The Quantitative Restriction of Mimesis in Plato-S Republic

Parnassos Press – Fonte Aretusa
Chapter Title: The Quantitative Restriction of Mimēsis in Plato’s Republic

Chapter Author(s): Guilherme Domingues da Motta
Book Title: The Many Faces of Mimesis

Book Subtitle: Selected Essays from the 2017 Symposium on the Hellenic Heritage of
Western Greece
Book Editor(s): Heather L. Reid, Jeremy C. DeLong
Published by: Parnassos Press – Fonte Aretusa. (2018)
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Guilherme Domingues da Motta1
The Quantitative Restriction of Mimēsis in Plato’s Republic2
While the educational program proposed in the Republic follows

traditional models by including both mousikē and gymnastikē, Socrates
advocates for various changes as well. Among these changes are a
series of restrictions concerning poetry—in terms of content and style—
in order to ensure the guardians inculcate in their souls that which is
noble and beautiful. When it comes to the restrictions concerning style,
much scholarly attention has been paid to how restricting imitative
content to noble psychological and emotional models can help citizens
attain virtue, and also to the fact that mimēsis involves a great deal of
emotional engagement.3 However, there has been relatively little
consideration of why Socrates claims it is also necessary to restrict the
quantity of noble mimēsis.
I will argue that the restriction on mimetic quantity is intended as
an important independent addendum to the limitations Socrates
imposes upon poetic mimēsis. However, the reason for limiting in
quantity even the noble kind of mimēsis—which is useful in the initial
stages of education—only becomes clear later in the Republic, with the
presentation of the natural qualities of the prospective philosophers. It
will turn out that in order for some of these natural philosophical
qualities to be properly and fully developed, they must initially be
carefully preserved as potentialities, to be directed otherwise later on.
In particular, a certain availability of dianoia must be preserved at all
costs. Before this can be explicated, however, some further preliminary
considerations of the Republic’s restriction on poetry are necessary.
Education in Republic takes place in two stages. The first consists of
mousikē and gymnastikē, and aims fundamentally to mold the character
of the young citizens, as well as to promote their physical excellence.4
The second stage consists of a lengthy training in mathematics and
dialectic, and is intended only for those who, after years of observation,
are considered fit to receive it, as a means of training them to eventually
become philosopher-rulers.5
Although this first stage follows the traditional educational
distinctions between mousikē and gymnastikē, a series of severe
restrictions is placed upon traditional poetry (mousikē), both in terms of
content and style. The content restrictions can be summarized by the
49
following rules: exemplary beings—gods and heroes—cannot be
portrayed as uttering words or performing acts unworthy of their
nature; moreover, it is unacceptable to say that the gods are the cause of
the evils that afflict us, or that Hades is a terrible place.6 The reason is
that this first stage of eductation is directed to people from their earliest
childhood, an age in which such provisions are considered to be
decisive in molding their character and beliefs according to those an
adult must have.7 The style restrictions involve allowing only poetry
that imitates noble behaviour, and only does so rarely. The need for the
“rare” restriction on noble imitation is the focus of this paper, and
requires closer analysis of Socrates’s reasoning for it.
After establishing that there are three main styles used by poets—
simple narration, pure imitation (mimēsis), and a “mixed” style which
uses both—Socrates considers which style should be accepted in the
city.8 However, this depends upon first answering a more fundamental
question: namely, whether or not the guardians, whose education is the
main goal of all paideia, should use imitation at all.9 If the purpose of
education is to shape the character of the young so that they come to
harbor in their souls only that which is noble and beautiful, imitation is
a powerful means to attain that goal, for such imitation involves
substantial psychological and emotional engagement, which can help
cement what is imitated into one’s character. Plato’s central concern
with the psychological and emotional effects upon the person who
imitates is revealed when Socrates asks: “Or have you not observed that
imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits
and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and the thought
[dianoian]?” (395d).10
Since one of the purposes of the initial phase of education is for the
young to incorporate certain values in the most permanent way
possible, it is thus understandable that Socrates claims the city should
adopt a “mixed” poetic style, which utilizes both imitation and simple
narration.11 However, since nothing would prevent the soul from
similarly adopting ignoble habits, were things of a low and vile nature
imitated, the only admissible stricto sensu imitation is that which
imitates the good and the noble—to the exclusion of that which imitates
indiscriminately.12 Socrates makes this explicit when he declares: “but
things unbecoming the free man they should neither be clever at
50
imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they
imbibe the reality” (395c-d).13
So far, Socrates has accepted that the poetic style the city (and the
moderate man) should adopt is one which allows both mimēsis and
simple narration: i.e. the one corresponding to the epic style of Homer.
He adds, however, that while mimēsis will be allowed, even in an
extended discourse, it should rarely be employed:
Then the narrative that he will employ will be the kind that we
just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction
will be one that partakes of both, of imitation and simple
narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a
long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say? (396e)14
Perhaps the reason scholars have not paid much attention to this
restriction on the quantity of mimēsis is that it seems to be a mere
consequence of all other limitations imposed on poetic style. There is no
doubt that the restrictions on what can lawfully be imitated—noble
imitations only—would entail major modifications in a work like the
Iliad, which would result in substantially decreasing the overall
quantity of mimēsis from that poetic work. Yet, there are reasons to
think that this explicit limitation in the quantity of mimēsis serves a
more important, independent role in the Republic’s educational model.
If there is one certain effect of mimēsis—including the
pedagogically useful sort—it is how it engages with, or redirects,
dianoia. Socrates makes this clear in discussing the first educational
stage, when commenting on an excerpt from Homer as an example of
simple, non-imitative narrative: “[...] the poet himself is the speaker and
does not even attempt to redirect [trepein] our mind [dianoian] to make
us believe that anyone but himself is speaking” (393a).15 The redirection
of the mind indicated here seems to be concerned with the avoidance of
deception by mimēsis. But Plato´s conception of the conection between
mimēsis and dianoia will develop to have further consequences. When
one considers the deep emotional engagement that also accompanies
mimēsis, this mimetic channeling of dianoia implies far more. Rather
than dianoia being merely channeled towards some false belief, its
operation becomes closely linked with strong emotions.
As will be shown below, this has the effect of compromising its
capacities, particularly in terms of engaging in the sort of studies
required in the second educational stage. In fact, such channeling of
51
dianoia towards imitative models, in conjunction with the deep
emotional ties that accompany such channeling, seems to be the main
reason for the quantitative restriction of mimēsis. For, even if the
imitation is noble, and even if one only takes pleasure in the imitation
of appropriate models, too much association between the operation of
the dianoia and emotions can end up compromising its ability to engage
in the studies required in the second state of education—the one
concerned with mathematics and dialectics. While only a few will
undergo this later educational state, it is of paramount importance at
that the early stage to avoid tying the operation of dianoia too strongly
with emotions, in order to allow for their dianoia to achieve the goals of
the second stage.
That imitation has such a deleterious effect upon the capacities of
dianoia is more clearly evident in Socrates’s even harsher treatment of
mimetic poetry at the beginning of Book X. Convinced that his stance
on mimetic poetry—understood to be that which imitates everything,
without restriction—is the right one, Socrates reaffirms that he and his
interlocutors were correct in their previous decision concerning poetry:
“[...] in refusing to admit at all so much of it as is imitative; for that it is
certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now
that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul” (595a-b).16 In
response to Glaucon’s question about the meaning of these words, he
answers:
Why, between ourselves — for you will not betray me to the
tragic poets and all other imitators [mimetikous]— that kind of
art seems to be a corruption [lobe] of the mind [dianoias] of all
listeners who do not possess as an antidote a knowledge of its
real nature. (595b)17
That these conclusions stem in part from Socrates’s conception of the
tripartite soul is explicitly noted. However, I propose that they are also
grounded in the recognition of how important it is that the dianoia of
prospective philosophers not be overly linked to the emotional aspects
of mimēsis. To defend this thesis, it is necessary to turn to the passages
of the Republic that deal with the natural qualities of prospective
philosophers.
Among the qualities that true philosophers must possess, Socrates
first emphasizes the importance of having a dianoia capable of
discerning and loving the nature of that which is beautiful in-itself:
52
“The lovers of sounds and sights, I said, delight in beautiful tones and
colors and all that art fashions out of these, but their thought [dianoia] is
incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the
beautiful in itself” (476b).18 He goes on to further describe the proper
qualities of objects upon which the philosopher’s dianoia should be
invested: “Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur
[dianoia(i) megaloprepeia] and the contemplation of all time and all
existence can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?” (486a),19
and, “Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind
[dianoian] endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition
will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal reality in all things”
(486d-e).20 At greater length, he replies to Adeimantus thusly:
For surely…the man whose mind [dianoian] is truly fixed on
eternal realities has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon
the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to
be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the
things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that
they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all
abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavour to imitate
them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness
and assimilate himself to them. Or do you think it possible not
to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with
admiration? (500b-c)21
These are just a few of the numerous passages in which dianoia/reason
is related by Plato to the faculty with which intelli-gible objects can be
apprehended and become known.22
One other famous passage worth mentioning is, of course, from the
Divided Line, wherin Plato establishes a more technical meaning for
dianoia than the broad sense that has been adopted in this paper so far—
i.e., that of “thought.” In the Divided Line, the meaning of dianoia is that
of a deductive or discursive thought, which occupies an intermediate
position between opinion and nous. Not only is this one of the
possibilities for dianoia to engage in, it is precisely the type of thought
that one is required to engage in during the second stage of education.
However, the problem lies exactly in the fact that dianoia also has the
broader and unqualified meaning—that of “thought” or a “capacity for
thinking”—which can be diverted from mathematics and dialectic (or,
53
for that matter, even from true opinion and “technical” knowledge), as
in the case of the members of the two other classes in the city.23
Plato’s understanding seems to be that mimēsis—or at least the
emotions it elicits—plays a major role in compromising dianoia, and is a
threat to the higher goals that, otherwise, could be attained through it.
At the root of this risk is the pleasure entailed in the experience of the
emotions awakened by mimetic poetry, an issue which is discussed
more fully in Book X, where Socrates argues that the “section of dianoia”
(603c)24 that coexists with mimetic poetry is its worst, irrational part.25
It might be argued that any discussion of the worst part of the soul,
a part which finds satisfaction in the varied emotions elicited by
mimetic poetry, cannot in fact refer to the rational element of the soul
where dianoia should have its seat. However, if it is accepted that dianoia
can be understood in the broad sense—i.e. the general faculty of
thinking (not only rational thought or reasoning)—it does appear to
make sense that there should be concern about the possibility that the
excessive experience of emotions from an early age might divert, drain,
and/or ultimately compromise the same dianoia required later for higher
studies.
There is a clear cognitive element involved in emotional
experiences: these have to be contents of conscious thinking, thoughts
that can become sources of pleasure. The reference to the section of
dianoia that coexists with these effects can be understood as a reference
to its capacity of being occupied with the pleasures arising from the
irrational elements of the soul. Dianoia, therefore, can be diverted to the
experience of emotions and its pleasures. On this point, the argument
made by Socrates in a famous passage of the Republic is quite
enlightening: “But, again, I am surely aware that when in a man the
desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other
things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel”
(485d).26 Socrates then adds: “So, when a man’s desires have been
taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they
will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself,
and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if
the man is a true and not a sham philosopher” (485d-e).27
As shown by Charles Kahn,28 a good understanding of that passage
requires it to be read along with the statement that there are three types
of pleasures (hedonai) and desires (epithymiai) associated with each of
54
the three elements of the soul.29 Kahn regards this as fundamental for
understanding the meaning of the claim that desires can be diverted
towards different objects. 30 The desire of the logistikon element of the
soul, which he calls “rational desire,” has a specific object; namely, the
good, as perceived by reason. For Kahn,31 the passage on the
channelling of desires32 would be better interpreted as referring only to
the rational desire.33
If the rational element of the soul, the seat of dianoia, has its own
object of desire—i.e. what is good—and if emotional experiences such
as those triggered by mimēsis and experienced as pleasurable and good
come to be taken as of great value in the hierarchy of values admitted
by reason, then they can monopolize or at least diminish the degree of
availability of dianoia that is required for the purposes of higher
education; for dianoia will be attracted and diverted to the pleasurable
experience of emotions. Recognizing this can help explain why
Socrates presents such a lengthy justification for the exclusion of
mimetic poetry from the city in Book X.34 Mimēsis stimulates and fosters
the irrational element of the soul. By strengthening the irrational part,
the rational part tends to be compromised, thereby frustrating the
educational program.35
The greatest risk mimēsis presents to the rational element of the soul
lies in dianoia’s plasticity—i.e., the fact that it may be occupied by and
concerned with very different kinds of contents. This risk is already
suggested in Book III, and is further explicated throughout many later
passages of the Republic.36 Consider, for instance, Socrates’s
consideration of how the soul can be drawn in various directions:
“Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and
would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind [philosophou
dianoias], directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned
earthward” (527b).37 Another paradigmatic passage of the Republic that
illustrates dianoia’s plasticity arises when Socrates describes the
transition from the oligarchic to the democratic man. After blaming a
failure of education for the outpouring from that man of numerous
potent desires, he says of those desires:
And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel of the young
man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and
honourable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best
55
watchmen and guardians in the minds [dianoiais] of men who
are dear to the gods (560b).38
Dianoia is a highly plastic element. It can be directed to objects as
different as science, true beliefs and unnecessary desires. Dwelling in
the rational element, which desires the good, it can easily be dragged
away by things that are experienced as pleasurable or good even when
its sources are the irrational elements of the soul.
Given the importance of dianoia for study and for achieving the
goals of higher education, preserving dianoia from any deviation,
especially in a city that must be governed by philosophers, is a task that
justifies the mobilization of all possible means. In order for there to be
sufficient capacity of dianoia for the tasks pertaining to higher
education, it is necessary for potential philosophers to be cared for from
childhood, so that their dianoia will not be harmed or diverted. In that
sense, the education through poetry proposed for children and young
people in the city needs to be considered not only as aiming at instilling
values and moulding the character, it must also be taken as aiming at
preserving the dianoia of prospective philosophers.
Therefore, the challenge of educating a philosopher in the city goes
far beyond finding people that possess, by their nature, the qualities
necessary for higher education. The challenge in fact begins much
earlier, and concerns the preservation of these natural qualities, so that,
at the proper time, they can be mobilized in order achieve the greatest
feats possible. That’s why mimēsis must be limited in quantity from an
early age, even in its more useful form, for education.
1
Guilherme Domingues da Motta is Professor (tenure-track) at Universidade
Católica de Petrópolis (UCP) and Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio
de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). His research focuses on Plato and the Platonic
conception of education. Representative publications include: “A
comunidade de bens, mulheres e filhos: uma leitura sobre a natureza e o
alcance da utopia na República, de Platão,” Studia Philologica Valentina 16
(2014): 113-140; “A figura de Sócrates como amante e guia nos Diálogos de
Platão,” Cosmópolis: mobilidades culturais às origens do pensamento antigo, eds.
Gabriele Cornelli, Maria do Céu Fialho and Delfim Leão (Coimbra:
Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2016), 47-64. E-mail:
gmotta427@gmail.com.
56
2 The main thesis presented here was previously presented in another text,
published in Portuguese, which aimed at defending that Plato´s dialogues
are not mimetic strictu senso. See: Guilherme Domingues da Motta, “O
Suposto Estilo Imitativo dos Diálogos Platônicos: uma falsa aporia, Filosofia
Antiga: Coleção ANPOF XVII Encontro, eds. Gisele Amaral, Lucas Angioni,
Adriano Correa, Maria Aparecida Montenegro, Noeli Dutra Rossato and
Dennys Xavier (São Paulo: ANPOF, 2017), 189-203. I would like to
acknowledge the editors, Heather Reid and Jeremy DeLong, for all the
support given; especially to Jeremy DeLong, for the thorough reading and
review of the English text, and for his comments and contributions, which
greatly improved the text.
3
On this aspect of mimēsis, see: Giovanni R. F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry,” in
The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism – Classical Criticism (vol I), ed.
George A. Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 92-
148; Eric A. Havelock, Prefácio a Platão, trans. Enid Abreu Dobránzsky
(Campinas: Papirus, 1996); Penelope Murray, Plato on poetry – Ion, Republic
376e - 398b9, Republic 595 - 608b10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996); and Christopher Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s critique of the
arts (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1995).
4
Plato, Republic, trad. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1969), 376d-412b. For the Greek text, I use John Burnet’s edition: Plato,
Platonis Opera: recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Joannes Burnet,
ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903).
5
Plato, Republic, 521a-535a.
6
Plato, Republic, 377d-392d.
7
Plato, Republic, 377a-b.
8
Plato, Republic, 392c-d.
9
Plato, Republic, 394d-e.
10
“ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη
τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν
διάνοιαν;” (Plato, Republic, 395d). In his lexicon of Greek philosophical
terms, Francis E. Peters, in accordance with the definition that appears in
the “divided line” passage, defines dianoia as a kind of intermediary
cognition between doxa and noesis. In his entry for noesis, Peters also
mentions that dianoia is, alongside noesis, another operation affected by the
logistikon part of the soul. When it comes to the relation between those
terms, Peters also distinguishes between two lines of interpretation: one
which sees dianoia as an activity of the spirit whose object is the
“mathematical” beings, whereas noesis has as its object the Ideas, and
another which understands dianoia as discursive rationality in general and
57
noesis as immediate intellectual intuition. Francis E. Peters, Termos Filosóficos
Gregos, trans. Beatriz Rodrigues Barbosa (Lisboa: Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian, 1977), 52-53 and 150-151. In Edouard Dès Places variously
defines dianoia as: (1) an act of the discursive faculty, (2) a faculty
(understanding), (3) discourse (as opposed to opinion or intuition). Another
meaning distinguished by Dès Places is that of thought and intention or
project. Edouard Dès Places, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique et Religieuse
de Platon (Paris: Les Belles Letres, 1964). The meaning of dianoia I shall
adopt in this paper is that of “thought”—the most accommodating of all the
definitions, but also, as I think Plato’s text allows, as “faculty of thinking,”
which includes all kinds of thinking, not only rational thinking.
11
See Plato, Republic, 395b-396e.
12
One should note that Socrates admits “degrees” of psychological
engagement when one imitates. It’s only admissible to imitate in earnest –
spoude(i) – i.e., with real psychological engagement, the good man speaking
or acting qua good man (Republic, 396c-e).
13
“[...] τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ
ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ
εἶναιἀπολαύσωσιν” (Plato, Republic, 395c-d).
14
“οὐκοῦν διηγήσει χρήσεται οἵᾳ ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ
τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων,
μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ
λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως; ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;” (Plato, Republic, 396e).
15
Shorey’s translation with some modifications. “λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ
οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων
ἢ αὐτός·” (Plato, Republic, 393a).
16
“τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ
παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ
χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη” (Plato, Republic, 595a-b). The
fact that Socrates states here that it was right to reject mimetic poetry does
not contradict what was said in Book III (396e, where it is established that
the guardians will use the form of elocution that contains simple narration
and mimēsis), for, as Elizabeth Belfiore has shown, Plato here uses the word
mimetike—a technical term created ad hoc by Plato—to designate a person
who imitates everything without restriction. The same term is used to in
book III (in 394e1, 395a2) to refer to the type of poetry that will not be
accepted in the city, the preference instead being for the type that employs
both simple narration and mimēsis only of the good man. This accepted
form of narration is designated “the unmixed form” (397d) because it
imitates only that which is proper for the good man, and not because it
58
excludes mimēsis. On that point, see: Elizabeth Belfiore, “A Theory of
Imitation in Plato’s Republic,” Transactions of the American Philological
Association 114 (1984): 126-127; Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry,” 114-115.
17
“ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι — οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς
τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς — λώβη
ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ
ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα” (Plato, Republic,
595b).
18
“οἱ μέν που, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς
ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων
δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν
φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι” (Plato, Republic, 476b).
19
“ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου,
πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον
βίον;” (Plato, Republic, 486a).
20
“ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν
ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει” (Plato,
Republic, 486d-e).
21 “οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν
διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ

μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς
τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους
οὔτ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ᾽ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ
κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.
ἢ οἴει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι
ἐκεῖνο;” (Plato, Republic, 500b-c).
22
Plato, Republic, 523b; 529d; 532a-b; 533a-b.
23
One must suppose that the classes of auxiliary guardians and producers are
composed of men and women that also have a rational element of the soul.
Its contents are not science or philosophy, but opinions and, in the case of
the producers, “technical” knowledge as well.
24
“τῆς διανοίας τοῦτο” (Plato, Republic, 603c).
25
See Plato, Republic, 603b-607b.
26
“ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι
εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον”
(Plato, Republic, 485d).
27
“ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς
ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος
ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ᾽ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη” (Plato,
Republic, 485d-e).
59
28 Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary
Form (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 276.
29
See Plato, Republic, 580d.
30
Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 278-279.
31
Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 279-280.
32
See Plato, Republic, 485d.
33 On this, see: Guilherme Domingues da Motta, “Philosophical Eros: “A
Twofold Desire in Plato´s Dialogues,” Educação e Filosofia (v. 30 n. 60.)

(Uberlândia: EDUFU, 2016), 905-916.
34
Understood as that which imitates everything indiscriminately. See n. 16
above.
35
See Plato, Republic, 603b-607d.
36
See Plato, Republic, 395c-d; 396d-e.
37
“ὁλκὸν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἴη ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν
φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἃ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν”
(Plato, Republic, 527b).
38
“τελευτῶσαι δὴ οἶμαι κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν,
αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων
ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι
διανοίαις” (Plato, Republic, 560b).
60

The Quantitative Restriction of Mimesis in Plato-S Republic

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Chapter Title: The Quantitative Restriction of Mimēsis in Plato’s Republic

Book Title: The Many Faces of Mimesis

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-

While the educational program proposed in the Republic follows

διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ

Twofold Desire in Plato´s Dialogues,” Educação e Filosofia (v. 30 n. 60.)

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