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V. Petrov/A. Scarfe (eds.) 2015, Dynamic Being, Cambridge Scholars, 2-‐28.
Aristotle’s
‘completeness
test’
as
heuristics
for
an
account
of
dynamicity
Johanna
Seibt
Aarhus
University
Abstract:
If
being
were
‘dynamic,’
would
it
be
more
amenable
to
a
definition?
In
this
paper
I
present
a
number
of
preliminary
considerations
for
an
exploration
of
this
question.
Working
from
the
methodological
stance
of
analytical
ontology,
I
assume
that
the
first
task
for
an
ontology
of
dynamic
being(s)
must
be
to
locate
suitable
linguistic
data
that
can
represent
the
conceptual
content
to
be
modelled
by
an
ontological
domain
theory.
I
try
to
show
that
Aristotle’s
so-‐called
‘completeness
test’
in
Metaphysics
Θ.
6,
and
the
discussion
of
this
passage
in
Aristotle
scholarship,
offers
some
useful
heuristic
leads
to
a
class
of
inferential
data
(aspectual
inferences)
that
analytical
ontologists
have
all
but
overlooked
so
far.
In
addition,
I
suggest
that
the
passage
also
can
offer
some
ideas
about
how
one
might
formulate,
in
mereological
terms,
a
component
of
an
implicit
definition
of
dynamicity.
The
study
of
dynamic
being
or
‘dynamicity’
is
an
unlikely
task
for
a
present-‐day
analytical
ontologist.
Other
modes
of
being,
such
as
actuality,
possibility,
and
necessity,
have
been
dominating
the
discussion
during
the
early
decades
of
post-‐
war
analytical
ontology,
together
with
a
focus
on
the
ontological
reduction
of
universals;
even
during
the
last
three
decades,
when
the
spotlight
finally
turned
onto
the
category
of
events,
the
problem
of
existence
in
time,
and
the
ontology
of
emergence,
the
investigation
of
the
nature
of
dynamic
being
remained
outside
the
purview
of
the
mainstream
debate.
With
the
exception
of
work
on
verbal
aspects,
it
seems
fair
to
say
that
analytical
ontology
so
far
has
been
strikingly
disinterested
in
the
exploration
of
dynamicity
and
the
forms
of
dynamic
being.
How
should
one
interpret
this
startling
neglect?
Is
this
another
instance
of
the
“Werdensvergessenheit”
that
Nietzsche
castigated
as
the
distinctive
mindset
of
Western
metaphysics?1
And
if
so,
is
it
a
purely
sociological
phenomenon,
a
case
of
theoretical
habituation
that
is
reinforced
and
propagated
by
the
review
system
for
professional
publications
that
gained
such
weight
in
20th
century
analytical
philosophy
in
general?
Or
is
it
rather,
as
Bergson
would
have
us
explain,
the
inevitable
outcome
of
using
the
wrong
investigative
1
Cf.
Nietzsche
(1882/1974),
306.
1
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
instruments,
namely,
theories
that
rely
on
conceptual
cognition
and
codified
meaning?2
In
my
view,
the
reasons
for
the
neglect
of
the
category
of
processes
and
the
dynamic
mode
of
being
lie
in
a
combination
of
sociological
and
conceptual
factors.
As
I
have
argued
elsewhere,
analytical
philosophy
may
have
shed
the
“myth
of
the
museum”
(Quine)
and
the
“myth
of
the
given”
(Sellars)
but
it
still
trades
the
“myth
of
substance,”
a
set
of
about
twenty
traditional
presuppositions
about
the
features
of
basic
categories
or
types
of
beings.3
While
these
presuppositions
block
the
introduction
of
the
conceptual
tools
needed
for
a
theory
of
dynamicity
and
dynamic
entities,
they
are,
as
I
have
tried
to
show,
by
no
means
‘laws
of
thought’
or
constitutive
elements
of
conceptualization.
Equally
important,
in
my
view,
is
the
insight
that
the
neglect
of
dynamic
entities
and
the
notion
of
dynamicity
is
not
due
to
the
methodological
approach
that
has
become
characteristic
for
analytical
ontology,
in
particular
the
use
of
formal
languages
for
the
description
of
ontological
domains,
or
the
use
of
quantifier
logic
for
the
analysis
of
ontological
commitments.
While
the
presuppositions
of
the
“myth
of
substance”
have
strongly
influenced
our
informal
interpretations
and
axiomatizations
of
formal
tools,
there
are
no
principled
obstacles
against
analytical
process
ontology
in
the
sense
of
a
formal
theory
of
dynamicity
and
dynamic
entities.4
My
aim
in
this
paper
is
to
present
some
preliminary
and
heuristic
consideration
for
a
formal
account
of
the
notion
of
dynamicity.
Process
philosophers
of
all
stripes
share
the
belief
that
being
is
a
fundamentally
dynamic
affair,
but
the
sense
of
the
epithet
is
mostly
left
in
the
space
of
the
metaphorical.
Some
process
philosophers
hold
that
the
notion
of
dynamicity
cannot
be
defined
or
even
conceptualized.
The
considerations
that
underlie
this
position—I
call
it
the
‘ineffability
position’—surely
must
be
taken
into
account
by
any
attempt
to
situate
the
notion
of
‘dynamicity,’
‘dynamic
Being,’
or
‘dynamic’
(as
predicate
for
types
of
beings)
within
a
theory.
In
the
following
I
will
address
the
ineffability
2
Cf.
Bergson
2002
(The
Idea
of
Duration).
3
Cf.
Seibt
1990,
1995,
1997,
2005,
2008,
2010.
4
For
arguments
in
favor
of
a
pluralist
reading
of
the
existential
quantifier
see
e.g.,
Turner
(2012).
For
sketches
of
a
process
ontology
that
uses
a
non-‐standard
mereology
as
domain
theory
see
Seibt
1990,
2002,
2004,
2005,
2008,
and
2009.
2
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
concerns
only
obliquely,
however,
by
exploring
the
first
steps
of
a
possible
strategy
for
an
implicit
definition
of
dynamicity.
Since
the
study
of
dynamicity
and
its
forms
is
a
new
task
in
ontology,
it
is
important
to
distinguish
from
the
outset
a
number
of
different
subtasks.
These
tasks—and
other
tasks
one
might
want
to
add
to
the
list—are
multiply
related,
of
course,
but
they
are
conceptually
separable
and
much
dialectical
headway
can
be
made,
I
think,
if
we
consider
them
as
modules
of
a
larger
investigation.
First,
and
this
is
surely
the
most
significant
distinction,
we
need
to
keep
ontological
and
metaphysical
investigations
apart.
It
is
a
striking—though
little
observed
fact—that
during
the
early
phase
of
20th
century
analytical
ontology,
until
the
1960’s,
ontologists
were
adamant
to
distinguish
ontology
and
metaphysics,
while
nowadays
the
terms
are
used
almost
interchangeably.5
But
the
ontological
project
of
devising
a
‘domain
theory,’
a
rational
reconstruction
of
the
inferential
commitments
embedded
in
a
natural
or
scientific
language
can
and
should
be
set
apart
from
metaphysical
project
of
determining
the
status
of
such
ontological
domain
theories.
Bergson’s
arguments
that
“durée”
or
becoming
cannot
be
conceptualized
illustrate
the
metaphysical
perspective,
which
is
driven
by
epistemological
concerns
about
the
significance
of
ontological
domain
descriptions:
are
these
descriptions
of
reality,
and
if
so,
in
which
sense—
of
reality
in
itself,
reality
for
us,
or
‘reality’
in
yet
another
sense
that
transcends
these
traditional
oppositions?
This
is
surely
legitimate
business
in
philosophy,
and
it
has
particular
traction
on
the
notion
of
dynamicity,
which
lends
itself
particularly
well
to
a
deconstruction
of
the
traditional
set-‐up
of
the
skeptical
dimension.
But
it
is
possible
to
do
category
theory
without
raising
the
questions
of
the
skeptical
dimensions;
while
Carnap
may
have
been
wrong
in
dismissing
the
possibility
of
doing
metaphysics,
he
was
right,
in
my
view,
about
the
possibility
of
doing
ontology
without
metaphysics.
Here
then
is
the
first
task
for
a
theory
of
dynamicity:
(1) A
theory
of
dynamicity
should
position
itself
clearly
with
respect
to
two
fundamental
investigative
perspectives
that
may,
but
do
not
need
to,
be
combined.
That
is,
a
theory
of
dynamicity
should
clarify
5
I
must
omit
here
any
discussion
of
this
terminological
shift,
which,
as
far
as
I
can
see,
has
merely
sociological
reasons.
For
a
presentation
of
the
methodological
insights
of
the
early
analytical
ontologists
see
Seibt
1996,
1997,
and
2000;
for
a
methodological
position
paper
see
Seibt
2001.
3
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
whether
it
pursues
an
‘ontology
of
dynamicity’
or
else
a
‘metaphysics
of
dynamicity,’
or
both.
An
ontology
of
dynamicity
takes
the
investigative
perspective
of
ontology
and
aims
to
reconstruct
the
inferential
meaning
of
‘dynamicity’
and
‘dynamic’
with
the
conceptual
tools
of
an
ontological
‘domain
theory’
(i.e.,
a
structural
description
of
a
domain
of
truth-‐makers
for
a
language).
In
contrast,
a
metaphysics
of
dynamicity
either
investigates
the
status
of
a
given
ontological
domain
theory
for
dynamic
beings,
or
else
discusses
the
role
of
dynamicity
in
a
philosophical
account
of
cognition.
Let
us
call
this
first
task
for
a
theory
of
dynamicity
the
task
of
methodological
positioning.
To
comply
with
it
right
away,
let
me
state
that
my
considerations
in
this
paper
will
pertain
exclusively
to
the
ontology
of
dynamicity,
in
the
sense
of
this
term
stated
in
(1).
Turning
to
the
ontology
of
dynamicity,
then,
we
can
again
identify
a
number
of
basic
tasks
among
which
are
the
following
three:
(2) An
ontological
account
of
dynamicity
must
suggest
a
direct
definition
of
dynamicity
in
terms
of
necessary
and
sufficient
conditions,
or
else
an
axiomatic
definition,
or
else
discuss
in
which
sense,
if
any,
dynamicity
can
play
a
role
in
analytical
ontology.
This
task
I
call
the
question
of
the
definability
of
dynamicity.
(3) It
must
clarify
whether
we
can
make
sense
of
dynamicity
independently
of
temporal
relationships.
In
other
words,
it
must
clarify
whether
it
is
possible
to
claim
that
there
are
dynamic
entities
outside
of
(space
and)
time,
as
Whitehead
notoriously
has
claimed.6
This
task
I
call
the
question
of
atemporal
dynamicity.
(4) It
must
clarify
which
modes
of
dynamicity
there
are,
which
are
basic
and
which
derived,
and
whether
there
is
any
one
basic
mode
of
dynamicity.
This
is
the
question
of
the
primacy
of
directed
dynamicity.
The
proximate
target
of
my
following
considerations
is
task
(4),
the
clarification
of
the
question
of
the
primacy
of
directed
dynamicity,
but
in
the
course
of
the
discussion
I
shall
also
address
task
(2)
and
propose
a
definition
of
dynamicity.
1.
Locating
inferential
constraints
An
ontological
account
of
dynamicity,
if
undertaken
in
the
general
methodological
paradigm
of
analytical
ontology,
aims
to
reconstruct
conceptual
6
But
also,
which
has
hardly
been
noticed
so
far,
by
Wilfrid
Sellars
in
his
1962.
4
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
content
as
manifested
in
(or
constituted
by)
inferential
relations.
If
we
want
to
explore
what
we
rationally
could
take
ourselves
to
be
committed
to
in
speaking
about
our
‘world’
(i.e.,
the
world
of
common
sense
or
the
world
of
physics
etc.)
we
need
to
begin
by
investigating
the
inferential
commitments
carried
by
relevant
linguistic
expressions.
The
structure
of
our
world
of
experience—so
runs
the
basic
methodological
thesis
on
which
neo-‐Kantianism
and
pragmatism
could
meet
in
the
1930s—dovetails
with
the
inferential
roles
of
basic
classificatory
concepts
and
other
linguistic
means
of
encoding
inferential
knowledge
that
has
been
produced
in
interaction
with
the
world.
Since,
for
the
analytical
ontologist,
language
is
the
guide
to
the
inferential
data
that
drive
the
development
of
an
ontological
domain
theory,
it
is
important
to
focus
on
relevant
linguistic
expressions
and
elements,
and
to
avoid
any
form
of
linguistic
bias.
For
example,
if
one
were
to
discuss
the
possibility
of
a
domain
of
‘dynamic’
entities—as
opposed
to
a
‘static’
four-‐dimensional
domain—in
relation
with
John
McTaggart’s
proof
for
the
impossibility
of
the
A-‐series,
one
would
immediately
be
on
the
wrong
track,
no
matter
whether
one
would
argue
pro
or
contra
dynamicity.
For
the
link
to
McTaggart’s
proof
or
even
his
terminology
would
create,
first,
a
problematic
tie
between
dynamicity
and
temporal
flow
or
passage.
Such
a
presuppositional
link
is
to
be
avoided
since
temporal
passage
does
not
seem
to
be
either
a
sufficient
nor
necessary
condition
for
dynamicity—temporal
passage
may
be
only
one
special
manifestation
of
dynamicity.
Only
if
one
could
show
(i)
that
change
is
the
only
type
of
dynamicity,
(ii)
that
we
must
conceive
of
change
in
terms
of
states
with
contradictory
features,
and
that
temporal
passage
must
be
conceptualized
in
terms
of
states
with
contradictory
temporal
features,
such
implications
could
come
into
view.
7
Second,
if
we
were
to
begin
a
discussion
of
dynamicity
with
a
reference
to
the
A-‐series,
we
would
,
confusingly,
give
the
impression
that
the
issue
of
dynamic
being
turns
on
the
question
of
how
to
interpret
tensed
verbal
predications
or
the
temporal
adjectives
‘past,’
‘present,’
and
‘future.’
But
even
if
one
could
be
somehow
convinced
that
atemporal
dynamicity
is
not
possible,
or
even
that
dynamicity
always
requires
temporal
passage,
it
would
be
bizarre
to
7
Whether
our
notion
of
temporal
passage
presupposes
(a)
change,
and
(b)
change
in
temporal
characteristics (‘past, present, future’) is debatable, see e.g., Maudlin 2007: ch. 4.
5
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
assume
from
the
outset
that
tensed
verbal
predications
or
temporal
adjectives
‘past,
present,
future’
are
the
only
or
even
the
most
relevant
linguistic
aspects
to
concentrate
on.8
Such
a
line
of
approach
to
an
analysis
of
the
notion
of
dynamicity
or
dynamic
being
would
be
a
non-‐starter
from
the
outset
in
my
view.
I
am
mentioning
it
here
only
to
draw
attention
that
to
the
fact
that
the
recent
debate
in
analytical
ontology
on
existence
in
time
has
little
to
offer
for
an
ontology
of
dynamicity,
even
where
it
nominally
speaks
of
“static”
entities,
of
“events,”
or
“becoming”.
This
debate
centers
either
explicitly
or
implicitly
around
McTaggart’s
contrast
between
a
(fourdimensional)
eternalist
universe
and
the
inconceivable
universe
with
temporal
passage,
where
the
latter
has
been
replaced
with
the
conception
of
a
“presentist”
universe,
and
the
interpretation
of
tensed
verbal
predications
and
the
adjectives
of
tense
still
plays
an
important
role
in
deciding
between
four-‐dimensionalism
and
presentism.9
Instead,
or
so
I
want
to
suggest
here,
an
ontological
account
of
dynamicity
needs
to
sidestep
contemporary
uses
of
‘dynamic’
and
‘static’
in
the
mainstream
discussion
of
analytical
ontology
and
take
its
bearings
from
other
sources.
One
possible
heuristics
would
be
to
turn
to
an
analysis
of
scientific
conceptions
of
dynamic
phenomena
and
to
try
to
identify
relevant
inferential
constraints
from
the
representational
tools
of
science.
Another
route
towards
locating
inferential
data
is
to
review
discussions
of
dynamic
being
in
the
history
of
philosophy.
This
is
the
path
I
shall
follow
here,
turning
to
a
passage
in
Aristotle
that
contains
central
leads
to
a
general
method
as
well
as
specific
inferential
constraints.
The
passage
I
want
to
focus
on
is
Aristotle’s
so-‐called
‘completeness
test’
in
Metaphysics
Φ.
6.
In
this
chapter
Aristotle
comments
on
his
double
distinction
between,
on
the
one
hand,
dynamis
and
energeia
and,
on
the
other
hand,
between
kinesis
and
energeia.
The
chapter
can
be
roughly
divided
into
four
thematic
sections.
(a)
Aristotle
begins
by
announcing
that,
after
treating
dynamis
in
the
previous
sections,
he
will
now
discuss
energeia;
(b)
he
warns
the
reader
8
There
are
languages
with
less
or
more
than
three
forms
of
verbal
tense,
there
are
languages
that
mark
tense
on
nouns
rather
than
on
verbs,
and
there
are
languages
without
adjectives—why
should
English
be
our
guide
to
ontology?
9
Cf.
e.g.
Rudder-‐Baker
2010.
6
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
that
there
is
merely
an
analogical
unity
among
the
senses
of
energeia;
(c)
then
he
clarifies
in
which
sense
the
infinite
is
potential,
and
finally
(d)
offers
a
paragraph
distinguishing
kinesis
and
energeia;
he
concludes
the
chapter
claiming
to
have
explained
therein
”what
and
how”
[ti
esti
kai
poion]
energeia
is.
The
relevant
paragraph
of
section
(d)
runs
as
follows
(cf.
Metaphysics
1048:b18-‐b35):
[1.]
Since
among
actions
[praxeis]
that
have
a
limit
[peras],
none
is
a
completion
[telos],
but
each
is
the
sort
of
thing
relating
to
the
completion—as
e.g.,
slimming
is
to
slimness;
the
[bodily
parts]
themselves
are
in
movement,
though
those
things
which
the
movement
is
for
the
sake
of
[whose
presence
constitutes
slimness]
do
not
yet
belong
[hyparchonta]
to
them—these
things
are
not
action,
or
at
least
not
complete
[teleia],
just
because
it
is
not
a
completion.
But
that
[sort
of
action]
in
which
its
completion
is
contained
[enuparchei]
is
a
[real]
action.10
[2.]
E.g.,
in
the
same
moment
[hama]
one
is
seeing
and
has
seen
[=
“knows”
by
sight],
is
understanding
and
has
understood,
[=possesses
understanding],
is
thinking
and
has
thought
[=
‘knows’
by
insight].
But
if
you
are
learning,
it’s
not
the
case
that
in
the
same
moment
you
have
learned,
nor
if
you
are
being
cured,
that
in
the
same
moment
you
have
been
cured.
However,
someone
who
is
living
well,
at
the
same
time
has
lived
well,
and
someone
who
is
prospering,
has
prospered.11
[3.]
If
that
were
not
so,
[the
prospering,
e.g.,]
would
have
had
to
come
to
an
end
[pauestai]
at
some
time,
as
is
the
case
with
slimming
[=
when
the
state
of
slimness,
of
one’s
having
completed
an
act
of
slimming
has
been
achieved].
But
in
fact,
it
does
not;
you
are
living
and
have
lived.
[4.]
Of
these
[actions],
then,
one
group
should
be
called
movements
[kineseis],
and
the
other
actualizations
[energeias].12
[5.]
For
every
movement
is
incomplete
[ateles]—slimming,
learning,
walking
[
=
walk-‐
taking],
house-‐building;
these
are
movements
and
are
incomplete.
[6.]
For
one
cannot
in
the
same
moment
both
be
taking
a
walk
and
have
taken
it,
nor
be
house-‐building
and
have
housebuilt,
not
be
coming-‐to-‐be
and
have
come-‐to-‐be,
nor
be
being
moved
[kineitai]
and
have
been
moved
[kekinehtai];
they’re
different,
as
[in
general]
are
moving
[kinei]
and
having
moved
[kekinehken].
But
at
the
same
moment
the
same
thing
has
seen
and
is
seeing,
and
is
thinking,
and
has
thought.13
[7.]
This
…then
I
call
an
actualization
[energeian],
the
other
…a
movement.
What
is
actually
[energeiai],
then,
what
it
is
and
what
sort
of
thing
[poion],
may
be
regarded
as
clear
from
these
and
like
cases.
This
passage
is
commonly
read
as
containing
an
inferential
criterion
or
‘test’
for
distinguishing
two
types
of
occurrences.
Indeed,
if
we
go
by
the
textual
surfaces,
Aristotle
distinguishes
in
passage
[1]
occurrences
that
cannot
be
called
actions
because
their
telos,
their
end
or
completion
does
not
belong
to
them,
from
10
Barnes
(cf.
1984:
1656)
translates
‘this
is
not
action’,
i.e.,
‘kinesis
is
not
action’
instead
of
Furth’s
‘these
are
not
action’,
i.e.,
the
kineseis
of
the
bodily
parts
that
constitute
the
process
of
slimming.
11
Commenting
on
this
translation
with
resultative
perfect,
Furth
notes
that
what
is
at
issue
here
is
not
a
matter
of
tense
but
“what
linguists
call
Aktionsart
or
Behandlungsart,”
also
called
“aspect”
in
a
“terminological
variant”
(1985:
134f.).
12
The
addition
“[occurrences]”
replaces
Furth’s
addition
“[actions]”
which
seems
odd
given
that
Aristotle
just
determined
that
kineseis
are
not
actions;
Barnes
(1984:
1656)
adds
“processes.”
13
Note
the
variation
in
Barnes:
“”it
is
a
different
thing
that
is
being
moved
and
that
has
been
moved,
and
that
is
moving
and
that
has
moved;
but
it
is
the
same
thing
that
at
the
same
time
has
seen
and
is
seeing,
is
thinking
and
has
thought.”
7
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
occurrences
that
can
be
called
actions
because
they
contain
their
completion.14
For
convenience
let
us
call
occurrences
which
do
not
contain
their
completion
‘other-telic’
and
those
which
do
‘self-telic’.
This
difference
in
completedness
is
explicated
by
means
of
differences
in
the
inferential
role
of
sentences
expressing
‘cases’
of
energeia
and
kinesis.
Part
[2]
tells
us
that
statements
about
kineseis
abide
by
the
pattern
[8.]
(subject,
Greek
verb
in
present
tense)
implies
the
falsity
of
(subject,
Greek
verb
in
the
Perfect)15
while
statements
about
energeia
do
not
govern
such
implications—the
present
tense
statement
is
compatible
with
the
associated
statement
in
the
perfect.
Most
commentators
read
the
expression
‘hama’,
‘at
the
same
time,’
as
an
inference;
so
for
statements
about
energeiai
it
holds:
[9.]
(subject,
Greek
verb
in
present
tense)
implies
(subject,
Greek
verb
in
the
Perfect).
Part
[7]
connects
the
inferential
criterion
for
completion
to
the
natural
temporal
boundedness
of
occurrences.
Those
occurrences
for
which
implication
[8]
holds
are
bounded
by
their
completion—it
is
part
of
what
they
are
(since
they
have
their
completion
not
in
themselves)
that
they
come
to
an
end
some
time.
Part
[5]
restates
the
inferential
difference
of
[8]
and
[9],
with
the
interesting
variation
that
in
one
case
the
implication
in
[9]
takes
the
other
direction
–
‘the
same
thing
has
seen
and
is
seeing.’
More
importanly,
however,
Aristotle
reformulates
the
inferential
difference
between
statements
about
kinesis
and
energeia
taking
the
role
of
the
subject
into
account;
that
is,
[8]
and
[9]
are
amended
to:
[10.]
(subject1,
Greek
verb
in
present
tense)
implies
the
falsity
of
(subject2
Greek
verb
in
the
Perfect)
[11.]
(subject1
Greek
verb
in
present
tense)
implies
(subject1,
Greek
verb
in
the
Perfect).
On
the
background
of
these
restatements
of
Aristotle’s
text,
let
us
now
consider
its
possible
heuristic
significance
for
an
ontology
of
dynamic
being.
To
restate,
the
passage
just
set
out
traditionally
has
been
read
as
providing
a
distinction
between
incomplete
and
complete
occurrences.
In
order
14
Telos
is
a
relational
noun:
the
‘for-‐the-‐sake-‐of-‐which’
or
the
‘towards-‐which’
of
an
occurrence.
(‘Perfect’) while general tense or aspect labels are lower-‐case (‘present tense,’ ‘perfect’).
8
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
to
appreciate
the
methodological
clues
contained
in
the
passage
we
need
to
review
for
a
moment
the
development
of
the
traditional
reading
within
the
interplay
between
philosophy
and
linguistics.
Following
Aristotle’s
observation
about
a
systematic
difference
in
the
inferential
role
of
certain
Greek
verbs
in
present
tense,
G.
Ryle
distinguished
between
“verbs
of
activity
or
process”
and
“achievement
verbs”
(1949:149ff),
in
order
to
contrast
at
the
ontological
level
activities
and
results.
Inspired
by
Ryle—but
apparently
independently
of
each
other—Z.
Vendler
(1957)
and
A.
Kenny
(1965)
later
produced
extended
classification
of
“action
verbs.”
To
illustrate,
in
Vendler’s
fourfold
distinction
between
“activity
verbs,
state
verbs,
accomplishment
verbs,
and
achievement
verbs,”
activity
verbs
such
as
“run,
walk,
swim,
push”
fulfill
the
following
four
conditions:
(C1)
They
take
the
continuous
form
i.e.,
‘A
is
V-‐ing’
is
a
well-‐formed
sentence.
(C2)
Their
denotations
are
unbounded,
i.e.,
the
form
‘x
finished
V-‐ing’
cannot
be
supplemented
to
yield
a
true
sentence.
(C3)
[Distributivity
condition]
For
every
temporal
interval
[t],
if
‘A
V-‐ed
during
[t]’
is
true
then
‘A
V-‐ed’
during
[t’]
for
every
period
[t’]
that
is
part
of
[t].
(C4)
[Homomerity
condition]
Any
temporal
part
of
the
denotation
d
of
V
is
of
the
“the
same
nature”
as
the
whole
of
d.
In
contrast,
“accomplishment
verbs”
such
as
“paint
a
picture,
build
a
house,
grow
up,
recover
from
illness,
run-‐a-‐mile”
fulfill
(C1)
but
their
denotations
are
bounded,
they
are
not
distributive
and
their
denotations
are
not
homomerous.
Since
Vendler’s
classification
of
“action
verbs”
combines
syntactic
and
semantic
criteria—i.e.,
the
conditions
I
called
‘distributivity’
and
‘homomerity’—
in
ways
that
seemed
to
dovetail
directly
with
the
quoted
passages
[2]
or
[6]
above,
Aristotle
scholars
in
turn
applied
Vendler’s
analysis
to
interpret
the
distinction
between
energeia
and
kinesis
in
these
sections
of
the
Metaphysics
.
Just
as
Vendler
sought
to
derive
a
division
in
“types
of
action”
on
the
basis
of
a
division
of
“action
verbs,”
Aristotle’s
interpreters
now
discussed
whether
the
energeiai
mentioned
in
paragraphs
[1]
through
[6]
should
be
understood
as
activities,
achievements,
or
states.16
However,
when
Vendler’s
and
Kenny’s
distinctions
became
the
subject
of
more
comprehensive
investigations
within
linguistic
verb
semantics
(in
so-‐
called
“aspect
theory,”“aspectology,”
or
theories
of
“Aktionsarten”)
they
soon
16
Cf.
Graham
1980,
Hagen
1984,
Ackrill
1965,
Kosman
1984.
9
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
part
of
the
linguistic
debate
on
Aktionsarten
and
verbal
aspect
Seibt
2004b,
ch.
2.
18
This
is
a
simplified
illustration;
see
Seibt
2004b,
ch.
2
for
a
review
of
various
linguistic
theories
of
aspectual
meaning.
Note,
incidentally,
that
ontologists
so
far
have
been
overlooking
not
only
inferences
based
on
so-‐called
‘verbal
aspect,’
but
also
the
aspectual
information
based
on
‘nominal
aspects’;
see
ibid.
ch.
4
on
this
and
Seibt
201+.
10
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
While
the
pointer
to
aspectual
inferences
is
particularly
pronounced
in
Kenny’s
analysis,
Vendler’s
analysis
can
be
credited
with
conveying
most
clearly
the
second
important
insight
I
wish
to
highlight
here,
namely,
the
insight
that
aspectual
inferences
dovetail
with
mereological
properties.
As
the
conditions
of
‘distributivity’
and
‘homomerity’
(C3)
and
(C4)
above
suggest,
implications
between
sentences
with
different
aspectual
meaning
can
be
used
to
derive
mereological
features
in
terms
of
which
one
can
introduce
different
types
of
truthmakers
(occurrence
types)
for
the
sentences
in
question.
With
these
credentials
in
place,
let
us
return
to
our
review
of
the
traditional
reading
of
Aristotle’s
distinction
between
energeia
and
kinesis
as
occurrence
types.
As
the
discussion
of
Vendler’s
and
Kenny’s
classifications
per
se,
as
well
as
in
application
to
the
quoted
passage
has
shown,
it
is
not
possible
to
define
different
occurrence
types
just
in
terms
of
one
aspectual
implication
as
in
Vendler’s
(C1)
or
Aristotle’s
[8/10]
and
[9/11],
respectively.
For
example,
the
fact
that
the
sentences
‘I
am
walking
about’
or
‘I
am
swimming’
both
allow
for
an
aspectual
inference
in
the
sense
of
[9/11]
are
not
sufficient
to
claim
that
they
denote
“activities,”
if
the
latter
are
taken
to
be
characterized
by
homomerity
alone—as
has
been
observed
by
a
number
of
authors,
what
ontologists
call
a
‘state
of
affairs’
(e.g.,
a
exemplifies
the
(possibly
complex)
property
F
)
would
seem
to
fulfill
the
homomerity
condition
just
as
well.
Moreover,
it
is
questionable
whether
an
occurrence
denoted
by
a
sentence
that
licences
the
aspectual
inference
in
[9/11]
and
fulfills
what
Vendler
calls
the
“time
schema”
associated
with
this
inference,
here
listed
as
the
‘distributivity
condition’
(C3),
should
at
all
be
labeled
an
‘activity’—some
authors
have
argued
that
the
notion
of
an
activity
does
allow
for
some
temporal
granularity,
i.e.,
for
some
short
phases
that
do
not
satisfy
the
predicate
in
terms
of
which
the
activity
is
characterized.19
In
reaction
to
these
difficulties
one
might
(a)
develop
alternative
ways
of
making
use
of
aspectual
inferences
for
the
definition
of
occurrence
types,
and
(b)
search
for
an
alternative
interpretation
of
Aristotle’s
‘completeness
test’
in
19
For
a
discussion
of
such
challenges
to
the
distributivity
of
activity
predicates
see
Seibt
2004a
11
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
Metaphysics
Θ.6.
Elsewhere
I
have
explored
(a),
20
here
I
want
to
offer
a
suggestion
following
line
(b).
2.
Two
modes
of
dynamicity
As
I
want
to
argue
now,
drawing
on
the
larger
context
of
Aristotle’s
writings,
the
passage
I
quoted
in
the
previous
section
contains
a
definition
not
of
occurrence
types
but
of
two
modes
of
dynamicity.
Consider
the
following
four
predicates:
[12]
Likepartedness
or
homomerity:
An
entity
of
kind
K
is
likeparted
iff
some
of
its
spatial
or
temporal
parts
are
of
kind
K.
[13]
Strict
likepartedness
or
strict
homomerity:
An
entity
of
kind
K
is
likeparted
iff
all
of
its
spatial
or
temporal
parts
are
of
kind
K.
[14]
Self-containment
or
automerity:
An
entity
E
is
self-‐contained
iff
the
spatiotemporal
region
in
which
all
of
E
occurs
has
some
spatial
or
temporal
parts
in
which
all
of
E
occurs.21
[15]
Strict
self-containment
or
automerity:
An
entity
E
is
self-‐contained
iff
the
spatiotemporal
region
in
which
all
of
E
occurs
has
only
spatial
or
temporal
parts
in
which
all
of
E
occurs.
An
action
is
complete,
Aristotle
says
in
section
[2]
of
the
quotation
in
the
previous
section,
if
is
completed
“at
the
same
time”
(“hama”)
at
which
it
is
going
on.
This
can
be
read
in
three
ways:
‘at
the
same
time’
(i)
for
some,
or
(ii)
for
any,
or
(iii)
for
all
of
the
of
the
times
at
which
it
is
going
on.
If
we
take
the
first
reading
we
can
claim
that
energeiai
are
homomerous
or
automerous.
If
we
take
the
second
or
the
third
reading,
we
can
claim
that
energeiai
are
strictly
homomerous
or
strictly
automerous.
Since
Aristotle
in
no
place
introduces
a
qualification
of
‘the
same
moment’
that
would
suggest
a
restriction
from
‘any’
to
‘some,’
I
take
the
second
or
third
reading
as
the
more
plausible
one.
As
far
as
I
can
see,
all
of
the
commentators
of
the
passage
agree
on
this
point.
Remarkably,
however,
the
difference
between
homomerity
and
automerity
seems
to
have
20
For
example,
I
have
suggested
a
classification
of
sentences
about
activities,
accomplishments,
states,
and
achievements
in
terms
of
small
networks
of
aspectual
inferences,
see
ibid.
21
The
condition
of
automerity
is
fulfilled
by
any
kind
of
repetitive
occurrence,
whether
it
be
an
12
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
gone
unnoticed.
Or
to
put
it
more
precisely,
it
seems
to
have
gone
unnoticed
that
Aristotle
commits
himself
by
the
combination
of
[1]
and
[2]
to
the
claim
that
energeiai
are
strictly
automerous.
For
in
[1]
Aristotle
explains
that
the
telos
(completion)
of
an
action
is
that
‘for-‐the-‐sake-‐of-‐which’
the
action
is
undertaken.
If
we
were
to
take
the
telos
of
an
ongoing
action
α
to
be
the
result
of
α,
taking
the
result
or
upshot
of
α
to
be
different
from
α
as
ongoing,
then
no
ongoing
action
could
contain
literally
“its”
completion.
For
an
ongoing
action
to
contain
its
completion
we
need
to
assume
that
the
telos
of
α
as
ongoing
is
α
as
ongoing,
not
the
result
of
α.
Consider
the
following
contrast:
[16]
Intelicity
(self-directedness
or
upshot
completion):
An
action
α
is
intelic
iff
α
is
done
for
the
sake
of
α’s
having
been
done.
A
non-‐agentive
occurrence
α
is
intelic
iff
the
telos
of
α
is
α’s
having
occurred.
[17]
Autotelicity
(strict
self-directedness
or
occurrence
completion):
An
action
α
is
autotelic
iff
α,
while
going
on,
is
done
for
the
sake
of
the
ongoingness
of
α.
A
non-‐
agentive
occurrence
α
is
autotelic
iff
if
the
telos
of
α,
while
going
on,
is
the
going-‐on
of
α.
If
we
take
Aristotle’s
text
literally
we
must
adopt
the
view
that
an
ongoing
occurrence
that
contains
its
completion
is
autotelic
in
the
sense
specified,
which
means
that
it
contains
literally
itself.
In
other
word,
then,
we
must
read
Aristotle
as
holding,
or
being
committed
to
holding,
that
energeiai
are
strictly
automerous
in
the
sense
stated
above.
Before
we
investigate
the
predicate
automerity
in
greater
detail,
let
us
consider
in
which
way
the
difference
between
autotelic
and
‘other-‐telic’
/allotelic
occurrences
(i.e,
occurrences
the
telos
of
which
is
not
reached
while
they
are
going
on,
cf.
[1])
could
steer
us
towards
an
new
understanding
of
energeia
and
kinesis.
In
other
places
(cf.
De
Anima
417a2ff,
Physics
193b7)
Aristotle
uses
the
contrast
between
dynamis
and
energeia
to
characterize
the
difference
between
changes
and
activities.
He
presents
these
not
merely
as
different
occurrence
types
(e.g.,
actions
vs.
events)
but
as
two
fundamentally
different
genres
of
occurrences.
Changes
realize
dynameis
for
becoming
F—for
example
the
dynamis
for
becoming
a
human
organism
or
a
flute
player.
The
realization
of
such
a
dynamis
for
becoming
F,
also
called
a
‘potency’
or
‘first
level
potentiality,’
brings
about
a
dynameis
for
being
F,
also
called
a
‘capacity’
or
‘second
level
potentiality’.
The
realization
of
a
potency
for
becoming
F
is
a
transition
which
13
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
results
in
the
capacity
for
being
F;
the
latter
are
the
telos
of
the
transition
but
are
not
included
in
the
transition.
As
Aristotle
emphasizes
in
Nicomachian
Ethics
1174a25-‐14,
occurrences
of
this
genre,
changes,
are
characterized
by
inherent
and
ubiquitous
difference,
with
each
part
being
“different
in
kind”
from
the
other.
In
contrast,
the
realizations
of
capacities
(e.g.,
of
the
dynamis
of
being
a
human
being
or
a
flute
player)
are
characterized
by
inherent
sameness;
they
are
‘self-‐realization’
structures
since
the
telos
of
this
genre
of
occurrence
is
the
realization
of
the
capacity
itself.22
Since
Aristotle
calls
the
first
genre
of
occurrences
kineseis
and
the
second
energeiai
one
might
at
first
form
the
impression
that
these
passages
confirm
the
traditional
reading
of
kinesis
and
energeia
as
occurrence
types.
All
that
this
larger
context
of
the
completeness
test
reveals,
one
might
argue,
Aristotle’s
target
is
not
a
distinction
between
‘species’
of
occurrences
(‘actions’
vs
‘non-‐actions)
but
a
division
at
a
much
more
fundamental
level
between
different
‘genera’
of
occurrences.
However,
this
adjustment
of
the
traditional
reading
does
not
square
well
with
the
fact
that
Aristotle
characterizes
energeia
as
a
form
of
kinesis,
calling
a
capacity
a
[18]
“principle
of
movement
(kinesis)…in
the
thing
itself
qua
itself”
(Metaphysics
1049b9).
More
importantly,
he
even
defines
kinesis
in
terms
of
energeia:
[19]
[T]he
energeia
of
the
buildable
as
the
buildable
is
the
house-‐building
(Physics
201b6-‐14)
[20]
I
call
the
energeia
of
the
potential
as
such
kinesis
(Metaphysics
K
1065
b16)
22
In
the
case
of
living
organisms
the
exercise
of
the
capacity
for
being
F
is
not
only
self-‐realizing
in
the
sense
that
this
capacity
for
being
F
is
realized
as
an
exercizable
capacity
for
being
F,
but
here
the
capacity
in
question
is
(a)
for
being-‐an-‐organism-‐of-‐this-‐kind
or
(b)
for
being-‐this-‐
organism-‐of-‐this-‐kind.
In
this
way
the
self-‐directed
is
even
stronger,
it
does
not
only
pertain
to
the
capacity
qua
capacity
but
also
to
the
‘content’
of
the
capacity.
Aristotle
calls
self-‐directness
in
the
sense
of
(a)
physis—the
nature
of
an
organism
is
to
realize
this
nature;
it
is
controversial
whether
the
notion
of
physis
also
can
be
read
as
self-‐directedness
in
the
sense
of
(b),
as
the
self-‐
realization
of
an
individual
instance
of
this
nature.
14
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
Passages
[19]
and
[20]
state
that
kinesis
is
a
certain
‘way
of
the
being-‐there’
of
a
potency,
namely,
the
way
in
which
the
potency
is
there
if
its
potentiality
for
generating
a
change
or
transition
is
no
longer
dormant
but
going
on
(and
not
yet
actualized).
The
potency
for
becoming
a
house
is
in
bricks,
beams,
and
tiles
even
if
these
never
become
a
house;
but
for
this
‘dormant’
productive
potency
to
become
‘manifest’
it
needs
to
attain
a
mode
of
being-‐there
that
realizes
it
as
productive
potency—the
potency
needs
to
‘go
on’.
Kinesis,
the
occurrence
of
the
development
or
movement,
is
thus
the
going
on
of
the
potential
as
potential.
But
then
kinesis
is
not
an
occurrence
type,
not
a
development,
but
the
mode
of
occurrence
of
such
an
occurrence
type:
coming
about.
Coming
about
is
a
distinctive
mode
of
occurrence
or
mode
of
dynamicity
that
always
strives
beyond
itself,
a
continuous
tendency
towards
difference,
until
a
definite
endpoint
is
reached.
In
contrast,
when
a
capacity,
a
dynamis
for
being-‐F,
is
going
on,
the
occurrence
generated
has
another
mode
of
dynamicity—it
is
the
continuous
expression
of
the
capacity-‐for-‐being-‐F
to
express
itself.
Aristotle
calls
that
mode
of
dynamicity
energeia.
If
kinesis
and
energeia
are
modes
of
dynamicity,
however,
one
might
have
some
qualms
about
the
role
of
energeia
in
quotations
[19]
and
[20].
There
the
term
energeia
is
used
to
characterize
a
‘way
of
being-‐there’
(‘going-‐on’)
of
a
dynamis
.
On
the
other
hand,
if
energeia
were
a
mode
of
dynamicity,
it
should
be
the
result
of
the
‘going
on’
of
a
dynamis
(i.e.,
of
a
dynamis
for
being
F).
Some
scholars
thus
have
suggested
that
energeia
is
simply
ambiguous
and
in
certain
contexts
means
‘activity’
(occurrence
type)
and
in
other
contexts
‘actuality’(way
of
being-‐there
of
a
dynamis).23
I
believe
that
when
Aristotle
reminds
his
readers
at
the
beginning
of
Metaphysics
Θ.
6
that
the
meaning
of
energeia
can
shift
(1047a30)
he
does
not
intend
to
announce
an
ambiguity.
We
can
work
towards
a
more
interesting
resolution
of
the
double-‐functionality
of
the
term
if
we
translate
it
into
‘logical
grammar’.
In
[19]
and[20]
energeia
appears
both
in
the
logical
position
of
a
function
(or
operator)
on
dynameis;
in
other
contexts
it
appears
in
the
role
of
the
‘value’
(or
outcome):
23
Cf.
Chen
1965.
15
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
16
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
being
of
seeing
nor
of
a
point
nor
of
a
unit,
nor
is
any
of
these
a
movement
or
coming
into
being;
therefore
there
is
none
of
pleasure
either;
for
it
is
a
whole.24
But
to
think
self-‐expression
as
an
unstructured,
non-‐developmental
whole
seems
quite
impossible
and
so
we
have
arrived
at
what
one
could
call
the
riddle
of
’dynamicity.’
It
appears
that
we
can
somehow
‘fathom’
two
forms
of
’dynamicity.’
First,
there
is
the
’stretched’
developmental
variety,
as
a
’push
from
here
to
there,’
as
continuous
becoming
different—the
mode
of
dynamicity
of
coming
about
(kinesis).
Second,
there
is
’dynamicity’
in
the
form
of
going-‐on
as
self-‐propagation—the
mode
of
dynamicity
of
self-‐expression
(energeia).
But
this
mode
of
dynamicity
also
appears
to
have
wider
scope
than
the
other—it
appears
to
articulate
a
notion
of
dynamicity
or
dynamic
being
in
general.
Anything
in
the
mode
of
coming-‐about,
any
development
‘is’
in
a
dynamic
sense—i.e.,
is
in
sense
of
being
as
self-‐expression.
And
yet,
while
we
somehow
can
‘fathom’
self-‐propagation,
we
cannot
think
nor
represent
symbolically
self-‐
expression
as
an
unstructured
whole—we
cannot
think
it
without
thinking
a
production
or
coming
about
that
is
somehow
’collected’
into
a
point.
This
creates
a
curious
interdependence:
the
second
mode
of
dynamicity,
going
on
or
self-‐
expression,
is
the
way
in
which
the
first
mode
of
dynamicity
is
there—coming
about
is
there
by
the
going
on
of
some
dynamis
to
become-‐F.
On
the
other
hand,
it
appears
that
we
can
only
understand
the
mode
of
dynamicity
of
self-‐
expression
by
contrasting
it
with
coming
about.
3.
The
riddle
of
dynamicity
What
to
do
with
the
interdependence
between
the
two
modes
of
dynamicity
I
called
‘coming
about’
and
‘going-‐on
by
expressing-‐itself’?
There
are
four
possible
reactions
all
of
which
are
exemplified
in
the
history
of
metaphysics.
First,
one
might
give
up
on
the
ontology
of
dynamic
being,
since
it
does
not
bring
us
any
further
with
respect
to
the
overall
ontological
project
of
defining
being.
Ongoingness
is
as
indefinable
as
being,
so
there
is
little
use
in
claiming
with
the
process
metaphysicians
that
being
consists
in
ongoingness.
24
1174b10-‐13.
17
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
Second,
one
might
reject
Aristotle’s
idea,
expressed
in
[19]
and
[20],
that
the
dynamic
being
of
coming
about
somehow
would
need
to
be
conceived
as
ongoingness.
Dynamic
being
can
be
coming
about
and
nothing
else.
When
a
house
is
being
built,
what
there
is
at
any
moment
during
which
that
coming
about
occurs
is
itself
a
’temporally
unextended’
coming
about.
So
at
any
moment
there
is
a
coming
about
of
coming
about—any
temporally
extended
coming
about
is
the
sequence
of
temporally
punctiform
coming
abouts
which
do
not
happen
over
time.
This
one
could
consider
to
be
Whitehead’s
solution
to
the
riddle
of
dynamicity;
the
basic
entities
of
Whitehead
process
metaphysics,
so-‐
called
’actual
occasions,’
all
have
the
structure
of
kineseis,
i.e.,
they
are
all
becomings,
which
do
not
happen
over
time
but
constitute
that
which
happens
over
time.
Third,
one
might
claim
that
the
interdependence
is
not
symmetric.
To
use
a
distinction
by
W.
Sellars,
self-‐expressing
depends
on
coming-‐about
in
the
”order
of
understanding,”
while
coming-‐about
depends
on
self-‐expressing
in
the
”order
of
being.”
In
order
to
make
descriptive
sense
of
being
as
going-‐on
or
self-‐
expressing,
i.e.,
in
order
to
render
going
on
a
concept
that
is
not
only
’clear’
but
also
’distinct’
in
the
rationalist’s
classification,
we
need
to
resort
to
the
contrast
with
coming
about.
But
this
does
not
detract
from
the
fact
that
ongoingness
is
the
way
in
which
coming
about
is
there.
In
Bergson’s
pregnant
articulation
of
this
third
reaction
to
the
‘riddle
of
dynamicity,’
process-‐metaphysical
inquiry
finds
itself
in
a
tragic
situation.
It
aspires
to
conceptualize
something
that
is
outside
of
the
very
domain
of
conceptualization.
What
can
be
conceptualized
of
a
coming
about
is
the
pair
of
initial
state
and
end
state;
the
transition
between
these
states,
however,
the
ongoingness
of
coming
about,
entirely
eludes
any
effort
of
descriptive
conceptualization.
Dynamicity
or
ongoingness
is
something
we
can
only
experience
in
”duration,”
as
plenum
without
separable
components,
and
can
only
approach
as
the
ever
fleeting,
ever
evanescent
object
of
an
attempted
conceptual
reflection
of
that
experience.
Fourth,
and
this
appears
to
be
the
most
popular
reaction
among
process
metaphysicians,
one
might
deny
that
self-‐expressing
is
descriptively
dependent
on
coming-‐about,
because
the
metaphor
of
self-‐directedness
(self-‐production
etc.)
is
a
definiens
in
its
own
right.
A
number
of
metaphysicians
have
played
on
18
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
25
The
concept
of
self-‐production
forces
us
to
conceive
of
a
unity
which
generates
and
cancels
a
relationship
to
itself,
and
this
peculiar
dynamic
structure—vide
Fichte’s
notion
of
an
”Ego”
as
”setting
the
Non-‐Ego”
or
Hegel’s
”identity
of
identity
and
non-‐identity”—can
be
used
to
undercut
the
traditional
dichotomy
between
thinking
and
being,
”subject”
and
”object.”
In
Fichte’s
and
Hegel’s
scheme,
the
thinking
of
self-‐production
thus
fulfills
three
functions:
it
generates
(a)
a
case
of
self-‐production,
(b)
a
definition
for
a
dynamic
account
of
being
correlative
to
the
structure
of
thinking,
and
(c)
a
model
for
the
relationship
between
thinking
and
being:
a
unity
that
is
both
identity
and
difference,
that
generates
and
cancels
its
own
relatedness.
Is
there
anything
in
this
approach
that
could
invite
further
exploration
from
the
perspective
of
the
analytical
ontologist?
Let
us
briefly
look
at
(b).
Hegel’s
insists
that
normal
predications
are
not
suited
to
express
“speculative
truths”
(definitions
of
dialectical
relationships)
but
must
be
articulated
by
means
of
a
“speculative
sentence,”
a
special
linguistic
form.
This
can
be
understood
as
a
precursor
to
the
idea
that
not
all
definitions
have
to
be
explicit
definitions.
In
essence,
then,
it
is
the
proposal
of
grounding
self-‐expression
and
other
self-‐referential
terms
in
what
one
might
call
‘performative
constitutions.’
Such
performative
constitutions
capitalize
on
the
self-‐similarity
of
content
and
form,
which—in
first
approximation—we
might
conceive
of
the
self-‐similarity
of
performative
constitutions
on
the
model
of
the
‘triangle
of
triangles’,
i.e.,as
the
similarity
of
the
nature
of
the
items
arranged
and
the
mode
of
arrangement.
Hegel’s
focus
is
on
connections
between
an
item
(e.g.,
the
subject)
and
that
which
is
other
to
it
(e.g.,
the
object)
in
various
‘modes’
(e.g.
epistemic
modes)
that
he
characterizes
themselves
in
terms
of
such
connections.
For
example,
if
we
let
subscripts
representing
the
‘mode’
of
presentation,
the
following
complex
structure—which
corresponds
to
Hegel’s
characterization
of
self-‐consciousness
in
the
Phenomology
and
his
definition
of
“something”
(“Etwas”)
in
the
Science
of
Logic—
has
a
mode
of
interrelatedness
that
mirrors
the
interrelatedness
of
its
components
and
their
respective
“one-‐sided”
modes
of
presentation:
‘((S
⇔
∼
S)
S
S
⇔
∼
(S
⇔
∼
S)
(S
S))
(S
S)
(S
S)’
.
⇔ ∼ ∼ ⇔ ∼ ⇔ ∼ ⇔ ∼ ⇔ ∼
19
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
rehearsed
historical
reactions
to
the
riddle
of
dynamicity
all
proceed
from
the
assumption
that
if
dynamicity
has
no
explicit
definition
it
must
be
indefinable,
or
even
inconceivable
.
But
once
we
admit
of
the
idea
that,
within
a
suitable
system,
a
condition
can
set
sufficient
constraints
to
ensure
that
dynamic
entities
are
among
its
models,
a
new
path
opens
up.
I
suggest
that
we
take
the
feature
of
strict
automerity
as
an
inferential
constraint
that,
in
combination
with
additional
restrictions
within
a
formal
system,
all
and
only
ongoing
or
‘dynamic’
entities
fulfill.
The
general
strategy
of
my
proposal
can
be
summarized
into
the
following
four
claims.
(i)
Dynamicity
or
dynamic
being
is
ongoingness
by
expressing
itself—to
be
is
to
go
on.
(ii)
Self-‐
expression
is
reflected
in
a
characteristic
structure
in
the
description
of
an
entity.
(iii)
For
example,
if
we
describe
an
entity
E
in
terms
of
a
partition
that
specifies
what
is
‘part
of
being
that
entity’
(i.e.,
we
specify
its
spatial,
function,
material
etc,
parts
within
one
partition
using
a
generic
part
relation),
the
fact
that
E
is
dynamic
will
be
reflected
in
the
partition
in
the
form
of
certain
distinctive
patterns
representing
self-‐expression.
(iv)
Self-‐expression
is
mereologically
reflected
in
strict
automerity,
which
generates
self-‐similar
patterns
within
a
partition.
Above
I
argued
that
autotelicity
(self-‐expression)
dovetails
with
strict
automerity.
Let
us
turn
to
a
closer
look
at
automerity
then.
I
have
been
using
the
predicate
without
discussing
whether
this
predicate
is
at
all
conceptually
coherent.
How
can
a
whole,
E,
contain
itself
as
a
part?
Indeed,
if
we
interpret
the
expression
‘is
part
of’
on
the
basis
of
the
axiomatization
of
Classical
Extensional
Mereology
(or,
in
fact,
any
axiomatization
that
operates
with
a
transitive
part
relation),
then
the
only
way
in
which
an
entity
could
be
automerous
is
by
having
no
spatial
and
temporal
parts
at
all.
Since
the
classical
part
relation
is
transitive
and
irreflexive,
no
part
of
E
can
have
E
as
part—by
the
transitivity
of
‘is
part
of’
we
receive
the
statement
that
E
is
part
of
itself,
which
is
in
conflict
with
the
irreflexivity
of
the
part
relation.
However,
we
are
by
no
means
bound
to
the
interpretation
of
‘is
part
of’
as
axiomatized
by
Classical
Extensional
Mereology.
There
are
at
least
two
varieties
of
non-‐standard
mereologies
both
of
which
allow
for
‘mereological
loops’:
one
can
either
relinquish
anti-‐symmetry
(Cotnoir
2010),
or,
as
I
have
suggested,
one
20
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
can
give
up
on
transitivity.
Classical
Extensional
Mereology
axiomatizes
in
effect
the
natural
language
expression
‘x
is
a
spatial
/temporal
part
of
the
spatial/
temporal
region
occupied
by
y’;
in
contrast,
‘is
part
of’
in
the
commonsensical
usage
is
not
a
transitive
relation.
The
switch
from
a
transitive
to
a
non-‐transitive
part-‐relation
betokens
that
‘is
part
of’
must
be
defined
relative
to
partition
levels.
The
parts
of
an
entity
α
are
a’s
1-‐parts,
the
parts
of
the
parts
of
α
are
at
α’s
2-‐
parts,
and
so
on—in
general,
the
nth
iteration
of
the
part-‐relation
yields
one
of
α’s
n-‐parts.
This
implies
a
profound
change
in
the
expressive
power
of
a
mereological
system;
as
I
have
argued,
however,
the
shift
to
“Leveled
Mereology”
is
for
many
purposes
in
ontology
quite
advantageous.
26
One
of
these
advantages
is
the
fact
that
in
a
mereological
system
with
a
non-‐transitive
part-‐relation
there
is
a
non-‐vacuous
reading
for
strict
automerity.
In
‘Leveled
Mereology’
not
only
parthood
is
relativized
to
partition
levels,
also
identity
(i.e.,
coreferentiality)
is
defined—via
the
Proper
Parts
Principle—
relative
to
a
certain
level
of
depth—briefly,
α
and
β
are
identical
just
in
case
they
have
the
same
1-‐through-‐n-‐parts,
for
a
given
n.
Assume
that
n
=1,
which
means
that
two
entities
are
identical
just
in
case
their
share
the
same
1-‐parts.
If
β
and
γ
are
the
1-‐parts
of
an
entity
α,
and
α
and
δ
are
1-‐parts
of
β,
then
α
can
be
a
2-‐part
of
itself.
In
other
words,
provided
a
partition
has
self-‐similar
structure
relative
to
the
level
n
for
which
the
identity
principle
has
been
fixed,
such
a
partition
can
represent
an
entity
E
that
contains
itself
or
is
(strictly)
automerous
in
the
sense
that
if
R
is
the
spatial/temporal
region
that
contains
E
as
a
whole,
the
some
(all)
subregions
ri
of
R
contain
E
as
a
whole.
For
example,
in
Figure
1
the
entity
α
is
identified
via
its
1-‐parts
β
and
γ;
both
of
these
parts
contain
α,
even
though
they
not
directly,
but
as
part
of
a
part.
If
we
were
to
supplement
the
figure
by
assuming
that
also
δ,
k,
ε,
and
θ
have
α
as
a
part,
it
would
represent
a
strictly
automerous
entity.
26
See
Seibt
2004b,
2009
and
2015.
21
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
Figure
1
γ
4.
Conclusion
In
this
paper
I
have
presented
reactions
to
Aristotle’s
so-‐called
‘completeness
test’
in
Metaphysics
Θ.6
that
were
to
serve
heuristic
purposes
only.
Whether
the
suggested
interpretation
of
energeia
as
the
‘dominant’
of
two
modes
of
dynamicity
is
at
all
tenable,
can
remain
open.
My
main
aim
was
to
use
Aristotle’s
text
as
a
foil
for
a
discussion
of
the
most
basic
concepts
within
an
ontology
of
dynamic
being,
concepts
like
coming
about
and
going
on,
that
remain
presupposed
in
more
specific
and
more
easily
analyzable
notions
for
occurrences
and
dynamic
features
in
the
science
(e.g.,
production,
motion,
causation,
reaction,
feedback,
self-‐maintenance,
autopoiesis
etc.).
I
have
tried
to
highlight
that
Aristotle’s
text
provides
us
with
two
very
useful
methodological
pointer.
First,
it
can
direct
analytical
ontologists
to
a
more
careful
investigation
of
aspectual
inferences
as
the
relevant
linguistic
data
for
an
ontology
of
dynamic
beings
or
occurrence
types.
I
have
argued
here
that
the
single
aspectual
inference
used
in
the
completeness
test
does
not
suffice
for
a
distinction
between
occurrence
types,
which
are
to
be
correlated
with
more
complex
dynamic
information,
but
it
can
be
used
to
fix
a
contrast
between
two
basic
modes
of
dynamicity,
coming
about
and
going
on.
The
second
important
pointer
that
22
In:
V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
Aristotle
has
left
us
with
is
to
mereology
as
a
tool
for
a
formal
ontology
of
dynamic
beings
and
modes
of
dynamicity.
Within
a
non-‐standard
mereology,
or
so
I
tried
to
illustrate
in
the
final
section,
we
can
formulate
the
self-‐referential
structures
that
seem
to
be
the
hallmark
of
any
attempt
of
conceptually
characterizing
dynamicity.
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J.
(1965)
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Energeia
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Bambrough
R.,
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and
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Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
24
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V.
Petrov/A.
Scarfe
(eds.)
2015,
Dynamic
Being,
Cambridge
Scholars,
2-‐28.
25