the House was auto
tnatically transformed into a Committee of the Whole. This relatively informal
procedure has the effect of easing the fight against dila tory tactics, for only 100
me1nbcrs arc required for a quo rum , and time-consuming roll calls are pro-
se
hibited. When substantive debate finally com men ced at 5:08 P.M ., the Hou
had consun1cd ahnost four and a half hou rs in calling the roll twelve times.
Only two hours were devoted to general deb ate , but even then dilatory
tactics were etnployed by the bill's opp one nts. When Chairman Spence offered
the
an an1endtncnt to substitute a committee-approved $25 1 million measure for
nate's $389.5 nlillion bill (S. 722 ), Congressman James Haley (0.-Fla.) forc ed
ive
a thirty-nlinutc reading of tl1e thirty-two page sub stitu te. When Representat
Willian1 Widnall (R.-N.J .) offered tl1e adm inis trati on's $53 million version, it too
had t~ be r ad verbatin1. Tl1e com mitt ee sub stitu te was accepted , but the Wid-
nan v r i n was rejected by a standing vote of 77 to 152.
A tl1 delib rations proceeded, Halleck and his southern allies close
ly