Ripp Yugoslav Conflict 1956 1958

Hungary's Part in the
Soviet—Yugoslav Conflict,
1956-58
ZOLTÁN RIPP
H u n g a r y , after the 1956 r e v o l u t i o n , played a special part in the dispute that b r o k e

out between the Soviet U n i o n and Yugoslavia and c o n t i n u e d w i t h varying intensity
for several years. 1
T h i s eventful story was an important part of the process that
decided the fate of the East-Central European region. T h e immediate cause of
political contention between Belgrade and M o s c o w was their differences over the
H u n g a r i a n question, especially the fate of Imre N a g y , w h o had been prime minister
d u r i n g the revolution. T h e intrinsic conflicts lay deeper, however. A l t h o u g h the
N a g y affair remained an important factor in the disagreements throughout — f r o m
his k i d n a p p i n g to the 'war of the protest notes' that f o l l o w e d his execution — it acted
mainly as a catalyst. T h e N a g y affair was an insurmountable p r o b l e m for all the
players concerned. It p r o v i d e d ample fuel for the debates, and each side f o u n d that it
c o u l d be used to put pressure on the other. D u e to the system of relations between
the three c o m m u n i s t countries, the H u n g a r i a n side played the least active part. János
Kádár, having c o m e to p o w e r through the crushing of the uprising of O c t o b e r
1956, was left in no doubt that H u n g a r y had to f o l l o w faithfully the K r e m l i n ' s
foreign-policy line and accommodate itself to Soviet regional p o l i c y requirements.
Nonetheless, the story remains interesting from Hungary's point of v i e w as w e l l ,
because it reveals m o r e than the constraints on a small, exposed country. It also
shows h o w Kádár, as he zigzagged between the conflicting demands of T i t o and
K h r u s h c h e v , trying to keep on g o o d terms w i t h b o t h , was gathering experience that
w o u l d be useful in his later foreign p o l i c y .
' For a fuller account, see Zoltán R i p p , Belgrád és Moszkva között. A jugoszláv kapcsolat és a Nagy
Imre-kérdés 1956. november-1959 február (Between Belgrade and Moscow. Yugoslav Relations and the
Imre Nagy Question, November 1956-February 1959) (Budapest: Politikatörténeti Alapítvány (Political
History Foundation), 1994). The main documents of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations have appeared in
two volumes: József Kiss, Zoltán R i p p and István Vida, eds., Magyar—jugoszláv kapcsolatok 1956.
Dokumentumok (Hungarian—Yugoslav Relations in 1956. Documents) (Budapest: M T A (Hungarian
Academy of Sciences), 1995) (hereafter Documents I), and Magyar-jugoszláv kapcsolatok 1956. december—
1Ç)}Ç). február. Dokumentumok (Hungarian—Yugoslav Relations December 1956—February 1959. D o c u -
ments) (Budapest: M T A , 1997) (hereafter Documents II).
Contemporary European History, 7, 2 (1998), pp. 197—225 © 1998 Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
198 Contemporary European History
I. Soviet—Yugoslav reconciliation and its effect on H u n g a r y
After Stalin's death, the n e w Soviet leadership under K h r u s h c h e v q u i c k l y set about

repairing what the dictator had destroyed of the Yugoslav relationship. A l o w point
had been reached in S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v (and so Hungarian—Yugoslav) relations, after
the notorious C o m i n f o r m resolutions of 1948 and 1949. W h e n the Yugoslav
communist leaders refused to sacrifice their independence and j o i n the Soviet bloc,
Stalin and the heads of the other countries branded t h e m as traitors to the socialist
cause and lackeys of imperialism. Thereafter Yugoslavia was subjected to the
strongest of ideological and political onslaughts for several y e a n .
The successive show trials in the Eastern European countries, especially
Hungary's R a j k trial, clearly served as a vehicle for d e n o u n c i n g T i t o and the
Yugoslav c o m m u n i s t leadership. 2
After the ' T i t o i t e band of spies' had been
c o n d e m n e d , Hungary's Mátyás R á k o s i , w h o aspired to be Stalin's prize p u p i l ,
managed w i t h his associates to foment positively warlike tensions against the
country's southern neighbour. T h e Yugoslavs had hitherto f o l l o w e d an o r t h o d o x
c o m m u n i s t line, but f i r m measures began to be taken against the p r o - S o v i e t internal
opposition. 3
R a d i c a l changes in the country's e c o n o m i c and political structure
ensued in the early 1950s. T i t o ' s Yugoslavia, h a v i n g preferred a breach to
subordinating itself to K r e m l i n policy, was obliged after a time to draw closer to the
West. T h e W e s t e r n countries, especially the U S A and B r i t a i n , had strong reasons of
p o w e r politics to w i s h that Belgrade w o u l d maintain its independence, and they
extended e c o n o m i c and military aid for the purpose. A l t h o u g h Yugoslavia retained
a strong proletarian dictatorship in the first half of the 1950s, it began to develop an
internal system of its o w n , based on producer self-management. 4
T h i s system,
different from the Soviet forms, aroused strong interest and attraction a m o n g
reformers in Eastern C e n t r a l E u r o p e , and fostered some illusions a m o n g them.
Soviet—Yugoslav reconciliation (faithfully followed in the e c o n o m i c , c o m m e r c i a l
and several other fields by measures towards Hungarian—Yugoslav reconciliation)
was not a s m o o t h process. O n e reason was the existence of conflicts w i t h i n the
Soviet and the H u n g a r i a n leaderships. T h e m a i n opponent of rapprochement w i t h
the Yugoslavs was V . M . M o l o t o v , w h o remained a serious r i v a l t o K h r u s h c h e v i n
the K r e m l i n struggle for succession, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d for several years. T h e prime
5
minister of H u n g a r y from June 1953 to the b e g i n n i n g of 1955 was Imre N a g y , w h o

followed a p o l i c y of radical reform. H o w e v e r , just as the Soviet—Yugoslav
2
László Rajk, a leading Hungarian communist, was sentenced to death and executed on fabricated
charges in 1949. The trial ushered in the hysterical campaign against the Yugoslavs.
3
Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovic, k n o w n as the 'Cominformists', were arrested in 1948 after
opposing the dismissive reply sent to the Soviet leadership. There were extensive purges carried out in
the Yugoslav Communist Party at the time.
4
See Harold Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism. Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), and
Duncan W i l s o n , Tito's Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
D
W h e n the 'anti-party' group was eventually removed in June 1957, one of Khrushchev's
accusations was that M o l o t o v , as foreign minister, had acted expressly against an improvement in
Soviet-Yugoslav relations. See Pravda, 4 j u l . 1957.
Hungary's Part in the Soviet—Yugoslav Conflict 199
reconciliation process reached the stage where h i g h - l e v e l relations c o u l d be restored,

the hard-line R á k o s i group regained p o w e r in Budapest, w i t h K r e m l i n support.
T h i s soon began to impede M o s c o w ' s efforts w i t h Yugoslavia, w h i c h were aimed at
restoring what it perceived as the n o r m a l order in the region seen as the Soviet
sphere of influence.
E v e n after Stalin's death, the Soviet U n i o n c o n t i n u e d to perceive the c o m m u -
nist-ruled countries in terms of regional p o w e r politics, and to treat the socialist
camp as a tight, centrally controlled, b l o c . Yugoslavia, w i t h its policy of a separate
road, was an irritant. It was a foreign b o d y in the system. It stood as a l i v i n g disproof
of the ideological tenet that w o r l d socialism, h a v i n g reached the stage of i m p l e m e n -
tation, c o u l d only exist and t r i u m p h as a w o r l d system by remaining a single bloc
based on identical principles. K h r u s h c h e v , the exponent of reconciliation, saw
T i t o ' s separate road as the harmful o u t c o m e of Stalin's erroneous p o l i c y , but
thought clever p o l i c y - m a k i n g might repair the damage his predecessor had done.
K h r u s h c h e v d i d not find it easy to hit the right note w i t h the Yugoslav
communists, w h o were fearful for their national interests and their ideology. T h e
trouble was not confined to the conflict of interests in regional policy. T h e
ideological and conceptual problems were tied up w i t h the p o w e r question. E i t h e r
side risked a great deal by m a k i n g ideological concessions, because there were also
blunt considerations of p o w e r b e h i n d the way in w h i c h the basic principles seen as
b i n d i n g on the w h o l e c o m m u n i s t w o r l d were interpreted. So the reconciliation
process was constantly subject to a tactical search for ideological, diplomatic and
economic equilibrium.
T h e first major step in the process of Soviet—Yugoslav reconciliation was a
pilgrimage of penance to Belgrade, made by K h r u s h c h e v and B u l g a n i n in M a y 1955.
T h i s ended the o p e n antagonism and i m p r o v e d the situation for Y u g o s l a v i a . It was
6
vital for Yugoslavia to settle relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n because it faced grave
e c o n o m i c problems, despite W e s t e r n assistance, and it was surrounded by hostile
countries. H o w e v e r , Yugoslavia d i d not w i s h to trade concessions in its international
position for normalization. It was intent on retaining its independence and its g o o d
relations w i t h the West. T h e Soviet U n i o n was called u p o n to recognize Yugoslavia's
independence and international freedom of m o v e m e n t , and its sovereign right to its
o w n internal system. T h e t w o sides put far from identical constructions on what was
achieved at the Belgrade meeting, w h i c h already signalled a difference of u n d e r l y i n g
a p p r o a c h . That difference remained throughout the successive crises of 1956.
7
R a p p r o c h e m e n t gained a further impetus w h e n the p o l i c y of de-Stalinization

was proclaimed at the twentieth congress of the C o m m u n i s t Party of the Soviet
6
For the Belgrade declaration, see Stephen Clissold, ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939—
1973. A Documentary Survey (London, N e w Y o r k and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 254-7.
7
T i t o reiterated his position in a letter of 29 Jun. 1955, to the C P S U central committee. This was
a response to a letter from Khrushchev, to the communist parties of the socialist countries, on 25 June.
He represented the meeting as something that had brought Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet fold and
distanced it from the West. Both letters can be found in the Magyar Országos Levéltar (Hungarian
National Archives, hereafter MOL) 276. f. 65/117.
U n i o n ( C P S U ) , in February 1956. A few months later, the j o i n t declaration agreed

at a M o s c o w summit meeting between T i t o and K h r u s h c h e v in June was justifiably
marked as a success by the Belgrade leadership. T h e y made no concessions regarding
their independence or principles, w h i c h greatly enhanced Yugoslavia's r e p u t a t i o n . 8
T h e success also gave support to T i t o ' s exaggerated foreign-policy ambitions, for

apart from aspiring to lead the infant m o v e m e n t of non-aligned countries, he aimed
to raise his country's regional standing by influencing the de-Stalinization process in
Eastern E u r o p e . T h e r e the Yugoslav president needed allies, or at least partners,
against the c o m p r o m i s e d Stalinist leaders in the socialist countries. Yugoslavia, on its
separate road, was not just a t h o r n in their side because of its internal policies. It was
a personal threat to t h e m , since it was m a k i n g changes that called their earlier
policies into question. T i t o naturally saw K h r u s h c h e v as his m a i n partner, but he
tended to overestimate the Soviet leader's c o m m i t m e n t to reform. T h e strident
demand for changes in P o l a n d and H u n g a r y and the struggles between reformers
and the o r t h o d o x camp led the Yugoslav leaders to hope that their concept of
socialism c o u l d be vindicated and Yugoslavian regional foreign p o l i c y ambitions
realized.
T h e M o s c o w declaration d i d not end the tensions caused by the t w o sides'

conflicting aims. K h r u s h c h e v reverted to a p e n d u l u m policy. On the one hand he
sought to reassure the Stalinist leaders of the countries under his influence that there
had been no changes of principle. F o r the sake of regional stability, he tried to curb
the efforts at reform, especially the demands for increased national independence.
On the other hand he encouraged n e i g h b o u r i n g countries, especially H u n g a r y , to
pursue further rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia.
O n e important factor b e h i n d R á k o s i ' s dismissal was that T i t o refused to raise the
process of Hungarian—Yugoslav reconciliation to the top political level w h i l e leaders
c o m p r o m i s e d b y the anti-Yugoslav p o l i c y remained i n p o w e r . H o w e v e r , Belgrade
9
put no trust either in R á k o s i ' s successor as first secretary, E r n ő G e r ő , as he was the

most influential m e m b e r of the R á k o s i group. It t o o k a series of gestures, i n c l u d i n g
the rehabilitation and reburial of László R a j k and his associates, c o u p l e d w i t h
persuasion by the Soviet leaders, before agreement was reached for a H u n g a r i a n
party and government delegation to visit Yugoslavia o n 15—22 O c t o b e r 1 9 5 6 . 10
It was clear that the Yugoslavs o n l y accepted the G e r ő leadership out of necessity,
8
See Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
' Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was dismissed at a meeting of the
central leadership on 18 Jul. 1956. Later he was taken to Moscow, from where he never returned.
The first move came in a letter from Gerő to Tito on 19 Jul. 1956 {Documents I, item 19).
On 5 Oct., while T i t o and Rankovic were staying in the Crimea, Khrushchev arranged without
their knowledge for a meeting with Gerő. It was there that agreement was reached over the reburial of
Rajk and his executed associates, and on the visit to Yugoslavia by a top-level Hungarian delegation.
The reburial of Rajk on 6 Oct. 1956, assumed the character of a mass demonstration. Y. V.
Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, in a report on 12 O c t . of his discussion with Gerő,
already referred to a worsening Hungarian domestic political situation and mounting Yugoslav
influence. See Vjacseszlav Szereda and Alekszandr Sztikalin, eds., Hiányzó lapok 1956 történetéből.
Dokumentok a volt SZKP KB levéltárából (Missing Pages from the History of 1956. Documents from the
Archives of the former C P S U C C ) , (Budapest: Móra, 1993), 83-90.
Hungary's Part in the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict 201
and d i d not expect any serious reforms f r o m them. On the other hand there was a
discernible c o m m o n interest, based on agreement in p r i n c i p l e , between T i t o and
the opposition reform group r o u n d Imre N a g y . Nagy's foreign-policy views and
intentions were in line w i t h the independent Yugoslav p o l i c y , based on equal rights
and the principle of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . 11
These aroused hopes in Belgrade that if
events were favourable, N a g y might prove a direct ally in Yugoslavia's northern
neighbour, and a partner in the de-Stalinization process in line w i t h Yugoslav ideas.
After all, their c o m m o n goal was a c o m m u n i s t , if not a ' M u s c o v i t e ' , solution to the
crisis. To H u n g a r y ' s reformers, the Yugoslav example (along w i t h the efforts in
Poland) was the m a i n encouragement and stimulus to m o v e towards independence
and democratization.
O n e idea that appeared prominently in US foreign p o l i c y at this time was that
'national c o m m u n i s m ' of the Yugoslav type might be a first step towards w e a k e n i n g
the Soviet camp and c o m m u n i s m . 1 2
H o w e v e r , this was o n l y identified later w i t h
Yugoslav intentions, by those fabricating a conspiracy theory to justify the reprisals
in H u n g a r y . M o r e important to the loose relationship that arose between Yugoslav
diplomats accredited to Budapest and some members of Nagy's opposition group
were shared political intentions. These p r o v i d e d a f i r m basis for the widespread
sympathy for Yugoslavia found in H u n g a r i a n society.
II. Yugoslavia and the H u n g a r i a n revolution
T h e outbreak of the armed uprising in Budapest on 23 O c t o b e r and the force

b e h i n d it caught the Yugoslav leaders by surprise, although they had sensed that the
crisis was deepening. T h e Yugoslav stance was ambivalent f r o m the outset. T h e y
saw in the uprising p r o o f that the Stalinist leadership of R a k o s i and G e r o was
bankrupt, 13
and that radical changes were needed in the practice of socialism. T h e y
h o p e d for a Yugoslav-style change, but they certainly d i d not want to see an
upheaval that wrested c o n t r o l over events f r o m the c o m m u n i s t leadership.
T h e positive example in Belgrade's eyes was P o l a n d and the type of solution to a
crisis that had brought W l a d i s l a w G o m u l k a to p o w e r . H o w e v e r , a P o l i s h type of
consolidation ceased to be feasible once the H u n g a r i a n and Soviet leaden had
branded the uprising as counter-revolutionary f r o m the outset and decided to
deploy Soviet troops to end it by f o r c e . 14
After all, it had rested primarily on
G o m u l k a , as a c o m m u n i s t leader, f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y that aroused national feelings,
in spite of the Soviet U n i o n . Also important was the fact that the workers' uprising
" See Imre Nagy: Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New Y o r k : Praeger,
1957)-
12
For Resolution 5608 of the National Security C o u n c i l , on United States policy towards the
satellite countries, see Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, V o l . xxv, 198-209.
13
As late as 22 Oct., the Yugoslavs signed a joint declaration with Gero, but after the uprising, this
assistance in legitimizing the old leadership was treated as if it had never happened.
14
Gomulka himself put the example of the Polish consolidation before the Hungarian leaders. But
its real significance came only after the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, when it served
more as self-justification than a real pattern for the Hungarians.
at P o z n a n in the summer was dismissed as 'counter-revolutionary'. T h e situation in

H u n g a r y developed in a radically different way after 23 O c t o b e r . It steadily emerged
that any basis for peaceful consolidation after the uprising w o u l d have to go far
b e y o n d what either T i t o or G o m u l k a thought desirable, or what N a g y h i m s e l f had
envisaged. T h e Yugoslav's v i e w of N a g y as an indecisive 'blunderer' really reflected
their o w n dilemma. On the one hand they c o n d e m n e d G e r ő ' s Stalinist leadership
for h a v i n g fomented the uprising w i t h their policies, and saw replacing it by a
N a g y - K á d á r team as a way to attain a regime close to the Y u g o s l a v m o d e l . On the
other they realized that there c o u l d hardly be a ' T i t o i s t ' consolidation of that k i n d if
p o w e r slipped out of the communists' hands. A l t h o u g h the Yugoslav ambassador
reported the demonstrators' acclaim for T i t o and w i d e sympathy for the Y u g o
slavs, 15
and the formation of workers' councils i m p l i e d an approach to the Y u g o s l a v
m o d e l , the course of events caused concern in Belgrade.
T h i s ambivalent assessment meant that the first official Yugoslav reactions were
restrained. T h e gratification at the collapse of the Stalinist leadership d i d not go to
extremes. A l t h o u g h the Soviet intervention was faulted, the Yugoslavs avoided
c o n d e m n i n g it outright by b l a m i n g the events that had precipitated it. At the same
time they expressed sympathy w i t h the policy of satisfying rightful popular
demands, w h i c h they expected the n e w c o m m u n i s t leaders to pursue. Belgrade
saw 28 O c t o b e r as the watershed, when the party central committee had
recognized the events as a national democratic uprising and met some popular
demands, but had maintained the bases of the e c o n o m i c and political system. T h a t
was a platform on w h i c h an independent, but still patently c o m m u n i s t , system
c o u l d rest. On 29 O c t o b e r T i t o c o m p l i e d w i t h a request to support the H u n g a r i a n
party leadership's efforts in an o p e n letter, but also set limits to what the a n t i -
Stalinist and national c o m m u n i s t platform should a t t e m p t . 16
T h e position taken by
the Y u g o s l a v communists encompassed the anxiety that i m b u e d T i t o ' s letter, w i t h
its w a r n i n g of 'unforeseen consequences', and solidarity w i t h the line taken on
28 O c t o b e r .
Belgrade received favourably the idea of placing Soviet relations w i t h the socialist
countries on a n e w basis. T h i s was raised by the M o s c o w government declaration of
30 O c t o b e r , along w i t h the prospect of talks on w i t h d r a w i n g Soviet troops from
Hungary. 1 7
T h e Yugoslavs supported the democratization of p u b l i c life, the
establishment of workers' councils, and the radical reorganization of the c o m m u n i s t
party. H o w e v e r , they feared that attempts m i g h t be made to restore the k i n d of
strongly right-wing, autocratic regime of H o r t h y ' s H u n g a r y before 1945. T h a t
c o u l d give p o w e r to nationalist groups that m i g h t go on to raise the question of
1
Telegrams 503 and 516 from Ambassador Dalibor Soldatic to Belgrade, 13 and 25 O c t . 1956,
Documents I, items 38, 39 and 41.
16
Tito's open letter appeared in the Hungarian press on 29 October. See Documents I, item 48.
17
Pravda, 30 O c t . 1956. M i c u n o v i c , the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, made a characteristic
comment when he noted in his diary that the declaration was belated, and at odds with Soviet political
practice. See Veljko M i c u n o v i c , Tito követe voltam. Moszkva 1956-1958 (I Was Tito's Envoy. M o s c o w
1956-8; original tide: Moskovskegodine ¡956-1958), (Budapest: Interart, 1990), 128-35.
Yugoslavia's sizeable H u n g a r i a n m i n o r i t y . 1 8
T h e y were alarmed by the a n t i -
c o m m u n i s t atrocities and by the general vehemence of the armed uprising. T h e y
expressly rejected the u n l i m i t e d i n t r o d u c t i o n of a multi-party system, the establish-
ment of a bourgeois democratic political structure, and the organization of right-
w i n g parties, in other words, all the developments in the early days of N o v e m b e r .
As for the N a g y government's decision to w i t h d r a w f r o m the W a r s a w Pact and
declare neutrality, c o m m e n t in the Yugoslav press was n o n - c o m m i t t a l , although the
w i d e public approval for the moves was made p l a i n . 1 9
T h e N a g y government's attempt at consolidation increasingly bore the character

of a four-party coalition. W i t h i n a few days after 30 O c t o b e r , the Yugoslavs had to
realize that it rested on things that their principles w o u l d not let t h e m support.
Events passed the p o i n t where it was still possible to imagine a ' T i t o i s t ' solution
b e i n g reached in a peaceful, integral way. T i t o and his associates soon came to see it
as the lesser of t w o evils to accept the second Soviet military i n t e r v e n t i o n , in the
light o f the 3 0 O c t o b e r declaration and Khrushchev's c o m m i t m e n t t o reform. O f
course they attached some strong conditions as to the persons i n v o l v e d , expecting
the group associated w i t h the names of János Kádár and of Imre N a g y to oust the
Stalinists permanently from the country's leadership.
W h i l e the Soviet U n i o n v i e w e d military intervention as a way to prevent the
arrangements in Eastern E u r o p e f r o m breaking d o w n , the Yugoslavs saw it as a
prerequisite for an acceptable political solution, even i f i t put the character of future
development at risk. A c c o r d i n g to Soviet sources, b o t h President T i t o and defence
minister Ivan Gosnjak clearly stated in m i d - N o v e m b e r that the Y u g o s l a v army
w o u l d have been prepared, ultimately, to i n t e r v e n e . 20
A l t h o u g h there was hardly
any l i k e l i h o o d of this happening, despite some troop movements on the Y u g o s l a v
side of the border, the m e n t i o n of the possibility sheds light on the way the
Yugoslavs were t h i n k i n g .
T h e meeting on the island of B r i o n i , at three in the m o r n i n g on 2 N o v e m b e r , far
exceeded Khrushchev's and M a l e n k o v ' s expectations. 21
T h e top Y u g o s l a v leaders —
E d v a r d Kardelj and Aleksandar R a n k o v i c were there as w e l l as T i t o — immediately
conceded that military intervention was essential, to safeguard the achievements of
socialism. T h i s followed directly f r o m the Yugoslav considerations m e n t i o n e d
already. H o w e v e r , although the t w o sides agreed on the decisive issue, their
difference of approach led to serious tensions later. K h r u s h c h e v , d u r i n g the talks,
ignored the Yugoslav arguments about basing socialism on the w o r k e r s ' councils,
reforms or de-Stalinization. Furthermore, the reaffirmation of the contents of the
18
Khrushchev, sensing this fear, later used the tactic of exaggerating the size of the Hungarian
ethnic minority in Yugoslavia and citing it before the Yugoslavs as a potential threat.
Miklós Molnár, Budapest, 1956. The History of the Hungarian Revolution (London: George Allen
and U n w i n , 1971).
20
Khrushchev referred to this in a letter to T i t o , on 10 Jan. 1957. It occurred in Belgrade on 18
N o v . 1956, when Tito and Gosnjak received a Soviet military delegation led by General V. N.
Komarov (Documents II, item 28).
21
M i c u n o v i c , Tito követe voltam, 128—35; N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, w i t h an
introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw (London: André Deutsch, 1971), 420-22.
30 O c t o b e r government declaration was designed m a i n l y to w i n Yugoslav support,

not to c o n f i r m that relations w i t h the socialist countries w o u l d be placed on a n e w
footing. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders were increasingly concerned to restore
the o l d u n i t y in the socialist camp, after the loosening effects of the twentieth
congress.
T h e difference of approach becomes clearest in personality terms. Yugoslavia
insisted that Kádár should be made leader, rather than Ferenc M ü n n i c h , the first
Soviet choice, in the hope that H u n g a r y w o u l d then f o l l o w a line closer to
Belgrade's and m o r e independent of M o s c o w ' s . T h e real issue was the fate of Imre
N a g y and his immediate circle. To the Soviets it was self-evident that N a g y w o u l d
have to go, since he was guilty o f ' c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ' . T h e Yugoslavs wanted the
consolidation to b r i n g a return to a Nagy-style p o l i c y of reform w i t h i n the system,
or at least the inclusion of Nagy's immediate associates in the leadership.
So the difference of approach failed to emerge at B r i o n i . T h i s was not the o n l y
circumstance that was to have grave consequences. T h e t w o sides also put different
constructions on an agreement between them. Based on a discussion that Ambassador
Soldatic had held at the H u n g a r i a n p r i m e minister's office on 1 N o v e m b e r , 2 2
the
Yugoslavs suggested g i v i n g temporary asylum to N a g y and his associates at the
Yugoslav embassy. T h e y offered to invite N a g y and a few colleagues to the embassy,
and there b r i n g t h e m to resign and support the n e w government led by Kádár.
K h r u s h c h e v and his party saw the proposal as a s m o o t h and satisfactory way of
sidelining N a g y , and t o o k the reference to b r i n g i n g the p r i m e minister to resign at face
value. T h e Yugoslavs, on the other hand, were seeking ways to salvage the situation
by forging a K á d á r - N a g y alliance and ensuring a c o n t i n u e d p r o - Y u g o s l a v p o l i c y of
reform. T h e y obviously h o p e d the N a g y group w o u l d realize that intervention was
inescapable, but that there was still a chance for partial, ' P o l i s h - t y p e ' independence.
III. A double trap
W h i l e K h r u s h c h e v and M a l e n k o v were negotiating i n Yugoslavia, János Kádár,

minister of state in the N a g y government, and Ferenc M ü n n i c h , the interior
minister, were s u m m o n e d by the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Y u r i A n d r o p o v .
T h e y were taken covertly t o M o s c o w w i t h the cooperation o f the Soviet army. O n
2 N o v e m b e r 1956, the presidium of the C P S U gave a hearing to Kádár. Shortly
before his arrival, Kádár had still voted at the m e e t i n g of the H u n g a r i a n government
for declaring Hungary's neutrality and w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m the W a r s a w Pact. He had
then announced in a radio address the dissolution of the o l d c o m m u n i s t party and
foundation of a n e w party, on a platform of parliamentary democracy based on free
elections, independence, and acceptance of h u m a n rights. T w o days later, Kádár
came forward as head of the n e w K r e m l i n - a p p o i n t e d H u n g a r i a n government.
22
During the Ambassador's conversation with Nagy's colleagues. Géza Losonczy and Zoltán
Szántó, Szántó proposed that if need be, the Yugoslavs should give asylum to the families of some
politicians.
Soviet documents published recently provide the clearest picture so far of what
happened in the few days leading up to Kádár's volte-face, w h i c h was tantamount to
treachery. 23
Initially Kádár emphasized the drawbacks of military intervention. In
spite of the tough political battles it was l i k e l y to cause, he c o n t i n u e d to argue in
favour of the course the N a g y government had chosen. He carried on d o i n g so u n t i l
it was made clear to h i m that the intervention had already been decided and the
o n l y questions still to clarify concerned the process of i m p l e m e n t i n g it. O n c e the
situation was plain, Kádár immediately accepted the role assigned h i m , although he
c o u l d hardly have doubted that this w o u l d brand h i m as a national traitor. He d i d
not do so unconditionally, but the conditions, aimed at securing a m i n i m u m of
independence, were vague and w i t h o u t real foundation, let alone any guarantee that
they w o u l d be observed, apart f r o m Khrushchev's promises. A p a r t f r o m the u n d e r -
taking to neutralize the R á k o s i group, w h o had fled to M o s c o w , there was an
important promise that N a g y w o u l d not cause problems of legitimacy too great to
overcome. T h e basis on w h i c h the Soviets made this promise was the solution they
had devised j o i n t l y w i t h the Yugoslavs. By agreeing to the intervention, Kádár had
adapted himself to the realistic p o w e r relations. H o w e v e r , by c o m m i t t i n g an act that
was morally reprehensible, he had set out on a course that w o u l d lead to the
execution of Imre N a g y and his associates.
T h e Soviet military intervention to crush the H u n g a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n began at
d a w n on 4 N o v e m b e r . H o w e v e r , the agreement reached at B r i o n i c o u l d not be
i m p l e m e n t e d , w h i c h at once caused serious tension between Belgrade and M o s c o w .
N a g y gave news of the Soviet attack in a dramatic speech on the radio, stating that
the H u n g a r i a n forces were d o i n g battle and the government was in place. T h e n he
t o o k up the i n v i t a t i o n of the Yugoslav diplomats, and w e n t w i t h several colleagues
to the Yugoslav embassy, where he received asylum.
Nagy's radio speech alone was e n o u g h to infuriate the Soviet leaders, w h o had
always i n c l i n e d towards treating h i m as a traitor. T h e situation was worsened w h e n
the plan to make the P r i m e M i n i s t e r resign came unstuck, despite the promises
made by Yugoslav diplomats and politicians. T h e N a g y group were not the o n l y
ones caught in a trap. T h e Yugoslavs f o u n d themselves in an irrevocably paradoxical
situation in w h i c h several factors were at w o r k . W h i l e the Belgrade leaders were
assuring the Kádár government of their support, they were also directly responsible
for what happened to the N a g y group, w h i c h dissociated itself utterly f r o m Kádár.
M e a n w h i l e they tried to keep on g o o d terms w i t h K h r u s h c h e v , w h o was b e c o m i n g
increasingly incensed. T h e y also had to l o o k to their international reputation, w h i c h
was already strained by their acceptance of Soviet intervention. N o r was the way in
w h i c h the situation was taken at h o m e irrelevant. T h e domestic political difficulties
were exemplified by the renewed arrest of the enfant terrible of Yugoslav politics,
M i l o v a n Djilas, for what he had w r i t t e n about the H u n g a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n .
23
V. N. Malin's notes of meetings of the Presidium of the C P S U central committee, in Vjacseszlav
Szereda and János M. Rainer, eds., Döntés a Kremlben. A szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról
(Decision in the Kremlin. The Soviet Party Presidium's Debates on Hungary) (Budapest: ' 56-os Intézet
(1956 Institute), 1996).
T i t o ' s biggest p r o b l e m was the rapid freeze in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, whose

consequences soon appeared in differing interpretations of the former H u n g a r i a n
uprising. K h r u s h c h e v , in a letter of 7 N o v e m b e r , was already expressing dismay that
the Yugoslavs had failed to keep their promise to neutralize the former H u n g a r i a n
prime minister. N a g y was b e i n g seen increasingly not just as a factor to be
overcome, but as the m a i n culprit for the H u n g a r i a n ' c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ' . So
M o s c o w found it unacceptable that the N a g y group should be taken to Yugoslavia,
as T i t o proposed. Instead the Soviets demanded that they be handed over to the
n e w Kádár government. O t h e r w i s e , K h r u s h c h e v openly threatened the Yugoslavs,
N a g y w o u l d be presented as a Yugoslav spy, and Belgrade given some of the blame
for the events in H u n g a r y . 2 4
A strong caution went out w h e n the columns of Pravda
were opened to the A l b a n i a n leader, E n v e r H o x h a , Yugoslavia's bitterest enemy, to
air his familiar accusations, w h i c h found a ready response a m o n g Stalinist leaders of
other c o m m u n i s t parties. 25
T h e famous speech by T i t o in P u l a on 11 N o v e m b e r reflected the ambivalent

situation in w h i c h the Yugoslavs found themselves, w h i l e accelerating and aggra-
vating the course of e v e n t s . 26
First, the Yugoslav president assured Kádár of his
support. T i t o k n e w that M o s c o w ' s m o u n t i n g impatience c o u l d easily cause a s w i n g
back to a hard line. So he argued that the outbreak of the H u n g a r i a n uprising should
be attributed to justified indignation against the R á k o s i regime, since 'the majority
of the w o r k i n g class and progressive people' had also taken up arms. T i t o felt it was
essential to Yugoslavia's interests for a reformist line to consolidate in the interna-
tional c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t . T h e assessment of the H u n g a r i a n uprising must offer
no pretext for a reversal. So he emphasized that his support for Kádár was support
for an anti-Stalinist solution. He pressed for relations among the socialist countries
to be subject to the principles governing the Soviet—Yugoslav reconciliation of
1955—56. It was also important that T i t o chose this occasion to state that the
twentieth congress had simplified the p r o b l e m of Stalinism, by targeting the
criticism on the cult of personality, instead of the system as a w h o l e . T h e function of
the 'system debate' started by this assertion was to ensure that the lessons drawn
from the H u n g a r i a n uprising should fit in w i t h Yugoslav—Polish—Hungarian
reformism, not the arguments of the hardliners.
T h e Soviets were disgusted, because T i t o had chosen to defend his o w n

reputation and to try to dissociate himself from the military intervention, and
because the p r o b l e m of Stalinism was an especially sensitive one for K h r u s h c h e v .
T h i s was a most inappropriate time for a debate on the Soviet and Y u g o s l a v models.
To retain a safe political base in the K r e m l i n , he had to prove above all his ability to
keep order on the edges of the empire and apply the steadfast principles of Soviet
regional policy. T i t o ' s support was opportune for Kádár, but the heightening
24
Khrushchev's letter to T i t o , 7 N o v . 1956, Documents I, item 77.
25
'Enver Hoxha, 15 Years of the Albanian Party of Labour', Pravda, 8 N o v . 1956.
26
Josip Broz T i t o , Borba za mir i medjunarodnu saradnju (Struggle for Peace and International
Cooperation), V o l . X (Belgrade: Kultúra, 1959), 210-32. For detail, see Clissold, Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, 263-8.
S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v tensions were an embarrassment, especially w h i l e M o s c o w kept a

sharp eye out for signs of ' T i t o i s m ' in the H u n g a r i a n leadership or press. 27
T h e P u l a speech gravely affected the N a g y group, trapped in the Yugoslav

embassy. F o r T i t o had spoken of 'flight', w h i c h pointed to a b r e a k d o w n of
solidarity. A l t h o u g h the Yugoslavs were careful to retain an appearance of sympathy,
the N a g y group were increasingly b e c o m i n g a burden to them. C o n c e r n to defend
Yugoslavia's reputation and escape from the predicament became almost the sole
criteria d u r i n g the negotiations about the group's future.
After l o n g and hard negotiations, the Yugoslavs managed to obtain Kádár's
signature to a letter guaranteeing i m p u n i t y and freedom to return h o m e for the
N a g y group, in exchange for their loss of asylum. B u t the Yugoslavs must have
k n o w n that this was just a safeguard against charges l i k e l y to be levelled against
t h e m , rather than a way of rescuing N a g y and his associates. T h e Yugoslavs d i d not
hesitate to make this sacrifice in order to escape f r o m the trap in w h i c h they were
caught. Nonetheless, they had managed, w i t h the letter of guarantee, to place a
t i m e - b o m b under the Hungarians, w h i c h Kádár had to try to defuse every time the
question of prosecuting the N a g y group was raised.
H o w e v e r , the existence of the guarantee letter, as evidence of a breach of faith,
was not the o n l y factor that c o o l e d the ardour of the H u n g a r i a n leadership's
conduct against Yugoslavia. Kádár sought to appear as a p o l i t i c i a n of the centre.
Irrespective of the letter, his p o w e r interests dictated that he should m i n i m i z e the
level of conflict, w h i l e carrying out mercilessly consistent reprisals to w h i c h the
Yugoslavs objected, above all the sentence on Imre N a g y . To this e n d he d i d not
hesitate to break his w o r d on later occasions either.
I V . T h e ideological battle and the N a g y affair
T h e m a i n concern of the Yugoslav leaders, in their diplomatic actions and protest

notes after the N a g y group had been kidnapped and taken to R o m a n i a , was to
restore their international r e p u t a t i o n . 28
At the same rime, they stepped up their
efforts to influence the nature of the consolidation in H u n g a r y by every available
means. T h e polemics in the columns of Pravda and Borba n o w appeared openly as a
debate about the Soviet and Yugoslav models of socialism and the alternatives of
Soviet hegemony or equal relations. G o m u l k a in P o l a n d , w h o had strong reserva-
tions about the Soviet position on the H u n g a r i a n questions, was an ally on w h o m
the Yugoslavs c o u l d still r e l y . 29
T h e H u n g a r i a n question gave the Yugoslavs an
27
The debate caused sharp tensions in the Hungarian party leadership. The editor-in-chief of the
central party newspaper was dismissed after a strike at the offices sparked by withdrawal of an article
intervening in the Soviet-Yugoslav debate. The 'Titoism' apparent in the Hungarian leadership was
mentioned in the report addressed by G. M. Malenkov, M. A. Suslov and A. B. Aristov to the C P S U
central committee on 24 N o v . 1956. Szereda and Sztikalin, Hiányzó lapok 1956, 175-7.
28
Yugoslavia protested in notes to the Hungarian government on 23 N o v . 1956 and to the Soviet
government on 24 N o v . against the blatant infringement of the agreement. For the exchanges, see
Documents I (items 123, 124, 129, 130 and 134) and Documents II (item 6).
29
Gomulka disagreed with the use of force and avoided the expression 'counter-revolution' until
excellent chance to set out their position. Indeed they tried to use the events as a
f o r m of self-justification. T h e y were remarkably active in associating the aspirations
apparent in the H u n g a r i a n revolution w i t h propaganda for the Y u g o s l a v m o d e l .
Budapest, on the other hand, suffered m o u n t i n g discomfiture as the need to
retain Yugoslav support began to clash w i t h the change in the approach to
consolidation. By early D e c e m b e r , the administration's measures to prop up its
authority were b e c o m i n g increasingly violent and v i n d i c t i v e , and aimed above all at
restoration. T h e central committee o f the H S W P (Hungarian Socialist W o r k e r s '
Party — the renamed H W P ) passed a resolution early in D e c e m b e r so defining 'the
causes of the c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ' that it was easy to deduce f r o m t h e m the idea of
an international imperialist plot assisted by domestic betrayal. W h e t h e r Yugoslavia
w o u l d be classed as a culprit depended simply on h o w relations between Belgrade
and the K r e m l i n developed.
T h e Yugoslavs reacted to the situation w i t h an ideological offensive. T h e
assessment of H u n g a r i a n events acquired a n e w d i m e n s i o n in the ensuing debate.
On 7 D e c e m b e r , E d v a r d Kardelj made a speech in Skupstina, Yugoslavia, that l o n g
remained a stumbling block for the leaders of the socialist c o u n t r i e s . 30
He raised
again the question of the system, by stating that the w o r k i n g class in H u n g a r y had
risen up 'against its o w n historical interests'. Clearly the Yugoslavs d i d not want to
diagnose either a 'deliberately organized c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ' or a 'struggle fought
for freedom and independence'. So they tried, in describing the uprising, to stress
the consolidation aspect, concentrating on the prospects for the w o r k e r s ' councils.
Kardelj argued that the truly communist approach was n o t to restore the bureau-
cratic system or reconstruct the political system centred on the party. It was to
develop the k i n d of system, based on workers' self-management, that the workers'
councils were demanding from an instinctively socialist position. H e r e he dis-
regarded the workers' councils' insistence on a multi-party system and other
'vestiges of bouregois liberalism' that the Yugoslav communists likewise rejected.
W h a t was essential was to present the Yugoslav m o d e l as an alternative to restoring
Stalinism. H u n g a r y , however, had no choice in the matter. T h e attempt to apply
pressure was fruitless. T h e argument became increasingly concerned w i t h v i n d i c a -
t i o n , as the debate became steadily more acrimonious.
T h e Yugoslav challenge was extremely unpleasant for the Kádár government. It

cast aspersions on the legitimacy of a forcible consolidation of p o w e r , in the area of
greatest topical concern: the struggle against the w o r k e r s ' c o u n c i l s . 31
Furthermore,
the spring of 1957. Another sign of closeness between the two countries was the visit paid to Poland by
a Yugoslav party delegation on 19—29 Dec. 1956.
30
Typically, Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Belgrade, described Kardelj's speech as a
cautious variant of Milovan Djilas's views phrased in Marxist jargon. He also said that the speech, which
went beyond Tito's at Pula, could be expected to provoke a strong reaction in the countries of the
Soviet bloc. Telegram N o . 847, 8 Dec. 1956, 371/124285. N H 10110/835, Foreign Office Records,
Public Records Office, London.
31
The Soviet intervention was followed in Budapest and across the country by a general political
strike led by the workers' councils. The Kádár government responded by banning the local workers'
councils and arresting their leaders.
it added to the pressure on H u n g a r y to distance itself f r o m the m o r e popular

Yugoslav m o d e l and fall into line w i t h the Soviet leadership, w h i c h further reduced
its chances of gaining legitimacy. T h e contradiction was contained in the Y u g o s l a v
action itself. T h e Yugoslavs c o u l d not do otherwise than oppose a trend unfavour-
able to t h e m , but in d o i n g so they weakened Kádár's position against the Soviets,
even though they saw in h i m the chance of a leadership that w o u l d be M u s c o v i t e in
a less o r t h o d o x way. T h e Yugoslavs had n o t h i n g to gain from a return by the
R á k o s i leadership. F r o m the safety of M o s c o w , the R á k o s i group were i n t r i g u i n g to
return h o m e and presume power. T h e y had sensed that the crisis was deepening and
emphasized the ' T i t o i s t ' nature of the Kádár leadership. 32
So for the Yugoslavs,
Kádár was relatively the best answer. As far as he c o u l d , Kádár tried to prevent
relations w i t h Yugoslavia from deteriorating. A l t h o u g h he subscribed ideologically
to the tenets expected of h i m in the Soviet camp, he usually f o l l o w e d a tactic of
d o i n g the m i n i m u m to satisfy Soviet demands. N o t for a m o m e n t w o u l d he have
wanted his image of fidelity to M o s c o w to fade, but he w o u l d not meet K r e m l i n
requirements if they conflicted w i t h the interests of the H u n g a r i a n leadership.
K h r u s h c h e v was satisfied if the Hungarians faithfully followed his instructions on the
political line and d i d not cause trouble w i t h i n the camp. Kádár throughout d i d all
he c o u l d to save the state and e c o n o m i c relations between H u n g a r y and Yugoslavia
f r o m the consequences of the political strife, and in d o i n g so he was not g o i n g
against Khrushchev's wishes.
T h e great international campaign against revisionism and national c o m m u n i s m

showed that it w o u l d be unfounded to assume that the historical situation presented
alternatives, even in a restricted sense. Belgrade's position in the ideological battle
simply became a defensive one, especially w i t h the active intervention in the region
o f the Chinese C o m m u n i s t Party, w h i c h had previously been u n u s u a l . 33
The
express w i s h of the leaders of the Soviet U n i o n and the other countries in the camp
was to see p o w e r consolidated in H u n g a r y by consistently restoring a Soviet-type
system. T h i s tendency towards restoration self-evidently meant that revisionism,
declared to be the m a i n threat at the b e g i n n i n g of 1957, had gained a qualitatively
different meaning from its counterpart, 'leftist leanings'. R e v i s i o n i s m was placed
outside the socialist system. T h e denunciation of it was accompanied by charges of
treason and of service to international imperialism. Parallel w i t h this began the
process of c r i m i n a l i z i n g the N a g y affair. T h e risk entailed in all this was that relations
w i t h Yugoslavia, the e m b o d i m e n t of the ' m a i n ideological danger', w o u l d revert to
32
Letter from Rákosi to Khrushchev, 9 Jan. 1956, in Éva Gál, András B. Hegedás, György Litván
and János M. Rainer, eds., A 'Jelcin dosszié'. Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ró'l (The 'Yeltsin File'. Soviet
Documents on 1956) (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó/56-os Intézet, 1993), 147-8.
3
Great significance was attached to an article in the Chinese party daily ('Once Again on the
Subject of the Historical Experiences of Proletarian Dictatorship', Renmin Ribao, 30 Dec. 1956, and to
Prime Minister Z h o u Enlai's talks in the Soviet U n i o n , Poland and Hungary. Relations deteriorated
further when the Yugoslavs refused to take part in an international communist conference, proposed
through the Chinese. This was obviously intended as an attempt to bring Yugoslavia closer to the
Soviet bloc. The incident ended the Chinese support for his attempts at independence, on which T i t o
had hitherto been able to count.
2io Contemporary European History
the situation before 1953. T i t o himself w a r n e d K h r u s h c h e v in a letter early in

February that occurrences reminiscent of the p e r i o d before the twentieth congress
were increasing. M o v e s b e i n g made by the countries in the Soviet camp suggested
that they intended to restore the situation of 1948. Instead, he proposed, attempts
should be made to include the 'progressive c o m m u n i s t forces' in the H u n g a r i a n
leadership, not brand t h e m as revisionist t r a i t o r s . 34
T h e r e was n o t h i n g Kádár wanted less than for H u n g a r y to become a front-line

country against Yugoslavia again, but the decision was not his. T h e H u n g a r i a n issue
gave the opposing sides their m a i n ideological weapons. Apart f r o m the pressure of
the Soviet-bloc countries, there was another bar to stopping the deterioration of
Hungarian—Yugoslav relations, w h i c h became irrevocable in the spring of 1957.
T h e system's sole possible basis for legitimacy was to label O c t o b e r 1956 a counter-
r e v o l u t i o n and Imre N a g y a traitor. T h a t , irrespective of other factors, meant that
internal policies designed to restore and fortify the system were b o u n d to have
adverse effects on relations w i t h Yugoslavia.
Attempts were made in Budapest to try to stop the relations f r o m worsening, but
the Hungarians had to y i e l d to the stronger tendency as w e l l . T h e balance was
affected most of all by t w o connected factors. O n e was the process of c r i m i n a l i z i n g
the Imre N a g y case. T h i s was not simply apparent in the way the charges against the
N a g y group c o i n c i d e d w i t h the criticisms of the Yugoslavs. Apart f r o m that, the first
steps were taken to investigate the relations between the t w o . T h e other decisive
factor was the Soviet—Hungarian summit m e e t i n g of M a r c h 1957, w h i c h finalized
the decisions that were being weighed. On the one hand, R á k o s i was declared once
and for all to be politically 'dead'. On the other, it was agreed to take c r i m i n a l
proceedings against Imre N a g y . T h i s c o i n c i d e d w i t h a further hardening of p o l i c y
towards Yugoslavia. As a sign of this, the Hungarians and the Soviet U n i o n , at the
topmost level and in p u b l i c , made statements c o n d e m n i n g the ' c o u n t e r - r e v o l u -
tionary' N a g y group and the Yugoslav leaders w h o had 'nourished and encouraged'
them. 3 5
T h i s aroused strong displeasure in Belgrade, especially w h e n the N a g y group

were arrested in R o m a n i a and brought back to Budapest. A n x i e t y was immediately
expressed that the trial of Imre N a g y , designed to compromise a recalcitrant
Yugoslavia, was b e i n g prepared as a repetition of the R a j k trial of 1949. 36
This
assumption was all the more justified because the H u n g a r i a n party leaders, on their
return f r o m M o s c o w , made the instructions they had received f r o m the C P S U clear
w h e n reporting on the results of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 37
34
Documents II, item 31.
3d
The speeches by Kádár and N. A. Bulganin on 23 and 27 Mar. 1957 were published at the time
in the Soviet and Hungarian press.
Begovic, Vlajko, Accusations and Facts', Borba, 5 Apr. 1957; M i c u n o v i c , Tito követe voltam, 218;
report by Lajos Cséby, Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade, on 13 Apr. 1957, Documents II, item 52.
37
Khrushchev's letter to T i t o on 10 Jan. 1957, quoted earlier, still contained a denial that a
campaign w o u l d be initiated against Yugoslavia like that in 1948. Kádár's reports to the leadership of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) in the early days of A p r i l gave evidence of the change in
the situation. This appeared in the reference to the validity of the 1948 Cominform resolution, in the
T h e parallel w i t h the R a j k trial was also a w a r n i n g by the Yugoslavs. T h e y had

other weapons to hand besides the N o v e m b e r letter of guarantee, if anyone tried to
use the N a g y trial against them. T h i s was one obvious reason w h y Kádár d i d not
want to aggravate matters. He hastened to assure the ambassador, J o v o K a p i c i c that
they wanted to settle relations on a friendly footing. If there were a trial, they w o u l d
not use it to compromise Y u g o s l a v i a . 38
F r o m then onwards, Budapest's handling of
Hungarian—Yugoslav relations was curiously ambiguous. Kádár wanted to moderate
the conflict w i t h the Yugoslavs, but not to make any concessions on the N a g y case,
w h i c h was generating the conflict. To resolve the c o n u n d r u m , he tried, even by
deception, to m i n i m i z e the Yugoslav i n v o l v e m e n t in the N a g y affair, w h i c h was
causing t h e m great concern. Kádár had the political committee of the H S W P drop
f r o m its agenda the sending of a provocative letter that explored the Yugoslav
responsibility for the H u n g a r i a n events and called u p o n the Yugoslavs to c o n d e m n
the c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n and distance themselves f r o m N a g y . 3 9
T h e demand w o u l d
have put Belgrade in an impossible situation. If they had distanced themselves as
requested, they w o u l d have lost their m o r a l g r o u n d for protesting over any future
trial. If they had not, they w o u l d have virtually admitted their c o m pl i c i t y .
Of course the m a i n source of conflict remained the difference between the

Yugoslav and Soviet positions on the question of the socialist c a m p . 4 0
The
Yugoslavs persisted in seeing it primarily as a military b l o c and a w e a p o n of Soviet
hegemony w h i c h they d i d not w i s h to j o i n , not as a voluntary association of
'fraternal solidarity' or a pledge of the w o r l d w i d e victory of socialism. T h e y left no
doubt about their adherence to the basic principles of their foreign p o l i c y . 4 1
V . D é t e n t e and disillusion
M o s c o w reacted sharply to the reiteration of the Titoist foreign-policy principles. It

seemed as if n o t h i n g c o u l d stop the deterioration process. 42
Y e t the t w o sides
succeeded in halting its intensification in the spring of 1957. T h i s was not simply
because each side had ways of m a k i n g life unpleasant for the other. D u r i n g M a y and
June, there were clear signs of détente in M o s c o w and Belgrade as w e l l . 4 3
So the
way the Yugoslav position was presented as the main support for the hostile imperialist attack, and in
the linkage of the Nagy group's activity as the 'main ideological weapon' for counter-revolution, with
the policy of the Yugoslavs. Documents II, items 48 and 49.
Memorandum by Deputy Foreign Minister Endre Sík, MOL, X I X - A - 2 S 14. d.; Ambassador J.
Kapicic's report of 10 Jun. 1957, Documents II, item 61; János Kádár's contribution at the 22 Jun. 1957
meeting of the H S W P central committee, Documents II, item 53.
39
Meeting of the H S W P political committee, 16 A p r . 1957, Documents II, item 53.
This was a matter on which Kádár and Foreign Minister Imre Horváth had to express
1
themselves explicidy, though they did so in a restrained way, in an attempt to mend relations.
Foreign Minister Koca Popovic's report in the Federal House of Representatives, 26 Feb. 1957,
Borba, 27 Feb. 1957.
42
The Soviet leadership's reply: Pravda, 11 Mar. 1957.
43
T i t o signified on several occasions his desire to normalize relations. He stated this in the paper
Mladost on 22 M a y 1957 and in Politika on 24 M a y . See Tito, Borba za mir, 284-310. Normalization of
inter-state relations was apparent in the conclusion of several agreements. A sign of rapprochement on
i m p r o v e m e n t c o u l d be seen before the attempt to oust K h r u s h c h e v , although it was

obviously connected w i t h the political strife and p o w e r struggle taking place in the
Soviet leadership. It was clearly not a coincidence that K h r u s h c h e v t o l d ambassador
M i c u n o v i c h e was planning major changes i n C P S U p o l i c y . 4 4
Khrushchev's plans
for reform and his desire to return to a policy of détente w i t h the W e s t were l i n k e d
w i t h i m p r o v i n g the Yugoslav relationship. T h e y w o u l d have fitted into an approach
of retaining Soviet hegemony in the region but refining the methods e m p l o y e d to
support it. T h e basis w o u l d have been laid at an informal, trilateral m e e t i n g w i t h
T i t o and G o m u l k a , w h i c h K h r u s h c h e v tried fruitlessly to arrange. It was all the
more important to settle matters in the region because Soviet attention was turning
increasingly towards the T h i r d W o r l d . T i t o was held in great respect in the n o n -
aligned countries. A rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia, or rather as M o s c o w planned
it, a closer approach by Yugoslavia to the fold, w o u l d have fitted in w e l l w i t h a
foreign p o l i c y shift towards the T h i r d W o r l d .
Hopes for a longer-term improvement came in the summer of 1957, w h e n an
attempted coup by M o l o t o v , K a g a n o v i c h and M a l e n k o v failed to topple K h r u s h -
chev. 45
T h e Y u g o s l a v leaders were gratified by the events, w h i c h they saw as a
v i n d i c a t i o n o f their p o s i t i o n . 46
T h e occurrences w i t h i n the C P S U and the
resolution of the central committee seemed to corroborate T i t o ' s v i e w of the
straggle between Stalinists and non-Stalinists. It augured a f i r m continuation of the
de-Stalinization line of the twentieth congress and the p o l i c y of détente and
reforms. Although the Yugoslav leaders were anxious about some negative
comments of Khrushchev's, they t o o k t h e m , for want of a better explanation, to be
gestures designed to outflank the Stalinists. M o r e importantly, the Soviet leaders
accepted their request to renegotiate their earlier stand of suspending the credit
agreements, and i n c l i n e d towards granting milder conditions.
In the early days of August 1957 it seemed as if the K h r u s h c h e v - T i t o s u m m i t
meeting in R o m a n i a w o u l d produce chances of settling the S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v and
the Hungarian—Yugoslav relationships. 47
K h r u s h c h e v t o o k advantage of the Y u g o -
slavs' notably peaceable attitude, w h i c h was motivated by hopes that the process of
détente w o u l d strengthen and the rigid regional p o l i c y become m o r e pliable, for
w h i c h Belgrade was w i l l i n g to pay a price. In the event they paid too highly. In
exchange for a declaration in principle — reiteration of the principles of the 1955
Belgrade and 1956 M o s c o w declarations — K h r u s h c h e v gained something concrete —
agreement from the Yugoslavs that they w o u l d attend the international conference
the Soviet side was that Marshal G. K. Z h u k o v received a high-ranking Yugoslav military delegation
for a lengthy visit in early June. It was also agreed that A. Rankovic and E. Kardelj would spend
summer vacations in the Soviet U n i o n .
44
M i c u n o v i c (1990), Tito követe voltam, 232—3.
45
Minutes of the June 1957 plenary meeting of the C P S U central committee, Istorichesky Arkhiv,
N o . 4-6, 1993.
46
M i c u n o v i c , Tito követe voltam, 267-74.
47
For detail of the joint communiqué, see Clissold (1975), p. 274. The unpublished memorandum
was sent to Budapest by the Yugoslavs on 17 Jun. 1958, for information purposes, Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, Documents II, item 128.
of c o m m u n i s t parties, a promise f r o m T i t o of diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n for the

G e r m a n D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c and assurances of support for the Kádár government.
H o w e v e r , this immediate c o m m u n i t y of interests disguised disparate aims. K h r u s h -
chev was still trying to edge Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet camp. T i t o , by g i v i n g
K h r u s h c h e v some foreign-policy success, was seeking to strengthen the K h r u s h c h e -
vite line, to ensure that the p o l i c y of de-Stalinization c o n t i n u e d and antagonism
towards Yugoslavia ceased. 48
T h e H u n g a r i a n leaders in the summer of 1957 certainly had no separate p o l i c y on

Yugoslavia, w h i c h the situation c o u l d not have allowed. T h e p r o b l e m was more
w i t h adjustment. T h e criminal investigation o f the N a g y group was completed i n
A u g u s t 1957, w h i c h raised the question of arranging the trial. T h e decisive factor
b e h i n d the postponement of the trial was that the K r e m l i n ' s relations w i t h
Yugoslavia were i m p r o v i n g . Hungary's Interior M i n i s t e r , briefing C P S U delegates
on the results of the investigation and the grave sentences decided in advance, said
the prosecution had no desire to make use of facts that w o u l d compromise the
Y u g o s l a v government. He also described plans for w a r d i n g off or b l u n t i n g the sharp
attacks to be expected, but on the w h o l e it seemed better to postpone the t r i a l . 49
D u r i n g the talks in R o m a n i a , the Yugoslavs made it plain that they were against
b r i n g i n g Imre N a g y and his associates to trial, and if this happened nonetheless, it
was b o u n d to strain Yugoslav—Hungarian relations. T h e b i g conference of c o m m u -
nist parties planned for N o v e m b e r c o u l d not be encumbered w i t h a conflict like the
one the N a g y trial w o u l d engender. T h e r e were also fears that a gross m o v e of this
k i n d w o u l d have adverse effects on the course of the Yugoslav party congress,
w h i c h was originally planned for the a u t u m n of 1957. Furthermore, the U n i t e d
N a t i o n s was preparing to debate the H u n g a r i a n question at its General Assembly in
September.
Irrespective of the postponement of the N a g y trial, the i m p r o v e m e n t in
Yugoslav—Soviet relations soon ceased. W h e n the preparations for the conference of
international communist parties revealed what documents the conference was
supposed to adopt, there was clearly no trace of the desired international shift
towards de-Stalinization. On the contrary, the draft d o c u m e n t s h o w e d marked
Chinese influence, and foreshadowed a renewal of the campaign against revisionism
and a revival of the ill-framed C o m i n f o r m in some f o r m . T h e r e was n o t h i n g the
leaders of the League of Yugoslav C o m m u n i s t s ( L Y C ) wanted less than to admit
anyone's right to lay d o w n for t h e m a c o m m o n ideology or political Une.
Yugoslavia's w h o l e foreign-policy doctrine w o u l d be questioned by such an
admission, w h i c h w o u l d amount to 'applying' t o j ó i n the Soviet camp.
As the strains built up again, the curious feature of the Hungarian—Yugoslav

relationship was the effort b o t h sides put into lessening the tension and preventing
its spreading. A l t h o u g h Kádár c o n t i n u e d to c o m p l y strictly w i t h the Soviet position,
48
M i c u n o v i c , Tito követe voltam, 285-8.
49
Notes by Y. V. Andropov, R. A. Rudenko and P. I. Ivashutin on their meeting with Interior
Minister Béla Biszku, 26 A u g . 1957, in Gál et al., Jelcin dosszié, 199—203.
he set about seeking a compromise solution on the conference d o c u m e n t . 50
Yugoslavia's behaviour was exemplified by its stance in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s on the

H u n g a r i a n question where it tried to i m p r o v e Budapest's p o s i t i o n . 51
Although
relations between Belgrade and M o s c o w became decidedly frosty just before the
M o s c o w conference, the H u n g a r i a n delegation led by Kádár had a successful
meeting w i t h Kardelj and R a n k o v i c in the Soviet capital. T h e r e still seemed to be
prospects after the talks of i m p r o v i n g relations. It was agreed in principle to h o l d a
confidential inter-party m e e t i n g to clear up outstanding differences. 52
V I . Yugoslavia in the d o c k
T h e M o s c o w meeting of c o m m u n i s t parties in N o v e m b e r 1957 and the declaration

adopted by the twelve parties in p o w e r reflected o r t h o d o x Chinese adherence to
Stalinist dogma, w h i c h most signatories gladly accepted. T h e Y u g o s l a v delegation
refused to sign. That meant they d i d not take part in the twelve-party meeting
either, 53
w h i c h simply increased the ardour of the Eastern E u r o p e a n hardliners in
c o n d e m n i n g Titoist revisionism. O n l y Poland's G o m u l k a tried to resist the pressure,
but it was hopeless. He d i d not even gain the support of Kádár, w h o on the
H u n g a r i a n question foreshadowed the m a i n ideological message of the N a g y trial by
defending the condemnation of traitors w h o fraternize w i t h the imperialist c o n -
spiracy. To vigorous applause from the c o m m u n i s t leaders, Kádár left no doubt
about what sentence he w a n t e d . 5 4
T h e m a i n question is what factors i n d u c e d K h r u s h c h e v to accept the shift to the

harder line that the Chinese p r o m o t e d . F o r , contrary to the original i n t e n t i o n , this
revived the tensions w i t h Yugoslavia instead of b r i n g i n g it closer to the socialist
camp. K h r u s h c h e v had to choose between B e i j i n g and Belgrade. He decided to
y i e l d to the pressure to take a m o r e pugnacious position to satisfy C h i n a , w h i c h was
adopting an increasingly decisive stance and seeking an increasingly p r o m i n e n t role
for itself. T h e w i s d o m of this choice was not vindicated by subsequent history. O n l y
a few years later there came a complete break w i t h C h i n a , w h i l e the t o u g h attitude
towards Yugoslavia became a hindrance to détente w i t h the W e s t and the p o l i c y of
o p e n i n g up to the T h i r d W o r l d . In principle K h r u s h c h e v c o u l d have chosen the
other course. He c o u l d have tried to beat back the efforts at re-Stalinization by
f o l l o w i n g m o r e consistently the p o l i c y of the twentieth congress, especially after the
failed c o u p allowed h i m to rid the leadership of his most dangerous rivals. On the
other hand, it is w o r t h considering what K h r u s h c h e v was l i k e l y to do in such
30
Kádár's letter to Khrushchev, 29 O c t . 1957, Documents II, item 81.
31
The Yugoslav delegate did not vote for the critical report by the so-called Committee of Five.
He argued that it was not objective enough and did nothing to encourage an atmosphere in which
Hungary could resolve its problems. Statement by Delegate Joze Brilej, Borba, 4 Sep. 1957.
32
Hungarian memorandum on the talks, Documents II, item 84.
33
The Yugoslavs signed only the peace manifesto accepted by the delegates of all the 68 parties
present in Moscow.
Kádár's contributions at the two conferences, and his speech to the H S W P central committee,
4
29 N o v . 1957, Documents II, items 85, 87 and 88.

circumstances, and what c o u l d be expected of h i m , w i t h his l o n g Stalinist past and

consequent political approach and set of tactical weapons. Despite appearances, he
had not got over the aftermath of the H u n g a r i a n and P o l i s h events of 1956 and the
attempted coup of 1957. T h e r e had to be a p e r i o d of consolidation if he was to keep
his tight h o l d over events in the l o n g term. M o r e o v e r , this was the time of the
Z h u k o v affair — the defence minister's dismissal f r o m the leadership showed plainly
that the p o w e r struggles had not ended. K h r u s h c h e v w a n t e d to secure himself on all
sides. It may have seemed more hopeful under the circumstances to attain unity
through the Stalinist doctrines prevalent in the c o m m u n i s t parties than to take an
uncharted course. It w o u l d have been especially hard to undertake o p e n conflict
with the ever more influential Chinese. They used clever tactics to avoid
heightening differences w i t h M o s c o w , h i d i n g their true intentions and offering
voluntary subordination so l o n g as the requisite political line was proclaimed.
A decisive factor b e h i n d Khrushchev's choice was the priority given to
consolidating unity in the socialist camp. T h a t c o u l d be done w i t h a rigid
declaration reminiscent of the Stalin period, w h i c h the party leaders w o u l d gladly
support because it helped to keep them in p o w e r . M a o , in exchange for the
proclaimed hard-line policy, recognized the Soviet U n i o n ' s leading role and himself
pressed for it to be underlined. So K h r u s h c h e v c o u l d hardly have chosen a different
course, because otherwise he w o u l d have brought on h i m s e l f the o d i u m of
precipitating the conflicts. T h a t was too h i g h a price to pay for gestures to a 'suspect'
country that wished anyway to stay outside the fold. R e v e r s i n g the rapprochement
w i t h Yugoslavia was one, albeit major, element in a game that had just begun, for
the basic Sino-Soviet difference of foreign p o l i c y remained. M a o was taking
aggressive, confrontational steps designed to p r o v o k e utilization of the temporary
military superiority gained in the missile arms race. K h r u s h c h e v wanted to exploit
this superiority in a different way, but due to other p o w e r factors, he was w i l l i n g to
make ideological concessions — even to revive the revisionism debate. T h i s , under
Chinese pressure, soon took an exceptionally crude f o r m , w i t h the H u n g a r i a n
question playing a p r o m i n e n t part.
C o n s i d e r i n g the roles in w h i c h the various players were cast, there is a greater
need to explain w h y the M o s c o w conference was f o l l o w e d by a short p e r i o d of
relative calm. T h e conference had not managed to fulfil its intended function of
b r i n g i n g Belgrade closer to the Soviet b l o c , because the return to o r t h o d o x Stalinist
ideology and the foreign-policy doctrine of strengthening the bloc were the
opposite of what Yugoslavia wanted. T h e circumstances that developed in the
autumn of 1957 raised the chances of another solution. T h e basis of principle
contained in the d o c u m e n t unacceptable to the Yugoslavs might complete the
isolation o f Yugoslavia, w i t h its distinct concept o f socialism and insistence o n n o n -
aligned status. T h a t w o u l d conclusively resolve the problems arising if anyone
should ever feel i n c l i n e d to f o l l o w the example of H u n g a r y , or even P o l a n d in 1956.
So the measures of N o v e m b e r 1957 set relations w i t h Yugoslavia on an
irreversible course. A l l that was l a c k i n g was an occasion for t u r n i n g the tension i n t o
o p e n political battle. M e a n w h i l e important events occurred in Hungarian—Yugoslav
2l6 Contemporary European History
relations, d u r i n g the calm before the storm. Since after the M o s c o w conference
there seemed to be no barrier to h o l d i n g the N a g y trial, Kádár put the final decision
before the central committee. In line w i t h his proposal, the central committee
adopted a m o t i o n in closed session on 21 D e c e m b e r o p e n i n g the way for the N a g y
trial to begin. No doubt was even left about what the sentence w o u l d b e . 5 5
The
decision naturally reactivated the sensitive Yugoslav aspect of the N a g y affair. Kádár,
in a situation that was far f r o m clear, tried to leave the options o p e n on b o t h sides,
in international relations and in links w i t h the Yugoslavs. So at the decisive
m o m e n t , it was still unclear whether Yugoslavia was acquitted of taking part in the
imperialist conspiracy and intervening directly in the H u n g a r i a n events, or whether
the Yugoslav leaders w o u l d be symbolically in the d o c k , alongside Imre N a g y .
Kádár w o u l d certainly have preferred the former version, but he c o u l d not be sure
of its chances. So in the ambivalent situation, neither a declaration of inherent ' g o o d
intentions' n o r any indication of a threat was i n c l u d e d .
A t t e n t i o n had to be paid, d u r i n g the political preparations for the N a g y trial, to
the w r i t t e n guarantee of i m p u n i t y that Kádár had given the Yugoslavs in N o v e m b e r
1956. T h e time had come to find a way to make it ineffective. T h e attempt to do so
and the failure of that attempt tie in closely w i t h the protraction of the N a g y trial, or
rather w i t h the Soviet—Yugoslav dispute that broke out and deepened in the
meantime.
It still seemed at the end of D e c e m b e r as if n o t h i n g w o u l d prevent the trial f r o m
g o i n g ahead, as the Soviet leadership had also agreed to i t . 5 6
In the event it had to be
interrupted early in 1958, at the Soviet U n i o n ' s request, for reasons of Soviet foreign
p o l i c y . M o s c o w , in late 1957 and early 1958, launched a large-scale peace offensive,
i n c l u d i n g strong elements of propaganda. W i t h initiatives to halt the arms race and
h o l d Soviet—US summit meetings in the air, it seemed anything but opportune for
H u n g a r y to conduct a trial that was sure to poison the international political
atmosphere. T h e idea of b l u n t i n g the negative reactions w i t h a light sentence had
never been seriously entertained, so that the o n l y o p t i o n was to suspend the trial just
after it had begun in secret. 57
T h e decision to suspend the trial later had serious consequences for relations w i t h
Yugoslavia. A l t h o u g h it aroused ideas about h o w to avert, or at least ease, the
conflict that the trial was expected to p r o v o k e , developments in the spring of 1958
l e d to a reversal of this favourable shift in events.
Essentially, the H u n g a r i a n tactic was to tie the annulment of the letter
guaranteeing i m p u n i t y to the N a g y group to an i m p r o v e m e n t in H u n g a r i a n -
Y u g o s l a v relations. T h i s w o u l d underline the seriousness of the offer to avoid raising
d u r i n g the trial the question of Yugoslavia's role and responsibility. As a first step,
3
~
János Kádár's report on talks with Y. I. Gromov, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, to the
36
meeting of the H S W P political committee, 28 Dec. 1957, MOL 288. f. 5/59.

The trial began on 5 Feb. 1958. The suspension features in the minutes of the political
57
committee meeting on 5 Feb. and the central committee meeting of 14 Feb., Documents II, items 95
and 97.
the H u n g a r i a n leaders sent T i t o a letter whose m a i n message was to affirm their

i n t e n t i o n of establishing g o o d relations between the t w o parties. T h e y called for
top-level inter-party talks, as had been agreed in principle at the M o s c o w meeting
in N o v e m b e r . U n i l a t e r a l annulment of the i m p u n i t y guarantee was to be a c c o m -
panied by a declaration that H u n g a r y w o u l d not use the N a g y trial to compromise
Yugoslavia. 58
T h e Yugoslav response was characteristic. T h e y reacted favourably to the

proposal for talks, but left o p e n their position on the trial, deferring an exchange of
opinions on it to the talks themselves, to be held in a friendly atmosphere. Belgrade
was hard at w o r k preparing for the congress of the L Y C , w h i c h was to adopt a n e w
programme. It seemed initially as if a C P S U delegation w o u l d attend the congress,
to be h e l d in Ljubljana in A p r i l , despite the tension after the Y u g o s l a v refusal to sign
the M o s c o w declaration. T h e H u n g a r i a n party leaders accordingly decided to attend
as w e l l .
T h e confidential party talks took place in Karadjordjevo at the end of M a r c h
between delegations headed by Kádár and T i t o . At this point there was still hope
that inter-party relations at the highest political level c o u l d be brought to match the
g o o d inter-state relations. No agreement c o u l d be reached on the issues that
w e i g h e d heaviest on the relationship — the causes of the 1956 uprising and the
question of Imre N a g y — but the H u n g a r i a n tactic still succeeded. Kádár d i d not
mislead T i t o about the i m m i n e n c e of the trial. A l t h o u g h the Yugoslavs, to retain
tactical freedom, preferred not to hear m u c h specific detail about the trial, especially
its likely o u t c o m e , they learned even from the few documents s h o w n to t h e m that it
was b e i n g held. T h i s announcement, as Kádár had expected, d i d n o t upset relations,
w h i c h seemed to be m e n d i n g , because the prime consideration for T i t o and his
colleagues was Hungary's promise not to turn the trial against Y u g o s l a v i a . 59
The
atmosphere at the talks gave grounds for confidence, and the H u n g a r i a n leaders
made rapid attempts to deepen trust. H o w e v e r , for reasons b e y o n d their c o n t r o l ,
events t o o k another t u r n that dealt Kádár's credibility a further serious b l o w .
T h e Soviet U n i o n had meanwhile decided to launch another political and
ideological offensive against the Y u g o s l a v s . 60
It was already a bad sign w h e n
K h r u s h c h e v resumed criticism of T i t o ' s P u l a speech, r e v i v i n g the charge that it was
simply an attempt to divert some of the socialist countries ' o n to the w e l l - k n o w n
Yugoslav road'. T h e Soviet leaders saw the Yugoslav conduct at the M o s c o w
meeting, and still more the draft programme due to be put to the seventh congress
of the L Y C , as a p r o v o c a t i o n to w h i c h the socialist camp had to make a decisive
response. T h e draft d i d not contain really n e w policies, but to incorporate the
'Yugoslav road' into a system and present it as a programme was a challenge to f i r m
38
39
This appears, for instance, from the Yugoslav note of 8 O c t . 1958, one of the important
documents in the Yugoslav—Hungarian exchange of notes after the Nagy trial. Documents II, item 150.
60
Hungarian politicians were able to gain information about the direct consequences from the
most authentic source when Khrushchev visited Hungary at the beginning of A p r i l . Documents II, item
108.
2l8 Contemporary European History
believers in the Soviet m o d e l . So the C P S U cancelled its plans to send a delegation

to the conference. T h e H u n g a r i a n party and the other parties under M o s c o w ' s
influence were obliged to do likewise.
T h e m a i n force b e h i n d the renewed campaign came f r o m B e i j i n g again. T h e
Chinese showed conspicuous activity and initiative in the struggle against T i t o i s m .
A g a i n , M o s c o w yielded to the pressure, and especially after its foreign-policy
successes had failed to m a t e r i a l i z e , 61
the Chinese a i m of irrevocably destroying
S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v relations seemed to have been attained. T h e r e began a series of
attacks on the Yugoslav communists that went b e y o n d the ideological campaign of a
year earlier. T h e most sensitive point for the Soviet leaders was Belgrade's rejection
of its b l o c p o l i c y and strong related objections to Soviet efforts to gain h e g e m o n y . 62
These differed in no way f r o m the principles expressed a year before. H o w e v e r ,

c o n f i r m i n g t h e m in a l o n g - t e r m party programme showed that Yugoslavia w o u l d
not abandon its independent position, adapt to the bipolar w o r l d system, or cease by
its existence and example to obstruct expansion of the Soviet camp and ideological
support for its unity. C r e d i t and aid were vital to the Yugoslav e c o n o m y , so that
b o t h the W e s t and the Soviet U n i o n c o u l d pressurize Belgrade to repay their
e c o n o m i c support w i t h political rapprochement. Of course the great powers realized
that vacillation between the t w o sides was part of T i t o ' s foreign p o l i c y . 6 3
T h e renewed international campaign against Yugoslavia and the obligation to

j o i n in were especially a w k w a r d for the H u n g a r i a n leaders. T h i s was not just
because they had to cancel their attendance at the L Y C Congress, o n l y days after
the Karadjordjevo meeting, where they had clearly c o n f i r m e d their i n t e n t i o n of
participating. It also became apparent that the N a g y trial w o u l d have a decisively
anti-Yugoslav message after all, despite the earlier promise. H u n g a r y was b e i n g
forced by the conflict into the position of a front-line country again.
After the L Y C Congress, the international campaign became stronger than ever,
w i t h the H u n g a r i a n question once more playing an important role. T h e first direct
linkage of Yugoslav revisionism w i t h the 'treacherous Imre N a g y clique' came in a
leading article in the Chinese party daily, w h i c h launched the sharp a t t a c k . 64
The
S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v relationship also worsened rapidly, and M o s c o w too r e n e w e d the
charges relating to the H u n g a r i a n question. T h e Yugoslavs were again rebuked
because they had greeted the H u n g a r i a n uprising as a national r e v o l u t i o n , called the
'unselfish Soviet assistance' an intervention, and openly supported the treacherous
N a g y group in the press. It seemed as t h o u g h the Soviets w o u l d take the extreme
Chinese position in every respect, even presenting Yugoslav revisionism as a direct
ally of ' A m e r i c a n imperialism'. T h i s all p r o v i d e d the required ideological back-
Western rejection of the Rapacki Plan, named after the Polish foreign minister, left diminishing
61
hope that the proffered summit meeting would be held.

Information from the Soviet leadership to János Kádár, Documents II, item 111.
63
W i l s o n , Tito's Yugoslavia, 122. The British Embassy's report of 10 M a y 1958 also concluded that
the Soviet charge was essentially one of Yugoslav duplicity, FO 371/596/N1011/27. A. Rankovic
refuted this in a strongly worded speech at the Yugoslav party congress.
64
Renmin Ribao, 5 M a y 1958.
g r o u n d for the N a g y trial, w i t h i n a conspiracy theory. Conversely, the concept

b e h i n d the trial p r o v i d e d vantage-points f r o m w h i c h to launch attacks on
Yugoslavia.
T h e r e seemed to be no w a y to stop the escalating deterioration of relations,
w h i c h spread to e c o n o m i c affairs, causing Yugoslavia some serious p r o b l e m s . 65
Belgrade soon concluded that there was a revival of the earlier policies and methods
of C o m i n f o r m . T h e Yugoslavs' most effective rejoinder was to confront the C P S U
leaders in the press w i t h their earlier statements on the de-Stalinization process. T h e
aim was to return the debate to the original p r o b l e m posed at the end of 1956, by
the differences in assessing the H u n g a r i a n uprising. W h a t m o d e l of socialism was to
be f o l l o w e d after the twentieth congress? T h e Soviet leaders solved the matter in the
short term by p r o n o u n c i n g the Y u g o s l a v views anti-Marxist and analysing the
conflict through the logic of the bipolar w o r l d s y s t e m . 66
H o w e v e r , this threatened
to lead q u i c k l y to the extreme situation of 1949 and a total break ( w h i c h was what
C h i n a wanted).
It was an especially sensitive p r o b l e m for H u n g a r y , on the eve of the N a g y trial,
to decide h o w to behave towards Yugoslavia. A l t h o u g h the ideological basis for the
trial suggested a clear political and ideological l i n k between Yugoslav revisionism
and the 'traitors', the Hungarians strove to prevent the n e w international campaign
f r o m appearing to be a repetition of the anti-Yugoslav crusade of 1949. If for no
other reason, it was important to a v o i d such charges for fear of parallels b e i n g d r a w n
w i t h the R a j k trial. So they tried to blame the conflict w i t h Yugoslavia on the L Y C ,
for having launched an ' o p e n attack of political principle' on the socialist camp.
Apart f r o m references to the similarity between Yugoslav revisionism and Nagy's
views, there were accusations that Y u g o s l a v pride at b e i n g outside b o t h camps was
furthering a break w i t h the socialist camp and preparing for a bourgeois restora-
tion. 6 7
Up to the last minute, T i t o tried to stop Yugoslavia b e i n g blamed for the events
in H u n g a r y of 1956. O n e day before the trial ended, he sent a l o n g letter to the
C P S U leaders. In it he appended to his arguments the hope that the promises about
the N a g y trial made by the Soviet U n i o n at the August 1957 talks in R o m a n i a and
by the Hungarians at Karadjordjevo w o u l d be kept. He added that if the campaign
On 27 M a y 1958, the Soviet Foreign Ministry presented a note to the Yugoslav embassy in
Moscow announcing a five-year suspension of the credit facilities under the Soviet-Yugoslav economic
agreement of 12 Jan. 1956 and the Soviet—GDR—Yugoslav agreement of 1 Aug. 1956. See Clissold,
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 278—80. It emerged from an article in Izvestiya on 5 Jul. 1958 that the
occasion or excuse for suspending the credit was a passage in Tito's congress address, where he stressed
the 'mutually advantageous' nature of these economic ties, as opposed to the 'unselfishness' of Western
assistance. It was important at the time for the Yugoslav leadership to settle the country's impaired
economic relations with the West. See Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, 118—23.
Khrushchev referred to the 'Trojan horse' of imperialism, in his speech to the seventh congress
of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Pravda, 4 Jun. 1958 (Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,
280-81).
67
The H S W P daily Népszabadság, 21 M a y 1958. On the 13 M a y debate on the draft in the H S W P
political committee, see Documents II, item 122.
reminiscent of 1948 continued, the Yugoslavs w o u l d have no choice but to take up

the struggle b e i n g forced u p o n t h e m . 6 8
In the event, the promises T i t o referred to were dispelled by the acrimonious

international conflict. T h e Kádár regime had to choose the worse o p t i o n from their
o w n p o i n t of v i e w as w e l l , so that the Yugoslav aspect received strong emphasis in
the N a g y trial. T h e materials prepared d u r i n g the investigation to compromise
Yugoslavia were brought forward for propaganda purposes d u r i n g and after the
N a g y trial, w h i c h aroused enormous international dissension. Symbolically there-
fore, the trial also placed the Yugoslav leaders in the dock.
VII. T h e N a g y trial and the war of the protest notes
T h e H u n g a r i a n government issued an official statement on 17 June 1958 about the

Imre N a g y trial, a n n o u n c i n g the execution or i m p r i s o n m e n t of the former prime
minister and his associates. T h e c o m m u n i q u e castigated the Y u g o s l a v leaders. T h e y
were charged w i t h active support, d u r i n g 'the counter-revolutionary uprising' and
subsequent 'organization of resistance', for the N a g y g r o u p , w h i c h had 'followed
the pirate flag of national c o m m u n i s m ' , as accomplices in the conspiracy by
international imperialism and domestic r e a c t i o n . 69
Naturally, the charges against Yugoslavia aroused immediate strong protests from
Belgrade. T h e l o n g diplomatic skirmishing that ensued was accompanied by initially
sharp polemics in the press. 70
T h e Yugoslavs totally denied the charges and drew
comparisons w i t h the notorious R a j k trial. T h e strongest diplomatic card, of course,
was to cite the fact that the guarantee of i m p u n i t y contained in the agreement of
N o v e m b e r 1956 had been openly breached. Belgrade considered it self-evident that
the smears served the purposes of the international campaign against Yugoslavia that
was taking place. T h e sharp tone of the statement indicated that the conflict had
reached a climax.
T h e task of formulating a reply to the Y u g o s l a v protest note caused m u c h
racking of brains in Budapest. It was a great benefit to Kádár that all the communist
parties in the bloc aligned themselves clearly b e h i n d the H u n g a r i a n m o v e , i n c l u d i n g
G o m u l k a , w h o had earlier had strong misgivings about the planned prosecution of
Imre N a g y . 7 1
H o w e v e r , although the c o m m u n i s t parties sought to identify in the
Yugoslav protests signs of collaboration w i t h the W e s t e r n powers' 'international
reaction', there also appeared a desire w i t h i n the Soviet leadership to contain the
confrontation. T h e Soviet U n i o n certainly w a n t e d Hungary's note of reply to allude
to the conformity between the reactions of the Yugoslavs and the W e s t e r n powers
68
Tito's letter of 14 Jun. 1958 to Khrushchev, Documents II, item 127.
Népszabadság, 17 Jun. 1958. The government devoted a whole chapter to the Yugoslav
dimension, in the fifth volume of the Fehér Könyv (White Book) published by the Information Office.
70
The exchange of notes between Yugoslavia and Hungary: Documents II, items 134, 140, 150,
153, 155 and 158.
71
Gomulka's speech in Gdansk on 28 Jun. 1958. During a visit to Hungary early in M a y 1958,
Gomulka had expressed deep anxiety about the campaign against Yugoslavia. Documents II, item 122.
and to include a threat of further i n c r i m i n a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . 72

On the other hand,
K h r u s h c h e v resisted the temptation to f o l l o w the p o l i c y urged by the Chinese,
w h i c h cast doubt on Yugoslavia's socialist nature and aimed at breaking off
relations. 73
He was content to show his ability to take f i r m measures, i n c l u d i n g the
application of e c o n o m i c pressure, and to demonstrate to countries in the socialist
camp what narrow constraints he placed on their independent political and
ideological endeavours. He d i d not want to b e c o m e a prisoner of the hardline
policy promoted by M a o . 7 4
O r d e r had been restored i n the region. After the N a g y
trial, not only Kádár, but G o m u l k a o f P o l a n d , w h o had s h o w n solidarity w i t h
Kádár, became a f i r m Soviet ally as w e l l .
H o w e v e r , this was unclear directly after the N a g y trial, at the symbolic climax of
the hostility, least of all to the H u n g a r i a n leaders. T h e problems w i t h formulating
the H u n g a r i a n stance in the diplomatic conflict that f o l l o w e d the trial were not
confined to gauging the right degree of action against Yugoslavia. T h e Hungarians
had to satisfy t w o conflicting demands at once. On the one hand they had to
contribute to the campaign against Belgrade, integral to w h i c h was the question of
Yugoslav responsibility in the N a g y affair. On the other hand they had to deny that
placing Yugoslavia in the dock was among the aims of this campaign, because that
w o u l d have justified the parallel the Yugoslavs were d r a w i n g w i t h the R a j k trial.
Eventually the protracted process of drafting the note led to more sober, moderate
policies prevailing over solutions that ran the risk of exacerbating the confrontation.
T h a t d i d not immediately end the differences, of course, but at least it d i d leave
o p e n the prospect of preventing a further deterioration in relations, w h i c h was not
in the interest of the Yugoslavs e i t h e r . 75
After the sharp exchanges of the summer, the Hungarian—Yugoslav war of the
protest notes c o n t i n u e d b e h i n d the scenes. D u r i n g the autumn of 1958, each side
tried to extricate itself from the conflict w i t h o u t losing face, w h i l e h i n d e r i n g the
process w i t h statements dictated by factors of prestige. B o t h the Yugoslavs and the
Hungarians insisted on their positions, although they made any further steps
contingent on each other's behaviour. E a c h tried to curb the other — by threatening
to publish d o c u m e n t e d facts — but the signals each sent to the other revealed a
c o m m o n interest in e n d i n g a sterile debate.
T h e conflict came to a relatively rapid end largely because the Soviet and the
Y u g o s l a v leadership saw that there was n o t h i n g m o r e to gain from deepening the
dispute. T h e Soviet leaders had still contributed directly to d e c i d i n g the measures
the Hungarians took d u r i n g the summer of 1958, but after that they w i t h d r e w from
72
Gál et al., Jelcin dosszié, 208-18.
73
János Kádár's report to the H S W P political committee, 1 Jul. 1958, Documents II, item 136.
74
The policy of the 'great leap forward' was announced at the second session of the eighth
congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in M a y 1958. Its consequences became increasingly
apparent.
75
The Yugoslavs conveyed this informally to Lajos Cséby, the Hungarian ambassador in Budapest,
and through their Budapest charge d'affaires ad interim, Bozidar Dimitrijevic. Documents II, items 144
and 145.
the business. A n y further w o r s e n i n g of relations w i t h Yugoslavia was at odds w i t h

their foreign-policy doctrines towards the W e s t and towards the T h i r d W o r l d .
Furthermore, K h r u s h c h e v had a prime interest in ensuring that his o w n ideas, not
the policy of re-Stalinization urged by the Chinese, should be the basis for restoring
order in the camp. T h e Soviet U n i o n was obliged to recognize Yugoslavia's separate
road and its withdrawal f r o m the influence of bloc p o l i c y . M o s c o w , amidst a
progressive foreign-policy shift towards the T h i r d W o r l d , c o u l d n o t afford to
continue its extreme confrontation w i t h Yugoslavia, w h i c h aspired, as a c o m m u n i s t
country outside the bloc, to a leading position in the m o v e m e n t of n o n - a l i g n e d
countries. N o r d i d it suit T i t o to take the conflict any further. On 22 D e c e m b e r
1958, the U n i t e d States and Yugoslavia concluded an e c o n o m i c agreement that
included loans and aid, so that there was n o t h i n g more to be gained f r o m c o n t i n u e d
strife w i t h the Soviet U n i o n . So T i t o strove to contain and conclude the debate that
had arisen over the H u n g a r i a n uprising of 1956, or w i t h that as its pretext. F r o m his
point of v i e w , the K h r u s h c h e v - K á d á r line of p o l i c y remained relatively the best
solution. Aggravating the relationship w o u l d only have c o m p o u n d e d his existing
problems w i t h neighbouring countries in the Balkans.
T h e Yugoslav, Soviet and H u n g a r i a n leaders all had to recognize that it was
senseless and counterproductive to p r o l o n g the battle. Several years had to pass
before a n e w S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v rapprochement, but K h r u s h c h e v returned to the
principle of w o r k i n g for n o r m a l e c o n o m i c and trade relations w i t h states, irrespec-
tive of other disputes. 76
M o s c o w retained on its agenda the ideological struggle
against revisionism, the ' m a i n threat', but the H u n g a r i a n question had become an
embarrassment to b o t h sides. It was finally pushed into the b a c k g r o u n d , after the
superficial exchange of protest notes over the N a g y affair came to an end in early
1959-
List of persons involved in events
A n d r o p o v , Y u r i V. (1914—84), Soviet politician. Soviet ambassador in Budapest

from July 1954 to M a r c h 1957.
Aristov, A v e r k i B . (1903-73), Soviet politician. Secretary o f the C P S U C e n t r a l
C o m m i t t e e ( C C ) from 1955 to i 9 6 0 ; m e m b e r of the P r e s i d i u m (Politburo) of
the CC from 1957 to 1961.
Begovic, Vlajko (1905-?), Yugoslav politician. D i r e c t o r of Borba, the central Party
daily, from 1955; in 1957, head of the Social Sciences Institute in Belgrade and
m e m b e r o f the C C o f the L Y C .
B i s z k u , B é l a (b. 1921), H u n g a r i a n politician. M e m b e r o f the H S W P C e n t r a l
C o m m i t t e e from 4 N o v e m b e r 1956; minister of the interior f r o m February 1957
to 1961.
Brilej, Joze (1910-81), Y u g o s l a v diplomat and permanent representative at the
U n i t e d Nations from 1954 to 1958.
Khrushchev's speech at his meeting with the Polish leaders, Pravda, 11 N o v . 1958.
C h o u E n - l a i ( Z h o u Enlai), (1898-1976), Chinese p o l i t i c i a n . Secretary of the central

committee from 1928, vice-president of the C C P f r o m 1954 to 1956, p r i m e
minister f r o m 1949 to 1976, serving also as foreign minister from 1949 to 1958.
C s é b y , Lajos (1899-1976), H u n g a r i a n diplomat. Ambassador in Belgrade f r o m
January 1957 to O c t o b e r 1961.
Dmitrijevic, Dozidar, Yugoslav diplomat. Embassy counsellor, then charge
d'affaires ad interim in Budapest in 1958.
Djilas, M i l o v a n (1911-95), Yugoslav politician and political writer. Dismissed
f r o m the L Y C leadership for his opposition writings in January 1954, and then
from the party and from official positions; arrested on 19 N o v e m b e r 1956 and
sentenced to imprisonment; freed early in 1961, but later imprisoned again.
G e r ő , E r n ő (1898—1980), H u n g a r i a n politician. D e p u t y general secretary of the
H u n g a r i a n W o r k e r s ' Party ( H W P ) from 1948, later secretary of the central
committee; deputy prime minister from 1952 to J u l y 1956, then H W P first
secretary u n t i l 25 O c t o b e r 1956; left for exile in the Soviet U n i o n on 28 O c t o b e r
1956, but allowed to return in i 9 6 0 .
Gomulka, Wladislaw (1905-1985), P o l i s h politician. General secretary of the
P o l i s h W o r k e r s ' Party u n t i l 1948; imprisoned on fabricated charges f r o m 1951 to
1954; elected first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party central
committee in O c t o b e r 1956 despite Soviet threats, serving u n t i l 1970.
Gosnjak, Ivan (1909—80), Yugoslav general. Defence minister from 1953 to 1967,
m e m b e r o f the L Y C political committee ( P C ) and presidium.
G r o m o v , Y e v g e n i I. (1909-?), Soviet politician and diplomat. H e a d of department
a t the C P S U C C f r o m 1954 t o 1957; Soviet ambassador i n Budapest from M a r c h
1957 to 1959.
H e b r a n g , A n d r i j a (1899-1951), Yugoslav politician. Industry minister u n t i l his
arrest in 1948 for his stance in the Soviet—Yugoslav dispute; died in prison.
H o r v á t h , Imre (1900—58), H u n g a r i a n politician and diplomat. Ambassador in
Berlin, Washington, L o n d o n and Prague between 1948 and 1956; foreign
minister f r o m July 1956 to the end of O c t o b e r and from 7 N o v e m b e r 1956 u n t i l
his death.
H o x h a , E n v e r (1908—85), A l b a n i a n politician. General secretary of the c o m m u n i s t
party f r o m 1943 u n t i l his death.
Ivashutin, Petr I. (1909-?), Soviet general. Senior official at the Defence M i n i s t r y
f r o m 1954 onwards.
K á d á r , J á n o s (1912-89), H u n g a r i a n politician. A c o m m u n i s t leader, he was in
prison on fabricated charges from 1951 to 1954; elected a PC m e m b e r in J u l y
1956, party first secretary on 25 O c t o b e r 1956, and then party chairman; taken to
M o s c o w on 2 N o v e m b e r and entrusted w i t h the transfer of power; appointed
p r i m e minister and f i r s t secretary o f the H S W P C C i n N o b e m b e r 1956.
Kaganovich, Lazar M . (1893-1991), Soviet politician. M e m b e r o f the CPSU
p o l i t b u r o f r o m 1930; deputy p r i m e minister from 1944 to 1957; dismissed and
expelled f r o m the CC in June 1957 for his part in the attempted coup against
Khrushchev.
K a p i c i c , Jovo (1919-?), Yugoslav diplomat. Ambassador i n Budapest f r o m D e -

cember 1956.
Kardelj, E d v a r d (1910—1979), Yugoslav politician. D e p u t y head of government
f r o m 1953 to 1963; m e m b e r of the executive committee of the L Y C f r o m 1952,
and the party's leading ideologist.
Khrushchev, N i k i t a S. (1894-1971).
K o m a r o v , V l a d i m i r N . (1904—76), Soviet general. C o m m a n d e r o f the V o l g a - U r a l
military zone in 1957—60.
L o s o n c z y , G é z a (1917—57), H u n g a r i a n journalist and politician. Imprisoned o n
fabricated charges i n 1951—4; from 1954 a leading figure i n the H W P opposition
around Imre N a g y ; appointed minister of state in the N a g y government on 31
O c t o b e r 1956; m e m b e r of the group receiving asylum in the Yugoslav embassy
before b e i n g deported to R o m a n i a ; arrested in A p r i l 1957; died in prison in
December.
M a o T s e - t u n g ( M a o Z e d o n g ) , (1893-1976).
M i c u n o v i c , Veljko (1916-83), Yugoslav politician and diplomat. Ambassador in
M o s c o w f r o m M a r c h 1956 to O c t o b e r 1958.
M i k o y a n , Anastas I. (1895—1978), Soviet p o l i t i c i a n . D e p u t y p r i m e minister f r o m
1937 to 1964; m e m b e r of the C P S U P o l i t b u r o f r o m 1935 to 1966.
M o l o t o v , Vyacheslav M . (1890—1986), Soviet p o l i t i c i a n . M e m b e r o f the C P S U
p o l i t b u r o f r o m 1926 onwards; foreign minister f r o m 1953 to 1956; expelled f r o m
the CC and dismissed from state office in June 1957 for his part in the attempted
coup against K h r u s h c h e v .
M ü n n i c h , Ferenc (1886—1967), H u n g a r i a n politician. Ambassador in Belgrade in
1956 f r o m August to 25 O c t o b e r ; appointed minister of the interior in the N a g y
government on 27 O c t o b e r ; f r o m 4 N o v e m b e r , deputy prime minister in the
Kádár government, overseeing the armed forces; m e m b e r o f the H S W P P C f r o m
N o v e m b e r 1956; p r i m e minister f r o m 1958 to 1961.
Nagy, Imre (1896—1958), H u n g a r i a n p o l i t i c i a n . P r i m e minister from J u l y 1953 to
A p r i l 1955, an advocate of reform; expelled f r o m the party for opposition activity
in D e c e m b e r 1955, but readmitted in O c t o b e r 1956; prime minister f r o m 24
O c t o b e r to 4 N o v e m b e r 1956, d u r i n g the H u n g a r i a n uprising; received asylum
on 4 N o v e m b e r in the Yugoslav embassy, but deported w i t h his associates to
R o m a n i a on 23 N o v e m b e r , then arrested and returned to H u n g a r y in A p r i l
1957; c o n d e m n e d to death and executed on 16 June 1958.
P o p o v i c , K o c a (1908-92), Yugoslav p o l i t i c i a n . F o r e i g n minister f r o m 1953 to
1965; m e m b e r o f the C C o f the Y u g o s l a v C o m m u n i s t Party, later the L Y C , f r o m
1948.
Rajk, L á s z l ó (1909-49), H u n g a r i a n p o l i t i c i a n . A secretary of the H u n g a r i a n
W o r k e r s ' Party after 1945; minister of the interior, then foreign minister in
1946—8; arrested in 1949, and c o n d e m n e d to death and executed after a s h o w trial
designed also to compromise Yugoslavia.
R á k o s i , M á t y á s (1892-1971), H u n g a r i a n politician. General secretary o f the
communist party from 1945 to 18 J u l y 1956; also p r i m e minister in 1952-3; in

exile in the Soviet U n i o n from July 1956 u n t i l his death.
R a n k o v i c , Aleksandar (1909-83), Yugoslav politician. M e m b e r of the communist
party PC from 1940; minister of the interior and c h i e f of the secret service from
1948 to 1953; deputy prime minister from 1953 to 1963.
R a p a c k i , A d a m (1909—70), Polish politician. M e m b e r o f the c o m m u n i s t party P C
from 1948 to 1968; foreign minister from 1956 to 1968.
Roberts, Frank (b. 1907), British diplomat. Ambassador in Belgrade from 1954 to
1957-
R u d e n k o , R . A . (1907—80), Soviet lawyer. C h i e f prosecutor o f the Soviet U n i o n
from 1953.
Sík, E n d r e (1891—1978), H u n g a r i a n diplomat. D e p u t y foreign minister from A p r i l
1954; foreign minister from February 1958.
Soldatic, D a l i b o r (1909—?), Yugoslav diplomat. Ambassador in Budapest from
N o v e m b e r 1953 to D e c e m b e r 1956, then head of p r o t o c o l at the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs.
Stalin, Josef V. (1879—1953).
Suslov, M i k h a i l A . (1902-82), Soviet politician. Secretary o f the C P S U central
committee f r o m 1949; politburo member in 1952—53 and f r o m 1955.
S z á n t ó , Z o l t á n (1893—1977), H u n g a r i a n politician. Served as ambassador in several
countries i n 1947—56; m e m b e r o f the H W P political committee and presidium
d u r i n g the O c t o b e r 1956 uprising; granted asylum in the Yugoslav embassy on 4
N o v e m b e r ; deported w i t h the N a g y group to R o m a n i a , but not prosecuted;
testified for the prosecution in the N a g y trial; a l l o w e d h o m e permanently in
1958.
T i t o , Josip B r o d (1892—1980).
Z h u k o v , G e o r g i K. (1896-1974), Soviet marshal. Defence minister from February
1955 to O c t o b e r 1957, w h e n he was dismissed and pensioned off w h i l e on a visit
to Yugoslavia and A l b a n i a .
Z u j o v i c , Sreten (1899—1986), Yugoslav politician. Finance minister and Yugoslav
communist party central committee m e m b e r from 1945 to 1948; expelled from
the party and dismissed from office w h e n the Soviet—Yugoslav conflict flared up.

Ripp Yugoslav Conflict 1956 1958

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Hungary's Part in the

H u n g a r y , after the 1956 r e v o l u t i o n , played a special part in the dispute that b r o k e

I. Soviet—Yugoslav reconciliation and its effect on H u n g a r y

After Stalin's death, the n e w Soviet leadership under K h r u s h c h e v q u i c k l y set about

minister of H u n g a r y from June 1953 to the b e g i n n i n g of 1955 was Imre N a g y , w h o

reconciliation process reached the stage where h i g h - l e v e l relations c o u l d be restored,

R a p p r o c h e m e n t gained a further impetus w h e n the p o l i c y of de-Stalinization

U n i o n ( C P S U ) , in February 1956. A few months later, the j o i n t declaration agreed

T h e success also gave support to T i t o ' s exaggerated foreign-policy ambitions, for

T h e M o s c o w declaration d i d not end the tensions caused by the t w o sides'

put no trust either in R á k o s i ' s successor as first secretary, E r n ő G e r ő , as he was the

II. Yugoslavia and the H u n g a r i a n revolution

T h e outbreak of the armed uprising in Budapest on 23 O c t o b e r and the force

at P o z n a n in the summer was dismissed as 'counter-revolutionary'. T h e situation in

T h e N a g y government's attempt at consolidation increasingly bore the character

30 O c t o b e r government declaration was designed m a i n l y to w i n Yugoslav support,

III. A double trap

W h i l e K h r u s h c h e v and M a l e n k o v were negotiating i n Yugoslavia, János Kádár,

T i t o ' s biggest p r o b l e m was the rapid freeze in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, whose

T h e famous speech by T i t o in P u l a on 11 N o v e m b e r reflected the ambivalent

T h e Soviets were disgusted, because T i t o had chosen to defend his o w n

S o v i e t - Y u g o s l a v tensions were an embarrassment, especially w h i l e M o s c o w kept a

T h e P u l a speech gravely affected the N a g y group, trapped in the Yugoslav

I V . T h e ideological battle and the N a g y affair

T h e m a i n concern of the Yugoslav leaders, in their diplomatic actions and protest

T h e Yugoslav challenge was extremely unpleasant for the Kádár government. It

it added to the pressure on H u n g a r y to distance itself f r o m the m o r e popular

T h e great international campaign against revisionism and national c o m m u n i s m

the situation before 1953. T i t o himself w a r n e d K h r u s h c h e v in a letter early in

T h e r e was n o t h i n g Kádár wanted less than for H u n g a r y to become a front-line

T h i s aroused strong displeasure in Belgrade, especially w h e n the N a g y group

T h e parallel w i t h the R a j k trial was also a w a r n i n g by the Yugoslavs. T h e y had

Of course the m a i n source of conflict remained the difference between the

M o s c o w reacted sharply to the reiteration of the Titoist foreign-policy principles. It

i m p r o v e m e n t c o u l d be seen before the attempt to oust K h r u s h c h e v , although it was

of c o m m u n i s t parties, a promise f r o m T i t o of diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n for the

T h e H u n g a r i a n leaders in the summer of 1957 certainly had no separate p o l i c y on

As the strains built up again, the curious feature of the Hungarian—Yugoslav

he set about seeking a compromise solution on the conference d o c u m e n t . 50

Yugoslavia's behaviour was exemplified by its stance in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s on the

T h e M o s c o w meeting of c o m m u n i s t parties in N o v e m b e r 1957 and the declaration

T h e m a i n question is what factors i n d u c e d K h r u s h c h e v to accept the shift to the

29 N o v . 1957, Documents II, items 85, 87 and 88.

circumstances, and what c o u l d be expected of h i m , w i t h his l o n g Stalinist past and

meeting of the H S W P political committee, 28 Dec. 1957, MOL 288. f. 5/59.

the H u n g a r i a n leaders sent T i t o a letter whose m a i n message was to affirm their

T h e Yugoslav response was characteristic. T h e y reacted favourably to the

believers in the Soviet m o d e l . So the C P S U cancelled its plans to send a delegation

These differed in no way f r o m the principles expressed a year before. H o w e v e r ,

T h e renewed international campaign against Yugoslavia and the obligation to

hope that the proffered summit meeting would be held.

g r o u n d for the N a g y trial, w i t h i n a conspiracy theory. Conversely, the concept

reminiscent of 1948 continued, the Yugoslavs w o u l d have no choice but to take up

In the event, the promises T i t o referred to were dispelled by the acrimonious

VII. T h e N a g y trial and the war of the protest notes

T h e H u n g a r i a n government issued an official statement on 17 June 1958 about the

and to include a threat of further i n c r i m i n a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . 72

the business. A n y further w o r s e n i n g of relations w i t h Yugoslavia was at odds w i t h

List of persons involved in events

A n d r o p o v , Y u r i V. (1914—84), Soviet politician. Soviet ambassador in Budapest

C h o u E n - l a i ( Z h o u Enlai), (1898-1976), Chinese p o l i t i c i a n . Secretary of the central

K a p i c i c , Jovo (1919-?), Yugoslav diplomat. Ambassador i n Budapest f r o m D e -

communist party from 1945 to 18 J u l y 1956; also p r i m e minister in 1952-3; in

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